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THE ROLE OF THE EVENT STRUCTURE METAPHOR AND OF IMAGE-SCHEMATIC STRUCTURE IN METAPHORS FOR HAPPINESS AND SADNESS



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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the appearance of cognitive linguistics around the mid-1970s, studies on the way our conceptual systems are organized have been a primary focus of attention in linguistics. One of the areas in which most efforts have been made is the study of metaphor. Such scholars as Lakoff, Johnson, Turner, and others have been able to unravel many of the intricacies of the English metaphorical system. In so doing, they have been able to determine to a large extent the nature of conceptual systems and their interrelations. One of the important breakthroughs in their research has been their understanding of metaphor as a conceptual rather than a merely linguistic phenomenon. For them, metaphor is a conceptual mapping of a source domain to a target domain, where aspects of the source are made to correspond with the target. Such correspondences allow us to reason about the target domain using our knowledge about the source domain (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Lakoff 1993a, 1993b).

One of the areas of special emphasis in recent cognitive studies is the determination of generic-level structure for metaphor (see Lakoff and Turner, 1989, and particularly Lakoff 1993a).¹ A well-known example of generic-level structure is the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 162-166), which maps a single specific-level schema onto a potentially indefinite number of specific-level schemas which share the same generic-level structure as the source-domain schema. This mapping is typically applied in the understanding of proverbs when used in particular situa-

tions. For example, from the situation depicted in the common saying *A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush* we derive the generic information that we are wise not to risk something we already have for something—no matter how valuable—which we might try to obtain. This information may be mapped to specific situations where someone is becoming involved in that kind of risk. Another well-known generic metaphor is what Lakoff (1993a) has called the Event Structure Metaphor. In it, the source domain is space and the target domain is an event. Some of the correspondences are: states are locations; changes are movements; purposes are destinations; means are paths; difficulties are impediments to motion; external events are moving objects. Some aspects of this general metaphor, as will be seen, are related to image-schematic structure. As an example of the power of this metaphor, consider the range of applicability of one of its correspondences: purposes are destinations. This would explain why a sentence like *We're going nowhere* makes sense whether said by a businessman who is worried about the development of his business, by an angry secondary school teacher talking about the little progress made by her students, or by a lover who is about to break off her engagement.

The increasing interest in the study of generic level in metaphor coincides with the discovery of other generic-level conceptual constructs, like image schemata. Image schemata have been investigated by Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1989, 1990, 1993a), among others, and can be defined as abstractions or generalizations over spatial concepts. The clearest examples of image schemata include the container, path, and orientation schemata. Each image schema consists of a number of structural elements and a basic logic which can be applied for abstract reasoning. For example, the container schema consists of an interior, an exterior, and a boundary; also, its basic logic tells us that everything is either inside or outside a container, and that if A is inside container B, and B inside C, then A is inside C (see Lakoff 1989: 116). Image schemata have been found to structure various semantic domains, (like the field of visual perception; see Faber and Pérez 1993); they have also been found to lie at the base of a large number of metaphorical constructions (see Fornés and Ruiz de Mendoza 1996). Following up this line of thought, it is my intention to give an account of the metaphorical expression of happiness and sadness in English in terms of the conjunction of the generic Event Structure metaphor, as analysed by Lakoff (1993a), and the container, path, and orientation image schemata. The domain of sadness (and indirectly, the domain of happiness) has already been analysed in great detail in Barcelona (1986). However, our own analysis differs from Barcelona's in several re-

spects; in that ours attempts to be more explanatory than descriptive, which is achieved by the use of generic-level structures where possible.

2. METAPHORS EXPRESSING HAPPINESS AND SADNESS

According to Lakoff and Turner (1989: 52), "metaphors are the principal way we have of conceptualizing abstract concepts." The concepts of happiness and sadness are no exception. In Barcelona (1986) there is an exhaustive description of the concept of depression in American English. Barcelona posits two types of metaphorical correspondences that structure the concept: one, perceptual; the other, ontological. The perceptual metaphors emerge directly from our experience and are divided into three types:

- (i) HAPPY IS UP, UNHAPPY IS DOWN (e.g. *John is really down*);
- (ii) HAPPINESS IS LIGHT, UNHAPPINESS IS DARKNESS (e.g. *These are black tidings*);
- (iii) HAPPY IS WARM, UNHAPPY IS COLD (e.g. *Those are really bleak prospects (i.e. 'cold and cheerless prospects')*).

