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AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO SOME "Ø" MORPHEMES IN ENGLISH (DEICTICS AND NUMERATIVES)

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INTRODUCTION

In analysing syntactically sentences of the type,

1.a. It's always the one Ø carries the radio that gets it.

1.b. The one Ø carries the radio always gets it.

linguists are likely to say that *zero* relatives function as the subject of their relative clause and control it, even though the relative nexus is not present in surface structure. It has been reduced, perhaps for economy of speech, to Ø even in such unclear patterns of language where the antecedent and its relative clause should not be linked in order to avoid confusion of fluent meaning in normal speech.

But linguists, on the other hand, also give a possibility behaving syntactically different from other morphemes which do

normally have their proper and determined function in the normal use of language and on the same level (such is the case of *deictics*, *numeratives* and *superlatives* functioning as *heads* of an NP if this may be so).

Such a variety of interpretations of similar conditions in the same or different levels of language make the study of syntax incongruent. Therefore it is somewhat disheartening that a certain lack of discipline (in following the logical principles upon which an empirical and theoretical science are to be based) can be clearly seen in current literature.

Deictics and Numeratives

Halliday (1985) described a number of important and now well known syntactic constituents of the Nominal Group, taking into account and clarifying the ordering and what the constituents represent within the group. He illustrates the ordering of the NG in the English sentence as follows:

Deictic	Numerative	Epithet(s)	Classifier
Those	two	very	small
		Thing	Qualifier
		cars	of the headmaster

However, in the course of making this proposal, which I think is quite correct, Halliday (1985: 173) concludes that,

There is always a head in the nominal group (unless it is "branched", like "one brown" in "one blue and one brown"), but there may be no thing. It is quite normal to have Numerative or Deictic as Head.

Thus, Halliday (1985) states that *Head* and *Thing* are not always the same thing. This claim, however, turns out to be somewhat superficial from my point of view, and if not, how can we say that *zero* relatives function syntactically as objects, subjects, etc.?

The examples given by Halliday (1985:173),

2.a. (Look at) those two

2.b. (Look at) those

as well as his illustrations of these two examples:

Deictic	Numerative
Modifier	Head
B	a

Deictic
Head
a

cannot be taken as arguments which lead to a clearer understanding of their theoretical implications out of context and, besides this reasoning is not based upon logical principles.

Although these two constituents (deictic in (b) and numerative in (a)) may be considered, as Halliday does, the *head*

of their respective NPs in unvariable structure without taking into account the semantic implications of the context in which they are included, the analysis does not show all the inherent properties in the phrase. Thus, Halliday does not take into account one of the most interesting aspects, that of conclusive meaning.

It is, then, worthwhile to note that *the thing* must be easily understood through contextual associations by both the speaker and the hearer, as the utterance without that implicit reference implying an adequate pragmatic interrelation between both interlocutors would be meaningless and, if this is so, what is the function of *the head* of a NP that does not show interactive meaning? This would be the case of such utterances illustrated above when they are to be analysed out of context.

Under this assumption we cannot accept deictics, numeratives or other constituents of the type as *heads* of an NP X considering that *the thing* though not present in surface structure, must be clearly stated through contextual relations.

In fact, it is quite logical in the use of language to elide a morpheme but the functional meaning of that morpheme cannot be elided and neither can its syntactical function.

Thus, from a logical point of view if TH = H when present in surface structure then when absent in surface structure, TH is required to provide functional meaning and, in this way, we may then understand that \emptyset TH = \emptyset H. This interpretative hypothesis attempts to explain several aspects omitted by both the unvariable and the multivariable analyses taking into account the semantic and pragmatic interaction that must be produced by the contextual implications of which the utterance "in question" is to be, though very important, one more constituent.

Considering these implications, we are to believe that the H of an NG-X- in English and other languages, for example Galician and Spanish, must be represented by TH and consequently we do not accept the possibility of deictics, numeratives and superlatives

being the head, although they resemble this when they stand alone in surface structure.

