THE ROLE OF SEMANTIC RELATIONS IN THE CREATION OF METONYMIC MAPPINGS

OLGA ISABEL DÍEZ VELASCO
Universidad de La Rioja

1. Introduction

Over the last decade, cognitive linguists have become more interested in metonymy, which has helped to place this cognitive phenomenon on equal terms with metaphor. Both metaphor and metonymy were first described by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) as mappings (i.e. sets of correspondences) between conceptual domains, locating the difference between them on the nature of the domains involved; that is to say, in metaphor the mapping occurs between two separate conceptual domains, whereas in metonymy there is a domain internal relationship. One of the main concerns of numerous studies on metonymy has been to set up typologies of metonymic mappings from various perspectives. Underlying these classifications there is often an attempt to understand the nature of metonymic processes. For example, Dirven (1993) defines metonymy in contrast to metaphor by refining Jakobson's (1971) distinction between the syntagmatic (metonymic) and paradigmatic (metaphoric) poles and puts forward a classification which is based on the types of syntagmatic association that exist between conceptual domains; Kövecses and Radden (1998) focus on the kinds of cognitive model that are able to generate metonymies, but they make no explicit attempt to provide the criteria for a systematic classification. Moreover, the parameters chosen are not always sufficient to establish the motivation of every metonymic mapping. For instance, Kövecses and Radden (1998) mention some

metonymic mappings which cannot be fitted in any of the metonymic types which they offer. We suggest that it is possible to develop a more consistent typology based on the relational system put forward for the construction of propositional idealised cognitive models[1] or ICMs by Ruiz de Mendoza (1996), and that such a typology would meet the difficulties mentioned above.

On the other hand, several authors have argued that these two cognitive processes (namely, metaphor and metonymy) represent the most important factors involved in meaning extension (cf. Taylor 1989: 122; Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 117) and, consequently, in the creation of polysemous words. For instance, Kövecses and Radden (1998: 45) define polysemy as a concept metonymy where the shift from concept (A) to concept (B) is not followed by a shift in form. However, the types of process which account for its appearance are still a matter of study. We observe that the relationship we postulate between metonymies and semantic relations proves useful in dealing effectively with metonymy-based polysemy.

In what follows an attempt has been made to show that Ruiz de Mendoza's (1996) relational system is adequate to provide a systematic classification of metonymy; an object of discussion will also be the consequences that the usage of this typology may bring about for our conception of metonymy and for the understanding of the relationships that hold between polysemous words. The examples selected for our analysis have been borrowed from the British National Corpus (BNC). Furthermore, some of the metonymies which are most frequently quoted in the literature will be examined.

2. The domain-internal nature of metonymy

Ruiz de Mendoza (1997, 1999a, 2000) has discussed in some detail the nature of the relationship that exists between the source and target domains of a metonymic mapping. This author has argued against the cognitive relevance of traditional part-for-part metonymies by showing that this type of mapping is inconsequential in terms of processing. In this connection he has posited the existence of only two basic kinds of metonymic mapping: one, the *source-in-target* type, in which the source is a subdomain of the target, expands and develops a domain of which the source highlights a relevant aspect (e.g. *The piano has the flu today* where "the piano" is a subdomain of "the musician who plays it"); the other, the *target-in-source* type, in which the target is a subdomain of the source, has the function of highlighting a relevant aspect of the source domain (e.g. *Nixon bombed Hanoi* where by "Nixon" we refer to "the army that carried out the bombing", which is a subdomain of our knowledge about this president). This second kind of mapping is often used when the speaker feels unable to pin down accurately the actual nature of the target (e.g. in *The White House isn't doing anything*, it is either

the president or some government officials or committee that is actually doing nothing). This difference in the communicative import of each metonymic type lends support to the claim for a two-fold classification of metonymy.

Furthermore, this distinction proves relevant when it comes to explaining certain phenomena of anaphoric reference in relation to metonymy. Compare examples (1) and (2):

(1) The piano has the flu today and *he* won't come to the rehearsal.

(2) Nixon bombed Hanoi; *he* did not know what *he* was doing.

