

# REVISIONISM OF VARGAS'S REVISIONISM: FREE WILL, DISAGREEMENTS, COMMON SENSE AND NEO-PYRRHONISM

REVISIONISMO DEL REVISIONISMO DE VARGAS: LIBRE ALBEDRÍO,  
DESACUERDOS, SENTIDO COMÚN Y NEOPIRRONISMO

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“A common opinion prevails that the juice has ages ago been pressed out of the free-will controversy, and that no new champion can do more than warm up stale arguments which everyone has heard. This is a radical mistake. I know of no subject less worn out, or in which inventive genius has a better chance of breaking open new ground,—not, perhaps, of forcing a conclusion or of coercing assent, but of deepening our sense of what the issue between the two parties really is, of what the ideas of fate and of free-will imply”.

(W. James, *The Dilemma of Determinism*)

“This dispute has been so much canvassed on all hands, and has led philosophers into such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry, that it is no wonder, if a sensible reader indulge his ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a question, from which he can expect neither instruction or entertainment. But the state of the argument here proposed may, perhaps, serve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promises at least some decision of the controversy, and will not much disturb his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning”.

(Hume, *Enquiries*)

## ABSTRACT

From an overview of philosophy, it can be said all issues are controversial. An example of this kind of never-ending controversy is the free will debate. The originality of Revisionism proposed by Vargas (2007, 2013) is to establish a position within the

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debate after having reviewed the terms in which it is discussed. His Revisionism focuses especially on reviewing how the different philosophical positions of the debate are linked to the intuitions or preconceptions of common sense. Vargas argues that common sense—as a preconception—has incompatibilistic elements that ought to be accepted when making a diagnosis. However, at a prescriptive level, the theory that ought to be adopted in philosophy is compatibilism. Thereby, Vargas proposes a *hybrid* Revisionism.

By reading Wittgenstein from a neo-Pyrrhonic orientation, I propose to reconsider the role of disagreement in the philosophical debate and the approach to common sense in order to argue that it is a plural set of practices rather than a preconception. These practices determine different contexts for the use of concepts, in which both deterministic and indeterministic positions can make sense. This pluralistic view of common sense also modifies the place of philosophy and the kind of disagreement faced in the debate.

**KEYWORDS:** Revisionism, Free Will, Disagreements, Common Sense, neo-Pyrrhonism

### RESUMEN

En una descripción general de la filosofía, se puede decir que todos los temas son controvertidos. Un ejemplo de este tipo de controversia interminable es el debate sobre el libre albedrío. La originalidad del Revisionismo propuesto por Vargas (2007, 2013) consiste en fijar una posición dentro del debate después de haber revisado los términos en los que se discute. Su revisionismo se centra especialmente en examinar cómo las diferentes posiciones filosóficas del debate están vinculadas a las intuiciones o preconcepciones del sentido común. Vargas argumenta que el sentido común—como preconcepción—posee elementos incompatibilistas que deben ser aceptados a la hora de hacer un diagnóstico. Sin embargo, en un nivel prescriptivo, la teoría que debe ser adoptada en filosofía es el compatibilismo. De este modo, Vargas ofrece un revisionismo *híbrido*.

A partir de una lectura neopyrrónica de Wittgenstein, propongo reconsiderar el papel del desacuerdo en el debate filosófico y revisar la aproximación al sentido común para argumentar que es un conjunto plural de prácticas. Estas prácticas determinan diferentes contextos para el uso de conceptos, en los que pueden tener sentido posiciones tanto deterministas como indeterministas. Esta visión plural del sentido común también modifica el lugar de la filosofía y el tipo de desacuerdo enfrentado en el debate.

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** revisionismo, libre albedrío, desacuerdos, sentido común, neopyrronismo

## 1. PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES:

A REVIEW OF THE FREE WILL CONTROVERSY<sup>1</sup>

Probably one of the most general descriptions of philosophy that can be made is that all topics within it are controversial. Following James's suggestion, free will is one of the "less worn out" controversies; by discussing this topic, "inventive genius has a better chance of breaking new ground". From my perspective, in order to establish the possibilities of "breaking new ground", it is necessary to make a diagnosis of the debate first. M. Vargas (2007, 2013) has this in mind when he proposes his revisionism.

