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FRENCH FEMINISTS AND ANGLO-IRISH MODERNISTS: CIXOUS, KRISTEVA, BECKETT AND JOYCE [1]

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Writing during a study visit to France which coincides with International Women's Day, I am struck once again by the radically different approaches of English and French feminists to cultural tradition. The present essay focuses on one area in which that difference has quite recently been highlighted. It had for some time been my intention to look more closely at the importance ascribed to the work of Samuel Beckett and James Joyce by two major French feminists: the philosopher and psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva and the creative writer and philosopher Hélène Cixous. The stimulus to action came with the sharpening of the controversy in English Studies over the debt owed —or not—by modernist women's writing to the founding fathers of European modernism. What in the French academy seems to be relatively unproblematic is for colleagues in English a matter of major dispute. The present study will begin therefore by sketching briefly the nature of the current controversy; after which, I propose to move sharply to the French side of the line, where the view seems to be less contentious, and devote the bulk of my time to exploring one key intersection of French feminism with Anglo-Irish modernism.

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GENDER AND MODERNISM: AN ACADEMIC ISSUE

Feminist academics in English Studies have recently renewed the attack on what is seen as a significant over-emphasis on the work of the canonical male modernist writers, and are engaged on a major project to rediscover the women of early modernism. Such writers as Virginia Woolf, Gertrude Stein, Djuna Barnes, it is felt, have still to receive proper credit for helping formulate some of modernism's most significant ideas and forms. This theme was first developed in the 1970s, at the stage in Women's Studies when it was important to emphasise the marginalisation experienced by women writing and to insist that women's writing be given fair hearing. Its most provocative formulations appear in the work of the Americans Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, who from the late 1980s have attacked wholesale the misogyny of modernism (Gilbert and Gubar 1988-94). Media interest fanned the flames in 1995 when Germaine Greer published her *Slipshod Sibyls,* raising the possibility that some "neglected" female writing reputations might now be receiving more celebration than they deserved.

In French Studies, the problem of neglect seems not to have arisen in the same form, at least as far as modernism is concerned. It is harder to neglect those who were not there in the first place, and the *fin de siècle* in France could number very few truly avant-garde women writers. As a consequence, contemporary French feminist writers and thinkers such as Kristeva and Cixous have not experienced the same inhibitions in acknowledging the work of male modernists. Some English academics have seen this as grounds for censure. Lyn Pykett, for example, in her recent book *Engendering Fictions: The English Novel in the Early Twentieth Century* (1995), has taken Cixous and Kristeva to task because they claimed to find in modernist male writing models that related to their own projects: signs of difference, of openness, of resistance to conventional ways of writing and thinking, challenges to the language of the Father and of Authority. Pykett argues that this position is a betrayal both of feminism and logic. She attacks contemporary critics such as Alice Jardine, Rachel Blau DuPlessis and Stephen Heath (the francophone and francophile Anglo-Americans) who, following the Kristevan line, describe the form of the modernist text, irrespective of the gender of its author, as anti-patriarchal, feminine and radical.

Some of Lyn Pykett's arguments are certainly cogent. For one thing, as she says, there is a real problem with criticism that, privileging form and textuality, separates "the 'verbal icon' from the complex social and cultural

world in which it is produced" (1995: 13). Though this is hardly the case for, say, Kristeva's texts of the *Tel Quel* period in the 1970s, from which much of the work of the francophile Anglo-Americans springs. *La Révolution du langage poétique,* for example, published in 1974, is actively concerned with the relationship between the language of the modernist Mallarmé and the political and socio-cultural conditions of its production.[2] The misogyny of much (though not all) of the Anglo-American modernist tradition is a real stumbling block. As Lyn Pykett says, "it is rather difficult to accommodate the Kristevan view of the language of modernism as a feminine language of flow and flux with the tendency of some important male modernists (Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot, and D. H. Lawrence, for example) to castigate the offensiveness or incoherence of women and feminine language" (1995: 13).

What her argument does not sufficiently recognise is the difference of the French modernist tradition from the English tradition, which produces, politically, a very different spin. In both instances, of course, the modernist moment is a compound of authorial stances, ranging across the whole political spectrum from left to right, given its coherence by the common preoccupation with the desire to renew discursive form. The French tradition, beginning in the 1870s and 1880s, has its own conservatives (relatively speaking), traditionalists and misogynists—Remy de Gourmont, for example, whose work was much appreciated and promulgated by Eliot and Pound. But their influence has been more marked among their Anglo-American successors than within France itself. The French modernist tradition looks back far more to writers such as Lautréamont, Rimbaud and Mallarmé, all open to the revolutionary challenges posed by anarchist and feminist enterprise. Rimbaud's famous declaration is worth invoking here: the search for a new poetic language would, he claimed, be transformed if women broke from their servitude and sought their own ideas and forms.[3] When Kristeva's *La Révolution du langage poétique* turns to such poetry for instances of her thesis on the mark of avant-garde writing—its disruption of conventional syntax by the rhythms of the repressed maternal drives—the ideological contradictions are far fewer than if she were dealing with an Eliot or a Pound. And when Kristeva and Cixous look outside their national tradition for further illustrations of what radical writing should be, they turn to the anti-hierarchical, left-wing writers, such as Joyce and Beckett. The Anglo-Irish branch of "English" modernism is the one that French culture takes on board, leaving it to the English to define their tradition by its more authoritarian and misogynist strand.

In Joyce and Beckett, Cixous and Kristeva found modes of writing whose political usefulness manifested itself on a different level than the straight statement of a pro-feminist position. These writers offered imaginative mod-

els that developed their understanding of the socio-political structures that operate through the family and through language, through deep processes of repression, to construct individual subjects, male or female. They helped shape their perception of the extent to which patriarchy—the Law of the Father—is the organising structure of society and its language. And most of all, they stimulated reflection on the possibility of a language in which one might think and talk differently about such things, with the intention of changing them: a language that might subvert patriarchal discourse. It is particularly this shared ground of subversion that brings together Anglo-Irish modernists and French feminists, joined in the search for genuinely different ways of conceiving and articulating the world.

The rest of this study will be devoted to a detailed discussion of the French writers' responses to the work of Beckett and Joyce. In each case, I shall begin by saying briefly what kinds of things women writers generally have found in them to use—or abuse—before picking out the key points where Kristeva and Cixous engage with their work. One principal difference emerges in the way the two men are perceived. Beckett is seen to be offering a model of patriarchal discourse in all its negativity—an ironic representation of the inherited language of Western culture. Joyce, in contrast, while similarly exposing the limits of that inherited language, looks also for a new kind of writing, for which the feminine becomes his emblem.

BECKETT: THE FATHER'S TALE

Interest in Beckett's work by creative women writers was relatively slow to develop. From the 1970s, however, women authors in increasing numbers and of various nationalities began to draw on his innovatory dramatic models of the general (and ungendered) human situation for forms, themes and techniques which could be adapted to stage a distinctively feminine condition. One example here will do duty for many. Leslie Kane, writing on the American dramatist Marsha Norman, says that many critics have drawn parallels between Norman and Beckett because both of them talk "sensitively" about survival:

> Certainly, her focus on helplessness, autonomy, and isolation, as well as the predominance of waiting and the simplicity of dialogue, setting and structure, may remind us of the great Irish writer. Images of entrapment and sickness, the use of couples, humor—however bleak—to undercut and underscore pain are additional qualities we have come to associate with Beckett's work. (Kane 1989: 255-6)

For feminist academics too, Beckett's drama has been important, though less so, perhaps, than his prose.[4] Julia Kristeva's work in psycholinguistics has been invaluable for Beckett studies in general in providing new approaches to his writing. Kristeva has been concerned not with the thematic surface of Beckett's model of civilisation and the symptoms of its sickness, but rather with the workings of his discourse and what this can reveal about the psychological structures underpinning contemporary culture. These, she argues in her seminal essay of 1976, "Le Père, l'amour, l'exil," derive chiefly from that particular amalgam of Judaism and Catholicism which was developed in the Renaissance.[5]

Kristeva's essay focuses on the short single-voiced narrative prose *First Love* (*Premier Amour,* 1970; English version 1974) and the monologue drama *Not I* (1972; *Pas moi,* translated in 1973) which between them, she says, encapsulate Beckett's textual universe. Both, she argues, model and criticise the construction of modern identity within the limits set by the repressive Father. The opposite of Joyce, Beckett shows the negative, that which poetic language must seek to subvert: "the pillars of our imagination," the internalised ideology by which we maintain our confinement to a sterile universe. In both texts, the narrators are the products of patriarchal discourse. The repressed son of *First Love* and the old woman who speaks in *Not I* are "a fascinating and impossible couple . . . sustained, on both sides, by censorship of the maternal body."

In *First Love,* a son, who is a writer and a bachelor, narrates his reactions to his father's death and the birth of his own child. Until his father dies, he does not experience love. After his father's death, his first love is a prostitute, who forces herself onto him. Eventually she bears his child, and at that point he leaves her and his story stops. From this episode, Kristeva nominates four of the pillars of our father-constructed imaginations. The Father is identified with death, in that both circumscribe and define our experience. Love is identified with death, because love in a patriarchal universe is only experienced—and desired—in the form of negativity, exclusion, rejection and waste (excrement, she points out, is a key image in Beckett's text). The Father is perceived as immortal and is forever internalised and reproduced by the son, as a dead space, a void incapable of creating value. Finally, in this Father-limited world, the feminine is also invested with negativity. The prostitute-figure is seen by the son to be as

arid as the Father, and as soon as she creates the child he rejects her. A son's story has no room for the new possibilities represented by the maternal body.

The text of *Not I* is a dramatic monologue, which provides two elements for representation in the space of the stage: the constantly-moving mouth of the old woman who speaks, and a silent Auditor, of unknown sex, standing in the shadows, who contributes only four gestures. Kristeva's text makes no mention of the Auditor, whom I would identify, in terms of her argument, with her "He beyond communication," the dead father. The old woman, Kristeva says, speaks with a voice irrevocably shaped by patriarchal discourse, "pursuing a paternal shadow binding her to the body and to language" (1980e: 154). She is incapable of producing speech as an autonomous subject, in forms generated by her feminine difference. Merging the discourses of female intellectual and sexual pleasure and production, Kristeva focuses her argument in metaphor. For the "forbidden" vagina, the old woman substitutes a mouth, through which, in the madness induced by repression, she pours out the flood of waste, fragmented language which is her perverted form of creative pleasure: "She experiences jouissance in nonsense through repression" (1980e: 154).

The "Religion of the Father," Kristeva asserts, characterises our culture, and is the source of the absurdity and waste figured everywhere in Beckett's texts. Beckett speaks of sons eternally fascinated and terrified by the power of the Father, a power

> which continues to infuse meaning, dispersed as it might be, into their absurd existence as wastrels. The only possible community [in Beckett's work] is . . . centred in a ritual of decay, of ruin, the corpse-universe of Molloy, Watt, and the rest of their company, who nonetheless continue their most 'Beckettian' of activites: questioning and waiting. Will he come? Of course not! But just the same, let us ask for Godot, this Father, this God, as omnipresent as he is incredible.
>
> There probably never has been a keener eye directed at paternal Death and the way it determines the son, our monotheistic civilization, and maybe even all granting of meaning: saying, writing, and doing. (Kristeva 1980e: 155)

She concludes however on a positive note, pointing out that the one element Beckett's texts leave untouched is "the jubilant serenity of the unapproached, avoided mother" (the prostitute with child of *First Love* is a figure on whom the son simply closes his door). Against predecessors such as Proust and Kafka, "the militant bachelors of the early twentieth century"

(1980e: 154), Beckett establishes love, the feminine and the (hetero)sexual act, as the foundation of creative production—while emphasising equally the "impossible" nature of such love in twentieth-century culture, inscribed in paternal meaning. His writing models a devastated world in which traces of the repressed feminine still occasionally emerge, pointing mutely to the possibility of an alternative "beyond the debris . . . the last myth of modern times, the myth of the feminine" (1980e: 158). Such traces, she argues, were first made explicit in the early Renaissance, with its brief rediscovery of the pagan force of the body: Bellini painted those traces in the eyes of his Madonnas. In the avant-garde writing of the twentieth century, they have finally surfaced again:

> It was not until the end of the nineteenth century and Joyce, even more than Freud, that this repression of motherhood and incest was affirmed as risky and unsettling in one's very flesh and sex. Not until then did it, by means of a language that 'musicates through letters,' resume within discourse the rhythms, intonations and echolalias of the mother-infant symbiosis—intense, pre-Oedipal, predating the father. . . . (1980e: 157)

Beckett's deliberately austere language mimes in its self-conscious self-denials the repressions by which the Father maintains his empire. But beyond Beckett, opening up a more disorderly domain, or at least, one that liberates a very different body of Law, is the work of his mentor, Joyce.

JOYCE: TRACING THE MOTHER

The tale of Joyce and the feminine is a larger, more diverse, more positive and much-narrated story.[6] From the very start of his writing career, Joyce's work, with its foregrounding of women, captured the interest and the active support of Anglo-American women publishers and women intellectuals: in London, Harriet Shaw Weaver, editor of the journal *The Egoist;* in Paris, Sylvia Beach, of the bookshop Shakespeare and Company; and in the United States, Margaret Anderson and Jane Heap, the American publishers of *Ulysses.* In the 1920s and 1930s, Joyce was a frequent point of reference for women writers engaged in modernist experiment. The poet Mina Loy, in her poem "Joyce's Ulysses," pastiched many of the features that would later attract Hélène Cixous: the disruption of syntactical order, throwing binary opposites into productive conflict ("Hurricanes / of reasoned music"), wild punning, and especially the fascination with the exchanges of language and desire

and the astute symbolisation of masculine erotic fantasy and its versions of the female: "The word made flesh / and feeding upon itself / with erudite fangs / The sanguine introspection of the womb // Don Juan / of Judea / upon a pilgrimage / to the Libido."[7]

Virginia Woolf found "undoubted occasional beauty" in the poetic phrases of *Ulysses,* though she was more irritated by what she saw as a lack of coherence in Joyce's writing ("interesting perhaps to doctors") and her own "quite unjust sense that he's doing it on purpose to show off." This would seem to have been a problem of national and class prejudice; Woolf confesses she is "bewildered, befogged. We don't pretend to say what he's trying to do. We know so little about the people" (in Scott 1990: 642-5). The novelist Dorothy Richardson responded more warmly to Joyce's formal experiments. She was fascinated by the narrative processes of *Finnegans Wake,* writing in 1939 of the difficulty but also the "sheer delight" of the semantic, syntactical and rhythmical innovation in a text that "releases consciousness from literary preoccupations and prejudices, from the self-imposed task of searching for superficial sequences in stretches of statement regarded horizontally" (Richardson 1939, rpt. in Scott 1990: 425-9).

Writing in the Autumn of 1949, in the aftermath of the second World War, Storm Jameson, antagonistic to modernist experiment, attacked Joyce as an "anti-humanist in language," one of the "desperate stylists" who "distort[s] reality to verbal ends." She rejected "the paradox of a work drilling deeper and deeper into reality, in order to petrify it," and drew a political moral:

> Writers, novelists, who devote themselves to the disintegration of language, may be innocent of the impulse that destroyed in a few days all the great libraries of Warsaw. But its roots stretch a long way, as far as it is from burning libraries to the concentration camps where men are burned. (Jameson 1949: 54-56)

Jameson was fairly isolated. But in the 1970s, more sustained negative criticism, from a very different angle, came from Anglo-American feminists, criticising in particular the negative stereotypes of women in Joyce's work. Marilyn French, for example, was quick to point out that Molly Bloom was the woman of male fantasy. Mary Ellmann, impressed by the "curiosity" Joyce showed for "becoming as well as judging the other" sex, was not pleased by his presentation through Molly of the "liquidity" of the female mind.[8] In the 1980s, the essays collected by Suzette Henke and Elaine Unkeless (1982) bore witness to the broad range of possible critical responses to Joyce's representation of women and acknowledged the

legitimacy of his interest in figuring the mystified feminine self-consciousness of a particular historical period. The conflict intensified between those who preferred to dismiss him as an arrogant misogynist (Gilbert and Gubar) and those who, following the French, admired him for his "feminine" discourse.

