The Outcome of 23-F Through Game Theory.A Methodological Application

Abstract

This article analyzes the outcome of 23-F by applying a method -coercive matrices- inspired by game theory. From this new perspective we study the crisis that triggered the 23-F, the preferences of its main actors and the result of the operation, supporting everything expressed in primary sources (mainly the two judgments on the coup, by the Supreme Council of Military Justice and the Supreme Court), as well as in the published literature on the event. This paper provides a novel theoretical and methodological approach that highlights the importance of uncertainty in understanding the past, because to understand what happened, it is important to explore what may have happened. Coercive matrices offer the possible solutions to a crisis and indicate those that are most likely to materialize, taking into account the degree of consensus reached among the actors involved in the crisis.

Keywords: Coup d’Etat, 23-F, game theory, methodology, “coercive matrices”