fects of insomnia and the way it puts time out of joint when sleep comes at odd hours: "Suppose that, towards morning, after a night of insomnia, sleep descends upon him while he is reading, in quite a different position from that in which he normally goes to sleep, he has only to lift his arm to arrest the sun and turn it back on its course [*il suffit de son bras soulevé pour arrêter et faire reculer le soleil*]" (F1:5; E1:5).

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RICHARD MULCASTER'S ALLEGORY:

A HUMANIST VIEW OF LANGUAGE AND STATE

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In *The Elementarie*,[1] written in 1582 by Richard Mulcaster, a prominent pedagogue and spelling reformer, the case is put against the radical overhauling of the English spelling system. His was a lone voice in an age clamouring for a phonemic spelling as the sole path out of the marshlands of uncertainty in which the language had become mired.

Mulcaster prefaces his suggestions as to how and on what basis English spelling is to be reformed with a political allegory which traces the development of writing from its inception, democracy, through oligarchy to his own time, represented by monarchy. The importation of the political metaphor into a discussion of an orthographic and linguistic nature highlights the humanist concept of language as a social institution, based on an act of consent, shaped by and for man. It also provides a crucial insight into the theory of language behind Mulcaster's spelling policy, based on the twin pillars of custom and change. Finally, the relation established between the commonweal and spelling allows Mulcaster to resoundingly denounce the attempts of the phonemic reformers as subversive acts which upset the process of natural evolution.

Mulcaster was not the first to place language and politics in a direct relationship. His vision of good government is influenced by his predecessors, Sir Thomas Elyot and Thomas Starkey. Mulcaster had read *The Book Named the Governor* (1531), which became a manual of political and educational

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theory in the sixteenth century, as is evident from his critical allusions to Elyot's educational theory in the opening pages of *Positions* (1581).[2] Mulcaster was more ambivalent and less blindly committed to reverence for the classics than Elyot. He had a greater affinity with the political thinker Thomas Starkey whose *Dialogue between Cardinal Pole and Thomas Lupset* (1538)[3] was outstanding in its day for the pragmatism and the global vision it presents of a society in the throes of change. Cultural relativism and an acute awareness of each nation's specific circumstances were becoming the norm for the appraisal and application of classical doctrines. Mulcaster and Starkey belong to a generation of humanists who "are able to go well beyond mere imitation of the ancients and to adapt classical precept and precedent to the realities of divergent cultures" (Ferguson 1963-64: 22).

Mulcaster has been praised for his "most liberal and independent mind" (Jones 1926: 281). Leo Weiner states that "Mulcaster was beyond his age" (1897: 66) in his treatment of spelling reform and his theory of language. Analysis of *The Elementarie* in the light of Starkey's text reveals that Mulcaster's ideas are neither as innovative or ground-breaking as they first appear. This is not to detract from his achievement, however. As Terence Cave points out, "the publication of a particular point of view at a particular moment has an importance which bears little relation to its originality . . . when seen in a wider context" (1979: 75). Mulcaster brought to bear on problems of a linguistic nature, opinions which had first been aired within a political context. His application of political theory to linguistic issues confirms the eclectic nature of his philosophy and supports the view that his main contribution to the language debate in the closing decades of the sixteenth century was his capacity for synthesising a global and comprehensive vision of society and language. Querying the standing of classical authority, attempting to incorporate change into a paradigm characterised by stability and achieving a balance between the two were, ultimately, challenges to be faced in all spheres of life (Ferguson 1963: 11). This is the mood that Mulcaster brings to his discussion of language. He is treading the precarious middle ground, charting a course characterised by compromise and synthesis.

Mulcaster's eclecticism has been commented on before (Donawerth 1983: 82: Dobson 1968: 122) and is confirmed by the allegory. It illustrates the dilemma of the late Elizabethan humanist who attempts to construct a theory which would incorporate the opposing factors of change and stability in language and society. His writings are shot through with a "painful awareness of the need to reconcile the absolute with the contingent" (Ferguson 1963: 20). The symbiosis between social well-being and linguistic form underlies much of humanist writing on language. Roger

Ascham, William Bullokar and Elyot all work on this basis. Mulcaster, however, was perhaps the first to carry this parallel to its final, pragmatic conclusion through his insistence that the vernacular be at the core of the reformed curriculum outlined in *Positions* and *The Elementarie*.