In France, Julia Kristeva struck her first distinctive pro-Joycean note in the second half of the 1960s, in the essay now familiar to English-speaking readers as "Word, Dialogue and Novel."[9] Kristeva presented Joyce as one of the creators (with Rabelais, Cervantes, Swift, Sade, Balzac, Lautréamont, Dostoevsky and Kafka) of the modern polyphonic novel, which she saw as the inheritor of the tradition of the Menippean carnivalesque structure analysed by Bakhtin. She characterises this mode of writing as dialogical in nature, existing only as a game of relationships, analogies and non-exclusive oppositions, and simultaneously representative and non-representative. It produces a text that thrives by exteriorising and parodying its own productive processes and by exploring and transgressing the forbidden frontiers of sexuality and death which constitute it, operating through a collocation of conflicting discourses which challenges both logical and representational language and the authorities (God and social law) which that language sustains. Carnivalesque discourse is a deeply subversive political form:

> [It] breaks through the laws of a language censored by grammar and semantics and at the same time is a social and political protest. There is no equivalence, but rather identity between challenging official linguistic codes and challenging the law. (1980e: 65)

Kristeva's work in the 1970s, though referring only briefly to Joyce, nevertheless helped guarantee his place in the pantheon established by *Tel Quel* as one of the handful of significant avant-garde writers credited with forging a new discourse, a new human subject and a new ideology to set against a crumbling bourgeois liberalism:

> As capitalist society is being economically and politically choked to death, discourse is wearing thin and heading for collapse at a more rapid rate than ever before. . . . Only one language grows more and more contemporary: the equivalent, beyond a span of thirty years, of the language of *Finnegans Wake.* ("How Does One Speak to Literature?" in Kristeva 1980e: 92)

This innovative writing is explicitly identified with the feminine. In *La Révolution du langage poétique,* Joyce is held to be the first to bring light

into the mystery of the family, articulating through his writing the repressed element of feminine sexual pleasure which, by the fact of its repression, constitutes the family structure and, in consequence, all contemporary hierarchy and the authority of the State:

> Sans cette *découverte de la génitalité,* sans sa mise en relation avec le discours et la situation de la femme (Molly dans *Ulysses*) et sans son exposition à travers le texte musiqué de *Finnegans Wake* comme économie sémiotique attribuable à tout sujet mâle ou femelle, le mystère persiste et les critiques fétichistes de la famille restent solidaires de son ordre.[10]

"From One Identity to An Other" (written in 1975) links Joyce, Céline and Artaud as creators of "poetic language," inventors of rhythms and sentence structures which reactivate the repressed, instinctive maternal element (Kristeva's "semiotic") by which language constitutes itself as a symbolic function, and which produce a discordance, unsettling the conventional subject and generating in its place a modern "subject-in-process" (Kristeva 1980b). The Joycean mode is characterised as an incestuous investment in daughters and mothers; in "The Father, Love and Banishment," Kristeva speaks of his "joyous and insane, incestuous plunge summed up in Molly's jouissance or the paternal baby talk in *Finnegans Wake.*"[11]

Kristeva never devoted a whole work to Joyce. Hélène Cixous, on the other hand, devoted several, and spelled out in some detail what he could offer as regards the remaking of language, which could be joined to rethinking gender roles. The last section of this essay will consider three of Cixous's texts all or partly devoted to Joyce: her thesis, published in 1968, sections of *La Jeune Née* (1975) [*The Newly Born Woman*], a key study of woman's voice, and the essay of 1976, "La Missexualité."[12]

Cixous's thesis, *L'Exil de James Joyce ou l'art du remplacement,*[13] supervised by the important Joyce scholar Jean-Jacques Mayoux, was the first big academic book on Joyce to appear in France and is still one of the biggest ever written by a single author. It emphasises three major points: Joyce's account of the relationship between writer, language and history; his account of the family; the structure of his work and its poetic language. The emphasis on Joyce's language represents Cixous's original contribution to Joyce studies; the only French scholar to invoke this aspect previously was Michel Butor, who noted its relation to the language of dream (Lernout 1990: 35). All three areas are ones which are of major importance in Cixous's own subsequent work as a creative writer, and in her own intellectual history, Joyce could well be said to play the Father to her

daughter-role. The difficult relationship between father and daughter, on the ground of writing, is the subject of much of her early prose. *Angst,* for example (1977), or *With ou l'art de l'innocence* (1981) both dramatise the anguish of a daughter who is shaped by the discourses she inherits, could not possibly speak without them—and feels she cannot speak *for herself* because of them.

The relationship of writer, language and history, clearly crucial for Joyce, is equally fundamental to the whole project of modernism. Cixous's thesis traces through his work the development of a consciousness that invents itself in the intersections of art and history. She discusses Joyce as both artist and Dubliner, tracing how his self-knowledge grows as he understands more about the history of an Ireland dominated by the English, which has pushed his own culture to the margins and denied him his own language. Joyce is shown to feel with increasing intensity the anguish of that marginalisation, and to pass through a period of radical doubt as to his own ability to come to terms with his history. In the end, he transcends the anguish, finding techniques of writing that release the repressed energies of frozen history and frozen culture, and turn a dead and deadly inheritance into a process of new becoming. In the Joycean work of art, Cixous explains, History—the real—is transformed from the source of anguish into the materials for new speech.

Cixous's own prose narratives subsequently work through the same pattern, which she presents as the archetypal pattern of experience for the female subject, who is as marginal in her society as Joyce was in his and, like him, is exiled from a language of her own. Particularly, this is Cixous's own trajectory from the pain of the triple marginalisation she attributes to herself: as woman and Jew, born in the colonies (Algeria), she escaped by inventing a way of a way of writing that could establish her artist's Dream of history in place of the real.

"Joyce's Dream" is the title of her thesis's Conclusion, in which she attributes to Joyce the ambition to produce "a written work which is to escape all the laws and metamorphoses which history imposes upon reality and to build itself up as a universe of its own, obeying its own linguistic laws" (Cixous 1968b: 729). The dream was achieved, she says, not so much in *Ulysses* as in *Finnegans Wake,* which she calls an ark of a text (1968b: 18) in which Joyce gathered up all the world's symbols, notations and cultural patterns in order to save them, and to draw out of them and through them the structuring elements of what it is to be human: "Joyce . . . was detaching himself from reality in order to understand life from the standpoint of those ageless human problems whose shadow, projected through Time, may be

mistaken for History" (1968b:14). Cixous's own later version of this historico-cultural compendium is her prose fiction *Le Livre de Promethea* (1983), [*The Book of Promethea*] which represents woman's discovery of herself as artist and subject, in the writing process. This finding of an individual self is linked with the exploration of the cultural history of humanity—the Noah's Ark of modes, symbols, and cultural patterns—through which the female writer finally constructs her own place and voice.

In her analysis of the Joycean family, Cixous displays considerable interest in Joyce's own difficulties with his father, and with his wife, at the level of biography. But she is most interested in deciphering the operations of the Law of the Father in Joyce's texts. She notes Joyce's emphasis on the family as an obstacle to Stephen's development as an artist, the importance he attributes to Stephen's recognition of and resistance to paternal authority ("the misrule and confusion of his father's house," 1968b: 11), and Joyce's negative representation of the mother as collusive with authority (that of the father and, especially, of the Church) in the repression of her son. This version of the family romance carries over into Cixous's own work, where the impetus is to resist the patterns the Father seeks to impose.

Finally, as regards the aesthetics of the Joycean text, Cixous appreciates the different levels of meaning at which *Ulysses* functions, the musicality of its discourse, and its consequent mobility and fluidity. Language, she says, loosens up in Joyce, and becomes open not to just one but to several interpretations. This openness, and the associated ambivalence, plurivalence and proliferation of meaning, will be one of the characteristics of Cixous's own future texts, and one she will nominate as basic to *écriture féminine*. Like Kristeva, she comments that *"Finnegans Wake* is a work of fatherhood and incest, whose language echoes that of the daughter" (1968b: 66). She also picks out Joyce's use of puns, parody and irony to accentuate the doubleness—or, indeed, plurality—of meaning (1968b: 724). Her own seminal text on women's writing, "Le Rire de la Méduse," (1975; "The Laughter of Medusa," trans. 1980), identifies subversive laughter as a key marker of feminine writing, and the Joycean influence on her work is perhaps most strongly marked by her own use of parody and puns.

Quite strikingly, there is little attempt in the thesis to assess Joyce's treatment of women from a feminist perspective. The same is true of the essays collected in *Prénoms de Personne* (1974), where her main interest is in Joyce's contribution to the discrediting of the traditional essentialist subject.[14] Things are very different though in *La Jeune Née* (1975, English trans. 1986), where Cixous engages with Catherine Clément in a key debate

on the nature of women's voice for which Joyce is a frequent point of reference—less as Father, interestingly, than as revolutionary brother.

This is the first of Cixous's texts to register the importance for feminist thinking of Molly Bloom. *Ulysses* is said to trace woman's trajectory in life, passing from bed to bed: bridebed, childbed, deathbed (in Cixous and Clément 1986: 66). Molly Bloom, lying dreaming on her bed, is drawn by Joyce as primarily a body and reduced to a reproductive function, "destined," says Cixous, like all women, "to be the nonsocial, nonpolitical, nonhuman half of the living structure." This is not an attack on Joyce, whom Cixous obviously reads as having written a conscious characterisation of woman constituted under patriarchy, constructed in the image of male desire. *Angst* uses the same figure of woman as shackled to the bed—birthbed, marriagebed, deathbed—and reduced to passive sexual object. Life's drama, for the woman in this text, consists in getting herself off the bed and finding a way to write herself into an active, independent thinking body.

Cixous latches on to Molly's dreaming, and the space Joyce gives to her imagination (in Cixous and Clément 1986: 85) and picks up Molly's famous "yes," and the stream of affirmation that concludes Joyce's text. Joyce, she asserts, here perceives something new, a dream not of masculine but of *feminine* desire, and Molly "carr[ies] *Ulysses* with her in the direction of a new writing." Molly is then the starting inspiration for a long development in Cixous's text characterising feminine desire and creativity as vast, vertiginous, open and affirmative—the opposite of the "litany of castration" which is masculine desire. The same features mark feminine writing which, like Joyce's Molly, is marked by the immediacy of its voice and its delight in the feminine body (in Cixous and Clément 1986: 94).

La Jeune Née nominates writing as the place *par excellence* to resist and subvert the Law of the Father. Cixous quotes *Ulysses* against the misogynist Freud, and especially against Freud's argument in *Moses and Monotheism* that the great step forward in culture came when matriarchy was replaced by patriarchy—a victory of spirituality over the senses. Stephen declares that paternal authority, on which all social authority is founded, is a tremendous confidence trick:

> Fatherhood, in the sense of conscious begetting, is unknown to man. It is a mystical estate, an apostolic succession, from only begetter to only begotten. On that mystery and not on the madonna which the cunning Italian intellect flung to the mob of Europe the church is founded and refounded irremovably because founded like the world, macro- and microcosm, upon the void. Upon uncertitude, upon unlikelihood. *Amor matris*, subjective and

> objective genitive, may be the only true thing in life. (*Ulysses* 204).

She immediately adds her own comment:

> What is a father? 'Fatherhood is [sic] a legal fiction,' said Joyce. Paternity, which is a fiction, is fiction passing off itself as truth. Paternity is the lack of being which is called God. Men's cleverness was in passing themselves off as fathers and 'repatriating' women's fruits as their own. A naming trick. (In Cixous and Clément 1986: 100)

The point recurs in "Freincipe de plaisir ou paradoxe perdu" (1983, rpt. 1986c), where Cixous considers *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and *Finnegans Wake*. In *Portrait*, she takes the primitive scene of the confrontation of the son, and budding artist, with the Law of Father. Joyce is seen to say that the artist needs to know that that Law exists, because art comes through its transgression: "L'artiste a besoin de la Loi, mais c'est pour mieux la frauder" (1986c: 103). For Joyce, she argues, the whole of art resides in the use of language to thwart the authority of the Father. Hence the importance in his work of language-play in the form of puns, irony, parody and pastiche, which recognise the rule of Law in discourse only in order to knock it down.

Cixous's perception of the new vital force in Joyce's writing has arguably its best representation in her twenty-page essay on *Finnegans Wake*, "La Missexualité: où jouis-je?" ["Missexuality: Where's my Pleasure?"], published in *Poétique* in 1976.[15] It begins with an epigraph which claims Joyce as both the great innovator in the art of modern prose and the first to come out on the side of the feminine in writing and, by extension, in cultural and sexual politics. Joyce is responsible, she says, in a double pun, for "la mise à n'oeuf des genres." Joyce has renewed genders and genres, and into the new ("neuf"), he has slipped the Egg ("oeuf"). Joyce puts writing back to its origins, the female egg where everything starts. The epigraph also tells us, in another pun, that Joyce "nous fait (t)ordre de lire." He orders us to read; he makes us writhe ("tordre") with laughter (a play on on "lire"/"rire") as we do so. That is, he exploits and subverts the authority of the Father, writing in a way that makes it possible for readers to experience the unrepressed pleasure of the text. Between the two puns, the meaning is clear. Joyce liberates language, and his liberating of language goes hand-in-hand with his liberation of the feminine.

Joyce liberates language through the poetic mode in which he writes. In place of authoritarian rationalist prose, which produces a single reductive meaning by repressing alternatives, he offers poetry, a mode of writing that recovers the chaotic origins of discourse and generates significance by proliferation, multiplication of connections and associations. He liberates the feminine similarly by expanding its conventional meaning. In place of the traditional figuration of the female as a passive body, the non-creative negative object that sustains the male subject, he offers a figure that, like his writing, bubbles over with sexual and intellectual creative energy. Joyce's idea of the feminine is the counterpart and the emblem of Joyce's idea of writing: plural, proliferating, expanding. And both are emblems of Joyce's modern—and modernist—concept of life as a process of artistic becoming.

Cixous sees this double innovation figured in the dairymaid M—a new Miss, and also a new Miss Sexuality.[16] The key to Joyce's text, she turns up just when he needs a focus to connect together all its signifying elements—not in order to finalise it, and fix it in a message, but to provide a form that will maintain those elements in movement, streaming along like milk, enabling the reader to experience the pleasure of the process of production.

> [A]nd looking wantingly around our undistributed middle between males we feel we must waistfully woent a female to focus and on this stage there pleasantly appears the cowrymaid M. who we shall often meet below who introduces herself upon us at some precise hour which we shall again agree to call absolute zero or the babbling pump of platinism. (cit. Cixous 1986c: 79)

The most cursory literary-critical glance indicates immediately what would attract Cixous in this text. Puns and innuendoes play the expected notes of desire for the female as sexual object ("undistributed middle," "waistfully woent," etc). But this cowrymaid (a coined word resonating with echoes of the female as animal, new-born Venus, means of exchange between males) appears bringing with her not just sensuality but a cornucopia of intellectual possibilities, "the babbling pump of platinism." Most of all, she appears of her own accord, introducing herself. The cowrymaid, Cixous notes, is responsible for producing the milk of inspiration, from which the artist makes the butter. She is the origin, matter and medium of the "masculine" text:

> Son arrivée provoque des cristallisations de rapports, de mises en chaîne de systèmes de figures: figures de transformation, figures de

> culture, de fabulation, tout un travail où se rencontrent et s'interrogent, s'échangent l'économie politique, l'économie libidinale, et l'économie biologique. Question, donc, de régimes.[17]

In a final move, Cixous introduces herself into Joyce's text and claims the right to play the patriarchal naming game. The maid is called Marge, which is short for Marjorie and also margarine. Marge, traditionally, is only a second-best, a substitute for butter. And marge also means margin, or edge, which stands, traditionally, for women's place. But Cixous offers an alternative. Marge-rine sounds out *marga reyna*, the marginalised Queen, Cleopatra, who is the centre and ruler of all desire. The true feminine is not the marginal, repressed element in the text, but the centre of production. And margarine, Cixous, concludes, is the perfect emblem of artistic production and the creative process, being both natural and artificial, as also is the feminine. Woman is both natural and social being, both body and intellect.

These jokes work better in the flow and tumult of the text, modelling the Joycean movement. But they do work; and ultimately, through her wordgames, and through Joyce and his wordgames, Cixous finds the language to stage the abolition of old linguistic categories, gender roles and reductive orders of thought. In their place emerges a new image of the feminine, of masculine and feminine exchanges, and of art and language. The old fixities are displaced by concepts of non-repressive process, exchange and change. This is the key contribution Joyce makes for feminist thinking, through the French writers, and it has to be recognised as a major one: he gives inspiration, space and the elements of a language in which to revise, radically, the limits of the feminine situation.

NOTES

1. This article is a revised version of a Public Lecture delivered at the University of Zaragoza at the kind invitation of Professor Susana Onega, and with the help of funding from the University of Zaragoza and the British Council, for which I should like here to express my thanks.

2. The English version of this text, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, leaves out the two-thirds of the book which contains Kristeva's actual discussion of texts, and retains only the theoretical elements.

3. Letter to Paul Démeny, 15 May 1871, in Rimbaud 1966: 221-2.

4. Beckett's negotiations with gender now constitute a sub-set of their own within Beckett studies. See for example Ben-Zvi (1990) and Bryden (1993).

5. Kristeva 1980a. There is an interesting contrast here with Cixous, whose own less-studied essay on Beckett in the same volume of *Cahiers de l'Herne* identifies capital, not religion, as prime source of the discourse of which his work provides the ironic model; see Cixous 1976b.

6. A useful short account is Bonnie Kime Scott's Introduction to the section on Joyce in her excellent critical anthology, *The Gender of Modernism* (1990: 196-204). For an extended analysis, see Bonnie Kime Scott, (1984, 1987); Alan Roughley (1991), especially chs. 3 and 4 on Anglo-American and French feminist approaches to Joyce.

7. Mina Loy, "Joyce's Ulysses," rpt. in Scott 1990: 248-9.

8. Scott 1990: 198, citing French (1975) and Ellman (1968).

9. On Kristeva and Joyce see Roughley 1991, especially 67-73, 159-64, 209-12.

10. Kristeva 1974: 494. ["Without this discovery of genitality, its setting in relation to women's discourse and situation (Molly in *Ulysses*) and its exposition through the musical text of *Finnegans Wake* as the semiotic economy to be attributed to all subjects, male or female, the mystery continues and the fetishistic critics of the family remain wedded to its order"—my translation.]

11. Kristeva 1980a: 151. See Roughley (1991: 211-12) for an interesting account of Kristeva's association of Molly with the concept of the Abject in *Pouvoirs de l'horreur* (Kristeva 1980f).

12. Cixous also discusses Joyce at length in *Prénoms de personne* (1974). See the excellent study of Cixous and Joyce in Lernout (1990: esp. 41-56).

13. Cixous 1968a. Some of the material in the thesis had already been published in article form in 1964 and 1965, under Cixous's former name of Berger. See Lernout (1990: 41), and his Bibliography, under Berger and Cixous.

