

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INTERACTION, FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

EVA ALCÓN SOLER
UNIVERSITAT JAUME I

1. INTRODUCTION

Input and interaction hypotheses have stimulated a lot of research during the last decade in the field of second language acquisition (Wesche 1994). Based on Krashen's input hypothesis (1985), which claims that comprehensible input is a necessary condition for second language acquisition (SLA), Long (1980, 1983, 1985) suggests that it is the negotiated interaction which simplifies comprehension and indirectly promotes SLA. From this interactional perspective, native speaker (NS) and nonnative speaker (NNS) discourse has been analysed taking into account variables such as sex (Gass and Varonis 1986; Pica *et al.* 1991, Alcón and Codina 1996), content knowledge (Woken and Swales 1989; Zuengler and Bent 1991; Zuengler 1993; Alcón and Guzman 1995), proficiency (Varonis and Gass 1985), and task differences (Duff 1986; Long 1980; Pica 1987; Pica and Doughty 1985; Plough and Gass 1993; Samuda and Rounds 1993).

Although the above-mentioned studies focus on the role of conversational interactions in second language acquisition, they do not show the role of interaction in terms of language development. Brock *et al.* (1986), who

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Although the above-mentioned studies focus on the role of conversational interactions in second language acquisition, they do not show the role of interaction in terms of language development. Brock *et al.* (1986), who examined the short-term effects of negative input in native-nonnative conversations, found little change in the learners' forms after listening to native speakers' feedback. However, Gass and Varonis (1989) showed that in nonnative-nonnative conversations corrected feedback helped interlocutors to incorporate target-like forms, but much later in the discourse. In 1994 Gass and Varonis supported the idea that the results of interaction are not necessarily immediate. In other words, through interaction learners may notice a gap between what they produce and what is produced by speakers of the L2. However, the awareness of this mismatch may show up later in time. In line with the results obtained by Gass and Varonis (1994), Alcón (1994) showed that in nonnative-nonnative interaction negotiation, independently of the learner's level of proficiency, familiarity with the items, or degree of participation, functions as a language awareness device. However, negotiated interaction was shown to be powerless to convert language awareness into acquisition.

In the literature on interaction, there seems to be agreement on the fact that negative feedback, which occurs when interlocutors find input which is incomprehensible, allows speakers to become aware of a possible conversational breakdown, modify their speech to make themselves understood (Long 1980, 1983, 1985), and adjust their production towards target-like use (Swain 1985). However, few studies have focussed on the effect of negative feedback on second language development. Pica *et al*. (1989) and Alcón and Guzman (forthcoming) analysed how second language learners responded linguistically when native speakers signalled difficulty in understanding them and compared types of learner responses in relation to different signal types and communication tasks. In both studies it was found that NS signals of non-understanding affected learners' interlanguage modifications. In particular, it was found that NS clarification questions had an effect on learner production. That is to say, by using clarification questions NSs provided negative feedback and thus forced learners to modify their production towards target-like use. However, Alcón and Guzman suggested that care should be taken in considering the effect of NS signals of incomprehension on second language acquisition. They claim that if it is true that NS clarification questions force

learners to modify their production, it is also true that NS confirmation requests provide learners with an input which may facilitate language development. The authors therefore concluded there was a need for research focussing on the effect of negative feedback on language development.

The present study was undertaken to address this need. If, as suggested by White (1987), comprehension difficulties are what allow learners to notice that certain linguistic modifications are necessary, what is the relationship between signals of non-understanding, second language production and language development? To answer this question three hypotheses were tested in a study of NS and NNS secondary school students. So that the task factor would become a variable affecting the amount of interaction, the NS and NNSs were asked to perform two different communication tasks: an information gap activity and an opinion exchange task. The hypotheses were:

1. The proportion of negotiated interaction would be greater in the information gap task than in the opinion exchange task (following the claim of Doughty and Pica 1986 and Duff,1986).

2. The effect of using clarification questions on learners' language development would be higher (drawing on Pica *et al*. 1989; and Alcón and Guzman, forthcoming, who reported that the NNSs' interlanguage modifications were greater after a request for clarification than after a confirmation or comprehension check).

3. There is an effect of interaction on language development, but this is not immediate (drawing on Brock *et al.* 1986; and Gass and Varonis 1989, 1994).

2. RESEARCH DESIGN

The subjects of the study were 14 Spanish females aged between 15 and 18 who were studying English as a foreign language at a secondary school. Two English native speakers also participated as subjects of the study. As shown by an entry test held at the beginning of the academic year, the learners' level of English was not statistically different.

Each subject performed two different communication tasks, an information gap task and an opinion exchange task. In the information gap task the NS had to tell the learners where to place objects (human beings, inanimate

objects, animals...) on a beach scene board. In the opinion exchange task NS-NNS engaged in a discussion on having holidays in Summer or in Winter. Immediately after performing the tasks, the subjects were given an identical board, but this time it was the learner who had to tell the NS how to arrange the objects on the board. In the opinion exchange task, they discussed the advantages and disadvantages of going to the sea-side during their holidays. Finally, a week later, they performed the tasks again, but this time, in order to control task familiarity as a variable, the same objects had to be placed on a summer house board, and the discussion was about going on holidays. In all the opinion exchange tasks NSs were asked to argue a point of view opposite to that of the learner in order to create discussion.

Every communication task was recorded and transcribed by the researcher. Immediately after finishing the first opinion exchange task and the first information gap task, we compared the total number of sequences of negotiation. That is to say, following Varonis and Gass (1985) we isolated the number of clarification questions, comprehension questions and confirmation checks produced by the speakers in the two communication tasks. Then we isolated the total number of lexical items for which the interlocutors asked clarification questions, confirmation checks or comprehension checks.[1] After transcribing the second opinion exchange task and the second information gap task, we compared the learners' ability to produce items in the L2 for which interlocutors had indicated non-undertanding in the first task. If they were not able to produce target-like use of the item, we checked whether the learners could provide a paraphrase or similar structure, or whether, on the contrary, if they were unable to deliver the message. Finally, a week later we made a similar comparison, but this time matching items produced in the first task with those produced a week later. Following Cohen's procedure (1960), a minimum agreement of 84% was found for the model. The following examples illustrate the procedure:

1st information gap task
NNS. What's fishing-rod?
NS. A fishing rod is something you use to catch fish, the animals that live in the sea.
NNS. Ah, caña de pescar.

2nd information gap task
NS. Pardon?
NNS. Yes, you must have an object to take some fish.
NS. Oh, the fishing rod, you mean.
NNS. Yes.

3rd information gap task
NNS. Place the fish-rod on the garage.
NS. OK; the fishing rod in the garage.

We see that the NNSs use a clarification question in order to ask for the meaning of fishing-rod, the NS uses a paraphrase in order to explain the item, and the NNS uses the Spanish word to indicate his understanding. In the second exchange the NS cannot understand the learner's utterance, which is repeated by the NNS. However, instead of using the word previously used in the first information gap task (fishing rod), the learner uses a kind of paraphrase to describe the object. Finally, in the third task the learner uses the word but it is not properly produced. Using this procedure, we could compare the items topicalized (highlighted in the discourse because of their difficulty) and produced correctly, and the items topicalized and produced incorrectly. In order to consider the effect of both the NSs' and NNSs' signal of incomprehension on second language development, items topicalized by NNSs were treated separately from those topicalized by the NS. So, in the previous example, "fishing rod" is topicalized by a NNS, while in the following example it is the NS who topicalizes the item:

1st information gap activity
NNS. No, next to the man with a camera there is . . .
NS. You mean a *towel?*
NNS. This is a *towel?*
NS. *There is a towel* next to the man with a camera.
NNS. Yes.

2nd information gap activity
NNS. There are a boy and mother.
NS. Yeah, there are a boy, his mother, and a *towel.*

3rd information gap activity
NNS. There is a *towel* on the floor.
NS. There is a green *towel* next to the door.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Hypothesis 1, which predicted that the proportion of negotiated interaction would be greater in the information gap task than in the opinion exchange task, was supported in this study. As illustrated in table I, the number of clarification questions, confirmation checks and comprehension checks was used to measure the amount of negotiated interaction.

Table I: total number of clarification questions, confirmation and comprehension checks used in all the tasks.

	INFORMATION GAP TASK	OPINION EXCHANGE TASK
CLAR	304	179
CONF	214	97
COMP	31	14

CLAR = Clarification questions.
CONF = Confirmation checks.
COMP = Comprehension checks.

X^2 analyses of results showed that the amount of negotiated interaction was greater in clarification questions ($X^2 = 32.04$, df = 13, p = < 0.05), and confirmation checks ($X^2 = 31.34$, df = 13, p = < 0.05) used in all the tasks by the interlocutors. However, the number of comprehension questions used in the information gap task and in the opinion exchange task is not statistically different ($X^2 = 77.91$, df = 13, p = > 0.05). Our results support the claims reported by Pica and Doughty (1986), Duff (1986) and Pica *et al.*, (1989) which suggested that information gap activities provide learners with greater opportunities to negotiate input. However, the results of the study partly contradict a recent study by Alcón and Guzman (forthcoming) in which the role of task was not a discriminating factor in the frequency of negotiation. The differences in the results may be accounted for by the difficulty of taxonomizing communication task types. That is to say, the degree of difficulty or complexity of the task may be modified by simply changing one feature, and as a consequence it is impossible for two tasks to be equal.

Drawing on Pica *et al*. (1989), and Alcón and Guzman (forthcoming), Hypothesis 2 predicted that the effect of using clarification questions on learner language development would be higher than the effect produced by using confirmation or comprehension checks. This hypothesis was also supported in this study.[2] To test it, the items highlighted by a clarification question or confirmation question were selected. In addition, as shown in table 2 (overleaf), we distinguished between those learners who indicated a lack of understanding in the first task (NU.), those who produced the item properly (PP.) and those who showed a certain approximation to it (A I.) in the second or third task. Since we were interested in the effect of interaction on learner language development, we ignored the items which, even if used in the first task, were not produced in the second or third information gap task. This type of activity was chosen in preference to the opinion exchange task because it produced a greater amount of negotiation.

The Pearson product-moment correlation test shows a high positive correlation between items highlighted using a clarification question and an approximation to the item in the following tasks (r = 0.98). The same statistical test shows no correlation between use of clarification questions and items properly produced (r = 0.39). On the contrary, the degree of relationship between items highlighted using confirmation check and an approximation to the item in later production is not significant (r = 0.36). Moreover, there seems to be no correlation between the use of confirmation checks and items properly produced (r = 0.16).

Table 2. Items highlighted by a clarification question or confirmation check in relation to learner production.

	NU. CLAR	NU. CONF	PP. CLAR	PP. CONF	A I. CLAR	A I. CONF
S1	10	3	1	0	8	1
S2	10	8	2	1	7	6
S3	10	10	0	9	10	6
S4	20	7	3	2	18	4
S5	18	5	1	2	14	2
S6	14	4	4	3	11	4
S7	34	11	3	8	27	9
S8	21	8	2	1	17	6
S9	14	4	4	3	11	3
S10	6	4	2	2	6	3

S11	6	6	1	6	5	4
S12	6	5	2	4	4	1
S13	8	2	1	1	4	1
S14	6	0	2	1	5	0

NU. CLAR. = non-understood items signalled by a clarification question.
NU. CONF. = non-understood items signalled by a confirmation check.
PP. CLAR. = Items produced properly in the second or third task and signalled by a clarification question in the first task.
PP. CONF. = Items produced properly in the second or third task and signalled by a confirmation check in the first task.
IA. CLA. = an approximation to the items in the second or third task and signalled by a clarification question in the first task.
IA. CON = an approximation to the items in the second or third task and signalled by a confirmation check in the first task.

So far, outcomes of the study support the claim that negotiation is the means through which language items are highlighted (Alcón 1994; Plough and Gass 1993). This is clear in the way most of the items for which learners indicate a signal of non-understanding are later used in the discourse, but frequently they are not correctly produced. Then, in line with the research reported by Alcón (1994), and Gass and Varonis (1994), our study shows the role of negotiation in making learners aware of certain linguistic difficulties, but casts doubt on the assumption that negotiated items in interaction have a direct effect on language development. The effect of using clarification questions for language development suggests that selective attention and awareness are important for language development (Schmidt 1990; and Long 1992). Closer examination of the data indicates that by using clarification questions speakers are forced not only to produce the language (Alcón and Guzman, forthcoming), but also focus explicitly on the way language is used. On the other hand, when they are exposed to confirmation questions, the listeners tend to express acknowledgment. Moreover, most of the clarification questions are produced in order to elicit lexical explanations, while confirmation checks are related to the content of the conversation. It is also possible that the learners' belief about the learning process has an effect on

the attention they pay to language. It must be remembered that for a long time the teaching of English was grammar-based and consisted of vocabulary learning. It is not difficult, then, to understand why the learners' attention is focused on lexical difficulties. Another possible explanation is suggested by VanPatten (1990) who claims that lexical information is processed before grammar.

The fact that clarification questions serve to focus learner attention in those cases where there is some difficulty in communicating, their effect on raising the learner's awareness and their impact on the learner's attempt to approximate the L2 are even clearer in NS use of clarification and confirmation checks (Figure 1 and 2).

The positive correlation between the use of confirmation checks and items produced correctly (r = 0.23) or incorrectly (0.38) indicates the direction of the association of the two variables. In other words, it shows that the use of confirmation checks helps learners to restructure their knowledge of the L2 to a certain extent. However, the relationship between the variables is not strong. On the contrary, the degree of relationship between the NSs' use of



CON.: Confirmation check.
PRO. COR: Items produced correctly.
PRO. INC.: Items produced incorrectly.

Figure 1: Lexical items topicalized by the NS' use of confirmation checks and produced correctly or incorrectly by learners.



CLA.: Clarification questions.
PRO. COR: Items produced correctly.
PRO. INC.: Items produced incorrectly.

Figure 2: Lexical items topicalized by the NS' use of clarification questions and produced correctly or incorrectly by learners.

clarification questions and items produced properly (0.41) or incorrectly (0.98) by learners shows a similar pattern to the one described above for the learners' use of clarification questions and items used correctly or incorrectly.

Hypothesis 3, which claimed that the effect of interaction on language development was not immediate, was not supported in this study. To test this hypothesis we chose only the items topicalized by clarification questions or confirmation checks in the first task and later used both in the second and third task. By comparing the items produced in the second and third task, we attempted to find out whether there were linguistic effects because of prior interaction. Figures 3 and 4 show the effect that interaction has on learner production in two different periods of time: one after finishing the first task and the other a week later.



2COR. = produced correctly immediately after performing the task (during the second task).
3COR. = produced correctly a week later (during the third task).
2INC. = produced incorrectly after performing the task (during the second task).
3INC. = produced incorrectly a week later (during the third task).

Figure 3. Number of lexical items topicalized by clarification questions and produced correctly or incorrectly in two different periods of time.



2COR. = produced correctly immediately after performing the task (during the second task).
3COR. =produced correctly a week later (during the third task).
2INC. = produced incorrectly after performing the task (during the second task).
3INC. = produced incorrectly a week later (during the third task).

Figure 4. Number of lexical items topicalized by confirmation checks and produced correctly or incorrectly in two different periods of time.

As far as the impact of clarification questions on learners' production is concerned, X^2 analysis of results shows that the difference between production in the two periods is not statistically different ($X^2 = 5.92$, df = 13, $p > 0.05$ for items produced correctly; and $X^2 = 1.94$, df = 13, $p > 0.05$ for items produced incorrectly). Nor is the difference significant for the impact of confirmation checks on learner production ($X^2 = 3.21$, df = 13, $p > 0.05$ for items produced correctly; and $X^2 = 3.30$, df = 13, $p > 0.05$ for items produced incorrectly). Results of this study show that interaction does not show a clearer effect on subsequent conversations than it does in the conversation in which the interaction takes place. As a consequence, in line with previous research (Alcón 1994; Gass and Varonis 1994), our study provides mixed support for Long's (1980) revision of Krashen's (1980) input

hypothesis. It is true that interlocutors' use of clarification questions and confirmation checks eases comprehension and, to a certain extent, leads to modification of the learners' interlanguage rules. However, the study also indicates that the relationship between interaction and acquisition is not clear. It appears that one may generally use certain cooperative strategies in order to comprehend input without turning it into intake. Similarly, one can easily be pushed to modify one's interlanguage in order to be understood without obtaining interlanguage development. This does not mean that there is a lack of relationship between interaction and language development, but simply that this relation is not immediate. In other words, the interactional feature observed in interlanguage discourse plays an important role in comprehension, but the relationship between interaction and language development is rather complex and not automatic.

4. CONCLUSION

This study examines the role of interactional features on language production and development in the context of learning English as a foreign language. The results shed light on the role that different types of task may have in the relationship between interaction and language production. The relationship between two different types of task (information gap task and opinion exchange task) and language output has been supported in this study, but the relationship between language output and second language development is not linear.

Conclusions drawn from the study also suggest that interaction facilitates better comprehension and awareness of linguistic difficulties. However, the effect of interaction on language development seems to be multiple and complex. Consequently, care should be taken before making general statements about the effect of interaction on second language acquisition, as they are bound to be oversimplified. The results of the study support the claim that interactional adjustments facilitate comprehension (Long 1980, 1983, 1985) and bring specific information to the learner's attention. The study also shows that by signalling incomprehension learners become aware that their current interlanguage rule system is inadequate and start to restructure their interlanguage. The main relationship between interaction and language pro-

duction appears to be more effective communication, including comprehension by NNS, but the relationship between interaction and learner intake appears to be a long-term process. What the learner gets from the interaction is a further stage in the acquisition process, as shown by the number of lexical items produced incorrectly by the learners. Imperfect learner output does not mean that the interaction has no effect on their interlanguage, but that deeper analysis, practice, and perhaps time processing are required for eventual second language development.a

NOTES

1. *Comprehension checks*: Following Pica (1987, 1991) *comprehension checks* occur when the speaker wants to determine if the listener has understood him. *Clarification checks* refer to the listener's signals of non-understanding. Finally, *confirmation checks* occur when the listener is not completely sure of the speaker's message.

2. Since the comprehension questions produced by the interlocutors were few and those produced in the tasks were statistically insignificant, we only analysed the use of clarification and confirmation questions. We also decided to focus on lexical items since the learners had difficulty in understanding them, and signalled their incomprehension in the discourse.

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-THE ROLE OF INTERSENTENTIAL CONNECTIVES IN COMPLEX NARRATIVE DISCOURSE: KATHERINE MANSFIELD'S "THE GARDEN PARTY"

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In an article on the role of interclausal connectives in narrative structuring, Segal, Duchan and Scott (1991) reconsidered the function of connectives in discourse. They revised four different approaches to the subject, which include: what they termed "an empty view" where interclausal connectives are assigned "no meaningful semantic role" (1991: 27); "a local cohesion view" which sees connectives "as functioning to create ties between clausal units in the text" (1991: 30); "a global marker view" where connectives are said to "serve as discourse markers which integrate or separate global units of discourse" (1991: 30); and finally, "a mental model-deictic shift view." This last view moves beyond the local and global perspectives, and assigns to connectives a role in the construction of a mental model as formulated by Johnson-Laird (1983).

Segal, Duchan and Scott carried out an experiment with 84 subjects to test the accuracy of these views. Their investigation provided enough evidence to conclude that "interclausal connectives carry meaning, they connect textual meanings at both local and global levels and they mark discourse con-

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tinuity and discontinuity both in the text and as inferred by the reader" (1991: 47). This confirms the fact that discourse connectives do not only help construct textual structure at the micro and macro levels, but they also function as indexical markers of continuity or discontinuity in the subjects' mental representations. However, when questioning the generalizability of their results, Segal, Duchan and Scott found their study limited by the following factors: "First, the subjects did not create these narratives. . . . Second, the discourse genre being studied [was] that of simple narratives told by a 5-year-old" (1991: 51). In the following pages, I will attempt to provide more evidence in support of their thesis by analysing the role played by intersentential connectives in Katherine Mansfield's short story "The Garden Party." This text has been chosen because it combines all the characteristics required for our purpose. It is a complex literary narrative, written by an original, remarkable writer, and with an interesting and very efficient use of connective devices. In this way the two factors that limited the results of Segal, Duchan and Scott's study will be neutralized.

The research will be centered on intersentential connectives. Interclausal connectives will be disregarded, because the main point will be to investigate the nature and extent of the cohesive function of these markers, not the coordinating one.

1. THE DATA

"The Garden Party" is a 16-page story.[1] It consists of approximately 554 sentences, 84 of which have as first element a connective of the conjunct type. Their variation and frequency of appearance are distributed throughout the story as follows:

AND 31
BUT 28
ONLY.....5
OF COURSE.....5
NOW.....4
PERHAPS.....2
THEN.....2
JUST.....2
SO.....2
RATHER.....1
SOON AFTER THAT.....1

A consideration of the data reveals the salience of the conjuncts *AND* and *BUT* as an evident feature. Their recurrence in the text seems to signal some kind of intentional use on the part of the writer. In order to determine and evaluate the possible significance of this recurrent use, I will explore some of the theoretical approaches to the function and meaning in discourse of both conjuncts. The conclusions obtained will then be contrasted against the actual role performed by *AND* and *BUT* in "The Garden Party." The rest of the conjuncts will not be considered specifically because their low frequency of appearance does not seem to confer them a prominent status in the global structure of the story, neither do they seem to be related to any relevant extent to the two recurrent ones.

2. SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Whether their scope be local or global, most discourse theories agree that *AND* and *BUT* are the most elementary markers of the additive and adversative relation respectively (See, for example, Halliday and Hasan 1976; van Dijk 1977, 1985; Schiffrin, 1988; Hyde, 1990, etc.). However, before we start comparing these basic concepts with the way these conjuncts are used in Mansfield's short story, I would like to consider two aspects related to them which could be relevant for an understanding of their function.

In their book *Cohesion in English*, Halliday and Hasan introduce the section on the relation established by the cohesive connective *AND* saying that

> the 'and' relation is felt to be structural [that is to say, coordinating] and not cohesive, at least by mature speakers; this is why we feel a little uncomfortable at finding a sentence in written English beginning with *AND*, and why we tend not to consider that a child's composition having *and* as its dominant sentence linker can really be said to form a cohesive whole. (1976: 233)

Though immediately afterwards Halliday and Hasan go on to explore the uses of *AND* as additive cohesive marker, it is nonetheless remarkable that they choose to open that chapter by making explicit reference to an apparently general reluctance (at least as far as mature speakers of English are concerned) to accept the use of *AND* as sentence initial conjunct. It is also worth mentioning that, when describing the type of adversative relation *BUT*

establishes, Halliday and Hasan present it as semantically related to the additive *AND*. They say:

> in addition to the meaning 'adversative', *but* contains within itself also the logical meaning of 'and'; it is a sort of portmanteau, or shorthand form, of *and however*. . . . The fact that 'but' contains 'and' is the reason why we cannot say *and but* , although we can say *and yet* , *and so* , *and then* , etc. (1976: 237).

These considerations set the mind to work in two directions. First of all, and once the general view has been taken into account, we feel inclined to assume that the use of *AND* as a recurrent additive connective in the production of a masterly creative writer, like Mansfield, must carry some significance and serve some aim, or else it would be in danger of being rejected as careless style or, as Halliday and Hasan suggest, childish. Secondly, taking into consideration their comments on the meaning of *BUT* we also feel inclined to view the scope within which this conjunct operates as embedded in the semantic field created and developed by *AND* .

It is true, of course, that *AND* and *BUT* are not the only cohesive linkers in Mansfield's story. There are many other devices—for example lexical reiteration (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 274ff.)—which intensively contribute to the building of the cohesion and coherence of the story. However, the frequency of their appearance as cohesive markers is, as has been said, an invitation to investigate the characteristics of their function. To this should be added the fact that the story itself opens with *"And after all* the weather was ideal" (emphasis added)—which is unusual by normal standards of regularities and expectations. In fact the use of anaphoric relators in discourse initial position is found to be quite rare in written texts (Hyde 1990: 208). This is a question to which we will return immediately; but, for the time being, let us concentrate on the relevance that this unconventional use of the additive and continuative conjuncts has for our thesis.

When discussing the process of discourse thematization, Brown and Yule say:

> What the speaker or writer puts first will influence the interpretation of everything that follows. Thus a title will influence the interpretation of the text which follows it. The first sentence of the first paragraph will constrain the interpretation not only of the paragraph, but also of the rest of the text. That is, we assume that every sentence

> forms part of a developing, cumulative instruction which tells us how to construct a coherent representation. (1983: 133-4)

The fact that Mansfield chose to convert the connectives *AND AFTER ALL* into the theme (left-most constituent or starting point) of her discourse cannot be considered, therefore, arbitrary. This prominent and unusual position is supposed to mark not only the structural development of the story, but also the process of reception by the speaker.

Bearing in mind the two questions discussed above: the recurrent use of *AND* and *BUT*, and the thematic prominence conceded to the additive conjuncts in this narrative, I will attempt to establish the actual role of these connectives in the processes of production and comprehension of Katherine Mansfield's "The Garden Party," as well as their range of influence in the construction of the cohesion and coherence of the story, be it local, global or contributing to the construction of a mental model.

3. THE METHOD

The notion of summary has been repeatedly associated by van Dijk with the semantic macrostructure of a discourse (1977; 1980; 1985). The difference between both concepts is that the first is based on an intuitive account of the information contained in the discourse, while the second covers the reconstruction of this information at a theoretical semantic level. Given its intuitive pretheoretical nature a summary should reflect the mental representation (Garnham 1987: 16) a specific discourse has created in the reader's mind at the very early stage of reception and comprehension of the text. The mental representation will also open the way to the writer's or reader's mental model, understanding by this a derivation from the semantic information contained in the text and the inferences generated in the process of reading in combination with his/her own knowledge and experience of the world (Johnson-Laird 1983; Garnham 1987).

To carry out the analysis, data from 36 summaries of "The Garden Party" have been examined. One of these summaries, the author's (as set down in a letter she wrote to William Gerhardi), will be reproduced in its entirety. The other 35 are summaries written by 35 fourth-year students of English at the Universidad de Salamanca who volunteered to participate in the process as part of a required course. They were instructed to carry out an intensive reading of the short story (it was recommended that the story should be read at

least twice) and to write an intuitive summary of it. No theoretical hints or literary introduction were given to them.

The reason for this procedure is that, as Johnson-Laird and Garnham proposed (1980), "speaker and hearer [here writer and reader] synthesize separate discourse models during conversation [here communication]" (Garnham 1987: 46). Consequently, if the function of certain cohesive elements is to be explored in terms of local and global structures and mental models, sufficient knowledge of all participants' mental representations, or at least of their textbase, should be available.

The cotext where the conjuncts *AND* and *BUT* appear will be studied so as to evaluate their function and interpret the scope of their meaning. I will work with the story divided into semantic blocks, according to actual evidence provided by the text (changes of topic, scenery, participants…) as reflected in the evidence found in the 35 summaries. The recognition of such blocks by so many readers and the identification of the nature of their content will guarantee the objectivity of the procedure, removing, to a certain extent at least, the risk of a subjective interpretation that might lead the analysis towards predetermined and not sufficiently contrasted conclusions. The analysis will conclude with a consideration of Mansfield's own view of "The Garden Party."

4. THE ANALYSIS

4. 1.- 35 summaries

A close analysis of the 35 summaries provided by my students showed that all summary-writers had, with slight variations, identified a number of episodes or semantic blocks in the text. Examples of each of them have been extracted from the summaries. The authors of the summaries have been given a number which appears in brackets. These are the different episodes:

1. Introduction:

A warm summer morning, Laura her mother and her sisters Meg and Jose are at home hurriedly working on the preparation of the garden party they are holding that afternoon. (2)

2. The workmen episode:

While the Sheridans [Laura's family] are having breakfast, Laura is supervising the workers who have to put up the marquee. She addresses the

workers in an authoritative way, in an attempt to imitate her mother. She likes one of the workers and because of this she thinks they are charming and nice guys. But she seems to be very superficial. Then she takes a very big bite of her bread and butter to prove that she is with them, that she doesn't care about conventions. But in fact she forgets them when she is making the arrangements for the garden party. (7)

3. News of the accident:

Later they learn that a man who lived in one of the poor houses near Laura's house has died in an accident. Laura feels very sad and she wants to stop the party, but her sister and her mother consider this an absurd idea. So the preparations for the party go on and finally it takes place. (32)

4. Laura's errand to the dead man's house:

When everything is over, Mrs. Sheridan suggests that they could take the left-overs to the dead man's family. Laura thinks that this is not a good idea but she accepts and does as her mother suggests. When she arrives at the dead man's house, everybody looks at her and she just wants to get away. When she manages to see the corpse she feels much better because the man looks as if he were dreaming. His sleeping face gives her the impression of peace and calmness. (10)

The frequency with which these episodes were registered in the summaries was distributed as follows: 35 mention the introduction (17 as a separate episode, 4 linked to the workmen episode, 14 linked to the accident episode); 16 mention the workmen episode (all mention the preparations for the party as part of this episode); 35 mention the accident; 31 mention Laura's errand to the dead man's house (17 of them say explicitly that Laura saw the corpse).

It is important to note that between the workmen episode and the reception of the accident news, there are 5 pages of the story (248-253) devoted to describing the preparations for the party. These pages have to do basically with the description of Laura's personality both through narration and action; but no mention is made of this aspect in the 35 summaries, only 3 refer briefly to some of Laura's actions (e.g. she answers a telephone call; she helps some servants and her mother and sisters to put everything in order…). At the same time, the actual celebration of the party (GP 257) is not recorded in the summaries either, except through indirect references of the type "the party

was successfully held." An important conclusion to this would be that only those episodes where the contrast between social classes was reflected occupied a prominent place in the subjects' mental representation of the story.

It is also a significant fact that although the use of conjuncts in the summaries was irregular (some subjects used them frequently, some not at all), the number of adversative connectives was still overwhelmingly superior to any other type (46 *BUT* ; 9 *NEVERTHELESS* ; 7 *THEN* ; 5 *ONCE* ; 4 *THEREFORE* ; 4 *SO* ; 3 *FIRST* ; 1 *LATER*). Again no additive connective was found. This evidence would seem to suggest that in their mental representations of the text receivers overtly retain the contrastive information conveyed by the adversative connectives; but they do not respond equally to the additive ones.

4.2. The writer's mental representation

> And yes, that is what I tried to convey in *The Garden Party*. The diversity of life and how we try to fit in everything, Death included. That is bewildering for a person of Laura's age. She feels things ought to happen differently. First one and then another. But life isn't like that. We haven't the ordering of it. Laura says, 'But all these things must not happen at once.' And Life answers, 'Why not? How are they divided from each other.' And they *do* all happen, it is inevitable. And it seems to me there is beauty in that inevitability. (Katherine Mansfield, letter to William Gerhardi [1977: 259]. Italics and capital letters in the original.)

Mansfield's intuitive summary of the story, or of its topic, is highly revealing. The same intersentential connectives (*AND / BUT*) are once more found to add weight to the thesis that their role in the text cannot be casual or superficial, but rather is deeply involved in the construction of the textual structure of discourse (Schiffrin 1988: 320). Their frequency of appearance also reinforces this: four additive continuative *AND* conjuncts, one of them paragraph-initial, and two adversative contrastive *BUT* in a totality of ten sentences clearly point to the relevance both semantic relations must have in the writer's mental representation.

It could be argued that this recurrent use might be a characteristic of Mansfield's style. A rapid skimming through both her creative writing and her personal letters and journals will show that, although she has a certain tendency to use conjuncts as intersentential connectives, this tendency is never so strong as in "The Garden Party." For example, out of her 88 stories

only two others begin with *AND*. This low but still significant frequency could be interpreted in terms of rhetorical control (Adams 1985: 59ff.), as an indirect resource the writer uses to influence the reader through the selection of the lexical items and their arrangement in the surface text.

As far as "The Garden Party" is concerned, the key seems to be in relation to her concept of life. If we attend to the explicit signals contained in the writer's summary, we discover that "life" is the only word repeated 3 times in the whole stretch, and its role in the semantic structuring gains importance as the paragraph evolves. When the term "life" appears for the first time ("The diversity of life and how..."), it plays a secondary role as modifier of the topic of the proposition. The second time, ("But life isn't like that") it is already the topic, while in the third case ("And Life answers…") it not only maintains the primary topic position, but it is also graphically emphasized by the rhetorical selection of a capital initial.

Some further exploration at cotext level will also reveal information essential to what we have been saying so far in relation to the writer's and reader's mental representations. It must be noted, first, that when life is being used as a secondary concept it is being subordinated precisely to the concept of "diversity" which will later be expanded as "everything, Death included" and qualified as "bewildering." All these lexical items contain in their semantic domain the idea of contrast/adversative and may be linked to the meaning projected by the connective *BUT*. The second thing that deserves mention is that although in the other two cases in which "life" appears ("But life isn't like that" / "And Life answers…") it is the topic of the propositions, it is not the theme (or left-most constituent). The thematic salience goes instead to the conjuncts *BUT* and *AND*. In this way a strongly cohesive and coherent quality is given to the structure of the discourse.

In the following section the actual appearance of *AND* and *BUT* in "The Garden Party" will be investigated in an attempt to shed some light on the differences detected so far between the writer's and the reader's mental representations. We will try to find a reason for the different way in which both participants in the communicative process deal with the additive connective relation while on the other hand they assign an equal role to the contrastive adversative one.

5. INTERPRETING THE DATA

1. The additive connective *AND*

We will start by discussing the first connective elements the reader encounters in "The Garden Party": the conjuncts *AND AFTER ALL* with which Mansfield chooses to open the story. Previous to the analysis, two theoretical aspects introduced above should be recovered. On the one hand, at discourse level, the theme—the lexical items which occur in discourse initial position—has both local and global relevance. That is to say, the meaning and the type of textual relation the theme establishes has an active influence on the macrostructural organization of the information contained in the text (Brown and Yule 1983). With this in mind, our research on the function of these conjuncts will not be limited to the immediate cotext. We will look as well for the possible cohesive relations they might initiate from their prominent semantic position.

On the other hand, it should be remembered that conjuncts, being essentially connective elements between parts of discourse, are not likely candidates for initiating discourse. The *in medias res* device with which Mansfield opens her story does not explain their presence either, for the effect would have been the same had she chosen to omit them (*"The weather was ideal…"). In this connexion it is interesting to note the reasons Hyde gives for the unexpectedly frequent appearance of conjuncts in discourse initial position in the type of text he investigates, newspaper editorials:

> Conjuncts . . . are anaphoric—they establish a logico-semantic relation with a presupposed, immediately preceding, portion of discourse. This would seem to imply that it would, by definition, be impossible to encounter a conjunct . . . in absolute discourse-initial position, that is to say, either in the headline or in the first sentence of an editorial. And yet, it is not unusual to find certain ISR [intersentential relation] signals in this position.
>
> Such discourse-initial use of anaphoric ISR signals would seem to be quite rare in written texts. The fact that they appear with some regularity in newspaper editorials is an important defining characteristic of this discourse type (at least in daily newspapers). Editorials are normally comments on immediately preceding events in the world and knowledge of those events is presumed to be still salient in the normal reader's knowledge base. This text type is very closely tied to the present moment. (1990: 208).

Hyde explains this particular use of conjuncts by making them relate the textual world they create to the events happening in the outer real world. Of course, for a type of text like editorials which are about current affairs, the

connexion between the two worlds is both logical and real. The state of things is not so simple for a work of fiction such as the story we are analysing. However, our case could be argued on grounds similar to those given for editorials, bearing in mind that the way to attain a certain effect in fiction, as opposed to the type of straightforward communication achieved in journalism, tends to be indirect and through rhetorical control (van Dijk 1976, 1981; Adams 1985).

There is a cultural convention in literary communication (Coleridge's "willing suspension of disbelief"), according to which the reader assumes from the very beginning that the textual world s/he is entering is autonomous and independent of outer reality. This is an indispensable condition for the semantic and pragmatic functions of literature (van Dijk 1976, 1981; Levin 1976; Banfield 1987) and a rule intuitively observed at all stages of the communicative process. There seems to be no reason why Katherine Mansfield's "The Garden Party" should be an exception. When the reader reads the first paragraph and enters the world of the story, ("And after all the weather was ideal. They could not have had a more perfect day for a garden party if they had ordered it.…" GP 245) s/he knows that the entities and states mentioned there do not relate in any sense to the entities and states that conform his/her "real" situation.

In a previous analysis of "The Garden Party," I contended that the use of the conjunctive combination *AND AFTER ALL* in discourse initial position was effective, economical and efficient

> for two reasons: first, because it produces in the reader the immediate effect of making him a part of the world created, even if he is at this early stage totally ignorant of it; second, because it saves the narrator the time and space consumed in a description of the situation. (Alonso 1991: 76)

These reasons are valid when we look at the story within the self-contained textual reality of the fictional world. My proposal now is that we look at it from the wider perspective of the communicative situation where writer and reader become active participants and essential constituents of the process (de Beaugrande 1980, de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981), even if it is impossible for them to interact (van Dijk 1976; Garnham 1987).

In this more ample scenario, we have a situation (local, temporal, social, cultural) external to the text, but which must be shared by or at least known to both the text receiver and the text producer, if the communicative act is to

be considered successful or felicitous (Austin 1962; Searle 1969, 1979; Levin 1976). In this context the role of the connectives *AND AFTER ALL* acquires a new dimension. To begin with and following Hyde (1990) we presume that conjuncts are anaphoric and presuppose the existence of some previous portion of discourse to which they can relate. The fact that this condition is not satisfied in "The Garden Party" makes us search for some type of conceptual content to which the conjuncts may be co-referring. The only previous information or experience that can be found has necessarily got to be external to the text. I would like to venture a risky but logical interpretation of this unusual situation.

By using an additive continuative combination of connectives as the first elements in her text, Mansfield might be explicitly signalling the reader to connect the textual reality s/he is entering with the actual reality s/he is a part of. The writer might be thus implying that the world she is creating is governed by the same rules that govern the outer world. It is presented as an addition and continuation of what the reader already knows. In this way and by converting the conjunct *AND AFTER ALL* into the theme of her discourse Mansfield might be partially cancelling the rule that instructs readers to separate fiction from reality. Instead, she might be attempting to guide them in the opposite direction, creating a counter-order:

> <apply to my text the same (socio-cultural) parameters you apply to reality>

This interpretation would be in relation to and supported by Mansfield's own words on "The Garden Party," which were quoted and discussed above. The analysis showed that the dominant concept in her mental representation of the story was "[the diversity of] life**.**" Life, with a capital letter as Mansfield chooses to write it in her paragraph, is a generic concept, not subject by definition to textual variations. Hence the life and/or situation to which the reader is introduced in "The Garden Party" should not be taken as different or unrelated to the social context that surrounded the writer and the readers of her moment, who would after all be the first to receive her text. In this reading, the conjuncts do not have to renounce their anaphoric nature, because they would be establishing a connection with the cultural and social reality that pertains to the world in which the text was created. Actually they would be fulfilling an exophoric indexical function, in the double sense described by Schiffrin when she says that "markers provide **contextual coordinates** for

utterances: they index an utterance to the local contexts in which utterances are produced and in which they are to be interpreted" (1988: 326).

If we pursue this reasoning a little further, the other 30 additive connectives which appear regularly and consistently woven into the text could also be taken as explicit markers for the continuation and addition of information on the same grounds. In essence, the additive conjuncts are not informative in themselves, in the sense given to the word by de Beaugrande (1980) and de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981). The relation they establish (cf. Appendix) does not add any new or different conceptual information to the text. Their role is intensively cohesive and continuative, but not primarily thematic. For example, out of the 31 *AND*s encountered in "The Garden Party" only 7 (including the initial *AND AFTER ALL*) start a paragraph, and just one is found initiating the contribution of one of the characters (Laura, the protagonist) to the dialogue. On the other hand, the fact that in many cases *AND* could have been supressed altogether (10 of them do not appear alone, but as part of a combination of conjuncts: *AND AFTER ALL, AND NOW, AND JUST, AND SOMEHOW, AND AGAIN, AND THIS TIME*) or replaced by a more meaningful additive conjunct (e.g. *besides*) proves that its recurrent use by the writer is intentional and purposeful.

All these reasons would explain why readers do not explicitly record the existence of these recurrent additive connectives in their summaries. In fact, readers interpret the function of these conjuncts correctly, as instructions from the writer which they intuitively interiorize while simultaneously incorporating their continuative semantic value. The actual consequence of this, as far as the function of conjuncts in the construction of the writer/reader's mental models is concerned, is that *AND* can be said to have a global scope and a pragmatic role to play in both the text producer's and text receiver's mental representation of the story. In both cases it is a marker for continuity and addition—necessarily explicit for the text producer (writer) who is instructing the reader to proceed in a direction which might seem unconventional for literary communication; implicit for the text receiver (reader) who acknowledges the validity of these markers by automatically incorporating the instructions received to the development of his/her own mental representation.

5.2 The adversative connective *BUT*

The case of *BUT* is slightly different but in a complementary sense. It explicitly signals contrast. And as we have seen, this concept is intimately related to the idea of "diversity of life" that is presumably the core of the story, if we

attend to the evidence provided by the summaries of both writer and readers. If we contrast the data (cf. Appendix), we find some interesting points. For instance, contrary to what was observed with reference to *AND*, *BUT* initiates 15 discursive units within the text (9 paragraphs and 8 dialogue contributions) which gives it quite a powerful thematic relevance. Besides, only 6 out of the 28 *BUT*s appear in combination with another cohesive element (*NOTHING BUT, BUT AT THE MOMENT, BUT NOW, BUT OH, BUT AT THAT MOMENT, BUT ALL THE SAME*). This implies that the presence of *BUT* in the discourse is semantically more informative than the presence of *AND,* which is basically more continuative and connective. It could be deduced then that the role played by the adversative conjunctive *BUT* is explicitly to establish a tight semantic relation built around the concept of contrast. Although the more immediate projection of this relation might be local, the recurrence of the device involves a wider scope which spreads over the global macrostructure.

The specific function of *BUT* does not contradict what we said about *AND* above. We have already quoted Halliday and Hasan when they say that the adversative *BUT* contains the additive *AND* (*BUT = AND YET*). Accordingly, from the point of view of meaning, each time *BUT* occurs it signals not only contrast, but also continuation. In this sense *BUT* should be seen as compatible with *AND*, reinforcing and completing its meaning. It should not be considered its opposite. The alternate use of both conjuncts definitely contributes to the formation of a tightly cohesive and coherent whole. Mansfield's mental image of "the diversity of life and how we try to fit in everything, Death included" is achieved in "The Garden Party" by the lexical and situational selection contained in the narrative descriptions, the dialogues, and the actions. There is no doubt however that the reiterative use of the connectives *AND* and *BUT* is an economic and highly effective way of guiding the construction of the reader's mental representation in that direction.

A schematic reproduction of the extracts from "The Garden Party" where *AND* and *BUT* appear will be given in the Appendix. An overview of their occurrence and distribution will further support our point.

6. THE SEMANTIC AND PRAGMATIC ROLES OF CONNECTIVES

T. A. van Dijk distinguishes two planes of conjunctive relations: the semantic and the pragmatic (1977: 86-7, 210-13). These two planes are related to

Halliday and Hasan's differentiation between the external and internal functions of connectives (1976: 237-41). In Hyde's words,

> external [van Dijk's semantic] ISR's are related to the content of what is being said and are located in the ideational or experiential function of language"; while "internal [van Dijk's pragmatic] ISR's are related to the speaker's organisation of his [her] discourse and are located in the interpersonal function of language. (1990: 199)

In all cases, it is admitted that the difference or distinction between the two functions is frequently a difficult one -and I would add, an unnecessary one if we consider the interactive nature of linguistic communication as the essence of the pragmatic component (de Beaugrande: 1979, 1980, 1985; de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981). Schiffrin sheds some light on the complexity when she defines "the semantic role [of conjunctive markers] as their textual meaning, and their pragmatic role as their interactional effect" (1988: 190).

As for the scope of this double function of connectives, both van Dijk and Halliday and Hasan explain it in terms of relations between short stretches of text, as corresponds to their basically local approach to the phenomenon. For example, van Dijk says: "The semantic function of connectives is to relate facts, whereas pragmatic connectives relate sentences (or propositions), as for instance, in inferences" (1977: 86). Hyde focuses on the local and global scope of connectives but finds no real differences in meaning or in the type of relation they establish:

> This distinction between short-range and long-range scope of particular signals obviously reflects the division into micro and macro factors of discourse. A signal which scopes only to the immediately preceding sentence will obviously express a very local, micro relation. A signal which scopes over one, two or even more paragraphs . . . will express a major, macro relation. . . . This makes it possible to divide ISR signals into so-called micro-connectives and macro-connectives. However . . . as far as conjuncts are concerned, at least, there are no formal differences between micro-connectives and macro-connectives. (1990: 206-7)

In "The Garden Party" the high frequency of the connectives *AND* and *BUT*, makes their relational function active at all levels of discourse: propositional, microstructural and macrostructural. A look at the Appendix will support this point. At local level, both conjuncts serve all kinds of purposes. For example, *AND* is used to indicate addition or continuation (1, 5, 9, 13,

14, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25) to change the topic or perspective of the previous sentence (2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 19, 24, 27, 29), to enumerate actions or facts (3, 10, 21, 26, 28, 30, 31), and to relate different speech acts (4, 15, 22). In some of the cases the meanings interact and the differences are not really clear-cut. Much the same could be said about *BUT* which sometimes denotes an additive adversative relation (13, 14, 15, 17, 24, 28), an unexpected consequence (2, 7, 8, 9, 10), an unfulfilled condition (1,4), a change of perspective through contrast (5, 6, 11, 12, 25), contrast proper (3, 21, 22, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27), or a dismissive relation (26).

At a more local level the strong presence of both *AND* and *BUT* in all the semantic blocks distinguished in the text gives sufficient evidence to support the notion that conjucts are an effective means of connection between ideas which cover stretches of text longer than a proposition.. For instance, all uses of *AND* in "the workmen episode" signal Laura's frame of mind and the continuity of her thoughts in relation to what she observes at the moment. On the other hand, in the "news of the accident" section, uses of *BUT* point to the contrast existing between Laura's opinion and the opinion of some members of her family (her mother and her sister Jose).

But perhaps the most interesting findings inferred from the use of the two connectives in "The Garden Party" concern the macrostructural level, where they help to introduce and maintain—through emphatic thematization and consistent recurrence—one of the main topics of the discourse: life as a continuum and its contrasts. The first consequence that can be drawn from these data is that *AND* and *BUT* actually have a clear semantic role in the structural organization of "The Garden Party." Their meanings are intimately related to the central idea that runs throughout the text. At propositional level they mark each character's (including the narrator's) subjective perspective. At macrostructural level they serve as explicit, though indirect, indicators of the writer's own topic.

As for their pragmatic function, the analysis of Mansfield's paragraph on "The Garden Party" demonstrated that both *AND* and *BUT* are essential elements in the writer's organization of her discourse because the presence of the two connectives is mantained in her summary and is even foregrounded. The interpersonal function associated with conjuncts also applies, but needs some adjustment. Literary communication is a type of asymmetrical linguistic communication. As Garnham says, "when reading a book it may be necessary to take the beliefs of the author into account, but it is not possible to have much effect on authors' beliefs by reading their books" (1987: 47). Thus, the interpersonal function in a literary text has to be seen as a one-way function,

where the writer instructs the reader in a certain direction. The fact that all 35 readers seemed to follow these intructions easily and without deviation, and read the text according to the lines marked by the writer, supports the idea that the interpersonal projection marked by the conjuncts *AND* and *BUT* worked both effectively and efficiently (de Beaugrande 1980; de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981).

6. CONCLUSION

In the introduction to this paper we stated that the basic aim was to explore the role of intersentential connectives in complex narrative discourse. Some recent trends of investigation support different roles for these connectives in the construction of discourse (see Segal, Duchan and Scott 1991). Our aim was to evaluate and measure their findings against data more complex than that usually found in theoretical studies of these phenomena. For this purpose, Katherine Mansfield's short story "The Garden Party" was selected, because it combined the characteristics of textual complexity and free elaboration, together with an interesting use of these connective devices.

The analysis of the prominent position and intensive recurrence of these connectives indicated the existence of specific values intentionally assigned to them by the writer. *AND* and *BUT* have been shown to be functioning in "The Garden Party," first as a means of attaining local and global cohesion and coherence, second and most important as explicit signals for the development and construction of all the participants' mental models.

The fact that these functions have to do with the semantic (meaning or topic) and the pragmatic (structural organization and interpersonal relation) planes of discourse has led to the conclusion that an intentional and repetitive use of intersentential connectives in discourse may activate their semantic and pragmatic properties in combination and with a global scope. We have also found that a creative use of connectives provide the text producer with the means to create multiple effects. First and most frequently, they are used to give "texture" (Halliday and Hasan 1976) to the text, but their contribution can go far beyond that. They can shape the actual meaning of the text, they can also serve as efficient markers for instructions in the communicative process established between writer and reader. Although more texts should be analysed before any general claims could be made, it is hoped that this analysis of Mansfield's "The Garden Party" offers an interesting point of departure for further research.a

APPENDIX

The data has been organized following the same semantic blocks that were used for the 35 summaries. However, the episode of the preparations for the party has been added as a separate microstructure because it carries enough evidence for our analysis of connectives.

AND

INTRODUCTION (GP 245-6):
1. *And after all* the weather was ideal (GP 245).

THE WORKMEN EPISODE (GP 246-248):
2. What nice eyes he [a workman] had, small, but such a dark blue! *And now* she looked at the others . . . (GP 246)
3. How nice workmen were! *And* what a beautiful morning! (GP 246)
4. *And* she pointed to the lily lawn … (GP 246)
5. Then the karaka trees would be hidden. *And* they were so lovely . . . (GP 247)
6. It's all the fault, she decided, . . . of these absurd class distinctions. Well for her part she didn't feel them. Not a bit, not an atom… *And now* there came the chock-chock of wooden hammers . . . (GP 248)

PREPARATIONS FOR THE PARTY (GP 248-253):
7. One moment—hold the line. Mother's calling. *And* Laura sat back… (GP 248).
8. The green baize door that led to the kitchen regions swung open and shut with a muffled thud. *And now* there came a long, chuckling absurd sound. (GP 249)
9. Little faint winds were playing chase in at the tops of the windows, out at the doors. *And* there were two tiny spots of sun . . . (GP 249)
10. I was passing the shop yesterday, and I saw them in the window. *And* I suddenly thought . . . (GP 249)

11. 'The flags for the sandwiches, Sadie?' echoed Mrs. Sheridan dreamily. *And* the children knew by her face that she hadn't got them. (GP 251)
12. 'Let me see.' *And* she said to Sadie firmly… (GP 251)
13. Do you hear me children . . . *And, and ,* Jose, pacify cook… (GP 251)

NEWS OF THE ACCIDENT (GP 253-257):
14. 'They were taking the body home as I come up here.' *And* he said to the cook . . . (GP 253)
15. *'And* just think of what the band would sound like to that poor woman,' said Laura. (GP 254)
16. 'What's given you such a colour? *And* Mrs. Sheridan turned round from her dressing table . . . (GP 255)
17. 'Look at yourself!' *And* she held up her hand mirror. (GP 255)
18. 'People like them don't expect sacrifices from us. *And* it is not very sympathetic to spoil everybody's enjoyment…(GP 255)
19. Is mother right? she thought. *And now* she hoped her mother was right. (GP 256)
20. I'll remember it again after the party is over. *And* somehow that seemed quite the best plan. (GP 256)
21. If Laurie agreed with the others, then it was bound to be all right. *And* she followed him into the hall. (GP 256)
22. *And* Laura, glowing, answered softly. (GP 257)
23. *And* the perfect afternoon slowly ripened. (GP 257)

LAURA'S ERRAND TO THE DEAD MAN'S HOUSE (GP 257-261):
24. 'Why will you children insist on giving parties!' *And* they all of them sat down . . . (GP 257)
25. 'Don't you agree? *And* she's sure to have neighbours calling in . . .'
26. 'Only the basket, then. *And* Laura . . . '(GP 258)
27. She stopped a minute. *And* it seemed to her that kisses, voices, tinkling spoons . . . (GP 259)
28. How her frock shone! *And* the big hat with the velvet streamer . . . (GP 259)
29. What was it all about? *And* the poor face puckered up again. (GP 260)
30. *And* again she began, 'You'll excuse her, miss . . . (GP 260)
31. *And* this time she didn't wait for Em's sister . . . (GP 261)

BUT

INTRODUCTION (GP 245-246):
1. *But* Meg couldn't possibly go and supervise the workmen. (GP 245).