Mulcaster has not enjoyed the attention he merits as a linguist. Moreover, the key function of the extended allegory has not been recognised. R. H. Quick in his 1888 edition of *Positions* dispatches it as "his very curious and interesting allegory" (Mulcaster 1888: 306). R. F. Jones offers no comment and merely paraphrases the tale (1926: 281-82; 1953: 159). This line is followed by Demolen (1970: 157) while Scragg (1974: 60-63) makes no reference to it. Notwithstanding these omissions, it is one of the key pieces in the groundwork of *The Elementarie*, allowing the twentieth-century reader a glimpse "through the glass darkly" of the sixteenth-century mind.

Mulcaster begins his arguments against the invention of new signs, the excision of superfluous ones and the relandscaping of English orthography[4] by illustrating the historical process whereby Sound lost its dominion over the form of written words and was joined in a position of shared power by Reason and Custom. Later, with the intervention of Art as supreme sovereign, the system reached its zenith.

Initially Sound was elected "soueraine and iudge" (*E* 73), a situation which quickly degenerated into chaos as all speakers became a law onto themselves. Alarmed at Sound's overbearing attitude, a delegation was sent to persuade him to share his power with Reason, based on observation and comparison, and Custom, holding the scales of linguistic justice and mediating between the forces of change and continuity. Together they would forge into law those practices which had been etched out over time and through their joint action, regulate spelling. The order established was, however, precarious until the supreme monarch, Art, using artificial method, bestowed stability on writing. The template chosen by Art was the late sixteenth century, a period when the language had reached the height of perfection.

The influence of the lively debates which had raged in Europe over the merits of the different forms of government was not felt in England which remained relatively free from the immediate pressures of Continental politics (Ferguson 1963). As Eccleshall remarks, "In the sixteenth century there was no need to raise questions of sovereignty. There was a need to justify the co-operation of the crown with influential groups in parliament" (1978: 100). There was in fact a strong trend in the late 16th and 17th centuries towards mixed constitutions as a guard against tyranny although, according to A. B. Ferguson (1963) in England only Starkey and Smith raised fundamental questions concerning the forms of government. The debate, he maintains, was di-

verted towards specific areas such as trade and international policy rather than a careful examination of fundamentals. A more searching analysis would only develop in the seventeenth century when the unstable political environment and the change in dynasty livened the debate.

This complacency is evident in both Mulcaster and Starkey, confirming J. Hankins's (1996) claim that the humanists were not intellectuals committed to a single political ideology. When Mulcaster numbers the three forms of government available to a people in *Positions*, he explicitly refrains from recommending one or the other (1888: 150). Like Starkey, he implies that the best form is decided "according to the nature of the people" (Starkey 1948: 60). This was to be his policy also as regards spelling and borrowing: necessity, circumstance and custom were the three parameters by which an innovation or reform was judged. In the allegory, however, elective government is represented as characteristic of primitive societies; it is continually in danger of degenerating into tyranny. The abuses perpetrated by Sound are attributed not to his own person but to an error of judgement in those who elected him (*E* 76). This comment suggests that Mulcaster was sceptical of the wisdom of the masses. In this respect he was within the mainstream of humansit political thought, "If the humanists had any common political prejudice, it was against purely popular regimes" (Hankins 1996: 120). Moreover, by the end of the sixteenth century, debate over the virtues of popular sovereignty had outgrown its historical context. The rediscovery of Aristotle's *Politics*, which placed monarchy as the best form of government, further contributed to the decline of support for republicanism. Sound's mandate comes from the people, who "give him alone the authoritie over the pen" (*E* 74). He acts like a prince but, as the source of his might is human, Mulcaster suggests, it is seriously undermined. Popular suffrage is not rejected, but seen to be insufficient on its own.