The structural metaphors, according to Barcelona, are used to structure aspects of other concepts besides depression and they constitute a vast array, among which we have THE CAUSE OF DEPRESSION IS A VIOLENT FORCE (e.g. *that event crushed him*); HAPPINESS IS HEALTH, DEPRESSION IS ILLNESS (e.g. *She had a fit of depression*); DEPRESSION IS A LIVING ORGANISM (e.g. *His unhappiness is growing*); DEPRESSION IS AN ENEMY OR OPPONENT (e.g. *He was seized yesterday by a violent depression*); DEPRESSION IS A BOUNDED SPACE (e.g. *I fell into a deep depression*). As an example of the way the source domains of these metaphors can be applied to structure other target domains, take the case of violent forces. If we speak of a *blow for a cause* (or an ideal, belief, etc.), we think of positive action that helps it to succeed (i.e. causes it to succeed). Something is said to have a *punch* if it is particularly effective. A *hit* at someone is a clever remark or sarcasm intended to be harmful. And so on. These are instances of the more general metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES.

Our classification of happiness/sadness metaphors, however, will differ from the twofold division mentioned here. Our method will be to try to establish as many degrees of generality as possible with the purpose of endowing our account with a higher degree of simplicity and explanatory power. This will have two effects: first, this metaphorical domain will be explained

in terms of more general domains which ultimately respond to the general Event Structure metaphor; second, the internal logic of the metaphors in the domain will be understood in terms of the general logic for image-schemata. The result, it is hoped, will be the combination of these two general conceptual constructs.

According to Lakoff (1993b), in the Event Structure metaphor CHANGE IS MOTION and CAUSES ARE FORCES. However, the metaphor is based on two different conceptualization systems. One is the *location system*, and the other the *object system*. In the former, change is the motion of the thing-changing from one place to another, while in the latter change is the motion of an object to, or away from, the thing-changing, in such a way that change is seen as the acquisition or loss of an object. Thus, in *I'm in trouble*, trouble is a location, but in *I have trouble*, trouble is a possession. In both cases, trouble is being attributed to the subject.

The Location System

Container Metaphors

A. ENTITIES ARE CONTAINERS (BOUNDED REGIONS)

It is possible to think of any entity as a bounded region in space. This has important implications which derive from the internal logic of the container image-schema. Its basic logic has already been outlined by Lakoff (1989) and was sketched above. Of this internal logic Fornés and Ruiz de Mendoza (1996) have provided an expanded version, which is presented below with some modifications:

- a) If A is in B, and B in C, then A is in C.
- b) Being a bounded region a container has a limited capacity. An excess of something inside it may alter or even damage its structure or functionality (eg. an excess of fluid may burst out by breaking the container walls or it may simply overflow).
- c) In a container may be found two types of cognitively basic entities: people and things (animals and plants may enjoy either status, as required; events and situations are usually treated as things).
- d) The interior of a container may protect the entity or entities inside it from any harmful exterior conditions. Conversely, harmful interior conditions may affect the entities inside the container negatively.

e) The interior of a container may prevent the entity or entities inside it from enjoying beneficial exterior conditions. Conversely, beneficial interior conditions may affect the entities inside the container positively.

f) If the entities inside a container are dynamic, they may interact more easily than if they are outside or than if some of them are separated off by the container boundaries. If some entity has will-power it may want to control (that is, to set behavioural restrictions over) all or part of the others. Control may be prevented by container boundaries.

g) The type of entities found in its interior may affect the container either positively or negatively.

This expanded version is the result of combining the basic container logic with other experientially basic concepts like control, harm, and benefit.² The various aspects of the resulting logic lie at the base of a large number of metaphors dealing with emotions, and more particularly with the domains of happiness and sadness. We discuss many of these metaphors below.