THE WORKMEN EPISODE (GP 246-248):
2. 'Good morning,' she said copying her mother's voice. *But* that sounded so fearfully affected . . . (GP 246)
3. Laura's upbringing made her wonder for a moment whether it was quite respectful for a workman to talk to her of bangs slap in the eye. *But* she did quite follow him. (GP 247)
4. 'A corner of the tennis-court,' she suggested. '*But* the band is going to be in one corner.' (GP 247)
5. Perhaps he wouldn't mind so much if the band was quite small. *But* the tall fellow interrupted. (GP 247)

PREPARATIONS FOR THE PARTY (GP248-253):
6. It was the heavy piano being moved on its stiff castors. *But* the air! If you stopped to notice . . . (GP 249)
7. There, just inside the door, stood a wide, shallow tray full of pots of pink lilies. No other kind. *Nothing but* lilies . . . (GP 249).
8. *But at that moment* Mrs. Sheridan joined them. (GP 249)
9. *'But* I thought you said you didn't mean to interfere.' (GP 250)
10. *But* at the word 'Goodbye', and although the piano sounded more desperate than ever, her face broke into a brilliant, dreadfully unsympathetic smile. (GP 251)
11. *But now* Sadie interrupted them. (GP 251)
12. *But* the back door was blocked by cook, Sadie, Godber's man and Hans. (GP 253)

NEWS OF THE ACCIDENT (GP 253-257):
13. *But* Godber's man wasn't going to have his story snatched from under his nose. (GP 253)
14. *But* Jose was still more amazed. (GP 253)
15. *'But* we can't possibly have a garden party with a man dead just outside the front gate.' (GP 254)
16. When the Sheridans were little they were forbidden to set foot there because of the revolting language and of what they might catch. *But* since they were grown up, Laura and Laurie on their prowls sometimes walked through. (GP 254)

17. They came out with a shudder. *But* still one must go everywhere… (GP 254)
18. *'But* listen, mother,' said Laura.(GP 255)
19. *'But* my dear child, use your common sense . . .' (GP 255)
20. *'But* , mother, ' Laura began again. (GP 255)
21. Just for a moment she had another glimpse of that poor woman and those little children, and the body being carried into the house. *But* it all seemed blurred, unreal, like a picture in the newspaper. (GP 256)
22. 'Yes, it's been very successful. *But oh*, these parties, these parties!' (GP 257)

LAURA'S ERRAND TO THE DEAD MAN'S HOUSE (GP 257-261):
23. *'But* , mother, do you really think it's a good idea? said Laura. (GP 258)
24. 'Are you Mrs. Scott?' *But* to her horror the woman answered, 'Walk in, please, miss . . .' (GP 260)
25. *But at that moment* the woman at the fire turned round. (GP 260)
26. *But all the same* you had to cry . . .' (GP 261)
27. 'No,' sobbed Laura.' It was simply marvellous. *But* Laurie—' (GP 261)
28. 'Isn't life,' she stammered, 'isn't life—' *But* what life was she couldn't explain . . . (GP 261)

NOTE

1. In the Penguin edition of *The Collected Stories of Katherine Mansfield.* References to this edition will be abbreviated hereafter as "GP."

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a

¬'SHORTCIRCUITING DEATH:
THE ENDING OF *CHANGING PLACES* AND THE DEATH OF THE NOVEL¬'

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Changing Places, considered as David Lodge's most innovative novel, expresses its author's interest in the processes which generate fictional form through a variety of metafictional techniques that operate on several levels.[1] The exaggerated imposition of pattern that Lodge undertakes appears to be an exercise of artifice, which draws attention to itself. The plot of *Changing Places* is conspicuously subordinated to artificial generative principles, a technique listed by Brian Stonehill (1988: 29-30) in his "repertoire of reflexivity" as one of the "family characteristics" of fictions that depict themselves. Everything in this "duplex chronicle" of academic exchange happens twice, and more often than not, at the same time. This symmetry and simultaneity—which Lodge takes to extremes—jeopardizes the verisimilitude of the novel. The reader is presented with too many of these coincidences, which work to deliberately disrupt his/her assumptions concerning the linear relationship between text and the world, characteristic of realistic fiction. The discursive strategy of juxtaposition—which presents simultaneous events successively in the spatial continuum of the text—further reinforces the absurd chronological symmetry, at the cost of interrupting

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the story line. The structural categories of time and space, instead of being inconspicuous and inert media in which events take place, are thus foregrounded and problematized by parodic overstatement. They cannot but advertise their conventionality, and that of all temporal and spatial designs in fiction. The strategies that fiction deploys are revealed not as "neutral" or "objective" but as a product of a series of conventions. "Ending," the last chapter of *Changing Places*, which unquestionably shows the pains David Lodge took in the structuring of the novel, proves especially interesting in this respect.

Endings particularly distinguish postmodernist fiction. The traditional closed ending—"in which mystery is explained and fortunes are settled" (Lodge 1989: 226), tying up all loose ends—and the modernist open ending—satisfying but not final—have given way to multiple endings, parody endings and non-endings. Even the modernist open ending seems now too comfortable in "its endorsement of the commonplace that life, somehow or another, goes on" (Lodge 1986b: 154), it still makes a claim for the fiction's realism. Postmodernist endings—which delight in disclosing their own conventionality—have in common an element of playfulness and even trickery, which sometimes takes the form of withholding information or cheating the reader (Alexander 1990: 3).

According to Steven C. Wiegenstein (1987: 246), in ending *Changing Places* David Lodge faces a quandary:

> The prospect of Morris and Philip returning to their respective homes, though seemingly demanded by the requirements of plot symmetry, is not a satisfactorily comic solution. Neither professor is entirely sure that he wants to return, and neither wife is entirely ready to accept him. The ending so often favoured by the academic comedy—flight—is likewise closed off; both couples have family and financial obligations from which they cannot and desire not to escape. . . . Shall the story end happily (and falsely) or unhappily (violating the comic structure that has been built in the preceding five chapters)?

As David Lodge observes of Hemingway's short story "Cat in the Rain," in *Changing Places* the story "tantalizingly stops just short of that point in the fabula where we should, with our readerly desire for certainty, wish it to" (1986b: 28). *Changing Places* refuses to impose organic, or any other kind of form on its comic spirit. The novel's problematic ending exposes and disrupts both comic circularity and narrative closure, rejecting in this way the

comforts of stereotyped endings, of the familiar narrative form of beginning, middle and end (and only one of each) (Alexander 1990: 37).

"The further we inquire into the problems of ends"—states Peter Brooks—"the more it seems to compel a further inquiry into its relation to the human end" (1984: 95). In *Reading for the Plot* Brooks explains the narrative process as an enactment of man's time-boundedness, of his conscious existence within the limits of mortality (1984: xi). Accordingly, the dynamics of plot are structured as a movement from the beginning—linked to Eros, stimulation into tension and the desire of narrative—through a middle—experienced as a detour, an imposed delay—, and finally to an ending which is associated to the death-wish, quiescence and non-narratability (1984: 107). In fact, we read moved by our desire for the end, for that recognition which is the moment of the death of the reader in the text, and a substitute for our desire for death and dissolution. The narrative end is supposed, like the human end, to provide total knowledge, and thus, it grants us the possibility of knowing that which must remain unexplained in our lives. It is a surrogate, Walter Benjamin claims, for "the death that writes *finis* to the life and therefore confers on it its meaning" (in Brooks 1984: 22). Thus, unsatisfactory open endings frustrate our desire for the end, for absolute knowledge and longed-for integration. Postmodernist endings, by withholding information from the readers, deny them the possibility of giving meaning to their lives, and reveal the narrative end not as "the moment of absolute truth" but as a convention.

The structural parallels which rule *Changing Places* from the beginning, come together in "Ending" bringing about an "air miss" over Manhattan (*CP* 239). The four characters are flying to a meeting where they will decide who should live with whom. The possibility of the characters dying in a plane crash is the nearest thing in the novel to a fulfilment of the reader's death-wish, and also a parody of it. *Let's Write a Novel*, a compendium of conventional wisdom of the novel genre which Philip Swallow bought second-hand for six pence and which functions as a parodic internal metatext—in Gérard Genette's terminology (1982)—has already informed both characters and readers of the three possible ways of ending a novel: the best is, of course, the happy ending, the second best is the unhappy ending, and the worst—and one which you should never attempt unless you have Genius—is the non-ending (*CP* 88). It is a straight choice: either Lodge is flaunting his Genius or he is blatantly challenging the teachings of *Let's Write a Novel* (or both). The non-ending of *Changing Places* puts an end to the reading activity, but not to the reader's desire for the end, which spills over the text's boundaries,

leaving the reader wondering about the future of the characters and also about his/her own final dissolution. The novel rejects the conventional alternative to human experience that narrative is supposed to provide.

Frank Kermode—who in *The Sense of an Ending* argues that human beings need fictions to give meaning to their lives—uses the classical term *peripeteia* to signify the postponement of the expected end in the interest of reality. According to him, the more daring the *peripeteia*, the more we feel that the work respects our sense of reality (in Lodge 1986b: 150). Since humankind views life *in medias res*, it is "more real" for novels to reach their endings in unexpected rather than expected ways. Thus, the unexpected ending of *Changing Places* is nearer to reality in that it imitates the anarchic flux of experience. As Paddy Bostock puts it "Lodge can claim to be adding an extra layer of realism to what is already his preferred form" (1989: 68). Paradoxically, in its rejection of closure, this ending can also claim to be in tune with the most radical postmodernist practice. Bostock interprets it as "another instance of Lodge having it both ways at the same time, showing awareness of radical thought and yet finding a way to domesticate it in the traditions of native realism" (1989: 69). One can wonder, however, whether this is an instance of Lodge's tendency to compromise, or just another manifestation of the ambiguous relationship between postmodernism—especially in its British version—and realism.

In "Ending" we also come across a parodic allusion to the postmodernist practice of the multiple ending. "There are choices to be made"—states Morris—"We must be aware of all the possibilities" (*CP* 245). And the characters move on to discuss the possible ways out of their double adultery: they can divorce and remarry, divorce and not remarry, go back to their original partners, or as Morris puts forward, practice group marriage. The novel refuses to make a decision, and thus passes the responsibility on to the reader. Postmodernist multiple endings do nothing but foreground an implicit tendency in the novel: novels are about choosing. They are often centred around characters who must choose—most often sexual partners or financial objectives, and often both: "Novels hover over the freedom of choice—Emma with Knightly or Frank Church, Lydgate with Dorothea or Rosamond, Jude with Arabella or Sue, and so on" (Davies 1987: 219). However, Davies notes, this privileging of choice in the novel is paradoxical since the reader is the one who is least able to change anything about the plot. The responsible exercise of freedom demanded of the reader in postmodernist endings tries to contest this fact. But "openness" does not mean "indefiniteness," and what is in fact made available to the reader is "a range of rigidly preestablished and

ordained interpretative solutions and these never allow the reader to move outside the strict control of the author" (Eco 1989: 6). The possibilities offered by the multiple ending lead to an illusion of individual freedom which ultimately echoes and reinforces the functioning of the capitalist economy, for, in order for the capitalist system to work the individual must feel that he or she has "free choice" (Lee 1990: 58). The multiple ending of *Changing Places* both exemplifies and goes against the role accorded to the reader in Lodge's fiction. While it gives the reader the illusion of freedom of choice, it actually restricts the possibilities very severely. Lodge experiences a vague anxiety concerning postmodernist practices, but his view of textual modes is dependent on rhetorical figures which are consciously placed in the text by the author.

The vicissitudes of the characters in "Ending" are narrated in the form of a film-script. Or, is it a script for a TV drama? Or to put it in other words, does the reader associate it with the cinema or with the television? Lodge, in his criticism, refers to it as a film script; Philip's reflexive comments on the difference between endings in novels and films point in the same direction; the characters, however, are shown in the course of this chapter in the act of watching television. The sole allusion to this medium is not as banal as it may seem. Television is both more private and more readily accessible than the cinema. This last chapter of the novel is just one further stage in the narrator's "steady renegotiation of his position" (Bradbury in Morace 1989: 170) that has been going on throughout *Changing Places*. The narrator has made a final attempt at going unnoticed, but, ironically, its place has been filled in by an even more omnipresent and omniscient medium:

> En los catecismos escolares de otras épocas, de las épocas en que había catecismos, se trataba de describir la realidad inefable de Dios de una manera parecida a esta: *Dios es invisible, todopoderoso, está en todas partes, lo sabe todo y está siempre con nosotros.* Algo parecido se podría decir hoy de los contenidos de la televisión, de su omnipresencia y su omnisciencia. . . . La gente del común se ha acostumbrado a citar la televisión como una fuente segura de conocimiento y experiencia. *Ha salido en la tele* es un argumento de autoridad tan contundente como *lo vi con mis propios ojos*. La pantalla doméstica nos permite ser testigos vicarios de mil acontecimientos universales (de Miguel 1983: 42).

The script technique suggests an illusion of visual representation, and vision is habitually equated with access to truth. The technique, however, is not

at all unobtrusive. Watching a film seems to require no effort at all, but reading the script directions of "Ending," which are ultimately meant not to be read but seen, proves rather tedious. The film-script may not appear more "real" to a reader accustomed to the usual conventions novels employ for creating the illusion of realism. Besides, this new story-telling technique is also laid bare by Hilary's metafictional commentary: "You sound like a pair of scriptwriters discussing how to wind up a play" (*CP* 245).

Lodge states that in developing the highly symmetrical and perhaps predictable plot for *Changing Places*', he felt the need to provide some variety and surprise on another level of the text, and accordingly wrote each chapter in a different style (Lodge 1992: 227). The reasons why he ended the novel in the form of a film-script, he affirms, are mainly two: the most striking variation in narrative technique should come at the end, and, principally, he did not want to take sides in the matrimonial debate:

> I found myself unwilling to resolve the wife-swapping plot, partly because that would mean also resolving the cultural plot. . . . I did not want to have to decide, as implied author, in favour of this partnership or that (Lodge 1992: 128).
>
> I did not want to write from just one point of view or even two, but from four. . . . [B]y using a sort of dramatic form, just the dialogue, the reader stays outside the characters, there is a kind of distance, so they all have an equal status (in Díaz Bild 1990: 275).

The very last scene of the novel features the four characters at the hotel, after a morning shopping in Manhattan. Philip and Morris have now completely dropped the subject of their marital problems and the conversation turns to literary matters. Hilary, the voice of commonsense in the chapter, complains: "This is all very fascinating, I'm sure, but could we discuss something a little more practical? Like what the four of us are going to do in the immediate future?" "It's no use, Hilary. Don't you recognize the sound of men talking?" (*CP* 250), says Désirée, conscious that they have been relegated to the position of silent spectators. This position is assumed and confirmed by the script directions:

> HILARY and DESIREE begin to listen to what PHILIP is saying, and he becomes the focal point of attention (*CP* 251).

Lodge's attempt to offer equal status to all four characters is thus revealed as ineffective at this point. The ending of *Changing Places* leaves the female characters no place from which to speak, or nothing to say. Hilary and Désirée are subordinated to the male discourse, equated throughout the novel to the discourse of literary criticism.

As teachers of English Literature, Morris and Philip are often given to expressing their own literary-theoretical views and to discussing all kinds of literary issues throughout the novel. This self-conscious theorizing about literature—usual in metafictional works—serves, in *Changing Places*, a double function: it is at the same time a naturalized constituent of the diegesis of the book—of the fictional world—and also a statement on the creation of such a world. Both Swallow and Zapp show a special interest in Jane Austen—Morris has published four "fiendishly clever" books on her, and Philip, a more modest researcher, chose her as the subject of his M. A. thesis. On the last page of *Changing Places* Philip brings up a passage from *Northanger Abbey* to illustrate the reader's experience of the ending of a novel:

> PHILIP: . . . You remember that passage in *Northanger Abbey* where Jane Austen says she's afraid that her readers will have guessed that a happy ending is coming up at any moment.
> MORRIS: (*nods*) Quote, 'Seeing in the tell-tale compression of the pages before them that we are all hastening together to perfect felicity.' Unquote.
> PHILIP: That's it. Well, that's something the novelist can't help giving away, isn't it, that his book is shortly coming to an end? It may not be a happy ending, nowadays, but he can't disguise the tell-tale compression of the pages. (*CP* 251)

The intertextual relationship between *Changing Places* and Jane Austen is very significant at this stage of the novel, and it signifies on various levels. *Northanger Abbey* (1818) is mentioned by Patricia Waugh as an example of the implicit tendency of the novel throughout its history to draw attention to its linguistic construction (1990: 67-68), a tendency that *Changing Places* continues in a much more explicit way. Thus, David Lodge seems to present his own experimentalism not as a break with or reaction against "the great tradition of realistic fiction" (*CP* 250), but as an extension of it. For David Lodge, Austen was "perhaps the first novelist to master the judicious blend of authorial omniscience and limited view-point, sliding subtly between direct narrative and free indirect speech, that permits the novelist to command the simultaneous double perspective of public and private experience" (Lodge

1989: 39). The issue of the private and the public is central to *Changing Places*, which by and large privileges the former over the latter. In the novel, Jane Austen is brought up by Philip Swallow not so much to express "the blending of public and private experience, inner and outer history" (Lodge 1989: 47), but to advocate the "old liberal doctrine of the inviolate self"—"what novels are all about" (*CP*250)—to which the protagonists suscribe. Reference to Austen's novels also brings to the fore the issue of the position of women in society, and works to both destabilize and install Lodge's male world. As Docherty notes, "Jane Austen's novels, while certainly granting a huge central importance to individual women characters as the main centre of attention and interest, simply operate to legitimize the bourgeois marriage and family which marginalized women in the first place" (Docherty 1991: 173). As a rule, her novels epitomize the endings of nineteenth-century novels in which the union of hero and heroine is an assurance of the possibility of a happy life extended in time and lived out in a world of meaningful social relationships (Lodge 1989: 181). Her novels are based on the social convention that marriage is a happy event, something to be desired. However, as Nicholas Mosley (1992: 5-6) states, there is little in them to suggest that life after marriage is happy. But the convention was strong enough to make the optimism seem convincing. This "perfect felicity"—as Philip Swallow notes and the ending of *Changing Places* confirms—is unavailable to contemporary novelists, who no longer share her experience of a common phenomenal world. The institution of marriage is also questioned both in *Changing Places* and in our contemporary world. Realizing that Jane Austen's happy endings are a thing of the past for them, Philip Swallow[2] connects their private troubles with a shift in aesthetic principles: "Well, the novel is dying and us with it" (*CP* 250), he despairs. The realistic novel, with its emphasis on private life, on the individual, is unable to account for the historic awareness of the new generation: "No wonder I could never get anything out of my novel-writing class at Euphoric State. It's an unnatural medium for their experience. Those kids (*gestures at screen*) are living a film, not a novel (*CP* 250)." And things begin to look more like a self-conscious parody when Philip brings up the question of ending on the last page. The novel ends with Philip Swallow's comparison of the different ways in which novels and films end:

> I mean, mentally you brace yourself for the ending of a novel. As you're reading, you are aware of the fact that there's only a page or two left in the book, and you get ready to close it. But with a film

> there is no way of telling, especially nowadays, when films are much more loosely structured, much more ambivalent, than they used to be. There is no way of telling which frame is going to be the last. The film is going along, just as life goes along, people are behaving, doing things, drinking, talking, and we're watching them, and at any point the director chooses, without warning, without anything being resolved, or explained, or wound up, it can just... end.
>
> PHILIP shrugs. The camera stops, freezing him in mid-gesture.
>
> THE END

Changing Places' ending is defined by Lodge as a "short circuit," a device characteristic of postmodernist fiction. The short circuit—which reveals the gap between the text and the world in order to administer a shock to the reader and resist assimilation into conventional literary categories—is often achieved by exposing literary conventions in the act of using them. The ending of *Changing Places* both installs and subverts the teleology, closure and causality of narrative, and effects this by means of contradiction, which articulates "irreconciliable desires and assertions" (Lodge 1977: 10). This contradiction is obvious when on the final page of the novel, after the camera freezes Philip in mid-gesture, we find an absurdly conventional and definite THE END obligingly inscribed in capital letters. Thus, *Changing Places* echoes the postmodernist urge to foreground the paradox of the desire for and the suspicion of narrative mastery (Hutcheon 1989: 64), showing that although we cannot do without plots we can at least show up their arbitrariness. "For me, and I think for other British novelists"—states Lodge—"metafiction has been particularly useful as a way of continuing to exploit the resources of realism while acknowledging their conventionality" (Lodge 1990: 43).

To contradict Philip Swallow's statement, the novel ends like a film, leaving us "without anything being resolved, or explained or wound up," (179) Philip frozen in a "concluding *tableau vivant*" a feature which, "as popularized by Truffaut's *400 Blows* (1959), has become a popular way for modern films to suggest open endings" (Deleyto 1992: 179). The author refuses to arbitrate between the characters and leaves us with them in mid-conversation, their futures and fortunes uncertain: "By having Philip draw attention to the fact that films are more amenable to unresolved endings than novels, while being represented as a character in a film inside a novel, I thought I had found a way to justify, by a kind of metafictional joke, my own refusal to resolve the story in *Changing Places*" (Lodge 1992: 227). So, apparently it is not only films that are much more ambivalent than they used to be. In the

ending of *Changing Places* Lodge is also poking fun at the theories of Robert Scholes, according to whom the camera has rendered literary realism redundant. The novel is "dying"—Scholes argues—and writers are now turning to "fabulations," to nonrealistic literary modes. The view that cinema has pushed the novel to self-reflexivity—a feature which is not uncommon among theorists of modern fiction (see Brian Stonehill 1988)—implies a naïve realistic theory of cinema, and also a restricted concept of realism. In fact, metafiction is present in the cinema from the beginning of its history. Traditionally film is held to give a powerful illusion of reality, but, we know through the studies initiated by Christian Metz and others, that cinema can never be directly "spoken" (Brunette and Willis 1989: 61). In the words, paradoxically, of Robert Scholes (1980: 199), "the more people understand the media, the more conscious they are of mediation." The belief that the cinema appeared as a challenge to realistic narrative is rejected by David Lodge. Although in "The Novelist at the Crossroads" (1986a: 17) he acknowledges that the contemporary cinema exhibits as wide a spectrum of styles as the contemporary novel, Lodge is not so much advocating a more sophisticated theory of the cinema[3] as writing off the "obsequies over the future of realistic fiction": "I am not convinced . . . that the camera is, in human hands, any more neutral than language, or that it renders literary realism redundant" (Lodge 1986a: 17). The fact that Lodge presents "Ending" in the form of a film-script is no capitulation on his part to Scholes'—and Swallow's—belief that the cinema is superior to realistic fiction when it comes to representing contemporary reality. In the words of Dennis Jackson "Lodge invokes the visual medium (television as well as film) mainly in order to reinforce a verbal communication—a novel, obviously, and one which sensitively enough registers the many discords of contemporary experience, and does so without stretching too far beyond the parametres of a realistic vision of life" (Jackson 478). Lodge's experimentalism in *Changing Places* can be interpreted as a set of rhetorical strategies which allow him both to partake of the appeal of innovation and to go on affirming his "faith in the future of realistic fiction."a

NOTES

1. For a comprehensive exposition of the metafictional techniques employed in *Changing Places* see the articles by Fernando Galván (1988) and Pilar Hidalgo (1984).

2. Philip, who at the beginning of the novel subscribes to the naïve theory of realism which Zapp despises, has evolved towards a more progressive view of literary texts. This evolution is due to his contact with the controversial Karl Kroop, the most radical literary critic of both academias. Kroop, who is giving a course on *The Death of the Book? Communication and Crisis in Contemporary Culture*, is described as quite an anticlimactic figure: "He was a short, bespectacled man with thinning hair—a disappointingly unheroic figure" (*CP* 183). His capacity as a literary critic is also called into question by Morris at the end of the novel: "It's a very crude kind of historicism he's peddling, surely? And bad aesthetics"(*CP* 250). One wonders whether David Lodge is thus disqualifying radical instances of literary criticism.

3. In fact, in later instances of his criticism, Lodge seems to contradict himself and affirm with Swallow and Scholes that film can imitate reality more faithfully: "Writing cannot imitate reality directly (*as film, for instance, can*)" (Lodge 1989:25) [my emphasis].

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A ROMANTIC VISION OF MILLENARIAN DISEASE: PLACING AND DISPLACING DEATH IN MARY SHELLEY'S *THE LAST MAN*

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The main topic of this paper is unfortunately fashionable in the context of the *fin de siècle* and millenarianism we are experiencing now in the last years of the twentieth century. Every time the end of a century approaches, there is a sense of uncertainty and uneasiness, the atavistic anthropological seed of our ancestors' belief in an apocalyptic end of the world. I say "unfortunately" because at the end of this protean century new viruses are appearing: new plagues—like the Ebola—co-existing with the older ones—like AIDS—all of them menacing our Western comfort and security. For, as Susan Sontag clearly adduced in her study *AIDS and Its Metaphors* (1988), plagues are always conceived of as "other," alien and foreign. This is one of our means of displacing death: death is even worse when it is not "ours," when it does not originally belong to our community. The literary sub-genre known as "plague literature"—including literary classics like Hesiod, Thucydides, Lucretius, Procopius, Boccaccio, Daniel Defoe, Albert Camus, Karel Capek, Michael Ende—deals mostly with "difference" from this perspective, therefore contemplating the plague as the ultimate "other."

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Plague literature written in English is relatively prolific, from Thomas Dekker's *The Wonderful Year* (1603) to, say, Poe's parable "The Masque of the Red Death" (1842). The best example is Defoe's *A Journal of the Plague Year,* published in 1722, an *a posteriori* account of the terrible plague of 1665 and its effects in London, then the incipient metropolis of a capitalist Empire. This work (an interesting blending of journalism, fiction and history) provides, in my opinion, the main intertextual source for the images of the plague appearing in Mary Shelley's *The Last Man,* begun in 1824 and published two years later, a narrative which was eclipsed by the Frankenstein myth and other canonical works and has been systematically excluded from the study of plague literature. This novel—as Anne K. Mellor has described (1989, introd. 1993)—constitutes a pessimistic and dystopian vision, projected from a peculiarly Romantic perspective, of the limits of language, history and art as human inventions and illusions. The book deals with the terror-laden possibility of the human race being exterminated from the face of the earth, and the meaningless fate of the last man, Lionel Verney, the only survivor to the plague, in this situation of utter desolation and despair.

Our main concern here is not with biographical details and other textual and critical possibilities—investigated by Audrey A. Fisch, Barbara Johnson, Morton D. Paley (1993), Anne K. Mellor (1989) and Emily Sunstein (1989)—bur rather with a study of the symbolic power and metaphorical referentiality of the plague in *The Last Man* as connected with the representation of death. A comparison between this Romantic dystopia and Defoe's *Journal* in terms of plague imagery will undoubtedly throw some light on the different ways of placing and displacing death in the two works, separated by a century. The fact that Shelley's narrative is set in the last years of the twenty-first century is not arbitrary: it locates the disease within the parameters of the ancestral and atavistic terror of the *fin de siècle,* for human history—according to the prophecy of the Cumaean Sybil at the beginning of the novel—will come to an end in 2100, the year of Lionel Verney's death.

In an interesting intertextual development, Mary Shelley refers to prior examples of plague literature, including Defoe's *Journal*:

> Does the reader wish to hear of the pest-houses, where death is the comforter—of the mournful passage of the death-cart—of the insensibility of the worthless, and the anguish of the loving heart—of harrowing shrieks and silence dire—of the variety of disease, desertion, famine, despair, and death? There are many books which can feed the appetite craving for these things; let them turn to the accounts of Boccaccio, De Foe, and Browne. (*LM* 193)

By remitting the reader to other more specific and explicit works on plagues, the writer avoids a definite description of an ineffable event which has to remain in the realm of the "unsaid," of the "other," in order to produce a terrifying picture. Like Frankenstein's monster—a term commonly applied to the plague—the elusive illness defies clear representation. The plague frightens because of its indeterminacy in semantic, scientific and rhetorical terms, aspects that Boccaccio, Defoe and Browne try to cope with, despite their limited knowledge of epidemiological factors.

Curiously enough, the plague appears for the first time comparatively late in the narrative (in Chapter I, Volume Two). This may be because Mary Shelley feels it necessary to describe in detail the state of chaos which leads to the disaster, a chaos which impregnates all the layers of human political, social, historical and gender conceptualizations. The reader's first impression is based on the narrator's metalinguistic allusion to the term *plague*:

> One word, in truth, had alarmed her (Perdita) more than battles or sieges, during which she trusted Raymond's high command would exempt him from danger. That word, as yet it was not more to her, was PLAGUE. This enemy to the human race had begun early in June to raise its serpent-head on the shores of the Nile; parts of Asia, not usually subject to this evil, were infected. It was in Constantinople; but as each year that city experienced a like visitation, small attention was paid to those accounts which declared more people to have died there already, than usually made up the accustomed prey of the whole of the hotter months.[1]

Merely thinking about the word—significantly emphasized in the written text by the use of capital letters—despite Perdita's lack of a referent for it, turns its conceptual associations into something more terrible than battles or sieges, which are man-made catastrophes.[2] The terror suggested by the word is linked to the recurrent use of various euphemisms for the disease ("visitation" in this passage). As in the case of H.F., the not very reliable narrator of Defoe's *Journal*, there is no possibility of coping with the lethal attack from a conceptual and literal perspective, the illness becoming thus linguistically "other" and eluding the characters in the book when trying to express their experience of it. In semantic terms, the plague is an agent: it completely transforms human life. But its non-human characteristics entail the linguistic reification of the disease from a pronominal perspective, the sickness becoming IT, a lethally active but unseen cause of unwanted

metamorphoses which convert the body into the ultimate alien. The plague can only be described from the point of view of its effects, because it rejects any other attempt at representation in a linguistic framework.

It is a common feature to writers of "plague literature" that, when dealing with the disease, they suggest rather than say. After the eradication of mankind at the end of the novel, the only certainty left to the reader is that the plague has been the fatal instrument of death, the only utterly unavoidable event in the lives of all those human beings. As Morton D. Paley (1993) puts it, death appears "only as a personification," first in the description of a picture showing the following scene:

> All the inhabitants of earth were drawn out in fear to stand the encounter of Death. The feeble and decrepit fled; the warriors retreated, though they threatened even in flight. Wolves and lions, and various monsters of the desert roared against him, while the grim Unreality hovered shaking his spectral dart, a solitary but invincible assailant. (*LM* 139; qtd. by Paley)

Verney describes Death later as "rising from his subterranean vault, girt with power, with dark banner flying." As Paley emphasizes, Death "never crosses the threshold from personification to literal being. This makes its effects more rather than less mysterious" (1993: 119-120).

In contrast with H.F.'s religious and moral fortitude at the end of *A Journal,* the problem in Mary Shelley's dystopian book is that even death seems to be meaningless, for no transcendental value is ascribed to the concept. The writer focuses on the frightening immediacy of the *here* and *now*: there is no future, and no hope for the afterlife is provided. As a matter of fact, the only religious feelings in the book are associated with fanaticism, another means of generating disorder and chaos.

The plague is seen in the fragment quoted above as the great enemy, and like Milton's Satan—a Hebrew word meaning precisely "the enemy"—it is metaphorically depicted as "serpent-head." The use of this epithet places the role of the plague in *The Last Man* within an apocalyptic parameter, for the book contains both the beginning and the end—the *alpha* and the *omega*—of human history. The millenarian background of the story is reinforced by the images of inexorable destruction caused by the plague. As in Defoe's *Journal*—and also as a matter of scientific fact—the disease increases its deadly virulence in summertime. The contrast between summer and winter recurs throughout the narrative, providing a *chiaroscuro* effect of the type

found earlier in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein,* where the symbolism of fire and ice was more explicitly conveyed.

The causes of the plague are never clear: no scientific explanation is provided—systematic data about the plague dates from 1894, with the discovery of the bacillus which causes it, the *Yersinia pestis.* However, its geographical origin is emphasized in *The Last Man:* it appears "on the shores of the Nile." Several associations can be deduced from this location; first of all, there is the Biblical connotation of the Ten Plagues of Egypt as described in Exodus. Of significance, too, is the classical tradition which described the "spontaneous generation" of life on the banks of the Nile, as in Alexander Pope's *Essay on Criticism.* But, more relevantly to this paper, as the feature of "otherness" is hinted at, the plague comes from "an-other" continent, Africa—supposedly the land from where AIDS, Ebola and other contemporary diseases are being transmitted, according to the Western interpretation, and possibly Verney's goal at the end of the novel. Although Egypt was the site of one of the most influential and prosperous of ancient Mediterranean civilizations, the cultural model is rejected by Mary Shelley in favour of the classical European tradition: the hieroglyphs are replaced by the writings of Greece and Rome, the literary cradles of the Western—and consequently European—modes of writing, including the Cumaean Sybil's prophecies and Verney's apocalyptic account. For this is a metaliterary book, which contains fragmented and scattered embryos of the history of European literature. Verney significantly carries with him the works of Homer and Shakespeare on his final pilgrimage.

Little by little, the fearful itinerary of the plague places and displaces death in geographical terms, moving from the sphere of otherness to the domains of the Western World, embodied in England. From the shores of the Nile, the plague is transmitted to the liminal setting of Constantinople (*LM* 136), the capital of the Turkish Empire, the crossroads in the middle of Asia and Europe. Turkey means for Lionel Verney, as it did for H.F., the narrator of Defoe's *Journal,* a locus of radical difference which has to be "purged" and then assimilated to the European model. Raymond, the *alter ego* of Lord Byron in the novel, wishes "to eradicate from Europe a power which, while every other nation advanced in civilization, stood still, a monument of antique barbarism" (*LM* 127). Verney also shares with H.F. his "awakening curiosity," a feature which will make them perfect witnesses and experiencers of the disaster, surviving in the end its deadly attack.

Lionel's premonitory dream about the plague as "a gigantic phantom, bearing on its brow the sign of pestilence" (*LM* 146) becomes tragically true.

Western Europe is then the last territory to suffer the consequences of the disease, which, as is commonly the case, comes from "somewhere else." Contagion spreads from the East (*LM* 162), promptly devastating Thrace and Athens. In a fragmentary way, the narrator tells us that the plague appears in South America, once again a site of otherness and difference (*LM* 168)—the place where Frankenstein's creature, a metaphorical reminder of the plague for Victor, would tentatively settle with the female monster. The Mediterranean countries soon suffer the effects of the disease, which at the same time spreads throughout the United States and reaches Ireland. In the wake of crowds of Italian and Spaniards, the Americans—former British Crown subjects—and the Irish, in an attempt to avoid the destructive effects of the plague, migrate to England (*LM* 171). A cruel war, followed by the definitive outbreak of the disease, spreads to London. The situation contains clear connotations of an an ideological nature: it is the ultimate nightmare of the post-colonial world, a context in which, once again, Mary Shelley subconsciously plays the role of an ignored Cassandra: the colonies will "invade" the Metropolis and the site of the Empire, producing an ironical inversion that the Western World today, in our millenarian context, is very much aware of. Moreover, commerce and trade increase the risk of contagion, in which case the colonial system becomes doubly dangerous: a source of richness and prosperity that bring with them now the possibility of utter annihilation. When the plague stalks London—descriptions at this point resemble Defoe's source—Verney's lament reflects the hopeless inevitability of an event which, despite the many attempts at restoring law and order, cannot be stopped:

> The plague was in London! Fools that we were not long ago to have foreseen this. We wept over the ruin of the boundless continents of the east, and the desolation of the western world; while we fancied that the little channel between our island and the rest of the earth was to preserve us alive among the dead. (*LM* 179-180)

England's insularity proves valueless. *The Last Man* shares with Defoe's *Journal* the obsession for control and order. When the origins and the scientific causes of a plague remain completely unexplained, human beings fantasize about and tend to create an ideological illusion of order, control and authority, as if our desire to remain untouched by the disease were enough to eradicate its physical consequences. As the plague is conceived of as "disorder," communities threatened by it tend to delude themselves into thinking they can escape from it and evade disaster by imposing a strict

discipline in their lives. Michel Foucault (1977) wrote perceptively on those measures as signs of the carceral nature of our society, the dream of a disciplined community which creates the utopia of health by excluding otherness and difference. *The Last Man* coincides with Defoe's and Foucault's descriptions of a community in danger of contagion adopting an illusory order. Like H.F., Verney emphasizes England's supremacy using the language of discipline:

> The cleanliness, habits of order, and the manner in which our cities were built, were all in our favour. . . . If manly courage and resistance can save us, we will be saved. We will fight the enemy to the last. Plague shall not find us a ready prey; we will dispute every inch of ground; and, by methodical and inflexible laws, pile invincible barriers to the progress of our foe. Perhaps in no part of the world has she met with so systematic and determined an opposition. Perhaps no country is naturally so well protected against our invader; nor has nature anywhere been so well assisted by the hand of man. . . . Remember that cleanliness, sobriety, and even good-humour and benevolence, are our best medicines. (*LM* 178)

Unlike Defoe's narrative but anticipating Foucault's ideas, *The Last Man* focuses on the fact that the plague—death—is ultimately inescapable, and Verney's illusory words mean nothing when the reader reaches the fatal *dénouement* of the novel.

Adrian's attempts at safeguarding control and order, culminating in Verney's scrupulous discipline even when alone at the end of the book (*LM* 338), are meaningless, for his measures show Mary Shelley's total rejection in this narrative of any political and philosophical system, especially Burke's, Godwin's and Percy Shelley's visions of perfectibility, amelioration and belief in human progress. The plague (death) is, paradoxically, the only "democratic event," very much in the millenarian and *fin de siècle* fashion of the medieval *danses macabres.* Like Defoe's *Journal, The Last Man* presents death as the only means of achieving social levelling (*LM* 198, 223...). Mary Shelley goes one step further: no human being except Verney (temporarily) escapes from the plague or a hubristic death.

Thus, the idealized picture of the English "welfare state" on page 76, with the futuristic claim that "disease was to be banished," is cruelly shattered by an enemy, a monster of natural origins which exterminates the proud human race. There is no remedy for the disease, and nature—in contrast with the nurturing mother described in *Frankenstein* (Mellor

1989)—is absolutely inexorable and remains indifferent to human sufferings. This is probably the reason why Mary significantly changes the anaphoric IT for the feminine pronoun *she* when referring to the plague in the passage above, associating it/her with a natural female principle. Mary Shelley may be seen here as a forerunner of the contemporary scientific theories about the earth as Gaia (Lovelock 1979, 1988), that living organism always in flux in a very Heraclitean fashion, a dynamic "being" which was there before man appeared, and will perhaps remain after the human race is extinguished. In this novel the earth is metaphorically tired of irresponsible progress and unfair social, political and gender relationships among her human inhabitants, even if moral implications are blurred. It is undoubtedly appropriate, from the point of view of realizing Mary Shelley's ethical purpose, that animals are not infected with the disease (*LM* 200). In effect, a dog is Verney's only companion at the end of the book. This is the futuristic sign of an ecological "poetic justice" (the anachronism should be forgiven).

It is significant that the plague is accompanied by other natural catastrophes, catalysts of nature's hubristic and vengeful powers: a black sun, a furious wind—very different from Wordsworth's and Percy Shelley's sources of inspiration—(*LM* 166), floods (*LM* 194), and, above all, the superbly described catastrophes taking place in apocalyptic Dover, illuminated by "three other suns" (*LM* 270). The intertextual links with *King Lear* seem obvious.

Again in contrast with Defoe and other writers of "plague literature," Mary Shelley widens the spatial parameter: instead of an enclosed and segmented space, she introduces an ample choice of geographical locations—theoretically speaking, the whole world—in order to show up the limitations of human resources when it comes to trying to avoid the lethal spectre of the plague. The factual and allegorical pilgrimage of the now dwindling number of human beings, desirous as they are to re-construct the history of our race (*LM* 226), is hopeless, and consequently past and future have no meaning whatsoever, just like all human illusions and inventions. Literature, culture, art... disappear with the last representative of the human race. Music provides a relevant instance in this respect, as the most sublime art form according to the romantic aesthetic. Music will leave no trace of its existence the moment the last player, or the last listener, dies. Verney's feelings when listening to Weber's "wild eastern air" become prophetic: "Ye are all going to die, I thought; already your tomb is built up around you. . . . Not one of you, O! fated crowd, can escape—not one! not my own ones! not my Idris and her babes! Horror and misery!" (*LM* 173-4). Later on in the narrative, a chorister

ironically dies while interpreting a song, his death mocking Verney's earlier reflections identifying "heaven-winged music" with a means of "commun(ing) with the Supreme." However, the most ironical and painful episode in *The Last Man* is the moment when Verney and his fragmented "family" hear the echoes of Haydn's "New-Created World," played by a blind musician and his daughter—the counterparts of De Lacey and his daughter in *Frankenstein* (Mellor 1989). Since characters like these are the embodiment of the ideal bourgeois family for Mary Shelley, their instantaneous death while playing this music on the organ destroys Verney's romantic and exalted words:

> Music—the language of the immortals, disclosed to us as testimony of their existence—music, "silver key of the fountain of tears," child of love, soother of grief, inspirer of heroism and radiant thoughts, O music, in this our desolation we had forgotten thee! (*LM* 306).

For music, like literature and other human creations, does not exist outside human referentiality. What is the use of our artistic works when no one is capable of perceiving them or endowing them with meaning? This is the fearful and pessimistic lesson that Mary Shelley wants the reader to learn, and in writing *The Last Man* she becomes a forerunner of Derrida's theory of deconstruction, as Anne Mellor and other critics have argued. The destruction of human language entails the destruction of human life, for "all conceptions of human history, all ideologies, are grounded on metaphors or tropes which have no referent or authority outside of language" (Mellor 1993: xxi-xxii). Verney's grim fate is similar to that of Robinson Crusoe—one of the comparisons used by Mary Shelley at the end of the novel—but the protagonist of *The Last Man* is utterly without hope. He is even more wretched than Frankenstein's monster, for, unlike the latter, Verney has enjoyed friendship, love and social relationships. He will have to go on living without any human company, writing a meaningless book for no one to read, fictionally speaking.

As a corollary, *The Last Man* offers a pessimistic romantic interpretation—different from other creative works dealing with the topic of "the last man" contemporary with Mary Shelley's narrative—drawing attention to the limits of human history, science and art when facing a plague of unknown origin and with no known cure, apparently caused by man's (and woman's) irresponsible behaviour. For our age of millenarian malaise and *fin de siècle* viruses and plagues like AIDS and Ebola, a highly relevant lesson of the novel might be that Verney reaches salvation by embracing "a negro

half clad, writhing under the agony of disease" (*LM* 245). Although he later on contracts the disease, this random act of holding a black man—significantly, the only black man to appear in the book—turns him into a survivor. Does Mary Shelley seem to imply that admitting and accepting "otherness" is the only viable future for the human race? However ambiguous the passage appears to be, the writer is concerned with this specific instant of unwitting solidarity which provides Lionel Verney with one means of "displacing" death, and incidentally points to a form of moral behaviour which might constitute one of the few hopes for the future.a

NOTES

1. Mary Shelley, *The Last Man.* Ed. Hugh J. Luke, Jr., introd. Anne K. Mellor. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1993. All parenthetical references hereafter are to this edition (abbreviated as *LM).*

2. Later, Verney will not be able to pronounce the frightening word: "My beloved friends were alarmed—nay, they expressed their alarm so anxiously, that I dared not pronounce the word *plague,* that hovered on my lips, lest they should construe my perturbed looks into a symptom, and see infection in my languor" (*LM* 174).

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NEW MULTIPLE CHOICE FORMATS: THE OMISSION ITEM

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As the general level of competence in English rises all over Europe, the simpler forms of measuring that competence are increasingly inadequate. The old staples of multiple choice tests were vocabulary, grammar and reading comprehension, but increasingly we need to measure higher-order competencies. Most of our graduates who train to be teachers in fact take up other careers: a recent count at an English and a German university showed that only 9% (the figure happened to be the same in each estimate) of the graduates go into teaching. The others go into commerce, industry, publishing, administration, advertising, politics, where they need to write, edit, correct and revise texts, make them more effective, not simply more correct. How do we test such forms of competence?

The omission item poses the sort of problem with which the graduate is often faced: what word fits where, which ones are essential, which are superfluous? This is how it looks:

1. Which word or set of words can be omitted from the sentence?

> Remember that there is (A) nothing in the (B) nature of our laws which forbids a citizen from building houses as high as the Eiffel Tower (C)

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and circular in shape.
D

The stylist will seize on “there is”—surely it is superfluous? “Remember that nothing in...” sounds more decisive and efficient as the opening of a sentence. But then comes the “which”—not at the candidate’s disposal here, and thus not to be thrown out. The “which” construction forbids the omission of the word group marked “A” after all. As to “the nature”—this is a trap for the French or German student, for in these languages *nature* often requires a definite article. But here “the nature” is *noli me tangere*. Option C, *as the Eiffel Tower,* could be omitted. But then we would have to carry out further changes in the sentence, like excising the “as” which precedes “high." So the key must be D, “in shape." This is an addition which, although it does not violate laws of grammar or of idiom, is simply “deadwood,” a tautology which needs to be cut if the sentence is to meet high standards of good English.

It will be immediately apparent that this is potentially a “discrete point” item, using the principle of the “sore finger” format (Bonheim and Kreifelts 1979, Bauer 1991). One might think it assignable to the general area of “idiom.” But further considerations of various kinds, not only of vocabulary or idiom, will play a role if the candidate is to come to the one and only correct answer. The sentence as it stands is grammatical, though not elegant. But that is not the point here. The item constitutes a test of editing skills, and needs to be solved at the level of what is nowadays called “text grammar.”

For over twenty years we have been using the omission format (we call them “omis," a pun that plays on the diminutive which young German children use for their grandmothers, the “Omas”). They have been included in university entrance examinations and in national scholarship tests. The point-biserial discrimination indices are on average almost double those achieved in standard items involving English idiom. Apparently the right solution to an omi is often based on an application of sentence logic rather than on the application of discrete-point language skills. Thus the candidate who can do one omi correctly is likely to be good at doing the others as well.

The reason for this becomes evident if we look at the conclusions which the candidate must draw so as to find the right answer to the item cited above. The interrelations of a number of words and phrases have to be taken into consideration, partly on a grammatical, partly on an idiomatic or stylistic basis. An overriding sentence logic plays a role as well. A student who has all the skills needed to construct correct and acceptable sentences and texts will

have fewer problems in finding the right answer than will the candidate who focuses on only one point at a time.

A little more difficult is the kind of omi in which the one *essential* element in the sentence has to be located. Our first and second examples are simple grammar items:

2. Find the word which is essential to the sentence and can*not* be omitted:

MacDuff and Richmond, the king to be, overcome the usurpers and
A B
succeed on the political level in restoring the order.
C D

Since each of the four positions are filled by a “the," a candidate can juggle with the possibilities more readily. The candidate can cover up each example of the article with a pencil or finger. The computer screen is even better: the test can be programmed in such a way that bringing the cursor to the word makes it disappear for the moment. This method requires less imagination of the candidate and probably allows a more concentrated attention on the problem to be solved, raising the validity of such items. After all, when we edit our papers, we also insert words into the text tentatively, just to try them out for size, as it were. We go back and cross them out or erase or delete them when we run through the text once more and see that they failed to work as we had hoped they would.

In a sense, this kind of omi is the opposite of our insertion items, which are also useful in work with advanced learners:

3. Where is the insertion of the definite article *obligatory?*

In most of _ city schools, of course, _ music and _ math are
A B C
taught in _ Spanish language.
D

Candidates are likely to be tempted by the distractors B and C, presumably because a number of European languages require the definite article where school subjects are involved. The standard forms of item analysis, which tabulates the number of times a candidate chooses each of the distractors rather than the correct answer, allows a systematic investigation of what goes wrong

when the item is not answered correctly. Thus it helps us in the class-room to build a bridge from the test item to the principles behind the problem that it poses.

It should be clear that this item format offers a welcome change from standard formats, especially in large test batteries: the change alleviates the monotony of the standard item types. It may also have particular advantages when it is presented on the computer screen. The insertion item on paper requires the candidate to *imagine* the inserted word at four points in the sentence, that is, to reimagine the sentence in four versions so as to come to a decision. The computer, by contrast, can readily present the four alternatives at the touch of a key. Of course this makes the item "cleaner," that is, it obviates the mental operation of imagining the text in a form other than it is and thus facilitates a direct grappling with the problem posed. On the other hand, editing in real life does to a large extent require us to imagine how the text would look after an addition or a deletion, so that the simpler format may be the most valid after all.

One reason why the omi is a good alternative type of item is that it need not be bound to the native language of the candidate: it can be used both with native and with foreign speakers. Consider, for instance, the following item:

4. Find the only word or set of words which can be omitted:

The Emir, who (A) lives in that 450-year-old palace which is (B) painted simply on the outside (C) and furnished lavishly inside (D), drives a babyblue Rolls Royce.

Again, it is only by looking at the sentence as a whole that the candidate will see that the correct answer is B ("which is"). If other changes than those allowed by the four-option format were allowed, any of the distractors would also be potentially expendable. If, for instance, the sentence read "**and** drives..." then option A would not only be unnecessary but downright wrong; option C is also potentially expendable, except that its excision would cut the ground out from under the contrast inside/outside and so leave option D hanging in mid-air. We have here an item which clearly tests editing skill, then, and one which can be put in a subtest of reading comprehension anywhere, be it for native speakers or for students of French, German or Spanish.

Thus far we have shown items which ask what elements in a sentence can be omitted. What we in fact have more experience with is a rather more sophisticated type of omission item. The head of the item will show why: it asks the candidate to find not what can be omitted but what is *essential* to the sentence, and thus can*not* be removed:

5. Decide which of the underlined word or set of words is essential to the structure of the sentence and could *not* be removed.

No-one among us (A) will ever know the reason (B) why the revolutionary movement collapsed just (C) when its support was widespread (D) throughout the country.

This item was first tried out in 1979 with a group of university entrants (n = 140) in Cologne. The facility index of .49 seemed satisfactory, and the point-biserial discrimination of over 0.5 most welcome. All the distractors worked at the 5% level. A disadvantage was that both distractors A and C had positive loadings: a number of the candidates who did especially well in the subtest chose these distractors rather than the correct answer. This disadvantage disappeared when the item was included in nation-wide tests for scholarship candidates in the decade after 1982.

Apparently a cluster of six or seven omis in a subtest of reading comprehension represents a factor that is rather different from the conventional "interpret-the-text" item, as the range of discrimination indices will indicate:

TABLE A: Facility and Discrimination

year	n =	fac.	disc.
1982	102	.539	.347
1985	290	.705	.515
1987	229	.867	.422
1989	279	.812	.495
	819		

The instability in the discrimination index is apparently the result of the use of quite different item clusters in the same subtest from one year to an-

other. It is noteworthy that the level of the applicants rose over the decades, thus rendering the item too easy for further use: the increased facility is unrelated to the measuring instrument of the kind of population. The test results themselves, in other words, show why more sophisticated methods have come to be needed: the higher facility index makes the item no longer usable in a test battery meant for university entry.

Now a further turn of the screw is in order, namely the performance of the omission item when not one but one *or* two correct answers are allowed. This is a format which we have also been using for about twenty years, and which is perfectly easy to administer when one uses machine-readable answer-sheets. At first the usual correction for guessing gave us some trouble, but that turned out to be easy to solve satisfactorily. The following is an example of the item type:

> Decide which of the underlined words or set of words is essential to the structure of the sentence and could *not* be removed.

6. As to whether (A) the sonnets of Wordsworth are of a character (B) as original as those (C) of Keats, the (D) experts disagree.

Here the candidate is expected to recognize that both A and C are essential to the sentence. In practice, at least 10% of the candidates in the entrance-exam group of 1975 (n= 592) marked either A or C. Again, the item in the Cologne entrance examination was slightly more difficult with a facility index of .285, but it showed a most gratifying discrimination index of .524. It is odd that a quarter of the entrance-exam group were taken in by option B, failing to see that this was deadwood and of no functional use in the sentence.

Fourteen years later the item was included in a scholarship examination for rather more advanced and select students (n= 279). Here over 80% apparently realized that the "As to whether" is needed: at first sight this locution may look like a ready candidate for deletion; but without it the final three words of the sentence make no sense syntactically. So the item turned out to be too easy for this group. The discrimination, however, remained almost exactly what it had been earlier on, namely 0.526, even though the facility index ranged from 0.285 for the group of beginners to 0.826 for end-of-the-second-year students.