Vargas's Revisionism is offered as "the most promising *solution* to that cluster of problems philosophers argue about under the heading of 'free will'" (my italic, Vargas 2007: 127). To achieve this purpose, he suggests making a distinction between two kinds of accounts. First, he proposes a *diagnostic* account "to describe how we do, in fact, think about free will" (*Ib.* 129. Cf. Vargas 2013: 27-29). In our ordinary lives, the tendency is to think of ourselves as having a powerful kind of agency associated with a deeply rooted notion of free will—we think about ourselves as agent—causes, having genuine alternative possibilities, etc. Second, and in contrast, he proposes a *prescriptive* account which tells us how we *ought* to think about it. To Vargas, "an ideal account might be able to offer a comprehensive *theory* of free will that is both diagnostic and prescriptive" (my italic; *Ibid.*; Cf. Vargas 2013: 196-214). In his perspective, not only does he distinguish between these two kinds of accounts but also between two different levels or views: our commonsense view and philosophy. The strategy he follows combines these *accounts* with these *levels*: in the diagnostic account, he argues "that our ordinary thinking about free will has elements that are incompatibilist" (Vargas 2007: 129). On the other hand, in the prescriptive account, he argues "that we should revise away from these commitments" and we should accept, in philosophical debates, a compatibilistic view.

In Vargas's Revisionism, philosophy should neither correct the point of view of common sense nor take the intuitions of common sense as permanent and uncontroversial notions. To illustrate this, Vargas proposes, at the level of revisionism of our common sense, three examples of concepts that have changed. The concept of "water" has changed because we have gained knowledge about its chemical composition; the concept of "marriage" depends on customs and

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and generous suggestions for improving my manuscript.

the concept has changed as customs have changed; the concept of “magician” is another example of dependence on cultural factors. When Copperfield holds his magic show, nobody believes that doing magic consists in the invocation of supernatural forces; however, in other cultural contexts there has been the expectation that a magician would have occult powers (Cf. Vargas 2007: 127). To Vargas, these cases show “we learned more about the world and about ourselves, it made sense to acknowledge that how we had previously thought about these things was *mistaken*” (my italic, *Ibid.*). They also apply to understanding how changes in common sense can occur. He interprets the use of these concepts in our common sense as depending on the knowledge we can establish about them and about nature and, therefore, he assumes that it is possible to determine both right and wrong uses of our concepts. Distinguishing mistakes in this scheme depends on the progress we make in our knowledge of ourselves and of the world. To Vargas, our commonsense view of the concept of free will could undergo changes like the three examples above. To him “revisionism is the view that what we ought to believe about free will and moral responsibility is different than what we tend to think about these things” (*Ibid.*). Consequently, philosophy should not take into account our commonsense conception of agency as a closed whole because it can be modified. His proposal is that revisionism considers “our intuitive, commonsense self-conception with a critical eye, giving up those parts that are least plausible or otherwise worth abandoning” (*Id.* 128). Hence, he establishes a difference between ordinary exchange and philosophical debate; the history of modification of some commonsense concepts shows that a continuum between common sense and philosophy cannot be established. On the other hand, in my interpretation and related with the notion of mistake, a third implicit assumption plays an important role in his Revisionism: the close relationship between philosophy and empirical science. This allows for understanding common sense as a view that “requires a metaphysics of agency that we have no independent reason to believe in and it mistakenly holds that we cannot attain a range of important human and moral aspects of our life in its absence”, (*Id.* 128). What is proposed by revisionism is that we critically consider our intuitive and commonsense self-conceptions, abandoning those parts that are less plausible in light of scientific evidence. This assumption plays a key role in the criticism that Vargas makes against Libertarian<sup>2</sup> positions

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<sup>2</sup> Briefly, Libertarianism, as Robert Kane argues, is the view that holds that we have free will and free will is incompatible with determinism., (Cf. Fischer 2007: 3).

and the difference that Vargas establishes between his Revisionism and Hard Incompatibilism<sup>3</sup>.

Positions, such as libertarianism, that base their defense of free will on commonsense intuitions misinterpret the stability these basic notions have. Through three examples of basic notions (water, marriage, and a magician), Vargas shows that the way of understanding them has changed over time. Assuming this historicism shows at least two things: there is no such thing as a permanent commonsense perspective; and the concepts used in the free will debate, based on commonsense intuitions, ought to be reviewed. Our “intuitions”, the natural inclination to believe in free will, are not established as the standard to determine the truth of a philosophical position, but they must not be denied either. While accepting some aspects of the commonsense preconception, Revisionism differs from a Libertarian position that defends the “strong” image of the agency. According to Vargas, the Libertarian position lacks “evidence” in its favor (cf. *Id.* 140). On the other hand, although he agrees with Hard Incompatibilism as regards the need to review our common concepts about free will, he disagrees with the skeptical position in that “we are not entitled to conclude that the implausibility of our self-conception is evidence that we are not free and responsible” (cf. *Id.* 146).