Mulcaster's description of the era of Sound's reign is designed to create the maximum impact on his readers. Chaos was the great bugbear of Tudor society: "without order may be nothing stable or permanent" (Elyot, *The Book Named the Governor* [1531], qtd. in Rollins and Baker 1992: 107). Sound behaves with "great uncertaintie, naie rather with confusion" (*E* 74). Mulcaster attributes this "odious" and "uncomely" lack of order to the plebes or communality, where there is no "discrepance of degrees" (qtd. in Rollins and Baker 1988: 107). Like Elyot, Mulcaster subscribes to the view that the "public weal" and the "common weal" are mutually exclusive, if not contradictory.

Sound is "in autoritie tyrannous" (*E* 75), and violates the humanist ideal of the good ruler by placing self-interest before the general good. It is arbitrary, a destructive force, governed by neither rule nor reason. The concession of power to Reason and Custom is dramatised to show the characteristics of the bad ruler. Sound's thirst for power and his reluctance to relinquish it for the common good make him prey to the false advice of those friends who fan his resentment and incite him to rebellion.

Sound is modelled on the tyrant that appears in Elizabethan literature, "allowing no mercy, or pitie but death, no pardon, no forgiveness, no misericordia" (*E* 74). The description invites comparison with the figure of Machiavelli, who, as Wyndham Lewis asserts "was at the back of every Tudor mind" (qtd. in Praz 1966: 118). Although a translation of *The Prince* was not available according to Praz (1966, 93) until 1602, he had been known to the Elizabethans with the publication of Gentillet's *Contre-Machiavel* in 1576. Whether the Machiavellian or the Senecan tyrant inspired the characterisation of Sound is irrelevant: both exploit their positions to exert power for their own private ends (Praz 1966: 111).

By equating Sound with tyranny Mulcaster strikes at the heart of phonemic reform. Sir Thomas Smith, John Hart and William Bullokar had attempted to thoroughly overhaul English spelling, following Smith's maxim, "ut pictura, orthographia" (qtd. in Jones, 1953: 145). Speech should mirror sound. In Mulcaster's opinion this represented a regression rather than an advance and would open the doors to anarchy, an anarchy more fearsome than that which ruled before their intervention. Where these reformers had run aground was in failing to adapt their reforms to time and place. As the English language was at that time further along the evolutionary scale, their efforts would overthrow any advantages won and endanger the commonweal. Moreover, in language as in politics, consent is the prerequisite for just government. The "private conceit" has no validity, no matter how well intentioned. Chaos and sedition therefore loom menacingly over the work of the phonemic reformers.

When discussing the reformers elsewhere in *The Elementarie*, Mulcaster extends the idea of rebellion and disruption. The verbs associated with this group suggest battle and violence: "thwart," "force," "cross" and "hinder." Mulcaster is exploiting the social and economic circumstances of an age haunted by the spectre of disruption and disorder, especially from internal conflicts. The border counties were a source of political unrest and over-ambitious members of the gentry were constantly hatching plots. Ireland, too, presented a persistent challenge to the harmony of the state. In spite of the optimism of the period, in the background loomed impending disaster.

The concept of an original "pure" language is also questioned. While the English humanists were, by and large, dominated by the Cambridge group in

their theory of language, Mulcaster, as W. L. Renwick (1925) points out, begged to differ and allied himself, through his contemporary Du Bellay, with a body of thought which extended back to Speroni, Castiglione, and Dante. The idea that a pure, God-given language had been undergoing a relentless necrosis and degeneration still held out in England long after it had been abandoned on the continent where the vernacular was invested with the capacity to grow and develop. The strongest voice emerging was that which favoured the view of language as a construct of man, and consequently, saw in change the possibility to prosper rather than to decline and decay. Behind Mulcaster's scalding criticism of the phonemic reformers lies the conviction that the linguistic sign is conventional and arbitrary in origin. This in turn, invalidates the necessity to return to the original state in order to perfect the language.

The analogy between the growth to maturity of society symbolised by its evolving forms of government and the increase in the number of factors governing right writing highlights the necessity for change. This is Mulcaster's rallying call: circumstance is all, and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances is the sign of a mature and responsible people. As society grows more complex, what formerly served must be, if not discarded, at least substantially modified . He attempted, like Starkey, to reconcile the changing condition that was part of the human lot with absolute unchanging verities. Therefore, "bare and primitive inventions, being but rude" (*E* 75) must yield to more sophisticated devices. Starkey had essentially voiced the same opinion, "To say that a custom was reasonable in origin is not to say that it must remain so in an enlightened society" (Ferguson 1963: 23) There must be constant adaptation, revision and review.