In (1) the anaphoric pronoun refers to the target domain of the metonymy (i.e. the piano player) whereas in (2) the pronoun is bound to the source domain (i.e. Nixon). In both cases anaphoric reference is made to what Ruiz de Mendoza calls the *matrix domain*, i.e. the most encompassing of the two domains involved in a metonymic mapping, no matter whether it is the source or the target of the metonymy. The preference for anaphoric reference to the matrix domain has also been observed in high-level metonymy (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez 2001). Thus, an analysis along these lines has shed light on certain metonymies such as EFFECT FOR CAUSE, where each of the domains involved could be claimed to be somehow presupposed by the other. Consider (3), borrowed from Panther and Thornburg (2000: 226), as a typical instance of this kind of mapping:

(3) What's that noise?

This question, which is metonymically interpreted as *What is the cause of that noise?*, can only be answered by making reference to the target domain (cf. ?*The noise is a burglar*; *The cause of that noise is a burglar*). Since only the cause of the noise is available for reference, it is this domain that should be considered the matrix domain.

Finally, the distinction between source-in-target and target-in-source metonymies is also relevant for the derivation of non-implicated meaning in conceptual interaction between metaphor and metonymy (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza 1999b). Briefly, the target-in-source type serves to highlight the metaphoric correspondence which is central to an understanding of the interaction, whereas source-in-target metonymies provide the conceptual material needed to develop the basic structure of the metaphor. By way of illustration, take the following two examples from Ruiz de Mendoza (2000: 120):

(4) He kept his eyes peeled for pick pockets.

(5) She could read my mind.

As figure (1) shows, example (4) contains an instantiation of a source-in-target metonymy. This mapping develops the target of the metaphor so as to provide

access to a full interpretation of it: the effort someone is making to keep alert. Conversely, in (5) the metonymy belongs to the target-in-source type and serves to stress the role of the correspondence where it takes place (see figure 2), in this case the ability to understand someone's thoughts (for further discussion on conceptual interaction see Ruiz de Mendoza 1999b; Díez 2000).



FIGURE 1: *To keep someone's eyes peeled*



FIGURE 2: *To read someone's mind*

3. Relational arches and metonymic mappings

In the introduction we have hinted at the possibility of developing a taxonomy of metonymic mappings which is not based on merely intuitive grounds and suggested that Ruiz de Mendoza's (1996) model provides a systematic basis for this classification where the metonymic extensions of a concept are obtained through the activation of relational arches. In this model, propositional knowledge is organised in terms of networks of conceptual schemas[2] which consist of a set of general defining conditions (which are termed *definers*) that are instantiated by means of relational activations. These relational arches form a delimited set which accounts for both the internal nature of concepts and their external relation to other concepts. Although the notion of relational arches may

seem to converge somehow with Fauconnier's (1985) proposal of *pragmatic functions*,[3] there is a difference in that relational arches systematise the whole range of different ways in which various aspects of a concept may be accessed, while Fauconnier's pragmatic functions are not part of a system but rather are postulated on an *ad hoc* basis. In fact, one of the main advantages of Ruiz de Mendoza's model is that it allows us to systematise a description of not only the core but also the periphery of any concept.

As far as internal relations are concerned, Ruiz de Mendoza (1996) has distinguished the following thirteen relational arches: agentive (an entity carries out a controlled activity or action), factitive (an entity carries out a controlled activity from which another entity results), purposive (an entity is the means or instrument whereby the previous relations hold), causative (either an entity or an event is responsible for the coming about of another event), resultative (an entity is the compulsory result of an activity), processual, originatory (an entity has no control over the state of affairs in which it is involved), positioner (two entities are related and it is up to one of the two to decide if the relationship holds), material, container, locative, partitive (an entity is the material, or the container, or the location, or part of another entity) and attributive (a property or set of properties is ascribed to an entity).[4]

Regarding external arches, he distinguishes five relations: classifying (an entity is the hyperordinate of another entity), identifying, contrasting, opposing (two entities are related in terms of their similarities, differences or common features) and analogising (two entities are compared by means of another relation). However, only the classifying arch can activate metonymic mappings because the other four link entities which are not in a domain-subdomain relationship. Let us now consider (6) from Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 38) and (7) from the *Master Metonymy List*:[5]

(6) Napoleon lost at Waterloo.