The remainder of this paper will give alternative ways of analysing \emptyset morphemes in NGs in English and other languages in this level of language, in an attempt to account for how they are to be understood.

As we stated above, this elided form and function (i. e. "thing" as a morphological component and "head" as a syntactical component) are represented by the same form integrated by basic meaning assumptions which make it an essential linguistic constituent of a NG X.

Considering that the only phenomenon that takes place, and which is particularly relevant, is that TH is not present in surface structure, probably because of "economy of speech" and due to stylistic factors which form an integrative part of a certain context without altering the given meaning, it is quite normal to assume that both the morphological and the syntactic units must be considered as elided components in their respective analyses.

Thus, we will refer to them as \emptyset H and \emptyset TH in order to present a full syntactic analysis where meaning is not left aside.

When Halliday (1985:173) suggests that *it is quite normal to have Numerative or Deictic as Head*, one must be aware, in assuming a principle of this type, of a possible incompleteness of meaning in the given analysis out of any given context.

The first reason for being suspicious of an analysis in which *deictics* or *numeratives* may be considered as the head of a NG is that it will not account for structurally identical sentences which happen to contain the head but are selectionally compatible with one in generalized communicative realizations, or when representing the world according to the speaker (i.e., by means of a personal pronoun).

It is also worthwhile to consider that *one*, for example, is not always compatible as in 3.

- 3.a. (Look at) Peter and John
- 3.b. (Look at) them
- 3.c. (Look at) those
- 3.d. (Look at) those two
- 3.e. (Look at) those ones
- 3.f. (Look at) those two ones
- *3.f. (Look at) them ones

A second reason for believing that *deictics* and *numeratives* cannot be considered as *heads* of NGs is the result of the elided H or TH they represent, which is necessarily very close to the speaker's and hearer's understanding of meaning. Thus, TH/H must be present in a specific situational context and because of that and in terms of *economy of speech* it transfers its properties to a *deictic*, a *numerative* or to other concrete morphemes. In spite of all this transfer of properties, it is quite difficult to justify the necessary conditions for a new and independent syntactical function through contextual insertion.

In these cases, *deictics* and *numeratives* stand for Jespersen's secondary function of morphological constituents, i.e., when one morpheme of this type substitutes a N morpheme in surface structure, but something implicit must be there in order to interpret any given meaning. This is, in Halliday's terminology, *the thing* which is not present in surface structure but which can be deduced through contextual interrelations by the interlocutors.

Thus, considering that contextual interaction is a vital part of effective communication it seems that an interpretive approach appears to be more reliable in a full analysis than a functional and syntactical integrative interpretation as it can certainly be considered that an explicit H or TH occurs in underlying representations of NGs with *deictics*, *numeratives*, etc., though apparently, they appear to function as H because of their position in surface structure.

There is, of course, no right or wrong way to focus the problem. However, of the various possibilities that word classes have of acting syntactically, these two are very much related to noun/thing elision and this is easily appreciated as the contextual implications show clear patterns necessary to clarify the given meaning.

This ambiguous use of any given morpheme standing for a noun in syntactic head position in surface structure, may be interpreted by the rule labelled: the rule of functional adequation to contextual conversion and improvement of meaning, explained as follows:

In any given situation where the context is or should be clear enough for both the hearer and the speaker, or the reader and the writer, to understand it, some morphemes of the X type may be used in place of N morphemes or even in place of complete phrases. Within this type of morphological constituents (i.e., pronouns, *deictics*, *numeratives*, superlatives and adverbials when substituting nouns, and auxiliaries when substituting verbs) those which replace a noun when it should occur as the syntactical head of a NG are specially relevant.

In this case, first both the semantic and communicative meaning and its syntactic function which represent the thing or person, the second, the implicit meaning and the syntactic function (i.e. indicating the object, signalling the function and giving the meaning), are incorporated into another word by the following rule: Rule of Functional and Contextual Transposition of Function and Meaning by which that morpheme together with its syntactic and semantic implications in a given contextual situation conditioned by interactive pragmatic relationship, is seen as two different acts by both the speaker and the listener:

- The known fact, i.e., the person/thing/who/which is known to both, through the evidence of the situational context, and

- The unknown fact(s), i.e., further comments to be transmitted.