Both Starkey and Mulcaster wrestle with the dilemma facing all humanists. Working within a conservative framework, philosophers, linguists and politicians were forced to expand the boundaries of traditional thought in order to account for and analyse the new patterns emerging in society. The economic penury generated by agrarian crises, social and religious radicalism and inordinate ambition in the professional and landed classes all raised questions in the more enquiring minds as to the adequacy of the sacrosanct social model championed by the humanists and reinforced by the Tudor dynasty. The tensions and ambivalence which Ferguson (1963) maintains provided a stimulus for political debate in the last decades of the sixteenth century also inform the linguistic issue, concentrated almost exclusively on the sole bone of contention—spelling reform. It is here that attitudes to custom and change are crystallised and enact on the stage of spelling the larger drama in which English society was involved. Mulcaster bolsters his defence of tradition in

spelling with arguments which appear repeatedly in the debate on common law and its relation to the figure of the monarch.

Mulcaster was the sole defender of custom in the English spelling debate.[5] It is, he staunchly proclaims, the "surest guide," the first variable to be taken into account when considering reforms in spelling. Change meant growth but only when firmly rooted in tradition and operating within its clear but unwritten parameters. His spirited defence of custom is in sharp contrast with his contemporaries, who referred to it as a "venom and poison," as being "corrupt," "filthie" and "vile." On the other hand, common law enjoyed the sanction of custom and as Ferguson claims, it (common law) fostered "a more tolerant, because a more historical, attitude toward custom" (1963: 21). Custom, the cumulative wisdom of a people, was exalted in the defence of common law. Mulcaster relied on this to build up a compelling argument in favour of tradition in spelling practices.

Both Mulcaster's and Starkey's defence of custom are couched in similar language and highlight the same qualities. Language and common law represent the culmination of the customs devised by men. They are diverse and variable, reasonable and natural, simple and flexible, adapting facts of pure reason to the facts of the time. Custom or tradition mediates between change and stability, innovation and stagnation and thus ensures regulated growth. Laws based on custom were framed according to the exigencies of everyday life and the requirements of the particular community, with its unique traditions and practices. The legal system and the language find a common denominator in custom. The spelling rules Mulcaster proposes can thus rest confidently on custom, foundation of common law and therefore guarantee of commonweal; foundation of spelling and hence, the establishment of right writing.

Mulcaster's attempts to modify English spelling following the road between the poles of custom and change are a practical illustration of the compromise he adopted—one which is also evident in the Cambridge humanist's attempts to adopt a policy on borrowing which would allow for following classical principles in a modern society. This too was the conundrum which attracted the attention of Castiglione and Speroni. All humanist writings bear the same stamp. Flexibility and stability are, therefore, the characteristics which define Mulcaster's spelling amendments. Two examples will serve to illustrate his approach. While on phonemic grounds the digraph <ou> has no justification, Mulcaster concedes as it has been used by the wise, those who form custom. As to the invention of new characters (proposed by Smith and Hart), they are found unacceptable on the grounds of their strangeness and lack of historical background. Mulcaster was aware that language is essen-

tially conservative but simultaneously formed through continuous and imperceptible changes. This is what he calls prerogative, the quicksilver and lifeblood of language: its ability to change, to shape itself to new circumstances and serve new purposes.

A close correspondence between the commonweal and the state of the language, a focus for nationalistic sentiments is established.[6] Language was seen as a moral barometer by which the virtue and "genius" of a people could be measured. It is therefore commonplace to find in texts of the period, pleas for orthographic reform which appeal to nationalist sentiments and protests against borrowing, which see it as a slur on national honour. Bullokar states that his efforts were intended "To no small profit and credite to this our nation" (qtd. in Jones 1926: 279). Defence of the language and attempts to improve it were only one manifestation, among many, of active citizenship. Mulcaster, in one of his most widely quoted aphorisms says, "I honor the Latin, but I worship the English" (1925: 269) He proposes to display his commitment to his country by making every endeavour to perfect that language.