This is a gap in facility indices, incidentally, that our reading comprehension items of the more conventional type do not reveal. An investigation of the reason for this phenomenon must be left to a later study. A likely hypothesis is that the more conventional sub-categories of reading comprehension are taught in schools as well as universities. University students, then, may have reached a learning plateau which does not apply to the omi, for that enters the ambit of a kind of editorial competence of which only the more advanced university students gradually become aware. One can attempt to be more precise about what kind of competence this is: it is an acknowledged fact that a beginner revises a paper by looking at local problems; the spelling of a word, the choice of one that is more appropriate or exact, the placement of a comma, the cutting of an overly long sentence into two. The expert edits with paragraphs and suprasegmental structures of argument in mind, considering rhetorical strategies which develop not simply from one sentence to the next but over a multi-paragraph section of the paper. How this is learnt, and whether it is in some direct way teachable, we do not yet know.

One advantage of the omission item in its one-or-two correct answer form is that many of our candidates hope to be teachers or translators or editors one day, and of course no text to be edited ever sends out signals to the effect that each sentence has only a single error or a single correct wording. The idea that there can be more than one error raises the face validity of an editing item without reducing the unusually high discrimination indices. These indices are in turn reflected in high reliability values.

One is tempted to analyse such items in greater detail to see what they actually test. It is a question that factor analysis has not yet made clear, although it shows that the omission item differs from the rest. A nationwide scholarship examination offers a suitable framework for such an analysis because a variety of other domains and item types are included in a test of 230 items and the following item parcels:

1. Vocabulary
2. Idiom
3. Style
4. Literary and Linguistic Terminology
5. British Civilization
6. Literary History
7. Reading Comprehension, including omission items
8. Grammar

A factor analysis of test results obtained by 279 candidates showed that the cluster of omission items was the only one with a high loading on one factor, whereas all the other parts were more or less dominated by the other factor 1. Subtests 1 and 2 are related to 3, all of the items being in some sense lexical ones, whereas 4, 5 and 6 all test knowledge rather than skills—so it is understandable that as a group they stand somewhat apart from the others in a computerised factor analysis. We must note, however, that factor analysis does not say what the factor is—that is a matter on which we can make an informed guess, based on an analysis of what the items seem to be testing. That it tests editing skills, then, is our thesis, but it cannot be said to have been proved conclusively.

The omission item, then, seems to allow us to test something that is a little different from other standard formats, though it can also be reduced to a set of mere grammar or idiom items. If this is so, proficiency in a cluster of such items seems to be related to vocabulary skills as well. What is probably special about the omi at its best is that it forces the candidate to look at the interrelations between sentence parts. Thus it involves a higher-order skill which more advanced students have to a marked degree, and which characterizes the kind of competence which has helped these students survive a set of hurdles over which some 75% of our students fail to leap. Unfortunately, a study of the prognostic value of the omission items, desirable though it might be, is not possible given the restrictions on time and budget imposed upon us at present.a

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"THE GENTEEL TRADITION IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY" AS A VALEDICTORY INDICTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES[1]

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Ideas are not mirrors, they are weapons.

No one questions now the importance of what paradoxically has been termed "Progressivism" in the construction of American cultural history. That label implies more than a crucial period in the development of the United States as a modern power that covered four administrations and witnessed the shift towards modern liberalism, from the 1900s to the aftermath of World War I. What I am especially interested in pointing out in this era is how it witnessed the birth of a new role for the intellectual in his/her society, often as a result of a more or less critical revision of the past. The usable past, as Van Wyck Brooks patented it, became a verbal reminder of the efforts of many American intellectuals eager to extract some lessons from the history of the United States.

This spirit could be seen in a remodelling of different spheres of knowledge, to the extent that the adjective "new" became part of some disciplines. Thus a "New History," (as practiced by Frederick Jackson Turner, James Robinson and, last but never least, the Beards), a "New Anthropology" as

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promoted by Franz Boas, who himself opened the gates to Margaret Mead, etc. For their part, Columbia, Chicago and Harvard spawned a new way of thinking and became the centers of (New) American philosophy in the early twentieth century. The following pages will focus on one of the pivotal figures among the Harvard philosophers: George Santayana. His work in the opening years of the century well illustrates for the cultural historian the call for a change in the conscience of the American ethos. Whether thinking alone would change the necessities of an expanding power is a debatable question; however, Santayana's efforts at establishing a new set of power relations is worth quoting if only to better understand the way American culture and society were apprehended at home at that time.

George Santayana represents a distinct intellectual unit along with other fellow philosophers in Cambridge, such as William James and Josiah Royce. Santayana can be regarded as a peculiar member of that group, however. His style of philosophizing and the problems he addressed were very much a response to his American fellow-thinkers. He was an expatriate in more than one sense: he had left Spain when he was nine and lived in the United States until his late forties. He scrutinized his host culture without the self-searching intellectual agony of the "hundred-per-cent" Americans; for this reason, his detachment became an invaluable intellectual tool. At the same time, his examination of the United States also created in him a sense of alienation from the environment where he had spent the most productive period of his life. Thus Santayana's vision of the world is singularly objective and ecumenical and his insights can be exceedingly penetrating. But he can also show flashes of a resentment not very different from those pervading the later Henry James—though diluted in philosophical speculations and inevitably focused on the layers of the American intellectual life he knew best.[2]

Santayana's distinctive evaluation of American society and philosophy can be seen most clearly in his much quoted essay "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy." Delivered in August 1911 at Berkeley, today this short piece is considered a cornerstone in the study of American intellectual history. My interest in it is threefold. Firstly, it was written in the middle of the Progressive Era, and is an essential critical text for understanding that time. Second, it summarizes Santayana's weariness with America and answers the questions that provoked his resignation from Harvard and his eventual departure for Europe. Finally, and perhaps more relevant for my purpose, "The Genteel Tradition" draws a line between the general criticism of his previous speculative work, best exemplified in his multivolume *The Life of Reason* (1905-1906), and his later critique, published after he had left North

America for good. The extent to which his address to the Philosophical Union of Berkeley became famous can be appreciated in the words of so restrained a critic as Lionel Trilling, written at the height of the Cold War: "What the historian of the American culture would do without Santayana's term 'the genteel tradition' is impossible to imagine" (Wilson, 1967: 2).

Of course, Santayana drew on several writers to exemplify most of his ideas. But his liaison with the philosophical system at Harvard allowed "The Genteel Tradition" to go beyond the bounds of the literary historian. The concept of experience, so crucial for understanding the idea of the "specious present" had political and social implications that could not have had their origins in the work of canonical writers, with the possible exception of Henry James. But it was in his brother William more than in him, that Santayana found an explanation for the obnoxious influence of the genteel tradition on the cultural and ideological development of the United States in this century. It certainly was from William James that Santayana acquired the insight to link the exhaustion of the American ideals of the Early Republic with the bipartisan endorsement of an expansionist diplomacy and an ambivalent social policy incomprehensibly branded "Progressive." Otherwise, it should be difficult to trace the meaning of the following paragraph, uttered early in "The Genteel Tradition:"

> America did not have to wait for its present universities, with their departments of academic philosophy, in order to possess a living philosophy—to have a distinct vision of the universe and definite convictions about human destiny.[3]

At first sight redolent of anti-intellectualism, this sentence is more an ironic dig at the role the United States had taken on in the early years of the twentieth century (a question that attracted much speculation at that time), than an appreciation of the American way of philosophizing. But in order to infer this, one must look more closely at the letter and spirit of the address. Santayana offered a dramatic clue when he sought to point out the sources of the unjustified self-confidence (and sometimes self-righteousness) he perceived in American culture. A considerable portion of his lecture was devoted to revealing the effects that Transcendentalism as a cultural and political ideology produced in successive generations. At the same time Santayana and his colleagues at Harvard were uncovering some of the effects of that legacy. Transcendentalism, then, had proved to be a mixed blessing.

It is true that as a contribution to Western philosophy, Transcendentalism offered a system that enabled the individual to surpass the constraints of the Lockean framework. William James, Santayana's mentor and professor at Harvard, had adopted Emerson as a prime figurehead when he formulated pragmatism as a celebration of individual sovereignty—both national and personal. As Professor Lentricchia suggests, Emerson started the tradition of a cult of individualism that not only broke the exhausting formulas of British empiricism in America; it also validated the moral outrage spawn in the intellectual circles that opposed American policies abroad as acts of transgression against the sanctity of human beings (1986: 15). Halfway between the times of Thoreau and the Berrigans, the 1910s offered opportunities for James to point up this conviction.

By the first decades of the twentieth century, however, Transcendentalism had proven to be as ambivalent as the doctrines it had aimed to replace. It had certainly once been coherent enough to be called a philosophy and precise enough to be labelled idealism—but this was no longer the case by 1911. Early in "The Genteel Tradition" Santayana termed Transcendentalism "the chief contribution made in modern times to speculation" (GT 100). His charge that despite his erudition and tactfulness Emerson "read *transcendentally, not historically*,[4] to learn what he himself felt, not what others might have felt before him" (GT 99), can apparently be dismissed as the reproach of a sophisticated intellectual looking down on the beginner of a tradition in American literature and culture. But Santayana's criticism should not be undervalued because he was allegedly unable to understand the lack of historical determinacy in Emerson. I feel that his argument against Transcendentalism as a form of *egotism* (note the frequency of this pejorative word in his work) is not so much that it contributed a naive theory of the state, but that in the long run, it turned out to be the breeder of dire social and political consequences in American life. Ironically, by the turn of the century the most revealing developments of Emersonian self-reliance became the domestic socio-economic havoc produced by industrialization, and an imperialistic foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere and the Philippines.

An attentive reading of "The Genteel Tradition" may give us further clues to Santayana's distaste for such an ideological swindle. If it was Kant who rescued the human essence from the barrenness of Lockean skepticism, Santayana did not spare German idealism a thorough rebuttal on account of the consequences that system had led to. His censure did not reach the anti-German extremes of *Egotism in German Philosophy* (1916); this notwiths-

tanding, one must not forget the negative tone in which he denounced the way a reified kind of idealism had managed to manipulate history. In response to the transcendentalists' claim of a new ontology, Santayana aimed to expose what he considered to be the truth underlying the romantic ideal of—call it harmony, spiritual power, or much better, Oversoul. To underscore his reluctance to accept the unworkable essences of an American proposal for philosophy, he resorted to the German example. A biased reader may well say that Santayana was foretelling a good deal of World War II Allied propaganda: "It occurred to [the Germans] to imagine that all reality might be . . . just their own transcendental self and their own romantic dreams extended indefinitely" (GT 100). The parallelism between German idealism and American Transcendentalism was more evident when he made Emerson match Kant. The former Unitarian had subverted organized religion into a call for American redemptionism, so deftly expressed in his "Divinity School Address." Santayana then found clues to point out where the seeds of that passion had been sown and how easily and why they had taken root in the United States:

> Kant had a genteel tradition of his own, which he wished to remove to a place of safety, feeling that the empirical world had become too hot for it; and this play of safety was the region of transcendental myth. I need hardly say how perfectly this expedient suited the needs of philosophers in America, and it is no accident if the influence of Kant soon became dominant here. (GT 101)

Of course one should not assume Santayana had said this in 1911 solely to discuss eighty-year-old Transcendentalism. His own times had witnessed enough events to validate the suggestion from Harvard that an aseptic idealism pervaded the politics of the Progressives. Attempts to thwart the labor movement at the domestic front (revolutionary or other non-A.F.L.) could go hand in hand with a foreign policy that had led to a second intervention in Cuba in 1906-1909, and the invasion of Nicaragua the following year.

But the impact of a reading of Transcendentalism on the cultural and political behavior of the nation had left scars long before the 1900s. Being as it virtually was an offshoot of the Unitarian system of belief, Transcendentalism simply fitted quite well into the bourgeois frame of reference in the United States, which was eager to replace an exhausted calvinism. It is not surprising then that one of the consequences of Emersonian idealism (despite the later Emerson himself) was that it should condone social injustice. If one is to understand Emerson's pre-Marxian version of detribalization, consisting

in the positive elements African-Americans could get from of their contact with the white race, one is prepared to accept Carnegie's explanation of the refinement of *homo sapiens* through exploitation. A random date earlier than 1911 could do just as well, such as 1877. This year is not only a watershed in American domestic political history. It may be just a coincidence, but the year that marks the rebirth of a nation and a new-found respect for the peculiarities of some states, is the same that has come down to us as the year of the first great nationwide strikes and that of a decisive trade agreement with the Kingdom of Hawaii. The "opening road of limitless freedom," as Matthiessen summarized the spirit of American romanticism and Jacksonian expansion, both in the 1830s, had proven to be a long and winding one.

But the spiritual search for a native *Weltanschauung* in the nineteenth century was not the task of one thinker only. Santayana did not put all the blame on Emerson. Strangely enough, in his essay-lecture at Berkeley he ignored Thoreau, whose "action from principle" proved to be as ambivalent as any product of American liberalism and thus a marvellous piece of criticism. Neither did he mention Melville, whose skepticism, on the contrary, would no doubt have destroyed his argument against the ethos of the American Renaissance. But Santayana criticized Poe and Hawthorne. The latter receives attention in another part of this commentary. Santayana's mention of Poe is more opportune than accurate for his thesis against Transcendentalism, and especially with regard to the German roots/bias of the movement.

Regardless of the implausible relation between Poe and the group of Concord, he and Emerson seemed to have absorbed German idealism through their divergent approaches to Coleridge. Whereas Emerson came in contact with Kant through Coleridge's translations and used the Fancy/Imagination disquisition to distinguish the ethical and esthetical realms of perfectibility, Poe did not. On the contrary, he pretended to fuse both "aspects of the poet's reach into that divine realm of harmony from which fallen man is estranged," as Geoffrey Rans so well expressed it (1965: 25). It was not so for Santayana. Despite the differences in the creed of each writer, he believed the writings of Emerson and Poe shared the call of the irrational and the egocentric. Accordingly, theirs seemed to be a second-hand critique of pure reason: "A refined labour, but it was in danger of being morbid, or tinkling, or self-indulgent. It was a play of intra-mental rhymes" (GT 99). Reading Poe and Emerson after the nineteenth century was ended and their writings were decontextualized turned these two writers into geniuses "employed on a sort of inner play." The supreme danger Santayana forewarned his American audience against did not reach the pitch of total disaster, although it did in his

second edition of *Egotism in German Philosophy* (1940). Instead of paranoia, by 1911 Santayana found schizophrenia to be the socio-political outcome of Transcendentalism. His much quoted comparison between the skyscraper and the colonial mansion is irrelevant for a study of his critique of the United States; the following description of American thought positively is not:

> The truth is that one-half of the American mind, that not occupied intensely in practical affairs, has remained, I will not say high-and-dry, but slightly becalmed; . . . alongside, in invention and industry and social organisation, the other half of the mind was leaping down a sort of Niagara Rapids. (GT 97)

Fortunately, Santayana would think of a counter-genteel tradition that righted the obliteration of the American promise in cultural-ideological terms. From this we presume that political and socio-ideological grounds were present too.

The first examples of cultural resistance consisted in those he labelled "the humorists," though it should be said he paid especial attention to Californian writers. A literary historian may assume that Santayana's "humorists" included not only Mark Twain and Bret Harte, but in general the writers of the so-called "Western local color"—a group I prefer to call Western realists. By so considering them, Santayana transgressed realism as understood by the New England canon. However, he qualified his own words; as one quotes from his lecture, "the humorists . . . only half escape the genteel tradition" (GT 103).

It is not necessary to remember here the social conditions reproduced west of the Mississippi in order to understand to what extent Western realism was impelled to contradict the bourgeois scale of values imported from the Eastern seaboard. But just let me attribute to those writers and not to the psychiatrists the description of American nervousness as a corruption of Tocqueville's American restlessness. Twain and Warner's *The Gilded Age* (1873) is then a fold-up version of *Democracy in America.* Once capitalism and liberalism discovered the West we must not center our attention only on those well known and by now banal events such as the Indian genocides, generous Homestead laws, or women's suffrage. Boom and bust, speculation and collapse, boomtowns, schemes, etc, also became high-frequency words.[5] As the years went by and the human adventure turned out to be less satisfying, the humorous flavor of the narrative mediations started to be more bitter, indeed more tragic. Twain's pen offered the best example of this ordeal. In

1876 Tom Sawyer appeared simply as the naive prototype of a believer in the American promise or, as Tony Tanner put it, "a capitalist pioneer with none of the sense of guilt" (1965: 180). Years later, *A Connecticut Yankee* denounced the deranged condition of many American ideals. Maybe Twain's novel of 1889 presents a gross distortion of the perils of industrial capitalism. But already Huck's flight to nowhere in Twain's most celebrated novel is a symptom of the void capitalism had left for any alternative to its social stratification and economic pattern in America. As the most representative writer of Western realism, Twain resolved that what remained was either the retreat into fantasy or resignation before the new condition of his country—even a full decade before Turner issued his thesis of the frontier as myth.

In this context then, we can better understand Santayana's seeing through the failed attempt of Western realism to subvert the cultural-ideological status quo:

> Their humor would lose its savour if they had wholly escaped [the genteel tradition]. They point to what contradicts it in the facts; but not in order to abandon the genteel tradition, for they have nothing solid to put in its place. When they point out how ill many facts fit into it, they do not clearly conceive that this militates against the standard, but think it a funny perversity in the facts. (GT 103)

In fact to what extent Santayana's dismissal of Western realism as subversion of the genteel tradition is accurate can be seen in the cultural negotiation of life in the West that pervaded the eclipse of the first writers. This is the case of the Western, as a canonized subgenre in the universe of American Studies. The way the Western movie has reflected the zigzags of American foreign policy is well documented and deserves more space than these pages permit. But it is important to point out that since Owen Wister assisted in building the Western as a cultural meeting point between American ideals and U.S. history, it has worked as a barometer of the way the place of the United States in the world was being felt at home. Undoubtedly Wister's *The Virginian* (1902) represents an early rebuke of the Progressive Era in the sense that the vanishing cowboy is a figure in retreat, and his space is progressively (in all senses) taken over by the buccaneering capitalists. But such domestic disarray can be mended, Wister and other cultural producers seem to suggest, by a change in American foreign policy. It is not for nothing that *The Virginian* was dedicated to President Roosevelt. The rare cowboy himself became a sign "of a true democracy disappearing under pressure from corporate and alien forces."[6] In the same way, the frontiersman

sought—as an epitome of ingrained anti-intellectual biases—spaces to vent his altruism and redeem the aliens in need of American civilization. It might be in this sense that these narratives granted the Platt and the Teller Amendments, concerning Cuba's sovereignty after 1898, the ideological justifications that the urban settings could not provide in cultural form. All of this positively led Santayana to conclude that ontologically the realists—other than Boston-centered—did not have many reasons to challenge the genteel tradition.

Whitman and the James brothers were a different matter. All three seemed to represent different kinds of successful opposition to the oppression of the established tradition.

Whitman definitely embraced in this context a striking, radical, and blatant rupture with the effects of the prescribed American culture. Whitman then was the *enfant terrible* among the searchers for a new cultural ontology to the extent that Santayana referred to him in his lecture as a poet "who has left the genteel tradition entirely behind." In other words, he was a visionary loner, although not a solipsist. According to Santayana, there are obvious reasons for Whitman's being cast out from the intellectual records of the times: "Educated Americans find him rather an unpalatable person, who they sincerely protest ought not to be taken for a representative of their culture; and he certainly should not, because their culture is so genteel and traditional" (GT 103). As a matter of fact, if civilization (understood as the appropriation of American idealism in late 19th-century United States) stifled as many traits of nature (human and physical) as was imperative for the expansion of a booming economy, Whitman succeeded as the conscientious critic in a way the Western realists did not and could not. Santayana had previously praised Whitman's concern about his expression of liberty and the prevalence of nature over the elements that had attempted to restrain it in all its forms.[7] And it was in Whitman that he found the source for his early speculations on the function of poetry.[8] Whitman's poetry thus appeared in "The Genteel Tradition" as an expression of that freedom which continually eluded cooption by bourgeois conformity. If so, then we could see Whitman as a forerunner of that select group of skeptics who had charged capitalism with obliterating "nature" and turning Emerson's ahistoricity into a respectable idea. Whitman was, then, the first to dissociate himself from the prevalent conventional values as he advanced guidelines for the 1900s. We could say that Whitman had discovered that "whatever is, in the context of bourgeois delusion, called nature, is merely the scar of social mutilation" as Adorno would comment later in a different context.[9] It is probable that

readers might argue that at most Whitman's criticism was lukewarm. Santayana was seeking justifications for the limitations of Whitman's ideal America when he pointed out that "an American in the nineteenth century who completely disregarded the genteel tradition could hardly have done more" (GT 104). By promoting the subversive role that Whitman adopted in the intellectual development of his times, Santayana was not only seeking a social function of poetry other than that of utilitarianism, which had concerned him so greatly in his early essays. He eventually opened a critical breach that led to the modern understanding of forms as social practices and expressions of power relations.

But Santayana's Whitman is a problematic figure, unable to hold up a well-structured alternative to the genteel tradition. Notwithstanding the conclusions reached in Santayana's essay, Whitman is the intellectual child of Emerson. The latter's disdain for the poets of the sublime, is an example that encourages us to contrast Whitman with the most genteel of poets—the Brahmins. Their reflections and passions, indictments and defenses were well-known celebrations of that progression towards the official ideal of an American ethos. Quite distinctly and in virtual opposition to the Boston-New York-Philadelphia ideologues and producers, Whitman apprehended a new ethical system. At least that is what Santayana apparently meant when, discussing Whitman, he contended that "the various sights, moods, and emotions are given each one vote; they are declared to be all free and equal, and the innumerable commonplace moments of life are suffered to speak like the others" (GT 104).

No doubt this is a very democratic discourse. But it does foster a reading of Whitman within the regular assumptions of the very tradition Santayana targeted. Somehow Whitman displayed in both his poetry and prose several political principles that the settled intellectual tradition had mystified into dogmas. Manifest destiny, for example, did not necessarily require more monumental epics than some sections from *Song of Myself* or *Drum Taps*; social cooption is simply obvious in "Starting from Paumanok." Whitman even becomes a myth-maker in "When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloom'd." His elegy to Lincoln is not alien to the hermeneutics of power expressed by the late Emerson in *Representative Men.* Finally, Santayana's criticism of Emerson that "the deeper he went and the more he tried to grapple with fundamental conceptions, the vaguer and more elusive they became in his hands," (1969: 218) could perfectly be applied to Whitman's brotherhood of (specifically) men.

On the contrary, the James brothers helped Santayana to rekindle his essay at Berkeley. As already seen, William James had supplied him with a referential alternative that contributed greatly to make possible a criticism of the genteel tradition, at least as Santayana had envisioned it. Indeed, pragmatism had defined the limits of nineteenth-century European thought in America, or rather, had provided the historian with an intellectual tool to explain how the import of European theory had made social havoc and aggressive diplomacy so likely in the United States.

By dismissing the successive interpretations of the Emersonian absence of evil, James strove to find a substitute for the appropriated liberal creed. As he was skeptical enough of millenarian and redemptive movements (also imported from Europe), he may be accused of temporizing with the nascent Establishment and even of expressing deviant compromise with reform.[10] But if mistrustful of definitive solutions, James also proved to be nonconformist enough not to sanction the American political system as the best of all possible ways of government: thus his aversion towards the negation of historical conditioning or, in other words, his opposition to exceptionalism. To the latter he opposed a 'tough-minded' philosophy, hardened by the evidences published in the mass media and the justification of the social status quo by thinkers of the day. Let us not lose sight of the fact that despite its current exhaustion as a philosophy of opposition to the Establishment, pragmatism was relevant a century ago on account of its proposal to de-intellectualize—that is to say, relativize so that terms be modified when appropriate—assumptions ingrained in the social and cultural fabrics. Little wonder then that syllogisms like those used in *Pragmatism* (1907) sought to disclose the fallacious ideological premises that held sway in the perplexing Progressive years. For his part, Santayana honored James by dedicating some paragraphs in "The Genteel Tradition" to him. His indictment of an accepted ahistoricity was a homage to his former professor for his refusal to be coopted:

> Ideas and rules that may have been occasionally useful [the genteel tradition] put in the place of the full-blooded irrational movement of life which had called them into being; and these abstractions, so soon obsolete, it strove to fix and to worship for ever. (GT 105)

As mentioned above, one of the most controversial legacies the Progressives received from the intellectual tradition was that of a revised manifest destiny, actualized into an aggressive foreign policy in Latin America

and the Philippines. This aspect of idealism is objected to by both Santayana and William James, and the latter's views can be traced in "The Genteel Tradition." Although apparently Santayana did not take a clear-cut position regarding the foreign affairs of his country of adoption, his defense of James was eloquent. An example of this may be the oblique way Santayana referred to the transpartisan expansionist vocation of the United States. Right in the beginning he explained the American redemptive stand vis-à-vis the world in his own way: "Goodwill became the great American virtue; and a passion arose for counting heads, and square miles, and cubic feet, and minutes saved —as if there had been anything to save them for" (GT 99).

It is commonplace to accuse Theodore Roosevelt of being an expansionist who paved the way for the global superpower that the United States eventually came to be in the twentieth century. But "The Genteel Tradition" involved many more people. Santayana was aware that that "tradition" involved the progressives' expansionist discourse. Progressivism had aimed at recovering the elements of American civilization obliterated by the two-party system. It did not stop then at accepting the biases of the former movements that had sought vainly to break that historical trend, from the Know-nothings to the populists. The result of the Spanish-American War, and the favorable results of the U.S. diplomatic efforts at the Far East had provided an argument for those in the Establishment who believed in the intrinsic goodness of the American institutions. And once the social consequences of industrialization had begun to lose their impact, the progressives' recipe for political survival was to criticize expansionism not because it depleted the right of other nations to exist, but because it failed to extend the benefits of American civilization to other peoples.

But as a text that questions a peculiar conception of foreign policy, "The Genteel Tradition" is not so much proselytizing as echoing William James's active compromise in the Anti-Imperialist League and his good relations with an array of dissidents throughout the 1900s. Let us not disregard then Santayana's meaningful description of James as a person once he had introduced him as an intellectual:

> William James became the friend and helper of those groping, nervous, half-educated, spiritually disinherited, passionately hungry individuals of which America is full. He became, at the same time, their spokesman and representative before the learned world; and he made it a chief part of his vocation to recast what the learned has to offer, so that as far as possible it might serve the needs and interests of these people. (GT 105)

Some may see in these words the defence of a radical. Independently of what that political label actually meant, the truth is that both men lived in harmony within an alternative ethos to that of industrial capitalism. As Frank Lentricchia suggests, William James's major concern was to prevent the triumph of the American version of imperialism and capitalism, which he considered a "world historical menace of unparalleled proportions" (1986: 21). Indeed this would be a far more pessimist prediction than that spawned by Leninist scholastics. It was that fearsome speculative conclusion of James's that gave rise to his search for a new system. And it was from that point onwards that his alternative to capitalism was aimed to explain the interaction between the redemptive discourse and the imperialist praxis, or in other words, between empire as theory and theory as empire (Lentricchia 1986: 11, 12).

Researchers find that Santayana was less sanguine than James as regards his criticism of the American system. Certainly his political criticism had not reached the explicitness of his later writings, especially from *Character and Opinion in the United States* (1920) onwards. His recollections of America's "singular preoccupation with quantity" had taken place in a context different from that of the prewar years. But what was being fully detailed in 1920 came to be an articulated continuation to his impassioned response to the stifling consequences of the genteel tradition. Sometimes Santayana's stratagem of intellectual confrontation with the Establishment can be wrongly perceived on account of his inaccuracies when putting his admired James against the socio-cultural background. I think that the most notorious instance of wishful thinking as regards James's social support can be perceived in Santayana's fallacy of what Americanism might be:

> [William James] had a prophetic sympathy with the dawning sentiments of the age, with the moods of the dumb majority. . . . His way of thinking and feeling represented the true America and represented in a measure the whole ultramodern, radical world. Thus he eluded the genteel tradition in the romantic way, by continuing it into its opposite. (GT 104)

The last sentence of the excerpt is true enough to be held as a consented truth. But to compare William James with the "true America" is sheer exaggeration. What Santayana called "true America" used to adopt positions that simply did not hold within a tolerant and cosmopolitan philosophy. The "dawning sentiments of the age" as were expressed in the average citizen did

not have to correspond with those of either of the James brothers, much less with William's. Santayana, probably unconsciously mistranslating his European cultural background into an American context, understood the making of a cultural tradition as a task reserved for a cultivated elite. But the common man, functionally illiterate, nationalist, nativist, and individualist to an extreme, had been not only the recipient of the American mythology: he was doing his share to set the WASP model, if only by casting a nativist eye on the immigrants arriving at U.S. ports. True America had more to do with the Hegelian "tragic-comic history of experience" (GT 104) than with the romantic clash proposed by William James.

However, due to his deep conviction that "philosophers are only apologists" (GT 102), Santayana faithfully followed James's identification of discourse and praxis, theory and empire. Starting from this assumption we can understand Santayana's substitution of history and science for philosophy. In the former disciplines Santayana believed one could find less contaminated tools than those a coopted philosophy advanced. It is for this reason that he boldly asserted that the truths found by history and science were so superior segments of knowledge that "no later interpretation can invalidate or afford to contradict [them]."

We can infer his insistence that Tocquevillean views on America aimed to highlight not so much the discovery of a past as the plausibility of a perfectible future. And in the pursuit of a brighter future the United States had to retrace many of its misguided steps and dispense with many adventuresome traits of exceptionalism. Here we have evidence not only of Santayana's plausibly Europeanized frame of mind, but also of his reliance on William James's subversive re-reading of Transcendentalism. The cure for conformity in America lay in a social realignment along old lines—the development of class-consciousness among intellectuals. James's gullibility obviously responded to the possibilities shown by the transcendentalists' (and in general the romantics') axiom concerning the social role of the bard.[11] But this conviction nevertheless represents the reply of the dissenting intellectual to what both William James and Santayana perceived as uni-directional social and political processes. Their proposal set out to rework all the principles on which the democratic system theoretically stood. Specifically for Santayana this new version of the American myth encouraged his appraisal of Whitman and Henry James as judges. The latter's resort to "turning the genteel American tradition, as he turns everything else, into a subject-matter for analysis . . . to be compared with other habits of mind" (GT 104) is relevant in this respect. Santayana's appreciation of Henry James's insight implies a

new concept of power relations whose relevance goes beyond those of culture-making. William James devised a pragmatic tool to pull down a comfortable unity and self-righteousness; his brother Henry submitted American culture to the formidable punishment of relativization. For his part, Santayana acquired an ideological network sufficient to define his belated naturalism. The intellectual's challenge turned unity into diversity. Consequently history is not just the fulfilment of a destiny manifest by fate; it becomes a text to be written by all and sundry, a "multi-authored book" (Lentricchia 1986: 11).

William James proposed the multiple reading of history as the counter-offensive to the totalizing plan of contemporary metanarratives, be they liberal, conservative or radical. By means of describing truth as an attribute of ideas rather than of reality,[12] life is released from uniform customs and convictions. Four years after *Pragmatism,* James's views on society as an open text are assumed in Santayana's universe. Thus constructed global reality is an "experiment" that "has not ultimate or total nature, because it has no end" (GT 106). This sense of society as an open text is indeed different from the chiliastic theories that in one way or another informed the ideology of contemporary naturalist thinkers and writers, especially those of the muckraking slant who served progressive politics. Santayana's distrust of formal democracy went in line with his concept of naturalism, which undervalued human beings' efforts to struggle forward in an unending progression to some ultimate goal. Santayana also learnt from James that reality surpassed preconceived ideas, as the following quote from "The Genteel Tradition" testifies:

> [Nature's] purposes are not to be static harmonies, self-unfolding destinies, the logic of spirit, the spirit of logic, or any other formal method and abstract law; its purposes are to be concrete endeavours, finite efforts of souls living in an environment which they transform and by which they, too, are affected. (GT 106)

A denial of human contingency in history perpetuates what Santayana derided as the "Satanic dream that we are creators and not creatures." Indeed "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy" is the written expression of an individual whose research led him to find that all isms, although capable of an oppositional role in a certain historical context, can be diminished by power relations. What remains, then, is our "animal status." This was true not only of the United States, of course; but American exceptionalism, idealism, moralism, etc, were targets set by the genteel tradition for Santayana to hit. To what extent William James actually assisted him in denouncing American

life and culture may be a debatable issue. The truth is that Santayana's critique had never been more pungent than in his lecture at Berkeley. It is correct to say that he came to distrust absolutes. His words in *Reason in Common Sense* had been clear: "Among unstable and relative ideals none is more relative and unstable than that which transports all value to a universal law, itself indifferent to good and evil" (1968: 2.200). But what he said on that occasion had a very wide—virtually universal—scope, whereas the subject matter of "The Genteel Tradition" was the society, the intellectual achievement, and the policies of the United States.

Such is Santayana's skeptical thesis. As an argument to contradict some contemporary tendencies of history-recording in American culture it is quite an elaborate piece of writing that only a thorough and somewhat iconoclastic intellectual effort could produce. However, a *reductio ad absurdum* of his own conclusions supports us in seeing them as dated. When trying to rescue his cultural heroes from the fire of intellectualism, he fell into the same trap. Already by the time of "The Genteel Tradition" Whitman and Henry James had started the making of an anti-realist, "detached," and doctrinaire tradition. We have inherited that stream of thought transmogrified into a variety of formalism, as intellectually discouraging as the tradition Santayana denounced at Berkeley: the so-called "humanist vision" that spread over part of the American learned collectivity is a good example. That bland notion of the genteel tradition gave a wide ideological umbrella to works like those by Wharton, Cather, Griffith, etc, especially before World War I definitively turned intellectuals into antagonists of the *Establishment.*

Various specific cases exemplify the way Santayana's thesis defended some ideas that at best can be called into question. Such is the case of Henry James as *the* successful analyst of the American tradition. Santayana most probably alluded to the sage Henry James who wrote *The American Scene,* not to the author of *Daisy Miller* or any of the so called international-theme novels prior to *The Ambassadors.* The late James had already purged his conscience when discussing his native land. But the one active in the two last decades of the nineteenth century experienced a great dilemma when approaching his cultural origins. Not until his failure as a playwright did Henry James renounce America as an idea—until that moment his predication had been less one of opposition than of suspension. The failure of Santayana's argument is not so much one of quality as one of degree: Henry James reached the same level of skepticism as the Californian humorists. However, Santayana elevated James's perplexity at the United States to the pitch of anti-Americanism. Besides, he prevented the Western realists from substitu-

ting a new essence of their country for the old, wasted, and (after the American Historical Association Conference was held in 1893) not-so-genteel New England tradition.

Santayana's discrediting of Hawthorne is also striking and one may be tempted to believe that it was forced. Early in the essay he tried to launch an attack on Calvinism as the defining layer of what was to become the genteel tradition. I think that his irony on calvinism's axiomatic indictment of human nature falls in a void; not so much as a result of his lack of dialectical resources to defend freedom, but because he puts Hawthorne on the same pile as those other writers who did not dare change the course of the prevalent intellectual status quo. For Santayana Hawthorne's achievement seemed as flawed as those of his fellow writers; it was "in danger of being morbid, or tinkling, or self-indulgent" too. Had Santayana known Hawthorne's work better, he should have taken into account that the latter had also denounced the secularization of Puritanism scores of years before it was scrutinized in "The Genteel Tradition." *The Blithedale Romance* and "The Celestial Railroad" are ample critiques of Transcendentalism and clearly distinguish Hawthorne from the thinkers with which Santayana compared him at Berkeley. And in general Hawthorne's efforts to explain the deviant behavior of national ideals by means of interpreting seventeenth-century America to the nineteenth-century readership is as valid a reflection on what the United States might have been as Santayana's valedictory reflections would be.

In spite of adopting from William James what he found fitting in his vision of nature, Santayana should have taken certain differences into account. Whereas James rejected any concept of telos, Santayana harangued his audience in the final words of his lecture; he believed that the human being's spirit, (he preferred to call it "mind") "rather than any fortunes that may await his body in the outer world, constitute[s] his proper happiness" (GT 109). The end of "The Genteel Tradition" then seems to favor a revision of Transcendentalism. It would be easier for Santayana if his aim were such, because he undervalued in his final paragraph the very pressure that social and political history had exerted on the cultural achievement of the United States. Despite his scathing overt and covert comments on the heritage of gentility in the United States, Santayana (as well as the Jameses), could not avoid belonging to the Era that he tried to indict and there are examples in his lecture that confirm this. The poor, the immigrants, and the blacks were disfavored social groups obdurately real beyond the walls of Harvard University. They all might apparently have expected William James to speak for them—if ever there was room for them in that aggregation of "half-educated, spiritually dis-

inherited, passionately hungry individuals of which America is full." Of course it was not Santayana's fault. He and his mentor had unfolded an antinomian vision that was frowned upon by the well-established intelligentsia. The problem was that the social response to their proposals had necessarily to be more receptive than it had been up to that moment. This caused their efforts to be judged negatively. At best, a critique like theirs only makes possible the adjustment of the individual to the society as it develops. And Santayana's words seen in isolation, "The Genteel Tradition" at worst could also be regarded as another case study of plea for ahistoricity. As John Dewey suggested, by counting exclusively on a collective like that considered in "The Genteel Tradition," culture would turn into "an individual achievement and not a class possession" (1939: 728). In a naive ideological twist of another kind, Santayana's thesis would only delay prompt appropriation.[13]

A quotation from "The Genteel Tradition" is most suitable for the conclusion of this essay. Santayana's good faith was obvious by the end of the lecture, when he conceded that the ruin of a residual tradition did not necessarily substitute for newer social and cultural constructions:

> The genteel tradition cannot be dislodged by these insurrections [i.e., the Jameses, Whitman, etc]; there are circles to which it is still congenial, and where it will be preserved. But it has been challenged and (what is perhaps more insidious) it has been discovered. No one need be browbeaten any longer into accepting it. (GT 107)

No exhaustive analysis is required here to understand how far Santayana had been infected by an optimistic assessment of America's tendency to challenge established values. He had no qualms about considering the success of this subversion (via the pragmatic method) of the culture and ideology that were alive in the United States in the first decade of the twentieth century.

In a wider sense, all this means that concepts born in the American pantheon, such as "democracy," "freedom," "justice" etc., must be worked over and given a new meaning. The artists/intellectuals—in their role as ideologues—would have a dramatic role to play then. An implementation of the thinking of Santayana's heroes in "The Genteel Tradition" implies the demise of tried and true concepts, devoid of their original content but formidable as sociopolitical bulwarks of a tradition that ultimately became the American ideology. Only then would individuals like Walt Whitman be genuinely respected, and the multifocal reality proposed by William James have serious consequences.

But a politics of realism determined it could not be so. The construction of the United States as an Emersonian transaction was far too powerful, and by 1911 there were already too many interests vested to renounce to the ultimate fruits of such a venture. Santayana underrated the prodigious capacity of the genteel tradition to assimilate disparate elements and reproduce itself in so many ways. Had it not been so, these would not be the closing years of the so-called "American century."a

NOTES

1. Part of this essay derives from a paper delivered at the First Conference of the Spanish Association of American Studies at Madrid in 1994. I wish to acknowledge the constructive criticism of *Miscelánea's* anonymous readers. I am also indebted to Sally Burgess and Marita Fumero for their comments on this work in a previous stage.

2. Contrast my arguments with those offered by T. Sprigee and A. L. Rowse. See Sprigee (1980: 200) for an assessment of Santayana's approach to the United States. On the contrary, Rowse (1990: 320) insists on the influence of Spanish thinkers of the "Generation of 1898" on Santayana's referential framework.

3. Santayana, *The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy* (1993: 97). Hereafter, page numbers will be given at the end of the excerpt; the title is abbreviated as GT.

4. My italics. Santayana's criticism of Emerson's negation of history is traced from 1900, when *The Interpretation of Poetry and Religion* was published. In the chapter on Emerson Santayana described what came to be one of the most permanent charges against Transcendentalism: "To reject tradition and think as one might have thought if no man had ever existed before." See Santayana (1969: 216-233); quotation from p. 220.

5. In a general sense I agree with some of the ideas expressed by Philip Fisher (1988).

6. See Eric Sundquist (1988: 501 ff). For a contrasting comment on the ideology of the West as a literary region and, especially Wister's achievement, see Peter Conn (1983: 14). Despite their obvious differences, both authors consider a common source in Henry Nash Smith's seminal metaphor written in the late 1940s: "The agrarian utopia in the garden of the world was destroyed, or rather aborted, by the land speculator and the railroad monopolist. These were in turn but expressions of the larger forces at work in American society after the Civil War—the machine, the devices of corporation finance, and the power of big business over Congress." See Smith (1969: 191).

7. For Santayana's previous acknowledgment of Whitman's poetry, see Ross Posnock (1991: 69-70).

8. Such opinion can be inferred in *The Sense of Beauty* (1896). Santayana wonders on the controversial borderline between the form and the content: "The Beautiful does not depend on the useful . . . but it is not independent of the necessary, for the necessary must also be the habitual and consequently the basis of the type, and of all its imaginative variations." See Santayana (1955: 98).

9. Quoted by Ross Posnock (1987: 34).

10. See also Douglas Tallack's interpretation (1991: 148).

11. See also Lentricchia (1986: 20); Rowse (1990: 323).

12. For an account of James's ultimate social applications of the pragmatic method, compare Lentricchia's argument (1986: 10) with Ralph Barton Perry's seminal study of William James's achievement (1964: 294 ff).

13. For more on the ideological debate Dewey-Santayana on account of culture, see Robert Westbrook (1991, esp. 345); for the sociological loopholes in Santayana's naturalism, see Warren Susman (1985: 92 ff.).

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a

THEME: TOPIC OR DISCOURSE FRAMEWORK?

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1. INTRODUCTION[1]

As is well known, Halliday uses a spatial metaphor, "point of departure"/"takeoff point," and a matter metaphor, "aboutness"/"concern," as two different, but equivalent, glosses of (*Topical*) *Theme*. Thus, he writes:

> In this teapot my aunt was given by the duke, the psychological subject is this teapot. That is to say, it is "this teapot" that is the CONCERN of the message—that the speaker has taken as POINT OF EMBARKATION of the clause. . . . The Theme is the STARTING POINT for the message; it is what the clause is going to be ABOUT. (1994 [1985]: 34, 39; my emphasis)

By contrast, Huddleston (1988, 1991, 1992) and Downing (1991) find that the spatial metaphor (i.e. "point of departure") and the matter metaphor (i.e. "aboutness") cannot be applied to the same category.[2] In my view, these two scholars interpret "aboutness" from a "referential" perspective (see Gundel 1988: 211-212), that is, as an intuitive context-dependent notion identifying

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the main cognitive entity involved in a message, usually labelled as *Topic* and associated with different kinds of given information (cf. e.g. Prince's [1981] *Scale of Familiarity*, Chafe's [1976] *Scale of Topic Accessibility*). Accordingly, Huddleston and Downing draw the same conclusion: "what a clause as a message is about" does not necessarily constitute its point of departure. However, the two scholars differ as for the importance they confer to the notion "point of departure" and as to the way they identify "what a sequence is about." The main thrust of this paper is to show that most of Huddleston's and Downing's objections to Hallidayan (Topical) Theme can be overcome, provided that this category is approached from a *separating* perspective (see Fries 1983 1981]) and its feature of "aboutness" is interpreted in a *relational* sense.

2. DOWNING'S AND HUDDLESTON'S APPRAISALS OF HALLIDAY'S THEME

Huddleston (1988: 162) discards Halliday's spatial metaphor ("point of departure"), realized in English by clause initial position, as not being relevant enough (syntactically or semantically) to constitute a grammatical function by itself. Instead, he concentrates on the matter metaphor ("what the clause is about"), which he calls either *Topic* or *Theme*.[3] Downing (1991: 122), in her turn, "willingly goes along with" Halliday's spatial gloss, but she rephrases its deictic function as a *framework-setting* device.[4] In other words, like Halliday she considers Theme as signalling the speaker's semantic and mood angle on the message, but invoking Chafe (1976) and Lowe (1987), Downing suggests that this category sets up different types of frameworks within which a discourse span holds, as illustrated in (1) below:

(1) i. *The Gauls* sacked Rome (Downing 1991: 123; participant individual framework)
ii. *In the East long before the time of Buddha* there had been ascetics... (ibid.: 134; spatial circumstantial framework).[5]

The idea of analysing Theme as a framework-setting device accords well with Halliday's arguments. Yet, it should be noted that while his *Multiple Theme* sets discourse frameworks related to the three metafunctions of language (i.e. *textual*, *interpersonal*, *topical*), Downing's three types of frameworks (i.e. *individual, circumstantial* and *discourse*) are based on two

syntactic variables [+/- Participant], [+/- nuclear constituent] and on one semantic criterion [+/- experiential meaning] (see Table 1). Further field research should be undertaken to elicit and contrast the discourse implications of both approaches.

Table 1 Halliday's Multiple Theme vs. Downing's frameworks

Halliday's multiple Theme	Downing's thematic frameworks				
metafunctions	framework	participant	nuclear	experiential	Theme
ideational	individual	+	+	+	Participant (Subject, Object, Complements, *as for,* elements)
					Attribute
		-	-	+	Process
		-	+	-	
	circumstan-tial	-	-	+	place Adjunct
	spatial	-	-	+	time Adjunct
	temporal	-	-	+	other Adjuncts (e.g., Participant-tied V-en clauses, participant-tied V-ing dependent situation clauses, to-infinitive clauses, etc.)
	situational				
textual	discourse				Conjunctive Themes, continuatives,
	logical	-	-	-	conjunctions, relatives and relational Themes
interpersonal	subjective	-	-	-	modal Themes

Turning to the "aboutness" feature, Huddleston agrees with Lyons (1977: 505), Chafe (1976), Comrie (1981: 58) and Reinhart (1982: 58) that, except for certain marked constructions such as those with *what about*, *as for*, etc., which take only *referential* (i.e. ideational or representational) *nominal items* as their complements, or some cases of fronting, Topic (i.e. "what a message is about") is not systematically encoded in English. Rather, this category is addressed as an intuitive concept that must be negotiated throughout discourse and that can only be inferred from its co(n)text(s), as illustrated in (2) and (3) below (from Huddleston (1988: 158-9, 1991: 99, 101):

(2) *She broke it.* (Topic: *she,* as an answer to *What did she do ?*; or Topic: *it*, in answer to *What happened to it?*)

(3) (i) *What about the battery?* (Topic: *the battery* / *it*)
(ii) *It was OK.*
(iii) *There was nothing wrong with it*.

(iv) *I had to replace it.*

Huddleston dissociates Topic from clause initial position (i.e. Halliday's (Topical) *Theme*$_E$, Theme expression, in English) on three grounds. First, he alludes to Schachter and Otanes' (1972: 81) observation that there exist languages in which the concern of the clause typically occurs in final position and is morphologically marked, if it is marked at all (e.g. the suffix *-ang* in Tagalog). The second reason adduced is that initial position may be filled by (an) item(s) other than referential and/or nominal, which therefore cannot express "what the clause is about," as can be seen in (4) below from Huddleston (1988: 158; 1991: 99):

(4) (i) *Nothing will satisfy you* [? *As for nothing, it will satisfy you*]
(ii) *You could buy a bar of chocolate like this for 6d before the War* [spoken to someone who was born before the War] [? *as for you, you could buy a bar of chocolate like this for 6d before the War*]
(iii) *There's a fallacy in your argument* [* *As for there, it/there is a fallacy in your argument*]

And third, in Huddleston's (1988: 158, 1991: 97) view, the significance of being the "first element" or the "point of departure" for the message is a matter of further research, not current understanding. Taking the aforementioned arguments as his point of departure, he raises four debatable issues:

(1) that Halliday does not *demonstrate* (i.e. he gives no type of evidence, empirical, grammatical or semantic), but only asserts, that:
  (a) the Theme of a clause extends up to (and includes) the first ideational element;
  (b) there is a single invariant meaning attaching to this category (i.e. Theme$_C$);
(2) that the hierarchical constituent structure of (multiple) Theme is not a valid construct;[6]
(3) that the thematic structure of questions (and imperatives) and messages in general is not marked by what Halliday regards as Theme$_E$, but by the *construction* as a whole;
(4) that Halliday has failed to make any explicit and systematic distinction between Theme$_C$ and Theme$_E$.

Alternatively, Downing's Topic evokes a contextual referential interpretation of "aboutness." It invokes the referent / participant / constituent / idea that establishes a relationship of "aboutness" between a clause / utterance entity

and the overall discourse as determined by the co(n)text, which Givón defines as:

> the participant most crucially involved in the action sequence of the paragraph; it is the participant most closely associated with the higher-level "theme" of the paragraph; and finally it is the participant most likely to be coded as the *primary topic*—or *grammatical subject*—of the vast majority of sequentially-ordered clauses/sentences comprising the thematic paragraph. (1983b: 8)

Furthermore, adopting van Oosten's (1986) model, Downing distinguishes between *super-ordinate*, or text level, Topics (i.e. "what a text is about") and *clause level* Topics (i.e. "what a clause is about"). The former are defined as *cognitive schemata* (i.e. the organization of thoughts into schemes of things) that compress a whole text in a single proposition (e.g. titles of books, articles, lectures and so on). Clause level Topics, on the other hand, are described as individual participants prototypically endowed with the features of referentiality, definiteness and agentivity and acting as Subject or Object, given that both functions are valency-bound to the verb and they may affect the mood structure of clauses. Conversely, the other syntactic functions (viz. Complements, Attributes or circumstantial Adjuncts) do not involve such syntactic implications and are described as Attributes of, and therefore subordinate to, basic clause level Topics.[7] As a result, Downing's definition of topical "aboutness," in agreement with Huddleston's analyses above, leaves out from the category of basic clause level Topic the following (cf. Davison 1984: 827):

(1) Negative and impersonal Subjects actualizing *non-referential* participants (e.g. *nothing, nowhere* etc., *You can define a net in one of two ways, depending on your point of view* —Downing 1990: 123 [my emphasis]);
(2) Fronted circumstantial (including presentative) Adjuncts (e.g. *At seventeen, he announces ...* —Downing 1990: 124 [my emphasis])
(3) Existential-*There* constructions (e.g. *There was once an ugly bear who hid from the world*, Downing 1990: 126 [my emphasis]);
(4) Fronted Attributes (e.g. *Worst of all was the emasculation of the League of Nations* —Downing 1990: 127 [my emphasis])

Downing claims that the above represent some of the means available in English to mark *Topic discontinuity* in discourse, that is, to introduce *new* clause level Topics, which

(1) provide emphatic points of departure;
(2) infuse with rhematic (end weight) and/or focal (end focus) prominence an element (the new Topic) that otherwise would not receive this type of prominence.

Downing makes three further points. First, like Huddleston, she seems to suggest that the label *Topical Theme* is not particularly felicitous, the implication being that only initial Subjects or initial Objects can behave as Topics and therefore properly be called Topical Themes. These are said to contribute to either the Topic continuity of texts (when cohesive) or to introduce new Topics over a discourse span (usually receiving focal prominence) [my emphasis], as is explained in (5) below:

(5) (i) *Another thing he would probably never see, and that would be any sign of a mammal.* (Downing 1991: 130)
(ii) *One half she ate herself, the other she gave to the child*. (Downing and Locke 1992: 231)
(iii) *Lea asked me to bring some tea from London. This I did*. (Downing and Locke 1992: 231)

Second, Downing regards the label *displaced Topical Theme* as unnecessary, arguing that clause level Topics need not be thematic. Initial non-Object marked Themes are said not to behave as Topics, but to set up emphatic points of departure which contribute to either Topic discontinuity or to Topic continuity over a discourse span, as in (6) below [my emphasis]:

(6) *For two hundred years the Roman soldier-farmers had struggled for freedom and a share in the government of their state; for a hundred years they had enjoyed their privileges.* (Downing 1991: 132).

And third, though accepting the concept of Multiple Theme, Downing suggests that the first experiential element need not represent the cut-off point between Theme and Rheme. She (1991: 127 (10)) suggests the possibility of recursive textual, interpersonal and ideational elements extending up to (and including) the clause level Topic, as reproduced in (7) below [my emphasis]:

(7)

1. ideational	*Towards the end of his life,* (1)
2. ideational (+ topic)	*Freud* (2) *concluded that (3)*
3. structural	*he* (4) *was not a great man,*
4. ideational (+ topic)	*but* (5) *he* (6) *had discovered*
5. structural	*great things. Arguably* (7),
6. ideational (+ topic)	*the reverse* (8) *might be true.*

7. modal
8. ideational (+ topic)

Elsewhere, however, Downing seems to abandon this hypothesis and return to Halliday's idea that Multiple Theme extends up to (and includes) the *first* experiential (their representational) element, as illustrated in (8), a re-analysis of the above excerpt:

(8) *Towards the end of his life*, (1) *Freud concluded that he was not a great man but he had discovered great things*. *Arguably*, (2) *the reverse* (3) *might be true*.