(7) Jack Nicholson was really mean to Batman.

In (6) there is no doubt that Napoleon did not lose the battle himself, but that, as the commander of the French army, he was responsible for the defeat. Hence, *Napoleon*, which is the source domain of the metonymic mapping, stands for the French army that fought at Waterloo. In (7) there is an instantiation of the ACTOR FOR ROLE metonymic mapping since *Jack Nicholson* is used to refer to *the role he plays in a film*.

At first sight it may seem that these two metonymic mappings have nothing in common. However, a closer inspection reveals that they share the relational arch through which their source and target domains are connected. Let us explain this in more detail. We propose that the source and target domains of every

metonymic mapping are connected by a relational arch that allows this mapping to take place and determines the nature of their relationship. As has been mentioned above, one of the semantic relations Ruiz de Mendoza (1996) distinguishes is the agentive one. It applies to entities which carry out an activity or an action that is commonly associated with them. Note that actions are normally goal-oriented (e.g. *The police arrested the thief*) while activities are not (e.g. *John runs*). Thus, the concepts *cat* and *mouse* are linked by this arch since *cats chase mice*. Similarly, *Napoleon* and *Jack Nicholson* are connected to *army* and *role* respectively through this agentive arch. For instance, in (6) the relation between *Napoleon* and *army* can be linguistically instantiated as *Napoleon controls his army*[6], while in (7) the way the agentive arch links *Jack Nicholson* and *role* can be realised as *Jack Nicholson plays a role in the film*. In brief, the metonymic extensions of a concept are developed through the activation of relational arches. Let us add another example to see how this works:

(8) Peter drank two bottles.

Example (8) is an instantiation of the CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS metonymic mapping, where the source (*bottle*) and target (*its liquid*) domains are linked through the container arch. This arch includes those metonymies where the relation that exists between the source and target domains is one in which one of them is prototypically seen inside the other. Hence, the relationship between the concepts of *bottle* and *liquid* can be realised as *A bottle contains liquid*.

In the traditional view, metonymy has usually been defined it as a relation between two contiguously related conceptual entities (Ullmann 1962). The use of the term 'contiguity' in the definition was possibly motivated by the difficulty they found in gauging the exact nature of the relationship that holds between the source and target domains of a metonymy. Nevertheless, the taxonomy of metonymic mappings proposed here helps to flesh out the rather vague notion of *contiguity*, which, from our point of view, can be redefined more accurately in terms of relational arches. Hence, we say that there exists contiguity between two concepts whenever they can be related through any of the arches proposed in Ruiz de Mendoza's (1996) model. Consider again the ACTOR FOR ROLE metonymic mapping in (7). The reason why we intuitively understand that a contiguity relation holds between the source (*Jack Nicholson*) and target (*role*) domains is that they are linked by an agentive arch. Therefore, the source and target domains of a metonymy are frequently described as contiguous because in the semantic network they are connected by a relational arch that makes possible the activation of the target domain when the source domain is activated.

This is only an illustration of the way Ruiz de Mendoza's (1996) semantic relations may be used to make explicit the links between the source and target domains of a metonymic mapping. Nevertheless, since it seems possible to classify

metonymies according to the semantic arch that relates the source and target domains, we argue that these relational arches should also serve to label the different categories of our typology. As a result, all the metonymic mappings connected by a container arch such as (8) should belong to the *container type* or may be called *container metonymies*. In the same way, it is easier to perceive the similarities that exist between the metonymic mappings NAPOLEON FOR ARMY and JACK NICHOLSON FOR ROLE if we observe that both of them are instantiations of the agentive arch, and therefore, agentive metonymies.

4. A taxonomy of metonymic mappings

In the previous section it has been seen that semantic relational arches can serve to make explicit the links that exist between the source and target domains of a metonymic mapping and it has been argued that they provide a consistent basis for a classification of metonymic types. In this section we shall provide an outline of the different categories of our taxonomy. Although all the examples we have analysed so far can be described and classified according to Ruiz de Mendoza's (1996) system, because of space limitations we shall only include some illustrative instances of each metonymic type.