A further example of how terms of state and language are interchanged appears in the analogy made between borrowed words and the enfranchised citizen. Mulcaster transposes the term "enfranchised" to the borrowed lexical item to display that the word, once incorporated into the language acquires all the rights and duties of the natural citizen "as the stranger denizens be to the lawes of our cunntrie" (*E* 174). These analogies are carefully crafted rhetorical devices designed to emphasise the links between language and nationhood. They also explain the urgency and energy invested in the issue of spelling reform. English spelling was described as chaotic and unruly. Chaos was a consequence of unsound government and a primitive society. A more logical writing system, therefore would benefit the nation as a whole—it was the commonweal that was at stake. Reform, whether agrarian, social, economic or linguistic was of prime importance for efficient statehood.

In the evolution from chaos to order, from arbitrary rule to divine right, from communality to hierarchy, oligarchy is placed on the second rung of the ladder, representing a half-way stage in the ascent to perfection. The order follows the grading given by Aristotle and in turn adopted by Elyot, the state "that hath mo cheif governours than one" is not perfect. "It is a monster with many heads." (qtd. in Rollins and Baker 1992: 108). What is lacking is an all-encompassing authority, which comes in the guise of Art. It is stressed, however, that its function is not to create but merely to implement and codify those laws which have been forged through time and consolidated in custom so that people can work with assurance of what is right and wrong.

There is clearly a similarity between the concept of the Tudor state and the perfection of the writing system. They share the common traits of order and obedience, security and service. In short, stability both linguistic and political is assured under the monarch. This conforms to Elyot's maxim, "one sovereign governour ought to be in a public weal. And what damage hath happened where a multitude hath had equal authority without any sovereign" (qtd. in Rollins and Baker 1992: 108)

The circumstances of Mulcaster's life would appear to confirm the fact that he was a monarchist. He enjoyed the patronage of the Queen, presented plays at Court with the boys of Merchant's Taylors and through his participation in the Tudor propaganda machine managed, at least temporarily, to alleviate his persistent financial embarrassments. In the allegory, however, he opts for limited monarchical power, a choice which was in consonance with the predominant trend of his time.[7]

Just as Art rested on the pillars of Reason, Custom and Sound, so too the monarch in theory was advised by the members of the Privy council. They represented, like their counterparts in language, the forces of tradition and common sense whose roots stretched downwards and backwards to embrace and strengthen its authority. During the Tudor dynasty its members were chosen by the monarch. This perverted its original function, making it no more than a puppet and confirmed a trend towards political centralization, represented as an act of national unity. As early as 1540, Starkey claimed that it mitigated against the common good, "to him must be joined counsel, by common authority, not such as he will, but such as by the most part of the parliament shall be judged to be wise and mete thereunto" (1942: 155). Mulcaster too advocated that the absolute monarch should "qualify his gouernament, and . . . use the assistance of a further councell" (*E* 75). The general feeling in England in the period was that,

> the English monarch could not govern in an arbitrary fashion because he or she was hedged about with communally beneficial restrictions. So long as the parliament was vigilant in using its privileges, the monarch could do nothing of national importance without its assent. (Eccleshall 1978: 38)

The structure and selection procedure of the advisory council that appears in the allegory follow closely on that recommended by Starkey. Art inherits a three-member council who have earned their place by merit not by royal favour. No law passed has any legitimacy unless signed by all four parties. It is therefore not over-audacious to suggest, on the basis of this evidence, that Mulcaster favoured a system of limited rather than absolute monarchy. This

echoes Pole's maxim that "the authority of the prince must be tempered and brought to order" (Starkey 1948: 165). His power had to be ratified from below but did not entail doing the bidding of the intemperate masses. Unquestioning obedience was demanded only on those issues which were already established by tradition and reason.

Just as the divine origin of language was being subjected to searching analysis, so too was the role of the monarch. Adam it was believed had not been given a language but the ability to name: the monarch was not divinely appointed but assigned the role of administrator. Starkey emphasises his purely remedial role, "to see to the administration of justice to the whole community" (qtd in Ferguson 1963: 18). In questions of a linguistic nature, royal intervention was frequently sought: John Baret, compiler of *An Alvearie* (1573) maintains that "true" writing will only be achieved by monarchical intervention. This is the role attributed to Art in the allegory. Art is a " beaten lawyer" (*E* 84) and a "notarie" (*E* 82).