As Vargas explains, his position is guided by two standards: “a standard of naturalistic plausibility and a standard of normative adequacy” (Vargas 2007: 153; 2013: 58-9; Cf. McKenna, 2016: 286). The first one “demands that any proposal be compatible with a broadly scientific worldview”. The second one “requires that the prescriptive theory of free will function appropriately with respect to the various normative burdens of a theory of free will” (Cf. Vargas 2007: 153). On the other hand, he admits that “inasmuch as philosophy is concerned with issues where we lack reliable methods for determining what the truth is in some particular domain, linguistic and conceptual intuitions will surely have an appropriate role to play”, (*Id.* 163). As far as I can reconstruct from Vargas's position, common sense seems to be understood as a proto-theory and there seems to be a certain melancholy for not having empirical methods in philosophy to prove that theory once and for all. As a consequence, he offers a *hybrid* account: incompatibilism about the diagnosis and compatibilism about the prescription (cf. Vargas 2007: 152; McKenna 2016: 286). In my view, if common sense is not understood as a proto-theory, or a preconception, but rather as a variable set of social normative

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<sup>3</sup> Following Derk Pereboom, “Hard Incompatibilism” is the label for any view that holds that (1) Incompatibilism is true and (2) we lack free will, (Cf. *Ibid.*).

practices (linguistic and non-linguistic), a different revisionism of the free will debate arises. As Lazerowitz and Ambrose noted:

In the case of the question about free will it would seem of primary importance to get clear on the nature of the question and on the kind of information it requests —factual, verbal, or *a priori*. *The possibility that it is not a scientific question*, i.e., that it is not a question to which any sort of observation or experiment if relevant, cannot be dismissed and must be included in the investigation of its nature, (my italic, Lazerowitz 1984: 6).

My proposal is to use some reflections that Wittgenstein made on the freedom of the will (1939) to show that common sense is not an incompatibilistic preconception as a whole, but that we can find both compatibilistic and incompatibilistic uses of concepts in different contexts. By understanding common sense in this pluralistic way, the conception of philosophy is also modified and, at this point, Wittgenstein's proposal is very close to Sextus Empiricus's. This no longer seeks to build a theory about free will, but rather provides us with the conceptual tools to detect and describe these different contexts, their grammars, and the various uses we make of concepts and features of disagreement.

## 2. DISAGREEMENTS: SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

In contrast to Vargas, the idea of diagnosis that I propose accepts a balance between the philosophical positions under debate. It does not seek a definite resolution of the established disagreement but a clarification of the deep grammar and meaning of what is discussed. This proposed clarification methodology does not imply reducing disagreements to a merely verbal issue. Assuming philosophical disagreements in these terms implies that, so far, there is not a criterion to reach an ultimate rational resolution of them; rather, philosophical work seeks a better understanding of what is at stake. This clarified understanding, in some cases, may dissolve certain ways in which disagreement is presented; or it may contain the dogmatic precipitation that claims to have achieved the criterion of rational resolution. Diagnosing the debate in this way assumes that, although they cannot be resolved, disagreements in philosophy are enriching as long as we can understand the terms they are established in. This assumption of the role of disagreement in philosophy is also linked to a way of establishing the relationship between common sense and philosophy as a continuum. Both the view of philosophical disagreements and the link between common sense and philosophy are inspired by the Pyrrhonic orientation proposed by Sextus Empiricus and by how the

second Wittgenstein has been read from this orientation. By neo-Pyrrhonism<sup>4</sup>, I understand a kind of diagnosis or revisionism inspired by Sextus Empiricus's and Wittgenstein's reflections on philosophical debates in terms of, so far, *undecided* disagreements<sup>5</sup> (Bett 2019; Machuca 2013; Powers 2010). Neo-Pyrrhonism allows for both understanding common sense as a set of social normative practices and establishing a continuum between common sense and philosophy.

The problem of disagreement is a vital matter in Sextus's philosophical proposal; in fact, in the *Outlines of Scepticism*<sup>6</sup>, he indicates: "skepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come to suspension of judgement" (PH I. 8). He later points out: "by 'opposed accounts' we do not necessarily have in mind affirmation and negation,

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<sup>4</sup> R. Watson had already proposed in 1969 the related strategy of Wittgenstein and Sextus Empiricus against metaphysics in favor of the public common world, (Cf. Watson 1969), but R. Fogelin (1981, 1987, 1994) was the first one to speak about "neo-Pyrrhonism" in order to establish the link between the second Wittgenstein and Sextus Empiricus. His interpretation is based on the distinction between "philosophical skepticism" and "skepticism about philosophy" to present the differences between the Cartesian version and the version of the Sextus Empiricus. To Fogelin, Pyrrhonian skepticism, in Sextus Empiricus's version, uses "self-refuting philosophical arguments, taking philosophy as its target" (Fogelin, 1994, p. 3). From my approach, the review of philosophical debates based on the type of disagreements that are established becomes central to a neo-Pyrrhonic orientation. For this task, the relationship between philosophy and common sense is vital. Understanding the latter as a set of linguistically articulated practices, philosophy must describe them in their performative and normative dimension.