14. See the useful discussion of these texts and bibliographical endnote in Schiach (1991: 42-44, 140).

15. Cixous 1986b. The essay was based on two papers read by Cixous at the 1975 Joyce Symposium in Paris, which she chaired.

16. For a very different reading to mine, see Schiach (1991: 44-6).

17. Cixous 1986c: 80. "'Her arrival is the catalyst for the crystallisation of relationships, the interconnecting of figurative systems: figures of transformation, figures of culture, narrative figures, a whole operation in which political, libidinal and biological economies meet in a process of interrogation and exchange. It's all a question of regimes"—my translation.

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LEXICISMO, MODULARIDAD Y FORMACIÓN DE PALABRAS: LA MORFOLOGÍA DERIVATIVA EN LOS ÚLTIMOS VEINTE AÑOS DEL GENERATIVISMO

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INTRODUCCIÓN: ANTECEDENTES

Una característica de los modelos generativos desde, y especialmente en su primera época, ha sido su dinamismo interno y capacidad de auto-elaboración. A partir de la visión "pansintáctica" que se ofrecía en Chomsky (1957) se ha podido observar una continua reformulación de la estructura de las gramáticas generativas. En este proceso, la morfología derivativa ha sido ubicada en diferentes lugares dentro de los modelos gramaticales y su propia concepción como objeto de estudio ha sufrido cambios radicales. Así pues, los estudios más tempranos del generativismo (Chomsky 1957 y 1965) eliminaron la morfología como disciplina independiente. En ellos, el interés era, por una parte, estudiar los mecanismos que producían amalgamamientos de elementos lingüísticos en estructuras mayores; la cuestión de si esos elementos eran unidades por encima o por debajo de la palabra no era relevante. Así pues, la morfología, al menos en uno de sus aspectos, queda absorbida por la sintaxis.[2] La fonología generativa de ese periodo se esforzó por reducir cualquier variación en la sustancia fónica de una unidad lingüística a un conjunto de reglas que alteraban una forma subyacente común a todas esas variaciones; de

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esta forma, el otro aspecto de la morfología, los fenómenos morfofonológicos como las alomorfias, se convertían en parte del componente fonológico.

Esta corriente "desmembradora" alcanza sus mayores cotas con el advenimiento de la Semántica Generativa, en la que las estructuras sintagmáticas incluyen no sólo los elementos formales, superiores o inferiores a la palabra; también tienen cabida en ellos los constituyentes últimos o primitivos que conforman la estructura semántica de las unidades léxicas. La sintaxis se convierte en un conjunto de representaciones estructurales de la estructura lógico-semántica de los mensajes, siendo los exponentes de sus nodos bien palabras, bien morfemas, bien conceptos abstractos sin representación sustancial.

Las reacciones contra la Semántica Generativa llevaron al desarrollo de una nueva percepción tanto de la sintaxis como del léxico. Con la aparición de la corriente lexicista desde el trabajo de Chomsky (1970) titulado *Remarks on Nominalization* se establece un componente léxico independiente que no sólo actúa como repositorio de las palabras sino que cuenta con un mecanismo semi-autónomo para explicar la producción y la composición interna de las unidades complejas. La estructura y capacidad de dicho mecanismo sigue siendo un tema de debate; lo que se ha venido haciendo cada vez más incuestionable en la evolución de la teoría generativa desde la década de los setenta es que la morfología en general, y la léxico-génesis en particular, necesitan un espacio diferenciado de otros ámbitos dentro de la gramática. Que ese espacio sea un componente en el léxico, o sean varios subcomponentes de los módulos del modelo gramatical también es un tema no consensuado. Pero es indudable que, a partir de la imposición de las tesis lexicistas en la década de los setenta, la léxico-génesis recibe un lugar diferenciado como objeto de investigación y debate.

EL LEXICISMO

La obra crucial que marcará esta "mayoría de edad" de la morfología derivativa es el trabajo de Mark Aronoff titulado *Word Formation in Generative Grammar* (1976), en el que se desarrollan plenamente los parámetros constitutivos de un componente morfológico en el lexicón. Exponemos a continuación los rasgos más interesantes de dicho trabajo:

Parte Aronoff de la formulación explícita de la diferencia entre la morfología flexiva y la derivacional, considerando que la primera es parte del dominio de la sintaxis, mientras que la segunda es dominio del léxico, en línea con la posición que se deriva de modo implícito en Chomsky (1973). Otro aspecto importante es el rechazo del concepto de morfema como la unidad mínima provista de significado (cf. Hockett 1958: 123), basándose en tres tipos de evidencia:

(a) Los *hapax legomena* que constituyen parte de palabras como *cranberry, boysenberry* y *huckleberry,* que no tienen significado independiente y que no aparecen en otras combinaciones.

(b) Aunque sería posible asignar significados a las formas *cran-* o *boysen-*, hay palabras como *strawberry* o *gooseberry* donde dicho procedimiento no es válido: *straw* y *goose* sí que aparecen en la lengua como unidades independientes, pero su significado no tiene nada que ver cuando forman parte de los compuestos arriba mencionados.

(c) Por último, utiliza verbos de origen latino que son analizables como combinaciones de prefijo + tema, como son *per/re/com/ad* + *mit.* y *re/de/pre/con* + *fer.* Da evidencia de este análisis basándose sobre todo en el comportamiento fonológico común de los temas; por ejemplo: *-mit* cambia siempre a *-mis* cuando se forma el nominal derivado a partir de los verbos *(permission, commission, admission);* ahora bien, no se puede establecer un significado común a estos temas. La conclusión a que llega Aronoff es la siguiente: dado que no se puede definir el morfema como una unidad con significado, no puede ser considerado un signo mínimo.

En tanto que la formación de palabras consiste en la creación de unidades provistas de significado a partir de signos mínimos, el morfema no puede ser la base de los procesos de formación de palabras. El corolario de esto será lo que se denominará *Word-Based Hypothesis*:

> All regular word-formation processes are word-based. A new word is formed by applying a regular rule to a single already existing word. Both the new word and the existing one are members of major lexical categories. (Aronoff 1979 [1976]: 21)

Cada regla de formación de palabras especifica, por una parte, el conjunto de palabras base sobre las que puede actuar y, por otra, realiza un conjunto de operaciones:

- Una operación fonológica sobre la base, que típicamente consiste en la adición de algún afijo, aunque en otras ocasiones puede ser una operación nula (en los fenómenos de conversión) u otras variaciones.
- Una operación sintáctica por la que asigna la categoría sintáctica y los rasgos de subcategorización a la palabra derivada.
- Una operación semántica por la que se da un significado a la palabra derivada que es una función del significado de la base.

Las reglas de formación de palabras determinan la categoría sintáctica de las palabras que genera. Para ello, los eductos se representan entre corchetes

etiquetados con los que se especifica tanto la categoría sintáctica de la base como la del educto; por ejemplo, la representación del sufijo deverbal *+ee* es:

$$[+[X]_V +ee]_N$$

También se dota a los eductos de un significado, que será siempre una función del significado de la base. Normalmente este significado se expresa mediante una paráfrasis en la que se incluye una variable; por ej. el significado del sufijo agentivo ocupacional *#er* sería: "one who Vs habitually, professionally..."[3].

La parte más elaborada de este estudio es la que se ocupa de la (morfo) fonología de las bases y de los eductos. En primer lugar, se realiza la llamada "operación fonológica" de las reglas de formación de palabras por la que se explicita una cierta operación sobre la base, normalmente la adición de un afijo. Aronoff (1979: 63) parte de que un afijo tiene una forma fonológica y un límite constantes. Con respecto a los límites asociados a los afijos sigue la teoría de Siegel (1974) al distinguir entre dos clases de afijos (los de Clase I con linde +, y los de Clase II con límite #); los límites codifican el lugar en la derivación fonológica de la base en el que actúa una regla de formación de palabras: + señala que una regla es prefonológica, y # que es postcíclica (es decir, que se aplica tras las reglas fonológicas que se asignan al nivel de la palabra). Aronoff integra así en su modelo un concepto de morfofonología ordenada en ciclos, que constituirá un área central de estudio por parte de los investigadores de la fonología generativa desde mediados de los setenta hasta la actualidad.

Ahora bien, a veces es necesario realizar ciertos cambios en la estructura morfofonológica de las unidades derivadas previamente a la aplicación de las reglas fonológicas. Tales cambios son realizados por las Reglas de reajuste, que son de dos tipos:

- Reglas de truncamiento: estas reglas eliminan un morfema en posición interna tras la adjunción de un afijo, y tienen el siguiente formato:

$$[[\text{raíz} + A]_X + B]_Y$$
$$1 \quad 2 \quad 3 \rightarrow 1 \varnothing 3$$

donde X e Y son categorías léxicas principales

Por ejemplo, el sufijo *-ant* es bastante productivo con bases verbales acabadas en *+ate*, que es eliminado para la formación del nombre correspondiente: *tolerant, stimulant,* etc. Tal proceso se ha de formular mediante una

regla de truncamiento. Aronoff (1979: 88 y ss.) señala que las reglas de truncamiento sólo se aplican con afijos de clase I (con límite +) en la lengua inglesa, y utiliza como ejemplos los sufijos *+ee* y *+ant*.

- Reglas de alomorfia: son reglas que realizan cambios fonológicos, pero que se aplican sólo a ciertos morfemas y cuando se encuentran en contacto con otros morfemas determinados. Tales variaciones alomórficas pueden afectar tanto al sufijo como a las bases. Una regla de alomorfia, por ejemplo, habría de provocar la sustitución de la forma *+ation* por las variantes *+ion* y *+tion* cuando aparece precedida de una raíz de origen latino con sonido final coronal, en el caso de *+ion*, o no coronal, en el de *+tion* (por ej. *consumption, absorption, rebellion, decision*).

En nuestra opinión, el trabajo de Aronoff constituye el modelo de formación de palabras más detallado desde una perspectiva lexicista. Un gran número de trabajos realizados en los años siguientes a la publicación de esta obra se basarán en la aplicación de dicho modelo a diferentes lenguas, o se dedicarán a la reelaboración o el desarrollo de algunas de las hipótesis que en él se incluyen. Entre esos trabajos se encuentran, por ejemplo, Hammond 1980 [1978], Booij 1977 y 1979, Strauss 1982a, Allen 1978, Bauer 1983, Roeper y Siegel 1978, Cressey 1981, Szymanek 1980 y 1985, Gorska 1982, Beard 1981, Corbin Silex 1984, Scalise 1987 [1984], Zwanenburg 1981, etc.

Expondremos brevemente las aportaciones que nos parecen más relevantes de algunas de estas obras; en especial, creemos dignos de mencionar los trabajos que han intentado ahondar en la semántica de las reglas de formación de palabras, ya que nos parece que ése es uno de los puntos menos desarrollados en el modelo de Aronoff (1979 [1976]):

Booij (1979) se centra precisamente en desarrollar un procedimiento para la interpretación de las palabras complejas. Basándose en distintos tipos de formaciones, señala que hay ocasiones en que el correlato semántico de una regla de formación de palabras es suficiente para determinar el significado de las palabras complejas, pero existen otras ocasiones en que la semántica de una regla es demasiado vaga para poder interpretar la nueva unidad; para probar esto último recurre a Downing (1977) y Clark y Clark (1978), donde se prueba que la predictibilidad del significado de ciertos verbos denominales o de compuestos como *cowtree* o *toe web,* que pueden ser interpretados de varias formas, se fundamenta sobre restricciones pragmáticas, como el contexto situacional o el conocimiento compartido entre hablante y oyente. Por ello, propone que, si bien las reglas de formación de palabras han de ir acompañadas de una definición semántica para las palabras complejas, la interpretación semántica, al menos para las formaciones más versátiles, se produce en dos niveles dentro del modelo de la Teoría Estándar Ampliada dado

en Chomsky y Lasnik (1977): en un primer estadio, se deriva la Interpretación Semántica I (Forma Lógica) a partir de la información dada en las reglas de formación de palabras; en un segundo estadio, se puede derivar una Interpretación Semántica II a partir de la Interpretación Semántica I, mediante la aplicación de ciertas *construal rules*, que expresan regularidades pragmáticas en la interpretación de palabras complejas, si bien no restringen los procesos para su creación.

Szymanek (1980 y 1985) desarrolla aún más esta concepción, separando definitivamente la semántica de la formación de palabras de la parte estrictamente formal. La idea central de su argumentación es que es bastante frecuente la existencia, por una parte, de afijos multifuncionales, es decir, afijos que tienen más de un significado regular (por ej. *-ish*$_A$) y, por otra parte, también suele haber afijos co-funcionales (isofuncionales), es decir, casos en los que una misma relación semántica se expresa formalmente por medio de diferentes afijos (como ocurre en el caso de los "nomina actionis": *-ation, -ment, -al, -ure,* etc.). Estos factores son dejados de lado en los estudios lexicistas, y especialmente en el trabajo de Aronoff.

Beard (1981: 32) también propone una distinción entre los aspectos léxico-semánticos y los aspectos morfológicos de la formación de palabras, y se basa además en los mismos argumentos de Szymanek (poli- e isofuncionalidad de los afijos). La solución que propone supone un alejamiento radical de la postura propiamente lexicista, ya que la formación de palabras no se ubica unitariamente en el componente léxico. Sugiere que la derivación léxica sea considerada como dos procesos separados: un proceso abstracto similar al de las reglas transformacionales, pero ubicado en el léxico y determinado léxicamente, por el cual se definen las relaciones semánticas de las derivaciones léxicas; y, posteriormente, una serie de procesos morfológicos de afijación situados en un componente morfológico intermedio entre las transformaciones y el componente fonológico. Tal distinción acerca la postura de Beard (1981) a la de los tratamientos modulares de la formación de palabras de los últimos trabajos dentro del paradigma generativista, que trataremos posteriormente.

Hay que hacer notar que todos estos trabajos conllevan el rechazo de algunas de las hipótesis de Aronoff (1979), sobre todo de la Hipótesis de la Ramificación Binaria (= "un afijo una regla"), ya que permiten la asociación de varios afijos a un solo significado, y la asociación de varios significados a un solo afijo.

Scalise (1987 [1984]) dedica también amplio espacio a revisar las diferentes hipótesis establecidas por Aronoff (1979), si bien sus soluciones se realizan sin alterar la organización del modelo propuesto en esta obra.

LA MORFOFONOLOGÍA LEXICISTA

Aparte de los distintos modelos sobre la organización del componente morfológico que acabamos de exponer, se produjo en el marco de las teorías lexicistas el desarrollo y reformulación de varios de los supuestos sobre fonología y morfonología que emanaban de *The Sound Pattern of English* (Chomsky y Halle 1968).

El primer trabajo que reelaboró algunos aspectos de Chomsky y Halle (1968) fue la tesis doctoral de Siegel (1974, publicada en 1979). La aportación principal de dicha obra fue dar fundamentación morfológica a la teoría de los lindes. En Chomsky y Halle (1968) la distinción entre el linde de morfema + y el de palabra # se basaba en los distintos efectos fonológicos asociados a cada uno de ellos. Siegel establece que ambos lindes en realidad suponen una diferenciación entre dos tipos de afijos: los *Afijos de Clase I* (a los que se asocia el límite +) y los *Afijos de Clase II* (con límite #). Los factores para distinguir entre ambas clases son de tipo fonológico y morfológico:

- Los sufijos de Clase I provocan desplazamiento de la estructura acentual, mientras que los de Clase II son lo que se denominó en Chomsky y Halle (1968) *stress neutral* (por ej. compárese *prodúctive* → *productívity* con *prodúctive* → *prodúctiveness*).

- Los afijos de Clase I sufren otros procesos fonológicos no automáticos; es decir, procesos que dependen precisamente de condiciones morfológicas. Los afijos de Clase II, en cambio, no provocan procesos de este tipo. Por ejemplo, el sufijo nominalizador *-y* es un sufijo de Clase I ya que provoca la alteración de la /t/ final de la base en /s/ en palabras como *democracy;* en cambio el sufijo *-y* que forma adjetivos pertenecería a la Clase II, como demuestra la palabra *chocolatey,* donde no se ha producido cambio fonológico alguno.

- Los afijos de Clase I permiten la afijación a temas (por ej. *re-mit, insist*), mientras que los de Clase II solo pueden adjuntarse a palabras (por ej. *un-pleasant*).

Tales distinciones permiten a Siegel (1979 [1974]: 152) establecer la que posteriormente será denominada *Affix Ordering Generalization* (Selkirk 1982: 91), según la cual existe una ordenación en la aplicación de las reglas de afijación y la reglas fonológicas cíclicas de asignación de acento, del siguiente modo:

Afijación de Clase I → Reglas fonológicas cíclicas → Afijación de Clase II

Tal modelo permite predecir qué combinaciones de afijos son posibles, como *+al#ness* (Ciclo I + Ciclo II) y cuáles no lo son, *#ful+ity* (Ciclo II +Ciclo I).

Una novedad interesante del trabajo de Siegel es el hecho de presentar una estructuración de los procesos de formación de palabras en diferentes capas o niveles, y no sólo en función de las características fonológicas de los afijos. Tal punto de vista fue desarrollado por Allen (1978 y 1980), quien prefirió hablar de Niveles y extendió la hipótesis para incluir la composición como el Nivel III, caracterizándose los compuestos por contar con el llamado *linde fuerte ##* (cf. Allen 1980: 15), tras los Niveles I y II que se corresponden con el Ciclo I y II de Siegel, respectivamente.

