The Proper Function of Linguistic Practice and Linguistic Meaning

Authors

  • Eduardo García Ramírez University of San Andrés , University of San Andrés image/svg+xml

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.2026213018

Abstract

At least since Grice (1967), Lewis (1969 and 1975), and Stalnaker (1978), though one could go as far back as Frege (1892) and Russell (1905), the analytic tradition has assumed that the proper function (i.e., explanatorily prior) of linguistic practice is informative communication. This assumption precludes a complete and satisfactory account of linguistic practice, by offering a view incompatible with the evidence on language evolution and ordinary language use. I want to offer an alternative account according to which the proper function of linguistic practice is social cohesion. In section 1 I present the traditional informativist conception of language. Section 2 shows how informativism is unable to account for the evolution of linguistic practice. Section 3 considers various ordinary conversations and shows how informativism is unable to account for them. Section 4 presents the alternative social-cohesion view and shows how it can meet both challenges. The paper concludes by offering a novel understanding of linguistic meaning from this alternative perspective. On this view, the basic unit of linguistic meaning, its proper function, is the very record of linguistic practice, a notion that is akin to what Lewis (1979) calls the “conversational score” of a language game.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Published

2026-10-15

How to Cite

García Ramírez, E. (2026). The Proper Function of Linguistic Practice and Linguistic Meaning. Analysis. Journal of Philosophical Research, 13(2), 243-279. https://doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.2026213018