<sup>5</sup> However, Fogelin (2005) was inspired by some paragraphs (§608-11) from Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* and established a type of *irresolvable* disagreement: deep disagreements. To Fogelin, deep disagreements are irresolvable since they consist of a clash between different frameworks. This prevents the argumentative exchange that could lead to a possible agreement. In this perspective over deep disagreements, the reflections of Sextus Empiricus, or a Pyrrhonian reading of *On Certainty* have not been considered.

<sup>6</sup> References to Sextus are made by placing PH [*Pyrrōneioi Hypotyposēis*] for *Outlines of Scepticism* and AM for *Adversus Mathematicos*, followed by the book number, stop and the line number after the citations. Annas and Barnes, *Outlines of Scepticism* (2000) will be used. There is previous translation, the bilingual edition (Greek-English) of the works of Sextus made by R. G. Bury (1933-1939). Bury divides the translation into four volumes: volume I (1933) *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (PH I, II, III); volume II (1935) *Against the Logicians* (AM VII, VIII); volume III (1936) *Against Physicists* (AM IX, X) and *Against the Ethics* (AM XI); volume IV *Against the Professors* (AM I, II, III, IV, V, VI). In case Bury's edition is used, it will be properly indicated.



but take the phrase simply in the sense of ‘conflicting accounts’. By ‘equipollence we mean equality with regard to being convincing or unconvincing: none of the conflicting accounts takes precedence over any other as being more convincing’ (PH I. 10). In a first synthesis of the modes (or *tropes*) of suspension of judgement—the Five Modes of Agrippa—he mentions disagreement as the first one: the mode deriving from dispute [or the mode of disagreement] (...) “we find that *undecided* dissension [*anepikriton stasin*]<sup>7</sup> about the matter proposed has come about both in ordinary life and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able either to choose or to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgement” (PH I. 166). With these indications of disagreement, Pyrrhonians understand that in our practices of giving and asking for reasons, both in common sense and in philosophy, it is not easy to find a criterion that settles the dispute. The question of not finding criteria is to be connected to the particular contexts in which the disagreement arises. Some interpreters have used the term “sceptic’s net” (PH I. 170-7; Cf. Barnes 1990) to refer to the modes (especially referring to Agrippa’s synthesis) as a closed and definitive system that inevitably leads to suspension of judgment. This implies any possibility of resolving disagreements and, thus, of further investigation is cancelled. Then, Pyrrhonism would be a variant of dogmatic (negative) skepticism (Cf. Bett, 2019; Bueno 2013, Powers 2010). To Powers, Sextus presents modes “as a loose system within which each sort of mode has a specific function to fulfill in advancing the aims of Pyrrhonian scepticism” (Powers, 2010: 157). According to Bett, Powers’s proposal is an attractive way understanding Agrippa’s first Mode: an *anepikritos* dispute is one with no arbitrator (*epikrités*) as everyone is a party to the dispute, (Cf. Bett, 2019: 119). Moreover, this way of understanding the trope of disagreement suggested by Powers articulates better with Sextus’s idea of Pyrrhonism as an open-ended inquiry: “Skepticism is an ongoing activity; suspension of judgment is generated again and again, on one topic after another, by an ever-renewed exercise of the skeptical ability” (Bett, 2019: 124; Cf. Bueno, 2013). On the other hand, as Machuca (2013) indicates, this does not mean that in certain domains one of the positions in dispute might not be chosen either for practical reasons or because of the force exercised by one of the parties over the other. The fact that one position has been chosen does

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<sup>7</sup> Bury (1933) translates *anepikriton stasin* as “interminable conflict”; Annas and Barnes (2000) as “undecidable dissension”. We follow Nathan Power (2010), who chooses the term “*undecided* dissension” to highlight that those involved in the dispute cannot be party and judge at the same time.



not mean that a rational *resolution* of the disagreement has been established: “this kind of *resolution* may just be due to the pressure exerted by one of the contending parties on the basis of their influence or power” (Macucha 2013: 1).