A.1. ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE CONTAINERS

Aspects (e) and (f) of the container logic are relevant here. Sometimes we can think of ourselves or of other people as being inside a container. The conditions inside the container are then seen as having an effect on us, which may be either positive (causing happiness) or negative (causing sadness). In order to establish the axiological orientation of these conditions, this metaphor usually interacts with others like the HAPPY IS UP, UNHAPPY IS DOWN metaphors (see below).

Examples:

To be in a black mood, to be in a good/bad mood, to put somebody in a good/bad mood, to be in high/low spirits.

A.2. EMOTIONAL STATES ARE CONTAINERS

This metaphor is a specification of the former more general one. In it, the target entity is a particular emotional state. When people are inside a container, they are potentially affected by what they find in it. One can enter a state or go out of it just as one can enter or leave a container or bounded region.

Examples:

To enter a state of euphoria/happiness/sadness, etc., to be in mourning, to fall into a depression, to emerge from the catatonic state one has been in, to wallow in self-pity/despair/misery, etc.

A.3. PEOPLE ARE CONTAINERS

Here we are dealing with aspect (g) of the container logic. Since in this metaphor the container is an experiencing entity endowed with feelings, the positive or negative quality of the entities found in its interior will cause feelings of happiness or sadness.

This may be put in relation to what Lakoff (1993b) has called the DIVIDED PERSON metaphor. In it we conceive of people as an ensemble of two separable entities, called the Self (the bodily and functional aspects of a person, including our emotions) and the Subject (our experiencing consciousness and rationality), the Subject being inside (or in possession of, or above) the Self. In application of this metaphor, we may argue that the PEOPLE ARE CONTAINERS metaphor is in fact THE SELF IS A CONTAINER metaphor. Emotions are usually seen as fluids³ located inside the Self and controlled by the Subject. Any non-controlled change in the normal emotional balance of a person is consequently pictured as having some sort of physical effect on the Self. This agrees with the nature of the examples we have found. For example, the metaphorical expression *burst with pride* suggests a violent physical reaction of the Self which has gone unchecked by the Subject. This happens in application of aspect (g) of the container logic.

Examples:

To feel/be full of joy, joyful, cheerful, gleeful, mirthful, sorrowful, mournful, rueful, doleful, woeful, painful, joyless, cheerless, etc., to contain one's joy, to burst into tears, to be crushed, to be broken, to burst with pride/happiness, etc.

The basic-level metaphor PEOPLE ARE CONTAINERS can be further specified. As a consequence, we find some specific metaphors which can be grouped under the heading DIFFERENT (RELEVANT) PARTS OF THE SELF ARE CONTAINERS FOR THE EMOTIONS. by means of perspectivization (see Taylor 1989), we can highlight some parts of a container and hide others (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980). For instance, if people are containers, the different parts of the body or Self are containers as well. Thus, attention can be focussed on the head disregarding such other parts as the trunk, limbs and so on. This is what Lakoff and Johnson call the used and unused parts of the metaphor.

A.3.1. THE HEAD IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS

The eyes are a functionally prominent part of the head. Much of what we experience and learn—as we say—comes through the eyes. Different eye positions are taken as signs of different emotions. Thus,

the eyes become containers for emotions. Since the eyes are located in the head, the head may be felt as containing the same type of emotions as the eyes.

Examples:

Somebody's eyes can be filled with happiness/sadness; there can be happiness/sadness in somebody's eyes; happiness/sadness shows in somebody's eyes; eyes brim with tears, tears well up, etc.

We can also come across related cases where we focus our attention on the surface of the container: for instance, someone's face.

Examples:

A smile leaves someone's face; wipe that smile off your face (cf. "To shake off one's depression," where the surface is the whole body).

A.3.2. THE HEART IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS

Johnson (1987: 88) observes that Lakoff and Zoltan Kövecses have argued that emotions like anger can be regarded as a model of hot fluid within a container. In this way, several metaphors can be constructed: emotions can simmer, well up, overflow, boil over, erupt and explode when the pressure builds up. In order to reestablish an equilibrium one can express, release or let out the emotions. We try to attain an emotional balance by repressing, suppressing, holding in or putting a lid on our emotions. On the other hand, there can be too little emotional pressure. As a result, lethargy, dullness and lack of energy appear.