Esta clasificación de niveles corresponde a los procesos léxico-genésicos del inglés, pero tanto el principio de que la morfología derivacional está ordenada en niveles como la afirmación de que éstos se hallan condicionados por diferentes procesos morfofonológicos han sido aplicados a varias lenguas, y parecen haber contado con bastante validez empírica. Entre los estudios más conocidos se encuentran la aplicación de Pesetsky (1979) para el ruso; la de Scalise (1983) al italiano, donde muestra que todos los afijos de esta lengua tienen un linde +; y la de Booij (1977), quien señala una estructuración similar a la del inglés para la lengua holandesa. Lang (1990 : 50) señala que en español la distinción es irrelevante, ya que los prefijos sincrónicamente productivos son siempre neutros a las reglas de acentuación, y los sufijos siempre afectan la estructura acentual. No obstante, defiende la ordenación en bloques extensos del componente morfológico. Dichos bloques serían los siguientes: composición, afijación, sufijación emotiva y flexión, que pueden ordenarse en niveles (cf. Lang 1990: 51).

Las ideas de Siegel (1979) y Allen (1978 y 1980) sobre la ordenación en niveles de la morfología derivacional y de la relación entre estos niveles con ciertas propiedades fonológicas fue posteriormente desarrollada en dos vertientes: por una parte se pretendió ampliar el concepto para desarrollar una teoría fonológica basada en la existencia de varios ciclos de aplicación de las reglas fonológicas y morfológicas; por otra parte, se creó el debate de si se deberían añadir la flexión y, en el caso de las lenguas romances, la derivación apreciativa como niveles o ciclos dentro del (sub)componente morfológico.

La labor de desarrollar una teoría fonológica en torno al concepto de "niveles" o "estratos" fue dirigida por Kiparsky (1982a, 1982b, 1982c y

1983) y seguida por varios investigadores.[4] En esta teoría, denominada FONOLOGÍA LÉXICA, se parte de la asunción de que las reglas fonológicas son de naturaleza cíclica, de tal forma que se pueden aplicar más de una vez en un dominio específico, y se hace interacturar las reglas fonológicas con las morfológicas en los diferentes dominios.

El modelo aparece completado con una serie de principios que explican los casos que inicialmente se consideran irregulares. El primero de éstos es la llamada *Elsewhere Condition* (cf. Kiparsky 1982a: 136-37), por el que de formularse dos reglas, A (más general) y B (más específica), a una misma forma, se ha de aplicar primero la regla más específica B, y en caso de causar algún efecto, A no se aplicaría. De este modo, se pueden explicar fenómenos de alomorfia regulares, como es por ejemplo, las variaciones del plural de los sustantivos ingleses, señalando primero la regla que adjuntaría la forma más específica (como es "Inserta /əz/ tras silbante"), y de aplicarse, no habría que continuar con la aplicación de otra(s) más genérica(s) (como "inserta /z/ tras sonora").

Una consecuencia de la organización en niveles de las reglas morfológicas es que la utilización de los lindes puede resultar innecesaria, ya que el encorchetamiento de las unidades refleja de forma precisa en qué nivel se produce la afijación.

Como vemos, el modelo de la Fonología Léxica toma como punto de partida crucial que las reglas fonológicas del nivel de la palabra están condicionadas morfológicamente. Una ampliación lógica de este enfoque es que la hipótesis de la ciclicidad y de la ordenación en niveles se aplique no sólo a la formación de palabras sino también a la flexión. La cuestión de si el componente morfológico del léxico debe o no abarcar la flexión ha sido una cuestión de debate aún no resuelta. Se han puesto de manifiesto en diferentes trabajos las similitudes y diferencias entre los procesos derivativos y los flexivos (cf. Varela 1990: cap. 4, y Scalise 1987 [1984]: cap. 6 para un resumen de tales rasgos) y dependiendo del énfasis dado a los primeros o a los segundos, han surgido defensores y detractores de los dos puntos de vista. Esta es la famosa controversia entre la llamada *Hipótesis lexicista fuerte* (que aúna derivación y flexión) y la *Hipótesis lexicista débil* (que considera la flexión una parte bien del componente sintáctico o bien del componente fonológico).[5]

Los modelos morfofonológicos que acabamos de ver dan una visión ordenada en estratos o niveles del componente morfológico que resulta bastante atractiva: proporciona una motivación morfológica para todas las reglas fonológicas que afectan a la palabra, y explican la constitución morfológica de las unidades complejas. Además, permiten como extensión natural integrar la

flexión en un último nivel dentro de ese componente morfológico, por lo que la morfología es percibida como un conjunto unitario. Sin embargo, tales modelos acarrean tambien inconsistencias importantes entre la estructura morfológica y la estructura sintáctico-semántica de un buen número de palabras complejas. Señalaremos dos ejemplos típicos: el compuesto *nuclear physicist,* según una morfología cíclica tiene la estructura [[nuclear] [physic+ist]], pero su semántica hace más adecuada una estructura [[nuclear physic]ist]; *ungrammaticality* está formada por un sufijo de clase I *-ity* y el prefijo de clase II *un-*, por lo que se constitución interna sería [un [grammatical +ity]]. Sin embargo, este análisis implica que *un-*, prefijo deadjetival, se adjunta al nombre *grammaticality,* lo que resulta imposible; por tanto, teniendo en cuenta la restricción sobre el tipo de bases de *un-*, la estructura sería [[un+grammatical]+ity], donde un afijo de clase I se adjunta tras un afijo de clase II, violando la restricción de ciclicidad estricta (*Strict Cyclicity Condition*).

Los primeros intentos por solucionar estas inconsistencias, denominadas "paradojas de encorchetamiento", vendrán dadas por los propios defensores de una morfología ordenada en niveles, especialmente por Kiparsky (1983) y Strauss (1982a y 1982b). Strauss propone relajar las restricciones sobre la ordenación estricta en niveles permitiendo que éstas actúen sólo con respecto al orden de los afijos que se adjuntan a un mismo lado de la base, por lo que la estructura [un+grammatical]+ity] sería correcta tanto semántica como morfológicamente. En Kiparsky (1983) se propone una solución diferente, que consiste en la posibilidad de reestructuración de los encorchetamientos resultantes de la afijación ordenada en niveles. Así, en el nivel I se formaría la palabra $[[\text{grammatical}]_A \text{ +ity}]_N$. En el nivel II y dado que *un-* sólo se adjunta a adjetivos se produciría una redistribución en $[[\text{un+grammatical}]_A \text{ +ity}]_N$. Tal solución supone abandonar algunos de los principios del modelo de Fonología Léxica, entre ellos la *Convención del Borrado de Corchetes* (*Bracketing Erasure Convention*), que se consideraba primordial, por la que a los eductos de cada ciclo se le eliminaban los corchetes etiquetados internos de tal forma que no habría acceso a su estructura interna y, por tanto, las operaciones posteriores sólo afectarían a la unidad como un todo. Estos intentos conllevarán un debilitamiento de la teoría, cuyas restricciones generales se irán relajando progresivamente, como se puede apreciar en uno de los últimos trabajos dentro de este marco, el de Mohanan (1986), donde ya se permite que haya la posibilidad de que una palabra "vuelva atrás" desde un nivel a otro anterior para pasar de nuevo por ciertos procesos derivativos. Por ejemplo, en el caso de compuestos como *parks commisioner* y *systems analyst* (en los que se produce un fenómeno de composición posterior a la flexión), o como *generative grammarian,* cuyo significado sugiere una estructura [generative grammar] +ian] en la que la composición precede a la sufijación.

LAS ÚLTIMAS TENDENCIAS SINTACTICISTAS

Todas estas propuestas de solución de las paradojas de encorchetamiento suponen un intento de adaptar la estructura gramatical a la estructura semántica, sin abandonar el modelo morfofonológico; pero hay otros estudios en los que se dan soluciones alternativas para resolver tales paradojas: su propósito no es intentar adaptar una estructura a otra sino generar una sola estructura gramatical que sea la adecuada. Así se desarrolló una nueva orientación en la que el interés fue abordar la formación de palabras desde el punto de vista de la estructura sintáctica interna de las unidades derivadas y desde la relación entre la estructura argumental de éstas con otras estructuras sintácticas.

Quizá el trabajo más importante desde esta nueva perspectiva es el de E.O. Selkirk titulado *The Syntax of Words* (1982). Partiendo de una postura lexicista, Selkirk ha diseñado una notación X-con-barra para explicar las propiedades estructurales de las palabras complejas. Para ello establece dos tipos de sintaxis (Selkirk 1982: 2), *W-syntax* ("word-syntax"), que corresponde a la morfología, y *S-syntax* ("sentence-syntax"), equivalente a la sintaxis propiamente dicha. La organización de la *W-syntax* es muy similar a la *S-syntax* de la teoría X-con-Barra del modelo chomskyano: hay un conjunto de reglas de reescritura libres de contexto que generan árboles etiquetados, los cuales reflejan la estructura interna de las palabras. Existe, también paralelamente a la *S-syntax*, una jerarquía de categorías en la *W-syntax*. Dichas categorías se proyectan sobre las unidades léxicas del nivel cero (= palabras); así pues, hay categorías X^{-1}, que se corresponden con lo que Selkirk considera Raíces; por ej. una raíz nominal se representará como N^{-1}, un lexema adjetival será formulado como A^0. Cualquier proyección X^n debe incluir una proyección de un nivel inferior, por lo que cualquier palabra ($=X^0$) debe incluir una raíz ($=X^{-1}$).

El componente léxico, por tanto está organizado del siguiente modo (Selkirk 1982: 10): primero, hay un diccionario con todas las palabras (*freely occurring lexical items*) de la lengua; segundo, también hay una lista de morfemas trabados que, junto con el diccionario, constituyen el diccionario extendido del componente léxico. El tercer subcomponente está formado por las reglas de estructura de la palabra, encargadas de caracterizar las estructuras morfológicas posibles de una lengua. Todos estos elementos conforman el núcleo del componente o base morfológica. La autora señala la posibilidad de

otros subcomponentes, como las reglas de alomorfia de Aronoff (1979), o las reglas morfoléxicas de Lieber (1980), aunque no ahonda en ellos.

En este modelo los afijos tienen varias características muy interesantes: en primer lugar, son considerados unidades léxicas, a diferencia del modelo de Aronoff donde eran caracterizados como una parte de las reglas de formación de palabras. Cada afijo tiene dos propiedades "sintácticas". La primera señala la clase (conjunto de rasgos) y el tipo (nivel en la jerarquía X-con-barra) de la categoría que actúa como nodo hermano del afijo, y si el afijo le precede o sigue. Esta propiedad aparece descrita en el marco de subcategorización que acompaña a cada afijo. Así, *-less* contará como marco [Noun ___], el cual informa que *-less* es un sufijo que se adjunta a nombres. La segunda propiedad sintáctica define el tipo de categoría que domina al afijo y al nodo hermano. Para codificar esta segunda propiedad, Selkirk (1982: 60-61) sigue a Williams (1981), quien propone que los afijos tienen rasgos categoriales al igual que las otras unidades léxicas. Al sufijo *-less*, por ejemplo, le corresponde una matriz categorial adjetival [+N,+V], y podrá ocupar una posición que en una estructura sintagmática esté etiquetada como $A^{A[}$. También sigue a Williams (1981) al considerar que los afijos pueden ser los "núcleos" (*heads*) de las palabras derivadas, y propone una versión revisada de su *Right-hand Head Rule* (Selkirk 1982: 20-21) según la cual:

> *In a word-internal configuration,*
>
> $$X^n$$
>
> $$P \qquad X^m \qquad Q$$
>
> *where X stands for a syntactic feature complex and where Q contains no category with the feature complex X, X^m is the head of X^n.*

Junto al concepto de núcleo también integra el de *Percolation*, por el que se asegura que una palabra (o un constituyente de una categoría inferior, como una raíz) "hereda" los mismos rasgos que su núcleo.[6]

Basándose en estos conceptos, Selkirk procederá a justificar la distinción de Siegel (1979 [1974]) y Allen (1978) entre los afijos de Clase I y los de Clase II en términos de los marcos de subcategorización y, consecuentemente, de la estructura sintáctica en que cada uno de éstos se inserta. Los afijos de Clase I, como *-ity* y *-ous*, serán considerados afijos cuyo nodo hermano es una Raíz, mientras que los de Clase II serán subcategorizados como afijos de Palabras (como son *-less* y *-ness*). La

restricción sobre el orden de los afijos (*Affix Ordering Generalization*) propuesta en las teorías de la morfología ordenada en niveles, es reinterpretada mediante una condición por la que en la *word-syntax* no se permite que ningún constituyente incluya un constituyente de un nivel superior en la jerarquía X-con-Barra. Esto conlleva que una construcción de un afijo de Palabra con un nodo madre Raíz es imposible. Hay dos tipos de potenciales contraejemplos, posibles "paradojas", a esta ordenación: por una parte, hay afijos de Palabra, como *-ise*, que aparecen adjuntados previamente a otros afijos que tienen Raíces como nodos hermanos, por ej. *standardisation*. La solución de Selkirk (1982: 104-105) es considerar que palabras como *standardise* son reanalizadas como raíces, por lo que pueden ser afijadas con sufijos como *-ation*. El otro tipo de contraejemplos se refiere a los casos en que se produce un proceso de afijación de un compuesto, como en *ex-frogman* o *non-hardback*. Ahora bien, dado que la regla de reescritura de la *word-syntax* para compuestos es Word → Word-Word y que también hay reglas de afijación del tipo Word → Word-Affix y Word → Affix-Word, es posible encontrar afijos que aparecen adjuntados a palabras compuestas. Pero estas reglas imponen una condición: sólo aparecen en esta posición los afijos que se subcategorizan como nodos hermanos a palabras, no a raíces (es decir, sólo los afijos de Clase II se adjuntan a compuestos).

En algunos aspectos el modelo de Selkirk (1982) aún mantiene ciertas conexiones con los modelos de morfofonología en niveles, como es la distinción entre dos tipos de afijos. Sin embargo, hay otros conceptos más novedosos, tales como la idea de extender la teoría de la X-con-Barra y la integración de conceptos propios de la sintaxis, como la noción de "núcleo" y de herencia de rasgos a la morfología, así como el espacio dedicado a la relación entre la estructura argumental de las unidades léxicas primarias y las derivadas, que han tenido bastante predicamento en trabajos posteriores, tanto dentro de la tradición lexicista,[7] como dentro de los enfoques "modulares" de la formación de palabras, en especial de la composición, que han surgido en los últimos años.

Estos enfoques "modulares", entre los que hay que incluir trabajos como Marantz (1984 y 1988), Fabb (1984), Sproat (1985 y 1988), Pesetsky (1985), Roeper (1988), Baker (1988) y Shibatani y Kageyama (1988), parten de la consideración de que al menos algunos de los procesos de formación de palabras, en especial la composición (aunque también ciertos procesos de derivación), son primordialmente un fenómeno sintáctico.

Utilizaremos como ejemplo de esta nueva tendencia los estudios de Fabb (1984) y Sproat (1985), que se basan fundamentalmente en argumentar que

los principios de la teoría de *Government and Binding* (GB) permiten explicar la morfología en general, incluida la composición y parte de la derivación.

Siguiendo la línea de argumentación de Selkirk, por la que los compuestos sintéticos como *truck driving* heredan y muestran la estructura argumental del verbo que está en el núcleo del compuesto, estos autores intentan fundamentar tal relación dentro del modelo GB. Dos son los principios de dicho modelo que se han de aplicar para garantizar dicha herencia argumental: el Criterio θ y el Principio de Proyección. Según el Criterio θ, si un verbo tiene roles-θ (argumentos) obligatorios en su estructura-θ, éstos deben ser asignados a una posición argumental. Por otra parte, el Principio de Proyección garantiza que todos los roles-θ de un verbo (su θ-*grid*) son proyectados en todos los niveles sintácticos: Forma Lógica, Estructura-P y Estructura-S; consecuentemente el Criterio-θ también ha de respetarse en todos esos niveles. Ahora bien, el Principio de Proyección no actúa en el componente léxico, asi que cualquier regla que viole el Criterio-θ ha de ser una regla léxica.

Dado que los compuestos sintéticos han de estar condicionados por estos dos principios, es lógico ubicar su generación en la sintaxis.

Otro aspecto interesante de la aplicación del modelo GB a la morfología es que, dentro de esta teoría, es posible considerar a los afijos como elementos léxicos, al igual que los temas y las palabras, que además cuentan con sus propias características sintácticas: son categorías de nivel X^0 en la jerarquía de X-con-Barra, que se aplican para la construcción sintáctica interna de las palabras.[8] Estos afijos se adjuntan a las bases mediante ciertas reglas sintácticas, proceso que se ha venido en denominar *afijación sintáctica*. Fabb (1984: 38-39) establece cuatro rasgos que diferencian la formación de palabras sintáctica de la que ocurre en el léxico: un proceso sintáctico de formación de palabras es (i) productivo; (ii) sus eductos son totalmente predecibles en todas sus propiedades; (iii) los aductos son constituyentes sintácticos; (iv) las partes de la palabra compleja generada sintácticamente tienen algún tipo de relación sintáctica y respetan los principios sintácticos de buena formación.

Con estas premisas no sólo es fácil asumir que los compuestos sintéticos sean procesos sintácticos, sino que los afijos que aparecen en tales compuestos (como *-er* o *-ing*) son afijados en la sintaxis.