(1) adjunctive (marked) Theme (2) modal Theme (3) unmarked (Subject) Theme.

(Downing and Locke 1992: 233)

Here *Towards the end of his life* is analysed as a Topical Theme despite its not being a referential participant, while *he*, the initial referential participant in the two subsequent subordinate clauses, is barred from this category.

3. HALLIDAY'S THEME: TOPIC OR FRAMEWORK?

I believe that, like Huddleston and Downing, Halliday dissociates Theme from Topic. From his "separating" perspective (see Fries 1983 [1981]), Topic is considered as a non-structural category at the level of texts disentangling their top-down processing. Put differently, in SFG Topics may be regarded as telling us "what texts are about" *referentially,* that is, by means of non structural relationships of *presupposition*, or cohesion (viz. *situational* and/or *verbal*—see Halliday 1974). Conversely, Theme represents a structural (clausal) category that announces "what clauses as messages are about" relationally. As I see it, Hallidayan "aboutness" invokes a *message-centred* (as opposed to co(n)text-centred) and a *clause-based* (as opposed to sentence-based, group-based, etc.) syntactically coded relation deriving from the linear quality of language established between an *entity* (viz. referent, participant, constituent)*/proposition*, or (*beta*) *Theme*, and a clausal (complex) predication, or *Rheme*. Hence, "what a message is about" is said to be iconically coded by message initial experiential position (i.e. a Participant,

an Attribute, a Circumstance or a Process), unless syntactically specified otherwise (i.e. unless there is some syntactically-marked thematic substitute preceding it). I contend that it is because of this relational interpretation of "aboutness" that Theme has been glossed by means of such psycholinguistic expressions as the "point of departure / point of embarkation of the clause as a message," or "the hook / peg on which the message is hung." Likewise, the relational quality of Halliday's "aboutness" can be attested at the three levels of description acknowledged in SFG, namely:

(1) from above the linguistic system;
(2) at the same level in the linguistic system;
(3) and from below the linguistic system.

From above the linguistic system, the relational "aboutness" of Theme is said to impose universal patterns of textual organization that are *instrumental to* (i.e. help to express) ideational and interpersonal meanings. For Theme is said to express a textual (*deictic*) meaning: it links the speaker's thought with its expression in language, establishing the framework or perspective (*speaker's angle*) from which the rest of the message unit develops. Therefore, Theme contributes to the bottom-up processing of texts, i.e. to their *method of development* (see e.g. Halliday 1978: 134; 1994: 61, 67, 336, 387; Fries 1983: 135) as well as to their *thematic progression* (see e.g. Martin 1988, 1992b; Giora 1983; Eiler 1986). And at a larger scale, thematic choices are also said to be affected by such variables as *register*, *gender* and *ideology* (see Martin 1992). At the same level in the linguistic system, on the other hand, Matthiessen and Martin (1991: 43-48) remark that thematic "aboutness" sets out *thematic proportionalities*, or textual paradigmatic relationships. In other words, Theme represents the concern of messages at clause rank in relation to:

(1) different classes and types of Themes and Rhemes within clauses as messages;
(2) given and new information within the Theme system complex, in correlation with the principles of *end Focus* and *end Weight* to build up the discourse prominence of (an) item(s);
(3) grammar as a whole, particularly the systems of Transitivity and Mood (the former determining from which semantic perspective, or transitivity role, a particular process is to be viewed and the latter expressing the purpose of the message, that is, declarative, interrogative, imperative or exclamative).

Lastly, from below Halliday argues [personal communication] that, if the clause contains two information units, then the overwhelming probability is

that the boundary will fall between the Theme and the Rheme. To summarize, thematic choices help texts to be coherent with respect to themselves (i.e. *cohesive*) and coherent with respect to their contexts of situation or register (i.e. *consistent*).

Four conclusions which are summarized below might be drawn from this relational rendering of the "aboutness" feature of Hallidayan (Topical) Theme:

(1) Spatial metaphor ("point of departure") and "matter metaphor" are two different aspects of Halliday's theme.

(2) "As for" (and similar) constructions cannot be used as "tests" for thematic "aboutness."

(3) The meaning of theme must be obtained from the construction as a whole.

(4) Halliday's category of "displaced theme" should be revised, if not discarded.

Firstly, I contend that Halliday is consistent in treating the *spatial metaphor* (the "point of departure" of the clause as a message) and the *matter metaphor* ("what it is about") as two different aspects of Theme, i.e. the psycholinguistic-syntactic and its feature of relational aboutness, respectively.[8] Moreover, I think that the label *Topical Theme* is consistent with a relational interpretation of aboutness that identifies this category with the clause / message initial transitivity constituent (or with the final constituent in substitute Themes). Likewise, I would like to suggest that this analysis answers Huddleston's (1988, 1991) demand for an explanation in terms of "aboutness" of messages introduced by non-referential constituents such as those in (2) above. I concur with Martin and Matthiessen (1991: 43-48) that such messages may be said to be "about" and to have as "point of departure" *nothing*, *you*, and *there*, respectively: these items express the speaker's experiential / interpersonal attitude to the message to be constructed, whether or not evoking referential nominals. Their *valeur* (i.e. paradigmatic value) is established in connection with their corresponding Rhemes and with respect to the proportionalities in which they participate, that is to say, in terms of alternative choices in similar discourse co(n)texts, as illustrated in Tables 2 and 3 below.

Hence, negative Themes such as *Nothing* contrast with positive Themes (e.g. *something, somebody, everybody*, etc.) and with rhematic instances, thematizing the polarity of the clause (except that the negative feature is restricted to the Theme) as well as a participant, which, if not acting as Subject, leads to the inversion Finite-Subject (e.g., *Nowhere would you get a better*

offer, Matthiessen and Martin 1991: 44). Similarly, *there*-structures are described as ideally designed for introducing participants as unmarked news at the end of the clause. *There*, the unmarked Theme (i.e. the Subject) of this clause type does not realize a participant, but functions simply to map the meaning "existence" onto Theme. It acts as an anticipatory framework signalling that something is coming, namely a new participant in a story, which is often picked up referentially and thematically in the subsequent discourse. In turn, acting negatively, It-Themes and cases of postponed (or discontinuous) Themes endow with end-Focus and/or end-weight-prominence items that otherwise would not get this type of discourse prominence, easing, at the same time, the information processing of the sequence(s). Likewise, clauses like *And perhaps he's right* can be claimed to be simultaneously about "and," "perhaps" and "he," in that these items participate in, for instance, the proportionalities included in Table 3 overleaf.

Table 2 *Some thematic proportionalities*

Theme	markedness	samples
non special Themes		
Theme-Mood	unmarked	*You could buy a bar of chocolate like this for 6d before the War*
	-	*Nothing will satisfy you*
	-	*Your argument has a fallacy*
	marked	*A bar of chocolate like this you could buy for 6d before the War*
	-	*You nothing will satisfy*
Theme-Transitivity	-	*A fallacy your argument has*
	unmarked	*A bar of chocolate like this could be bought for 6d before the War*
	-	*You will not be satisfied*
	marked	*Before the war a bar of chocolate like this could be bought for 6d*

special Themes		
Theme-Predication	unmarked	*It was a bar of chocolate like this that you could buy for 6d before the War*
	-	*It is you that nothing satisfies*
	-	*It is your argument that has a fallacy*
	marked	*Before the war it was a bar of chocolate like this that you could buy for 6d*
	-	*You it is that nothing satisfies*
	-	*Your argument it is that has a fallacy*
Theme-Identification	unmarked	*What you could buy for 6d before the War was a bar of chocolate like this*
	-	*Who nothing satisfies is you*
	-	*What has a fallacy is your argument*
	marked	*A bar of chocolate like this was what you could buy for 6d before the War*
	-	*You are who nothing satisfies*
	-	*A fallacy is what your argument has*
Theme-Reference	unmarked	*As to chocolate, you could buy a bar like this for 6d before the War*
	-	*As for being satisfied, nothing satisfies you*
	-	*Regarding your argument, it has a fallacy*
	marked	*As to chocolate, before the war you could buy a bar like this for 6d*
	-	*Regarding your argument, a fallacy it has*
Theme-Substitution	unmarked	*You could buy it for 6d before the War, a bar of chocolate like this*
	-	*It has a fallacy, your argument*
	marked	*This you could buy for 6d before the War, a bar of chocolate like this*
Existential Theme		
	-	*A fallacy it has, your argument*
	unmarked	*There was a bar of chocolate that you could buy for 6d before the War*
	-	*There is nothing that satisfies you*
	-	*There is a fallacy in your argument*
	marked	*Before the War there was a bar of chocolate that you could buy for 6d*
		In your argument there is a fallacy

Table 3 Multiple Theme and textual proportionalities

Clause	Theme		
	logical	interpersonal	topical
And perhaps he's right	1	2	3
And he perhaps is right	1	0	2
perhaps he is right	0	1	2
he perhaps is right	0	0	1

Secondly, I agree with Halliday 1994 [1985]: 39) and with Matthiessen and Martin (1991: 46) that *as for* (or similar) constructions cannot be used as a "test" for thematic (Huddleston's topical) status, for they either question or disregard items that from a relational perspective would behave as Themes (e.g. those included in [2] above). Rather, such constructions seem to act as explicit markers of thematic items, which typically:

(1) function as Subjects;
(2) convey given information;
(3) play an experiential role in the ideational structure of the clause;
(4) either introduce an elaboration of some aspect of a general statement made earlier in the text (usually the second or later in a series) or signal a change of Topic in discourse (see e.g. Andrews 1985; Geluykens 1992; Downing and Locke 1992).

Thirdly, I think enough evidence has been presented to substantiate Bazel's (1973: 201) and Huddleston's (1991: 105) remark that the meaning of Theme should be derived from the meaning of the *construction* as a whole. To my knowledge, Halliday does not only imply this relational tenet (an entity plays the role of Theme because there is another playing the role of a rhematic predication), but he also explicitly states it on describing the thematic structure of subjectless imperatives (e.g., *Keep quiet*):

> Strictly speaking, these have no explicit Theme; the meaning "I want you to," which might have been thematised, by analogy with those above [Subject imperatives], or with the interrogative, is realised simply by the *form* of the clause. (1994: 49; my emphasis).

And fourthly, like Downing, I believe that the label *Displaced Topical Theme* is to some extent inconsistent with Halliday's argumentation. First, the idea of a displaced, or non initial, Topical Theme violates Halliday's description of this category as extending up to (and including) the first experiential / transitivity element. Hence, on not being initial, "displaced" transitivity constituents cannot be regarded as thematic. And second, Halliday's identification of a displaced Theme as that which "would be unmarked Theme in the ensuing clause, if the existing marked Topical Theme was reworded as a dependent clause" (1994: 66) is so vague that virtually all marked Themes could be considered to precede a displaced Theme. This would imply a shift in the theory that, to my knowledge, Halliday has never intended. Rather, the account of displaced Themes is restricted to just three examples of different types of marked (Adjunct) Themes as illustrated in (11)

(from Halliday 1994: 64-5), which reveals the account of this category as rather *ad hoc* and lacking self-consistency:

(10) (i) *Apart from a need to create his own identity «having well and truly trained and educated and, indeed, used his father for so long, emotionally and practically» Robert* felt that at twenty the last thing he wanted to do was to join a family firm in Newcastle*.
(ii) *For all his integrity and high principles, Robert* pulled a slightly fast one over his father and business partners*.
(iii) *In a letter [written to Longridge] on 7 June, eleven days before Robert's departure, George* sounds distinctly miserable, even bitter, << though trying hard to hide it, >> at the prospect of travelling to Liverpool in time to see Robert off*.

Even if it could be admitted that the Topical Themes in (10: i, ii) do display some sort of semantic dependency on *Robert*, which could justify the analysis of this constituent as a displaced Topical Theme, that is not the case in (10: iii), where an independent place Adjunct is also analysed as displacing the Topical Theme. This could be a consistent analysis if, like Downing, Halliday interpreted Theme from a referential perspective, which would restrict "aboutness" to referential participants only. But, it seems to me, this is not Halliday's intention, for elsewhere initial circumstances are presented as a central type of marked Topical Theme, which to me indicates a relational semantic interpretation of "aboutness."

4. CONCLUSION

In this paper I have argued that, like Huddleston or Downing, Halliday separates out the categories of Topic (i.e. "what a text is about") and Theme (i.e. "what a clause as a message is about"): the former represents a non-structural category developed throughout texts by situational and/or cohesive relationships of presupposition, while the latter is treated as a structural category that is iconically realized by the first *experiential* constituent of the clause (viz. a Participant, an Attribute, a Circumstance or a Process). I have also defended Halliday's different, though equivalent, glosses of the latter category as the "point of departure" and the "concern" of the clause as a message. These have been taken to refer to two different aspects of Theme, i.e. the psycholinguistic-syntactic and its feature of relational aboutness, respectively. However, I have argued that only by interpreting "aboutness" in

a relational sense can the two glosses be applied to the same category. The claim has been made that Halliday uses "aboutness" relationally, so to speak, to gloss the function of Theme at clause rank in relation to other categories at the same level of description in the linguistic system, from above it and from below it. From above, "what a clause is about" has been said to express the speaker's angle on the clause as a message, its scope, or framework setting potential, extending over the ensuing discourse span (one clause or more). At the same level, clauses have been considered to be about their Themes with respect to their Rhemes and these, at the same time, to be rhematic in relation to their Themes. The thematic patterns derived therefrom acquire their *valeur* from the grammatical and discourse co(n)text(s) in which they occur. Thus, I suggest the label *Topical Theme* be interpreted in a *relational* sense, that is, with respect to other possible initial transitivity and/or textual and/or interpersonal elements staging the grammatical structure of clauses as messages against the background of a context. Finally, from below, it has been suggested that the information structure of messages typically marks their thematic (and rhematic) configuration. By contrast, I have contended that Huddleston and Downing endorse two different versions of a referential interpretation of topical "aboutness": the interactive and the contextual interpretation, respectively. Thus, Huddleston renders this notion as an intuitive-referential notion that is not grammatically coded in English, but must be inferred from discourse, whereas Downing identifies it with Subject and Object participants.

Therefore, I conclude that Huddleston's and Downing's Topic, coding two different kinds of referential "aboutness," can be reconciled with Halliday's Theme, a framework-setting device denoting relational "aboutness." My hypothesis admitted that these categories invoke different notions that may, but need not, coalesce in discourse, as illustrated in (11) and (12) below (re-analyses of [2] and [3] above, respectively; emphasis added):

(11) (i) *She broke it*
Topic: *she*, *it*, *she broke it* (context dependent); Theme: *she*

(12) (i) *What about the battery?*
(ii) *It was OK*
(iii) *There was nothing wrong with it*
(iv) *I had to replace it*
Topic: *the battery*; Theme: *what about*, *it*, *there*, respectively.

The possible benefits of a relational interpretation of "aboutness" notwithstanding, I have detected five problems in relation to Halliday's account of (Topical) Theme, namely:

(1) Two aspects related to terminology:
    (a) whether or not "the first *ideational* element" accurately defines / identifies Theme;
    (b) whether or not the label *Textual Theme* is a misnomer.
(2) The accuracy of initial position as criterial for thematic status.
(3) The type of structure imposed by thematic patterns.
(4) The co(n)text-(in)dependence of thematic choices.
(5) The separating nature of the approach as a whole.

Space constraints preclude further discussion of these five issues here. Yet I hope that this paper contrasting the "aboutness" feature of Halliday's Topical Theme with Huddleston's and Downing's Topic may contribute to the forging of some sort of consensus about the nature of these notions and about the relationships they may impose on discourse.a

NOTES

1. This is a revised edition of a paper presented at the 20th International Systemic-Functional Congress, July 19-23, 1993, Vancouver, Canada. The research for this paper was conducted in the framework of research project PB90-0370 (Spanish Ministry of Education and Science). I wish to thank M. A. K. Halliday, Peter Fries, Chris Butler, Teresa Fanego, Margaret Berry and Peter Collins for their suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Bari Samitta (Nottingham) for correcting my English.

2. Compare for instance Bazell 1973: 201; Firbas 1974: 25, 212; Gundel 1974: 47, 87; Dahl 1976: 48; Creiden 1978: 200; Kuno 1975: 326, Footnote 1; Allerton 1978: 166; Fronek 1983: 312; Taglicht 1984: 14; Davison and Lutz 1985: 33; Hudson 1986: 797, 798; Siewierska 1991: 149 note 3.

3. Huddleston favours the first label. He justifies this identification arguing that Halliday (Halliday 1985: 54) himself admits that Topical Theme "corresponds fairly well to the element identified as 'topic' in topic-comment analysis."

4. Chafe (1976: 50) was the first one to use the label (*spatial*, *temporal*, or *individual*) *framework* as limiting "the applicability of the main predication to a certain restricted domain." But he ascribed this function to Topic, rather than Theme. Lowe (1987: 6) and Downing (1991: 128) adopt Chafe's different types of framework, but they associate these with Theme and expand their scope of applicability over the *ensuing discourse span*, i.e. any unit, usually larger than the sentence, contributing to the topic continuity or discontinuity of texts.

5. Exceptions to this would be: (1) negative Adjuncts (e.g., *never, not often, not a soul*, etc.); (2) directional Adjuncts (e.g. *Off they go*, Downing and Locke 1992: 228 [my emphasis]); (3) *so, neither* and *nor* introducing elliptical clauses (e.g. *Ed passed the exam and so did Mary*, ibid. 229; my emphasis]); (4) *such* and *so* acting as Modifiers of Objects, Complements or Adjuncts (e.g *So depressed did he feel that nothing would cheer him up*, id.; [my emphasis]); and (5) subordinate clauses of condition and concession (e.g *Had I know the facts, I would not have employed him*, id.; [my emphasis]). These Themes are regarded as Attributes of basic clause level Topics, rather than basic level Topics, because, despite triggering inversion of Subject and Finite or Predicator, they are not participants.

6. Huddleston (1991: 106) δcannot make any sense of the ideaδ that the underlined sequences in *and perhaps he's right* or *well but then Ann, surely, wouldn't the best idea be to join the group* behave as a single Theme indicating what these messages are about [my emphasis])

7. In SFG texts are defined "semantically," as any passage of coherent and cohesive discourse (see Halliday and Hasan 1976: 23). By contrast, clauses are considered as structural units because they can be described in terms of functionally different *horizontal* (i.e. word order) and *vertical* (i.e. whole-part/part-whole) dependency relations.

8. This holds despite such observations as Matthiessen and Martin's (1991: 42, 49) that, as a notion derived from circumstances of matter in transitivity, "aboutness" proves difficult to apply to interpersonal meaning and gives only partial and ideationally biased accounts of the textual metafunction, as opposed to the more global implications of Halliday's notion of Theme =point of departure)

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a

NIVEL NARRATIVO, STATUS, PERSONA Y TIPOLOGÍA DE LAS NARRACIONES

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La noción de nivel narrativo deriva lógicamente de la noción más básica de nivel discursivo.[1] La definición básica se remonta a Platón y su clasificación de los modos enunciativos (enunciación simple, imitativa y mixta) en la *República*. El criterio básico es la distinción entre enunciación simple y ajena, ya presentada en forma de discurso de directo o como enunciación ajena insertada en la propia enunciación. En el caso de que la enunciación ajena insertada sea una narración, diremos que se ha creado un nuevo nivel narrativo.

Genette define así la noción de nivel narrativo (*niveau narratif* o *niveau diégétique*): "tout événement raconté par un récit est à un niveau diégétique immédiatement supérieur à celui où se situe l'acte narratif producteur de ce récit" (1972: 238). El narrador ocupa el nivel *extradiegético* con respecto a su narración; el personaje ocupa el nivel *diegético* (o *intradiegético*). Una narración dentro de la narración principal será una narración *intradiegética* o un *relato intradiegético* (*méta-récit*, *hypo-récit*). El personaje protagonista de una narración intradiegética ocupa el nivel *intradiegético en segundo grado*.[2] El narrador de este relato ocupa, como hemos dicho, una posición

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extradiegética respecto del propio relato, pero su posición respecto del relato principal es *intradiegética.* Téngase en cuenta que estamos hablando del narrador sólo en tanto que narrador. En la narración homodiegética el yo-personaje es, por supuesto, intradiegético; pero el yo-narrador es siempre extradiegético con relación a su narración: "[l]a narration et la réception du récit premier ayant lieu hors de la diégèse, le *narrateur* et le *narrataire* appartiennent au niveau narratif extradiégétique" (Lintvelt 1981: 210). Al margen de su posición en tanto que personaje, hablaremos del nivel del narrador en dos sentidos: a) con respecto a su propia narración; b) con respecto a la narración principal.[3] Así, pues, al hablar de narradores intradiegéticos presuponemos un nivel exterior que engloba al relato de esos narradores; siempre habrá un narrador extradiegético.

Tomando una dirección virtual inversa, y adentrándonos en el relato, no encontramos límite alguno: siempre podemos insertar un nivel intradiegético en tercer grado, en cuarto grado, etc. Esto no es en absoluto un fenómeno exclusivo de la novela moderna, pues los ejemplos más extremos de múltiples inserciones provienen frecuentemente de un género tan rancio como la novela-marco.[4] En pura lógica, los niveles discursivos intradiegéticos son multiplicables hasta el infinito.[5] Esta multiplicación jerárquica no afecta grandemente al relato que sirve de marco, a no ser que la multiplicación de niveles desborde la memoria del lector y produzca incoherencias y cruces entre ellos: si se prolonga demasiado una narración intradiegética, el lector tiende a olvidar la existencia del nivel extradiegético que la introdujo. En palabras de Pratt, "the limits on embedding are pragmatic rather than logical" (1977: 211). Lo mismo sucede, en general, con cualquier complicación de la estructura narrativa.

La multiplicación recursiva del nivel del narrador no debe confundirse con la distinción jerárquica entre niveles narratológicos, la que separa la acción o *fabula* del relato y del discurso (véase el diagrama y definición de estos niveles de análisis en Onega y García Landa 1996, Introd.). Como observa Lanser (1981: 137) cada uno de los niveles de comunicación y organización del texto narrativo es potencialmente multiplicable: puede haber varios autores (reales y textuales), una multiplicidad de narradores, y de focalizadores. Pero añadiríamos que algunos de estos niveles, como el autor textual o el narrador extradiegético sólo se pueden multiplicar "horizontalmente"—por adición, y no por inserción. No hay problema en multiplicar los relatos intradiegéticos: aunque no tienen "la misma *jerarquía* lógica", observa Martínez Bonati, "[t]ales narraciones tienen todas la misma

naturaleza lógica" (1972: 64). El narrador extradiegético o el autor textual tienen, en cambio, una naturaleza lógica distinta uno de otro. Es decir, puede haber una obra con varios autores textuales o varios narradores extradiegéticos *en distintas secciones de la obra* ("horizontalmente", por así decir) pero por definición no puede haber un narrador extradiegético cuya narración introduzca enunciativamente ("verticalmente") a otro narrador extradiegético.[6] En algunos casos, donde se multiplica el acto de escritura o narración, sí aparece una jerarquía de autores textuales o narradores extradiegéticos, pero téngase en cuenta que son autores o narradores *de otra obra,* no de la que engloba todas esas figuras y relatos, y que por tanto están actuando en realidad como narradores secundarios, en un papel subordinado a la totalidad ideológica de la obra.

Algunas teorías (cf. por ejemplo Lanser 1981: 137) establecen una diferenciación entre *public narrator* y *private narrator:* el primero, aun pudiendo ser totalmente ficticio, se dirige al público en general (por ejemplo, Robinson Crusoe); la narración del segundo va dirigida hacia otro personaje ficticio, más bien que hacia un equivalente textual del público (es el caso de *L'Immoraliste*). Para nosotros no se trata de niveles diferentes, como parece indicar el cuadro de Lanser (1981: 144). En cada texto suele haber un narrador (público o privado) sin que sea necesario distinguirlos como dos niveles coexistentes, y aún menos jerarquizados; a no ser, claro, que en el caso de textos con un *private narrator* consideremos necesario postular algún editor virtual que haya transformado el documento privado en una obra literaria. En cualquier caso, se trata para nosotros de un artificio más de motivación del texto narrativo.[7] Aún se podrían establecer ulteriores diferencias: por ejemplo, ¿es como obra literaria como se nos presenta la narración del narrador público, o cambia su sentido, a pesar de tener un destinatario colectivo?

Hay que prestar especial atención para no confundir la distinción de nivel (intradiegético/extradiegético) con un problema de persona narrativa: el sujeto que figura como narrador extradiegético puede estar presente también como personaje en la acción, puede ser tanto un narrador homodiegético como heterodiegético.[8] También es crucial no confundir los niveles narrativos con los niveles de ficcionalidad, pues una diferencia de nivel narrativo no es condición necesaria ni suficente para establecer una diferencia de nivel de ficcionalidad, y viceversa. La ficcionalidad o no ficcionalidad es una cuestión de *status narrativo* y no de persona o nivel. En este sentido, podríamos distinguir los relatos intradiegéticos homodiegéticos

de los relatos intradiegéticos heterodiegéticos en mayor o menor grado, o ficticios en un segundo grado (cf. Lozano, Peña-Marín y Abril 1982: 141). Como observa Lanser (1981: 137), convendría ampliar la noción de nivel, no restringiéndola a la inserción narrativa, para dar cabida a fenómenos como los editores ficticios, etc., que se constituirían en un primer nivel más básico que el del narrador. En el caso de los editores no se trata de una enunciación ficticia, sino de una transmisión o publicación ficticia de un escrito, aunque puede haber elementos de enunciación entremezclados en mayor o menor grado. La edición es un fenómeno si no enunciativo al menos comunicativo. El escalonamiento de los niveles enunciativos / comunicativos (y no exclusivamente narrativos) iría así desde el autor hacia los narradores intradiegéticos, pasando por el autor textual, los posibles editores ficticios, y el narrador extradiegético. Téngase en cuenta, sin embargo, que en el caso de los editores se utiliza un criterio distinto de la mera inserción enunciativa. La labor de un "editor" no necesariamente cambia el status ni el nivel de un narrador. Así, por ejemplo, Robinson Crusoe se dirige al público directamente como autor a pesar de la leve mediación de un editor ficticio, que presenta su narración como unas auténticas memorias y defiende su valor edificante.

Por otra parte, no toda inserción relevante en un texto narrativo tiene por qué ser una inserción narrativa. Es decir: podemos considerar útil una distinción de diferentes niveles dentro de un texto según criterios ajenos a la inserción discursiva. Se trataría de inserciones semióticas o psicológicas. Fenómenos de inserción semiótica comparables, pero de carácter no lingüístico, se han descrito en relación con otras artes narrativas, como el cine o la pintura (cf. Bal 1981: 203 ss; Cervellini 1984: 52). Estos fenómenos también afectan a la estructura del discurso.

Entendemos que hay una inserción semiótica cuando en el texto narrativo se menciona un objeto semiótico que codifica un mundo posible (real o ficticio) que puede coincidir o no con el mundo codificado por el texto narrativo que le sirve de base (es decir: tampoco hay que confundir estas diferencias de nivel semiológico con diferencias ontológicas entre mundos posibles, al margen de las presupuestas por el proceso mismo de codificación semiótica). Los niveles de representación psíquica provienen del contraste entre el nivel narrativo de base y las representaciones intencionales en el pensamiento y actividad psíquica de los personajes. En este sentido, los cambios de nivel narrativo distinguidos por Genette y a los cuales nos hemos referido en primer lugar no son sino un tipo particular de estos cambios de nivel

semiótico. Los cambios de nivel de focalización de Bal serían otro tipo.[9] Los pensamientos, los sueños de los personajes pueden dar lugar a otros tantos mundos posibles que dejan huellas relevantes en la coherencia del texto. Van Dijk habla del "predicado 'creador de mundos' *pensar* " (1980: 160) y observa que "verbs like *to say*, *to present*, *to think*, *to dream*, *to hope*, *to predict*, etc. may have embedded textoids in which temporal indication and semantic structure are incompatible with related textoids not dominated by those verbs" (1972: 304). La ruptura de cualquiera de estos tipos de nivel semiótico origina una figura narrativa cuya naturaleza habrá que especificar.

LOS RELATOS INTRADIEGÉTICOS

El relato intradiegético, o metadiegético según la terminología de Genette, es una variante particular de la narración de palabras, en general del discurso directo. No es un fenómeno único en su género, sino un caso particular de la inserción que puede efectuarse de cualquier tipo de discurso, incluidos otros géneros literarios o documentos escritos (poemas, cartas, noticias, estadísticas, etc; cf. Volek 1985: 118).

El relato intradiegético puede ser ficticio o no ficticio con respecto al lector por una parte y con respecto al mundo de la acción principal por otra. Es decir, puede referirse al mismo mundo de la acción principal y ser factual con respecto a ese mundo (aun siendo ficticio para nosotros) o puede hallarse un (segundo) grado de ficción más allá. Si es ficticio, y uno de los personajes es su autor, asistimos a un desdoblamiento de la estructura pragmática de la narración. Una estructura subordinada se añade a la del relato principal. Así, en *The Golden Notebook* Anna Wulf es la autora (y narradora heterodiegética) de la historia de Ella en "The Yellow Notebook". En *Malone meurt* Malone es el autor de la historia de Macmann, y ve peligrar su posición de narrador heterodiegético a medida que el personaje se le va pareciendo más y más. Si ninguno de los personajes es el autor del nuevo relato podemos tener un caso como el de la novela de "El curioso impertinente" en el *Quijote*, en este caso con la complicación adicional de que Cervantes se nos presenta como el autor del relato que contiene la historia marco y del relato intradiegético ficticio. En general, serán aplicables a los relatos intradiegéticos las mismas categorías de análisis que al relato principal, aunque la finalidad narrativa a la que están dirigidos hará que algunas de estas categorías sean muy poco productivas en este segundo nivel.

Perteneciendo al mismo mundo ficticio, la acción del relato intradiegético puede pertenecer o no a la acción del relato principal. Puede ser una anécdota contada como real pero con personajes distintos a los de la acción principal. Es lo que sucede en la narración de Cardenio en el *Quijote,* o con las narraciones del *Heptaméron.* Puede también referirse a la misma acción y ser el equivalente de la narración del mensajero en la tragedia griega: así, por ejemplo, el relato del posadero hacia el final de *Jane Eyre*. O puede tener un carácter retrospectivo, rememorativo, como la narración de Nelly Dean en *Wuthering Heights.*[10] La importancia y el papel de los relatos intradiegéticos en relación al conjunto del discurso puede ser muy variable. En *Malone meurt* se utilizan como un artificio reflexivo sobre la propia creación, y el proceso de su escritura es parte del argumento. Pero pensemos en el variado papel que juegan en obras como el *Decamerón*, *El Conde Lucanor* o *The Canterbury Tales* por un lado, o *The Woman in White*, *Bleak House*, *Ulysses*, *The Golden Notebook*... los ejemplos son tan numerosos como relatos hay en el mundo. Aquí podemos hacer poco más que mencionar esa variedad, algunos de cuyos aspectos narratológicos pueden definirse mediante la utilización conjunta de las categorías que estamos aislando.

Genette[11] propone un mínimo esquema para clasificar los principales tipos de funciones del relato intradiegético:

• El primer tipo requiere un nexo causal entre el relato y el relato intradiegético (es decir, que ambos pertenezcan a la misma acción). La función del relato intradiegético será *explicativa*.. Para ello es preciso que el relato intradiegético sea *homodiegético,* es decir, que haya personajes comunes y acciones conectadas entre ambos.

• En el caso de una prolepsis intradiegética, la función es *predictiva*. Por ejemplo, es el caso del segundo mensaje que Youdi dirige a Moran en *Molloy*.

• La relación entre relato intradiegético y relato principal puede también ser *temática*. No hay relaciones de causalidad entre las acciones, sólo de contraste o analogía. Los casos más espectaculares y representativos de paralelismo serían las distintas variedades de reduplicación interna o "texto espejo" (Bal 1985: 151): ya no es sólo el acto narrativo el que se duplica, sino otros elementos temáticos o estructurales: el desenlace, el conflicto central... La reduplicación puede variar entre la mera analogía o relación figurativa hasta la inserción paradójica del relato en sí mismo.[12] "Toda parte de la obra de arte puede ser considerada como isomorfa en la obra entera" (Ming 1979: 142)—

tal es el principio simbolista en el que se basa la reduplicación interna en la narrativa experimental moderna.

• La relación temática puede no cumplir una función puramente estética, sino *persuasiva* ; pensemos en *El Conde Lucanor*.

• En otros casos, las acciones no mantienen relaciones de ningún tipo: es el *acto de narración* del relato intradiegético lo que es significativo, cumpliendo una función obstructiva en la historia. El ejemplo de Genette es *Las Mil y Una Noches*. La función también puede ser *distractiva*, como en el *Decamerón* (estas dos últimas funciones ya son distinguidas por Shklovski 1965: 189). Y, por supuesto, el valor obstructivo o distractivo de la narración puede simultanearse con otros valores: para Malone (en *Malone meurt*) su narración es un juego, una distracción, pero a la vez es una analogía temática de su propia situación, y quizá una retrospección a su vida pasada.

RUPTURAS DE MARCO

La transición de un nivel narrativo a otro está mediada por un acto narrativo que delimita la frontera de cada relato. Es bien conocido el efecto sorpresivo que causa la interferencia entre niveles narrativos, cuando, por ejemplo, personajes de un relato secundario independiente se mezclan repentinamente con personajes del nivel principal. Estas interferencias resultan fantásticas o humorísticas: son, en sus casos más extremos, lógicamente transgresivas.[13] Genette denomina *metalepsis* (*métalepse*) a la transición ilegítima de un nivel narrativo a otro. Este no es el significado tradicional que tiene el término en retórica, y deriva de una definición poco sistemática de Fontanier. Para Fontanier, la metalepsis consistiría en "substituer l'expression indirecte à l'expression directe, c'est-à-dire, . . . faire entendre une chose par une autre, qui la précède, la suit ou l'accompagne, en est un adjoint, une circonstance quelconque, ou enfin s'y rattache ou s'y rapporte de manière à la rappeler aussitôt à l'esprit" (Fontanier 1977: 127-28). Fontanier incluye como una variante, de manera a nuestro parecer totalemente arbitraria, el tipo de ruptura de marco narrativo discutido por Genette. Arguye Fontanier que "On peut rapporter à la métalepse le tour par lequel un poëte, un écrivain, est représenté ou se représente comme produisant lui-même ce qu'il ne fait, au fond, que raconter ou décrire" (1977: 128); y añade como otra variante más la del poeta dirigiéndose directamente al objeto poético para darle órdenes y así describirlo. Se ve que la definición de este tropo se va alejando

absurdamente de sus definiciones clásicas, centradas en la indirección[14]—hay un elemento de indirección en todas las variantes del término. Aunque está claro que no debemos esperar una definición unívoca de la retórica clásica, Fontanier parece ser la única fuente de las supuestas metalepsis "transgresivas" de Genette. Y en los ejemplos relativos a la acción/verbalización del poeta asimilados por Fontanier a la metalepsis no es la indirección la causa del efecto sorpresivo o chocante. Este viene dado por un elemento ajeno a la definición que da Fontanier: la transgresión de las fronteras entre los niveles narrativos u ontológicos. Conviene, pues, evitar extender el nombre de metalepsis al tipo de figura narrativa que estamos discutiendo. En lo que sigue hablaremos de "rupturas de marco", lo que también nos permitirá ampliar la definición demasiado limitada de Genette para incluir rupturas de marcos no sólo narrativos o enunciativos, sino más generalmente semióticos.

Como señala Genette, la ruptura de marco narrativo ("métalepse" entre comillas) es una figura corriente en sus versiones más moderadas; así algunas rupturas de marcos temporales "jouent sur la double temporalité de l'histoire et de la narration . . . comme si la narration était contemporaine de l'histoire et devait meubler ses temps morts" (1972: 244). Otras veces la ruptura de marco proporciona la situación central de la *acción,* como en algunas obras de Pirandello (Genette 1972: 245). Y también existen relatos que hacen de ella un uso sistemático, tanto narrativo como temático (por ejemplo, *Tristram Shandy* de Sterne, *Jacques le Fataliste*, de Diderot, o *Fragmentos de Apocalipsis*, de Torrente Ballester). La ruptura de marco puede ser también sólo aparente: así, un personaje intradiegético puede aparecer luego como por causalidad en el relato marco sin que haya inconsistencia lógica real, sino sólo más o menos aparente, según el status ficticio o no que se otorgue al relato inserto.

Esto nos lleva al problema de los tipos de marco y de fronteras entre ellos. Genette limita indebidamente la ruptura de marco-"métalepse" a la transgresión de nivel narrativo. Ya hemos señalado que hay varios posibles tipos de relato intradiegético. En cada uno de ellos la ruptura de marco narrativo tiene implicaciones distintas. La diferencia entre relatos intradiegéticos homodiegéticos y heterodiegéticos establecida por Genette (1982: 202) no recubre la diferencia de status ontológico: puede no haber interferencia ni conexión entre la acción de dos relatos (en el mismo nivel narrativo o en niveles distintos) sin que por ello uno sea ficticio con respecto al otro. Así pues, hay que cuidar de distinguir el nivel narrativo (*statut narratif* en

Genette) del status ontológico; como hemos dicho antes, aquí reservaremos el nombre de *status* para la diferencia entre ficción y realidad.[15]

De hecho, podemos distinguir un tipo de ruptura de marco que no tiene que ver con la ruptura de niveles narrativos, y sí con la transgresión de la frontera entre mundos reales y posibles: un ejemplo lo vemos en el cuento de Yourcenar "Comment Wang-Fô fut sauvé", en el que un pintor escapa a la muerte huyendo a través de uno de sus cuadros. El mismo tema aparece atenuado o amagado en la autobiografía de Nabokov *Speak, Memory,* donde el autor sólo imagina que entra en un cuadro. No hay en estos ejemplos ruptura de nivel narrativo, pero sí una ruptura de marco ontológico/semiótico.[16] Hay una transgresión de un nivel semiológico, el nivel de los signos pictóricos nombrados, que se identifica repentinamente al mundo de referencia efectivo del texto que leemos. La transgresión de un mundo real a un mundo ficticio sería sólo un tipo de transgresión ontológica. En efecto, no puede haber mundo ficticio, ni siquiera en un segundo nivel de significación, sin una jerarquía ontológica y una base semiótica que lo sustente. Pero no toda transgresión ontológica supone un paso de la realidad a la ficción. Una fotografía representa nuestro mundo real, pero no por ello podemos introducirnos dentro de ella. Toda frontera *significada* es una frontera virtual, que puede tanto respetarse como manifestar su artificialidad. Con esta ambigüedad juega la épica clásica al introducir la écfrasis, o descripción de una representación plástica que es animada de modo ambiguo o imposible por el movimiento de la narración (por ejemplo, el escudo de Aquiles en la *Ilíada*).

En suma, parece más adecuado extender el concepto de ruptura de marco a una transgresión más general entre niveles reales y niveles significados (sea cual sea el código significante). Así serían también ejemplos de ruptura de marco el salto a través de la pantalla cinematográfica en *La rosa púrpura del Cairo* de Woody Allen o las manos de Escher que se dibujan recíprocamente. Los diversos tipos de ruptura de marco podrían clasificarse formalmente, según la naturaleza y estructuración de los códigos semiológicos transgredidos, y ontológicamente, según el status real o ficticio de los mundos así comunicados. Por supuesto, son muy frecuentes los casos en los que se presentan simultáneamente dos o más tipos de ruptura de marco: el enunciativo y el de ficcionalidad, u otro tipo de jerarquía semiótica. Es lo que sucede cuando en el monólogo final de *Ulysses* Molly Bloom exclama *"Jamesy"* en lugar de "*God"*. "Jamesy" es el autor textual, en el cual se juntan papeles narrativos y creativos.

PERSONA

Puede establecerse una analogía entre la persona narrativa y la categoría gramatical de la persona verbal. A nivel gramatical, "la première personne signale l'identité d'un des protagonistes du procès de l'énoncé avec l'agent du procès de l'énonciation, et la seconde personne son identité avec le patient actuel ou potentiel du procès de l'énonciation" (Jakobson 1963: 182). Siguiendo un rígido criterio gramatical, se ha propuesto frecuentemente una clasificación de las narraciones en base a la persona pronominal: podríamos hablar de relatos en primera persona y relatos en tercera persona, e incluso (más raramente) de relatos en segunda persona.[17] Pero deberíamos tratar con precaución las transposiciones directas entre el sistema gramatical y la estructura dicursiva. No hay relación necesaria entre la persona gramatical y la persona narrativa (cf. Lintvelt 1981: 56, 80), como no la hay entre tiempo verbal y temporalidad narrativa. Tras la aparente sencillez de la clasificación según la persona gramatical se esconde una variedad de criterios y una ambigüedad en cuanto a algo tan decisivo como el referente de ese pronombre. Al hablar de narración en primera persona, se da por supuesto que el referente es el narrador; al hablar de narración en tercera persona, el personaje. Bajo un concepto aparentemente sencillo se esconden varios criterios de clasificación. Cada uno de ellos es básico para caracterizar una narración; sólo la confusión existente en torno al tema podría justificar que Booth (1961: 150 ss) quite importancia al criterio de la persona narrativa.

La definición más literal de relato en primera persona sería *aquel relato en el que el narrador hace uso de la primera persona para referirse a sí mismo*. En ello no se diferenciaría el narrador de cualquier otro enunciador, pues todo enunciador utiliza necesariamente la primera persona para referirse a sí mismo. Según Prince, "we can say that the narrator is a first person, the narratee a second person and the being and object narrated about a third person" (1982: 7). En este sentido no podríamos hablar de relatos en segunda persona o en tercera persona salvo en aquellos casos en los cuales, guiado por alguna extraña estrategia retórica, el narrador se refiriese a sí mismo en segunda o en tercera persona. Ni siquiera obras como *La Modification*, *Esmond*, *De bello gallico* o la *Anábasis* parecen ajustarse estrictamente a esta definición, pues es el yo *personaje* quien es el referente de la segunda persona. Podemos decir que según esta definición, todos los relatos están escritos en primera persona. Para Genette es así en el sentido de que el

narrador siempre puede aludir a sí mismo.[18] Siempre hay un hablante (o escribiente, o pensante) en el nivel del discurso.

La observación no es tan perogrullesca como parece. Véase el concepto de *récit historique* propuesto por Benveniste (1968: 239): un estilo narrativo en el que se evita (en la medida de lo posible) toda referencia a la situación enunciativa. El narrador no hace referencia a sí mismo en primera persona porque no hace referencia a sí mismo en absoluto. Este tipo de narración sería un derivado, una especie de técnica retórica de distanciamiento. Como señala Greimas,

> podemos decir que la estructura económica de la enunciación en la medida en que se puede identificar con la comunicación de un objeto enunciado entre un remitente y un destinatario es lógicamente anterior y jerárquicamente superior a la estructura del enunciado simple. De esto se deduce que los enunciados lingüísticos del tipo "yo-tú" dan la impresión de estar más cerca del sujeto no lingüístico de la enunciación y producen una "ilusión de realidad" más intensa. (1976: 28-29)

La definición de "relato en primera persona" coincide, por tanto, con la "enunciación discursiva" descrita por Benveniste. El narrador que utiliza la primera persona reconoce en cierto modo que está haciendo una narración, establece un "contacto declarado" con el narratario. Por ello, es útil determinar un eje de posibles actitudes del narrador a este respecto, que van desde la continua referencia a su persona hasta su desaparición total como referente pronominal. Es lo que Lanser (1981: 174) denomina el *axis of directness* en su tipología de voces y perspectivas narrativas; Booth ya había distinguido (con bastante más ambigüedad) los *narradores dramatizados* de los *no dramatizados* (*dramatized* / *undramatized narrators;* 1961: 151 ss).

Pero si en cierto sentido todo relato está "en primera persona", también es cierto que puede formar parte de la estrategia del hablante no aludir a sí mismo; no sólo se ha de juzgar al narrador por lo que *puede hacer*, sino también y ante todo por lo que *hace efectivamente*. Cuando el James de *The Ambassadors* se descuida y deja escapar un "I", la intrusión es mucho más violenta que cualquiera imaginada por Trollope. Por supuesto, no es el uso de la primera persona del singular el único rasgo que hace más vívida la presencia del narrador: los pronombres de primera persona del plural, los pronombres de segunda persona, las referencias explícitas a su personalidad, el conocimiento que manifieste de acontecimientos distintos de la *acción*

narrada… todo contribuye a personalizar o despersonalizar su imagen (cf. Prince 1982: 9).

La definición de "relato en primera persona" que hemos presentado, como sinónimo de la *énonciation discoursive* de Benveniste no responde, sin embargo, al uso que se ha hecho de este término y de su correlato "relato en tercera persona". Genette señala la vaguedad ambos términos, y el sentido real que se pretende darles:

> Le choix du romancier n'est pas entre deux formes grammaticales, mais entre deux attitudes narratives (dont les formes grammaticales ne sont qu'une conséquence mécanique): faire raconter l'histoire par l'un de ses "personnages" ou par un narrateur étranger à cette histoire. (1972: 252)

La primera persona gramatical es en sí ambigua: puede referirse al narrador en tanto que narrador, lo cual no implicaría su presencia *dentro* de la *acción,* o puede señalar una identidad narrador-personaje, una narración hecha por uno de los actores de la acción. Esta es la "primera persona" en el sentido corriente,[19] sentido que se veía complicado por la existencia de narradores como el Fielding de *Tom Jones*, narradores "en tercera persona", ausentes de la *acción*, y que sin embargo aluden constantemente a sí mismos usando el "yo". Como bien ve Genette, la distinción clásica entre relatos en primera persona y relatos en tercera persona debe definirse no en relación a la persona gramatical más frecuente, sino atendiendo a la identidad o no identidad del narrador con uno de los personajes de la acción :

> On distinguera donc ici deux types de récits : l'un à narrateur absent de l'histoire qu'il raconte . . ., l'autre à narrateur présent comme personnage dans l'histoire qu'il raconte . . .. Je nomme le premier type, pour des raisons évidentes, *hétérodiégétique,* et le second *homodiégétique* (1972: 252).

Stanzel (1984: 90 ss) observa que sólo el grado de presencia física, corporal, del narrador en el mundo de la *acción,* determina la persona narrativa. En la ausencia de acciones o referencias explícitas del narrador en este sentido, su situación respecto de la acción puede ser averiguada a partir del uso de los deícticos. Pero no olvidemos que éstos pueden obedecer a centros de orientación puramente conceptuales con una libertad que a veces se infravalora.[20]

Observemos que existe cierta diferencia de criterio entre la simple *presencia o no presencia* del narrador en el mismo plano de los personajes y su *actuación* en la acción. A estas distinciones de persona parece referirse Booth cuando opone los "observadores" a los "agentes narradores" (1961: 154-155), aunque deberemos tener en cuenta su enormemente inclusivo concepto de "narrador", que incluye a los personajes focalizadores. Como observa Booth, la intervención en la acción del agente narrador puede ser más o menos decisiva. Diremos con Genette (1972: 253) que un narrador homodiegético es *autodiegético* si es el protagonista de la *acción* en la cual aparece; "Qu'il y figure seul, ce serait la forme absolue de l'autodiégétique" (1983: 93). Es ésta la situación narrativa que Beckett ensaya en *L'Innommable,* llevando a la paradoja de que así proliferan las pseudo-identidades provisionales para el narrador. En modalidades más habituales, el narrador homodiegético puede ser un personaje importante, como en *Heart of Darkness*, un personaje secundario, como en *The Great Gatsby* o un simple observador, como en *La de Bringas.* Cada uno de estos situaciones motivará (o bien pondrá en evidencia la artificiosidad de) distintas perspectivas narrativas.[21] De todos modos, la frontera entre la narración homodiegética y la heterodiegética no es tajante, sino borrosa (cf. Genette1983: 55). Es útil la propuesta de Lanser (1981: 159) de ver en la narración heterodiegética y en la autodiegética dos polos extremos con muchas gradaciones posibles entre ellos.

La situación enunciativa de un narrador puede así determinarse en relación a muchos criterios, de los que resaltamos tres que se suelen prestar a confusión: el del *status* ficticio o no ficticio de la narración respecto del narrador, el de la *persona narrativa* (en el sentido de posición del narrador con respecto a la acción), que define narradores homodiegéticos (autodiegéticos o testigos) y heterodiegéticos (Genette 1972: 255 ss), y el del *nivel narrativo,* que definirá a los narradores extradiegéticos, intradiegéticos, intra-intradiegéticos, etc. Hay que recalcar que ninguno de estos criterios es la clave para todas las diferencias de voz: por ejemplo, un narrador ficticio homodiegético puede encontrarse en el mismo nivel narrativo que un narrador heterodiegético no ficticio (cf. Bal, *Narratologie* 31). Por último, recordemos que estos criterios no tienen por finalidad atender a la coincidencia o no coincidencia entre narrador y autor textual (un problema de estructuración ideológica) ni status ficticio del narrador respecto del autor (pues nos hemos referido al status de la narración respecto del narrador). Así, los narradores de la *Autobiography* de Trollope y de *Great Expectations* de

Dickens son muy distintos en su caracterización estructural global, pero ambos son narradores factuales (no fabuladores), autodiegéticos y extradiegéticos.[22]

La situación de un narrador no siempre es claramente determinable: pueden darse variaciones a lo largo de un relato como la que se da en *Madame Bovary*, donde el narrador comienza siendo extradiegético y homodiegético, para convertirse seguidamente en extradiegético y heterodiegético[23]; también puede darse una ambigüedad generalizada. Normalmente, la narración homodiegética se utiliza de modo realista, respetando su motivación autobiográfica, epistolar, etc.; es decir, se mantiene dentro de los límites de la credibilidad o al menos no los rompe abiertamente.[24] Este tipo de narración está más condicionado de entrada que la narración heterodiegética:

> la narration homodiégétique, par nature ou convention (en l'occurrence c'est tout un), simule l'autobiographie bien plus étroitement que la narration hétérodiégétique ne simule ordinairement le récit historique. En fiction, le narrateur hétérodiégétique n'est pas comptable de son information, l'omniscience fait partie de son contrat. (Genette 1983: 52)

La elección de persona narrativa no es, por tanto, indiferente al contenido de la narración. Se dan casos de escritores que han comenzado a escribir un relato en primera persona para después pasar a la tercera, o al revés. Si Kafka reescribió en tercera persona su manuscrito de *Das Schloss,* Rushdie reescribió en primera persona el borrador en tercera persona de *Midnight's Children.* Estas revisiones suelen entrañar una profunda transformación del contenido narrativo.[25] Pero el discurso narrativo es infinitamente manipulable, y puede perfectamente darse una transposición directa entre personas narrativas; incluso se puede dar lugar así a efectos modales inusitados. Son así concebibles modos narrativos poco "naturales" (y altamente artísticos): por ejemplo, un relato en el que sólo se nos presenten focalizados perceptibles ("visión desde afuera") y que sin embargo sea narrado en primera persona; es el caso de *L'Étranger.* [26] Podemos también tener varios tipos de interferencias o incoherencias entre la omnisciencia autorial y la perspectiva limitada del narrador homodiegético.[27] La literatura no se ha cansado de explorar el terreno que media entre la primera y la tercera persona, mostrando que su extensión no se agota, sino que crece a medida que se penetra en él. Para Stanzel,

> the opposition between first and third person narration and the underlying opposition of the identity and non-identity of the realms of existence of the narrator and the fictional characters is still an area of immediate interest for contemporary authors.[28]

Beckett no es el menos llamativo de estos autores: otros son Grass, Frisch, Brooke-Rose, Torrente Ballester, etc. En *Midnight's Children*, en concreto, es crucial la movilidad del narrador entre posturas homodiegéticas y otras que en principio se asocian a la narración "omnisciente" heterodiegética: ambos modos quedan así problematizados; sus límites respectivos se usan y abusan productivamente. La literatura fantástica, en general, abre nuevas posibilidades para la narración homodiegética que con frecuencia no son previstas en las tipologías (cf. por ejemplo las limitaciones impuestas por Lintvelt [1981: 79 ss]—la mayoría de ellas sólo tienen justificación en la literatura realista). Por ejemplo, nada impide que los narradores de *Malone meurt* o *Pincher Martin* nos narren su propia muerte; H. G. Wells llega a "matar" a su lector implícito en *The Man Who Worked Miracles* (Bronzwaer, "Implied Author" 8). Todo tipo de combinación entre voz y perspectiva es posible en principio (Genette 1983: 85 ss), aunque siempre habrá que distinguir entre lo común y lo excepcional: si todo es posible, no todo es probable, especialmente en la narración conversacional o en el realismo tradicional. La necesidad de esta distinción es especialmente evidente en el estudio diacrónico de la evolución de las técnicas narrativas (1983: 89). Este es quizá el mejor argumento para el estudio tipológico tradicional de las "situaciones narrativas", en el que se combinan voz y perspectiva, un enfoque sintético (1983: 78), frente al analítico que hemos venido exponiendo.[29] En la segunda mitad de este trabajo, adoptaremos una perspectiva tipológica / sintética sobre algunas de las situaciones narrativas más características.