The first metonymic type which we distinguish is the agentive one. This relation has already been dealt with in the previous section, so it will be enough to discuss just one more example:

(9) The ham sandwich is waiting for his check.

In (9) *the ham sandwich* metonymically stands for *the customer* within the restaurant frame; and both domains are linked by means of the agentive arch as illustrated by the following prototypical linguistic realisation of the relationship that holds between the source (*ham sandwich*) and target (*customer*) domains: *A ham sandwich is ordered/eaten by a customer*. Other metonymies belonging to this type are VEHICLE FOR DRIVER (e.g. *The buses are on strike today*), MUSICAL INSTRUMENT FOR PLAYER (e.g. *The sax got sick*) or ROLE FOR ACTOR (e.g. *Hamlet was wonderful tonight*), among many others.

As regards the factitive type, it includes all the metonymies whose source and target domains are related by means of the factitive arch. This arch connects an entity that carries out an activity with the entity which comes into existence as a result of this activity. For example, *baker* and *bread* are linked by this arch since bread is the result of the activity of a baker (i.e. a baker makes bread). By way of illustration, consider the following examples:

(10) (a) He always enjoys reading Shakespeare
(b) He's got a Degas in his bedroom.

In (10a) we find a case of the AUTHOR FOR WORK metonymic mapping where by *Shakespeare* we refer to *his literary work. Shakespeare*, being a writer, performs the activity most typically associated with him (*writing*) and as a result another entity (*his literary work*) comes into being. Similarly, in (10b) *Degas* stands for *one of his paintings* Note that the picture comes into being as a result of Degas' activity of painting. Therefore, the source and target domains of these metonymic mappings are linked by the factitive arch, which makes it possible to say that (10a) and (10b) contain instantiations of factitive metonymies.

Purposive metonymies are those which are activated by a purposive arch. Through it, any of the entities involved in an action are connected to the instrument or other means used for carrying it out. This relation is instantiated in the following example: *A painter draws a picture with pastels*, where the purposive arch allows us to relate "pastels" to "painter" and "picture". Now consider (11):

(11) You give me a hand to clear my room.

Example (11) contains a metonymic mapping where *hand* is used metonymically to stand for *help*. This occurs because *hand* is considered the body part which is more closely connected with the notion of *help*. Let us explain the reason why. You need your hands for tidying or cleaning or, in general, for carrying out most activities that require physical work. Since whenever you help someone, you let him benefit from your work, a hand plays a prominent role in the *help* domain (i.e. you stereotypically use your hands when helping someone). It is the purposive arch that relates both domains (*help* and *hand*) and allows the mapping to take place. For instance, in this sentence the relationship between the source and target domains of the metonymic mapping could be linguistically instantiated as *He uses his hands for helping someone to clear the room up*. Another instance of a purposive metonymy is found in *Wilde was the wittiest pen of his time*, where "pen" metonymically stands for "writer" (cf. *A writer uses a pen for writing*).

With regard to the causative relational arch, an entity or an event is considered to be the cause of another event. This is the kind of relationship that holds between *attack* and *death* (i.e. a heart attack causes death). Let us consider again example (3) which we repeat for convenience as (12):

(12) What is that noise?

Imagine that (12) is uttered in a context in which a person is woken up in the middle of the night by a strong noise. Here, *that noise* refers to *the cause of that noise.* Thus, an answer which describes the noise (e.g. *It is a high pitched noise*) will be found irrelevant or not appropriate whereas one that provides some information about the possible cause will not (e.g. *It is a burglar*). This is an instance of a causative metonymy since the effect is used to refer to the cause of an event (EFFECT FOR CAUSE). A

possible linguistic realisation of the relationship that holds between the source and target domains is *A noise may be caused by a burglar when trying to break into a house.* In the processual relation an entity is conceived as taking part in an activity over which it has no control. This is the arch that links *river* and *to flow* (i.e. a river flows). An example in which the processual arch allows the activation of a metonymy can be observed in (13):

(13) This plant flowers between June and August.