It is because of this semantic interaction of the communicative act between the speaker and his interlocutor, that he, the producer of the enactment, resolves to shorten it by widening the contextual semantic relationship, announcing the known fact without naming the thing by its proper referent; and due to the conditions in which the enactment is involved, it is felt to be unnecessary for the efficient transmission of the message.

The linguist, however, in the analysis of any isolated unit, does not know the exact word the deictic, numerative or superlative stands for. Thus they cannot have the properties of a syntactical H.

On the other hand, in the English language as well as in other languages, in spite of the level or dialect, displayed anomalies in surface structure are quite easily recuperable in Deep Structure by means of contextualization. This happens when an implicit/explicit contextual relationship takes place in the linguistic field by pragmatic interaction rather than by the insertion of their own morphological or syntactic reference.

Up to a certain degree, in a logical reading, what is true for syntax is also true for morphology and semantics. Nouns represent things, persons, places or ideas and they function as H of a NG, a PG or an AG. Deictics, numeratives or even superlatives may sometimes take the position of the noun in the phrase but there might be a clear implicit reference to that noun in order to avoid problems of meaning. Thus, they cannot absorb their function totally. If this special realization is produced, it is, then, important that a rather clear contextual relationship between the thought expressed by the utterance in question and the external circumstances of the medium should be given in the production of the communicative act as a whole.

It is then disputable that a H/TH distinction could be upheld out of the N-system and it is noticeable that isolated patterns in any given language do not produce effective communication, especially when there is a lack of pragmatic interaction, see the dialogue below,

4.a. *Look at those*

b. *Which?*

a. *Two*

b. *Two what?*

here, the pragmatic interaction between both speakers could only be fulfilled if both interlocutors were well aware of the intended meaning and so other interferences would not be liable. Thus, only in very concrete situations can deictics and numeratives be used alone and using them alone in the sentence implies that there must be a perfect pragmatic interaction between the producer of the utterance and the receiver of the message and it is not easy to observe many possibilities of focusing interactive meaning.

It is, then, important to note that even though the TH may not be present in surface structure, there must be a certain link by means of which some implicit reference is maintained between those two constituents, (i.e., between the TH not present in surface structure and its referent) in order to specify what kind of linguistic meaning is performed and transmitted according to the speaker and hearer competences in contextualized realizations.

Nevertheless, there must be a straightforward relationship between both the syntactic and semantic behaviour and besides there must also exist a strong relationship between morphological and syntactic interpretations with semantic and pragmatic relations in order to establish clear patterns of morphological, syntactic and semantic linguistic behaviour.

I hope to have shown that H/TH in English are represented by a semantically and syntactically definable class: the noun, and/or

replacing it as a proper referent the (personal) pronouns, but under the formula - Pronoun = \emptyset TH/ \emptyset H, and that the interpretation of other classes as (being taken as) H in surface structure is just a question of interpreting the situational context in which they are involved.

In a similar but descriptive manner Huddleston (1984:284-5) shows that other phrases can have a double interpretation. In my opinion such phrases (as for example *a lot* in *a lot of books*) are to be considered as complex H and cannot be divided into immediate constituents. It seems quite irrelevant to accept *a lot* as the H and *of books* as classifier, as *a lot of* stands for *many* books and this follows the right order of the constituents forming the utterance.

Thus, in the spirit of the work done by Halliday (1985:158-175) lies a clear-cut distinction between both the morphological and syntactic properties of deictics and numeratives in relation to TH; on the contrary, the ideal representation of these categories according to our proposal and taking in Halliday's examples in the following:

5.a. (Look at) those two (\emptyset)

Those	two	\emptyset
Deictic	Numerative	Head
MODIFIERS		
Ψ	B	a

5.b. (Look at) those (\emptyset)

Those	\emptyset
Deitic	Head
Modifier	
B	a

In this hypothetical representation, however, the interactive relationship between H = TH shows that the ideal equipotent representation of morphological categories and syntactic function is to be measured in terms of contextual relationship and interactive meaning.