The heart is often seen as the place where emotions are located (probably because our experience tells us that when we are sad or worried about something we feel as if our chests were oppressed). Thus, like our bodies, our hearts can be filled with anger, bitterness, pride, happiness, sorrow, etc.; or they can be empty of emotions, or these emotions may overflow, and so on.

Emotional distress is often expressed in terms of heart trouble. Thus, to have a broken or a bleeding heart is a clear sign of unhappiness. This conceptualization is interesting for two reasons: first, it is based on a metonymy according to which the entities inside the container (the emotions) stand for the container (the heart); second, it also responds to another metaphorical mapping, where—as suggested by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 58)—happiness is seen as health and life, and sadness as sickness and death.

Examples:

To be heartbroken or brokenhearted, to be sick at heart/heartsick, to have a heartache, to have an aching heart, to have a bleeding heart.

Vertically Metaphors

Two important correspondences are regulated by the up/down orientational image-schema:

Euphoria and happiness are being up/ in a high location.

Depression and sadness are being down/ in a low location.

A.4. HAPPY IS UP, SAD IS DOWN

Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 15) have attempted to explain the experiential basis for this metaphor: "drooping posture goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state." But this provides only a partial explanation of this metaphoric mapping. For example, while it accounts neatly for a metaphor like *She's a bit crestfallen*, it cannot deal well with such a common expression as *She's down*. We may suggest a complementary explanation for cases like this in terms of the notion of control: if one is/goes up, one is in a higher location than if one is/goes down; a high location provides the person with a vantage point and consequently with control over other people or things, but a low location involves the subject's inferiority with respect to other people or things. Therefore, high locations are positive (or good) and related to happiness, whereas low locations are negative (or bad) and related to sadness.

Examples:

—Explicit *Up-Down* orientation:

To perk up, to cheer up, to brighten up, to feel up.

To be/feel down, to be downcast, to be downhearted, to be down in the mouth, to be down in the dumps, to be bowed down.

—Implicit *Up-Down* orientation:

To be on top of the world, to be over the moon, to make somebody's day rise, to lift somebody's spirits, something gives someone a lift, to boost somebody's spirits, somebody's smile keeps someone else soaring, somebody's spirits rise, to be on cloud nine.

To be crestfallen, to be chapfallen, to fall into a depression, somebody's spirits sink, to be depressed, to be dejected.

A slight variation on this metaphor is HAPPY IS HIGH, SAD IS LOW. This metaphor appears either in isolation (that is, based exclusively on the up/down orientation schema) or in combination with the container logic. When this happens, it yields the more specific mapping TO BE HAPPY IS TO BE IN A HIGH LOCATION / TO BE SAD IS TO BE IN A LOW LOCATION.

Examples:

To be in high or fine feather, to be in high spirits, to reach new heights of ecstasy, to be high as a kite, to be in Paradise, to be in Heaven, to be in one's seventh Heaven (also, to be in Eden/Elysium, Arcadia, which, interestingly, are sometimes thought to be, like Heaven and Paradise, high places).

To be in low spirits, to be low, to be (down) in the dumps, to be in the depths or bowels of despair, to be in the pits, to be in Hell.

Some of these metaphors combine with aspects (d) and (e) of the container logic. Thus, low places like a pit (or Hell, in our culture) affect the person inside negatively. A pit is dark and difficult to escape from. High places, in contrast, are often associated with pleasant conditions.

The Object System

B. EMOTIONAL STATES ARE POSSESSIONS

Emotional states are often treated as physical entities that can be transferred. Transfers involve the path schema. However, the logic of this schema (eg. each point on the path must be passed through before reaching the destination) plays a much less important role for these metaphors than the container logic for the location system. This is mainly due to the fact that the emphasis here is on control, as will be made clear below. The general mapping is:

- Something abstract (emotions) becomes something concrete (possessions)
- To take, get or have an emotion is to possess something concrete.
- To shake off, lose or banish an emotion is to lose or get rid of something concrete.