Uno de los problemas que también ha de tenerse en cuenta es cómo relacionar tales representaciones estructurales con la estructura morfofonológica de las unidades léxicas complejas, especialmente en los casos en que ambas estructuras sugieren encorchetamientos diferentes (las "paradojas"). Sproat (1988) señalará que este problema consiste en establecer una conexión entre dos niveles de representación de las formas complejas, la Estructura-S y la

Forma Fonológica. Ahora bien, las propiedades que describen ambas estructuras son muy diferentes: la estructura sintáctica expresa relaciones jerárquicas de rección, señala la categoría de las bases y de los derivados, etc., pero no expresa el orden linear de los constituyentes. La Forma Fonológica indica la posición de los afijos, si son acentuados o no, etc. Lo que es necesario, pues, es establecer algún principio que una ambas representaciones. Tal será la función de la *Mapping Relation* (Sproat 1988: 344). Básicamente, este principio señala que si dos morfemas son hermanos en la Estructura-S, deben ser morfemas adyacentes en la representación fonológica. Por tanto, los morfemas pueden aparecer en cualquier orden siempre y cuando dicho principio, y cualquier otro principio sobre ordenación, sean respetados. Así, por ejemplo la ordenación lineal resultante de las representaciones sintácticas anteriores sería:

[[un [gramatikal]] iti]

Ahora bien, si se tiene en cuenta que existe una ordenación en niveles en los procesos de afijación (como que *un-* , prefijo de Clase II según la teoría de Siegel/Allen, debe ser externo a *-ity*, de clase I), tal encorchetamiento supondría una violación del *Mapping Principle*, por lo que se necesita una redistribución de los corchetes, con el siguiente resultado:

[un [[gramatikal]] iti]

Esta solución a las paradojas de encorchetamiento difiere de la de Selkirk (1982) y se acerca a la de Kiparsky (1983), en tanto que utiliza el procedimiento de reestructuración de corchetes, pero en este caso tal fenómeno afecta a dos niveles de representación en la estructura gramatical y está gobernada por un principio general de la organización gramatical; es decir, las paradojas de encorchetamiento no son un fenómeno ubicado en el componente léxico, ni son considerados casos excepcionales.

Todos los trabajos que hemos calificado de "modulares" se caracterizan por explicar los fenómenos de la morfología recurriendo a varios niveles de representación gramatical y a la utilización de principios o reglas gramaticales generales. Por ejemplo, Pesetsky (1985) asignará dos niveles de representación para los compuestos sintéticos, la Forma Lógica y la Estructura-S, que se relacionarán mediante una transformación (Mueva-α) que desplazará de posición el afijo:

$$_N[\text{un } _N[_A[\text{grammatical}]_A \text{ ity}]_N \Rightarrow _N[_A[\text{un } _A[\text{grammatical } t]]_A \text{ ity}]_N$$

Shibatani y Kageyama (1988) darán evidencia de que en japonés existe un grupo de compuestos que son formados tras el nivel sintáctico, es decir en el componente fonológico. El estudio de las características de estos compuestos les lleva a señalar que varias de las restricciones morfológicas que afectan a palabras formadas en el componente léxico también se aplican a los llamados *postsyntactic compounds*, lo cual les lleva a disociar dichas restricciones del léxico y a establecer un sistema independiente de principios que afectan a los procesos de formación de palabras, la cual ocurrirá en varios componentes del modelo gramatical. Es decir, el modelo de formación de palabras se caracteriza por constitutir una teoría morfológica que actúa de forma modular en todos los niveles gramaticales: léxico, sintaxis y fonología (cf. Shibatani y Kageyama 1988: 480-482). Tal visión adquiere desarrollo pleno en Spencer (1991: 454 y ss.): la morfología es concebida como un módulo autónomo; no constituye un componente o un nivel a través del cual todas las derivaciones pasan desde la estructura léxica a la semántica y de ahí hasta la forma fonológica. En vez de esto, la morfología representa un conjunto de reglas y principios que definen la buena construcción de las palabras, sin tener en cuenta el modo en que se crean. Es decir, el módulo morfológico es autónomo con respecto a otros niveles de representación, y tiene su propio conjunto de elementos y principios combinatorios.[9] Ahora bien, este módulo morfológico funciona de forma paralela al resto de los componentes gramaticales, lo cual se puede interpretar de dos formas: por una parte, los procesos definidos sobre objetos léxicos, sintácticos o fonológicos pueden servir como aductos de diversos procesos de formación de palabras; por otra parte, ciertos aspectos de la estructura de las palabras son "visibles" para otros componentes de la gramática; por ejemplo, la categoría sintáctica de una palabra es visible para la sintaxis, y su composición fonológica lo es para la fonología.

Una de las ventajas de este modelo es que una gran parte de los procesos de formación de palabras (morfología derivativa y la llamada "composición léxica") se define en el nivel del componente léxico, sin tener que restringir que todos los procesos se definan sólo en este nivel.

CONCLUSIÓN

La conclusión que emerge de los diferentes enfoques sobre la morfología en general, y sobre la léxico-génesis en particular, que se han dado en el paradigma generativo evidencia que varios de estos fenómenos son de naturaleza conflictiva, y que intentar amoldarlos a algún componente de la gramática supone un sacrificio de varios aspectos relevantes a la léxico-génesis. La visión

lexicista estricta tendía a aunar los fenómenos de la flexión con los de la derivación, lo que permitió profundizar en los aspectos morfofonológicos de la morfología, en detrimento de la investigación sobre los aspectos sintácticos. Por otra parte, la investigación de la relación entre la sintaxis y la formación de palabras llevaba a exagerar la regularidad de los procesos léxico-genésicos. Por ello, creemos que una concepción como la de Spencer (1991), en el que la morfología constituye un componente autónomo con sus propios principios que va de forma paralela al componente gramatical, resulta ser una línea teórica más adecuada. Por su propia naturaleza, la léxico-génesis supone un conglomerado de factores que la relacionan con todos los niveles de descripción gramatical: la creación de una palabra morfológicamente compleja está restringida por condiciones de todo tipo, morfológicas, léxicas, fonológicas, semánticas, etc. Por todo ello aún sigue siendo un desafío y una necesidad definir su naturaleza exacta y su función y—a partir de éstas—será posible hacer un diseño adecuado de qué procesos le son propios, cuál es su lugar en un modelo gramatical y, por consiguiente, cuál es el lugar y función de los demás componentes.

NOTAS

1. Este trabajo constituye parte del proyecto de investigación PB 94/0437 financiado por la Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica (DGICYT).

2. Este es el punto de partida del trabajo de Lees (1960), obra pionera sobre la formación de palabras en el paradigma chomskyano.

3. Como se puede apreciar, la parte semántica del modelo de Aronoff, y en general de la mayoría de los trabajos con orientación lexicista, está muy poco desarrollada.

4. Entre los que destacan las obras de Mohanan (1982 y 1986), Harris (1983) y Wiese (1994).

5. Entre los defensores de la Hipótesis lexicista fuerte se encuentran Halle (1973), Jackendoff (1975), Booij (1977), Lieber (1980), Kiparsky (1982c), Selkirk (1982) y Scalise (1987 [1984]). Entre los seguidores de la Hipótesis lexicista débil están Siegel (1979 [1974]), Aronoff (1979), Allen (1978), Anderson (1982).

6. La convención de *percolation* fue introducida originariamente por Lieber (1980) y adoptada por Williams (1981), que considera tanto a los sufijos flexivos como a los derivativos núcleos de las palabras en las que están insertados; Selkirk (1982: 74 y ss.) negará el status de núcleos a los afijos flexivos. Bauer (1990) hace una crítica tanto del concepto de "núcleo"

para la morfología como de la convención de *percolation* de marcos de subcategorización, señalando que la función de "núcleo" en morfología no se puede basar en los mismos criterios que caracterizan al "núcleo" en sintaxis, y que la principal evidencia para la validez del uso de este concepto se refiere a que determina los rasgos que se heredan desde los núcleos a su proyección superior. Pero, según Bauer, tal función de los núcleos en morfología no es exclusiva de éstos y, además, no se puede establecer que haya un procedimiento regular por el que se produce la herencia de rasgos de subcategorización. La conclusión a que llega es que para poder usar de forma adecuada el concepto de "núcleo" en morfología habría que empezar por redefinirlo de una forma estricta y separarlo del concepto de *percolation*, por lo que considera que sería mucho más acertado, como sugiere el título de su trabajo, *to be-head the word*.

7. Entre los últimos trabajos situados aún en el lexicismo y que continúan el enfoque de Selkirk (1982) y Williams (1981), aunque con variaciones y refinamientos diversos, se encuentran Lieber (1983 y 1992), Scalise (1988), Szymanek (1980 y 1985), Beard (1981 y 1993) y Di Sciullo y Williams (1987). Con la excepción de éste último estudio, donde aún se defiende la concepción de un componente morfológico que incluya tanto la flexión como la léxico-génesis (es decir, la Hipótesis lexicista fuerte), la necesidad de admitir la existencia de un interfaz entre morfología y sintaxis, así como el estudio de los diferentes efectos gramaticales de la flexión y la derivación ha llevado a defender una versión lexicista "débil" (llamada también *Split Morphology Hypothesis*), en esencia similar a la propuesta de Aronoff (1979), de tal forma que los procesos de flexión son generados mediante reglas sintácticas y la léxico-génesis habría de permanecer en el componente léxico. Quizá los estudios de morfología flexiva más desarrollado desde esta posición sean los de S.R. Anderson (1982, 1985, 1988, y 1992) y los de Zwicky (1988 y 1990).

8. En este aspecto existe una diferencia en relación a Selkirk (1982), que consideraba los afijos como una categoría sintáctica separada de dicha jerarquía.

9. Recientemente, Adouani (1995), basándose en la morfología del francés, defiende también la existencia de un componente morfológico independiente de la sintaxis, rechazando las teorías sintacticistas que hemos señalado; en especial critica la concepción de Lieber (1992), para quien los principios de la sintaxis X-con Barra y los módulos relacionados con ella no son específicamente morfológicos o sintácticos, sino de aplicabilidad unitaria en ambos dominios.

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"WE ARE ALL ARTISTS OF OUR OWN LIVES": A CONVERSATION WITH ROMESH GUNESEKERA

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Sri Lankan-born British writer Romesh Gunesekera is a poet and writer of fiction. His first collection of short stories, *Monkfish Moon*, was published in 1992, winning for him critical acclaim. It is a powerful collection, both for its deft mastery of style, characterized by poetic subtlety and understatement, and for the dynamic within the text that portrays the ambiguity of the exile who reflects on "home." This collection of stories presents differing views of Sri Lanka and emphasizes the need to return, albeit with the imagination, to that place which, in a sense, becomes a metaphor for change. In each story, the writer maps out how individual lives, in Asia or in the West, are marked by catastrophic political events that transform the spirit and identity of a country and its people: those who live there, those who leave, and those who choose to return. Gunesekera seems to imply, in this collection, that the land of one's childhood always haunts those who leave it, and the memories, coupled with the imagination these spark off, become central to the identity of the exile abroad.

This theme is one he retakes in his first novel, *Reef*, shortlisted for the Booker Prize in 1995, which is a novel of remembering—and perhaps even defining—a lost home. Innocence in the years before a war is the theme of the book; *Reef* is an elegy for a time and place that is gone forever but which remains alive in the mind of Triton, the narrator. Triton works as cook for Mister Salgado, a marine biologist studying the country's reefs in an attempt

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to check their destruction. The reef then becomes the principal metaphor of the novel, symbolizing the devastation from the inside of the precarious socio-political structure. This lyrical novel is a *Künstlerroman* laden with sensuous descriptions of the colors and fragrances of an island that is alive for Triton. One of Gunesekera's principal triumphs in this novel is the perspective he presents, which moves from that of Triton as an adult in England to that of himself as a local boy in Sri Lanka. The counter-orientalism of the novel is evident, as we are shown the island from the inside, replacing the Westerner's view of the East with the Easterner's view of the West.

Q: Can we begin with a brief story of your life, with some biographical details?

GUNESEKERA: My biographical details are very sketchy. That's the way I like writers to be, rather than having huge biographies. I was born in Sri Lanka in 1954 and lived there in my childhood. I went to the Philippines with my parents in the 1960s. We spent a few years there, and then in the early 70s, I went to Britain. I would have been about 17 or 18. I've lived in Britain since then.

Q: When did you start writing? And why?

GUNESEKERA: I've always been interested in books. And I think that people who are interested in books are people who are interested in somewhere else, somewhere else meaning just "not exactly where they are." There is a world inside books. So I used to be fascinated by worlds in terms of reading. Not reading great literature, I never read "important" books. I would read just pulp fiction, in fact. Then I started reading American fiction which I came across a lot of in the Philippines. And American fiction, as it was in those days, about ten years out of date by the time you got it in the sort of place where I was. So it was the generation of writers in America who were alive and writing for the moment which made me realize that writing was something people did, that books didn't just appear, that someone wrote them. So that's how I got interested in writing, and I think that's when I started writing. I must have been 14 or 15, that sort of age. And I've been writing since then. Mainly, I've always written short fiction, but a lot of the time I am writing poetry. And, that's just been there—all along.

Q: Who were these American writers, and are there any others who have, if we can put it this way, "influenced" your writing?

GUNESEKERA: It is very difficult to tease out influences. My mind goes blank every time I have to think about specific writers. Depending on what sort of period we were talking about, I would probably say different things. When I started reading something that was other than pulp fiction, which was still probably regarded as pulp fiction by everybody else, it would be things by Kerouac and Ginsberg and the Beat Generation. And then when I was a bit older, I had a mixture of reading things that I just had not read before, in terms of the "classical canon," if you like. There is one writer I never remember to mention whenever I'm asked this question, García Márquez. I read *One Hundred Years of Solitude* before it became such a big thing, because somebody told me to read it. It was a book to read and I read it very early on. So I have read things from everywhere. And I can't work it out in terms of who has influenced me because, on the whole, as a writer you read everything and you react one way or the other, so there are negative influences and positive influences.

Q: What is your purpose when you select your material? Is there a conscious attempt to "do" anything when you write?

GUNESEKERA: No, not really. It would be very rare for me to have a formulated idea that I will work out. To me, writing is about living, it is the way I live. It has always been the way I think. It is in that engagement—that physically formulating words—that I find the way I deal with the world. That is the primary impulse and other things come out of that. It would depend on the story. If you take the stories in *Monkfish Moon*, for instance, I think one or two would be about a voice, about a mood, and then after that it was writing the other stories to create a book of stories. Because they are not miscellaneous, they are built to be, in a sense, complete, a shape, a pattern. I wanted to sketch out that imaginary world of a place which I hadn't read very much about. Not necessarily a physically real place, but the imaginative equivalent of all those other places that you can go to without moving your feet. And I wanted to explore that. It's an exploration, I suppose, a trying to discover something, what you understand about something, what it's all about.

Q: Is there a process to your writing? Apart from the voice or the mood you speak of, do you see the form or does that develop as you write?

GUNESEKERA: Everything changes. I think my earlier writing would be pretty much open-ended and it kind of finds its own form. It would be com-

pletely untrue to say that about *Reef*, though, because, with *Reef*, I was writing a novel. I knew I was going to write a novel. I had finished *Monkfish Moon* and the next thing was to write a novel. That was part of it, so that much intention was certainly there. I did not think too much about what kind of a novel it would be. Probably I did have more definite ideas, maybe not so much on content, but on the type of novel I wanted. I wanted a novel of that size, for example. I didn't want a big, enormous novel. At that stage I thought it would be good to find this book, read it, and actually read it, not carry it around. I think I knew the size of it, the shape of it, before I started. But the actual content was an exploration.

Q: Who do you write for? Do you have a specific public in mind?

GUNESEKERA: Not with the first two books. But that again is, I think, a changing thing. The way I look at that whole question is that I write for someone who is willing to read. Willing and able to read. But actually that is an enormous demand I am making, though it sounds very slight. It means someone has got to be literate, which is a privileged position in the world—a billion people aren't. I write for someone who is willing to read responsively and open-mindedly, which again is quite difficult because most people bring a lot of baggage into reading anything. But I would like a little bit of openness. And I think I have discovered that readers need to have a sense of humour, otherwise they might end up going in the wrong direction completely. But I think after you have written a couple of books you do know some of the people who are going to be reading the next one. It's a bit like a relationship you have developed, like you've been talking to yourself and then suddenly realize that somebody has been listening to you all this time. You've then got to change it a little bit.

Q: When you are studied or reviewed, you tend to be considered a postcolonial writer. Does this label mean anything to you? Do you write as anything?

GUNESEKERA: With regards to the classification of "postcolonial writer," I still don't entirely understand it and I have not found anybody "in the field" who does either. The way I look at it, theoretical frameworks are simply a way of handling the world and if dividing it into those terms helps someone to get into a series of books, fine, that's one way. Now if you happen to divide the world slightly differently and say that you are only interested in books written between 1950 and 1975, well that is another way. To me, it

doesn't really make a lot of difference. I'm never quite sure how people see me either.

Q: But what do you think of yourself as?

GUNESEKERA: Well, only and basically as a writer. And even then, it's only when I am writing that I am a writer.

Q: Sri Lanka is clearly a pervading theme in your fiction. Does this respond to some obsession, considering that you left it as a child and have lived most of your adult life in England?

GUNESEKERA: I don't think it is an obsession. There are two ways to look at that, I suppose. With a novel like *Reef* which is, in one sense, steeped in Sri Lanka, some people see it very much like that. But that aspect of it came into the book unintentionally. The "obsession" there, for me originally had much more to do with the relationships of certain individuals, the characters in there. *Monkfish Moon*, on the other hand, was very much about getting a certain idea of a place. I think there is a kind of "convenience" again, in the way of looking at the world, to talk of how stories are located in places. Of course stories are not located in places. These are places that exist in stories. It is just very convenient for us and it is actually quite a pleasure to think of a book being about a place. But a book—a good book anyway—the sort of books that I am, in a sense, interested in— is about a place only in a very tangential way. A book is about itself. We like to think that books are about places, so if we were going to, say, Singapore, then we might want to read a Singapore story. But that doesn't work because if you actually go to Singapore, and want to know how to get from A to B, or where to buy a camera or something, you do not read a novel. And then you might read a Singaporean writer who is writing about Canada and you might actually get much more about the imagination, or about Singapore.