In (13) there is a metonymic mapping where the entity involved in a process metonymically refers to the process as a whole (i.e. *flower* stands for *the process in which flowers appear and open*). This is a case of a grammatical metonymy[7] since the metonymic mapping entails the transformation of a noun into a verb; in other words, there is a recategorisation process, which has syntactic consequences. All metonymic instantiations of the processual type are grammatical metonymies (cf. *rain, snow, bloom, blossom, thunder*). This is grounded in the fact that in this semantic relation there is only one entity involved and, consequently, the metonymic mapping has to include the activity as a whole in one of its domains.

Positioner metonymies include those mappings where there is a relationship between two entities and one of the entities controls[8] a situation and can thus choose whether or not the relation holds (e.g. *A rich man has riches*) as shown in (14):

(14) Mrs Kennedy married power.

It is obvious that since only people (animate entities) can get married, *power*, being inanimate, can never be the object of the verb *marry* in its literal sense. *Power* is the source domain of a metonymic mapping whose target is a *powerful person.* The source and target domains of this metonymy are connected by the positioner arch which allows the mapping to take place (i.e. a powerful person has power and it is up to this person whether to exercise this power or not). The use of this metonymy highlights the fact that what made Mrs Kennedy get married was the fact that her husband was powerful. This communicative effect would be lost in a literal version of (14) (e.g. *Mrs Kennedy married a powerful man*).

Material metonymies account for those mappings where the source and target domains can be described as being the material out of which the other is made, as evidenced in (15):

(15) (a) At the cocktail party, there were women in furs and men in overcoats.
(b) Bring her a glass of water.
(c) Could you polish the silver?

In (15a), *fur* does not refer to a material (i.e. the hair that grows on the body of mammals) but to the piece of clothing that is made of it (stereotypically, a coat). Hence, in this example there is an instantiation of the MATERIAL FOR OBJECT

metonymic mapping where both domains are related by means of the material arch that activates the metonymic mapping (i.e. fur is the material of coats). The same relation holds between the source and target domains in (15b) and (15c). Thus, *glass* as a substance stands for a container made out of it and *silver* metonymically refers to objects fabricated from this metal.

In locative metonymies the source and target domains are conceived in such a way that one of the two is seen as the typical location of the other. This metonymic type is frequently found in metonymies related to institutions such as *the White House*, *the Kremlin*, *Wall Street* and *Buckingham Palace*.[9] However, it is not restricted to these cases, as the following example from the *Master Metonymy List* show:

(16) (a) He loves fine china.
(b) The stadium clapped his performance.

Example (16a) is an instantiation of the LOCATION FOR PRODUCT MADE THERE metonymic mapping where *china* stands for *porcelain*. This is grounded in the fact that porcelain (the source) was formerly made in China (the target). Besides, this country is considered to produce the best quality porcelain. It goes without saying that both domains are connected by means of the locative arch, which could be linguistically instantiated as *China is the place where porcelain is made*. In (16b) there is another locative metonymy where a place (i.e. *stadium*) is used to refer to the people present there.

The partitive arch links entities where one of them is conceived as composed of other entities (e.g. pistol/trigger). Thus, in the domain-subdomain relationship that is established in a metonymy, the matrix domain is considered to be composed of different parts and one of them is the subdomain chosen in the mapping, as evidenced in the following example:

(17) Suspicions quickly find ready ears.

Sentence (17) is an instantiation of the EAR FOR PERSON metonymic mapping. As the ear is considered the body part most closely connected to hearing,[10] its choice as the source domain has to do with the intention to highlight a state of affairs in which people are listening. Hence, (17) portrays a situation is which *ears* refer to people that are eager to listen to criticism of others. As has already been mentioned, there exists a partitive relational arch between the source and the target (i.e. the ear is a part of the person) which makes possible the activation of the metonymy. The partitive type also accounts for the following metonymies: WHEELS FOR CAR (e.g. *I've got a new set of wheels*), TELEPHONE FOR RECEIVER (e.g. *He picked up the telephone*) or WINDMILL FOR VANE (e.g. *The windmill is turning*). As is evident, the partitive arch lies at the basis of the generic PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, of which all the metonymies mentioned here are instances.

As was mentioned in the previous section, container metonymies include metonymies where one of the domains is regarded as holding the other in its interior. One of the main characteristics of this arch is that it entails that the entity which acts as a receptacle must be conceptualised as three-dimensional. In fact, the notion of three-dimensionality is what differentiates the container from the locative arch. Take the following example:

(18) Ian smokes more than two packets a day.