EL NARRADOR AUTODIEGÉTICO

En la narración homodiegética, la distancia entre narrador y personaje no desaparece, si bien su sentido se modifica al ser los dos fases distintas de una identidad. Narrador y personaje son un mismo yo, dividido en dos roles: el yo actuante y el yo narrador, lo que Spitzer llamaba *erlebendes Ich* y *erzählendes Ich*.[30]

Según Stanzel, en cada una de las situaciones narrativas básicas que él distingue (1ª persona, autorial, actorial) domina una determinada categoría de mediación: la voz, la perspectiva y el modo, respectivamente (1984: 5). A nuestro parecer "dominar" es vago: lo que sí parece darse es una *motivación* de una categoría distinta en cada situación: en una novela en primera persona se motiva el acto narrativo (y con él, la perspectiva); en una narración hetero-diegética focalizada actorialmente, solamente se proporciona motivación a la perspectiva. La motivación de la perspectiva no es, por supuesto, la misma en la narracion homodiegética y la heterodiegética. La focalización está en el primer caso ligada a un personaje y un cuerpo físico; esto impone sobre la focalización constricciones que no pueden ignorarse a la ligera (cf. Stanzel 1984: 93).

La narración homodiegética, y en particular la autodiegética, presenta otras peculiaridades. En este caso el acto narrativo resulta ser el punto final ideal, el último acontecimiento de la acción narrada. Es ésta una peculiaridad que puede ignorarse o explotarse. El yo está señalado no solamente por las referencias al presente de la narración, sino por la totalidad de la narración en tanto que indicio: el estilo de la narración homodiegética tiene la peculiaridad de remitir a la acción de esta doble manera (cf. Starobinski 1971: 286). La autobiografía o libro de memorias es la forma de narración homodiegética por excelencia. Su tema es el propio yo y sus experiencias. De hecho, la narración homodiegética novelesca deriva de las memorias auténticas, tanto lógica como históricamente (cf. Watson 1979: 16 ss). Las memorias con frecuencia son publicadas póstumamente: de ahí lo que Watson llama la convención ficcional del "viejo arcón de roble" en el que un editor encuentra la narración que se nos ofrece, con la conveniente explicación en un prólogo. Por tanto, el narrador es con frecuencia un "narrador privado"; es el editor quien dirige la narración al público desde el nivel extradiegético. Esta tradición se presta a infinitas variantes, y parodias. Véanse los casos de prólogos auténticamente ambiguos y problemáticos, como el de algunas obras de Defoe,[31] doble prólogo, con doble función, en casos como *The Unfortunate Traveller*,[32] las alusiones fosilizadas a la vieja convención en algunas novelas del XIX (Watson 1979: 19), la resurrección de aquélla en el prólogo lleno de ironía y ambigüedad de *El nombre de la rosa*, etc.

El estilo de la autobiografía es especialmente revelador: "to the explicit self-reference of the narration itself the style adds the implicit self-referential value of a particular mode of speaking" (Starobinski 1971: 285). Ya hemos

mencionado la distinción de Spitzer entre *erzählendes Ich* y *erlebendes Ich*, a los que llamaremos por mayor comodidad yo narrador y yo narrado. Una separación semejante no es en absoluto original de la narración homodiegética literaria: se encuentra implícita en fenómenos lingüísticos mucho más básicos, como el uso de la primera persona gramatical (cf. Jakobson 1963) o las tomas de postura del enunciador tal como son definidas por Ducrot.[33]

En principio, el yo narrador está separado del yo personaje por una distancia temporal, la que media entre los acontecimientos que se narran y el acto narrativo. Esta distancia temporal puede conllevar una diferencia de carácter. La competencia de uno y otro yo puede ser variable. Genette observa que normalmente se hallan separados por una diferencia de edad que permite al narrador tratar con superioridad y condescendencia al inexperto personaje. Starobinski señala una constante de la autobiografía confesional: el narrador ya no es el mismo que el personaje, pero asume la responsabilidad por las acciones pasadas (1971: 290 ss). Es conocido el virtuosismo que Dickens introdujo en el tratamiento de esta diferencia entre narrador y personaje en novelas como *David Copperfield* o *Great Expectations* (Watson 19 ss). Este progreso psicológico puede asumir matices muy distintos: pensemos, por ejemplo, en las *Confessions* de Rousseau tal como las describe Starobinski: "the past . . . is at once the object of nostalgia and the object of irony; the present is at once a state of (moral) degradation and (intellectual) superiority" (1971: 293). Starobinski encuentra en la autobiografía de Rousseau una alarma ante la vaciedad deíctica del pronombre "yo", sujeto de la autobiografía, y un intento de sustancializarlo mediante la ficción.

> the autobiographical "I", the *auto-* in *autobiography*, is the exorcising substitute for the linguistic tautology that "I" is the one who says "I". It tries to exorcise the tautology, to divert it, to substantivize and deformalize it. This is a process of "de-shifterizing" the shifter. How? By filling this "I" who says "I" with an image. (1971: 295-296)

No hay frontera clara entre autobiografía y novela; el autobiógrafo no sólo recuerda su pasado, sino que lo inventa y construye.[34] Utiliza hacia sí mismo la misma comprensión imaginativa que utilizamos para acceder a la conciencia de los demás a partir de su comportamiento externo y atribuir una intencionalidad a sus acciones. Se ha señalado con frecuencia este impulso ficcionalizador de la autobiografía, esta tendencia a buscar un patrón

coherente en la propia vida, una sustancialidad en una personalidad en última instancia disgregada. El caso memorable de las *Confessions* de Rousseau estudiado por Starobinski nos recuerda también la empresa de Beckett en *The Unnamable*. Tanto uno como otro desarrollan ciertas tendencias inherentes al género autobiográfico. Starobinski señala la gama posible de objetivación de la autobiografía basándose en la teoría de la enunciación de Benveniste. Esta gama va desde el relato "histórico" descrito por Benveniste y centrado en la *acción* (forma elegida, por ejemplo, por César en *De bello gallico*) hasta el modo extremadamente "discursivo" de las autobiografías líricas o meditativas. Estas tienden a centrarse en el yo narrador y el desarrollo del *discurso*. Para Starobinski, la concentración absoluta sobre un "yo" acaba por destruir la inmediatez de la primera persona, que ha de definirse frente a una tercera:

> the exclusive affirmation of the "I" favours the interests of an apparently vanished "he." The impersonal event becomes a secret parasite on the "I" of the monologue, fading and depersonalizing it. One need only examine the writings of Samuel Beckett to discover how the constantly repeated "first person" comes to be the equivalent of a "non-person." (Starobinski 1971: 288)

La diferencia considerable entre yo narrador y yo personaje es, pues, una posibilidad estructuralmente justificada en la narración homodiegética autobiográfica. También puede, por supuesto, ignorarse, con lo que se asume una perfecta identidad psicológica entre narrador y personaje. La narración homodiegética implica inevitablemente una diferencia de conocimiento. El narrador en primera persona sabe el resultado que tendrán los actos del personaje; a mayor distancia temporal ente ambos, mayor será la perspectiva de que goce, y tanto más indiferenciada estará su narración de la de un narrador omnisciente. El uso de la focalización puede introducir nuevas modulaciones en este sentido.

Así pues, la narración homodiegética autobiográfica se presta en principio a dos tipos principales de perspectiva narrativa:

• El conocimiento a posteriori de los hechos, lo cual produce en ocasiones el fenómeno que hemos señalado, un efecto semejante a la omnisciencia[35]; hay que distinguir, sin embargo entre estos dos tipos de visión "por detrás". Una convención útil para la narración homodiegética, aunque no imprescindible, es la memoria perfecta del narrador (cf. Cohn 1978: 144).

• La visión "con" el personaje, es decir, el relato en el que el yo personaje, y no el yo narrador, es el focalizador (cf. Lintvelt 1971: 86). Esta posibilidad, bien descrita por Cohn, es descuidada por muchos teorizadores, que no distinguen las visiones del yo personaje y el yo narrador (por ejemplo Ingarden 1973: 230). Ello no quiere decir que sea rara, ni mucho menos.

En la mayoría de los casos se establecerá una tensión y un vaivén entre estas dos modalidades. Aún otra posibilidad es la ausencia de distancia entre yo narrador y yo narrado. Puede justificarse de diversas maneras, y servir a su vez de justificación a efectos distintos de la reposada meditación sobre el propio pasado. También Beckett sirve como ejemplo límite a Stanzel:

> the narrative distance, which in the quasi-autobiographical first-person novel constitutes the prerequisite for the well-balanced and judicious attitude of the narrating self to his earlier experiences, almost always decreases with the withdrawal of the narrating self.... Beckett's first-person characters vegetate towards their existential disintegration, a disintegration which can also be observed in the absence of distance between the narrating and experiencing selves. (Stanzel 1984: 211)

No hay que confundir el uso del yo narrado como focalizador con la ausencia absoluta de distancia entre el yo narrador y el yo narrado. En el primer caso, se trata de una estrategia retórica atribuible al narrador; en el segundo caso, toda la retórica es del autor.

Otra forma autodiegética relevante es el diario ficticio. La diferencia principal entre autobiografía y diario usados como motivación ficticia para la novela (al margen de la estructuración temporal) es que la autobiografía suele ir dirigida al público desconocido, mientras que en el diario el único narratario es el propio narrador. Así pues, tienen en principio menos justificación las maniobras retóricas, la creación intencionada de suspense, la exposición ordenada, etc. La ruptura de la motivación es más grotesca cuanto más dista de la novela el artificio usado para la motivación. Beckett es también aquí un buen ejemplo de usos paródicos del artificio: "why should the dying Malone decide 'to remind [him]self briefly of [his] present state before embarking on [his] stories?" (Sternberg 1978: 278).

Una forma próxima al diario es la novela epistolar de un solo autor, como las *Lettres d'une religieuse portugaise*. Ya las diferencias son notables: el narratario es otro personaje; no estamos ante un monólogo sino ante un diálogo. Si la novela epistolar comenzó utilizando las cartas de un solo per-

sonaje, pronto adquirió una forma más específica. Se transforma en un dúo (*Love Letters Between a Nobleman and his Sister*, de Aphra Behn) o combina las narraciones epistolares de varios personajes, como sucede en las novelas de Richardson o *Les Liaisons Dangereuses* (cf. Watson 1979: 30 ss). La novela epistolar es, pues, una forma espontánea de la narración múltiple. También es ésta una forma que se presta a ser "editada" e introducida por un personaje más o menos anónimo; y también aquí se fosiliza pronto esta convención, transformándose en la excusa para un juego de voces ya en Richardson o Laclos.[36]

Caben asimismo muchas otras formas de narración múltiple no epistolar: podemos tener una combinación del diario de dos personajes, colecciones de informes, combinaciones de diario, informe, carta, etc. como sucede en *The Woman in White*, o de narración "real" y narración ficticia en segundo grado, como en *Malone meurt*. Las variaciones concretas son infinitas.

EL NARRADOR TESTIGO

En esta variedad de la narración homodiegética, el protagonista no es el narrador, sino un personaje conocido por el narrador (cf. Friedman 1972: 125). Con frecuencia, este personaje ha vivido una experiencia de importancia transcendental. Su carácter excepcional, sagrado, terrorífico o simplemente indefinible hace necesario el desdoblamiento en narrador y protagonista.

Según Kawin (1982: 34), la narración testimonial es adoptada a menudo por sus posibilidades dramáticas. El lector comparte la experiencia del narrador; ambos se encuentran excluidos de la experiencia fundamental del protagonista, que puede ser de un carácter no fácilmente comunicable. El narrador testigo es un intermediario ante la experiencia de lo innombrable: la señala, sin llegar a mostrarla, utilizando como excusa la relativa inferioridad de la experiencia del narrador. Es lo que sucede en *Moby Dick* :

> Melville uses the limitations of the narrator's metaphysical insights to hint things that could be meaningless if said directly.
>
> Thus the author of a secondary first-person novel is not forced to deal directly with transcendent experience but can deal with it through the mask of a compulsive narrator who has experienced as much as can be talked about, yet who urges himself, in the aim of relating the

> hero's experience, even deeper into regions that can hardly be guessed at. (Kawin 1982: 49, 35)

En *Moby Dick* hay para Kawin toda una serie de acercamientos progresivos a lo inefable; esta experiencia es transmitida al lector a través de filtros sucesivos: el narrador Ishmael, Ahab y la misma ballena. Una estructura parecida descubre Kawin en *Heart of Darkness*, donde la experiencia de lo inefable es intuída a través de la narración de Marlow, de la aventura de Kurtz y del corazón de las tinieblas. Otros ejemplos aportados por Kawin son *Pale Fire* o las obras de Castaneda.

> It is characteristic that a secondary first-person narrator be a man of words and blame his "inability" to deal with or adequately convey the hero's experience in his own moody bookishness; it is also characteristic that this specific limitation is his chief asset. (Kawin 1982: 72)

En el corpus beckettiano que viene sirviéndonos como fuente de casos límite hay una obra, *Watt*, que presenta rasgos semejantes a los mencionados (Kawin 1982: 64 ss), si bien algo más complejos. En general, la narración testimonial se presta a una moderada reflexividad, predominando su aspecto de motivación realista. En *Watt,* la estructura narrativa duplica el tema de la obra. El narrador Sam es un intermediario entre la experiencia de Watt y el lector, como Watt es un intermediario entre la experiencia de lo inefable en la casa de Mr. Knott y la narración de Sam. Una modalidad más radical de narración testimonial aparece en *L'Innommable* (Kawin 1982: 37). Aquí el narrador proyecta yoes y va desprendiéndose de ellos, y da testimonio de su propia inestabilidad ontológica. *L'Innommable* es un caso de reflexividad extrema, que subsume o más bien desconsturye la estructura de la narración testimonial como desconstruye toda otra estructura narrativa.

EL NARRADOR-AUTOR

Es ya una especie de tradición en la teoría de la novela el confundir las atribuciones respectivas del narrador y el autor. Narrador y autor no pueden distinguirse sin más diciendo que el narrador es ficticio y el autor no lo es.

El autor es el creador de una obra literaria; el narrador no tiene por qué serlo. Hay narradores que son escritores (de ficción o no), que pueden

incluso aludir con frecuencia a su actividad, hasta convertirla en un tema de la propia narración.[37] Este fenómeno tiene obviamente influencias enormes en la estructura de la narración: el narrador es consciente (dentro de la ficción) de enfrentarse a un público, y esto facilita el acceso a la narración por parte del lector real. La motivación está en cierto modo asegurada, por la duplicación de la función narrativa.[38]

No es infrecuente que el narrador extradiegético se presente abiertamente como un autor. Este es el caso no marcado en una consideración histórica. Si observamos las tempranas clasificaciones de voces narrativas, desde Platón a los formalistas rusos, veremos que dan por hecho que el narrador extradiegético en tercera persona es "el autor".[39] Como se deducirá de nuestra teoría, no hay diferencias tajantes entre esta figura y el autor real (o el "autor narrador" que discutimos a continuación), sino una difuminación gradual que varía de una obra narrativa a otra: el narrador autorial puede ser un narrador completamente ficticio, de un *alter ego* del autor, o sencillamente, la representación de su *ego*. Si los escritores cobran derechos de autor en persona, es justo que se les conceda la oportunidad de contarnos sus historias en persona.

La posible duplicación (o multiplicación) de la función de autor es ignorada con frecuencia por la teoría.[40] Por último, deberemos recordar que hay que diferenciar los narradores que no aluden a su actividad compositiva de los que explícitamente se nos presentan como *no-escritores*, es decir, como hablantes, pensadores, etc. En la tradición del siglo XVIII, el narrador puede escribir un diario, una carta o unas memorias. Así se hace necesaria la intervención de un nuevo personaje, implícito o explícito, perteneciente a la "esfera de acción" del narrador: el *editor*, el personaje ficticio que recoge ese documento privado para presentarlo después al lector. Su importancia puede variar, según sea un simple marco y un transmisor, o intervenga (como artificio de motivación) sobre la presentación del texto. También los editores tienen cierta autoridad retórica, en especial a la hora de reducir, censurar y suprimir. Pensemos en los "editores" de *Roxana* o *Moll Flanders,* que no sólo recogen y transcriben unas memorias, sino que mejoran el estilo, sin por ello abandonar la primera persona de la protagonista.

EL AUTOR-NARRADOR

Una vez rechazado el mito del discurso impersonal o incluso de la "muerte del autor",[41] la semiótica actual insiste en señalar la presencia necesaria del enunciador en su enunciación. En literatura podemos encontrarnos con el autor de manera implícita (autor textual) o apareciendo explícitamente, asumiendo el discurso como obra suya. Se trata de un tipo determinado de las clásicas "intrusiones del autor", aquéllas en las que comenta sobre su actividad. Se trataría de un desarrollo a nivel *discursivo* de la clase de enunciados performativos "parentéticos" (Lyons 1977: 739) del tipo "pienso", "creo", etc. Se trata, según Lozano, Peña-Marín y Abril, de "indicadores metalingüísticos, expresiones de una relación del enunciador con su enunciado".[42] En palabras de Greimas, "el *enunciado llamado enunciación* se muestra como una posible isotopía del discurso poético" (1976: 28). Greimas propone clasificar semánticamente esta isotopía en tres tipos de contenidos: los relativos al *ser* del autor, los relativos a su *hacer* y los relativos a la *finalidad de su hacer* (1976: 28). Aquí nos interesa particularmente la actitud del autor frente al status ficticio o real de la acción.

El autor puede señalar su ficción como tal ficción, introduciéndose en el texto como el creador del mundo ficticio; es lo que hace Diderot, por ejemplo, en *Jacques le fataliste et son maître*, así también el Fielding de *Tom Jones*, el Trollope de *Barchester Towers* o el Thackeray de *Vanity Fair.* Si queremos, podemos pensar que no se trata del autor, sino de un *autor-narrador;* habría que estudiar en cada caso la relevancia de esta distinción. Pero si el autor habla en tanto que autor no está atribuyendo sus actos de habla a nadie: mientras esté comentando la ficcionalidad de su creación tiene (en principio, y simplificando mucho) las cartas sobre la mesa. O, mejor dicho, debemos suponer provisionalmente que las tiene auque sólo sea para seguir el hilo de su estrategia narrativa. El autor-narrador se desdobla en autor (que comenta la ficcionalidad de la obra) y en narrador (que, sin inmutarse por ello, continúa inmediatamente narrando la historia). En tanto que habla como autor, debemos suponer una interacción comunicativa entre él y el lector. La frontera entre la novela, el ensayo, la biografía o la historia puede ser muy tenue, debido precisamente a esta capacidad del autor para desdoblarse en narrador de manera casi imperceptible, sin un cambio de identidad. Nada impide al autor aludir al (probable) contexto real en el que su obra se leerá. Pero esos fragmentos se definen precisamente en relación a los fragmentos propiamente narrativos, los que nos transmiten el *relato*. Y en esos fragmentos el valor de verdad de las frases del narrador no es el mismo. Las frases narrativas deben ser entendidas como atribuidas al rol narrativo

del autor-narrador, a su actividad en tanto en cuanto es narrador. Al adoptar el papel de narrador, el autor se coloca dentro de la ficción, y habla en función de ella. Es de gran interés estudiar la transición de unas actitudes a otras en estos tipos de discurso (un tipo más del dialogismo teorizado por Bajtín). El autor no tiene por qué adoptar una postura coherente. La figura autorial de una novela dada puede muy bien ser coherente con su papel de principio a fin, pero la de otra puede tan pronto jugar con las cartas sobre la mesa como cambiar las reglas del juego a su libre albedrío; así el autor-narrador "Diderot" en *Jacques le fataliste*, tras reconocerse como el creador de la ficción, finge ignorancia sobre un punto de la *acción* en un momento dado (1973: 264).

Por supuesto, la definición del autor-narrador es de gran complejidad teórica. Se presuponen en ella formas de narración estructuralmente más simples, como la narración homodiegética y la narración heterodiegética ficticia; la definición de ésta, a su vez, presupone la narración heterodiegética real. Es decir, el narrador, al menos en uno de sus roles, está realizando actos de habla, que se interpretan comunicativamente. El elemento de comunicación está implícito en la estructura de la narración ficticia, aunque otros se le hayan superpuesto.

En lo anteriormente expuesto hemos señalado sólo algunas de las estructuras enunciativas que han de tenerse en cuenta para una caracterización semiótica de los diversos planos del relato literario. Que la narración literaria sea tan compleja estructuralmente es una indicación de su complejidad funcional y pragmática, pues sigue tratándose en todo caso de un discurso intencional e ideológicamente orientado.a

NOTAS

1. Cf. Martínez Bonati 1972: 64; Todorov 1973b: 173; Bal 1985: 140, 147, 153.

2. *Metadiegético* (*métadiégétique*) en Genette (1972: 238-239); la extensión perfectamente lógica del prefijo *intra-* también es insinuada por Genette (1983: 61), sin que por ello se decida a adoptarla. Aunque seguimos en líneas generales la terminología de Genette, nos parece que es acertada la crítica de Bal: el prefijo *meta-* tendría aquí un sentido contrario al que tiene, por ejemplo, en el término *metaficción:* debería utilizarse un prefijo que indicase un nivel inferior, menos inclusivo (1977: 35; cf. Lozano, Peña-Marín y Abril 1982: 141; Volek 1985: 174). Bal propone *hypo-récit, hypo-diégétique*. Prince (1982: 15) habla de *main, secondary,*

tertiary narrators. Aquí utilizaremos el mismo prefijo *intra-* para hablar tanto de narradores como de narraciones, pero en caso en que se superpongan varios niveles es preferible utilizar una numeración, porque la repetición del prefijo lleva a confusión. Sobre la noción de inserción narrativa, cf. también Shklovski (1965: 189 ss); Pratt (1977: 209); Ruthrof (1981: 93 ss).

3. Cf. Bal 1977: 31; Berendsen 1984: 149 ss.

4. Todorov (1973b: 173ss) y Genette (1972: 241) señalan la multiplicación de niveles en las *Mil y Una Noches*.

5. Cf. Martínez Bonati 1972: 64; Todorov 1973b; Bal 1977: 35.

6. A menos que haya ruptura de marco. En la novela de Mailer *Why Are We in Vietnam?* cada uno de los dos narradores inventa al otro.

7. La noción de motivación fue desarrollada por los formalistas rusos (véase Tomashevski 1982: 195 o Eïjenbaum 1965). Para Sternberg motivación es "the explicit or implicit justification, explanation or dissimulation of an artistic convention, device, or necessity either in the terms of artistic exigencies, goals, and functionality (aesthetic or rhetorical motivation) or in terms of the referential pattern of the fictive world (realistic or quasi-mimetic motivation)" (1978: 247).

8. Cf. Bronzwaer 1978: 2; Genette 1983.

9. Sobre la noción de cambio de nivel de focalización, cf. Bal (1977: 38 ss; 1981: 203 ss); para una crítica a la concepción de Bal, cf. Bronzwaer (1981: 197ss) Genette (1983: 51).

10. Se pueden establecer subdivisiones ulteriores: según la teoría dramática neoclásica, la narración del mensajero es de dos tipos: puede colocar al público en antecedentes de una situación o bien referir el resultado de alguna línea de acción que se ha desarrollado sobre escena (Corneille 1971: 221 ss ; Dryden 1970: 44).

11. Ver Genette 1982: 202ss; 1972: 241 ss; 1983: 62-63.

12. Sólo podemos apuntar la relevancia de este tema para un tratamiento de los niveles narrativos, y remitir a la obra de Lucien Dällenbach (1978) para un tratamiento detallado.

13. Todorov 1973b: 175; Genette 1972: 243-244; Lintvelt 1981: 210.

14. Por ejemplo, en Pseudo-Plutarco la metalepsis "por sinonimia indica una cosa diferente" (§ II 21; 1989: 59); para San Isidoro, *"Metalepsis* es un tropo por el que el consiguiente se toma del antecedente" (I.37.7; 1993: 340-41); du Marsais, Littré y Lausberg también definen la metalepsis como una figura donde el antecedente se toma por el consecuente; Dupriez, que recoge éstas y otras variantes, relaciona la figura con la alusión, la metonimia y el eufemismo (Dupriez 1984: 284-85). Para Lázaro Carreter, en la metalepsis "en lugar de una palabra se emplea otra que es sinónima de su homónimo" (1974: 311). Prince (1988), repite la definición

de Genette (con errores conceptuales en su ejemplo, por cierto). La primera alusión de Genette a la metalepsis (1982: 215-16) se ceñía más a la definición de Fontanier.

15. Cf. García Landa (1992: 22-23). Recalquemos la existencia de diversas relaciones de status: por ejemplo, entre el autor textual y el narrador (a) y entre el narrador y su narración (b). Un narrador ficticio puede narrar un relato que es factual *para él*.

16. En Todorov, que habla de "pasos de un grado a otro" (1973: 175) tampoco se aprecia un intento de diferenciar conceptualmente el status (ficticio / no ficticio) de la simple diferencia de nivel (diegético / intradiegético).

17. Cf. Booth 1961: 150; Füger 1972: 272 ss (cit. en Lintvelt 1981: 136); Kristeva 1974: 134; Fludernik 1994.

18. 1972: 252; 1983: 66; cf. Bal 1977: 34; Sternberg 1978: 279, Stanzel 1984: 48. Esta inevitabilidad de la primera persona, dada por la misma naturaleza del lenguaje, ya era subrayada por Theodor Lipps (1903: 497; cit. en Ingarden 1973: 206).

19. El sentido en que utilizan este término Leibfried (1972), Füger (1972) o DoleΩel (1973) (cits. por Lintvelt 1981: 134 ss), Stanzel (1984: 48), Tacca (1973: 65), Ruthrof (1981: 103), Prince (1982: 13), etc.

20. Por ejemplo por el mismo Stanzel 1984: 92. Sobre el uso de los deícticos para ordenar el texto en relación a diversos focalizadores o diversos presupuestos cognoscitivos, cf. Bronzwaer (1978: 4); John Tynan (1988).

21. Cf. Prince 1982: 14; Stanzel 1984: 49. Recalquemos que Booth (1961: 153) utiliza *observer* en un sentido distinto, incluyendo (¿solamente?) a los narradores heterodiegéticos.

22. De no atender a esta limitación de alcance, la definición de "narración en primera persona" se puede complicar innecesariamente. Asi, según Pratt, "[t]he author of a literary work may identify the fictional speaker as someone other than himself, usually by giving him a proper name. This is the configuration we normally call first-person narration. *Jane Eyre* is a good example of a first person novel in which the unmarked case is realized" (1977: 208). Pero según esta definición no podríamos llamar "narración en primera persona" a la narración real, autobiográfica, (cuando en realidad es éste el caso no marcado). Un descuido semejante comete Stanzel en su propia definición de la primera persona (1984: 48).

23. Genette 1972: 253; cf. Lanser 1981: 159.

24. Genette observa en Proust una sorprendente indiferencia a esta convención: el narrador de *A la recherche du temps perdu* "n'en sait pas seulement, et tout empiriquement, *davantage* que le héros: il *sait* , dans l'absolu, il connaît la Vérité" (1972: 260).

25. Cohn 1978: 169 ss; Genette 1983: 74 ss; Stanzel 1984: 84 ss. Cf. sin embargo Genette: "Les conséquences modales du choix narratif ne me paraissent ni si massives ni surtout si mécaniques qu'on le dit souvent " (1983: 76).

26. Genette (1983: 83 ss). Algunos teorizadores no acaban de aceptar esta independencia entre la perspectiva y la persona, entre el relato y el discurso. Lintvelt (1981: 84) niega la posibilidad de este fenómeno, al que hipotéticamente denomina "homodiegético neutro". Como señala Genette, esta negativa se debe a una diferenciación insuficiente por parte de Lintvelt entre dos tipos de "objetividad": la de los pensamientos y la de las percepciones. La teoría de Bal evita este tipo de confusiones.

27. Kayser 1977: 75 ss; Genette 1972: 214 ss.

28. Stanzel 1984: 84. Stanzel relaciona el juego de ambigüedad entre primera y tercera persona con la psicología de la personalidad dividida (1984: 106; 150).

29. Enfoques tipológicos de distintos tipos se encuentran en Richardson (en Allott 1968: 258), Lee (1968), Lubbock (1921), Friedman (1972), Stanzel (1984), Booth (1961), Lintvelt (1981), etc. Algunos críticos miran estos enfoques sintéticos con desconfianza; cf. Genette (1983: 77 ss); Chatman (1978: 165 ss); Ruthrof (1981: 4 ss). Para una defensa del método tipológico, cf. Stanzel (1984: 58 ss).

30. Spitzer 1928, cit. en Cohn 1978: 298 n.3. Cf. Cohn 1978: 143 ss, Ruthrof 1981: 63, Tacca 1973: 138.

31. Cf. Watson 1979: 17, Hawthorn 1986: 89; Couturier 1995.

32. Cf. Onega 1985: 54.

33. Ducrot distingue entre el enunciador en tanto que tal ("Je_1") y el enunciador en tanto que persona del mundo que coincide con el enunciador ("Je_2:) (1980: 531, 574).

34. Pouillon 1970: 44 ss; Frye 1957: 307; Cerny (1975) rastrea este mismo fenómeno en la autobiografía ficticia de *David Copperfield* (cit. en Stanzel 1984: 82). Es especialmente recomendable el libro de Freeman (1993) sobre la articulación narrativa del yo.

35. Cf. García Landa 1996; Lintvelt 1981: 84.

36. Cf. Todorov 1966: 127; Watson 1979: 33; Couturier 1995.

37. Cf. los *self-conscious narrators* de Booth (1961: 155). Cf. Prince 1982: 12; Tacca 1973: 113 ss.

38. Véase García Landa (1995: § 3.1.3); cf. Sternberg (1978: 254 ss). Pozuelo llega a incluir al narrador-autor en su esquema básico de la comunicación literaria, llamándolo "autor implícito representado" y distinguiéndolo tanto del narrador como del autor textual, al que llama "autor implícito no representado" (1988: 236, 239). Para nosotros, se trata de una figura derivada mediante una reduplicación de una estructura más básica y corriente, y en modo alguno esencial en un esquema básico de la comunicación narrativa.

39. Platón, *República* III; 1983: 102; Aristóteles, *Poética* XXIV, 1460 a; Richardson (en Allott 1968: 258).

40. Por ejemplo, por Jon-K. Adams en su tratamiento de la "autoridad retórica": "the writer's authority over the speaker is different from the speaker's authority over a character, for the levels of embedding are not comparable. The speaker has rhetorical authority over a character because both are in the same fictional world" (1985: 60). Tanto el narrador como los personajes están en un mundo ficticio, pero ese mundo no tiene por qué ser el mismo. Si queremos llamar *speaker* o "narrador" a la voz narrativa que abre *El amigo Manso* de Galdós, ahí tenemos un ejemplo. Si no, *La dentellière* de Pascal Lainé o *Fragmentos de Apocalipsis* de Torrente Ballester presentan otras variantes.

41. Ver por ej. Burke 1992; Couturier 1995.

42. *Análisis del discurso* 1982: 185. Como señalan estos autores, los enunciados realizativos metalingüísticos se pueden relacionar con los verbos realizativos "expositivos" de Austin (1980: 161).

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a

THE DENOTATIVE-REFERENTIAL DIMENSION OF LEXICAL ITEMS

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1. INTRODUCTION: GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIC PROPOSAL

Over the past two decades the lexicon has attracted a great deal of attention in the field of Generative Grammar. A part of the discussion has focused on whether there should be an independent lexical component within the general make-up of the grammar, a component that would hold the principles necessary for the explanation of the properties of words, or whether, on the other hand, a modular approach should be adopted, so that the same set of general principles can be assumed to account for the properties of both phrasal and morphological expressions (see Di Sciullo and Williams [1987] and Sproat [1985] for arguments for and against the existence of such a component, respectively).

Be that as it may, there is no denying that there has to be a lexicon in at least one sense: a store or list of entries in which lexical items are associated with their properties. This sense of the lexicon has played a central role throughout the history of Generative Grammar, and this role is even more important in recent theorical formulations, in particular, in the Government

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and Binding (henceforth GB) framework, where many authors (for example, González Escribano [1991]) assume that the derivation of phrases begins with the projection of lexical units and their associated information in such a way that the semantico-structural representation of a given expression is built up out of the properties of the lexical items plus the operation of a few general principles such as Government, the Projection Principle, Case Theory, etc. (Haegeman [1991] offers an introductory treatment of basic GB notions—along with the original sources—that may help the less specialized reader).

Of the assorted information associated with lexical items, the notion of *Argument Structure* (A-Str) is probably the aspect that has been given most attention by linguists: A-Str occupies such a prominent position in the make-up of natural languages that whenever a new theoretical proposal appears in the field of morphology or syntax its author has to take a stand on this issue. Different views on A-Str may be found in Williams (1981), Zubizarreta (1987) and Grimshaw (1990), who has put forward quite an elaborate proposal.[1]

The aim of this paper is to claim that in addition to the argumental dimension there is a second dimension or level of analysis that has to do with the meaning of lexical items and that must be kept separate from the notion of A-Str. We will call this entity the *Denotative-Referential Structure* (DR-Str) of lexical items.

One of the first authors to study this aspect of the meaning of words was Williams (1981), who assumed that nouns (Ns) have an argument, which he called R (=Reference), that shows up both in predicative and referential uses of noun phrases (NPs). Thus, in *John is a fool* the NP *a fool* is predicated of *John*, and *John* is therefore its R argument, whereas in *The fool left* R is satisfied referentially in the sense that it is represented by the denotation (the extralinguistic referent) of the NP itself (cf. Williams [1981: 86], Williams [1982: 286] and Di Sciullo and Williams [1987: 32]). For these authors, then, R corresponds to the denotation of the noun ("event," as in *destruction*, "individual," as in *fool*, etc.) or to an NP of which the N in question is predicated. An additional feature of this proposal is that R belongs to the A-Str of the lexical item—where it bears the role of external argument—even though it cannot be seen as a thematic role, i.e. an Agent, Theme... (see note 1). Thus, the A-Str for the N *destruction* is (R, Agent, Theme), where the underlined argument is the external one.

Another author who has dealt with this dimension of words is Sproat (1985). Sproat follows Higginbotham (1985) and defends the existence of a

modality of thematic satisfaction which he calls "thematic binding," by means of which the SPEC[2] position of NPs restricts the reference of these expressions because it binds an open position (a kind of argument variable) that is carried by all Ns. For example, the article *the* in *The fool left* occupies that position and it restricts the reference of the NP in such a way that it is not any fool that has left, but a particular fool.

The two approaches sketched above have one thing in common: both Williams and Sproat see the referential side of nouns as something that may be integrated in the A-Str of lexical items (Williams) or that has a thematic nature (Sproat), i.e. they conceive of this level as part of the argumental dimension.

As we have already stated, our claim is that there is a denotative-referential side (DR-Str) to the meaning of lexical items that is conceptually different (and also technically different, at least partially—see below) from the notion of A-Str. Whereas the A-Str of a given predicate codifies the lexico-conceptual properties of the predicate, in the sense of the participants among which the predicate establishes certain relations ("Agent of," "Patient of" (i.e. Theme), etc., cf. note 1), DR-Str has to do with the general denotation of lexical items and the way this denotation is integrated or embedded in the larger linguistic context (the phrase) the item belongs to and linked up to the (extralinguistic) world of reference. Roughly speaking, verbs denote events or states, nouns may be classified into those that denote events and those that refer to results or objects (see section 2 below), and adjectives denote properties. Now, these contents or denotations need "referential windows" that are capable of restricting them; otherwise native speakers would not be able to use language to talk about *particular* events, objects or properties.[3]

To sum up, DR-Str is a unifying notion since it applies to the three major lexical classes (Ns, Vs and As), all of which have to achieve a certain degree of referential saturation; it is conceptually different from A-Str and for this reason alone it is worth exploring in some depth; it has an advantageous spin-off: the existence of this level of analysis allows us to preserve a homogeneous picture of A-Str, one that includes only participants or thematic roles.

The sections that follow are dedicated to the study of the DR-Strs of nouns and adjectives, which are quite interdependent. As regards verbs, for our present purposes we will assume, after Sproat (1985), that the position known as INFL (which in the standard GB framework represents the inflectional properties of the verb in a given sentence) contributes to fix or define reference by restricting the verbal action to a given point in time or period of

time (past, present, future). Therefore, for the time being we leave the deeper investigation of the DR-Str of verbs as a subject matter for future inquiry.

2. THE DENOTATIVE-REFERENTIALSTRUCTURE OF NOUNS

It has been assumed in a number of recent studies (Zubizarreta 1987, Grimshaw 1990, Lebeaux 1986, Murasugi 1990, Van Hout 1990, etc.) that nouns may be classified into two large groups: event nouns (ENs) and result nouns (RNs). Result nouns are those that do not denote events; they may refer to the result of an event or to any type of object, but they do not have an eventive meaning. Williams (cf. references cited above) and others (for example, Grimshaw [1990]) have associated these Ns with an argument R, which has led to a certain amount of confusion because R may be taken as representing the denotative value or semantic type of the N (i.e. "result") and in such a case we would be faced with a contradiction since both the predicate (result noun) and its argument would be identified by means of the same notation. A different type of notation must therefore be used to represent the argument (more specifically, the argument variable or open position) that is satisfied by some element capable of binding the noun's denotation to the world of reference: Sproat (1985) uses the open position <1>, which we will adopt (see Figure 1 below), whereas we will keep R to represent the denotation of the N.

A second, and probably more important, drawback that undermines Williams' proposal is the fact that whereas his R argument is explicitly satisfied or saturated when the N is used predicatively (i.e. after a predicative verb), since in this case there is an independent NP that satisfies it (the subject: see section 1), there is no such thing when the N has what Williams calls a referential use, i.e. when there is no predication (as in *The fool left*): in this case he does not associate R with any structural node or category and as a consequence it is very difficult to see how R is saturated. In our theory of DR-Str this vagueness disappears: the denotation of lexical categories must be constrained by means of what we have called "referential windows." These are not abstract entities but have a clear structural correlate, i.e. they are associated with structural positions. In this matter we coincide with authors like Sproat (1985) and Zubizarreta (1987) in that the SPEC node of NPs is responsible for the satisfaction of the <1> position of nouns (note that

Williams establishes no relation with the SPEC node of NPs), although we disagree with the idea that this is a kind of "thematic" satisfaction. In short, then, the variable <1> is discharged within the NP; thus, Sproat (1985: 156-157) provides the following representation for the NP *the dog*, where the asterisk indicates that <1> has been satisfied[4]:

(1)



Let's now consider event nouns (ENs). In the tradition we have been assuming (in particular, in Sproat [1985] and Grimshaw [1990], not in Williams [1981, etc.]) these nouns (eg. *destruction, assignment*, etc.) are associated with an argument (or rather, an argument variable) E (for "event"). As we suggested in relation with the R argument in Williams, we think that this notation is unnatural in so far as "event" is the denotation of the predicate, that is, the lexical head, and so it is misleading to use E to refer to an argument of that predicate. We propose then that the denotative-referential variable of ENs be represented by <1> and that the features R and E be kept to mark the semantic value or denotation of result nouns and eventive nouns respectively.[5]

The relation with the SPEC node we examined in relation with RNs is equally important for ENs: the position <1> is discharged in this node because the specifier binds the denotation of the noun to the world of reference. Nevertheless, Grimshaw (1990: 67) notes that the system of determiners is sensitive to the distinction between result and event and in her opinion the only determiner that is compatible with eventive interpretations is *the*. Hence the ungrammaticality in (2):

(2) *a / *this destruction of the city

We think the reason for this limitation on ENs has to do with their abstract denotation: the bigger the degree of abstraction the more difficult it is to associate the noun with a specific referent.

From what we have said so far it can be gathered that we assume that the basic referential needs of nouns are covered by the SPEC node of noun phrases (see below for those cases in which there is no overt specifier, e.g. *I love flowers*). But this claim must be made compatible with the fact that, regardless of the specifier, NPs (like other phrases, cf. Williams [1980]) may be used predicatively:

(3) John is a / the / that boy

Our position is that the predicative use of NPs contributes to further restricting the referential entities that are invoked. In other words, predication, in addition to its creating expressions that are associated with a truth value, is a mechanism that plays an important role when it comes to tying an expression to the world of reference. But independently of this device, there are resources within the internal structure of NPs whereby a certain degree of referential saturation may be achieved. As we have defended, this is the role of the SPEC node. We will say more about predication in section 4.

3. THE DENOTATIVE-REFERENTIAL STRUCTURE OF ADJECTIVES

A number of authors have argued for different types of mechanism to capture the relation that exists between adjectives (As) and the nouns they are combined with. In our framework, such a relationship may be quite naturally interpreted as one more manifestation of the DR-Str of lexical items. Like the other lexical categories, adjectives have their own denotation (roughly, "property," "attribute"), a denotation that is restricted and linked to the world of reference in the linguistic discourse. If the primary referential window for nouns is the SPEC node (leaving aside the restriction involved by predication), we claim that in the case of adjectives the noun itself plays the role of referential window. The denotation of adjectives, property, is clearly a dependent or relational notion (i.e. "property of"), that is, it needs a bridge that can link it to the world of reference since properties do not exist by themselves, they only exist in the objects or entities that have those

properties, and the objects, in turn, are represented by the nouns. That is why we think that nouns constitute the referential window of adjectives. The technical counterpart of our proposal is that As are associated with the denotative-referential position <1> and the feature P (for "property"). Thus, the representation for the expression *beautiful day*, which contains an adjective, is that shown in (4):

(4)



Note that, as in Figure (1), once the position <1> has been satisfied, in this case by the N, that saturation is marked with an asterisk in the dominating node, in this case N'. Moreover, for the sake of clarity, in (4) we have disregarded the DR-Str of the noun itself: only that of the adjective is represented. For the X-Bar version we have followed in (4) see note 4 at the end of this paper and references cited there.

Sproat (1985) and Grimshaw (1990) assume that the relation between adjectives and nouns is captured by a modality of thematic satisfaction which (following Higginbotham 1985) they call "thematic identification." According to Sproat:

> The intuition we want to capture is that *white house* refers to those entities which are both white and house. Assuming that both *white* and *house* have a theta role, we will say that those roles are identified, this identification being notated by a line connecting the two relevant places in the grids. (1985: 157)

In our view, this approach presents a clear flaw: no direct relationship is established between the denotation of the adjective and that of the noun since the open position (a thematic position for Sproat, not for us; cf. above) borne by the adjective is not satisfied by the N and its nominal properties. This is not in accordance with the idea we have defended that N is the referential window for the A; we consider that the referential properties of the adjective are satisfied by the noun, independently of the fact that the N has its own referential needs that are expresed by an open position that is saturated or bound by the SPEC node. The open position carried by N accounts for its integration in discourse and its linkage to the extralinguistic world of reference, but it is independent of the relation between N and A.

Apart from the argumentation above, when Sproat and Grimshaw relate the open position of the adjective with that of the noun they allow for the possibility of relating any A with any N, since those positions or variables belong to the respective lexical classes and not to particular Ns or As. This is not supported by the empirical facts given the unacceptable combinations of (5):

(5) (a) *handsome stone
(b) *pregnant tree
(c) *stupid air

These examples prove that the adjective selects the noun it is combined with, i.e. the N is a thematic argument of the adjective, which leads us to the conclusion that in the case of adjectives the argumental-thematic dimension (the one that has to do with thematic roles, which we have called A-Str) and the denotative-referential dimension (DR-Str) meet at the same nominal node: N is the link that connects the A to the world of referents by saturating its position <1>, and at the same time N realizes a thematic argument of the thematic predicate A. This argument may be represented by the variable x. (The difference between argumental-lexical variables and referential variables is explained in more detail in section 4).

A piece of empirical evidence in favour of the hypothesis that adjectives are associated with both argumental and referential variables (or open positions), i.e. that the two of them are necessary and independent from each other, is provided by derived As, for example those that take a verbal base (like *amusing,* in *amusing activity*). In such cases the suffix determines the adjectival category and denotation of the complex word and is therefore asso-

ciated with the position <1>, just as we saw when considering noun-forming suffixes (cf. note 5). However, the suffix alone cannot select a thematic argument (and cannot therefore be associated with a thematic position): the adjective that results after suffixation inherits that argument and the variable that represents it from the verbal base, in such a way that it ends up being associated with two variables, <1> and <x>.

As for non-derived adjectives (like *happy*), these originally (originally in the sense that they are not subject to derivation) bear those two variables: *happy* [<1>,<x>]. This notation must be interpreted as follows: the lexical item *happy* belongs to a lexical class that denotes "property" whose referential requirements, represented by the position <1>, are satisfied by the lexical class of nouns. In addition, that item is a thematic predicate because it must be combined with a noun, represented by the variable <x>, whose lexical properties are selected by the adjective.[6]

We will finish this section on adjectives by considering Zubizarreta's proposal. For this author (1987: 19-20) adjectives constitute a lexical category whose lexical properties are expressed in the notation $<A + AGR_y>$. This means that besides being associated with the category A, adjectives bear the morphological marker AGR (for "agreement"), which, according to Zubizarreta, "agrees in person, number and gender with the noun of which the adjective is predicated . . . or with the noun which the adjective modifies." That N corresponds to $_y$ in this author's notation. But Zubizarreta also admits that her morphological marker receives no explicit realization in English. We think it inappropriate to postulate such inexistent categories from a synchronic point of view—although it is true that such an agreement morpheme existed in earlier stages of the language—especially if what needs to be explained can be accounted for in some other satisfactory way.

To sum up, <1> must be substituted for AGR and the relation between Ns and As may be quite naturally integrated in what we have called the denotative-referential dimension of lexical items.

4. COMPARING ARGUMENT STRUCTURE AND DENOTATIVE-REFERENTIAL STRUCTURE

One of the most important claims we have put forward so far is that the denotative-referential side of lexical items must be kept separate from the the-

matic dimension both from a technical and from a conceptual point of view. A-Str has to do with the lexical-thematic properties of lexical predicates, whereas DR-Str deals with the way lexical items (both predicates and non-predicates, from a thematic point of view) are integrated into phrasal units endowed with the elements necessary for the expression of reference.

Those two levels of lexical structure include variables that must be saturated by elements that occupy specific structural positions. As the levels are different, we will talk about two different types of variable: thematic variables, for which we will use the notation x, y, z, etc., and referential (or denotative-referential) variables, <1> for all lexical heads. The former belong to each particular predicate, but the latter do not belong to specific items but to the major lexical categories (N, V, A), which correspond to major denotational categories ("property," etc.—see above). In spite of the notational uniformity, the position <1> is satisfied differently depending on the denotation of the head: the saturator is SPEC in the case of nouns, the N itself in the case of adjectives, and the INFL node in the case of verbs.

We think Zubizarreta (1987: 13-14) is right in claiming that thematic variables (which she calls lexical variables) are satisfied (or "evaluated," in her own words) by lexical indices whereas referential ones are given value by referential indices. Zubizarreta argues that each lexical unit is identified in the dictionary by a lexical index that represents the concept or type (Frege's "sense") expressed by the item. For example, *man* would carry the index *j* because it denotes *j*. In this way, in a sentence such as *The man left*, that index would be assigned to the thematic variable representing the Agent of *leave*, say x, and thematic saturation would be achieved. Likewise, the item *stone* would be associated with an index *k* because it denotes *k*, but such an index is unable to satisfy the variable x of *leave* because the type denoted is not adequate.

Zubizarreta (1987: 14) is clear about the fact that "a lexical index, borne by lexical items, is not to be confused with a referential index, borne by noun phrases which function as referential expressions in a discourse." That is, the indices that evaluate referential variables do not belong to lexical items; in her own words (1987: 51), "the referential index is borne by the determiner and inherited by the Spec node that dominates it." At first sight it is logical to argue that the determiner is the element that bears such an index since it has the function of restricting reference, but upon further consideration it turns out that the SPEC position may be occupied by elements other than determiners, for example, Saxon Genitives like *yesterday's* or *Peter's*, or quantifiers like *some* or *every*. That is why we think that Zubizarreta's hy-

pothesis should be modified: we propose that the SPEC node itself should bear an abstract referential index that receives a specific value from the element that is realized under SPEC. The same goes for the verbs: the INFL node is associated with an abstract index that is given a specific value by the tense morpheme.

Adjectives constitute an exception in relation to the idea that referential variables are evaluated by referential indices since we have defended that the <1> variable of adjectives is assigned value by the noun the adjective is combined with. N (or its projection N', which is a sister to the adjective phrase (A'') in the structural phrase marker; see Figure 4) does not have a referential index to evaluate the <1> of adjectives: on the contrary, it has its own <1> variable to be evaluated by SPEC. Our proposal is that in this case the lexical index of N itself can assign a value to the <1> of adjectives because that index represents a nominal denotation and such a denotation is always closer to the world of reference than the denotation of an adjective. In other words, with respect to adjectives, nouns may establish a certain degree of linkage with reference; they allow adjectives a certain degree of referential capacity. Nouns, in turn, have their own linkage, SPEC, but it must be clear that this is the referential window for Ns, not for As. All this leads us to the conclusion that there are different types of referential window or different degrees of referential saturation. A consideration of Ns and As together may yield a gradation or cline with three different degrees, as shown in Figure (6), where (a), (b), and (c) represent the minimal, medial and maximal degree, respectively:

(6) (a) beautiful day
(b) the beautiful day
(c) Sunday was the beautiful day

In short, the N above links *beautiful* to the world of reference; the N' *beautiful day*, in turn, is further restricted or vinculated by the determiner *the*; and the predicative mechanism in (c) further narrows the referential circle so that the NP in predicative position has a specific referent.

Predication probably offers the highest degree of referential saturation and it must be remembered that all maximal projections (i.e. all phrases) can be used predicatively (Williams 1980: 206), so that predication may be seen as a default mechanism that has a cross-categorial effect and makes it possible for all categories to achieve a similar degree of saturation. Predication in principle does not lead to the satisfaction of a thematic

variable unless the maximal projection that is used as a predicate has one unsaturated variable. This is the case of the AP in an example like *the day was beautiful*. As we saw in Section 3, in the case of adjectives the thematic dimension and the referential dimension conflate in the accompanying noun (or noun phrase), so that *the day* satisfies both the thematic and the referential variable of *beautiful*. But in *Sunday was [the [beautiful]* $_{AP}$ *day]* $_{NP}$ both variables are satisfied within the NP and the predicative structure further restricts the referential scope of the NP. We think, with Williams (see reference cited above), that predication is a coindexing mechanism: the predicative mechanism itself assigns the same index to subject and predicate when the latter does not have unsaturated variables, whereas if there are unsatisfied variables predication takes care that the subject assigns them a value (that is the case of the example above, *the day was beautiful*).

One possibility we have not considered yet is that in which an NP does not bear a specifier and is not used predicatively either, which means that its referential variable receives no interpretation. This is the case of expressions such as *I love [flowers]* $_{NP}$. In our view, the most natural approach to this situation is to assume that sometimes the communicative needs of speakers require that denotation should not be vinculated to specific referents and therefore natural languages allow high degrees of abstraction. In such cases the referential variable is simply left unsaturated.

5. CONCLUSION

The main hypothesis that has been developed in this paper was presented in section 1 (Introduction). It is the claim that there is a level of analysis in the meaning of lexical items that, contrary to what some authors have proposed, is distinct from the level traditionally known as Argument Structure (A-Str) and that can be identified by the expression Denotative-Referential Structure (DR-Str). This is a self-explaining designation since this level is about the way the general denotation of major lexical classes is restricted in discourse so that speakers can use nouns, verbs and adjectives to refer to particular entities, events and properties.