Q: So you believe that it is actually irrelevant to think of books as being about places?

GUNESEKERA: In a way. But, at the same time, there also is a pleasure involved in it, and part of the work of the artist is to play with these pleasures. So you end up reading about Dublin in Joyce, for example, and you can have a lot of fun with Dublin and Joyce but you are making a huge category mistake if you think you can retrace Leopold Bloom's footsteps. You can spend

money doing it, but that's not where he is, he's in the air. And that is the way I see the "place." In my own writing, in the two books on Sri Lanka, I put there the Sri Lanka I know, or have in my imagination. It was important to me. It was not so much an obsession, I think. It was more like a series. If you are a painter, and you paint your sunflowers, you do not paint another kind of sunflower every time, because maybe there is something about the colour that you're still excited about. You are still exploring it and you haven't gotten there. So I really write about this kind of place. It will change, with each book the mixture will be different.

Q: Can you say something about the role and the importance of memory in your writing?

GUNESEKERA: I think all writing is about memory, about the past. All writing is clearly about the past. Even scientific writing merely records your observations, what has happened. The same happens with science fiction. And our imagination is fed by the past, by the impressions we remember, the things we've heard and seen. So more than just memory, I try to put in my writing impressions of things, of nature, for instance.

Q: Moving on to your novel, why did you choose a child as the narrator for Reef?

GUNESEKERA: The novel is about a man who is trying to tell the story of his life. He is trying to understand who he is, how he has come to be what he is, which means, in a sense, exploring memory, trying to understand memory. If you look at it at that level, it is a changing shape. So the picture he has of his life is a particular one. It would change if he looked back at his life ten years later, or twenty years later. It would be a very different story he would tell. But at this point in his life the important things are these particular things to do with his past which, chronologically, if you like, may not make up much of his biographical portrait, but is actually psychologically important for him. And the idea of moving from the child's view fits in with the convention. Also, the book is about identity, gaining a voice, finding a voice, which to me again is linked with the whole idea of an artist. It is an artistic enterprise, which is about finding a voice. And what you get in the book is the idea that actually we are all artists, we are all artists of our own lives. We make our own lives. And, in a sense, we do two things: we make our own lives by living the way we do, and then we recreate it in our memory, trying to deal with the things we didn't do right, for example. There is a

creation and a recreation process, which is the artistic process as well. So, that birth of the artist, the birth of the voice, to me, paralleled this idea of the child becoming an adult. That you can see in the book. In the early sections, we have a very closed, primal world which then becomes more like a family world, and then it becomes wider. It gets bigger and bigger just like in our lives. So that's what is going on, with the child, really, and that perspective allows you to see that. It also allows you to see the world as naturally as one can, I think. People who read the book and are looking for the big events of life, as it were, and want more of it, are in a sense looking for sociology or political history. But you should be looking for an imaginative life.

Q: I have the impression that much contemporary Sri Lankan fiction has deep political significance or maintains a political stance. In Reef, *for instance, you do actually imply the whole political upheaval and the child is aware of it, though he may not know how to articulate the tension.*

GUNESEKERA: The center of the story is not the situation. It's the imagination and the mind that is working and what is happening. And that is why it is fundamentally much more about memory, much more about being alive, about how you stay alive, and what you need to stay alive. Also, I want to suggest that what you need is not just memory. You need memory but, like the reef, where you have a huge amount of solidified memory, you have and need imagination on top to keep it alive. And so all those other things are going on, but those are not central to it.

Q: In Reef *and several of your short stories, there are extremely vivid, detailed and sensuous descriptions of food and the preparation of food. Were you aware this was happening?*

GUNESEKERA: Well, I don't think that was conscious. Certainly it wasn't, initially. When I look back, I realize that in *Monkfish Moon*, there are stories that do have entire meals in them. But that, to me, is simply natural. I suppose it might even be naturalistic writing in a rather old-fashioned sense. There is something else going on as well, I hope, in the books. But the truth is that in your life you really spend quite a lot of time eating or getting ready to eat. That whole process is a big thing. And it is invisible in lots of books. I don't think it is invisible in really good books—we can talk about Proust if you want. Or you take any of these big books and there are huge scenes to do with it, along with other things. The only difference is that in

Reef, you've got a narrator who is a cook so it becomes more of an obsession. And I use that. I take it from what I think is a natural level, which should be there always. Maybe it is not there only in books written by people who presumably do not get involved with cooking at all. But it is a mystery. It is fundamental to life, to social life as well, and therefore fundamental to the sort of things I write. But I think in different books, in different stories, the ways I use that will be different. So in *Reef*, it is enhanced by the fact that Triton is a cook. But, more than that, Triton is and functions as an artist. It is also the birth of an artist. Triton becomes an artist in the sense of becoming a cook, a chef, very much in the way a painter finds his palette and a writer finds his voice. In the other book, if there isn't a chef, the food will be there, but it will be in the background maybe. But having written *Reef* and having to talk about it, I have been thinking about it more. I also think it has a lot to do with my experience, biographically. I obviously use my experience and in my experience, everyone is cooking.

Q: It has also been said that the smell and taste of food is fundamental to the process of remembering.

GUNESEKERA: Yes, very much, yes. You can take the Proustian element, for instance, and even joke about it. But you can look at *Reef* in those terms, it's just got no madeleine, you have all these smells and ways of cooking which just sets it all off. But it is memory, it is a trigger.

Q: In Reef, the narrator reflects on the past on several occasions, claiming that he is either "emptied of all the past" or that he can only succeed "without a past, without a name." Why is there this need to reject or forget the past? It seems contradictory to his being led to remembering.

GUNESEKERA: I think he's a kind of cheater really. Triton as a child comes without a past, in effect. We know very little about him. We don't even know his name, he has no name. "Triton" is a kind of given name, which he acquires once he enters this other world. And he has to make a life out of it. If you look at the identities of Triton and Salgado, you see that Salgado is a man who has a well-rounded past, he has a lot of things going for him and yet, throughout the book, you see him moving from, if you like, his huge view of the world, from being quite at ease with the world, into a person who is not at ease with an open world and actually wants a closed, familiar, small world. In a sense, neither his sense of the past nor his past privileges have helped him. As far as we know, of course. Triton, in a sense, survives

because he rejects the past. Or maybe because he has no past. He started from those humble origins and becomes a survivor in the West. You get the feeling he can survive anywhere because he has learned something about himself. And he has apparently freed himself from the past. But of course, ironically, he hasn't, because when he tells this story he is telling everything about the past. So the question hangs there: is he actually still dominated by these old monsters, by the past? Does he have no imagination still? I think you have to respond to that in your reading. You need to question who the survivors are, what helps them survive, or, ultimately, who do you want to survive. Sympathies may change, your feelings may change, and there is a sense of the difficulty of making that kind of choice. There is also the desire to move away from that setting somehow, which you imagine to be safe or comfortable, a bit like coming to the end of a book and feeling you would rather like to be sucked right back in again so it can go on forever. You also know you can never do that because now you know it. That is the kind of emotion I'm trying to get into the book.

Q: In the novel, you do create a space. There is a consciousness of the reef, the house and the country. Are you trying to recreate a particular place? Is this a real landscape or one you have in your mind?

GUNESEKERA: As I was saying earlier, there are no real landscapes in fiction. They are all in the mind and we share them to some extent. Sometimes we share them with a handful of people, sometimes with communities. Sometimes, as what happens in Sri Lanka now, communities no longer share the same vision of the landscape, what it looks like, who is there, what identities. So you fictionalize everything. I feel that perceptions are a kind of negotiation with what might really be out there and what you think is out there. Having said that, at the same time, you can have this imaginary landscape that does bear resemblance to what other people might see as the same place. So there is an element of that and I was interested, I think, in just exploring again that sort-of real place at that sort-of moment in time. What I was clearly interested in was how any moment in time can suddenly seem terribly fragile and special and about to change. Urban late-60s Sri Lanka is one which was not in my consciousness, or wasn't enough. So it was an area to explore and put down into a story. It may be accurate or not. In a sense, the point about fiction is that it doesn't really matter. What matters is that, while you're in the book, it is real. Some people write and tell me that this is great because it is so familiar to them, that this is the world they know. Other people write and tell me that I know nothing about Sri Lanka.

But this is also entirely understandable. This is their world. Something like that goes on when you read books, and that is what we work out, trying to find out about us.

Q: What about the way you use language? In Reef, *there is a large amount of native terms, and there is clearly a change in the way Triton uses language.*

GUNESEKERA: That is conscious. There are some Sinhala words at the beginning. I am not sure in terms of volume whether there are more towards the end. I think there is a period when they get more. Also, the language itself becomes a little bit more complex towards the end, the articulation becomes more complex. But that is because Triton reads. And because the novel is also trying to keep together two things. One, if you like, is the linear narrative of the child growing up and therefore becoming more complex. The other one, of course, is that the complex man is already there telling the story but has to relive it. But he is also discovering something about himself as he grows through the story, so there is a natural mirror working there to make the language more elaborate. And at the same time, as Triton frees himself and achieves his independence, his identity—as he finds himself—he's getting his English. As the English becomes more sophisticated, his Sinhala is also coming back as important. It's just playing with all of that, I think, to try and make a pattern that somehow made sense within that book.

Q: The novel is also very counter-orientalist, in that it reveals how the concept of "exotic" exists only in the eye of the beholder. Yours is probably the only piece of writing that has described a turkey as an "exotic bird"! Any comments on this?

GUNESEKERA: There are several things going on. One of the things I do is to play with these ideas of East-West which, partly, is Salgado's problem. His failures are, I think, in not being certain as to how to handle this world. He seems to be able to handle it and then suddenly, he has something like a nervous breakdown, except that he is probably just getting older, because he is quite a young man at the beginning of the story. But, as he gets older, he finds that it doesn't all fit together properly. In the end, the only way to make things fit together is just to close your eyes, as it were, and hope it doesn't catch up with you, that it doesn't matter. That is part of what is going on. The other part is just really to play with this exotic idea, which is what using language is all about, really. It is to refresh the language in some sense. Again, to come back to the figure of the child, I believe that the

child's eye of the world is the poet's eye of the world. It is there to be used, it's something incredibly alive. I love that in the book and that to me is at the heart of literature. If ever the book brings out a life in it, no matter what anyone says, that is the thing for me. It is interesting how people talk about how exotic all this food in the novel is. And I say that this is the way memory works. You read the book and you have this impression of exoticism, but if you look at it again, it is not exotic, it is all terribly ordinary.

Q: Reef has been compared to The Remains of the Day, *because of the way it portrays the master-servant relationship. What do you think of this connection?*

GUNESEKERA: Again, I think that is an example of those categories that one has to use. I think that the concerns of both books, what they are trying to do, are actually very different. I don't know *The Remains of the Day* well enough to make a proper comparison. I think the fact that Ishiguro is who he is and that we share many things, including perhaps a tonal similarity—which is simply a different way of approaching language—has brought about this comparison. This may be deceptive, but if you look at a lot of books you see that *Reef* clearly follows a pattern set by somebody else. There are all sorts of books about the servant in the house. What is different, I think, is the view taken, what the expectations are, what will happen, and what actually happens. And I think the concerns with language in terms of art and the idea of the artist and the birth of the voice, are all completely different concerns. It was not an arbitrary putting together. It's a bit like a meal, you know, a book is like a meal. And a lot of meals share the same things: they are all made out of certain types of food and then you have to heat them in some way to cook them and you all eat them by putting it in your mouth. So superficially you can look at any meal anywhere in the world and see it as the same, just the way you might see all books as the same. That's the way I see it. There are other books published which have a ten-year-old starting to tell a story and there may be lots of similarities and yet they are completely different.

Q: Do you prefer writing short stories? Are you more comfortable with the form? Now that you've written a novel, a very successful one, and you can choose what to write, what will you be doing next?

GUNESEKERA: I find all writing difficult. The novel and the short story require equal amounts of imaginative energy. You have to get the story, and

that takes as much out of you whether it's a novel or a short story. Because you have more time with a novel, it seems a bit more relaxing. But it's not more relaxing because it's desperate, really, a kind of life or death thing. I still don't know how to write.

Q: What are you working on now?

GUNESEKERA: I'm just finishing the next novel. It's called *Sandglass* and it will be published next year. It is a bit about Sri Lanka, so it has the same axis as the others. The proportions are perhaps slightly different. I hope people who found something in *Reef* will find something in this, but it will be different, and longer. *Reef* is like a "what am I doing here" kind of question novel, but in the other one, the question is "how do I live, how can I survive"? It's about mortality.

Nice, March 21, 1997

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ANONYMOUS DEATHS:

A READING OF DEREK MAHON'S "A REFUSAL TO MOURN" AND CRAIG RAINE'S "IN THE MORTUARY"[1]

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1. INTRODUCTION

According to Blake Morrison and Andrew Motion in their *Penguin Book of Contemporary British Poetry*, "[a] shift of sensibility has taken place very recently in British poetry" (1982: 11). Young poets coming from different backgrounds have initiated what seems to be a break away from the poetry of their immediate past: the techniques and intricacies of Modernist poetry; the socially and politically committed poetry of the 30s, an exaltation of humanist values and in itself a break from the previous modernist period; Dylan Thomas's new romantic movement of exaltation of the cycle of life and death; and the so-called "Movement" poetry of the 50s and 60s, a self-effacing, modest, unobtrusive poetry, with a didactic aim aided by a concern with structure and perfect syntax, and written in reaction to the romanticism and traditionalism of the period before their own.[2]

Nevertheless, if we have a look at the poems of this generation of poets, we will discover that a complete break with the past, a total dissociation from a previous poetical manifestation, is never fully attained. These poets cannot avoid using elements, themes, images, etc., from the poetry which they have, no doubt, read at home or been taught at school. However, their usage of elements from previous poetry is not simply an imitation but rather a reappropriation from which an essential difference will spring. As a result of their impossibility to escape from the old themes, images and techniques,

Miscelánea: A Journal of English and American Studies 18 (1997): 55-67.

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these poets share the common attempt to make the familiar strange again. Morrison and Motion point to one of the strategies they use in this attempt, the change in their own conception as poets:

> as a way of making the familiar strange again, they have exchanged the received idea of the poet as the-person-next-door, or knowing insider, for the attitude of the anthropologist or alien invader or remembering exile. (1982: 12)

In the remaining pages of this essay, I will attempt to analyse the ways in which two of these poets, the Belfast poet Derek Mahon and the Englishman Craig Raine, become anthropologists or observers in their own particular way when looking at one of the most important events for human beings, death, in two well-known poems: Mahon's "A Refusal to Mourn" and Raine's "In the Mortuary." In order to do so, they have chosen to portray the death of a common man or a common woman since, as Stan Smith has pointed out in reference to these poets' work,[3] "a lot of these poems are about things left from objects, people, traces of lives, after lives, abandoned lives, lost lives, that nobody has noticed." Although the dead man and the dead woman of the poems bear certain resemblances, there are differences in the circumstances that surround them. The protagonist of "A Refusal to Mourn" is an old man who has spent his life in the country; the woman in "In the Mortuary" has lived her anonymous life and died anonymously in the city. In the first case, death comes as a result of old age, while in the second case, the presence of the body in a mortuary indicates that the woman's death has been tragic. The poems develop into opposite directions: Mahon's poem begins with a detailed portrayal of the life of that man, and the man's death will be followed by the consolation of the possibility of transcendence. Raine's poem begins with a somewhat playful description in which language foregrounds its own components; but, as the poem progresses, the description becomes a sincere expression of feelings and of the hopelessness of the human condition.

The initial hypothesis of this paper is that Mahon's "A Refusal to Mourn" and Raine's "In the Mortuary" constitute examples of two different ways of negotiating the theme of death in contemporary poetry; but both of them aim at the defamiliarisation of the same event, the death of a human being, and engage in the same programme, that of trying to approach the 'world outside' from a new perspective. And in order to do so their authors use some elements of the past in such a way that they position themselves by comparison and/or contrast to the poets that precede them. Their position comes close to that of the ideal postmodernist author that Barth describes in

"The Literature of Replenishment," that of effecting a synthesis of past materials already exhausted in order to "generate new and lively work" (1980: 70-71).

We are going to analyse both poems separately and in reference to each other; other poems by the same authors or by different authors dealing with the same subject will also be mentioned by the way.

2. DEREK MAHON'S "A REFUSAL TO MOURN"

An analysis of Mahon's poem from a strictly formal point of view can be summarised in the following terms: the poem consists of ten stanzas, each one composed of six lines, and is devoid of rhyme (except for the last stanza). However, if the poem is examined more closely, it becomes evident that the separation between form and content is possible only at a theoretical level; the content in this poem is, as in all poems, part of the form, as the Russian Formalists already claimed at the beginning of the 20th century.