(18) shows an instantiation of the CONTAINER FOR CONTENT metonymic mapping since people do not smoke packets but their content (the cigarettes). Note that a box or packet is prototypically conceived of as a container whose main function is to hold objects within itself. Thus, the source and target domains are linked by the container arch which could prototypically be realised as *A packet contains cigarettes*. Other metonymies belonging to this type are offered in (19):

(19) (a) The kettle is boiling
(b) Open the ketchup, please.

The attributive metonymic type includes those mappings in which an entity is so closely connected to a certain property that we refer to the entity through its property or the other way around. Consider the following example:

(20) They all kissed the Stars and Stripes before leaving.

In this sentence *Stars and Stripes* stands for *the United States flag*. This is based on the fact that the most prominent feature of a flag (i.e. what distinguishes it from the flags of other countries) is its design. Accordingly, the design of the United States flag (stars and stripes) is the property more typically ascribed to it, the flag (target) and its pattern (source) being linked by the attributive arch. Another instance of this metonymic type is found in *Blonds have more fun*, where "blonds" metonymically stands for "blond girls".

Finally, in the classifying metonymic type the source and target domains of the metonymic mapping hold a hyponymy relationship; in other words, they are seen in a hierarchy where the meaning of the hyperordinate term includes the meaning of its hyponyms (e.g. the concept *dog* includes the concept *husky*). Consider now the following example:

(21) She was sure Leo was taking drugs.

In (21) *drugs* stands for *illegal drugs* such as heroine or cocaine. Since drugs may refer to any chemical, this is a case in which a category as a whole is used to refer to a member of the category. Classifying metonymies are productively employed to refer to a product by means of the brand most commonly associated with it (e.g. Hoover for vacuum cleaner; Kleenex for tissue).

specify the set of potential metonymic extensions of any lexical item. In other words, the relationship we have observed between metonymic mappings and semantic relations can also be useful in accounting adequately for polysemy. Consider now the following examples:

(24) They harvested the cotton before it was ready.
(25) His family has a large cotton plantation in Missouri
(26) He is the one with the red cotton shirt.
(27) Apply a small quantity on a piece of cotton wool.
(28) There is a needle and cotton there.

These five examples instantiate some meanings of the word *cotton*; namely, in (24) we refer to the soft substance that grows in the pods of certain plants (COTTON 1), in (25) to the cotton plant (COTTON 2), in (26) to a type of cloth (COTTON 3), in (27) to the soft material obtained from cotton that is used to clean the skin (COTTON 4), and, in (28) both to the thread made from cotton (COTTON 5) and, by extension, to any kind of thread (COTTON 6). It will be observed all the different senses can be related by calling upon metonymies that exploit several relational arches. What follows will attempt to explain the way it works.

Firstly, (24) shows the most central sense of *cotton* (COTTON 1). This is the only domain which is shared by all the metonymic activations (see figure 5). However, the original meaning of *cotton* is not found in COTTON 1 but in COTTON 2. Hence, COTTON 1 is a metonymic extension which develops from the activation of the partitive arch since COTTON 1 is part of the cotton plant (COTTON 2). This is a fairly productive arch in this domain since plants and their fruit are often labelled by using the same name. Thus, we speak of a *cherry orchard*, *an olive grove*, or *a strawberry field*, and when we eat artichokes we only eat the centre of this vegetable.

Another very productive metonymic type for meaning extensions is the material one. Thus, COTTON 3, COTTON 4 and COTTON 5 are the result of activating this arch. For example, COTTON 1 is the material cotton wool (COTTON 4). This metonymic mapping is so highly lexicalised that on many occasions, the substance and the object most stereotypically obtained from it have the same name, the object always being a metonymic extension based on the material arch (cf. glass, silk, iron...).