Section 2 explores the case of nouns. Williams (1981, etc.) is rejected on the grounds that his notation is confusing and his proposal structurally and conceptually vague. It is claimed that nouns have a “referential window” that

corresponds to the specifier node of noun phrases and, with authors like Sproat (1985) and Zubizarreta (1987), we assume that the formal counterpart of this idea is that nouns in general are associated with an open position <1> that is assigned a value by the element realized in the specifier position.

In section 3 we focus on how the denotation of adjectives is referentially restricted. First, we provide a critical assessment of the hypothesis of Sproat (1985) and Grimshaw (1990) that this is achieved through a modality of thematic satisfaction which they call "thematic identification." This idea encounters two flaws: no direct relation is established between the denotation of adjectives and that of nouns, and it leads to the incorrect prediction that any adjective may be combined with any noun. Secondly, we argue that, as was the case with nouns, adjectives are associated with a position <1> that in this case is saturated by the N that is combined with the adjective. This captures the intuition that Ns are closer to the world of reference than adjectives and therefore constitute their referential window, and at the same time it allows us to claim that the relation N - A is one more manifestation of the Denotative-Referential Structure of lexical items. Thirdly, in the case of adjectives A-Str and DR-Str are considered to conflate at the same nominal node due to the fact that adjectives are thematic predicates and as such they select their nouns. Finally, Zubizarreta (1987)'s postulation of an Agreement marker for English adjectives is discarded as counterintuitive.

Section 4 compares A-Str and DR-Str. These two dimensions differ not only conceptually, but from a technical point of view too. Both of them have open positions (or variables), but whereas thematic variables belong to each particular lexical item, referential variables belong to each major lexical class. Furthermore, the former are given value by lexical indices that identify specific items in the lexicon, whereas the latter are saturated by referential indices, although adjectives represent an exception since the lexical index of the N is the one that satisfies their referential open position. The phenomenon of referential saturation is conceived of not as an "all or nothing" issue, but as a cline along which there are different degrees of saturation; thus, whereas the relation A - N probably represents the lowest degree, the highest level may be provided by predication, a cross-categorial mechanism that contributes to constrain reference.

All in all, we believe that there are well-founded reasons for studying the meaning of lexical units from the point of view of the mechanisms that natural languages use to restrict the general denotation of word classes and link it to the world of reference.a

NOTES

1. The notion of A-Str entails the idea that lexical items may be seen as predicates that take certain arguments: in the case of verbs (Vs) or eventive nouns (ENs) the arguments are the participants in the event. For example, in *John sold a car to Mary* the predicate *sell* takes three arguments (or thematic roles), an Agent (*John*), a Theme (*a car*), and a Goal (*to Mary*). Those arguments that belong to the scope of the Verb Phrase (VP), in traditional terms, the complements of the verb, are called "internal arguments" in the GB framework, whereas the argument that falls outside that scope, i.e. the subject, is known as the "external argument."

2. SPEC stands for "specifier" and the SPEC position in a phrase marker is a structural position, i.e. a node, that is meant to hold any specifier that a NP can take: articles, demonstratives, Saxon genitives and the like.

3. Zubizarreta (1987: 4-5) emphasises the importance of phrase structure as the frame in which reference is determined or fixed: "phrase structure provides the background against which the order among referential entities in the sentence is computed. If this were not the case natural languages would be essentially reducible to a system of complex-word compounding."

4. The version of X-Bar theory adopted in this representation is that which Chomsky has consistently assumed from his "Remarks" paper (1970) to his *Barriers* monograph (1986). As can be seen in Figure (1), in this version the specifier position of NPs is structurally a sister of N' and a daughter of N''. See also Radford (1988).

5. Note that in the case of derived Ns the semantic value of the N is usually determined by the affix. For example, *-ion* and *-ing* tend to form eventive nouns, whereas *-ee* and *-er* produce nouns that denote individuals, not events. In such cases it is logical to associate the markers E and R (respectively) with the affixes, since these are responsible for the denotation of the noun.

6. Although perhaps the majority of adjectives take only one thematic argument, some of them take more. For example, *fond (of)* and *keen (on)* take two: *John is fond of Mary, Peter is keen on maths*. The one that is introduced by a preposition is the internal argument, whereas the argument that is realized in subject position is the external one. See note 1 for parallel examples with verbs.

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"BUENO, HASTA LUEGO": EL USO DE *BUENO* EN CONVERSACIONES

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1. INTRODUCCIÓN

En las páginas que siguen presentamos un posible análisis de *bueno* en su función de marcador del discurso. Este análisis es parte (y a la vez resultado) de un trabajo contrastivo en torno a *well/bueno* y de otros marcadores del discurso en inglés y en castellano, dado su frecuente uso en la conversación cotidiana. La razón por la que se comparan estos dos marcadores es porque se pensó que podían coincidir en su función en ambos idiomas, y se procedió al análisis para comprobar esta hipótesis.

El corpus utilizado no es muy amplio: incluye quince conversaciones relativamente breves[1] en las que se han clasificado cincuenta ejemplos del uso de *bueno* como marcador del discurso; si bien el corpus es limitado, creemos que es suficiente para una primera aproximación al tema. Un análisis posterior, con una ampliación sustancial también del corpus objeto de estudio, permitirá clasificar con más acierto el uso y la función de los marcadores discursivos de forma sistemática y científica.

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El corpus en que nos hemos basado son conversaciones cotidianas, y que podrían ser clasificadas como "phatic communion" en el sentido que Malinowski (1923) le dió inicialmente:

> a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words.... They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener. Once again we may say that language does not function here as means of transmission of thought.

Las conversaciones fueron grabadas sin conocimiento ni previo aviso a los participantes, para no restar naturalidad, aunque posteriormente se les solicitó permiso para la utilización de esos datos. Queremos subrayar que este tipo de conversaciones, aparentemente banales, son sumamente interesantes para nuestro propósito y creemos que los marcadores del discurso desempeñan aquí una función fundamental y decisiva.

En este tipo de conversaciones, más que los temas tratados, lo importante consistiría en evitar posibles conflictos en las relaciones entre los participantes, ya sea a fin de evitar un clima "tenso" o ese "silencio" que tanto temen la mayoría de los hablantes occidentales (no es ése el caso con los finlandeses).

2. EL ESTADO DE LA CUESTIÓN

Cortés (1991), en su análisis de connectores, expletivos y muletillas, observa que "no encajan claramente en las categorías sintácticas y semánticas de los textos gramaticales" y señala la necesidad de estudiar la función de estos elementos y de diferenciar aquellos que son de "relleno" de los que no lo son.

En su análisis de *bueno* señala que los valores estudiados nada tienen que ver con las acepciones más generales que de esta palabra dan nuestras gramáticas; y hace una clasificación de los usos de *bueno*, distinguiendo principalmente entre el uso (a) como conector paragráfico o extraoracional: en el que atribuye a *bueno* el valor de restricción, continuación y corrección; (b) como marcador: en posición absoluta y marcando una respuesta que no se corresponde con la esperada según el contexto; (c) como expletivo; y finalmente lo que incluye bajo (d) otros sentidos, entre los que se incluye el uso de *bueno* para "imitar el lenguaje oral": por ejemplo cuando los hablantes intentan repetir lo dicho por ellos mismos u otras personas; y

cuando se utiliza en sentido afirmativo pudiendo ser sustituido por un adverbio afirmativo.

Aunque nos parece acertada la enumeración de las funciones y usos atribuidos a *bueno*, no estamos completamente de acuerdo con la clasificación que ofrece Cortés. A nuestro juicio en todos los casos *bueno* estaría funcionando como marcador y los distintos usos descritos por Cortés corresponderían a las diferentes funciones que dicho marcador puede desempeñar en el discurso.

3. CRITERIOS DE ANÁLISIS

El marcador *bueno* parece no transmitir ningún tipo de predicción semántica o sintáctica y, en realidad, podría ser eliminado de la enunciación sin que el significado ni la gramaticalidad de la misma se vean alterados. Consideramos por esto que su función como marcador pragmático se presenta como la única alternativa para explicar su presencia en el discurso.

3.1. Los conceptos de "transaccional" e "interaccional"

Brown y Yule definen estos conceptos del modo siguiente:

> That function which language serves in the expression of 'content' we will describe as *transactional*, the general assumption being that the most important function of language is the communication of information. And the function involved in expressing social relations and personal attitudes we will describe as *interactional*. (1983: 1)

La distinción entre ambos conceptos es importante para el análisis de la función de *bueno*, aunque reconocemos con McCarthy (1991: 136) que: "the boundaries between transactional and interactional are blurred" y creemos que en el discurso se solapan continuamente; pero nos parece que *bueno* desempeña una función más relevante como marcador interaccional que transaccional. Puesto que no parece tener relevancia excesiva a la hora de interpretar el contenido proposicional de la enunciación, sospechamos que su función se realizaría más a nivel interaccional, donde sí importaría la actitud del hablante hacia su propio discurso o hacia el de los demás participantes. De ahí la importancia que para nosotros tiene el concepto de *participation framework* que Schiffrin (1987) incluye como parte de su modelo de discurso.

3.2. Marco de participación

Según Schiffrin

> The relationship between speaker and hearer and their utterances will also influence the way in which speaker and hearer relate to each other. So participation framework captures both speaker / hearer relations and speaker / utterance relations. (1987: 27)

Schiffrin considera el marco de participación como básicamente pragmático por naturaleza ya que afecta a las relaciones entre los participantes: de unos con otros y con respecto a lo que se está diciendo y se quiere decir. La función de *bueno* nos parece esencial aquí, al igual que en el caso de su correspondiente en inglés *well.* Schiffrin atribuye a *well* esta función:

> I will propose in addition that *well* functions in the participation framework of discourse, as oppossed, for example, to *oh* which functions to organize the information state... *well* is a respondent marker which anchors its user in an interaction when an upcoming contribution is not fully consonant with the prior coherence options. It is because this function displays a speaker in a particular participation status—respondent—that it functions in the participation framework. (1987: 102-103)

La pregunta que podríamos formular es por qué los hablantes utilizan este marcador u otros cuando parecen ser totalmente innecesarios a nivel semántico y sintáctico. Creemos que su función principal sería la de establecer y mantener las relaciones entre los participantes en una conversación. En el caso de *bueno* creemos que fundamentalmente contribuye a mantener la "buena relación" entre los participantes para evitar crear un conflicto comunicativo, suavizando el discurso negativo que atente contra la imagen del oyente.

3.3. Método de análisis

El método para analizar las funciones de *bueno* en la conversación ha consistido en comparar las funciones atribuidas a *well* en inglés con las posibles de *bueno* en castellano. Seguimos pues básicamente la aproximación funcional que Schiffrin (1987) hace en su estudio de los marcadores en inglés, por estimar que este trabajo supone el análisis más completo hecho hasta el momento sobre marcadores del discurso en inglés. Para el caso de *bueno*

también hemos tomado en consideración el estudio hecho por Cortés (1991) sobre expletivos, conectores y muletillas. Lo que aquí presentamos, por tanto, son los resultados de esa comparación.

Procedimos al análisis y clasificación de los ejemplos en los que aparecía *bueno* distinguiendo si afectaba a la conversación a nivel global o a nivel local, es decir si el uso de dicho marcador tenía un efecto local (para la elocución inmediatamente anterior o relativamente cercana) o un efecto global (si nos remitía más atrás en el discurso o afectaba por ejemplo a conclusiones de tipo general).

4. *BUENO* A NIVEL DE COHERENCIA LOCAL

4.1. Pares pregunta-respuesta

En estos casos *bueno* se utiliza para señalar una respuesta insuficiente o una respuesta que no se corresponde con las opciones ofrecidas por la pregunta. En nuestro corpus hemos encontrado tres ejemplos que reflejan este uso y que aparecen en posición inicial absoluta.

(1)
98	- V-	¿ Y esta tía pesa 50 kilos ? (+ 2 segundos)
99	- E-	¿Qué no ?
100	- V-	Tú no puedes ir por la vida con 50 k.¡ Gorda!
101	- C-	¿ Pesa 50 kg?
102	- V-	¡ Gorda!
103	- R-	**Bueno,** el otro día me dijo eso.
104	- C-	Será 60.[2]

(2)
16	-M-	¿El queso le deja a uno despierto? Como si le quita el sueño a uno, porque lleva[3] dos noches sin dormir y se ha tomado una Coca-Cola.
17	-S-	**Bueno,** pues tómate una tila.

En 101, C formula una pregunta cuestionando el peso de E. R precede su respuesta con *bueno* señalando la imposibilidad de precisar la información solicitada y de conformarse con las opciones ofrecidas por la pregunta (sí o no), dando en su lugar una respuesta indirecta.

En términos de Stenström, esto podría clasificarse como el tipo de respuesta que ella denomina <supplies>:

> <Supplies> are non-committal. B neither provides the information required, nor does he abstain from giving one, albeit inadequate, information which is somehow related to Q . . . <supplies> answer a different Q. . . . From B's point of view, <supplies> constitute a very convenient way of responding. They give him a chance to cooperate by stating whatever he knows even if he does not possess the exact information. (1984: 192)

4.2. Petición de confirmación o ampliación de información

Bueno aparece en casos de respuestas que no se conforman con las deducciones que otros participantes puedan hacer de las enunciaciones previas. Así por ejemplo en (3):

(3)
91	-C-	No me lo digas, porque en Nottingham todo el mundo es joven.
92	-A-	Esto se acaba.
93	-M-	Sí.
94	-A-	Nos hacemos abuelas a la carrera.
95	-C-	Ey. ¿No ves que todo el mundo está empezando primero, segundo, tercero? Que son tres años, o sea que el más mayor allí tiene 22.
97	-A-	Claro, serán veinti algo.
98	-C-	**Bueno**, no, pero este año tengo amigos que tienen veintiséis o eso.

A asume que si toda la gente tiene edades comprendidas entre dieciocho y veintitres años, los amigos de C también tendrán esa edad. Sin embargo la deducción hecha por A no es correcta, así que C contesta con una enunciación que inicia con *bueno* y que le permite aclarar que su situación es diferente. La función de *bueno* es aquí la de señalar que la respuesta va a diferir de las opciones ofrecidas por la petición de confirmación.

El uso de *bueno* a nivel local podría resumirse pues como marcador de divergencia con respecto a las opciones ofrecidas por las preguntas o peticiones de confirmación, adelantando al oyente que su respuesta no va a ser la esperada, bien porque el hablante no está en posesión del conocimiento necesario para contestar o porque no desea hacerlo. Cuando las respuestas se apartan de las opciones ofrecidas por la enunciación anterior *bueno* aparece en posición inicial. Podríamos concluir pues que *bueno* se utiliza para señalar un discurso "incoherente" con respecto a las expectativas creadas por la enunciación anterior.

5. "BUENO" A NIVEL GLOBAL

5.1. Reflexión sobre el discurso propio y corrección de ese discurso

Se ha afirmado muchas veces que, a diferencia de lo que ocurre cuando escribimos, mientras hablamos no podemos reflexionar sobre lo que vamos a decir o cómo decirlo. Así pues las correcciones serían algo muy corriente en el habla ya que recurrimos a ellas con frecuencia para llegar a expresar aquello que queremos precisar.

A nuestro juicio el papel de los marcadores del discurso es esencial e insustituible en estos casos. Si pensamos no sólo en los ejemplos del corpus, sino en otros que hayamos podido escuchar, nos encontramos con expresiones como: *o sea, es decir, bueno,* entre otros, que nos permiten reflexionar sobre lo que vamos a decir, (ya que tras ellos se produce normalmente una pausa) y sobre lo que ya hemos dicho. Estas expresiones, que actúan como marcadores, establecen una barrera entre el discurso anterior y el que va a tener lugar, señalando la relación entre ambos y ayudando a introducir una modificación en el discurso. Este es el caso del ejemplo (4):

(4) 13- -A- Tú a la tuya+. No, decía que como no tengo mucha faena estas Pascuas, **bueno**, sí que tengo teóricamente, pero aún no he empezado a estudiar los temas de la oposición.

Otro caso de modificación del discurso sería lo que Du Bois (1974) clasifica como 'claim editing': "the speaker modifies a claim he decides is excessive or a description he decides is too extravagant", como sería el ejemplo (5).

(5) 12- -M- Hoy hace calor. **Bueno**, calor no.

Otras veces las correciones precedidas por *bueno* se adelantan al discurso que sigue. Interpretamos pues que el hablante utiliza *bueno* para señalar a los oyentes que su contribución no es la que realmente quería hacer; señalaría un cambio de dirección en el discurso, sería un *anticipador*, un mecanismo de corrección que anticipa información por llegar. La enunciación se interrumpe y queda incompleta, el uso de *bueno* justifica esta "agramaticalidad" y ayuda a corregir el discurso:

(6) 1 - -M- ( ) de contar, yo no tengo nada que contar!

2 - -A- ¡ Mentirosa !
3 - -C- ¡ Ay que trolera !
4 - -A- No digas mentiras. Si no sabemos nada de ti.
5 - -M- Pero si, si estoy siempre*** **Bueno**, mentira. No voy nunca a Valencia.

En estos ejemplos los hablantes estan tratando su discurso como algo de lo que tienen que dar cuenta, que ha de ser modificado, corregido o sustituido (incluso cuando ni siquiera ha ocurrido) y expresan ese discurso como contenido proposicional que ha de ser atendido y controlado con el mismo cuidado con el que analizamos el de nuestro interlocutor para asegurarnos de que estamos interpretando el mensaje correctamente. Los marcadores del discurso y en concreto *bueno* facilitan esta tarea al hablante.

5.2. Correcciones de fondo

Schiffrin (1987: 300) define *background repairs* como "subordinate asides which provide information to modify and/or supplement hearers' understanding of surrounding material" y afirma que una vez que el hablante incluye estas digresiones en su discurso repite o parafrasea el material que había sido interrumpido. *Bueno* al igual que *well* en inglés, cumple también esta función en castellano:

(7) 45 - -M- Sí: Es que es un chico —**Bueno**, bajo de mi casa es como si fueran mis tíos ¿no? Y los hijos, el mayor...[4]

Por medio de la corrección precedida por *bueno,* M da información que ella considera necesaria para entender su discurso. Están hablando sobre la posibilidad que M tiene de trabajar en un banco e intenta explicar quién le dio esa información. Comienza con un impreciso "es un chico", al darse cuenta de que esto puede resultar muy vago añade, precedido de *bueno*, la información adicional necesaria que justificaría por qué se lo ha dicho a ella y no a cualquier otra persona.

5.3. Cambios en el centro deíctico del discurso

> Deictic elements define the deictic centre of an utterance, i.e. the locus from which speaker, hearer, time and place coordinates are

> fixed, and are thus assigned a context-specific interpretation. (Schiffrin 1987: 323)

Schiffrin argumenta que *well* concentra la atención en el hablante u oyente, puesto que aquel que utiliza *well* se está definiendo a si mismo como demandado en relación a las expectativas del hablante anterior, quien a su vez se verá obligado a alterar sus expectativas sobre el discurso que va a tener lugar. Para Schiffrin, *well* converge tanto sobre el discurso anterior como sobre el posterior.

Bueno, al igual que *well*, marca cambios en la orientación del discurso que son creados por el estilo indirecto en el que probablemente el tiempo, lugar y autor no coinciden con el momento en el que se narra ese discurso. *Bueno* marca el cambio de estilo indirecto a directo. Muchos de los casos precedidos por *bueno* son respuestas reproducidas/repetidas. En el ejemplo (8) V está contando una conversación que tuvo con su madre acerca de los cambios que los jóvenes de hoy han sufrido, comparándolo con su época:

(8) 118 -V- Mi madre contándome pues yo salía y con una peseta me compraba yo de todo. Y encima ya había comido. Y me compraba para regaliz. Y me guardaba dinero para la semana que viene. Yo, "**Bueno**, joder".

Cuando se produce un cambio de hablante, éste se inicia con *bueno* seguido de las palabras exactas pronunciadas en el momento en que ocurría la conversación. En el ejemplo que sigue se observa además el cambio de tiempo verbal: de pasado a presente, que suele acompañar a estos cambios de estilo indirecto a directo:

(9) 149 -E- Y me levanté y digo "**Bueno**, y qué, ¿a casita a la noche o qué pasa ?"

El marcador actúa como puente entre los dos tiempos verbales señalando que esto va a ocurrir.

En los ejemplos que hemos visto, *bueno* precede autocorrecciones (lo que se denomina *self-repairs*) hechas por los hablantes a nivel estructural o ideacional. En el nivel estructural se produce un cambio de estilo indirecto a directo. A nivel ideacional o de contenido señalan al oyente que lo que van a decir es relevante con el discurso anterior y por lo tanto coherente.

5.4. Protección de la propia imagen

Lo que nosotros hemos llamado protección de la propia imagen se observa a dos niveles que hemos clasificado como nivel pragmático y nivel de contenido. A nivel pragmático este recurso es utilizado por los hablantes para protegerse de una imagen negativa resultado de su propia contribución en la conversación. A nivel de contenido discursivo marca un abandono por parte del hablante de cualquier compromiso con su discurso.

En (10) le han preguntado a M sobre cierta información que ella posee sobre cambios que se iban a operar en la enseñanza primaria y media. A y C se niegan a creer que falta tanto tiempo para que todos estos cambios propuestos empiecen a funcionar y lo manifiestan con 176-177, que sin duda muestran una falta de aprecio por la afirmación de M.

(10) 174 -C- Noventa y nueve. Faltan diez años.
175 -M- Faltan nueve.
176 -A- ¿Tan despacio?
177 -C- ¿Nueve? ¡Pero hija!
178 -M- **Bueno**, eso nos dijeron en el C.A.P., seguro ya.

Ante tal situación M se siente evidentemente "amenazada". Los otros dos participantes en la conversación parecen poner en duda lo que M dice. Su reacción podría ser descrita en los siguientes términos: no contesta a la pregunta y da una respuesta evasiva atribuyendo su discurso a otra persona y librándose así de cualquier compromiso con lo dicho, salvando así la propia imagen. Stenström encuentra que *well* es utilizado de la misma forma en las respuestas que ella denomina <evades>:

> <Evades> reflect that B is able but not willing to provide the information required, or, occasionally, that he does not want to reveal his inability to give an adequate R[esponse]. The reasons for choosing an evasive manouvre vary; B may for instance want to get out of an awkward situation and save his own face, or he may wish not to offend a third party. (1984: 193)

5.5. Interrupción

Bueno aparece también en las conversaciones con la función de interruptor; suaviza la interrupción y le permite al hablante tomar el turno de habla.

(11) 77 -A- > Lo pensaba, o sea pensaba celebrarlo hoy un poco así a lo grande y tal, pero luego me he arrepentido porque ha llegado el día y &

78 -M- **Bueno**, yo es que hablo como... [risas]
79 -A- > porque ha llegado el día y he dicho ( )

En 78 M trata de tomar el turno y utiliza *bueno* para iniciar su enunciación: interpretamos este uso del marcador como recurso por parte del hablante que interrumpe, de manera que aparece como cooperador, a la vez que está haciendo algo no cooperativo: una interrupción. Sin el uso de *bueno* probablemente sería considerado como un acto poco cortés, pero se suaviza con el uso de este marcador.

En algunos ejemplos, *bueno* se utiliza para retomar el tema tras la interrupción:

(12) 20 -C- yo vi a Marian el otro día y me dijo que este año no se iba a presentar, pero que al añ*** que se habían juntado no sé cuanta gente y que habían [reelaborado los temas.
21 -A- ¿ Hecho un equipo] y [tal? ¡ Qué guay!
22 -C- sí:, sí,] que habían hecho mucha faena. **Bueno**, parece ser que los los temas no estaban muy bien hechos.
23 -A- Sí.
24 -C- Y ellos los los han reorganizado, los han vuelto a elaborar.

Tras la interrupción de A en 21, C contesta a su pregunta y vuelve a lo que trataba de explicar iniciando su enunciación con *bueno*. *Bueno* señala que su discurso tiene relación con el anterior (coherencia discursiva) y le permite además reafirmar lo que realmente quería decir: no estaba interesada en el hecho de que habían formado un equipo sino en el hecho de que estaban reelaborando los temas.

5.6. Abandono del turno de habla

De la misma forma que *bueno* se utiliza para tomar el turno, también aparece como recurso para abandonarlo o ceder la palabra a otro hablante:

(13) 98- -R- Nos hicimos*** ¡Dos coca-colas 600 pelas! Cuando salimos de allí: **Bueno** ya:

(14) 15- -M- Y justamente el sábado por la mañana que es cuando más faena hay en mi casa + **Bueno** en mi casa...

Los participantes suspenden y dejan sin terminar sus enunciaciones encabezadas por *bueno*. En cierta forma es como si se diera por supuesto que

el oyente es capaz de deducir y completar la enunciación. Stemström hace referencia a este fenómeno en conversaciones entre gente conocida, que es también el caso de los participantes en nuestro corpus: "Since intimate speakers share a great deal more common ground than distant speakers, they do not have to be very explicit in order to be correctly understood, whereas distant speakers have to be more careful" (1984: 190).

5.7. Cambio de tópico conversacional

Bueno desempeña un papel importante a la hora de cambiar de tema o de volver a uno anterior o incluso de cerrar temas y/o abrir otros nuevos. Los ejemplos que veremos ahora son prueba de ello:

(15) 27 -Ma- ¡Qué abuelos estamos hechos ya!
28 -A- Abuelos abuelos.
29 -C- Yo no me lo creo todavía.
30 -Ma- ¡Qué pasada!
31 -A- Abuelos. **Bueno**, ¿entonces qué hago?

(16) 46 -M- ( ) oye llama.
47 -S- ¡Ay! Después.
48 -M- ¿Sabes que tengo que llamar a F?
49 -J- **Bueno**, mañana os vengo a limpiar la piscina.

En los dos casos la brusquedad de un cambio de tema de conversación es suavizada por el uso de *bueno*. *Bueno* es utilizado aquí como recurso que permite al hablante interrumpir el tema que se está tratando e iniciar otro nuevo. Svartvik (1980) encuentra que *well* también precede cambios de tema totales o parciales.

5.8. Cierre conversacional

Bueno se utiliza también para señalar que la conversación ha finalizado, o bien que un determinado hablante desea abandonarla. Es lo que Sacks and Schegloff (1974) llaman "pre-closing device".

(17) 42 -M- Sí, pues cierra si quieres. Apaga las luces primero. **Bueno**, yo te dejo. Tú ya más o menos sabes ¿no?
43 -A- Sí. Más o menos.
44 -M- Más o menos. **Bueno**, hasta luego.

(18) 430 -M- Pues sí que he ido de todos los colores, eso es verdad.
431 -A- **Bueno**, me voy.

Bueno suaviza la interrupción y además sirve para "pedir permiso" para abandonar la conversación de manera cooperativa. Los mismos ejemplos sin el marcador sonarían mucho más bruscos e incluso denotarían mal gusto por parte del hablante.

6. CONCLUSIONES

Como ya dijimos en nuestra introducción, este trabajo pretendía ilustrar provisionalmente, en una selección de casos, el uso de *bueno* en conversaciones cotidianas. Las argumentaciones sobre el uso de este marcador no permiten la justificación tradicional. Los usos de *bueno* descritos en las gramáticas tradicionales, principalmente como adverbio y/o adjetivo, como exclamación o interjección, no son suficientes para explicar la variedad tan amplia de funciones que, como ya hemos visto, desempeña. Nos atrevemos a afirmar que los vocablos que en la gramática tradicional son clasificados como "voces de relleno", y que para nosotros son en su gran mayoría marcadores, no pueden clasificarse como tal porque se ignoran muchos aspectos fundamentales para entender la conversación cotidiana: principalmente la relación hablante-oyente y la relación del hablante con su propio discurso y hacia el discurso de los demás participantes. Nuestro enfoque ha intentado poner de manifiesto la pluralidad funcional de estos elementos en la conversación, función esencial a la hora de "juzgar" la "naturalidad" en el lenguaje hablado. Un estudio pormenorizado de los marcadores del discurso y sus funciones entre distintas lenguas, tal y como hemos hecho con *bueno*, sin duda contribuirá muy positivamente a la enseñanza de lenguas extranjeras.a

NOTAS

1. La media es de unos 500 turnos. En los ejemplos aparece la inicial del nombre del participante y delante de cada turno un número que corresponde a la enumeracón de turnos dentro de cada conversación de donde procede el extracto.

2. En (1) los participantes están hablando de si han engordado o no. En las dos intervenciones anteriores E se ha quejado de que estaba gorda. V le sigue la corriente diciendo que 50 Kg es mucho peso.

En (2) S y M están hablando, se oye el timbre y vuelve M a la habitación con J y explica lo de las dificultades de J para dormir. Se deduce que se lo ha dicho de camino a la habitación. El tono de la conversación es de broma.

3. Aquí se referiere a J, que aparece más tarde en la conversación. De ahí la referencia verbal a un tercero.

4. En esta conversación hablan de un "chico" que ha conseguido un trabajo. Empieza a hablar del chico pero immediatamente con la corrección empieza a hablar de su familia y la relación que tiene con ellos.

Signos utilizados en las transcripciones

( )	Ininteligible
+	Pausa corta (hasta 3 seg)
++	Pausa: más de tres segundos.
>	Señala el punto donde un hablante es interrumpido. Esto sólo aparece marcado si el hablante vuelve a tomar su discurso en el punto donde se le había interrumpido tan pronto como toma el turno de nuevo..
<	Punto donde el hablante toma el discurso que le habían interrumpido.
[ ]	Participantes diferentes hablando al mismo tiempo. "[" señala donde empieza. "]" señala donde acaba.
#	El hablante toma el turno sin ni siquiera la mínima pausa que es normal entre turnos. No llega a la interrupción.
&	Interrupción.
***	Discurso incompleto: el hablante interrumpe su discurso para modificarlo, parafrasearlo, y suele quedar incompleto.
:	Alargamiento de vocal.
Negrita.	La utilizamos en los ejemplos para señalar los casos a los que nos estamos refiriendo y analizando en ese texto.

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FREQUENCY AND VARIABILITY IN ERRORS IN THE USE OF ENGLISH PREPOSITIONS

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O. INTRODUCTION

For a long time teachers of English as a foreign language have been aware of the great difficulty that Spanish students encounter in mastering English prepositions. Teachers' intuitions are corroborated by studies which have shown the complexity of this part of speech for Spanish learners of English from all levels (Moreno and Ruiz 1986, Benitez and Simón 1990, Morales 1992). The feature is not restricted to any particular group of students since the foremost position of preposition errors in lists of the most frequent error types compiled from learners of English of different nationalities has been reported by researchers in the field of second language acquisition (Politzer and Ramirez 1973, Khampang 1974, Lococo 1976, Meriö 1978, Azevedo 1980, Meziani 1984, González Royo 1986).

The studies cited above differ in some respects but share the common purpose of determining the frequency of either general common errors or specific errors in learners of a L2. Moreover, there is evidence of the difficulty experienced by native speakers of both English and Spanish in using prepositions correctly (Shaughnessy 1977, Benítez and Simón 1990).

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In order to explain the frequency of this particular error, some researchers (French 1949; Haastrup et al 1984; García 1993) have claimed that the sheer number of prepositions in English as well as their high degree of polysemy make the task of systematization nearly impossible. This is reflected in the confusion found not only in grammar books but also in English language textbooks. Particularly in the latter, care is not always taken to emphasize important aspects such as that a given preposition has more than one meaning depending on the context or that some verbs require an obligatory preposition. Fernández (1994: 52) remarks that students learn verbs without learning that they may require a following specific preposition.

Works that contrast English and Spanish are relevant in this connexion since they predict the main problematic areas for speakers of these languages. Swan and Smith (1987) have pointed out the difficulty that Spanish and Catalan learners of English have with sentences like "I don't know who they're working for," since in Spanish and Catalan prepositions must always go with their noun phrase and cannot be end placed. Similarly, they predict that these two groups of learners will tend to follow the preposition plus infinitive construction of their native languages rather than make the necessary structural transformations that are necessary to express the same idea in English. Thus,

> *Spanish:* Después de ver la película nos fuimos a casa
> *English:* After seeing the film, we went home

Correa (1989) and González (1992) have analyzed four English prepositions of location: "in," "on," "at" and "over" and contrasted them with their Spanish counterparts finding them to overlap in many cases. In her study, González predicts that due to the interference of Spanish, students of English will tend to use

> a) "in" in contexts where "on" and "at" are required
> b) "on" in contexts where either "over" or "in" are required
> c) "of" in contexts where "in" or "on" are required

If we do not restrict our analysis to prepositions but take a broad perspective to include all the learners' common errors, we find that interference of the mother tongue (L1) in the foreign language (L2) has been one of the most frequent explanations of errors. The premise underlying this hypothesis is that similarities between the two languages (L1 and L2) facilitate learning while differences hinder it and as a result errors occur in

the L2. This hypothesis has received a great amount of criticism from many sectors but especially from the well known quarters of Error Analysis and Interlanguage. A review of this literature falls without the scope of this paper, but it is worth mentioning that it was from this perspective that the concept of learner's language systematicity was introduced.[1] Errors were considered then to be positive and systematic, which means that they are internally consistent and rule-governed.

In the last decade, in tune with tendencies in sociolinguistics, researchers of second language acquisition, Ellis (1985) Tarone (1988) have argued the existence of systematic variation in the production of second language learners. This variation can be explained and predicted in advance. It includes both the variability caused by individual learner factors and the variability caused by both the situational context or the linguistic context. With regard to the former, Pavesi (1987) has proved the effect of different kinds of linguistic exposure—classroom versus naturalistic—on the variability and systematicity of the production of prepositions of location by Italian speakers. With regard to the latter, several theories, in particular those which follow the sociolinguist Labov, assume that the linguistic context determines the variability in the forms of interlanguage. In Ellis's words, "it can be shown that the choice of one linguistic form rather than another is influenced by the linguistic elements that precede or follow the variable structure in question" (1987: 7). Some studies have shown that the presence or absence of elements respond to systematic principles. This means that certain linguistic contexts favour the production of correct forms whereas others hinder it. For instance, in a compound sentence, the omission of the verb "To be" tends to occur in the second clause and not in the first one. Similarly, the morpheme -s in the third person singular tends to be omitted in the second clause of compound sentences while the omission is less frequent in independent clauses (Ellis 1988).

1. OBJECTIVES

This study aims to describe the patterns of difficulty and the variability observed in the incorrect use of English prepositions in a descriptive composition written by Spanish speakers studying English as a compulsory subject in three state secondary schools. In particular we wish to answer the following research questions:

a) What are the most frequent errors in a descriptive composition?

b) Is there variability in the frequency of preposition errors among students of different state secondary schools?

c) Can we find any patterns of variability for preposition errors related to the linguistic contexts in which they occur?

2. HYPOTHESES

We hope to support the following hypotheses:

a) Preposition errors use will be among the three most common errors in a list of ten found in a descriptive composition.

b) The frequency of preposition errors will be similar for students of three different secondary schools.

c) Preposition errors will appear in some linguistic contexts but not in others.

We believe that this study has interest for language teachers because it gives them information based on real data about the recurrence of preposition errors in descriptive compositions. Likewise, this study contributes to filling a gap in the research of second language acquisition since most studies of Error Analysis and Interlanguage have focused on phonology and morphosintaxis and excluded the analysis of preposition errors. The rare studies which have dealt with the acquisition of prepositions either limit their analysis to a few prepositions, or use a very reduced number of informants or fail to report percentages of errors.[2] Finally, we hope to contribute to the research on variability in Interlanguage studies with a tentative qualitative analysis of the linguistic contexts where errors of preposition use appear in a descriptive writing task. Most of the research into the influence of linguistic context on the patterns of interlanguage variability has focussed on phonological features but little research has been done on other language components. We share Ellis and Roberts' opinion when they say that "by identifying how the learner varies in the use of L2 and by relating the patterns of observed variation to contextual variables, the researcher is able to study how different aspects of the context affect SLA" (1987: 4).

3. THE STUDY

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Samples

The corpus of this study is based on 290 essays written by third year students of English as a foreign language from three Spanish state secondary schools (Madrid, Pamplona, Calahorra): 118 males and 172 females between 16 and 19. The students had all completed at least two one-year courses in English and half of them had studied it in primary school. Due to differences in the amount of classroom exposure time their level varies from elementary to upper intermediate.[3]

3.1.2. Materials and Procedures

In order to help students focus their attention on the task, we used a visual prompt from Byrne (1967: 20). In the selection of this visual cue for eliciting interlanguage corpus, we followed Corder's (1981) recommendation to choose real and meaningful tasks suitable to the level of the learner. Participants were asked to write as much as possible about the photograph for thirty minutes during a normal school day. They were informed that the data was not to be used for student evaluation but for research and that communication and not accuracy was the most central aspect we were examining.

The collection of the corpus was followed by the coding, classification and processing of the data by means of the formal taxonomy described below and the computer programme DBASE III Plus.

We were aware beforehand that descriptive compositions tend to be characterized by the use of nouns, adjectives, present tense and a great number of prepositions which relate the referent to the particular setting. In other words, we assumed that by using a descriptive writing task we had greatly conditioned the type of linguistic data to be generated since a descriptive composition based on a photograph determines—more than other type of task—the obligatory contexts in which prepositions would appear.

3.1.3.Working definitions

We follow Dulay, Burt and Krashen (1982: 138) in defining error as "any deviation from a selected norm of mature language performance" and we take Standard English such as it is described in Quirk and Greenbaum (1985: 16) as the touchstone of what was or was not a preposition error.

Our classification of preposition errors is based on formal criteria which focus on the description of the surface alterations of linguistic items of the parts of speech.[4] Following Dulay, Burt and Krashen (1982: 150-163) we will describe and analyse patterns of variability according to three categories: omission, addition, and substitution. Errors of omission are described as "the absence of an item that must appear in a well-formed utterance" (1982: 154),

while "addition errors are characterized by the presence of an item which must not appear in a well-formed utterance" (1982: 156). We will use the category of substitution to refer to the use of a particular preposition instead of the one that is required by a linguistic context. It should be noted that we are using this category in a broad sense which includes spelling and misformation errors.

The main advantage of adopting a formal taxonomy to classify errors is that this allows for descriptive analysis in itself without considering the possible causes of the error. Although this type of classification has been criticised as being rather limited it has also had its advocates. Among others, Hammarberg (1974) and Abbot (1980) have noted that a rigorous description and categorization of formal features of errors is the first step that should be adopted by the researcher.

We will follow Quirk and Greenbaum for the definition of preposition. For the terminology to be used in a description of the linguistic contexts where preposition errors are detected we will follow Downing and Locke (1992). Quirk and Greenbaum define the preposition in this way:

> In the most general terms, a preposition expresses a relation between two entities, one being that represented by the prepositional complement, the other by another part of the sentence. The prepositional complement is characteristically a noun phrase, a nominal wh-clause, or a nominal -ing clause. (1985: 657)

We believe that if a student makes a lot of preposition errors it simply means that s/he has difficulties with this part of speech. Nevertheless, we are conscious that the absence of errors does not imply that a student has no difficulty in this area. As several researchers have observed (Schachter 1974; Kleinmann 1977), it may well be that the student is avoiding those structures in which s/he does not feel secure. Although in general terms we agree with these researchers, we think that the avoidance strategy does not apply to prepositions. Their great number as well as the relating functions they hold in the sentence makes avoiding them nearly impossible. For this reason, we believe that a predominance of preposition errors can be accurately understood as being a real symptom of the difficulty of learning a second language. The more frequent an error is, the more problematic that area of learning will be. We assume, as Stockwell (1965: 282) did a long time ago, that a one-to-one correspondence will be the easiest to learn. Nevertheless we do not assume Stockwell's hierarchy of difficulty, mainly because the

purpose of our study is not to establish levels of difficulty but to examine recurrence of errors and patterns of variability in prepositions and also, in part, because we believe that the difficulty of learning—and in consequence linguistic variability—depends on the task the student is engaged in (Lococo 1976, Koda 1993). As we have stated above, by using a descriptive composition we are forcing the student to use more prepositions than s/he might have to use in other types of tasks as, for instance, argumentative writing.

3.2. Results

3.2.1. Quantitative analysis

Table 1 summarizes the general data obtained and helps to contextualize the analysis following the tables.

Table 1. Data on the descriptive composition

Total number of compositions	290
Total number of errors coded	3427
Average number of errors per composition	13
Standard Deviation	8
Average number of words per paper	106

Standard Deviation	43

Table 2 displays the distribution of the ten most frequent errors in the writing task analysed together with their absolute and relative frequency.

Table 2: The ten most frequent errors

Order type	*Errors*	*%*
1. Substitution of Preposition	407	11.88
2. Substitution of Noun	397	11.58
3. Substitution of Verb Tense	397	11.58
4. Substitution of Verb	284	8.29
5. Wrong order	114	3.33
6. Addition of Preposition	111	3.24
7. Omission of Preposition	127	3.71
8. Substitution of Article	109	3.18
9. Substitution of Possessive	102	2.98
10. Substitution of Participle	83	2.42

The figures reveal without any doubt that the preposition error is the most frequent one in this top ten list. Not only does it hold the first place but also appears in the sixth and seventh ranking.

Although these data are interesting in themselves we need to extend our analysis by means of adding two more perspectives: that of the formal taxonomy used and the percentage of the students who have made a preposition error. As shown in Table 3, 180 students (75.89%) made substitution errors in

comparison with 81 (33.89%) and 79 students (33.05%) who made addition and omission errors.

Table 3: Percentage of Prep. Errors per category and student

Category of error	Students %
Substitution	180 75.31
Addition	81 33.89
Omission	79 33.05

Finally, Table 4 shows the number and percentage of the students in each centre who made any of the three types of errors of preposition.

Table 4: Distribution of categories and frequencies in each centre

Error	Madrid (%)	Pamplona (%)	Calahorra (%)
Substitution	84 (85.71)	56 (73.68)	40 (61.54)
Addition	36 (36.73)	21 (27.63)	24 (36.92)
Omission	29 (29.59)	29 (38.16)	21 (32.31)

3.2.2. Qualitative analysis

From close analysis of the students' interlingual sentences we observe two outstanding features. In the first place, we find that preposition errors appear more in certain linguistic contexts and never in others. For instance, we do not observe errors in patterns of *nominal wh-clauses* or *nominal -ing clauses*. Secondly, this qualitative analysis gives evidence of the variability of the patterns of preposition errors according to each formal category .

The following is a description of the type of linguistic contexts in which we have detected preposition errors. We will illustrate each of these linguistic contexts by means of examples selected from the corpus.[5]

Substitution

Students produced these errors in four different types of linguistic contexts:

a) Prepositional phrases denoting position and direction functioning as an adverbial subject complement as in (1) and as adverbial as in (2) and (3).

1) * The handbag was in the bench (on the bench)
2) * He was walking for the path (on)
3) * There was a lot of money into the handbag (in)

b) Sentences with prepositional verbs especially in the pattern "verb + preposition + noun/pronoun":

4) * The woman waited to the man (for)
5) * A man is looking to the handbag (at)
6) * It depends of her (on)

c) Sentences containing a ditransitive verb with a patient object and a recipient object:

7) * The woman gave some money at the old man (to)
8) * He has given it at Mrs Wilson (to)
9) * She gives the money for me (to)

Addition

Although a frequent error in itself, when compared to the category of errors described above the addition of an unnecessary preposition is less frequent. Nevertheless, as can be seen by the following examples, addition appears in

different types of linguistic contexts and also there is more variety than in the other formal categories analysed.

a) Sentences with the pattern “Subject + verb + direct object." In most of the cases the verb is “invite," “thank," “help," “see” and “hear” and the direct object is a noun:

10) * Jim invited to Mathews to a party
11) * She thanked to her
12) * The woman saw at the man
13) * I help to my friends
14) * She heard to the man

b) Preceding a possessive:

15)* You forget about your handbag
16)* She was trying to remember of his office appointment
17)* Her house was near of ours

c) Double preposition in post verbal linguistic contexts functioning either as adverbial or adverbial subject complement:

18) * She went quickly after of the end of the classes
19) * The man ran behind of Mary
20) * It was about at 7 in the afternoon
21) * She walked around for the park

d) Following quantifying adjectives:

22) *She gave some of money
23) * He gives something of money (some money)
24) * Have you any of money?

e) Preceding words which exclude the use of prepositions in some obligatory contexts:

25) * I had to go at home

f) Unnecessary addition of “for” in purpose clauses:

26) * She was dressing for to go her friends’ party (to go, in order to go)
27)) * They did not have money for to buy it (to buy)

Omission

As we have seen above the figures for the relative frequency of preposition omission is similar to that of preposition addition (33,5%). We have encountered omission of preposition in different linguistic contexts:

a) Omission of "to" in sentences that contain a ditranstitive verb followed by a patient and a recipient complement (direct + indirect):

28) * this man gave the handbag her owner (to her owner)
29) * Mary gives her address the man (to the man)

b) Omission of "to" followed by omission of "it" as direct complement:

30) * He ran for give her (to give it to her)
31) * The man gave her (it to her)

c) Omission of "to" in the context of it in the function of direct object (the pronoun "it" is usually omitted):

32) * The woman looked the man (at)
33) * She listened him (to)

d) Omission of the preposition introducing the predicator complement that follows verbs of movement:

34) * She went the park (to the park)
35) * He ran the lady (towards the lady)

4. CONCLUSIONS

The results of this study indicate that English prepositions are difficult for third year Spanish secondary students. Our first hypothesis (see point 2) is clearly confirmed by their appearance in first, fifth and sixth position on the list of frequent errors. The high percentage of relative frequency of errors of preposition as well as their systematic presence in the three centres of our sample confirms the results observed by other researchers already cited in our

introduction (Lococo 1976, Politzer and Ramirez 1973, Kampang 1974, Moreno and Ruiz 1986).

Our second hypothesis in which we predicted that the frequency of preposition errors would be the same for the three centres of our sample has proved to be true only in part. Although preposition errors are certainly very numerous in the three centres examined there is also a clear variation shown by the different percentages of frequency. It would have been interesting to have controlled other variables such as the type of methodology used, the style of teaching, the type and the intensity of input given to the students as well as their proficiency in the language as determined by the length of classroom time received. This would have allowed us to interpret any changes of variation as a consequence of these variables. Unfortunately, we did not do this, obviously a limitation for the interpretation of the results of our study. Nevertheless we believe they offer a good start for a further study in which we could investigate whether preposition errors vary according to the type and the intensity of the input the student receives.

Preposition errors are certainly very common but they are not all of the same kind. Their variability is shown by the different percentages obtained in the three formal categories we have analyzed. We have seen how substitution errors are more common than omission and addition errors. The differences in percentages are not surprising as there are studies that report that omission and addition errors tend to occur in beginners.

The data gathered also allow us to confirm our third hypothesis: preposition errors appear in some linguistic contexts but not in others. We have seen how there is variability of the patterns in which substitution, addition and omission errors occur.

However interesting these results may be, they cannot be extrapolated to the whole population of Spanish secondary students. Further studies are needed in which care should be taken to use a random sample and to include students with different proficiency degrees. For example, it would be convenient to find out whether there is variability in the frequencies of errors attached to formal categories in beginners and intermediate students. In the same way, in order to achieve a more accurate picture of the difficulties, a study should include the incorrect prepositions use but correct use as well. It is also necessary to validate this study be means of a quantitative analysis of the linguistic contexts where preposition errors occur.

Nevertheless, one of the most positive aspects of this study is that the sample used contained a large number of students. This together with the high frequency of preposition errors detected gives us sound reasons to be-

lieve that English prepositions must be considered as a difficult area for Spanish learners of English. But as stated above, it is necessary to confirm these results by means of further studies in which other types of writing tasks as well as other types of formal contexts are included.

Finally, although it has not been the purpose of our study to show the interference or non-interference of Spanish in the commission of preposition errors, we want to call attention to the need for more studies in this specific area. We do not claim that interference is the only cause of preposition errors but most of the examples drawn from our corpus and already discussed in the preceding section can be interpreted as a literal translation from Spanish, particularly in examples 1, 2, 6, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 26, and 27. These results confirm González's prediction that Spanish learners of English tend to use "in" instead of "on" and "of" in contexts where "in" or "on" are required.

Prepositions errors do not seriously interfere with communication. But, as Norrish (1980: 111) remarks, "we cannot pretend that accuracy is totally unimportant." In our opinion, it is realistic to be aware of the social expectation that a speaker should be not only fluent but accurate, and that in any case official examinations exist in classroom contexts. In the end the students will be judged not only by their fluency but also by their accuracy.a

NOTES

1. The term "interlanguage" was introduced by Selinker (1969, 1972). See Selinker (1992) for a recent revision of the concept.

2. These studies usually give the absolute frequency but they do not report the relative frequency. That is, the proportion of errors to the number of words produced in each composition. This tendency is not exclusive to error analysis of prepositions but error analyses in general, as Schachter and Celcé Murcia remarked (1983).

3. In order to control the degree of proficiency in the language several steps were followed. First, all third year students from the three schools were asked to respond to a survey in which there were some items designed at getting information about the length and quality of exposure to the foreign language. Secondly, the students' final marks in second and third year of BUP were collected and analysed. Finally, the degree of proficiency in the language was measured by means of the "Profile Technique" for correcting compositions (Jacobs et. al. 1989). This technique is well accepted among researchers as an objective instrument to measure

effectiveness in communication as well as a reliable way to rank students according to their degree of proficiency in the language. As the objective of this study is not to correlate the degree of language proficiency and preposition errors in the use of English language we include neither the results of the survey nor the "Profile" results. The reader may refer to Jiménez (1992) for a detailed description of these issues.

4. This study forms part of a large scale research project in which 90 error types were classified in order to correlate their frequencies with several individual and social variables. For further details on this classification as well as results of this research the reader may refer to Jiménez Catalán (1992).

5. An asterisk is used to mark the sentence containing a preposition error, and brackets for the suggested correction. Most of the examples have been shortened and in some cases some corrections have been made in order to illustrate the preposition error only.

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a

THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF A COLONIAL SUBJECT: OTHELLO

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> Is there in truth any difference between one racism and another? Do not all of them show the same collapse, the same bankruptcy of man?
> Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*

> Taking off his spectacles, as was his habit before enunciating a general truth, he looked into them sadly, and remarked that the darker races are physically attracted by the fairer, but not vice versa—not a matter for bitterness this, not a matter for abuse, but just a fact which any scientific observer will confirm.
> E. M. Forster, *A Passage to India*

I. TRAVEL NARRATIVES AND AFRICA

As Edward Said remarks, it is something of a commonplace to hear that literature and culture in general are politically and historically innocent, and that, more specifically, knowledge about Shakespeare, among many other writers, is not political. But as Said concludes, that is not the case (1979: 27), espe-

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cially so when we examine the "racial disturbances," to use John Salway's words, which appear in some of Shakespeare's plays. Characters such as Caliban, Shylock, Aaron or Othello bring up racial issues which are central to the dramatic action of the plays, to the history of their interpretation, and to their stage history, and which demand our critical attention. Of all the strange and monstrous characters which abound in Shakespeare's plays, from the distinctive portrayal of Shylock as a Jew to the description of Caliban as an ugly and deformed slave, perhaps the most shocking are the spectacles of blackness presented for Elizabethan audiences in characters such as Aaron and Othello, a plain black villain the former, a gallant Moor the latter.

As Jones explains in *Othello's Countrymen*, African characters of varying colours—generally called "moors"—were part of the London stage tradition. Devils in the medieval mystery play had black faces, the participants of the Morris dance had their faces blackened up, and a set character in the medieval mummers plays was the "king of Egypt," who had a black face (Jones 1971b: 28). The Elizabethans distinguished between black Moors or Negroes whose blackness and malignity was emphasized in the text, and the white or tawny Moor, portrayed as a dignified oriental but, as Jones explains, still capable of the cruelty credited to all Moors (Jones 1971b: 86-87). Whereas Aaron appears simply as the cruel black Moor, different accounts have gone into different aspects of Othello's blackness: some are concerned with the precise shade of his blackness, others claim he was a tawny or white Moor, others that he was the villanous type of black Moor, or that he was just a confusion of the two types. But whatever shade of black Othello was in Shakespeare's imagination is not the crucial issue. What is more important, as Loomba remarks, is the fact that black was a "political colour" and for Elizabethan audiences the colour of "the other" (1989: 50). Therefore race becomes a relevant issue in the study of a character which bears a "political colour" and which evokes a series of conventions and attitudes which were part of the already known and the culturally given. Moreover, Othello's "political colour" reveals itself as being more complex than Aaron's blackness in *Titus Andronicus*; while Aaron is a plain villain who internalizes the essence of black Moor (black man, black soul) and defines himself against all the rest, Othello is more aptly defined as a colonial subject or "washed Ethiop" who, in the Duke's racist words, "is far more fair than black" (II, ii 289).[1] Racial prejudice is equally the centre around which Iago articulates Othello's fall. He exploits the politics of colour in the play until he makes Othello internalize the black stereotype which was part of his loan culture.