That the poem lacks conventional rhyme does not mean that it is devoid of rhythm; other elements contribute to create a rhythm that constitutes the very essence of the poem. It is not difficult to observe the abundance of prepositions, conjunctions, or expressions that refer to the passing of time; almost every stanza contains a syntactical element in reference to time: "before dawn" (5),[4] "[a]ll day" (7), "[w]hen" (12), "[a]fter" (14, 60), "[w]hile" (19, 31), "[o]nce a week" (25), as well as other time expressions: "[l]ong evening" (31), "last evening" (38), "the following year" (42), "[i]n time" (43), "[t]ill the next ice age" (51). The poem is packed with references to the passing of time at the level of imagery and metaphors too. For instance, the conception of gardens not as static manifestations of beauty but as almost menacing entities that do not only move but creep: "[t]he trim gardens crept / [t]o his door," (3 and 4), the clock that "[t]icked on the kitchen shelf," (9), the personification of the cinders that "[m]oved in the grate," (10) with a life of their own, or the cases of the briar that "gurgled" (11) like water flowing, and the wind that changed everything:

> [...] raking
> The roof of the hen-house,
> And swept clouds and gulls
> Eastwards over the lough
> (20 to 23)

the "long evening" (31) shedding "[w]eak light" (32) in what had previously been a "bright house" (8), and finally, the reference to "his dead / [w]ife" (33 and 34). All of these images point to a particular conception of time as linear. The rhythm they create is aided by the length of the sentences (stanzas 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 8 and 9 constitute a single sentence each), the use of adverbs or expressions of frequency such as "seldom" (13), "once a week" (25), and the rendering of the monotony of habit in the life of the man, stressed by the inclusion of a ludicrous habit-distorting event:

> And if a coat-hanger
> Knocked in an open wardrobe
> That was a strange event
> To be pondered on for hours
> (15 to 18)

And if we examine the expression of time as effected through verbs, we will be able to establish a division in the structure of the poem. In the first six stanzas an iterative simple past prevails, almost exclusively. The seventh stanza can be said to constitute a point of transition, the present and future tenses appear in dialogues in direct speech, and the past simple is not iterative but singulative, that is, it refers to a single event, the death of the man. The last three stanzas take place after the man's death; in 8 and 9, the future tense, or the grammatical present in time clauses that indicate future, contrasts with the last stanza in an atemporal present. This particular use of tenses is, as shall be explained, motivated by the content of the poem.

The different modes of expressing the passing of time in the poem (conjunctions, time clauses, metaphors, use of verbs) are not gratuitous. An analysis of these strategies will allow us to define the basic structure or pattern in the poem, which, in my opinion, creates its meaning. A clear-cut separation can be established between the first seven stanzas and the last three stanzas on several grounds. Firstly, stanzas from 1 to 7 are devoted to the life of the anonymous man, while stanzas from 8 to 10 deal with the time after his death. Secondly, time expression in the first seven stanzas corresponds with a particular conception of time, time as linear, historical, irreversible and inevitably ticking away. By contrast, the last three stanzas make reference to the existence of another conception of time, time as circular, as universal and always existing; notice how repetition of syntactical structures increases in these last three stanzas (e.g. "and" + subject + verb), since repetition is the key element in this new conception of time.

Finally, there is a movement from the first seven stanzas to the last three ones in terms of particularity-universality. The retired old fisherman of

the first section is a common man, living in the country "in a small farmhouse / [a]t the edge of a new state," (1 and 2), whose life is slowly passing away, and who spends most of his time alone: "All day there was silence / [i]n the bright house" (7 and 8), "[w]hen the old man talked to himself" (12); nobody seems to have noticed him. This man is defined from the beginning through his connections with nature: the farmhouse, the gardens, the briar, the wind, the clouds, the lough (which suggests a particular regional location for the poem, Ireland), and the trees. And it is due to these connections with nature that, in the last section of the poem, his particularity will turn into universality, as we shall see, and, after his death, through the tightening of his bonds with nature (through the rain, the sea, the clouds, the earth, the ice, and the stone), he will become one with nature:

> "And his name [will] be mud once again"
> (48)

The last three stanzas represent the transformation of the particular into the universal. The man in his death has managed to annihilate the linear conception of time in favour of the eternally recurring cycle of life and death: "And his name [will] be mud *once again*" (my emphasis, 48). He, not the common man any more but Man, who was created out of Earth, to Earth will return. But, and there is a "[b]ut" at the beginning of the last stanza,

> But the secret bred in the bone
> On the dawn strand survives
> In other times and lives,
> Persisting for the unborn
> Like a claw-print in concrete
> After the bird has flown.
> (55 to 60)

The common man at the beginning of the poem, a retired old fisherman, has become the Fisher King himself, returning to the mud out of which he was born; a decadent man that "[will] not last the winter" (39), whose strength has vanished—"[i]nching down the road" (27)—has died; but with the help of "astringent rain" (93)—the element of life and death—and time, his secret, the secret of life, the possibility of renewal after death, persists "for the unborn" (58). Mahon's poet is the anthropologist that succeeds in his "search for some sign of the persistence of the person" (Kiberd 1995: 599). The repetition of actions and events that haunted the life of the old man has turned him into an archetype, annihilating linear time through his death and allow-

ing life to spring up again in the future. However, there is a difference between this man and the primitive man that re-enacts gestures and events in order to become real and turn into an archetype to abolish time. The gestures and events that are repeated by primitive man have to be paradigmatic,[5] but the acts of the man in the poem, which have also become rituals with the passing of time, are not. Neither should they be considered as debased rituals but, on the contrary, they represent the possibility for any man, even if unimportant, to become an archetype.

A reference to Dylan Thomas's Poem "A Refusal to Mourn the Death, by Fire, of a Child in London" must be made. Mahon's poem retakes the title of Thomas's poem and part of its subject matter, the death of an anonymous person. But the circumstances and the message of Mahon's poem are slightly different. Dylan Thomas refuses to mourn the tragic death of a child by fire because as he says "[a]fter the first death, there is no other" (1980: 94). Mahon refuses to mourn the natural death of an old man because the man is part of the cycle that allows death and life to succeed each other continually. For both of them death is only a guarantee of immortality, of perpetual life, either in a cosmic eternity or in a "biological" unity with nature (Thomas), or in continuous rebirth (Mahon). But Mahon's poem is then also related to a previous revision of Thomas's poem, D. J. Enright's "On the Death of a Child," a "typical" Movement poem written in reaction to Thomas's complex style, excess of feeling and romantic ideas. Enright advocates restraint and simplicity of style because "the big words fail to fit" (1987: 10), so that the mourning for the death of a child does not become an excuse to express the poet's subjectivity. His concept of life presupposes death as something human beings have to accept: "[t]he monsters we must live with" (1987: 10). Mahon's poem effects the absorption and recasting of the two previous texts. The new concept of transcendence that he proposes is mythical and at the same time empirical and material, since it is derived from the power that mud has to generate life out of death, to give birth to new lives in different manifestations; simplicity, honesty of feeling and the acceptance of death, together with the possibility of renewal that guarantees the perpetuation of life.

The death of a fisherman can also be inscribed within the line of Seamus Heaney's poetry. According to Stan Smith, "[m]any of [Heaney's] poems celebrate the people, crafts, and skills which sustain communal life" (1980: 401). His poem "Casualty" (In Morrison and Motion 1982: 33-35) focuses on the death of a fisherman, although the implications of the fisherman's death are not mythical but political; his story is the story of a common man, who, in the middle of warfare in Northern Ireland, breaks the curfew every

night to have a drink in a pub with his own people. In Derek Mahon's poetry, political overtones are usually hidden under religious, mythical or metaphysical subject-matters (see for example, "Afterlives," "Ecclesiastes," "The Apotheosis of Tins," and "A Disused Shed in Co. Wexford," in Morrison and Motion 1982: 69-80, and "In Carrowdore Churchyard," dedicated to Louis MacNeice—another Belfast poet and an influence on Mahon—in Mahon 1991: 11).

Denaturalisation of common objects as in the case of the discarded tins in "The Apotheosis of Tins," the autumn dead leaves in "Leaves" or the mushrooms growing unnoticed in "A Disused Shed in Co. Wexford," or of common people, as in the case of the fisherman in "A Refusal to Mourn" and the anonymous old lady, once "[a] tentatively romantic / [f]igure," in "An Old Lady" (Mahon 1991: 126-27), through the unusual attention paid to them, allows for a creative imagery in dealing with themes that have previously been the object of attention for poets in the past. The mythical charge in "A Refusal to Mourn" is also present in some of his other poems. In "The Banished Gods" the same kind of connections with nature are established. In "Lives" the protagonist is specifically inscribed within the cycle of Life and Death and of Eternal Return. In "The Last of the Fire Kings," the Fire King, a variation of the Fisher king in mythology, refuses to continue being inscribed in the cycle of Life and Death in favour of a final death which is, therefore, seen as positive (as positive as the opposite idea, the idea of the cycle, is seen in "A Refusal to Mourn"). This line of Mahon's poetry recuperates the yearning for transcendence through a resort to myth that is characteristic of previous modernist poets, especially in the case of T. S. Eliot. But the retaking of subject matter and imagery of the past is inevitably effected with a difference. The difference lies in the presence of the parochial and of feelings. The fisherman in Mahon's poems is seen as a mythical figure only in the last three stanzas; all through the poem he is a common man, old, alone, living in the country in Ireland. And the poet is not only an observer from the outside but has a presence, an "I" in the diegesis of the poem—a recognisable Wordsworthian echo:

> 'I'm not long for this world'
> Said he on our last evening,
> 'I'll not last the winter',
> And grinned, straining to hear
> Whatever reply I made;
> And died the following year.
> (stanza 7)

Modernist poetry never reaches such a level of personal inclusion into what seems an objective-descriptive poem. By contrast, this stanza turns Mahon's poem into a candidly personal expression of mourning for the death of a "common" man.

3. CRAIG RAINE'S "IN THE MORTUARY"

If, as we have seen, Mahon's poem uses language consciously in the positioning of time conjunctions at the beginning of several lines, and in the use of repetition, metaphor and personification, in order to achieve a particular rhythm and create the meaning of the poem (the life and death of a man as seen through different conceptions of time), Raine's poem makes excessive use of language in order to defamiliarise and, therefore, to attract attention to the death of an anonymous woman.

The poem starts with a pictorial comparison in the vein of Raine's Martian in "A Martian Sends a Postcard Home":

> Like soft cheeses they bulge
> sideways on the marble slabs
>
> helpless, waiting to be washed.
> (1 to 3)

And not until the fourth stanza are we told that we are looking at the dead body of a woman: "[h]e calls the woman 'Missus'," and at this point we realise that "they" refers to the woman's breasts. The description of this woman's body aims at the defamiliarisation of the event of death through the focusing on only certain parts of her anatomy (firstly, the breasts are described, then the nipples, the knees, and finally, the stomach), and through the imagery and figures of speech that are used: breasts are compared to cheese, that is, to "dead" milk, nipples to round pieces of rubber for mending punctures:

> two terra cotta nipples
> like patches from a cycle kit,
> (11 and 12)

Our daily perception is unsettled: sweat becomes an "abacus of perspiration" (8); her solitude shows physical signs that become "cobwebs/in the corners of her body" (24 and 25); things rhyme visually with other things. Objects and parts of the body are personified: her breasts are "helpless" (39), her

knees are "puzzled" (13), the cotton wool "clings" (4) to the tongs. Imagery appeals to the senses: "cheese" (taste), "creaking" (hearing), "terra-cotta" (feeling), "watermark" (sight), in order to depict the physicality of death. While the poem apparently defines this event as common: "[a]nd she is the usual woman—," language strives to transmit the opposite idea. This effect is achieved through the use of ordinary language and images taken from everyday life which have been displaced, and is emphasised through poetic syntax: alliteration (see stanza 2: "waiting"; "washed"; "wool"; "wisps," and "cotton"; "clings," and the "t" sound in stanza 6: "two terracotta nipples," or "c" sound in stanza 12: "cares"; "cobwebs"; "corners"), the suggestiveness of punctuation—"its creaking purpose done" (6), and "inside a drawer, her spectacles" (20)—and very long sentences (see stanzas from 2 to 8), combined with very short ones (see stanza 9).

Defamiliarisation is not only achieved through the use of language but also through the selection of the objects upon which description is focused. The objects of description are all physical: her breasts, her nipples, her knees, her eyes, her hair, her stomach, her body. Nothing is said about the woman's life or past, or feelings. Apparently this description is "physically" neutral; it concentrates on the woman's body displayed for a male gaze to inspect (notice that the male gaze further objectivises the woman). The self or the soul, if they exist, die with the body. There is no immortality or prospect of regeneration or the existence of cyclic renewal in time. This is what it really is to be dead, something physical, a naked body exposed in a mortuary "like a watermark / held up to the light" (15 and 16). Death is neither transcendental or metaphysical nor pathetic (or comic or parodic). Death is impersonal:

> Distinguishing marks: none.
> Colour of eyes: closed.
> (stanza 9)

at least for the first nine stanzas...

At this point of the analysis we may have the impression that, through the movement that has been effected from the particularity of imagery to the universal theme of death and its demythologisation, the poem's final stance is that of showing that death is hopelessly real; and it is. As Stan Smith explained in the above-mentioned lecture, the metaphors these poets use "do not displace the real, they take us back to it," they show that the world exists under metaphorical languages. In Mahon's poem the link between myth and reality was feasible; in Raine's poem the physicality of death does not allow us to contemplate any consolation. But, nevertheless, under the poem's

experimentation with language, and all these linguistic signs and games used to defamiliarise death and demythologise its modernist conception—as entertained in Mahon's poem—and under the very poem's emphasis on the physicality, reality and irreversibility of death, there is still room for feelings and social commitment.

The corpse exposed in the mortuary belongs to a "usual woman," but, what does "[a]nd she is the usual woman—" (10) in the context of the poem mean? notice the meaningful dash at the end of the sentence, a sign of complicity with the reader: "there's no need for an explanation," and that is why the poem concentrates on a description of her physical traits. Is it possible to deduce any social overtones from that line? she is an ordinary woman: "Distinguishing marks: none" (17). The different interpretations of this line can lead to different interpretations of the whole poem; the woman has no distinguishing marks because in death all corpses look the same, or the woman is a common, ordinary woman. If her corpse is to be examined in a mortuary, her death is not a natural death but probably the result of violence (remember that her belongings are "inside an envelope / inside a drawer" (19 and 20). She is neither too young: "finely / crumpled skin around the eyes," (13 and 14), "[h]e calls the woman 'Missus'," (7), nor too old: her breasts "bulge" (1), and the skin around her eyes is only "finely crumpled." No names are mentioned: the orderly is "he" and she is "the usual woman," a reference to the anonymity and commonplaceness in a big city perhaps? The poem deals only with the present moment of the woman, the here and the now, there is neither past nor future, only present. This atmosphere can be said to be summarised in stanza 9, the most impersonal description, a file:

> Distinguishing marks: none.
> Colour of eyes: closed.
> (stanza 9)

If the poem ended at this point, the only form of immortality the human being could enjoy would be reduced to a file in a filing cabinet.

But in the last three stanzas of the poem, a change of tone is effected. Syntactical elements contribute to create a different rhythm: alliteration increases, notice the "s" sound in stanzas 10 and 11 ("somewhere" "spectacles" "somewhere else" "someone"), and the "c" sound in the last one ("cares" "cobwebs" "corners"), and words and structures are repeated ("somewhere" "somewhere else," "inside an envelope / inside a drawer"), in contrast with the rest of the poem where structures are constantly varying. The descriptive technique is, nevertheless, kept and taken to extremes. The poem focuses not only upon parts of the human body but upon details concerning those parts

of her body: her spectacles, not her eyes, and the parting of her hair, which becomes a very intimate aspect of the woman.

In this way, even though the objects of description all through the poem have always been physical, at this point the poem turns into a personal elegy for the death of a woman. The poem has effected a move from the playfulness with language to the defamiliarisation of death in order to show that there are no mythical elements in the death of a person. Immortality has not simply been reduced to the file in the filing cabinet, but the only consolation offered in the end is the memory of another human being—an anonymous someone, absent from the scene, that has an intimate knowledge of this woman:

> Somewhere else, not here, someone
> knows her hair is parted wrongly
>
> and cares about these cobwebs
> in the corners of her body.
> (stanzas 11 and 12)

The memory of somebody who is as capable of helping this woman now that she is dead as he/she was during the woman's life; the words "not here" summarize the isolation and marginality of this woman that even finds a physical refection in her dead body: "cobwebs in the corners of her body" (ominously connected with the sininster action of the tongs in the autopsy), not only in her death but also in her life. The vision of death at the end is not triumphant but very humane and impressive at the same time, and hopelessly sad...

Most of Raine's poems included in Morrison and Motion (1982: 169-181) are also about looking at things and aimed at renewing the ordinary. Common features become the focus of his poetry: common objects ("A Martian Sends a Postcard Home," "An Inquiry into Two Inches of Ivory" and "A Cemetery in Co. Durham"), common people ("The Butcher," "The Grocer"), or common animals ("The Behaviour of Dogs"). They all may look ingenious light-hearted poems. Except when he looks at the commonest of events, death ("In the Mortuary," "In the Kalahari Desert" and "A Walk in the Country"). In "In the Mortuary" we look at death as observers from a high standpoint. There is no romantic intrusion on the part of the poet as in Mahon's "A Refusal to Mourn"; we look at the corpse of a woman at the same time as the orderly that is operating on her or the poet that is operating on our perception of her. But in the end, this death-watching process turns into an unsettling realization of the threat of human extinction.

3. CONCLUSION

We have looked at two opposed perceptions of death. Mahon resorts to the consolation of the modernist myth of transcendence, the possibility of life and death eternally recurring. His poetry, though, is not as elitist as that of the modernists. He introduces natural elements that recuperate the ordinariness that the Movement poets advocate as the subject matter of poetry. Nevertheless, as has been argued, his poem manifests that it is possible to find the mythical element in the ordinary world, and in this Mahon brings together two previous poetic manifestations, those represented by Dylan Thomas and D. J. Enright.