To understand the scope of this way of assuming disagreement and the subsequent suspension of judgment that follows, it is necessary to move away from the conceptions of justification of our beliefs centered on individual subjects. This individualistic approach takes into account that “knowledge and justified belief do not depend on what other people believe or whether they disagree”, (Lammenranta 2013: 46). Following the previous suggestion, Lammenranta indicates “only if we accept the dialectical conception of justification can we explain the intuitive appeal of skepticism and the role of disagreement within it” (*Ib.* 47). Sextus Empiricus seems to adhere to this socio-dialectical orientation of disagreement by emphasizing two points against the centrality of the individual. On the one hand, he argues that, if we are a party to the dispute, we cannot resolve a disagreement simply by preferring our own beliefs to the beliefs of those who disagree with us, (Cf. *Ib.* PH 1. 90). On the other hand, resolving a disagreement rationally requires an impartial judge (PH 1. 59). To Lammenranta, these points are related: if I cannot settle a dispute since I am a party to it, I need someone who is not a party to the dispute to settle it for me. Sextus’s point is that if I do not have an impartial or neutral point of view to decide who is right and who is wrong, the disagreement is rationally *undecidable* (Cf. Lammenranta 2013: 50. This author refers to rationally “irresolvable”). Emphasizing the social-dialectical aspect of disagreement in philosophy presupposes a connection to our ordinary epistemic practices. In our daily exchanges to face disagreements we are all the time subjected to these dialectical practices in which we are challenged to defend our position<sup>8</sup>. In an *undecided* disagreement, neither do we have reasons to convince the other; therefore, nor it is justified that we persist in the disputed beliefs. The real skeptical challenge comes from disagreements that cannot be resolved in principle. Such disagreements exist for all our beliefs about the nature of reality (Cf. Machuca 2013: 51). From my reading, I consider that Wittgenstein is akin to this approach to philosophical disagreements, mainly because philosophy is not about questions of fact (Hacker 2013) but about the functioning of the uses of language. Thus, Wittgenstein complements this approach to *undecided* disagreements by providing tools to establish, firstly, what kind of disagreement we are facing.

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<sup>8</sup> Lammenranta defines the dialectical conception of justification in these terms: “S is justified in believing that *p* if and only if S can defend *p* against appropriate challenges”, (Lammenranta 2013: 61).

In *A Lecture on Freedom of the Will* (1939, published in 1989), Wittgenstein reviews the ways of considering human actions and decisions: free or not free<sup>9</sup>. To achieve this, Wittgenstein explores how we use these same concepts in ordinary language, mainly: free will and determinism; and the concepts related to them, such as causality and logical necessity, among others. As it is common in his way of doing philosophy, he begins his critical review of concepts from certain analogies: in this case, natural laws and the common way of relating them to compulsion. Wittgenstein starts his conceptual clarification by analyzing an analogy “[we] could explain the way people looked at natural laws by saying they regarded them as if they were rails, along which things had to move” (Wittgenstein, 1989: p. 85). The idea of fixed rails that establishes an unalterable track is associated with natural laws that compel events and actions in a necessary and inevitable way. The analogy seems to link the terms “law” and “rail” from the idea of compulsion and not of observed regularity. Thus, the idea of natural law seems to be related to a certain kind of fatalism. Wittgenstein suggests that the analogy between laws and rails is confusing. The analogy thus established suppresses the idea that rails can break, malfunction, and thus modify courses of action. Therefore, we should not strictly assume that the rails necessarily determine the path because they can break (in fact, they usually do). The idea of rails does not entail the idea of compelling (necessary determination). Confusion arises from not recognizing “difference between being causally determined and being logically determined” (PI 1958: §220). After treating several examples, Wittgenstein will indicate that the fact that something occurs in a regular and predictable way —such as the movements of a machine or the behavior of a human agent— does not *entail* that it happens *necessarily* (cf. Nadelhoffer 2019).

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<sup>9</sup> Wittgenstein discussed the problem of the will in several texts. In his early thought, especially in the *Tractatus*, the influence of his *ethical* readings of Schopenhauer is clear. In his later thought, especially in the *Investigations*, the analysis of the concept of will is related to the problem of voluntary action. To Gómez-Alonso (2016), the influence of the early reading of Schopenhauer allows him to understand aspects of the position assumed by Wittgenstein in his later thought: the voluntary action is not a form of behaviorism. Gómez-Alonso even argues that in *On Certainty*, “the role played by the will in our language-games and the status of the so-called hinge-propositions” can only be properly understood by paying attention to the connections with Schopenhauer’s ideas (Gómez-Alonso, 2016: 82). In this paper, I will not focus on this way of understanding the problem of will connected to action; I will focus on the way in which Wittgenstein evaluates the philosophical debate on determinism.

Wittgenstein re-thinks about the notion of regularity. This notion does not depend on our knowledge of laws but on our *observation* of regularities. The use of the rail simile only exemplifies “a certain way of looking at things”, (Wittgenstein, 1989: 87). This way of conceiving regularity as compulsion is peculiar “in the sense that fatalism is a peculiar way of looking at things” (*Ibid.*). Another example he gives is the comparison between a thief stealing a banana and a stone falling. Do they both share the same kind of movement, the same kind of regularity? To Wittgenstein, inquiring in this way, such as thinking that a stone falling and a thief stealing a banana are comparable (both behaviours can be understood in terms of natural laws, for example)- reflects some commitment with determinism. Wittgenstein asks: “Why don't we regard it in the light of indeterminism?”, (*Ib.* 88). Nonetheless, what makes these different questions arise? What makes people choose the deterministic way or the indeterministic way of establishing comparisons?