The evolution of black as a political colour is fascinating. Although as Jordan explains in *White over Black* English voyagers did not touch upon the shores of West Africa until 1550, and the first native West Africans probably did not appear in London until 1554, black was already a "partisan colour" before the 16th century. Its meaning included "deeply stained with dirt; soiled, dirty, foul. . . . Having dark or deadly purposes, malignant; pertaining to or involving death, deadly; baneful, disastrous, sinister etc." White, its direct opposite, conveyed purity, beauty and the principle of good versus evil (*Oxford Dictionary* 1978; rpt. 1933). The Church Fathers such as St. Jerome and St. Agustine, Jordan explains (1968: 7, 18), had already made the connection between blackness and sinfulness as they accepted the theory that Africans were descended from Ham's sons, an assumption which became universal in Christendom. Ham, "the accursed of God" for looking upon his father's nakedness as he lay drunk in his tent, was to be "a servant of servants." It was traditionally assumed that his dark skin marked and singled him out so that he could be recognized. The dark skin of the Negro becomes, as Sir Thomas Browne explains, "more than aesthetically displeasing; it becomes the symbol and the product of a moral taint as well" (quoted in Tokson 1982: 11). As if this mark of blackness was not enough to distinguish Ham's progeny, it was believed that Ham failed to teach his offspring any of the religious or social values held by his faith. Hence his sons, and the sons of his sons, degenerated into barbarism (Hodgen, quoted in Tokson 1982: 13). An alternative theory explained the curse of blackness as the result of Ham's disobeying Noah's commandment to his sons not to copulate with their wives out of reverence for and fear of God. But Ham, who knew that the first-born after the flood would inherit the dominion of the earth, had sex with his wife in order to dis-inherit the offspring of his other two brothers. As a punishment for his disobedience, Hakluyt writes in his *Principal Navigations*, God willed that a "son should be born whose name was Chus, who not only itself, but all his posteritie after him should be so blacke and loathsome, that it might remain a spectacle of disobedience to all the world. And of this blacke and cursed Chus came all these blacke Moors which are in Africa" (quoted in Tockson 1982: 14).[2]

When the English first started their voyages to Africa and encountered real Africans they found a referent and a recipient of blackness with all its negative connotations. As their accounts reveal, English travellers found no difficulty in further filling out the details and circumstances in which a people was cursed. Their theories, like those of their predecessors, clearly presented God's curse as having become attached to a race whose members could be

met with in 1578 in English cities with greater frequency. To the surprise of the English—and as if to invalidate the naturalistic theory which explained blackness as a consequence of exposure to the sun—the Africans brought to England had the ability to communicate their blackness to their offspring, even if they took fair English women as wives (Newman 1987: 146). This "natural infection" peculiar to the Africans had generated alarm by the end of the 16th century. Queen Elizabeth began to be discontented at the "great number of Negars and Blackamoors which . . . are crept into this realm," and in consequence issued two edicts in 1599 and 1601 in which she commanded that the infidels should be "discharged out of Her Majesty's dominions" (quoted in Jones 1971a: 20). The Queen complained about the great number of Africans, and about the fact that they were infidels, but perhaps more relevant to our topic is the fear of that "infection of blackness" latent in her words. "There are of late," wrote Elizabeth, "divers blackmoores brought into this realme, of which kinde of people there are allready to manie, considering howe God had blessed this land with great increase of people of our own nation" (quoted in Newman 1987: 148). These words reveal what we can call "the sexual bias" of the expulsion, and the fear of miscegenation —traditionally considered to be one of the causes of the lowering of the physical and mental standards (Fanon 1967: 120). Linked with the fear of miscegenation is the belief that, as George Abbot wrote in 1599, "the monsters of Africa . . . were bred when contrary kindes have coniunction the one with the other" (quoted in Jones 1971b: 20); a belief which, at least unconsciously, ties together miscegenation and monstrosity.

It seems, therefore, that as England widened its horizons through new expeditions to Africa, the traditional associations of blackness as being at the heart of Africanness were reaffirmed. In all these explorations abroad, England remained in the privileged centre. For, as Edward Said explains, "even as Europe moved itself outwards, its sense of cultural strength was fortified" (1979: 117). Travel books, from Herodotus and Pliny to Mandeville, Hakluyt, Thomas Windham, and Leo Africanus offered the Elizabethan reading public an imaginative "monstrous literature" which narrated their encounters with the Africans. They described men that had "neither nose nor nostrils, but the face all full. Others that have no upper lip, they are without tongues, and they speak by signs, and they have but a little hole to take their breath at .." (Pliny, quoted by Jones 1971a: 5). As they described their monstrous physical qualities, they constructed the Africans' "monstrous mores."[3] In an account by Herodotus we find that, along with the better known custom of anthropophagy, Africans "are all inveterate

conjurers, and given to the black art" (quoted in Jones 1971a: 4). Dark-skinned people are irresponsible and lustful, as can be seen in the casualness with which the fish-eating Ichthyophagi—as described in Waterman's *Fardle* (1555)— "fall upon their women" (quoted in Jones 1971a: 7). In the opinion of an Elizabethan traveller, John Lok, Negroes are "a people of beastly living, without a God, law, religion, or commonwealth" (quoted in Jones 1971a: 12). Leo Africanus' *Geographical History of Africa*, which was translated by Pory in 1600, is reputed to have dispelled the image of monsters from a great part of Africa. Leo, indeed, describes the Moors, for example, as "devout, valiant, patient, courteous, hospitall, and as honest in life and conuersation as any other people. . . . They are reported likewise to be most skilful warriors, to be valiant, and excellent louers and practisers of all humanitie" (quoted in Whitney 1922: 481). But while Leo recorded the humanity and positive qualities of some of the Moors, he also presented the Elizabethan reading public with what would become one of the most characteristic features of the Moor. Some of these Negroes, as Leo specified, are extremely jealous of the chastity of their wives: "For by reason of jealousy you may see them daily one to be the death and destruction of another, and that in such savage and brutish manner that in this case they will show no compassion at all" (quoted in Jones 1971a: 25). Although Leo Africanus is talking of the Numidians, soon enough not only the Numidians but the inhabitants of "the Southern Nations, and such as dwell in hot regions," (quoted by Campbell 1961: 150-51) were being described as very jealous, as Robert Tofte wrote in 1615 in his *Blazon of Jealousie*, the most complete study of jealousy during the Renaissance.

In all these definitions, Africans, whether white or black Moors, are transformed into what Said terms "Platonic images" (1979: 36). As viewed by the Europeans, they seem to have a stable and unchangeable essence which the travellers capture in final and definitive descriptions. Sentences in European accounts of Africans are declarative and profess to be self-evident; the tense they employ is the "timeless eternal" (Said 1979: 72). Throughout the travel narratives of this literature of the monstrous it becomes manifest that, as Said remarks, knowledge about the other creates "the other" (1979: 40). Instead of bridging the cultural distances between Europe and Africa, travel literature seemed to emphasize the differences between western thought—the familiar—and African culture—the strange, the alien. The sense of "difference" inherent in travel books confirmed Europe's hegemony and superiority. Information about the other not only created the other but was transformed into more power over the other—as was confirmed shortly

after England's first encounter with the Africans with the start of slaving voyages such as Sir John Hawkins' (1562, 1564 and 1567). Ready to devour the monstrous tales that abounded in the travellers' accounts, the Elizabethans may well have preferred the fixity of texts to the more elusive and direct encounter with the Africans whose number was increasing in Europe towards the end of the century. We could say further that Elizabethans would develop with respect to Africans what Said calls "a textual attitude to life" which dispensed them from having to make an encounter with the real (1979: 93).

II. FROM MOOR TO OTHELLO

The audience experiences such a textual attitude to life during the first scene of the play when Othello's appearance is delayed. Such delay, as Newman explains, awakens in the audience shared prejudices against the Moors, especially in the visions of carnal love Iago so vividly describes (1987: 151). All throughout Act I, sc. i and most of I, ii, Othello is presented as an abstraction which impersonates—like a Platonic essence—all the vices traditionally associated with the Moor. In Iago's words he is a "lascivious Moor" (I, i, 125), and the target of all kind of animal imagery which emphasizes his bestiality and lack of restraint. Iago stresses the negative impact of the animalistic metaphors with the use of colours, "black ram"/"white ewe" and their connotations: "an old black ram/Is tupping your white ewe" (I, i, 88-89); "you'll have your daughter covered with a Barbary horse" (I, i, 110-111); "your daughter/and the Moor are now making the beast with two backs" (I, i, 115-116). Othello and Desdemona's elopement is thus reduced and represented through powerful expressionistic images which confirm that when talking about the Negro, as Fanon remarks, "everything takes place on the genital level" (1967: 157). Cunningly, Iago awakens the ghost of the bestial sexuality attributed to the Negro, as well as the delicate issue of miscegenation or the "infection of blackness" which had come to disturb the Queen towards the end of the 16th century.

Brabantio completes the picture of the Moor in I, i and I, ii as an "inveterate conjurer," a "bondslave and pagan" who had charmed his daughter (I, ii, 63; I, iii, 59-60). His claim that Othello had used magic immediately places the African character in the kingdom of otherness where he belongs as a barbarian and outsider. Brabantio's words take Othello back to the fixity of the pages where he can be fully known and interpreted. For

Brabantio, Othello is, as Caliban was in Prospero's eyes, "a thing" (I, ii, 71). After the images of bestiality which have been associated with Othello, his marriage would seem to the audience as gross and repulsive as a hypothetical union (or rape) between the abhorred Caliban and Miranda. Othello's intention to marry Desdemona and therefore secure a position in the Venetian oligarchy is also seen by Brabantio as an inversion of order, as a nonsense world with black over white, to use Jordan's words. "For," as he explains, "if such actions may have passage free,/ Bondslaves and pagans shall our statesmen be" (I, ii, 98-99). For Iago and Brabantio, Othello represents an unnatural choice, "a gross revolt" for a modest maid who had "shunned /The wealthy curl'd darlings" of Venice (I, ii, 68). For them Desdemona herself has "erred/Against all the rules of nature" (I, ii, 100-101). A nature, we could add, which is a fully ideologized concept, an ideological construct, fully instrumental and conducive to maintaining the purity of the Venetian oligarchy. Iago's and Brabantio's representation of Othello is a paradigmatic example of how a character is fully dissected, reduced and understood in terms of and as just another version of the well-known features of the African. Their descriptions of Othello further illustrate the importance of the concept of fixity in the ideological construction of "otherness" (Bhabha 1994: 66). In fact Jean-Paul Sartre equated colonial power with the capacity to impose fixity upon an otherwise fluid subjectivity (Pease 1991: 114). Venice, as Iago and Brabantio demonstrate, needs this "colonial discourse" in order to articulate the forms of difference and so exercise colonial power. The stereotype becomes in these pages the repeated, unchanging formula which controls reality and immediately domesticates the unknown and re-establishes a threatened order.

In fact, Brabantio's attitude towards Othello is comparable to Venice's attitude towards its colonial subjects. Venice is in the 16th century a colonial power which possesses an unstable hold in the East which it has to defend against the feared and powerful Turks. As a colonial power, Venice has what could be termed a "double nature": it both includes and excludes its aliens. Venice moves between cultural pluralism and a more limited, clearer definition of its social, racial and political identity (D'Amico 1991: 163). It appears as an open community for the purposes of war but remains closed at the level of local politics and the more conservative sense of "the family." Othello, as a subject assimilated to superior western culture, is viewed as a useful Caliban; he can be instrumentalized in order to secure Cyprus against the ever present menace of the Turks, but remains an alien when he intends to marry white Desdemona. This is precisely Brabantio's double vision of

Othello. Othello is on one hand a civilized Christian citizen and a pliant servant to the Venetian State, and Brabantio, as we hear in Othello's speech, "loved" him, oft invited him," and asked him to tell the story of his life (I,iii, 128). Here Othello's difference or ethnicity does not appear threatening. It seems that when Othello narrates "the story of his life" his blackness dissolves, or at least Brabantio is able to see beyond it and envision a landscape of wildness and exoticism which is attractive and stands sufficiently far removed from civilized Europe. Othello's "ethnic tales" reveal themselves as aspects of that "tamed" ethnicity which is so appealing to the Venetians (including Desdemona). Othello's difference becomes extremely menacing, however, when Brabantio views him as a potential husband for Desdemona. In that case Othello reverts to being a pagan and slave—a mere instance of the stereotype (Singh 1994, 289). Brabantio's is another case of what Mannoni terms "Prospero's complex," which he defined as "the sum of those unconscious neurotic tendencies that delineate at the same time the 'picture' of a paternalistic colonial and the portrait of 'the racist whose daughter has suffered an [imaginary] attempted rape at the hands of an inferior being'" (quoted in Fanon 1967: 107).

While Iago and Brabantio openly express their visions of Othello, Shakespeare provides the audience with enough cultural clues to recognize in him "the Moor's" most common features. In this way, the audience becomes an active participant in the creation of what is automatically viewed as "the voice of common sense."

Surprisingly, however, our first glimpses of Othello in person in I, ii challenge "the textual attitude to life" Iago and Brabantio so forcefully contrived as if "the other" were not entirely knowable; as if there were further difference within difference. It immediately becomes clear that there were gaps in Iago's and Brabantio's representation of Othello as "the Moor" as soon as Othello appears talking to Iago in I, ii. Othello is no Aaron, no vice taken out of a morality play; he is self-restrained—as his encounter with Brabantio demonstrates—and self-assured. He knows his own value and is confident that his life and existence will deconstruct the fixity of stereotype Brabantio imposes on him: "My services which I have done the signiory/Shall out-tongue his complaints" (I, ii, 18-19). Actions and real life, Othello feels, will conquer words or the textual attitude to life he, as an African, has to face. Othello, his name, his social usefulness, and the story of his life—a narrative supposedly told from the point of view of "the other"—will deconstruct the image of "the Moor," and allow him to make the transition from Moor to Othello.

But who is Othello? He appears in the play as a colonial subject who has absorbed European culture and morality, and has therefore domesticated the wildness implicit in his origins. He has also expelled from his personality the menacing aspects of the stereotype of the African such as lasciviousness, lust—as he makes clear before the Duke and the Senators (I, iii, 261-264)—and jealousy—as Desdemona confirms in III, iv, 30-31. Fully immersed in European culture, for Othello the Turk is "the other." Although he is in the liminal position of those accepted but not welcome in the Venetian oligarchy, he has become, with the limitations specified above, an "honorary white" (Loomba 1989: 48). While he feels at ease within his adoptive culture, his own African culture remains absent, or rather represents one of the "stressed absences" in the play. The handkerchief he confides to Desdemona as a family present is the only repository of his own history in the play, a part of the past which represents itself without resorting to language. Apart from the handkerchief, Othello appears as the perfect "mimic man" or colonial subject who has assimilated the quintessential western culture. As Draper has demonstrated, Othello's references are classical and Christian. It is indeed ironic that words like devil and hell (which we can identify as the traditional semantic field reserved for black characters and for infidels in general in medieval English drama) are more frequent in *Othello* than in any other play (Draper 1966: 172). These are part of what may be termed "the conditions of visibility" of the black character in the white text. Othello has to impress upon everyone, as Draper implies, the fact that he was no unbeliever so that his dubious or "obscure" past will be fully obliterated or "forgiven" by the audience. Othello's cultural references at this early —and optimistic— stage of the play would confirm the open nature of the metropolis and western culture in general. A liberal education, the play seems to imply, does indeed free the individual from the great limitations of time, space, class, and, we may add, race. The play, nevertheless, will show quite the opposite. Race is indeed a more problematic category than any of the other variables, and not at all a movable category even in the Renaissance. As *Othello* will demonstrate, the self-fashioning peculiar to the Renaissance is limited for the black man.

But the infinite possibilities of self-fashioning—if we understand by the term the assimilation of Othello to Venetian mores, habits and religion—are manifest in the narration of his autobiography before the Duke, Brabantio, and the rest of the Senators. As an exercise of self-representation, the autobiography is another instance of tamed difference, of a kind of ethnicity which is appealing to his Venetian listeners. Since Othello has to textualize

himself and his journey from the wilderness of Africa to the superior European culture in order to become an acceptable and civil character, he only has to reproduce the most familiar images of European travel narratives and colonial discourse when dealing with the African. In this way he can establish an insurmountable barrier between the monsters in Africa and his civilized self. His autobiography thus turns into a travel narrative which echoes other narratives such as Pliny's, Herodotus', Mandeville's, and other "racial encounters" such as Anthony and Cleopatra's. As in the texts of his predecessors, the gap between the European —or Europeanized— and the African is widened; as is the case in their texts, in Othello's narrative "stressed absences" also appear. We do not hear about the nobility, the civility and hospitability of certain African kings. Instead we get the most common features of the Elizabethans' image of Africa and its monstrous wonders. Africa, in Othello's words —as in the words of any other western traveller— is reduced to a land populated by "the Cannibals that each other eat,/The Anthropophagi, and men whose heads/Do grow beneath their shoulders" (I, iii, 142-43).

Rather than reveal Othello's origins, his tale demonstrates, as critics such as Newman (1987: 150) and Singh (1994: 288) explain, that Othello has no access to his past except through a borrowed language and its colonial discourse. Othello does not reveal his origins any more than the travellers' tales revealed the real nature/s of the Africans. He simply reproduces his identity as an unchangeable Platonic essence, as Said would say. The tale also reveals Othello's narrative position as a subject immersed in western European culture looking like a curious traveller at the object of his observation, the African, from his western ideological position. In his narration the "other" is tamed and isolated in the same way that Othello himself has been domesticated and accepted into Venetian society. The tale does not add anything new to the traditional image of Africa, and in this way reaffirms the familiar. At the same time, Othello's narrative eases European conscience as if Africa were already known and essentialized once and for all. Equally reassuring in the ears of the Venetians is the sense of progression toward purification implicit in the word "pilgrimage" with all its connotations of a journey to a centre of religious cult. In this light, Othello's autobiography stands as the conversion narrative of a man who started in darkness and has reached the light.

Othello's is therefore a conversion narrative at the level of culture and religion and at the level of language. Unlike Caliban, Othello does not use language to curse. He has learnt the white man's language and explicitly pos-

sesses the world vision expressed and implied in that language. To speak the Venetians' language is to take on a world vision and a culture, as Fanon would say (1967: 38). What is surprising about Othello's tale is that he is emphasizing two different positions: he is on one hand emphasizing his difference in order to win Desdemona and satisfy her appetite for marvellous tales, while at the same time he is asserting through a tranquilizing narrative his assimilation into white society and culture. Sensitive to his listeners—and the Europeans' appetite for monstrous literature and unusual scenes—Othello gives Desdemona and the rest of the Venetian Notables what they expect: difference wrapped up in the familiar sameness. He just pours out the stereotypes of the traditional travel narrative into the ears of an insatiable Desdemona.

By the end of the scene, the Duke sanctions Othello and Desdemona's union and bids Othello to leave for Cyprus immediately. Othello has been able to impose a fluid subjectivity on the straitjacket of the stereotype of the "Moor," and emerges as a triumphant character. As the play proceeds, however, he will never again be seen in control of his own subjectivity nor of the two halves which make up his personality: a European, an African, "two souls," as W. E. B. Du Bois would say, "two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body" (1989: 3). While it is Othello who is able to blend his "twoness" by means of his narration, it will be Iago who cleaves an unbridgeable gap between the terms of this "twoness." Fully cognizant of the disruptive potential of Othello's two "warring ideals," Iago is going to build the tragedy of Othello on his schizophrenic personality. For Othello, full assimilation into Venetian society and culture implies looking at himself through the eyes of others, as Du Bois would say (1989: 3), and seeing himself as a lustful, conjuring and deeply jealous pagan Moor. Iago will gradually destroy Othello's confidence as a European until only his Africanness remains. But for a "washed Ethiop" or mimic man like Othello, Africanness means savagery, that world full of cannibals and monstrous men from which he providentially escaped. The Venetian gaze deprives Othello of his humanity until it reaches his alleged wild nature. Othello's assimilation to Venetian society implies self-annihilation. Through Iago's agency, Othello will cease to be himself and will become "the Moor."

III. FROM OTHELLO TO MOOR

Stephen Greenblatt has termed Iago's attitude towards Othello as "colonial" (1980: 233), a most fitting term to explain the way Iago takes possession of Othello's mind in a series of scenes from III, iii onwards. Greenblatt uses the term within a larger context referring to improvisations of power. He starts with a discussion of the Spaniards' manipulation of the native Lucayans' religious beliefs to their advantage. Greenblatt, however, does not study the obvious racism which makes Iago consider Othello "an erring barbarian," nor does he analyse how colonial power intersects with racism. Patricia Parker also uses the term "colonial" when she explains how Othello's ear is poisoned, "occupied," or "colonized" (1994: 99). The reference appears as another instance of the homoerotic imagery which is so insistent throughout the play.

Peculiar to this taking possession or devouring of Othello, we would add, is the fact that it is not forced or violent, as Prospero's possession of Caliban in *The Tempest* is. Othello manifests his willingness that it be so when in III, iii, he binds himself to Iago in a "mock marriage" ("I greet my love,/Not with vain thanks but with acceptance bounteous" III, iii, 469-70). Iago's words, "I am your own for ever" (III, iii, 80) sound indeed too ironic at a point when Othello, in the face of Iago's manipulation of trifles into evidence, has given himself up to Iago's designs and starts to be Iago's representation. As a result Othello will not be able to see himself as an individual but as the incarnation of a stereotype. Iago fashions his construct or representation of Othello not by attributing a lustful, bestial and uncontrollably jealous type of behaviour to him, but rather by mimicking the mind and reasoning attributed to the traditional stage Moor, as if he were trying to awake a dormant and monstrous side in Othello. Iago, as Othello remarks, "echoes" him: "By heaven, he echoes me,/As if there were some monster in his thought/Too hideous to be shown" (III, iii, 106-8). Through this "echoing" Iago places Othello in another "monster narrative" which is similar to the narrative of the men whose heads grow beneath their shoulders, but not quite the same. Iago's is the narrative of the monster "within," as he tells his master: "O, beware, my lord, of jealousy!/It is the green-eyed monster, which doth mock/The meat it feeds on" (III, iii, 165-67). Othello's role in Iago's narrative is defined by his colour. Men, according to Iago, "should be what they seem" (III, iii, 126). Othello, the Moor, should be what he seems: an erring barbarian capable of the most astonishing cruelties, since the blackness without is only an instance of the darkness within. Iago's main strategy is therefore a strategy of reduction of the human, of the fluid personality of the individual to the workings of abstraction and stereotype.

The results of the strategy are immediate. Iago's poisoning of Othello is indeed much more effective than Othello's alleged enchanting of Desdemona. Indeed there is some sinister magic in the "words" of it. Othello adopts the role of a wronged Venetian husband who imposes fixity upon Desdemona and transforms her actions and words into the adulteress, "the weed" (IV, ii 67), the woman who has "whore" written on her most goodly book (IV, ii, 71-72). Just as Iago "devours" Othello, so Othello "devours" Desdemona, as Emilia explains through cannibalistic imagery: "[Men] are all but stomachs, and we are but food; / They eat us hungerly, and when they are full, they belch us" (III, iv, 104-105). But in condemning Desdemona, Othello condemns himself. Iago, fully aware of the fragile construction of Othello's character, knows that Othello's identity, his visibility and his humanity are dependent upon Desdemona's love (Loomba 1989: 59). We read how his soul is "enfettered to her love" (II, ii, 327), and how when he does not love her, "chaos is come again" (III, iii, 91-92). When his love fails through Desdemona's alleged frailty, Iago makes Othello return to his original blackness. But for this honorary white, blackness does not reveal itself as a triumphant realization as in *Titus Andronicus*, but rather as a sudden recognition of what Othello really is and represents in Venetian society: "Haply, for I am black / And have not those soft parts of conversation / That chamberers have" (III, iii, 263-65). Paradoxical though it sounds, this is perhaps the moment when Othello has most fully immersed himself in white society. But total assimilation into western society implies seeing himself through the eyes of the Venetians, not as a defiant black soul, like Aaron in *Titus Andronicus*, but as a "contrite" black soul which bears forms of residual paganism, lasciviousness and beastly behaviour.

Once he has fully adopted the perspective of his host culture, Othello acknowledges the "unnaturalness" of Desdemona's choice in marriage when "against all rules of nature," as Brabantio said, (I, i, 101), she chose Othello. Now it is Othello who echoes Brabantio's words in "and yet, how nature erring from itself" (III, iii, 27) without questioning the ideological location of what is natural. There is, therefore, no further question of what makes the union between a black man and a white woman unnatural. What is erased from "nature" in Othello's utterance, and in many others throughout the play (II, i, 248; II, i, 231-32), is the fact that it is instrumental and persuasive, it has status and establishes canons of taste and value (Said 1979: 19), that nature is completely "unnatural."

Once Othello has accepted the implications of what is natural and unnatural, he equally acknowledges the connotations of black and white as

understood by his host culture. Black appears now as a partisan colour, a symbol of baseness and evil, and a sign of danger and repulsion (Tokson 1982: 7). In this way, Desdemona's name is now begrimmed and black, like his own face (III, iii, 385-87); Othello conjures up "black vengeance from the hollow hell!" (III, iii, 447), and is careful to reserve a marble colour for the heaven he swears by (III, iii, 460). Othello's glamour as a victorious warrior vanishes and only his blackness, his real essence remains. Imprisoned in Iago's representation, Othello realizes that he lives in a monstrous world where "horned men" are monsters and beasts (IV, i, 62), and where women bear "whore" written on their fair paper (IV, ii, 71-73).

Othello the performer, engaged in the "perpetual reiteration of the norms of another culture" (Greenblatt 1980: 245), is then reduced to the role of the stage Moor. Although Othello intensely wished to distance himself from this stereotypical image and has taken every opportunity to deconstruct the stereotype through his fluid subjectivity, in III, iii, he begins his transformation into an abstraction. Iago, the stage manager, the reducer and the imposer of the fixity of stereotype directs Othello towards the traditional role of the villainous, jealous Moor. As Othello tells Desdemona in IV, ii, 54, he becomes a "fixèd figure," the kind of character who is what he seems and whose physical traits—assuming the tenets of traditional physiognomy—are a kind of writing which reveals a jealous and violent personality.

Peculiar to Shakespeare's representation of Othello's downfall and lapse into the stereotype is, however, a counter-representation of Othello's host culture. Othello, the violent Moor who is extremely jealous of his wife's chastity, is at the same time the colonial subject who has assimilated the role of the Venetian husband who has been wronged by an erring, now "blackened" wife. The handkerchief Iago places in Cassio's hands and which plays such a crucial role in the transformation of Othello into a stage Moor has a double reading as well. It can be viewed as bearing some private significance given the family history implicit in it, but it can also be taken as an index of Othello's adoption of a borrowed culture. In *cinquecento* Venice, as Newman remarks, the possession of the handkerchief was proof of adultery (1987: 155). Othello, bestowed with the power of life and death over his wife, had the right to carry out the penalty for adulterers. In mid-sixteenth century, George Joye called for a return to the Old testament and wrote: "God's law . . . is to punish adultery with death for the tranquility and common wealth of His Church" (quoted by Greenblatt 1980: 247). Whatever representation or performance Othello chooses, it will bring about similar consequences. There is no option for Othello: if he is to act as a white man,

the wronged Venetian husband has to clean and restore his honor and kill Desdemona. If he is to act like a jealous Moor, he will have to sacrifice Desdemona too. The two possibilities are one and the same. Shakespeare subtly reminds the reader of the savagery or monstrousness implicit not only in the alien, but in the most deeply ingrained Christian *mores.*

Interestingly, Othello is judged not as the supposedly wronged Venetian husband but as the cruel, unrestrained and jealous Moor. If Othello, as the rest of the characters remark, is fully transformed, he is not viewed as the mistaken Venetian husband but as the traditional "Moor" whose malignity has finally crept up to the surface. Othello in fact loses his individuality and becomes "the Moor," a "dull Moor" and a "cruel Moor" in the last scene. We find that for Emilia he is "the black devil" (V, ii, 132). For Othello himself, he is the person "that was Othello" (V, ii, 284). Once he has lost Desdemona and his public side has vanished, he sees himself, echoing Brabantio's words, as a "cursèd, cursèd slave" (V, ii, 287). Reduced to the base role of a slave, of "the other," Othello does not seek to rebel against the order which has "reduced" and savaged his humanity. Nothing awaits him but his destiny as a damned soul, the process of cleansing the self involving, as it must, his own destruction: "Whip me, ye devils,/From the possession of this heavenly sight!/Blow me about in winds! roast me in sulphur!/Wash me in steep-down gulfs of liquid fire! (V, ii, 278-81). An interesting reference which in effect confirms that the "washing of the Ethiop" implies destruction.

The play opens with an "optimistic" autobiography in which Othello tries to harmonize his two souls as African and European, and it may be said that it closes in a similar way, although in a tragic tone. Othello—who is not in control of his biography—instructs those present on how they should "these unlucky deeds relate" (V, ii, 341). Othello's position as a Moor assimilated to a culture which deprives him of his humanity and isolates him in his blackness is manifest in his last speech, in which we can hear the double voice of a "schizophrenic hero." Othello, as Greenblatt (1980: 234) and Loomba (1989: 49) have explained, appears as both Christian and infidel, the Venetian and the Turk, the defendant of the state and its opponent. When faced with the choice, however, Othello, unlike Aaron, decides to kill "the other" in him, the Turk who has "traduc'd the state" (V, ii, 355), and immolates himself in the name of civilization.

Othello thus moves from the position of an "honorary white," a colonized subject existing on the terms imposed by white Venetian society and trying to internalize its ideology, to the position of a total outsider. As an outcast and a cursed slave Othello occupies the true position of "the other"

(Loomba 1989: 48). Ironically, it is precisely from his position as an outsider that he may be said to have fully assimilated the ideology of his adoptive culture and fulfilled his role. In this light Shakespeare presents the predictable trajectory of a "stage Moor" who lapses into stereotype unable to resist the "call of evil" supposedly implicit in the deeper impulses of his nature. In this sense Shakespeare can be read as validating the view that when one scratches the surface of an African one sees a mad, cruel and bestial Othello (Orkin 1987: 63).

However, I believe that Shakespeare's position is more complex. True, Shakespeare describes Othello as lapsing into stereotype, but he does so, as Loomba remarks, by "laying bare the process of construction of stereotype." This "laying bare" allows us to get to see barbarity, monstrousness and monstrous sexuality in a whole new light: not as natural or essential features of the black character, but as artificial and "ideological constructs" (Loomba 1989: 61). It is Iago, we would add, who is the key character in enabling us to see the stereotype in the making. Moreover, the play subverts our vision of what is natural and what is artificial in such a way that monstrousness and barbarity appear as features more suitable to the character who consciously constructs them rather than the character on whom they are projected. Instead of confining "monstrousness" to the African character, Shakespeare places it at the centre of civilized society. In this way the audience is forced to challenge the validity of interpreting the individual through the fixity of stereotype and to ask themselves which world is more monstrous, the world supposedly populated by monsters and wonders or that other world which creates "green eyed monsters," horned men, and deprives the black character of his humanity. As D'Amico explains, Othello, who had survived the monsters in Africa is unable to survive the so-called civilized world (1991: 191) where monsters live "within." In fact, the cannibalistic tendencies Europe found and marvelled at when exploring the world of "the other," are present in its very self. Civilization, like jealousy, is "the monster which doth mock / The meat [the Othellos, we could add] it feeds on." In this light, *Othello* may well portray the mad Moor you get when you look beneath the skin of an African, but the Venetians —as represented in the play— confirm that when you look beneath the skin of an European you see the anatomy of a racist; a glimpse of the monster within.a

NOTES

1. All quotes from the play are taken from Gerald Eades Bentley's edition of *Othello* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958).

2. There was also a "naturalistic" theory which maintained that the Negro's blackness was due to his exposure to the hot sun.

3. See Jack D'Amico for an interesting and detailed explanation of the meanings and implications of "monstrous" (1991: 179-80).

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a

DURRELL WRITING ABOUT WRITERS WRITING:
TOWARDS A SPATIAL DEFINITION OF *THE AVIGNON QUINTET*

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The aim of this paper is to analyse the reciprocal influence between Lawrence Durrell and a number of writers who share with him similar creative techniques and preoccupations. The main problem is that, strictly speaking, these writers do not exist outside the literary text, but are Durrell's creations and fictional projections in *The Avignon Quintet.* In order to explore this blurring of boundaries between fiction and reality, I shall reflect the confluence of two opposite forces at work in *The Avignon Quintet:* on the one hand, the "closed" nature of fictions which cannot transcend their own fictional status; and on the other, the "open" nature of an endless process—the creation of different ontological levels through the presence of an author figure (i.e. a writer who "fixes" that reality only to be finally exposed as part of a broader design). In this way, through "writers writing about writers writing,"[1] the *Quintet* both acknowledges its own status as fiction while at the same time it gradually increases the feeling of proximity to a random, ineffable reality. Throughout this paper, I shall also try to interpret the shape of the quincunx[2] and its three-dimensional development—the pyramid—as the narrative architecture where these two antagonistic ideas are condensed into a single process of creation.

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I should like to begin with a brief analysis of *Monsieur*, the first novel of the *Quintet. Monsieur* is divided into five parts. The first four chapters include two hypodiegetic narrations (two versions of the same reality which correspond, respectively, to the diaries of Bruce Drexel and to the frustrated novel of Robin Sutcliffe). Both narratives give rise to an interesting application of the concept of entropy to the creation of a literary text.[3] This process can be described in the following terms:

Bruce's narration entails the investigative task of reconstructing the past and thus achieving an understanding of the causes which brought about the present situation, that is, his wife's insanity and her brother's death. Bruce offers us clues to his personal evolution when he finally accepts that the determinist attitude with which he undertook his task is false: the search for the causes of a certain situation is not always possible. What is more, to assume that these causes exist implies the acceptance of a determinist universe. Reality, with its random elements, cannot be fitted into this model. Through his unsuccessful attempt to investigate the past, Bruce discovers the inaccessible nature of reality, its resistance to adapting to the strict laws of causality which rule any narrative:

> It has done me good to put so much down on paper, though I notice that in the very act of recording things one makes them submit to a kind of ordering which may be false, proceeding as if causality was the real culprit. (*M* 171)

Bruce's failure to justify the present situation is preceded in the novel by small interferences in his account of the events. We discover through him the parallel existence of a novel, written by Rob Sutcliffe and about the same characters, to which the "real" incidents are surprisingly adapting themselves. These interferences increase as does the difficulty in integrating them within a single narration. In this way, Rob Sutcliffe, the professional writer, gradually inserts himself into the novel until by the third chapter he has become the main character.

This third chapter describes the working techniques of the novelist Sutcliffe, the creation of his characters, and the shaping of a plan for his novels. Sutcliffe bases his characters on real people. He combines characteristics from several acquaintances and lets the logic of the narration give a definite form to the result. Surprisingly enough, the beginning of the novel imagined by Sutcliffe not only resembles the present events described by Bruce in his diary (*M* 7) but turns out to be identical:

> The Southbound train from Paris was the one we had always taken from time immemorial. . . . (*M* 187-8)

There is, then, a confluence, a blurring of boundaries between the real version of the events and their fictional rendering. Bruce's narration—accepted by the reader as real—fits unpredictably into the outline of Sutcliffe's novel, making us doubtful as to its genuine status. Faced with the task of describing the events from a historical or a fictional perspective, both writers have fixed reality, submitting it to a plan and therefore imposing a subjective order. In contrast, reality—as both writers feel in their own lives—is subject to unpredictable elements such as whim, accident, and sheer coincidence. The realization that it is impossible to convey the sheer randomness of reality through fiction leads Sutcliffe to abandon his creative work:

> Yet the element of chance, of accident, had so much to do with what became of us that it seems impossible to search out first causes—which is perhaps what led to the defeat of Rob in his fight with his last book. He was overwhelmed, he says, by realising to what degree accident had determined his life and actions (*M* 171-2).

The gradual confluence between these two writers is completed in the fourth chapter: Bruce appears again as narrator but he is now in charge of putting the rough drafts of Sutcliffe's novel in order after his suicide. However, Bruce becomes aware of the subjectivity of any kind of ordering process, and so the reader is presented at the end of the chapter with the disordered notes of Sutcliffe (*M* 250-74): the ideas which could have been used or discarded in his own novel.

The increasing disorder is brought to an end by the appearance in the fifth chapter of a new writer—the novelist Aubrey Blanford. This novelist turns out to be the creator of what we now recognize as the previous fiction (or secondary reality), thus revealing the existence of a diegetic level (or primary reality). Bruce and Sutcliffe are only his characters, desperate writers hopelessly trying to understand and depict a life written by Blanford. In this new light, the element of accident and chance present in their lives, or even the amazing coincidence between the diaries of Bruce and the fiction of Sutcliffe, are now justified simply as part and parcel of Blanford's plan. Blanford is clearly at odds with his characters: his work seems to prove that the randomness of real life may be, in fact, the deceitful product of a

determinist fiction and an "evil" creator. On a different plane, his presence introduces a new element: through Blanford's thoughts and plans for his future work, we eventually reach the moment of creation, the original idea which could be worked into a novel such as the one we are reading.

This global process of "disintegration" which leads us backwards from a traditional narrative, through the presentation of the notes which might have been used in a novel, to the original moment of creation, can be summarized in the following outline:

Chapter I	Unitary Fiction.
Chapter II	Unitary Fiction together with materials which are not completely integrated.
Chapter III	Process of creation of a novel (Outline, proofs, etc.).
Chapter IV	Previous Material (Notes, observations, drafts, etc.).
Chapter V	Poetic illumination. Moment of creation.

According to this outline, *Monsieur* reflects the destructive action of entropy on the very text which is gradually created through the representation of this process. Durrell's apparent belief in the reversibility of all processes, including entropy (Gibaldi 1991: 101), compelled him to convey the illusion that this regeneration is possible, but brought him face to face with a problem of representation: we know that, scientifically speaking, the entropy of any closed system is irreversible[4]; an external force is needed if the process is to be stopped or the system regenerated. In much the same way, the increasing disorder of this fictional closed system (secondary reality) can only be regenerated by the action of an external force: the creative act, or imposition of an order on chaos, represented by the writer Blanford (primary reality). The inclusion of this external force, however, breaks the closed character of the system—a necessary requisite for the entropic process to take place. The only way to resume it is by presenting this writer as part of a new closed system and, therefore, equally subject to the action of entropy. According to the second law of thermodynamics, whenever two or more systems are joined together, the entropy of the combined system is bigger than the sum of the entropies of the individual systems. From this perspective, the different writers and their creations can be read as one single and paradoxically "generative" process of disintegration. My proposal, then, is to analyse this entropic process as a structuring principle in *Monsieur*.[5]

As we have seen, this unitary process of creation / disintegration is projected on three main writers and their respective fictional levels. *Monsieur*

confronts us with two views of the same reality, two symmetrical stories spun around the central narration which becomes both the origin of the story (moment of creation) and the end of the text (final chapter). One possible spatial representation of this arrangement can be seen in fig. 1.



MONSIEUR

FIG. 1

This mixture of hypodiegetic and diegetic levels which eventually reveals the existence of a superior reality and narrator becomes not "merely a novel within a larger novel," as Barnes (1978: 378) defined *Monsieur*, but a

more complex process. As we have seen, Blanford's appearance can give sense to the contradictions of his characters and restore the feeling of order: Blanford's power over the narration seems absolute and so he feels that "he should perhaps offer a final summing up from the diary of Bruce" (*M* 276) or "let Sutcliffe finish and print his *Tu Quoque* if it could be found among his papers" (*M* 282). In this way, *Monsieur* introduces that "overt, self-conscious control by an inscribed narrator / author figure that appears to demand, by its manipulation, the imposition of a single, closed perspective" which Hutcheon (1984: xiii) points out as being one of the characteristics of postmodernist metafiction. The novelist Blanford represents the author figure in charge of imposing that single, closed perspective.

However, Hutcheon reminds us that, at the same time, postmodernism "works to subvert all chances of attaining such closure" (1984: xiii). Thus, we soon discover that Blanford's power over his novel "Monsieur" is not that absolute since *Monsieur*—the novel we are reading—includes some material he had discarded and had thrown into the wastepaper basket (*M* 294). Eventually, this final chapter plunges the reader into the vision of a "mad" novelist speaking to a person who turns out to be only the result of his imagination. The reader realizes something which Blanford can only suspect: there is a new writer, the creator of this "unreliable" novelist and of the novel we are reading.

This continuous deceit, whereby reality subsides into fiction soon after being created, plunges the reader of *Monsieur* into a final mistrust of any definite ordering or apparently closed narrative system. The Envoi, or appendix to this first novel, comes as a new attempt to restore order and confirm the existence of a global outline. However, through the combined actions of the entropic process and the Envoi, the way is open for the reader to accept both the existence of a series of boundaries between ontological levels, and the possibility of blurring them in a fluid universe—a new territory shared by both writers and their creations.

This possibility materializes in the following novels through, for example, Blanford's dialogues with his *alter ego* Sutcliffe. The novelist Blanford shares the working technique he attributed to Sutcliffe in *Monsieur* : they both create characters based on an amalgam of traits shared by real people. In *Livia* , however, they suggest the opposite by dreaming of "five panels for which your creaky old *Monsieur* would provide simply a cluster of themes to be reworked in the others" (*L* 11). This objective reflects the inversion of the conventional way of rendering the events: in *Monsieur* reality subsides into fiction, but now fiction must be reworked into reality. One important conse-

quence of this structural choice is that, by presenting the hypodiegetic level first and then the diegesis, we are forced to recognize several traits of the real protagonists through our previous acquaintance with the fictional characters they inspired. We cannot but help recognize them as both new fictional characters and real models. As a consequence, and irrespective of their inescapably fictional status, characters in the primary reality are perceived by the reader as, so to speak, "more real."

On the other hand, the characters and events of the diegesis are not simple mirrors of their fictional counterparts. We rather perceive those allotropic[6] changes which make us aware of the basic unity between apparently different things. Some physical and psychological traits, objects, characteristics or even names reappear slightly altered, condensed or telescoped into a different person or context thus becoming unifying echoes and also underlining the fact that character is a mere convention created by a writer.

Monsieur becomes, according to Blanford's plan, the central volume, the fiction in which we first meet in condensed form the "echoes" of the different subjects and characters which will then be fully developed in the following novels. These four novels make up, in turn, a new arrangement around that central and generating text. As MacNiven puts it, "*Monsieur* is the hub about which the others rotate like stepchildren, both in themes and in structural devices" (1987: 238). The spatial representation of this relationship can be seen in fig. 2.


LIVIA
Primary Reality
Ch. 1
Outremer
Secondary Reality
Primary Reality
QUINX
Ch. 4
Life with Toby
Ch. 5
Dinner at Quartila's
Ch. 2
Macabru
CONSTANC
MONSIEUR
Ch. 3
Sutcliffe, the Venetian Documents
SEBASTIAN

FIG. 2

We observe, then, a small quincunx which progressively expands into a bigger one. This structure has interesting properties since it is susceptible of unlimited expansion into new levels while keeping its generating central point and its initial shape. The resulting global structure maintains the fifth chapter of *Monsieur*, a sort of crossroads of ontological levels, as its central focus.

Apparently, however, Durrell did not make use of this unlimited possibility of development, but consciously gave the novel a closed character presenting this arrangement as an image of totality and closedness. Thus, in contrast with the "Workpoints" at the end of *The Alexandria Quartet* which suggested "a movement outward, a transcendence of the given work of art" (Kellman 1980: 96), Durrell warned his readers that this new work was complete in itself: "Aquí el final es lo contrario del *Cuarteto de Alejandría* , cuyo final era un final abierto. . . . En el *Quinteto,* la última página es efectivamente la última página" (quoted in Wajsbrot 1986: 28).[7] It may be interesting, then, to elucidate which is the "last page" of the *Quintet*..

From a chronological point of view, the beginning of the story takes place in *Livia* , whereas the end goes back—through the first chapter of this same novel—to the fifth chapter of *Monsieur*. In this novel, Blanford reveals that most of the characters described in the primary reality are dead whereas he is depicted as a mad novelist. However, our reading of the whole *Quintet* enables us to re-interpret this ending in a different light. Blanford's insanity can be seen now as a productive madness, associated with the act of creation or poetic illumination.[8] It is only this madness that enables him—like Sylvie or Quatrefages (other "mad" characters), or the reader at this point—to perceive the existence of different ontological planes at the same time. Thus, Blanford not only wonders whether Sutcliffe (secondary reality) really "exists" (*M* 284) outside his work, but doubts whether he himself (primary reality) will be the real creator of this universe (*M* 281). Thus, the fifth chapter of *Monsieur*—one possible "last page" for the *Quintet*—presents us with chaos and confirms the vision of a creator who suspects his imprisonment in a closed and inescapable system.

We know that Durrell eschews linearity in his work and that the arrangement he proposed for the *Quintet* contradicts a linear interpretation. We cannot, however, dismiss another possibility: reading the novels in order of publication—that is, reading the plot in a linear way—the last page corresponds to the end of *Quinx, or the Ripper's Tale*, the fifth volume of the sequence. At the end of *Quinx* , the narrator describes:

> It was at this precise moment that reality prime rushed to the aid of fiction and the totally unpredictable began to take place! (*Q* 201).

The text ends up by suggesting the possibility of an explosion in the caves in quincunx—an image of the *Quintet*—thus breaking the prisonhouse of fiction, and giving way to the realm of unpredictability. In this new realm, the rules of fiction that govern, but also limit, any traditional narrative (such as causality or determinism) no longer apply. We are faced, then, with the existence of two hypothetical and contradictory "final pages": one of them represents the end of the text, whereas the other represents the end of the story. In much the same way as happened with *Monsieur*, the end of the *Quintet* brings us face to face again with the imposition of a closed perspective and the impossibility of attaining closure.


"Reality Prime"
Primary
Reality
Livia
Quinx
Constance
Sebastian
Ch.1
Ch. 5
Ch.4
Ch.2
Primary Reality
Ch.3
Secondary Reality
Monsieur

FIG. 3

By using now the three-dimensional representation of the quincunx—the pyramid (fig. 3)—it is possible to define the resulting structure with greater precision. As we have already noted, each chapter in *Monsieur* makes up one side of the square or base of the pyramid (secondary reality) around the fifth chapter (ontological breaking of boundaries). The following novels represent the four sides of the pyramid (primary reality) around the generating text *Monsieur*.[9] As a result, the whole structure converges at one point, the apex of the pyramid, which stands for the final page of the text (*Quinx*). However, this point sends us back—through logic and memory—to the chronological end of the *Quintet* (*Monsieur*). Both ends are situated along the same axis that goes from the apex of the pyramid to the central point on its base. This descent leads to the death or madness of all the characters. They become prisoners of a determinist and closed system, and are incapable of transcending their fictional nature.

We must remember, however, that there are clues throughout the novels which allow us to reach a different interpretation. Thus, the references to the work of art as "the star-y-pointed pyramid to point to where the Grail lies hid" (*Q* 134) hint at a second possibility. Together with the descent to the fifth chapter of *Monsieur, Quinx* introduces the possibility of a redeeming explosion: the ascent to a superior ontological plane equated with the Grail. This second reading "breaks" the novel as a determinist prisonhouse and leaves it in the hands of randomness in the realm of the "unpredictable," that is, the external world.

The pyramid, like the narration, is a closed structure which can only point to a superior realm (star or Grail) whose real nature is ineffable. The narration cannot escape its own determinism. The disappearance of an ultimate focalizer is impossible: there is always an observer who disturbs the course of nature. The disappearance of an ultimate narrator is also impossible: a subjective order is always imposed on the narration. However, by stressing the complexity of levels or blurring them, by representing the "generative" action of entropy and by plunging the reader into mistrust of a closed narrative, fiction can increase its proximity to that random and ineffable reality.

There is no point in deciding which of the two endings is, in fact, the real ending to the *Quintet*. Both of them are.[10] But then, why was Durrell so categorical in emphasizing the existence of a last page? The answer to this dilemma can only be found "outside" the narration: in the Envoi, or appendix to the first novel, *Monsieur* (296). This outline confirms that there is, in fact, an external reality or new ontological level, represented by D., who is the

creator or "begetter" of this universe and whose existence turns the primary reality into an equally fictional construct.

In contrast to the closed character of the text, the Envoi becomes a condensed image of its process of creation and presents us with an open structure where the Centre—D—generates a series of inferior narrative levels *ad infinitum.* A concrete image of this condensation is given by D's creation—Blanford—who creates the writer Sutcliffe endowing him with traits shared by real characters. Through Sutcliffe, Blanford creates his own parody: the novelist Bloshford (*L* 5). From then on, the boundaries blur gradually: Sutcliffe becomes increasingly more real whereas Blanford acquires more fictional traits. Finally, we are told that the person in charge of writing Sutcliffe's biography after his death is his rival, a mediocre writer called Aubrey Blanford (*M* 279).

This process of creation, interrelation, and blurring of narrative levels is continuous throughout the *Quintet*. Thus, apart from the proper writer-characters, there are many other characters who initiate the creation of their own works. In *Monsieur*, the secondary reality, some characters, such as Bruce Drexel, write a diary; Piers de Nogaret writes his "Waterbiography" (*M* 42), and his own diary (*M* 152). We are also presented with some fragments from the fictitious diary of Piers, written in this case by Rob Sutcliffe (*M* 53). Toby Goddard writes the historical study "The Secret of the Templars" (*M* 235) where, in turn, he quotes fragments of the study of his opponent Basil Babcock. This process extends to the primary reality where, for example, Doctor Jourdain is writing a treatise on psychiatry, Constance writes a psychoanalytical study on the novel *Gynacocrasy* (*Q* 14) and Sylvie becomes a remarkable writer. All these cases point to the existence of inferior levels of narration which occasionally appear in the novels in a fragmentary form.

The existence of these inferior fictional levels is parallel to a game of allusions to elements drawn from "external" reality (actually from Durrell's previous novels) which surpasses the closed character of the text. Thus, there are references in the *Quintet* to places such as lake Mareotis (*Q* 173) or characters like brigadier Maskelyne (*S* 47), Melissa (who appears in *Sebastian* as an old friend of Affad's (*S* 45)), Capodistria (now a member of a gnostic jury (*S* 38)) or the writer Pursewarden (whom Sutcliffe describes as "the only endurable writer in England at the moment," including titles and quotations from his works (*M* 226)). Lord Galen's attempt to create a sexual robot or the presence of old Gregory (*S* 189) describing doctor Schwarz's death are also examples of a process of intertextuality within Durrell's own work.

The process also extends to a plethora of other writers; in some cases only through quotations: St. Augustine, "inter faesces [sic] et urinam nascimur" (*L* 263), Cervantes (*Q* 83-4), etc.; on other occasions, well-known quotations are altered, "Clowns weep where angels fear to tread" (*M* 250), and reworked, "where angels come to weep" (*M* 253). There are literal or parodic quotations of T. S. Eliot (*M* 287), (*M* 293), Paul Valéry (*M* 178), etc. Implicit (Coleridge (*M* 251)) and explicit adaptations: "As Thoreau nearly said" (*M* 267). Joseph Conrad is parodied through a black stretcher-bearer: "Mister Schwarz he dead" (*S* 189), while the works of Shakespeare are repeatedly alluded to through parallelisms with some events in the *Quintet*—the trio of lovers reflected in the *Sonnets* (*M* 12), *Hamlet* (*M* 168)—or through particular interpretations of his plots (*M* 289). This sort of textual re-interpretation of historical or fictional events includes subjects such as Don Juan, Robinson Crusoe and Friday or the Thermopilae which are both openly discussed by some characters (*Q* 50) and subtly developed in the novels. It is a global process which does not spare the parodic inclusion of its own criticism by putting forward different subjects for a doctoral dissertation (*M* 227).