Finally, it was mentioned that in (28) *cotton* could have two different interpretations according to the context. In the former, *cotton* refers to cotton thread (COTTON 5), the metonymic extension being activated by the material arch just mentioned. In the latter, *cotton* (COTTON 6) refers not only to thread made of cotton, but to any kind of thread. *Cotton thread* and *thread* are connected by a classifying arch since cotton thread is a type of thread. In COTTON 6, what

we have is a metonymic extension from a previous metonymic extension. The whole set of relationships that is established among the different meanings of the word 'cotton' is shown in figure 5:



FIGURE 5: Conventionalised metonymic extensions of cotton

In sum, we suggest that whenever the polysemous meanings of a word are based on metonymic mappings, they can be accounted for by postulating a primary central sense plus a number of extensions, each of which is based on a relational arch.

7. Conclusion

The analysis has shown that relational arches provide a very valuable tool for describing metonymies and help to define the relationship is that are established between the source and target domains of a metonymic mapping. Hence, semantic relations can be used to clarify the sometimes obscure notion of *contiguity*, which has often been said to be the basis of metonymy, but never defined on solid grounds. Moreover, we have suggested a taxonomy of metonymic mappings, based on these relational arches, which seems to overcome the main flaw of previous classifications: the lack of systematicity in the categories chosen.

Moreover, our typology is compatible with Ruiz de Mendoza's (1999b) distinction between two basic types of metonymies. This is shown in the fact that the two directions of realisation which exist for every arch coincide with the two metonymic types mentioned above. And this distinction holds consistently across all the possible instantiations of a metonymic type, i.e. once a specific metonymic mapping (CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED) belonging to a metonymic type (target-in-source) is linguistically realised in a given direction, all the metonymies activated by the same arch (agentive) in the same direction will belong to the same metonymic type (target-in source).

Finally, we have exemplified the way our typology can be used to deal with the phenomenon of polysemy and can help us reach a deeper understanding of the processes that give rise to metonymy-based polysemy. It has also been suggested that the patterns which operate in polysemy are sometimes conventionalised and apply in numerous instances: the relationship between COTTON 1 and COTTON 3 equals the relationship between the polysemous meanings of *glass* or *silk* (substance and object).

Notes

*. Correspondence to Olga Isabel Díez Velasco, c/ San Antón 12 - 2ª, 26002 Logroño, La Rioja; tel. (941) 249962. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this article for their very useful comments.

1. According to Lakoff (1987), an idealised cognitive model is a domain of knowledge that results from the activity of a structuring principle.

2. Conceptual schemas, as defined by Ruiz de Mendoza (1996), are formalisations of encyclopedic knowledge.

3. Fauconnier's (1985) notion of *pragmatic function* makes reference to the links we establish between objects of a different nature for psychological, cultural or pragmatic reasons.

4. A more detailed description of each relational arch will be provided when analysing the way they work in metonymic mappings.

5. The *Master Metonymy List*, which has been compiled by Naomi Leite (1994), contains a selection and classification of more than a hundred metonymies.

6. It could be argued that the relation that holds between *Napoleon* and *his army* is causative so that Napoleon caused the defeat of his army; however, this is not the case because the defeat is only a consequence of the battle but it does not define the relationship between Napoleon and the French army.

7. Making a parallel with Halliday's (1994) description of grammatical metaphor as the result of the grammar of language allowing parts of the system to be expressed in a non-congruent form, Ruiz de Mendoza (1999a: 92) coins the term *grammatical metonymy* to refer to the process by means of which a word form is recategorised. For a more detailed account of grammatical metonymy, see Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez (2001).

8. According to Ruiz de Mendoza (1996), an entity has control if it has the power to decide whether a state of affairs will obtain or not.

9. This metonymic type is also frequently employed to refer to the rulers of a country by means of the place they govern (e.g. *Canada supported the USA in the war*).

10. Whenever activities are related to senses (e.g. *listening*), there is a tendency to choose the external organ involved in the perception as the source domain of a metonymy where this sense plays a role. This may be grounded in the fact that external organs such as *ear* in (17) are experientially more prominent than other organs that have a role in listening (e.g. *the tympanum*).

Works cited

BARCELONA, Antonio. (ed.). 2000. *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads*. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

BRUGMAN, Claudia. 1981. "Story of OVER: Polysemy, Semantics and the Structure of the lexicon. New York / London: Garland.