Mulcaster's spelling amendments as outlined in the seven general precepts are designed to amend those things capable of rectification within the bounds of established use. They are the fruit of hindsight. Over-zealousness, it had been seen, only caused social upheaval in the form of the agrarian and corn revolts, misery, homelessness and an ensuing crime wave. Moderation was the lesson to be learned from past mistakes, and Mulcaster, who was a man who never lost touch with the common people, was able to apply these social lessons to what he conceived to be a social institution—language.

Mulcaster's writings demonstrate that the issues of state and language were coterminous, just as they are today. Spelling reform was, and is, a high-priority political issue. He exploits this relationship in order to reinforce his vanguard views on language and to denounce those who championed alternative and, in his view, anachronistic approaches to the issue. It is chiefly by means of his political allegory that he illustrates how the well-being of the state was so closely related to the linguistic issue and introduces into the debate the non-quantifiable factor of custom, the foundation of so much that was considered intrinsically English.

NOTES

1 The full title of the work *is The First Part of the Elementarie which entreateth chefelie of the right writing of our English tung.* All references to the work are from E.T. Champacnac's 1926 edition (abbr. *E*).

2. *Positions*, Mulcaster's first work on education, puts the case for reform of the educational system in order to adequate it to the changed and changing circumstances of the times and in true humanist fashion identifies a sound educational policy as the basis for social harmony.

3. *A Dialogue* was composed between 1536 and 1538 and was presented to the king in June 1538.

4. Linguistic unease in the sixteenth century developed around this theme. The beginning of the seventeenth focused on grammar, but awareness of syntax did not develop until the latter half of that century. See Salmon (1986).

5. Other spelling reformers saw custom as an insurmountable obstacle to the implementation of their new systems. Hart rated against "vile custom" and Sir Thomas Smith and Sir John Cheke, William Bullokar and John Baret express their frustration at people's clinging to tradition. It should be noted, however, that their treatment of custom is not consistent and is characterised by more than a shade of ambivalence.

6. The close parallels established in the allegory between the well-being of the state and language, between language and national sentiment are further corroborated by Mulcaster's own use of literature as a propaganda tool. He was the author of the précis of the 1559 pageant of Queen Elizabeth's entry into London on coronation day. It is used as an instrument of persuasion, highlighting the positive aspects of the young queen and the continuity she represents.

7. Mulcaster's portrayal of the Queen in the 1559 passage presents a different view of the monarchy. Here, it is the Queen's power, not its contingency or dependence that is stressed. The apparent inconsistency between these two representations is found in much humanist writing and did not pose a moral problem for them. In fact, they all display a doublethink between their functions as propagandists or statesmen and their humanist ideology. See Hankins (1996) pp. 118 - 141.

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THE ROLE OF THE EVENT STRUCTURE METAPHOR AND OF IMAGE-SCHEMATIC STRUCTURE IN METAPHORS FOR HAPPINESS AND SADNESS

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since the appearance of cognitive linguistics around the mid-1970s, studies on the way our conceptual systems are organized have been a primary focus of attention in linguistics. One of the areas in which most efforts have been made is the study of metaphor. Such scholars as Lakoff, Johnson, Turner, and others have been able to unravel many of the intricacies of the English metaphorical system. In so doing, they have been able to determine to a large extent the nature of conceptual systems and their interrelations. One of the important breakthroughs in their research has been their understanding of metaphor as a conceptual rather than a merely linguistic phenomenon. For them, metaphor is a conceptual mapping of a source domain to a target domain, where aspects of the source are made to correspond with the target. Such correspondences allow us to reason about the target domain using our knowledge about the source domain (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Lakoff 1993a, 1993b).

One of the areas of special emphasis in recent cognitive studies is the determination of generic-level structure for metaphor (see Lakoff and Turner, 1989, and particularly Lakoff 1993a).[1] A well-known example of generic-level structure is the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 162-166), which maps a single specific-level schema onto a potentially indefinite number of specific-level schemas which share the same generic-level structure as the source-domain schema. This mapping is typically applied in the understanding of proverbs when used in particular situa-

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