Historical figures undergo a similar process and they are fictionalized in the *Quintet* at different levels. Their presence in the narration seems to confirm Lord Galen's statement: "A little celebrity and one subsides into being a character" (*M* 273). Thus, the *Quintet* mentions Groddeck, Einstein, Spengler—several bases of Durrell's "own thinking" (Durrell 1970: xii)—together with Marx, Hitler, Nietzsche, etc. In some cases there are reworkings of names like Jung, who becomes doctor Young (*M* 254) or Joy (*M* 203)—the translation of *Freude*—while Freud, described also as doctor Fraud or Uncle Freddy, is in charge of treating Pia. The physical presence of Freud's couch in the old château of Tu Duc clearly symbolizes this possibility of crossing ontological boundaries, irrespective of their real or fictional nature, confronting us with the paradoxical belief that "to be real means to be recorded in literature" (Alter 1975: 10).

While the Envoi suggests this endless multiplicity of inferior narrative levels that point to a superior reality, at the same time it apparently creates an impassable superior limit by placing D. as the origin of creation: D. seems to refer to Durrell,[11] the creator of that fictional universe, who finally restores order and confirms the reassuring superiority of our real world—the level of reality we share with the author—over the narration. However, the process does not stop at this point: D. might also refer to "the Devil at large" (*M* 281), the Prince of Darkness who, much in the same way as characters in a book, writes our apparently random lives and keeps us ignorant and impris-

oned in an inescapable fictional system.[12] In *Monsieur* we only become aware of the existence of a new superior level when its author chooses to reveal it. Thus, the reader is forced to share first the ignorance of some characters (thinking that there are only versions of a single reality), and then the suspicions of others (thinking that there might be a superior level of reality). Through the Envoi, this gradual realization may be extended outside the novel creating an endless process, and inducing that impression of "ontological vertigo" which Alter (1975: 6) finds in other self-conscious works such as *Don Quixote.* Ingersoll (1992) interprets the whole process as a *mise en abyme* whose superior level "reflects outward into our world, into "reality," with the implications that Durrell's biography is yet another text like our biographies as well."

How, then, can a writer who depicts and makes us aware of that endless multiplicity of reality condense it into a closed, and therefore limited, fictional system? By suggesting that this generative process can be repeated in both ways *ad infinitum.* Faced with a similar problem of representation, scientists turn to the mathematical concept of "limit" which allows them to represent the infinite in a finite way. Some geometrical figures which use this concept of limit are the so called "fractals." A fractal is a very irregular model put forward by Mandelbrot in order to represent objects and phenomena of the real world which—studied in detail—are also extremely irregular. In this way, the chaotic and irregular can be paradoxically represented through a perfectly defined geometrical structure. One possible way of creating a fractal is by choosing a geometrical object, establishing an alteration of this object, and indicating that this alteration will take place indefinitely in each of the resulting parts. An example of this process, based on a pyramidal structure, can be seen in the fractal represented in fig. 4.



In much the same way as the fractal, the Envoi represents the endless generation of new levels of reality. The finite character of the *Quintet,* like that of any narrative, imposes inescapable limits which put an end to this process. It is, then, the idea of an infinity that can only be reached outside the realm of fiction that the Envoi tries to convey.

We have seen throughout this paper that the shape of the quincunx is used to represent the co-existence of these two contradictory forces. *Monsieur* leaves us with the vision of a mad novelist imprisoned in a closed fictional system represented by the Envoi. A global reading of the *Quintet*

enables us to understand Blanford's madness as a sort of "illumination" and like him perceive that multiplicity of ontological levels reflected in the Envoi, the last page of the sequence. However, we are also able to perceive the opposite force: the basic unity of the different writers in a single and generative entropic process, the confluence of the different events and characters as allotropic states of a basic form, as options which are "hardly more numerous than the available Christian names used by the race" (*C* 123). In this new light, Sabina (*Q* 85)—Sabine—Sylvaine—Sylvie—Livvy (*M* 290)—Liv (*Q* 119)—Livia—Pia (*M* 9) start to condense under a kind of "panoramic vision" (*Q* 25) which Blanford and Sutcliffe describe in *Quinx* :

> Actually, if you believe, as I do, that all people are becoming the same person, and that all countries are merging into one country, one world, you will be bound to see all these so-called characters as illustrations of a trend (*Q* 26).

If *Monsieur* stands for reality subsiding into fiction (i.e. the origin which will be manifested in the subsequent four novels), *Livia, Constance, Sebastian* and *Quinx* suggest how fiction can be reworked into reality, revealing its "constructedness" and leading us back to the original point of departure: *Monsieur* and the Envoi where this endless process is represented. We are now in a position to contemplate the whole work from a new perspective. We only have to analyse the *Quintet* , that "star-y-pointed pyramid" which points "to where the Grail lies hid" (*Q* 134) by placing us precisely at that point, the star or Grail—our external reality—pointed to by the pyramid. From this superior perspective, the pyramidal structure of the *Quintet* condenses into the concentric structure of the Envoi creating a classical image of all processes of creation (fig. 5): the Unity as point of origin and return.


Envoi
Ch. 1
Envoi
LIVIA
Envoi
Ch. 4
Ch. 2
(D.)
QUINX
CONSTANCE
Ch. 5
SEBASTIAN
Primary Reality
Ch. 3
Secondary Reality
MONSIEUR

FIG. 5

This unity of the fragmentary—or, in Heraldic terms, "the Oneness of everything" (Durrell, in Wickes 1964: 203)—which can only be pointed at, or alluded to, through symbol would seem only too adequate as a means of extrapolating a global meaning (the authorial intention) and underlining, for example, the mythical unity of the *Quintet:* "In the heart of the licensed confusion a sense of meaning" (*Q* 179). Such an interpretation, however, would only highlight the complex process of creation of the illusion while playing down an equally important move—the subsequent revelation of its artifice, the admitted impossibility of attaining closure: "There is no meaning and we falsify the truth about reality in adding one.*The universe is playing, the universe is only improvising!"* (*Q* 167). This twofold movement—the "perpetual dialectic of interpretation and deconstruction" (Stoicheff 1991: 90) which is at the base of metafictional works like the *Quintet*—leads us to a complementary vision of the Envoi: its solid hierarchy of ontological levels, the "Great Plan" (*Q* 54), blurs now into a self-reflexive image of the novel's perpetual deferral of a unified "meaning."

The Envoi, much in the same way as Borges's "circular ruins," becomes a final labyrinth for the reader where "the more information he gathers, the greater the number of intervening circles of language to carry it, the larger the indeterminacy, the more complex the interpretation, and the wider the abyss whose circumference he travels" (Stoicheff 1991: 90). This final labyrinth reminds us that the text re-creates the complexity of reality only to eventually make us aware of its constructedness; that language both creates the Grail and prevents us from apprehending it.a

NOTES

1. This mirror-sentence is taken from the first chapter of Stonehill's study on self-conscious fiction, aptly entitled "Imitation's Limitations; or, Why Writers Write About Writers Writing" (1988: 1).

2. Through several motifs associated to this five-part structure, Ian MacNiven shows that the shape of the quincunx provides a structural model of *The Avignon Quintet* which, "if not an end in itself, is at least an integral part of meaning" (1987: 234).

3. A preliminary account of this entropic process in *Monsieur* as well as the resulting outline can be found in Plo (1991: 111).

4. According to recent research in the field of nonequilibrium thermodynamics, there would be an alternative explanation to Durrell's particular use of a "reversible" entropy. In White's words: "Although change can destroy a system, at the critical moment of transformation matter may spontaneously organize itself into a more complex structure. That is, at a stochastic bifurcation point in far-from-equilibrium conditions, the famous second law of thermodynamics (according to which entropy never decreases) is consistent with *local* decreases in entropy" (1991).

5. This proposal seems consistent with Gibaldi's study on the subject where, in addition to dealing with it from a thematic point of view, she analyses two structural manifestations of Durrell's submission to entropy: "his peculiar use of repetition and his even more peculiar inclusion of inconsistencies in the novels" (1991: 104) which add to the creation of "a structure that defies the irreversibility of entropy in its reliance upon endless reversals" (1991: 106).

6. An allotrope is one of the different physical forms of an element, but possessing the same chemical properties as other allotropes, e.g. the allotropes of carbon include diamond, graphite and charcoal.

7. "Here the ending is the opposite of that of *The Alexandria Quartet*, whose ending was open. . . . In the *Quintet*, the last page is indeed the last page" (my translation).

8. The fact that the poet's inspiration can be compared to a state of madness is a classical convention stated, for example, in Plato's *Ion* : "The poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and reason is no longer in him; no man, while he retains that faculty, has the oracular gift of poetry" (1971: 14-15).

9. In *Constance*, the triangle formed by the billiard balls is described as "a formation suggesting the symbolic properties of the Grand Pyramid's square root of five; symbol which faraway Blanford was even then thoughtfully contemplating in a big book of engravings concerned with such abstruse matters" (*C* 139). In my opinion, this image alludes to the "Golden Section number" whose mathematical expression would be $x= (1\pm\sqrt{5})/2$. This irrational number represents a mathematical proportion first formulated by Euclid and analysed by Luca Pacioli in his treatise *De Divina Proportione* (1509), illustrated with some "engravings" of geometrical figures by Leonardo. Pacioli describes the symbolic properties of this proportion which, allegedly, gives the sides of a rectangle "a particularly pleasant shape" (Vajda 1989: xiii). It has been said that the floor of the royal chamber in the "Grand Pyramid" of Cheops faithfully reproduces a "Golden" rectangle. In any case, this proportion has been widely used in painting and architecture. The fact that the novelist Blanford is "thoughtfully contemplating" this symbol where number 5 and a pleasant shape are combined may be viewed as a new reference to the spatial architecture of the *Quintet*.

10. This structural "indeterminacy" seems consistent with P. H. Lorenz's interpretation of the *Quintet* as ruled by the logic of quantum theory—the logic of Heisenberg or Heraclitus—whereby both endings can "co-exist" at the same time (Lorenz 1990). It could also be said that the *Quintet* goes a step further and adopts the logic of chaos, with a similar emphasis on

unpredictability, but concerned with systems "configured so as to bring even microscopic fluctuations quickly up to macroscopic expression" (Hayles 1991a: 11).

11. The identification of the almighty novelist with God (D. / Deus) is a common device in self-conscious fiction. However, Gass points out the new characteristics this relationship is adopting in recent examples: "These days, often, the novelist resumes the guise of God; but he is merely one of us now, full of confusion and error, sin and cleverness" (1979: 20).

12. This possibility links up with the gnostic account of the cosmogony described throughout the *Quintet*: the universe is actually ruled by an evil demiurge who supplanted God.

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Editor's note: due to the insertion of oversize graphics in the Internet version, the pagination of this article does not correspond with that of the printed version of *Miscelánea.*

BACON, ESSEX, AND DISCIPLINE

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Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was the first English philosopher to envision and theorize a thorough reform of the institutions of learning according to a utilitarian design. This design, which remained a constant in his philosophical writing, appears in its clearest formulation in *Of the Advancement of Learning* (1605). During the years 1592-1601, Bacon served as secretary to the second Lord of Essex, Robert Devereux, to whom he also acted as unofficial tutor. In the latter capacity he wrote four letters of advice on the Irish affairs, in which he cautioned Lord Essex against letting his popular image of military emancipation undermine his courtly construction as Elizabeth's loving servant.[1] In this paper I compare the disciplinary strategies that Bacon devises for the statesman and the scientist, respectively. This comparison was prompted by Bacon's use of the phrase "blessed physician" to characterize his relationship to Essex, and of "the human medicine of the Mind" to characterize the preliminary preparation of the scientist's psyche.[2]

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Robert Devereux's need of a censor who would counsel him at all times is specifically directed by Bacon towards the three main goals that the Earl set for himself: his courtly conquest of the Queen's heart, his epic conquest of alien territories (in Ireland, Spain, and Portugal), and his political conquest of absolute autonomy, i.e. his treasonous conduct.[3] It should be emphasized in this connection that the Earl's potential for energetic movement, be it in the mind or in geographical space, is construed by Bacon as being unpredictable in its outcome. The need to channel this random movement through discipline appears all the more urgent in turn-of-the-century England, whose people were still coming to terms with the simultaneous events of having a female ruler to obey and a new continent to conquer.

Bacon wrote at a time when England first committed itself to creating, sustaining, and expanding a sea-borne empire. Along with Sir Walter Ralegh, Lord Essex is considered the proverbial exemplar of the scholar-navigator-courtier, and in fact the two became associated on different occasions with Bacon's projects of reform.[4] By reason of his secretarial involvement with Essex, Bacon took on the roles of mentor, ghost writer, and client or suitor. He also attempted to fashion Essex as a patron of the sciences.[5] The noted Bacon scholar, Benjamin Farrington, has remarked that the implicit contract between both men involved their mutual collaboration in the pursuit of their very different goals: Essex would repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) recommend Bacon for promotion to a high executive office, while Bacon would help Essex appear, both in his writing and in his conduct, as a more prudent and self-sacrificing subject than he actually was (1969: 47-49).[6]

In the first of the four advisory letters to his patron, Bacon argued that Elizabeth herself distrusted the professional soldier's popularity and "command of swords," and that the soldierly and the courtly aspects of Essex's career should be kept apart and exercised only under self-conscious scrutiny. I quote from this letter, written on 4 October 1596, shortly after a definite breach had appeared in the relationship between Essex and the Queen by their offending each other in public:

> The impression of [the Queen's] greatest prejudice [against a subject] is that of military dependence. . . . Therefore, again, whereas I heard your Lordship designing to yourself the Earl Marshal's place, or place of the Master Ordinance, I did not, in my own mind, so well like of either, because of their affinity with a martial greatness.
>
> . . . The only way ["to handle tenderly your popular reputation"] is to quench it *verbis* (in words), and not *rebus* (by deeds); and

> therefore to take all occasions to the Queen to speak against popularity and popular courses vehemently, and to tax it in all others; but nevertheless, to go on in your honorable commonwealth courses as you do. (1861-74: 2.44)[7]

Martial greatness involves authority with the troops and popularity with the people. In Elizabeth's estimation, however, these otherwise favorable circumstances rendered a subject suspect of wanting to arrogate to himself her own unsurpassed authority and popularity in the realm. Essex in fact upheld, like Sidney before him, an outdated feudal ideology, which he invoked as his "native and legal freedom," and which reduced Elizabeth to the status of *prima inter pares*. This was tantamount to believing that the Queen could be publicly censured and legitimately deposed by her equals: "Cannot Princes erre? Can they not wrong their Subiects? Is any earthly power infinite? . . . I can never subscribe to these principles" (Robert Devereux, qtd. in McCoy 1989: 95-96). Bacon seemed more aware than Essex of Elizabeth's sensitivity to displays of feudal independence on the part of military (and therefore male) subjects: "I demand whether there can be a more dangerous image than this represented to any monarch living, much more to a lady, and of her Majesty's apprehensions?" (1861-74: 2.41).

Sensing this royal anxiety, Bacon offered himself as a surrogate conscience (in fact a physician of the mind) to counsel Essex in the latter's dealings with the Queen. Thus, in the fourth and last letter of advice, written in 1599 shortly before Essex's departure for Ireland, Bacon promulgated what was to become in *Of the Advancement* one of the cornerstones of his theory of subject formation, namely, the notion that volitional drives, like bodies and souls, need to be "doctored," either by self-discipline or by means of initiation, confession, and conversion. For the purpose of maintaining a measure of decorum in his exhortation to Essex to abandon the idea of the Irish campaign, Bacon explains to his disciple-patron that "being no man of war, and ignorant in the particulars of State," he only has "had the honour of knowing [his] Lordship inwardly," enough to understand Essex's need of "a waking censor . . . a blessed physician" (1861-74: 2.132).[8]

Bacon worried about Essex's inability to repress or at least conceal his desire for total autonomy from the Queen. This lack of self-restraint (Bacon calls him "a nature not to be ruled" [1861-74: 2.41]) can be best understood when contrasted with the sobriety and obedience that characterized the contemporary meritocratic ideal of a government career. A case in point is the philosophy of public service upheld by Bacon's own uncle, William Lord

Burghley, in the famous letter of advice to his son and future successor as Elizabeth's Principal Secretary, Robert Cecil.[9] Around the time Robert was completing his formal education, his father outlined a set of golden precepts for him to follow at all times:

> Towards thy superiors be humble yet generous; with thy equals familiar yet respective; towards inferiors show much humility and some familiarity. . . . The first prepares a way to advancement; the second makes thee known for a man well-bred; the third gains a good report. . . . Yet do I advise thee not to affect nor neglect popularity too much. Seek not to be Essex and shun to be Ralegh.[10]

Burghley's unpretentious warning provides much more than an instance of the *aurea mediocritas* topos in the fashioning of a civil servant. It provides evidence that by the late 1580s (when this letter seems to have been written) Robert Devereux's and Walter Ralegh's cultivation of a quasi-feudal self-image of personal autonomy was considered dangerous, since it threatened Elizabeth's claim to absolute control over her courtiers.

Bacon's own criticism of the untrustworthy subject is found in the masque *Of Love and Self-Love* (1605), which he wrote precisely to flatter Essex and fashion him into a disciplined knight. *Of Love and Self-Love* was presented at court before Queen Elizabeth, and in it three characteristic figures—a soldier, a hermit, and a statesman—commend the excellence of their respective vocations in terms so cynical that they become an easy target for the criticisms of Bacon's mouthpiece, a wise and sensible squire. The latter can thus oppose his own master's true virtue to the false ones of his three interlocutors. His lord, the squire explains, is neither violent (like the mercenary soldier) nor solipsistic (like the contemplative hermit) nor self-seeking (like the "hollow" statesman). All three counter-exemplars "seek most [their] own happiness." On the contrary, the paragon of chivalry and virtue that is the squire's master is bent exclusively upon "mak[ing] the prince happy he serves" (1861-74: 8.382). The dignity of this noble knight, who is meant to be perceived as a stylized image of Essex, lies in

> the truest and perfectest practice of all virtues . . . [namely, the exercise] of wisdom, in disposing those things which are most subject to confusion and accident . . . ; of temperance, in exercising of the straitest discipline; of fortitude in toleration of all labours and abstinence from effeminate delights; of constancy, in bearing and digesting the greatest variety of fortune. (8.380)

This enumeration echoes the general end of *The Faerie Queene* as stated in Spenser's prefatory letter, which is addressed to Sir Walter Ralegh:

> The general end . . . of all the book is to fashion a gentleman or noble person in virtuous and gentle discipline. . . . [T]hat I conceived should be most plausible and pleasing being colored with an historical fiction—the which the most part of men delight to read, rather for variety of matter than for profit of the example. (Spenser 1985: 74)

Bacon's invocation of "temperance," "constancy," and even "abstinence from effeminate delights" also provides an accurate description of the moral argument deployed in Book II of *The Faerie Queene,* whose chief protagonist, the knight Sir Guyon (also called Temperance), takes up the challenge of resisting precisely the "effeminate delights" offered to him by the sensuous Acrasia and remaining "constant" to his legitimate ruler, the Queene of Faery. In Bacon's and Spenser's formulations, then, "virtue," "discipline," and "temper-ance" can be considered as interchangeable concepts in the larger project of fashioning a gentleman and obedient subject.[11]

This Renaissance concept of discipline should perhaps be construed, as Michel Foucault does in *Discipline and Punishment,* as a way to bind together and to multiply the shifting and confused multitude of forces at work within an individual subject or an area of society.[12] In point of fact, in his philosophical treatises Bacon subjects all prospective scientists to a disciplinary process not unlike the one he recommended to Essex in the letter of advice of 1599. The "waking censor" and the "blessed physician" of that document resurface in *Of the Advancement* as the "human medicine of the Mind." If the scientist is not to suffer the same fate as the aristocratic warrior who turns successively into an explorer, a conqueror, and a self-destructive rebel, he must continually seek counsel and subject himself to disciplinary processes.

Bacon's most extended statement on philosophical "doctoring" occurs in the Second Book of *The Advancement,* in the context of an exposition of "the part of moral philosophy, concerning the Culture or Regiment of the Mind." After complaining that Aristotle said very little about psychology in the *Ethics,* Bacon undertakes to present a brief "inquiry touching the affections." Specifically, he offers a taxonomy of "receipts and regiments" that anyone can use "to recover or preserve the health and good estate of the mind." These "receipts," Bacon goes on, are "within our command," and include all

the progressive ways of exercising "force and operation upon the mind to affect the will and appetite and to alter manners," such as *"custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies"* (1861: 6.238; emphasis in the original).

The "human medicine," then, comprises a comprehensive set of strategies for social homogenization. In Bacon's scientific writings, the quintessential disciplinary device is that of method, which he alternately refers to as *"modus"* and *"methodus."* Generally speaking, a method is not only a normative way of ordering personal experiences, empirical phenomena, thoughts, and utterances, but just as important, a way of creating the illusion of causality and necessity where there is arbitrariness.

One of Bacon's most revealing comments on the uses of method appears in his posthumously published treatise, *The Refutation of Philosophies* (*Redargutio Philosophiarum* [written 1608; publ. 1734]). There he makes the following statement:

> My system and method of research is of such nature that it tends to equalise men's wits and capacities, like the testaments of the Spartans [Lat. *haereditates Spartanas*]. . . . [I]n that kind of natural philosophy which rests solely on intellectual strength, one man may far outdistance another. In the kind I recommend intellectual differences between men count for little more than such differences as commonly exist in their senses. For my part I am emphatically of the opinion that men's wits require not the addition of feathers and wings, but of leaden weights. Men are very far from realising how strict and disciplined a thing is research into truth and nature, and how little it leaves to the judgment of men. (Farrington 1966: 118-19; 1861: 7.77-78; English trans. emended)

The languages of politics and science contaminate each other in this passage through their attempt to reduce the other to a psychological process. "[R]esearch into truth and nature," Bacon argues, is a "strict and disciplined thing," and "leaves [little] to the judgment of men." These men are like Spartan soldiers, and their minds are prepared and "equalise[d]" by banning from them whatever prejudicial and imaginative idiosyncrasies they may harbor, just as the bodies of the Spartans were subjected to enormous physical exertion to prepare them for the discipline of warfare.

The end of this Baconian discipline is the replacement of both personal initiative and random thinking with a concerted intellectual effort directed

from above. In *Thoughts and Conclusions* (*Cogitata et visa,* written 1607, pub. 1653) Bacon writes that "the action of chance is intermittent, undesigned, random." By contrast, the human manipulation of phenomena should be guided by a method or "art" which itself "acts steadily, purposively, cooperatively" [Lat. *artem operari contantem, et compendio, et turmatim*] (Farrington 1966: 96; 1861: 7.134). "Art acts purposively" is also an obvious definition of the human capacity for exercising agency in a given field of ideas and actions.

To extend a little further the analogy between the scientist and the statesman who find themselves in serious need of "doctoring," it can be argued that Bacon attempted to discipline Essex by turning his random actions into an methodical "art" not unlike that of the disciplined scientist. Such a doctoring would have demanded Essex's "cooperation" with his blessed physician (Bacon); his "purposive" yielding to the all-encompassing designs of his legitimate monarch (Elizabeth); and his "steady" cultivation of an acceptable courtly self-image.

In Elizabethan works that mirror, however indirectly, the Irish campaigns, we find other physicians and other patients who also face the challenge of remaining faithful to their culture when immersed in an alien environment. To give an example, in *Antony and Cleopatra* (c. 1607) the experienced Enobarbus unsuccessfully tries to counsel Antony as the latter penetrates deeper and deeper in his own Egyptian heart of darkness. As Enobarbus puts it, the Egyptian environment of unchecked human passions, which appears paradoxically embodied in the protean yet calculating character of Cleopatra, succeeds in "subdu[ing]" Antony's "judgement" (3.13.36-37). Refusing to listen to Enobarbus' dispassionate and sensible advice, Antony "make[s] his will/ Lord of his reason" (3.13.3-4), and lets his "heart" rule his "brain" (3.13.198-99). In other words, as Antony begins to listen less to his "waking censor"—Enobarbus—and more to the call of his own untutored instincts, he not only loses his self-command, but begins to be perceived by others (e.g. Enobarbus, Caesar) as a dangerous image of absolute autonomy.

In Book II of *The Faerie Queene* Spenser features two characters, Guyon and the Palmer, in a situation reminiscent of the Baconian interaction between physician and patient. Being older and holier, the Palmer plays the part of restraining conscience to the more impetuous Guyon, whose appointed mission in Book II is to search out the evil yet almost irresistible Acrasia and her abode of sensuous pleasures. Guyon's challenge is twofold, for his attempts to achieve self-control engage him in a defence of his hierarchical

superior's interests. As in Bacon's advisory letters, in Book II of the *Faerie Queene* the subject being disciplined has a legitimate queen to serve (Elizabeth / the Queene of Faery) and an enemy to subject (the Irish rebel Tyrone/ Acrasia).[13] And as in *Antony and Cleopatra,* he must defeat a female ruler (Cleopatra / Acrasia) who interferes with the interests of a centralized political power (the Roman triumvirate as it regresses into a dictatorship / Elizabeth's quasi-absolutist regime), and who embodies a characteristically non-Western form of sexual power.

The notion that Guyon's valour and the Palmer's judgment complement each other is highlighted in the episode in which they encounter a seemingly defenceless maid crying for help. While Guyon all too hastily offers to deviate from the appointed course of his quest in order to help this maid, the Palmer reacts differently:[14]

> Which Guyon hearing, straight his palmer bade
> To steer the boat towards the doleful maid,
> That he might know and ease her sorrow sad.
> Who him advising better, to him said,
> "Fair sir, be not displeased if disobeyed;
> For ill it were to hearken to her cry.
> For she is inly nothing ill apaid,
> But only womanish fine forgery,
> Your stubborn heart t' affect with frail infirmity" (2.12.28)

In all three authors—Bacon, Shakespeare, and Spenser—we find an older and wiser character "better advising" a younger and more precipitate one. What Bacon does with Essex, Enobarbus with Antony, and the Palmer with Guyon is not unlike Bacon's fashioning of his "sons of science." The ideal Baconian scientist, like the ideal subject of a commonwealth, must willingly submit himself to a disciplinary process whereby he internalizes a series of assumptions about how knowledge is structured. This order is in turn an index of larger social distinctions or hierarchizations.[15] Such a correlation becomes nowhere clearer than in Bacon's last work, *New Atlantis* (1623), where the scientists of Solomon's House are called Fathers by analogy with the heads of each extended patriarchal family in the kingdom of Bensalem—the Tirsans. When the European narrator is chosen by a Father of Solomon's House to become the propagandist of their ideas on science and reform among a European audience, he is immediately called "Son" and required to undergo a rite of investiture that amounts to acknowledging his subordinate position in this curious scientific family. The presentation of relations of

power in the form of filial relationships is indeed a pervasive feature of Bacon's rhetoric, appearing most prominently in *The Masculine Birth of Time* (*Temporis partus masculus,* written 1603, publ. 1653), *The Refutation of Philosophies,* and *New Atlantis.* In sum, as the scientist produces scientific works, and through them his own identity, he also contributes to reproducing a preexistent ideology.

Not even Queen Elizabeth, who alone of all the members of the realm could lay claim to absolute autonomy, can escape the ubiquity of the Baconian disciplinary process. This is evinced in the following passage from Bacon's posthumous eulogy, *On the Fortunate Memory of Elizabeth (In Felicem Memoriam Elizabethae* [1608]):

> For Elizabeth at her birth was destined to the succession, then disinherited, aferwards superseded. . . . And yet she did not pass suddenly from the prison to the throne, with a mind embittered and swelling with the sense of misfortune, but was first restored to liberty and comforted with expectation; and so came to her kingdom at last quietly and prosperously, without tumult or competitor. All which I mention to show how Divine providence, meaning to produce an excellent Queen, passed her by way of preparation through these several stages of discipline [Lat. *disciplinae gradus*]. (1861-74: 6.306; 292)

The historical situation that Bacon is recalling here is Elizabeth's final accession to the throne in 1558 after the successive deaths of her two half-siblings: King Edward VI and Queen Mary. In his extraordinarily rich evocation of Elizabeth's early years, in which she suffered various forms of seclusion and denigration, Bacon makes three points regarding disciplinary processes: first, Elizabeth herself is the end product of a *method* implemented by Divine Providence in order to "produce an excellent Queen"; second, this process of production must be timed so that it does not induce a trauma in the subject being doctored—Elizabeth's mind is not "embittered and swelling with the sense of misfortune";[16] and third, "discipline" consists in a series of "stages" (involving practices, discourses, deprivations, renunciations, and so forth) designed to humble the spirit of the disciplined person. When Bacon applies his medicine of the mind to the highest-ranking person in England, then, he transforms an ostensibly human design into a transcendent one.

Disciplinary processes are to be found wherever there are social interactions, even if they are often not recognized as forms of social constraint. For Foucault, discipline differs from other kinds of punishment such as state-

sponsored repression and physical violence in that it seeks to organize and redirect the forces of an antagonistic power rather than simply reduce them to powerlessness. The strict discipline of the early seventeenth century, Foucault adds, is

> an art of correct training. . . . Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. It is not a triumphant power, which because of its own excess can pride itself on its omnipotence; it is a modest, suspicious power, which functions as a calculated economy. (1984a: 188)

To continue with Foucault's metaphor, Bacon attempted to reduce and redirect the inflation of images of emancipation and autonomy generated by Essex. His letters of advice read like a plan to supervise the economy of his emotions and actions, and above all, that of his self-representations. If Essex had been adequately disciplined as an obedient military leader, assuming a corresponding subordinate position in all his public appearances with the Queen, his popularity could have contributed to the success of Elizabeth's foreign policy and to the advancement of Bacon's own career at court.

Bacon's initial confidence in the power of education and surveillance foreshadows the ethical optimism characteristic of the Enlightenment, but is at odds with the skeptical ethos of post-Enlightenment critical thinking. In fact, Essex's resistance to being fashioned into an enthusiastic patron of the sciences, into a self-restrained soldier and courtier, and into a prudent statesman amply illustrates the well-known New-Historicist principle of reciprocity. According to this principle, the power to discipline and the contrary impulse to resist more often than not enter into an open-ended dialectic.[17] In Essex's case, this process found no closure other than the ultimate pacification of his rebellious nature by the institutional technique of the execution.a

NOTES

1. Bacon's Victorian editor and biographer, James Spedding, conveniently titled and dated these four important letters as follows: (1) "Letter to the Earl of Essex, 4 October 1596"; (2) "A Letter of Advice to the Earl of Essex, to Take upon Him the Care of Irish Causes, When Mr. Secretary Cecil Was in France" (1597-98); (3) "A Letter of Advice to the Earl of Essex, upon the First Treaty with Tyrone, 1598, Before the Earl Was Nominated for the Charge of Ireland"; and (4) "A Letter of Advice to My Lord of Essex, Immediately Before His Going into Ireland" (1599).

2. Stanley Fish (1972) defines the concept of the "good physician" as the hypostatization in discourse of a set of strategies aimed to dislodge the reader's liking for abstract logic. For Fish, Bacon is one of six seventeenth-century authors (the other five being Donne, Milton, Herbert, Burton, and Browne) who present their arguments in such a way as to debunk the expectations of their reader, who in his experience of reception moves from one pole of the argument to the other and back following the dialectical unfolding of the text. Yet Fish overlooks both Bacon's use of the expressions "blessed physician" and "human medicine of the mind," and his straightforward argumentation in works other than *The Essays,* which is the only one studied by Fish.

3. Essex's seizure of the ports of Cadiz and Faro in 1596 (he was in charge of the famous 'Cadiz Expedition') did not yield the expected profits in the form of Spanish gold. In 1587 Cadiz had already been captured and plundered by Sir Francis Drake, who also attacked Corunna in the same year (Hibbert 1991: 230-31, 220).

4. Given Elizabeth's distrust of martial prowess, under her rule the qualities of the courtier-poet-suitor became a *sine qua non* for anyone aspiring to royal favour amidst an ever more gregarious and theatrical English court. Being older and brighter than Essex, Ralegh occupied a place of privilege in the Queen's fancy that Essex wished for himself. In a justly famous letter to Edward Dyer dated 21 July 1587 (included in e.g. Devereux 1853: 1.188; Starkey 1990: 273) Essex asked his friend rhetorically "whether [he] could have comfort to give [him]self over to the service of a Mistress that was in Awe of . . . such a wretch as Ralegh."

5. Bacon wrote three "conceits" or masques for Essex to stage before Elizabeth, respectively in the years 1592, 1594, and 1595. Along with the conventional disguised figures enacting a dramatic action interspersed with dance and song, Bacon's masques typically feature an appended analytical speech, such as "In Praise of Knowledge" (1594) and the "Device of the Indian Prince" (1595), in which his ideas for reforming learning are advanced in a more resolute manner.

6. Bacon summarized his commitment to fashioning Essex as a perfect statesman in his declaration during Essex's trial for treason: "he had spent more time in vain in studying to make the Earl a good servant to the Queen and state, than he had done in anything else" (qtd. in Farrington 1961: 49).

7. On the so-called "Elizabethan cult of popularity," and how it affected the shifting fortunes of the Earl of Essex, see Starkey 1990: 263, 270-83.

8. In the "Letter of Advice to the Earl of Essex, to Take upon Him the Care of Irish Causes," Bacon cynically laments the indifference with which his counsel is often met by the

Earl: "Thus have I played the ignorant statesman; which I do to nobody but your Lordship: except to the Queen sometimes when she trains me on. But your Lordship will accept my duty and good meaning, and secure me touching the privateness of that I write" (1861-74: 2.96).

9. Essex detested Robert Cecil because he was the Queen's right-hand man in civil affairs and epitomized the class of plebeian *apparatchiks* whose elevation to the aristocracy clashed with his own notion of feudal privileges (McCoy 1989: 101).

10. Letter reproduced in Starkey 1990: 262. Burghley's advice to his son foreshadows Polonius' words to Laertes on the occasion of the latter's departure from Denmark: "There, my blessing with thee. / And these few precepts in thy memory / Look thou character. Give thy thoughts no tongue, / Nor any unproportion'd thought his act. / Be thou familiar, but by no means vulgar" (*Hamlet* 1.3.57-61).

11. The key work for understanding early modern self-fashioning, and specifically Spenser's disciplinary project, is of course Stephen Greenblatt's *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (1980). For more on Spenser and Greenblatt see Rodríguez García (1996).

12. An important clarification is in order at this point. After Essex's fall from royal favour Bacon was appointed to prosecute him. As he exchanged the role of mentor for that of attorney of the Crown, he also altered in retrospect the nature of his attempt to control Essex, emphasizing alternately the repressive and the formative aspects of his mentorship. See in this connection Bacon's two judicial reports, *A Declaration of the Practices and Treasons Attempted and Committed by Robert Late Earl of Essex* [1601] (1861-74: 2.245-74) and *His Apology Concerning the Late Earl of Essex* [1603] (1861-74: 3.139-62).

13. In the two-page "Proclamation on the Seizure of the Earls of Essex, Rutland, and Others for Their Rebellion" (1601), Elizabeth highlighted the accused's unpardonable crime of "lay[ing] plots with the traitor Tirone" (Kinney 1975: 325).

14. In the Preface to *The History of World,* Ralegh argues that departing from one's usual course of action entails a corresponding separation from truth and certainty. What is more, since "we digress in all the ways of our lives," our explanations of how our "lives and actions" deviate from their intended courses add further "to the heap of human error" (1972: 148).

15. On how the organization of a field of knowledge contributes to establishing both divisions of labour and social distinctions, see ch. 7 of Bourdieu's *Language and Symbolic Power* (1991), especially 165-167.

16. In the *Letter of Advice to Queen Elizabeth* (1585), written to impress her with his precocious political wisdom, Bacon argues for a peaceful solution to the problem of the dissenters who questioned Elizabeth's legitimacy on religious grounds. He specifically calls for an inculcation in their children of notions of political obedience "under the colour of education" rather than using physical violence against them (1861-74: 1.50).

17. The sociological formulation of this dialectic is clearly stated in Foucault 1984b: 428. The best application of the same principle of reciprocity to Renaissance culture is to be found in Montrose 1986: 317-18.

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REVIEW

Susana Onega and José Ángel García Landa, eds.
***Narratology: An Introduction*.**
London and New York: Longman, 1996. 324 p.

Narratology: An Introduction, edited by Susana Onega and José Ángel García Landa is the latest title in the Longman Critical Readers Series. Like the other volumes in this collection, Onega and García Landa's book constitutes an authoritative and stimulating guide to some of the most representative work on a subject which will surely be of interest for both students and professionals in the field of literary criticism.

Narratology has proved to be the source of many key concepts and analytical tools which have increasingly been applied to the study of a wide variety of texts, in the general sense of the word. One of the aims of this reader is, in fact, to call attention to the way in which narratology has evolved into a multi-disciplinary study of narrative. It is this ability to negotiate and incorporate the insights of other critical discourses that has made it applicable to the analysis of both literary and non-literary genres, as well as of texts which need not be defined as strictly narrative.

The work provides an Introduction with a rather detailed overview of the subject. It begins with a definition of narratology both in its wider and narrower senses, a distinction which is kept in the selection and arrangement of the texts to follow. Even if narratology is, etymologically, the science of narrative, the term as such became popular under the auspices of structuralist criticism. It is mainly for this reason that narratological analyses were associated with strictly formalist approaches until the 1980s and 1990s, when the post-structuralists' reaction against the taxonomic and scientific pretensions of their predecessors progressively led to the proliferation of new lines of development in such areas as gender studies, psychoanalysis, reader-response criticism, etc. In an attempt to present narratology as a rapidly growing field without neglecting its original structuralist core, the Introduction promises a

selection of texts aimed at providing the reader with as complete a perspective as possible. Before reaching that selection, though, the editors have felt it necessary to define some key terms, as is the case, for instance, with Mieke Bal's three basic levels of narrative analysis—fabula, story and text. Other central terms are explained as this initial scheme is re-drawn from different angles. A narrative text, we are told, is not only a compound of elements that can be analysed horizontally and/or vertically, it is also an instance of discourse. Accordingly, if enunciative structures can be exploited aesthetically in literature, discursive schemata open new possibilities for the critical study of texts. Charts and graphics are included at this stage to clarify the meaning of and the relationship between different concepts.

The last section of the introduction is devoted to an historical overview which sketches the development of the discipline from the early prescriptive poetics of specific genres, through formal and structural analysis, to recent trends which propose the study of narrative forms in relation to the culture that generates them. Beginning with the classics, this historical overview points out a black spot in narrative theory—the lack of an interdisciplinary approach to narrative genres and structure—and counterbalances, in so far as it is possible to do so in a few pages, the basically synchronic stand adopted by most work on narratology.

The essays that follow this introduction—none of them dated before 1950—are grouped in five sections. The first three are devoted to structuralist narratology; the remaining two are meant to be an illustration of some of the most influential alternative approaches to the discipline, now understood in the wider sense of the term. They are all prefaced by individual forewords, which anticipate the contents of each essay and help the reader to place it in context.

The overall framework used in Parts One, Two and Three recalls Mieke Bal's tripartite scheme of analysis, already explained in the introduction. Accordingly, the texts in Part One have to do with narrative structure and, specifically, with the most abstract of all narrative levels: the fabula. There we find a selection from seminal works by Roland Barthes, Claude Bremond and A.-J. Greimas, all names associated with the pathbreaking research carried out by the French structuralist school under the assumption, central for the later development of narratology, that all narratives share a basic structure which can be isolated and analysed. The first three essays are, therefore, proposals for the analysis of that basic structure underlying all kinds of fabulas.

In Part Two, we move to Bal's second level of analysis: the level of the story. Working as a kind of bridge between the first two parts of the book, Jonathan Culler's article questions the view of the fabula proposed by French narratologists, that is, the fabula as the true or natural sequence of events which the narrative presupposes and modifies in a greater or lesser degree. For him, the fabula is, instead, a tropological construct, the product of, rather than the reality reported by discourse.

The other essays in Part Two focus on concrete aspects of the relationship between story and fabula. In Bal's terms, a story is a fabula which has been given a representational form by introducing a specific point of view and temporal scheme. Following these premises, focalization is discussed in a chapter selected from Mieke Bal's *Narratology*. Meir Sternberg's essay deals with the distinction between represented and representational time, and Paul Ricoeur's develops a study of fictional time at three levels: the time of the act of narrating, the time that is narrated and the time of life.

Part Three opens with Wayne Booth's analysis of the different types of narration theoretically available. Some key concepts, such as "implied author", "unreliable narrator" and "distance", are explained in these pages, which prepare the reader for the more systematic typologies proposed by F. K. Stanzel and Gérard Genette, both of them included in this section.

The applicability of narratological tools to the analysis of experimental fiction in the second half of the century and, specifically, to the study of metafictional texts, is illustrated in the reader by Linda Hutcheon's taxonomy of what she terms "narcissistic" narratives. This chapter gives way to Parts Four and Five, devoted, respectively, to narratology and film, and post-structuralist narratology.

As the editors stress in the Introduction, present-day narratology studies the narrative aspects of texts in general. The convinction that narratology works when applied to languages other than the novel, as is the case with film, constitutes a necessary presupposition, as well as the basic point of departure of Deleyto's pathbreaking attempt, in chapter 14, to adapt Genette's and Bal's concept of "focalization" to the specific analysis of film narrative. The same can be said of the selection from Edward Braningan's *Narrative Comprehension and Film*, which illustrates, in addition, the productivity of the alliance of narratology with cognitive psychology in film studies.

Widening the scope of the relationships between narratology and other disciplines, Hayden White's essay studies the techniques of historical writing as versions of literary or mythical plots. Likewise, Peter Brooks's chapter constitutes an example of the convergence of post-structuralist reader-

response criticism and psychoanalysis, an approach also used by Teresa de Lauretis (chapter 17) in her discussion of the desire of the woman spectator in film.

After such an input of narratological concepts as well as a suggestive illustration of extrinsic approaches to narrative, the book ends by making a wink to the reader as it closes, in a clearly post-structuralist tone, with Hillis Miller's ambitious attempt in "Line" to trace the aporia underlying any use of narratological terminology.

With *Narratology: An Introduction*, Onega and García Landa have collected and organised for us some of the most interesting contributions to the study of a discipline whose field of application is growing day by day. I think this book will be a useful and unavoidable source of knowledge for those interested in literary criticism in general and narratological approaches, in particular. The clear framework and gradual development of the subject—from structuralist narratology to more recent works that assess the mutual influence of narratology and other areas of study—help the reader to assimilate concepts without getting lost in a path that widens—and winds—more and more as the book advances. Those who approach the work with a relatively solid background may find that the chapters intended to illustrate the interdisciplinary possibilities of the critical method under consideration are too few, in comparison with those devoted to structuralist narratology (double in number). All in all, I think that the texts selected for the last two sections make for a wide understanding of narratology in themselves, while simultaneously suggesting some of the directions that further reading may take. In view of what has been said, we can conclude, then, that Onega and García Landa's work constitutes a good, varied and stimulating selection, as well as an interesting and definitely rewarding reading.

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ABSTRACTS

INTERACTION, FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Eva Alcón

This study investigates the influence of interaction on foreign language production and development. In the last decade research has focused on the way in which nonnative speakers interact with native speakers and other nonnative speakers, but little is known about the effect of conversational interaction on the development of a foreign language. The present study was undertaken to determine whether native speakers' signals of incomprehension—clarification questions, comprehension and confirmation checks—influence nonnative learners' output and their effect on language development. Fourteen Spanish women were audiotaped perforing two communication tasks in three different periods of time. Outcomes of the study

shed light on the role that different tasks play in regulating the amount of learner interaction. Interactional modifications also correlate with learner awareness of linguistic difficulties. However, the relationship between interaction and language development is not linear.

THE ROLE OF INTERSENTENTIAL CONNECTIVES IN COMPLEX NARRATIVE DISCOURSE: KATHERINE MANSFIELD'S "THE GARDEN PARTY"

Pilar Alonso

This paper explores the role of intersentential connectives in complex narrative discourse so as to investigate the applicability of recent findings in the literature to more complex data than that usually found in theoretical studies of the phenomenon. For this purpose the function of connectives in Katherine Mansfield's short story "The Garden Party" will be analysed, concentrating mainly on the intersentential connectives *AND* and *BUT* which are unusually salient and recurrent throughout the text. The analysis shows

that both connectives provide a means of attaining local and global cohesion, and, most important, they efficiently serve as explicit signals for the development and construction of all participants' mental representations of the story.

SHORTCIRCUITING DEATH: THE ENDING OF *CHANGING PLACES* AND THE DEATH OF THE NOVEL

Bárbara Arizti

According to Peter Brooks we read moved by our desire for the end, for the recognition which is the moment of the death of the reader in the text, and a substitue for our desire for death and dissolution. The experimental "non-ending" of David Lodge's *Changing Places* frustrates our expectations by putting an end to the reading activity, but not to our desire for the end. The present paper focuses on the implications of Lodge's decision to end his novel unexpectedly in the light of the ambiguous relationship between realism and postmodernism.

A ROMANTIC VISION OF MILLENARIAN DISEASE: PLACING AND DISPLACING DEATH IN MARY SHELLEY'S *THE LAST MAN*

Antonio Ballesteros

This article deals with Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley's *The Last Man* (1826), a dystopian and pessimistic narrative which focuses on the representation of death from a millenarian and apocalyptic perspective. Death is symbolized in the novel by a mysterious plague which both factually and metaphorically menaces mankind with (almost) complete extermination. The study centres itself upon the literary and ideological consequences of the plague in the anachronistically Romantic context depicted by Shelley and on the connections with our *fin de siècle* and millenarian situation at the turn of a new century.

NEW MULTIPLE CHOICE FORMATS: THE OMISSION ITEM

Hanspeter Bauer and Helmut Bonheim

The omission item in a multiple choice test consists of a text in which four or five words or phrases are marked, only one of which is essential to the grammatical, syntactic or logical coherence of the text. Such items have a number of advantages: they allow authentic language materials to be used; a wide range of facility indices can be achieved, including those required for advanced and sophisticated learners of English as a foreign language as well as native speakers; the discrimination indices are unusually high, which suggests that the item taps layers of ability in understanding difficult texts. The format allows a number of variations: the key can be defined as the string which is essential, but also the string which is disposable (mere verbiage or deadwood). Half a dozen examples of these types is presented, together with the results of a factor analysis based on trials involving up to 500 candidates.

"THE GENTEEL TRADITION IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY" AS A VALEDICTORY INDICTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Juan José Cruz

This article aims to point out some intellectual and cultural elements that constructed Santayana's most famous lecture and phrase. Written in the aftermath of the events that transformed the United States in the turn of the century, "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy" is more than an elaborate literary critique. It contains Santayana's objections to authors whose canonized aesthetics had provided ethical alibi for two defining features of the United States in those years: social injustice at home and a foreign policy based on the right of might. This helps us explain Santayana's decision to leave America not just as the pose of a aesthetician; rather, it foresees the discontent that the American intelligentsia would widely express the following decade. Finally, some comment is offered on the limitations of "The Genteel Tradition" as a tract; our 80-year hindsight permits us assess the shortcomings of early twentieth-century liberal formulas to overcome the evils bred by nineteenth-century capitalism.

NIVEL NARRATIVO, STATUS, PERSONA Y TIPOLOGÍA DE LAS NARRACIONES

José Ángel García

This paper is an interpretation and a critique of the narratological concepts of narrative level and narrative person as defined by Genette, Bal and other theorists. These concepts are placed on a firmer ground by relating them to a wider semiotic theory, especially to the theory of enunciation. The structure of narrative relies on the enunciative construction of textual subjects and on the story's ability to convey multiple enunciations which can be used to motivate its discursive structure. Some of the main narrative positions (first-person narration, witness narration, reliable and unreliable authorial narration) are examined from this perspective. The concept of metalepsis or frame-break is also redefined.

THEME: TOPIC OR DISCOURSE FRAMEWORK?

María A. Gómez

Halliday's notion of (Topical) Theme has been questioned by Huddleston and Downing, *inter alia*. Their criticism focuses on the idea that the first element in an English clause, Halliday's (Topical) Theme, does not always identify "what the clause is

about." This debate rests on three different interpretations of thematic/topical "aboutness." Whereas Halliday understands "aboutness" in a *relational* sense, Huddleston and Downing support an *interactive referential* and a *contextual referential* interpretation, respectively. Section 1 outlines the points involved in three accounts. Section 2 expands Downing's and Huddleston's views, which section 3 tries to reconcile with a relational interpretation of the 'aboutness' feature of Halliday's (Topical) Theme. Section 4 comprises the main conclusion drawn therefrom, namely that Halliday's (Topical) Theme and Huddleston's and Downing's Topic invoke different functions, which may, but need not, be conflated or "mapped" onto one another.

THE DENOTATIVE-REFERENTIAL DIMENSION OF LEXICAL ITEMS

Benilde Graña

This paper defends the hypothesis that, along with the notion of Argument Structure, which encodes the

lexical-conceptual properties of lexical predicates (i.e. the idea that the verb *eat*, for instance, takes two arguments, an Agent—the eater—and a Theme—the thing that is eaten—as shown in *Peter ate the pizza*), there is a second dimension to the meaning of lexical items. This level, which we call Denotative-Referential Structure, is concerned with the way words are embedded in the larger syntactic context (i.e. the phrase) that contains them, and are referentially constrained within that context. It is argued that this dimension must be kept separate from Argument Structure both technically and conceptually. The general theoretical framework is that of Generative Grammar and more specifically the set of assumptions that constitute Government and Binding Theory.

"BUENO, HASTA LUEGO": EL USO DE *BUENO* EN CONVERSACIONES

Carmen Gregori

This paper presents a possible approach to the analysis and use of the Spanish discourse marker *bueno* in everyday conversation. The analysis is part (and at the

same time a result) of a project in which the functions of *bueno* are compared to those of *well* in English conversations. In this project English and Spanish discourse markers are being compared in order to find similarities and differences between their function and use in conversation. In this paper we do not try to reach definitive conclusions since the corpus needs to be extended and it is necessary to elaborate a framework in order to classify every occurrence of the different markers in a systematic way.

FREQUENCY AND VARIABILITY IN ERRORS IN THE USE OF ENGLISH PREPOSITIONS

Rosa Jiménez

The purpose of this study is: a) to determine the frequency of preposition errors in a descriptive composition written by Spanish secondary students; b) to prove the systematicity of these errors in students from different state secondary schools; c) to carry out a tentative qualitative analysis of the variability of prepositional errors in terms of their formal

classification, and in terms of the linguistic contexts in which they occur. Although percentages differ from one school to another, the results show that preposition errors are the most common of all errors. Results also show considerable difference in the frequency of error types: substitution errors are far more common than omission or addition errors. We have also obtained evidence that preposition errors seldom appear in linguistic contexts such as preceding *non-finite -ing clauses* and *stranded-preposition constructions* including *wh-questions* and *zero-relative clauses*.

THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF A COLONIAL SUBJECT: OTHELLO

Ana María Manzanas

Taking as a starting point the fact that Othello's colour is politically and ideologically relevant in the development of the play, this article offers a reading of *Othello* as a tragedy of race. The article reviews key texts where the stereotype of the black man as a "pagan conjurer" of beastly living and monstrous sexuality crystallized, and traces the presence of the

stereotype throughout the play. Othello's condition as a black man—whatever shade of blackness he was—is further complicated by his condition as a colonial subject who wishes to adopt western culture. The play dramatizes the apparently unlimited possibilities of self-fashioning available to man in the Renaissance, only to deconstruct this optimistic self-fashioning or self-creation when race issues come into play. It is Iago's exploitation of the politics of colour and of Othello's double nature (proper to a colonial subject) that brings about Othello's downfall.

DURRELL WRITING ABOUT WRITERS WRITING: TOWARDS A SPATIAL DEFINITION OF *THE AVIGNON QUINTET*

Ramón Plo

The aim of this paper is to analyze the reciprocal influence between Lawrence Durrell and the fictional writers he creates in *The Avignon Quintet* . In order to explore this blurring of boundaries between fiction and reality, I reflect on the confluence of two opposite forces at work in these novels: the *Quintet* both acknowledges its own status as fiction and gradually increases the feeling of proximity to a random,

ineffable reality. Throughout this paper, I shall also try to interpret the shape of the quincunx and its three-dimensional development—the pyramid—as the narrative architecture where these two antagonistic ideas are condensed into a single process of creation.

ESSEX, BACON, AND DISCIPLINE

José María Rodríguez

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was the first English philosopher to envision and theorize a thorough reform of the institutions of learning according to a utilitarian design. During the years 1592-1601, Bacon served as secretary to the second Lord of Essex, Robert Devereux, to whom he also acted as ghost writer and mentor. In this paper I compare the disciplinary strategies that Bacon devises for, respectively, the statesman and the scientist. This comparison was prompted by Bacon's use of the phrases "blessed physician" and "waking censor" to characterize his relationship to Essex, and of "the human medicine of the Mind" to characterize the preliminary preparation of the scientist's psyche.

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

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