Wittgenstein's approach is not to take a position in the metaphysical debate on free will, but to critically evaluate what is being debated. This critical evaluation consists of understanding how certain concepts are used in the debate. In order to elucidate the features of disagreement in the free will debate, Lazerowitz (1984) uses these suggestions from Wittgenstein. In so doing, he suggests that one can think of “voluntary” and “involuntary” as implying opposite consequences. However, both terms can be conceived as not opposed to each other—in the sense that one does not (necessarily) exclude the other; then, this is not an instance of contradiction. This distinction would show the uses in which the terms are actually opposed and the uses in which they are opposed but do not imply contradiction. It should be clarified that the task of philosophy is not reduced to a passive description of a verbal controversy. By detecting and understanding how certain concepts are used and related to others, we have a better understanding of what our disagreements and problems are and which tensions or incoherencies may arise. In order to implement this method which, on the one hand, emphasizes the social dimension of disagreements and, on the other hand, pays attention, as a starting point, to the concrete uses of language, we must analyze the different daily uses that make up our commonsense practices<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> Following Kusch, Vinten (2020) considers that “approaching problems concerning freedom of the will in the light of the debates about folk psychology could be fruitful”. Based on Wittgenstein's reflections on this topic, Vinten focus on the work of P. S. Churchland to “make latent nonsense patent nonsense and to show that the formulation of the problems involves some conceptual confusion”, (Vinten 2020: 162). Although in my paper I will review different approaches to common sense, this time I will not focus on the folk psychology debate.

### 3. COMMON SENSE: NORMATIVISM OF SOCIAL PRACTICES AND CONTEXTS OF USES

The strategy of describing our ordinary uses of words to describe grammar in order to understand how we use certain concepts to review the metaphysical debate on free will seems to have a *family resemblance* with the strategy exercised by P. F. Strawson (1962). This strategy has been considered *normative* because it does not take a position in the metaphysical<sup>11</sup> debate, but describes the most basic and unavoidable aspects of our social practices. In “Freedom and Resentment” (1962), one of P. F. Strawson’s most discussed texts, he comments upon the apparent mutual exclusion between accepting determinism and accepting to be agents susceptible to moral evaluation. Strawson presents two positions: the pessimists, who understand that determinism cancels our moral practices; and the optimists, who understand that it does not cancel them. Strawson seems to support the optimistic point of view, but he will not participate in the metaphysical<sup>12</sup> debate. His strategy will be to focus on our daily moral practices, especially on what he calls “reactive attitudes”. These attitudes, such as “gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings” (Strawson, 1974 [1962]: 5), are a very important part of human life. These feelings are the response to how human beings treat each other. They are the interpersonal relationships between people that arise in social contexts, when we evaluate actions in which we may feel hurt or appreciative. Strawson also points out that there are cases in which these attitudes can be suspended; for instance,

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<sup>11</sup> In his book *Individuals* (1959), Strawson makes a distinction between “descriptive metaphysics” —to specify his proposal— and “revisionist metaphysics” —an approach that he will criticize. Broadly speaking, revisionist metaphysics is that which proposes corrections to our ways of thinking, and offers alternative constructive theories that improve our ways of understanding the world. On the contrary, descriptive metaphysics shows our basic and universal conceptual scheme. This idea of description —of Kantian heritage— will later undergo modifications, tending towards a more plural and social perspective of “conceptual schemes” or “concept-mapping” (Strawson 1985, 1992). In the debate on moral responsibility and determinism, when we refer to Strawson’s position as one that does not take sides in the metaphysical debate, we understand metaphysics in this constructive revisionist sense. Vargas proposes a kind of revisionism —not descriptivism— that is linked to the metaphysical debate but in a different sense from Strawson’s. He thus differs from both the constructive revisionism and the Kantian concept-mapping descriptivism proposed by Strawson.

<sup>12</sup> See footnote above.

when we understand that the person who hurt us suffers from some mental disorder or some type of limitation due to, for example, stress. In these cases, we do not treat this person as a morally responsible agent. The important conclusion Strawson reaches is that this *objective* attitude —this suspension— towards certain agents is an exception which we cannot maintain as a general rule (Cf. *Ib.* 9-23). If we only keep an objective attitude, what we understand as “social human life” would be completely lost. In this sense, it can be said that reactive attitudes are central —and inevitable— to our life in society. Now, is this an answer to the challenge posed by determinism? No, because this approach remains at the level of descriptions of the inevitable and constitutive aspects of our social practices. Describing these aspects of human life does not imply a valid justification as a criterion for settling the metaphysical debate on free will. Otherwise, appealing to reactive attitudes is not a way of resolving philosophical disagreement about determinism. There are important differences between Strawson’s strategy based on feelings and attitudes and Wittgenstein’s methodology based on the grammar of language-games. However, from my perspective, they share the *normative* methodological strategy: the task of philosophy is to describe social practices. In this sense, there is a continuum between common sense and philosophy. In order to dispel philosophical problems, the ordinary uses of our concepts must be described. This does not entail an empirical task to find answers to philosophical problems in common sense, but to understand that the “correct” uses of concepts —uses with “sense”— are shown in their everyday contexts (See Vinten 2020: 121-2; PI 1958: §109, §124).