Typically, possessions are controlled entities. The possessor may get rid of them at will. However, it is often the case that someone becomes a possessor unwittingly. Thus, sometimes a harmful entity may affect the possessor for a certain amount of time without the possessor being aware of it; or there are cases in which a person, though aware of the potential harm, is not

really doing anything effective about it. These are situations which pertain to our knowledge about possession and that have found their way into a number of metaphorical expressions.

Examples:

To take heart from something, to take (great, little, no, etc.) pleasure in something, to take (great, little, no, etc.) delight in something, to have the blues, to have depressions, to shake off one's depression, to lose heart, to banish the blues.

In the case of "take/lose heart," meaning 'take or lose courage' we have a metaphor which is based on a metonymy which is, in turn, based on a metaphorical application of the container image-schema. The heart is thought to be the container for our feelings, emotions, and attitudes, as we indicated above. Courage is, in this view, an emotion to be found in the heart. If one takes heart, one is (metaphorically) taking the container for the thing in the container (this is the metonymy). The result is the possession of a beneficial entity which, once within the control sphere of the possessor, endows the possessor with positive qualities.

Complementary Metaphors

These metaphors respond to requirements from either of the two systems. For example, one noteworthy complementary system is based on the weather. On some occasions, people talk about a weather-related mood. The weather is a visible event which pervades everyday experience and affects our lives. There is, therefore, an experiential correlation between good weather conditions and a good mood (for example, on a sunny day people can leave home and enjoy outdoor activities), and between bad weather and a bad mood (during bad weather people are usually confined to their homes).

Examples.⁴

A happy person has a sunny disposition, to be in a dark/black mood, to brighten up, to be dull (not sunny and thus, sad), to be bleak (cold, cheerless, depressing), to be a bit under the weather (a bit ill and therefore, sad).

The metaphorical mapping involved here, apart from the location and object systems already referred to, is:

C. INTERIOR EMOTIONS ARE EXTERNAL WEATHER CONDITIONS

The mapping consists of the following two correspondences:

-Happiness is good weather conditions
-Sadness is bad weather conditions
This metaphor, in turn, interacts with the following one:

D. HAPPINESS IS LIGHT AND LIGHT COLOURS, SADNESS IS DARKNESS AND ALL DARK COLOURS

The previous metaphorical mapping interacts with this one because good weather conditions are related to light colours and therefore, to happiness. On the other hand, bad weather conditions are associated with dark colours and therefore, with sadness. As a consequence, sadness is related to such dark colours as black, grey, leaden, drab, dull, and to other adjectives associated with darkness such as dismal, dreary, sombre, grave, lugubrious, and so on.

3. FINAL REMARKS

Johnson (1987: 45-48) deals with seven of the most common force structures that are usually found in our experience. Four of them are relevant to this consideration of happiness and sadness:

1. Compulsion. Sometimes we feel as if we were driven by external forces. In such cases, the subject has no control over the emotion.
2. Removal of restraint. When something such as a container is opened, we are free to come into it (for instance, "I entered a state of euphoria") or to get out of it (for example, "I emerged from the catatonic state I had been in for a long time"). On such occasions, the subject has some control over the interior of the container (the emotions).
3. Enablement. When people become aware that they have some control or power to carry out some action: for instance, "to banish the blues," etc.
4. Attraction. We are attracted to good or beneficial forces or emotions such as happiness and try to get rid of or to be far from harmful emotions or forces such as sadness so that they cannot control us because the further the subject is from the harmful force, the less control such a force has over the subject. For example, "I tried to emerge from the catatonic state I had been in, since it was driving me mad"; "I entered a state of euphoria."

This description reinforces our argument in favour of the importance of the notions of benefit, harm, and control for an account of metaphors dealing

with emotions. By way of conclusion, it may be noted that the effect of these notions on the container schema logic is the following:

A PERSON IS A CONTAINER (AND AN EMOTION IS AN INTRUDER)

—If a positive emotion (such as happiness) enters the container, such an emotion will affect the subject in a positive way.

—If a negative emotion (such as sadness) enters the container, such an emotion will affect the subject in a positive way if the subject controls it and in a negative way if the subject does not control it.

—If a positive emotion leaves the container, that will be harmful for the subject because he/she will not be affected by such a positive force any more.