The H in such cases could be viewed as a function consisting of two forms or members: the conclusive and the hypothetical. To each of these we assign a specific positive value, certainty and ambiguity, (it should be noticed that in isolation, in the written medium, a unique interpretation is often possible but this is not so in the spoken medium). These specific values share the more general aspects of grammaticality, acceptability and interpretability. Needless to say, both forms correspond to a grammatically relevant, *semantic level*, and to a grammatically irrelevant, *pragmatic level* respectively. In the former, there is, inevitably, a one-to-one relationship and in the latter, there is a one-to-many relationship.

The same occurs with the superlative (e.g., the smallest) when the TH is made explicit by means of non-linguistic arguments, as well as when the TH is not made explicit and has the capability of being substituted by one/ones, although in the latter case, as Halliday points out, no doubt is reflected. He states that:

The element we are calling "Thing" is the semantic core of the nominal group. It may be common noun, or (personal) pronoun. (...) There is also a generalized pronoun (one).

The interpretation of these generalized pronominal forms as H may be specified by the inherent semantic and syntactic properties of these forms (i.e., substituting nouns), but even so, in those cases the referent assumes the properties of the elliptical TH that it represents, and the concept that TH expresses as well as the contextual implications implicit in the utterance have to be very clear in order to produce any type of pragmatic interaction, and, besides, this implies a concrete knowledge on the part of both the hearer and the speaker. Thus, even in those cases, and in order to avoid confusion of function and meaning the proper function should be signalled in any type of illustration. As, for example in 6

6 Buy these ones

These ones ØH / TH	
Deictic Modifier	Head

CONCLUSION

We have looked at an interactive process of some Ø morphemes in English and seen the flexibility that can be exploited by users of English. Integrative aspects of syntax and semantics are

not easy concepts to deal with partly because what is seen in surface structure are true morphemes and not Ø morphemes.

It is, however, worth remembering that there exists a relationship in which a word and its function cannot be in free variation in all or most contexts. The closest we come to absolute pragmatic interaction is through contextual relations but even here the choice of one term rather than another indicates an individual preference on the part of the speaker.

Although the choice of one or other form within the communicative act does not have to be necessarily based upon features of good style, they must rely on a contextualized structure being grammatical, acceptable and interpretable.

The result, however, is that effective communication does not allow ambiguity, and, in this sense where syntactic ambiguity may produce ambiguity of meaning, it should be marked in order to show a true interpretation through the interaction of different linguistic levels and, although in speech or in continuous prose such ambiguities are rarely noticed in clear contextual associations because the use of intonation and stress makes one interpretation more probable, the minimum probable wrong-interpretation should be avoided in any type of scientific analysis showing in this way a correlation of different levels of language towards a more scientific foundation.

NOTES

- 1 The following notational conventions are employed in this paper:
NG = Nominal Group, H = Head, of a Nominal Phrase, TH = Thing,
N-System = Nominal System.

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OLIVER TWIST : EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN THE VICTORIAN UNDERWORLD

Chantal CORNUT-GENTILE D'ARCY

"O for the coming of that glorious time
When, prizing knowledge as her noblest wealth
And best protection, this imperial Realm,
While she exacts allegiance, shall admit
An obligation, on her part, to teach
Them who are born to serve her and obey;
Binding herself by statute to secure
For all the children whom her soil maintains
The rudiments of letters".

(Wordsworth, 1904: lines 293-301)

Wordsworth's lines, which have been quoted again and again by generations of orators and pamphleteers, may have proved more influential over the years than the educational writings of the economists and political philosophers of the time. This fact may remind us that Dickens was not a pioneer in using literature for educational propaganda. Rather, he was the first important novelist to do so.