Part of Wittgenstein’s methodological recommendations consists in analyzing the deep grammar of the everyday and effective uses of our concepts. Understanding how through these uses we group elements, that should be separated, together (analogies) or separate what should be together, allows us to detect certain linguistic confusions that explain the fascination for certain philosophical nonsenses. Describing how this deep grammar of our daily uses works also allows us to identify the origin of these confusions. In the context of the free will debate, Wittgenstein suggests: “It seems as if, if you’re very strongly impressed by responsibility which a human being has for his actions you are *inclined* to say that these actions and choices can’t follow natural laws. Conversely, if you are very strongly *inclined* to say that they do follow natural laws, then I can’t be made responsible for my choice. This, I should say, is a fact of *psychology*”, (my italic, Wittgenstein 1989: 90). Some interpreters think that this opinion is close to James’s viewpoint about the role that temperament

plays in our philosophical choices<sup>13</sup>. Choosing determinism or indeterminism does not depend on metaphysical or scientific discoveries, it depends on our different temperaments or psychological profile. In this line of interpretation, which emphasizes psychological inclinations, Lazerowitz points out that: “the tenacity with which he holds his view [determinism] leads one to suppose that the linguistic innovation associated with it is psychologically important to him” (Lazerowitz, 1984: 15). And he adds in a psychoanalytical tone: “it may, at the unconscious level of the determinist’s mind, represent the need to avoid inner censure for an unacceptable wish” (*Ibid.*).

Wittgenstein is not part of the metaphysical debate because he assumes what philosophy can do in this type of debates in a diverse way. This explains why he writes: “all these arguments might look as if I wanted to argue for the freedom of the will or against it. But I don’t want to”, (Wittgenstein 1989: 93). However, this does not imply a psychological approach either. From my reading, Wittgenstein’s strategy is not reduced to a question of temperaments; rather, he seeks clarity about how we speak about this topic. By establishing distinctions between cases, different uses are identified: for example, cases in which there is a drug effect, cases in which there is some incidence by the education received, or cases of acting under threat. In all these cases, distinctions in which you say ‘The man is free’ and ‘The man is not free’, ‘The man is responsible’ and ‘The man is not responsible’, can be made (*Ibid.*). To Wittgenstein, the choice between these options depends on the power of *conversion* that these different cases may have on you: “an argument is all right if it converts you”, (cf. *Ibid.*). By using the term “conversion”, I assume he refers to the persuasive power of analogies rather than to the logical validity of arguments or to the evidence for or against them<sup>14</sup>. When

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<sup>13</sup> In the first part of *Pragmatism*, James claims: “The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason (...) [the philosopher’s] temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. (...) Yet in the forum he can make no claim, on the bare ground of his temperament, to superior discernment or authority. There arises thus a certain insincerity in our philosophic discussions: the potentest of all our premises is never mentioned”, (James, 1908: 7-8).

<sup>14</sup> This seems to be reinforced not only by the references made to W. James, but also by those made to Cardinal Newman in the first paragraph of *On Certainty*. One of the aims in “An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent” (1870) is to draw the distinction between real and notional assent. With this distinction, Newman seeks to analyze the philosophical problem of the justification of those beliefs (religious and secular), which lack absolute logical proof.

he emphasizes this persuasive aspect, he seems to emphasize the interpretation that reduces the choice for determinism or indeterminism to a matter of temperament. In contrast, by highlighting this aspect, Wittgenstein shows that the debate does not have access to a metaphysical or scientific criterion to be resolved —as seen in the previous section. In fact, this debate is not about the structure of the world or our temperament; it is a debate about our linguistically articulated social practices and the performative dimension of our uses of language. This is the reason why he proposes a specific philosophical methodology of clarification.

Wittgenstein's methodological proposal is to analyze —or clarify— each case through questions that point to the analogies we use to connect concepts in a certain way. This connection —or analogy— does not work for all cases, for all contexts:

Suppose I said: he is making a comparison of his situation with one thing rather than with another. He says 'I am not a hero' as he might say 'This is a cake. How could it be anything else?' Where is this comparison taken from? What sort of analogy is he making? How does he know he is not a hero? Because he has always acted in this way? In the case of the hero, there is nothing analogous to the case of the cake. Why are you making a point of this analogy at all? (Wittgenstein 1989: 96).