—If a negative emotion leaves the container, that will be beneficial for the subject because the further away the emotion is from the subject, the less it will affect such a subject (in the same way, the nearer the emotion is to the container, the more such a container—the subject—is affected by the emotion).

AN EMOTION IS A CONTAINER (AND A PERSON IS AN INTRUDER)

—If a person enters "a positive emotion," either willingly or moved by some external force, that will be beneficial for the subject.

—If a person enters "a negative emotion," either willingly or moved by some external force, that will be harmful for the subject.

—If a person leaves a container, which stands for a negative emotion, that will be beneficial for the subject.

—If a person leaves a container, which stands for a positive emotion, that will be harmful for the subject because it will not be affected by such a positive force any more.

Finally, the logic underlying such emotions as happiness and sadness is intimately bound up with the Gestalts for force and control, with image-schemata, and with metaphoric and metonymic mappings, something which we tend to take for granted to such an extent that we are not easily aware of it. ☛

NOTES

1. Such generic structures have been related by Fauconnier and Turner (1994) to the theory of mental spaces (see Ruiz de Mendoza, 1996, for a review and criticism). Within the framework of pragmatics, the importance of postulating such generic structures has been stressed by Ruiz de Mendoza (1997) and Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (1996). In general, it may be safely admitted that the use of generic structures in language production and processing works in favour of the economy principle. It has further been noted that generic-level metaphors combine well with other generic conceptual models, like image-schemata (see Fornés and Ruiz de Mendoza, 1999).

2. Lakoff and Johnson have also expanded the basic logic of the container schema by means of what they like to call the "entailments" of the *in-out* orientation (see Johnson, 1987:22). They propose at least five: 1) protection; 2) restriction; 3) fixity of location; 4) accessibility to the view of some observer; 5) transitivity of containment. However, the version outlined by Fornés and Ruiz de Mendoza, and our expanded version above cannot be considered a "basic" logic but simply a generic logic resulting from the combination of generic conceptual constructs.

3. The correspondence between emotions and fluids derives from our everyday experience. Fluids build up pressure and break out of a container more readily than other physical entities.

4. Apart from happiness and sadness, there are other feelings which can be spoken of in terms of weather conditions. For example, warmth is related to friendliness (Warm means friendly in a pleasant way. Examples: *They gave us a very warm welcome, He was aware of the warmth of his feelings.* Moreover, *to be warm-hearted* means to have or show warm and friendly feelings). Broadly speaking, *Warm Is Friendly, Cold Is Unfriendly*. Thus, we have expressions like:

To be cool (not particularly friendly)

To be cold (very unfriendly)

To be warm (friendly)

This metaphor could be related to the *More Is Up* metaphor where the higher the temperature, the more friendly the situation or the person is and the lower the temperature, the less friendly the situation or the person is.

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THE "MEMO" PAGES OF FRANKLIN'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY: ON THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LIFE WRITING



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Benjamin Franklin did not live to finish his autobiography, which at the moment of his death in 1790 had grown into a sequence of four drafts written over a period of eighteen years.¹ Although a great deal of attention has been paid to the history of this truncated manuscript, such has not been the case with the transitional fragment that links the first two parts. The so-called "Memo" pages are structured around the two letters that Abel James and Benjamin Vaughan wrote to Franklin in 1783 urging him to continue the narrative of his life begun in 1771.² It is my contention that these pages function in the text of the *Autobiography* as a rite of institution and a *mise en abyme*, since they consecrate in a public context Franklin's first autobiographical effort while also featuring him in all the creative roles in which he appears in the rest of the narrative—author of his own life, of his life story, and of his nation.³ In the "Memo" pages life writing is treated as a conservative instrument of reproduction for transmitting certain values by means of print technologies, and as a disciplinary device for fashioning Americans after Franklin's example. Such values remain unexamined to the extent that Franklin succeeds in ventriloquizing his own thoughts through the voices of two characters (James and Vaughan) who praise him unreservedly and unanimously, and in demonizing other types of self-narration and other versions of his career that might have circulated concurrently with his own.

In the the first two parts of the *Autobiography* Franklin speaks privately to his son and to his friends James and Vaughan at the same time as he sends an institutional message to the generality of fellow Americans. The duplici-