DÍEZ VELASCO, Olga I. 2000. "A Cross-Linguistic Analysis of the Nature of Some *Hand* Metonymies in English and Spanish". *Atlantis* 22 (2): 51-67.

DIRVEN, René. 1993. "Metonymy and Metaphor: Different Mental Strategies of Conceptualisation". *Leuvense Bijdragen* 82: 1-25.

FAUCONNIER, Gilles. 1985. *Mental Spaces*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

HALLIDAY, M. A. K. 1994. *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*. London: Edward Arnold.

JAKOBSON, Roman. 1971. *Selected Writings*, Vol. 2. *Word and language*. The Hague: Mouton.

KÖVECSES, Zoltan and Günter RADDEN. 1998. "Metonymy: Developing a Cognitive Linguistic View". *Cognitive Linguistics* 9 (1): 37-77.

LAKOFF, George and Mark JOHNSON. 1980. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

LAKOFF, George. 1987. *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

LEITE, Naomi. 1994. "Master Metonymy List". Berkeley: Unpublisehd Draft.

PANTHER, Klaus-Uwe and Linda THORNBURG. 2000. "The EFFECT FOR CAUSE Metonymy in English Grammar". In Barcelona, A. (ed.): 215-332.

RUIZ DE MENDOZA IBAÑEZ, Francisco. J. 1996. "Semantic Networks in Conceptual Structure". *EPOS, Revista de Filología, UNED* 12: 339-356.

—. 1997. "Cognitive and Pragmatic Aspects of Metonymy". *Cuadernos de Filología Inglesa*. 6 (2): 161-178.

—. 1999a. *Introducción a la Teoría Cognitiva de la Metonimia*. Granada: Método Ed.

—. 1999b. "From Semantic Underdetermination via Metaphor and Metonymy to Conceptual Interaction". Essen: *LAUD* Nº 492.

—. 2000. "The Role of Mappings and Domains in Understanding Metonymy". In Barcelona, A. (ed.): 109-132.

RUIZ DE MENDOZA IBAÑEZ, Francisco J. and Lorena PÉREZ HENÁNDEZ. (2001). "Metonymy and the Grammar: Motivation, Constraints and Interaction". *Language and Communication* 21: 321-357.

STERN, Gustaf. 1931. *Meaning and Change of Meaning.* Bloomington: Indiana U. P.

TAYLOR, John R. 1989. *Linguistic Categorization. Prototypes in Linguistic Theory.* Oxford: Clarendon.

ULLMANN, Stephen. 1962. *Semantics: An Introduction to the Science of Meaning.* Oxford: Blackwell.

UNGERER, Friedrich and Hans-Jorg SCHMID. 1996. *An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics.* New York: Longman.

PRESENT DAY ENGLISH EXISTENTIAL *THERE*-CONSTRUCTIONS AND THEIR PRAGMATICS. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED CATEGORISATION.[1]

ANA E. MARTÍNEZ INSUA
Universidad de Santiago de Compostela

1. Introduction

This study is intended to examine English existential *there*-constructions[2] (hereafter TCs) from the pragmatic point of view. It attempts to determine their functions in discourse, and provide a possible categorisation. Aiming to be a study in empirical pragmatics, the classification advanced here is offered as a tool for describing and understanding TCs. This paper can be regarded as an exploratory, initial approach towards a typology of TCs from the perspective of their communicative functions, even though space constraints have limited the inclusion of as many examples as it would be appropriate for a study of this kind. Also, the overall context from which the examples are taken will by necessity be short. Despite these constraints, the contexts included will hopefully determine the features associated with the TCs in question, and provide the reader with enough information to identify the functions attributed to them.

Section 1 of this paper (sub-sections 1.1. and 1.2.) will briefly refer to some of the traditional attempts to explain TCs as thematic structures, and as strategies for the introduction of *new* information or the assignment of focus (Huddleston 1988; Quirk *et al.* 1985). Sub-section 1.3. will outline some of the semantic characterisations of TCs that preceded the more strictly pragmatic ones (especially, Davidse 1992a, 1992b, 1997 and Wierzbicka 1996), and will then refer to some relevant attempts at a pragmatic classification available in the

miscelánea: a journal of english and american studies 23 (2001): pp. 29-56