The revision of our most basic concepts through the analysis of the analogies we use helps to clarify the philosophical debate. In this way, it can be understood that there is a continuum between common sense and philosophy. Wittgenstein's methodological proposal consists of situating concepts in their contexts of use in order to dispel the confusions that are generated by confusing or mixing contexts (for example, logical necessity with causal necessity). On the other hand, these clarifications make it possible to understand that the uses of concepts are not fixed; they depend on contexts that we must know how to identify. However, understanding that these concepts do not have a univocal sense, definition or ultimate justification makes it possible to analyze them, modify them, understand them better, refine their uses, dissolve confusions, etc.

#### 4. NEO-PYRRHONIAN REVISIONISM

In the *hybrid* revisionism proposed by Vargas, although he establishes a review of the debate based on the ways in which we ordinarily understand the concepts of free will as a starting point, he establishes a link with a scientific normativism. Thus, in the face of disagreements in philosophy, scientific discoveries seem to form the criteria for resolving them. Therefore, *hybrid* revisionism implies



correctness. Especially the second Wittgenstein defends a separation between the philosophical method and the scientific method. This does not imply that Wittgenstein denies that scientific advances are changing our forms of life. For example, when we speak of someone's character to explain their unimpeachable conduct, or we appeal to their unchanged character to indicate that they are trustworthy, we are not offering scientific statements. Wittgenstein points out:

These statements are not used as scientific statements at all, and no discovery in science would influence such a statement. This is not quite true. What I mean is: we couldn't say now 'If they discover so and so, then I'll say I am free'. This is not to say that scientific discoveries have no influence on statements of this sort. Scientific discoveries partly spring from the direction of attention of lots of people, and partly influence the direction of attention. (Wittgenstein 1989: 97)

This shows, that for Wittgenstein, scientific knowledge is not a definitive criterion for evaluating philosophical disagreements. As Wittgenstein pointed out in *Zettel*: "metaphysical investigations obliterate the distinction between factual and conceptual investigations", (*Z* 1967: §458). Hence, many philosophical problems arise from confusing conceptual investigations and factual investigations. On some occasion, Vargas's revisionism seems to exemplify this kind of confusion. For example, when he describes how the concepts of water, marriage, and being a magician change over time, he sometimes refers to *concepts*; others times, to *beliefs* (they can be mistakes, true or false); other time, to *folk concepts*; other times, to *theoretical suppositions*; others times, to *intuitions*. In all these uses, Vargas seems to show all ordinary conceptual resources that we use to think and speak about free will and responsibility. What is not clear in Vargas's perspective is how scientific discoveries could change, correct, justify the ordinary uses of these concepts that, from the Wittgensteinian perspective, are not answerable to reality. What needs to be analyzed is how it influences certain contexts, and this can be determined by deep grammar analysis of the uses of concepts in given contexts. This view emphasizes the link between philosophy and common sense because grammatical analysis must always begin with the effective uses of language. These uses in their performative character shape our forms of life. Detecting them allows us not only to understand what norms we follow for their use but also to modify the norms themselves in some cases.

Taking this into account, two aspects of normativism in Wittgenstein's Neo-Pyrrhonian Revisionism can be considered. First, its non-metaphysical approach can be considered normative because it appeals to everyday practices to explain the free will debate. Second, those everyday practices and uses of concepts are

normative because they have rules —norms— that explain how we are to use them. Assuming this perspective of the uses of our concepts in the framework of the different contexts of social practices emphasizes the social aspect of disagreement. Admitting a dialectic and social perspective of disagreements supposes understanding that they are established in a normative field of giving and asking for reasons. In the field of practices, we follow rules that are arbitrary and public, i.e. we determine them —so they can be modified; and their public character allows us to delimit that not all the ways of following them are the correct ones. On this point, Wittgenstein differs from Vargas, since his *hybrid* revisionism proposes a prescriptive normativism understood as “the standard of normative adequacy requires that the prescriptive theory of free will function appropriately with respect to the various normative burdens of a theory of free will” (Vargas 2007: 153). In Wittgenstein, nothing is prescriptive because he does not produce a theory. It is because of this that I propose Wittgenstein’s conception of common sense is a plural set of linguistic and non-linguistic practices rather than a preconception. These practices —linguistic and non-linguistic— determine different contexts for the use of concepts, in which both deterministic and indeterministic uses can make sense. This pluralistic view of common sense also modifies the place of philosophy in the debate: it no longer has to construct a theory, but to point out the contexts (linguistic and not linguistic) in order to clarify the different uses of concepts. This philosophical clarification is not reduced to a passive description: by detecting and understanding how certain concepts are used, are related to others and are connected with linguistic and non-linguistic practices, we understand better what our problems are, the tensions or incoherencies that may arise and we can (at least partially) modify it in light of our personal and social purposes and worries.

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