Raine's position, by drawing attention to language itself, points to the way we perceive the world and problematises received images of death. But the result is not anti-representational; poetic language in this case does not replace reality. His poem recuperates the ingenuity of the metaphysical poets in order to lay bare the reality of death: when you stop seeing the human being inscribed in a pattern, myth or religion, the only thing left is science, a naked body exposed in a mortuary, and the only redeeming but transient consolatory thought is the memory of another human being.

NOTES

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2. According to Booth, "[t]he Movement consisted of poets whose primary concern was to revalue poetry by reacting against the romanticism and traditionalism of the post-war period that was so dominated by poets of those two learnings —Dylan Thomas, for example, who was the last of the great romantic poets" (1985: 110).

3. In the course of a lecture entitled "The 'New Generation' Poets: Hype, Hope or Happenstance" at the 18th AEDEAN conference (Spanish Association for Anglo-American Studies), in December 1994, and a seminar on "Modernist and Postmodernist Poetry" held in January 1996 at the University of Zaragoza, Spain.

4. The numbers in brackets correspond to the numbers of the lines of the poem. This sign (/) will be used to indicate that the words after it belong to a different line.

5. According to Mircea Eliade in *Le mythe de l'éternel retour*: "L'abolition du temps profane et la projection de l'homme dans le temps mythique ne se produisent, naturellement, qu'aux intervalles essentiels, c'est-à-dire ceux où l'homme est véritablement lui-même: au moment des rituels ou des actes importants (alimentation, génération, cérémonies, chasse, pêche, guerre, travail, etc)" (1979: 50).

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RELATIVE CONNECTIVES IN PRESENT-DAY ENGLISH: A CORPUS-BASED ANALYSIS

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1. INTRODUCTION

The complexity entailed by the description of relative clauses in English has resulted in a great number of studies devoted to different aspects of this type of construction. One of the topics which has aroused most interest is the examination of the factors which condition the selection of the relative pronoun. Grammatical, stylistic, and psychological or cognitive aspects combine to determine to a greater or lesser extent the choice of the connective which introduces the relative clause. The purpose of this study is to shed some light on the subject of pronouns introducing relative clauses. My data are the 180 relative clauses contained in three files of the Lancaster Parsed Corpus of British English (an abridged version of the Lancaster Oslo/Berger Corpus. These three files are LPCA (8188 words), which contains 728 clauses from written press, LPCJ (7537 words), containing 450 clauses extracted from scientific English, and LPCK (11279 words), which consists of 1119 clauses from general literary texts. The whole corpus, therefore, amounts to 2297 clauses and 27004 words. The reason for using this corpus is that it constitutes a fairly representative sample of present-day written

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English. On the one hand, it is a homogeneous corpus, since all the clauses belong to a formal written type of language, but on the other hand, three different major styles—literary, journalistic and scientific—are represented, which allows a comparative study of the way the stylistic differences affect the choice of relative pronoun. This paper partly draws on Yamashita (1994), but its focus and objectives are different. The aim of Yamashita's paper is to analyse the language processing principles by means of which the processing effort involved by relative clauses can be minimized. In our paper, however, it is the factors which condition the selection of the relativizer that have been focused on. Some of these factors are determined by strategies which facilitate the production and understanding of relative clauses, but other aspects, such as for instance stylistic characteristics, have been found to be relevant. On the other hand, while the corpus used in Yamashita (1994) corresponds to the spoken language, ours has been extracted from written material. This fact may be responsible for some differences in the results obtained in both papers. In section 2 grammatical factors conditioning the selection of relative pronoun are dealt with; section 3 concerns itsef with cognitive strategies which affect the choice of relative connective, namely the closure strategy and the non-ambiguity strategy; section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the effect of stylistic characteristics over the distribution of relative connectives. Finally, section 5 summarizes the main conclusions reached in this study.

2. GRAMMATICAL FACTORS

The most frequent relative linkword in this corpus is *which*, with 69 occurrences (= 38.33%), followed by zero, which occurs 44 times (= 24.44%) and at a distance by *who* and *that*, with 21 occurrences each (= 11.76%). These data indicate that, as an alternative to *which* and above all to *who*, *that* is not chosen very often, which is probably a consequence of the fact that all the relative clauses of this corpus have been extracted from written material. The general data of the frequency of the relative linkwords in the corpus is presented in Table 1.

	WHO	WHICH	WHEN	WHERE	WHOM	WHOSE	THAT	ZERO	AS
N	21	69	10	9	3	2	21	44	1
%	11.76	38.33	5.55	5	1.67	1.11	11.76	24.44	0.55

Table 1. Frequency of the relative linkwords.

One problem which has to be faced in an investigation of this type, as Taglicht points out (1973: 329), is the separation of the restrictive from the nonrestrictive relative clauses, since there is no single criterion that can be considered satisfactory on its own. Phonological and punctuation criteria have proved insufficient to distinguish between both kinds of relative clauses. Thus, for instance, several examples have been found in this corpus in which, contrary to the prescriptive rule, the nonrestrictive clause is not preceded by a comma:

(1) *the mass of oxygen per year at this rate would be approximately 8x10 g/year which is a quite insignificant quantity.*

(2) *she was afraid and could only hope that the girl had gone to Erich who loved her, however hopelessly.*

The converse phenomenon, the insertion of a comma before a restrictive relative clause, is much more infrequent and the only example found in this corpus is due to the introduction of a prepositional phrase between the antecedent and the relative clause:

(3) *it was fate, in fact, that was making fools of all of us.*

The punctuation criterion, therefore, was relied on only in those cases in which either the grammatical structure or the context could not offer a better tool. The distribution of restrictive and non restrictive relative clauses is the following: there are 143 restrictive relative clauses, which amount to 79.44%, and 37 nonrestrictive relative clauses, which represent 20.56%.

As could be expected, nonrestrictive relative clauses are introduced by *wh-* pronouns or adverbs. There is not any nonrestrictive clause which is introduced by *that* or zero. As regards restrictive clauses, although there are more *wh-* clauses than *that* or zero clauses, the difference is not very significant. Seventy-seven relative clauses contain a *wh-* pronoun or adverb, and 65 have *that* or zero as relative connective. Table 2 shows the distribution of the relative pronouns in restrictive relative clauses.

The choice of relative pronoun in nonrestrictive relative clauses is much more limited, since, as has been said above, the use of *that* and zero in this type of clauses is extremely rare, and in this particular corpus no instance of these connectives has been found. The distribution of relative connectives in nonrestrictive relative clauses is presented in Table 3.

WHO		WHICH		WHERE		WHEN		WHOSE		WHOM		THAT		ZERO		AS	
N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
12	8.39	48	33.57	5	3.50	9	6.29	1	0.70	2	1.40	21	16.48	44	30.77	1	0.70
77 (53.85%)												65 (45.45%)				1 =0.7%	

Table 2. Distribution of relative linkwords in restrictive relative clauses

WHO		WHICH		WHERE		WHEN		WHOM		WHOSE	
N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
9	24.32	21	56.76	4	10.81	1	2.70	1	2.70	1	2.70

Table 3. Distribution of relative linkwords in nonrestrictive relative clauses

SUBJECT										OBJECT							
WHO		WHICH		THAT		ZERO		AS		WHICH		THAT		WHOM		ZERO	
N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
21	25.61	44	53.66	16	19.51	----	0	1	1.22	9	19.57	2	4.35	1	2.17	34	73.91
82 (45.55%)										46 (25.55%)							

Table 4. Functions of relative pronouns and relative adverbs

PREPOSITIONAL COMPLEMENT										DET.	
WHO		WHICH		THAT		WHOM		ZERO		WHOSE	
N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
----	0	16	72.73	1	4.55	2	9.09	3	13.64	2	100
22 (12.22%)										2 (1.11%)	

Table 4 continued.

ADVERBIAL									
WHERE		WHEN		THAT		ZERO		WHICH	
N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
9	31.03	10	34.48	2	6.90	7	24.14	----	0
28 (15.55%)									

Table 4 continued.

Apart from the absence of *that* and zero, there are not many other divergent aspects in the two types of relative clauses with respect to the distribution of the relative connectives. If the percentages of *who* and *which* in nonrestrictive clauses are added up (81.08%) and compared with the percentages of *who, which, that* and zero in restrictive clauses (87.41%), the results are fairly equivalent. Assuming, as De Haan (1991) does, that zero and *that* are alternatives for *who* and *which*, the implications are that relative pronouns of basically the same sort are used in both types of relative clauses. There is a difference with relative adverbs, since *where* is more frequently used in nonrestrictive clauses and *when* in restrictive ones. However, due to the small sample of nonrestrictive clauses, these results cannot be considered very significant.

The function of each relative pronoun and relative adverb has been analyzed and the relation between syntactic functions and relative connectives is depicted in Table 4. All the functions fulfilled by the different relative connectives are illustrated in the following examples from our corpus:

SUBJECT:

(4) *Labour should not take any steps [which would appear to prop up an out-dated institution].*

DIRECT OBJECT:

(5) *he quoted from this letter [which Gaitskell had received].*

PREPOSITIONAL COMPLEMENT:

(6) *but governments should be free to negotiate and refuse proposals [with which they did not agree].*

DETERMINER:

(7) *I feel rather like a father [whose child is bleeding to death].*

ADVERBIAL:

(8) *they were a reminder of the time [when the districts had been little hamlets before they were swallowed up in London's vast sprawl].*

(9) *he was ashamed of the way [() she credited other people with her own memory].*

When the position occupied by the relative connective is that of subject, *wh-* pronouns tend to be selected against relative *that*. While *who* acts as

subject on 21 occasions, which amount to 25.61% of the subjects, and *which* on 44 occasions (= 53.66%), there are only 16 examples (= 19.51%) in which *that* is subject. An aspect which is worth mentioning is the fact that when the subject relative has a personal antecedent, it is only *who* that occurs as relative pronoun in our corpus. In none of the 16 examples in which relative *that* functions as subject the antecedent is personal. There is not any example in this corpus either in which the zero relative pronoun occupies the subject position.

The relative pronoun which most often functions as direct object is zero, with 34 examples, which represent 73.91% of the object relative pronouns. *Which* is direct object on 9 occasions (= 19.57%), *that* on 2 (= 4.35%), *whom* on one (= 2.17%), and *who* does not fulfil that function in this corpus. The total number of objective relative pronouns is 46. Of these 46 relative pronouns, only 3 have a human antecedent; two are zero relative pronouns and the other one is *whom*. With such a small sample, no final conclusions can be drawn with regard to the choice of relative pronoun acting as object when the antecedent is human.

SUBJECT		OBJECT		PREP. COMP.		ADVERBIAL		DETERMINER	
N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
82	45.55	46	25.55	22	12.22	28	15.55	2	1.11

Table 5. Frequency of the syntactic functions fulfilled by the relativizers.

Among all the possible syntactic functions (see Table 5), subject is that which is most often fulfilled by the relative pronouns, followed by direct object, adverbial, complement of preposition and determiner. In 82 examples the relative pronoun is the subject of its clause, which means 45.55% of the total. The number of relative pronouns which function as object is 46 (= 25.55%). Twenty-two relative pronouns (= 12.22%) fulfil the function of prepositional complement, 28 (= 15.55%) that of adverbial, and 2 are determiners (= 1.11%). In this connection, it has been suggested that those clauses in which a subject has been relativized are easier to process than those in which a genitive, for instance, has been relativized. Thus, Keenan and Comrie introduced the theory of the Accessibility Hierarchy, according to which certain syntactic functions are more easily relativizable than others.

Pronoun		which	who	where	when	whose	whom	that	zero
	N	4	1	---	---	---	---	3	9
	%	23.53	5.88	0	0	0	0	17.65	52.94
Proper noun	N	---	7	3	---	---	---	---	1
	%	0	63.64	27.27	0	0	0	0	9.09
Count singular	N	33	9	3	6	1	1	5	21
	%	42.31	11.54	3.85	7.69	1.28	1.28	6.41	26.92
Count plural	N	20	2	3	2	1	1	8	6
	%	45.45	4.54	6.82	4.54	2.27	2.27	18.18	13.64
Non-count	N	11	2	---	2	---	1	4	7
	%	40.74	7.41	0	7.41	0	3.70	14.81	25.92

Table 6. Distribution of linkwords by realisation of noun phrase antecedent.

They have established a scale in which the last positions can be relativized if and only if the previous positions in the scale can too. This is, according to them, a universal principle which applies across languages:

> We argue that languages vary with respect to which NP positions can be relativized, and that the variation is not random. Rather, the relativizability of certain positions is dependent on that of others, and these dependencies are, we claim, universal. The Accessibility Hierarchy (AH) below expresses the relative accessibility to relativization of NP positions in simplex main clauses. Accessibility Hierarchy (AH) SU>DO>IO>OBL>GEN>O COMP (1977: 66).

If the occurrences of relevant examples in our corpus are counted, the results will be: Subject: 82 (45.55%), Object: 46 (25.55%), Oblique: 22 (12.22%) and Determiner: 2 (1.11%). The data of our corpus confirms, therefore, the Accessibility Hierarchy.[1] As Schmied indicates, this hierarchy is related to the psychological principle of 'right-branching', according to which "the easiest structure is when a subject relativizer is attached to the last matrix noun phrase" (1993: 89).

Another aspect which influences the choice of the relative linkword is the realization of the head of the noun phrase, that is to say, whether it is a pronoun, a proper noun, a singular count noun, a plural count noun or a non-count noun. Table 6 shows the distribution of the relativizer over the realisation of its antecedent noun phrase. *Which* scores high on singular count nouns, with 33 occurences and 42.31% of the relative pronouns which have a singular count noun antecedent. It is followed in this category by the zero relative pronoun, which appears in 21 examples (= 26.92%). *Who*, on the other hand, is used after more than half of all proper nouns (7 out of 11= 63.64%), followed by *where*, used in 3 examples (= 27.27%) and zero, which appears in what constitutes an exceptional example (= 9.09%):

> (10) *in the large airport bus she had a better view of the London () she had not seen for over two years.*

With respect to plural count nouns, the most frequent relative pronoun is *which* (20 cases and 45.45%) followed at a great distance by *that* (8 cases= 18.18%). With pronoun antecedents, the zero relative pronoun scores high, since it is used in 9 of the 17 examples (= 52.94%). As regards the category formed by those examples in which a non-count noun is the antecedent, *which* is the most frequent pronoun (11 cases= 40.74%), closely followed by zero (7 cases= 25.92%).

3. COGNITIVE STRATEGIES

The relative clause constitutes one of the possible constituents which can function as post-modifier of a noun phrase. Adverbs and non-finite clauses can also be noun phrase post-modifiers. However, relative clauses add information which neither adverbs nor non-finite clauses can provide. According to Quirk et al., "part of the explicitness of the relative clause lies in the specifying power of the relative pronoun" (1985: 1245). Yamashita (1994: 73) believes that the facts that the relative pronoun concords with its antecedent in gender and that it has a function within the relative clause on the one hand result in more explicit information, but, on the other hand, create difficulties in language processing, both from the perspective of production and of understanding. However, language has developed some linguistic principles which have helped to minimize the problem, among which we encounter some cognitive strategies. These cognitive strategies often influence the choice of the relative pronoun and they are also related to the function which the relative pronoun fulfils.

3.1. The Closure Strategy

One of the cognitive strategies which simplifies the production and understanding of relative clauses is the closure strategy, which Prideaux and Baker define in the following terms:

> CLOSURE. In processing a particular linguistic unit (phrase, clause, etc.), the language user (speaker or hearer) attempts to obtain closure on that unit as early as possible. (1986: 32)

The closure strategy predicts that non-interrupted structures, like example 11 below, are easier to process than interrupted ones (example 12).

Final: (11) *boiling the effluent with more than 5 ml. of acid resulted in gravimetic recoveries [which were too low to be tolerated].*

Medial: (12) *she found no difficulty in assuming for convenience that the attack [she had begun on Martin] hadn't happened.*

Therefore, the closure strategy conditions the position that the relative clause occupies with respect to the main clause, since it favours relative clauses in

final position as opposed to those which occupy medial position. In this corpus there are 155 relative clauses (= 85%) which occupy final position, and only 27 which are placed at medial position (= 15%). In this connection, Kuno argues that center-embedding reduces comprehensibility, and this "is related to the limitation of the human capacity of temporary memory" (1974: 120).

The prediction that non-interrupted sentences are more easily processable than interrupted ones implies that OS and OO sequences (in which the first letter indicates the function of the antecedent NP and the second one that of the relative pronoun) are easier to process than SS and SO types. To test this hypothesis, only those examples whose relative pronouns and antecedents function as subject, direct object or subject complement have been considered. The reason for including subject complements in the analysis is, as Yamashita points out (1994: 79), that object and complement take the same position, and in this analysis what is important, rather than the grammatical function, is the ordering or syntactic position. Examples of CS and CO in our corpus, included under the category of OS and OO are:

CS: (13) *stones in a soil profile are those things [that have failed to weather to form a soil].*

CO: (14) *there are sides to me [() you'll never know].*

Categories SC and OC have not been able to be included, since there is no example in our corpus in which the relative pronoun functions as subject complement. The hypothesis is confirmed by the data of the corpus (Table 7), since the number of OS sequences is 23, which added to the OO ones (29 ex.) make 52, whereas SS (12 ex.) and SO (5 ex.) types together constitute 17 cases. Examples of these four types are the following:

OS: (15) *you just wait till you meet the girl [who thinks you are a god].*

OO: (16) *he looked up into her eyes and saw the immeasurable depth of eternity [that God has put in there for man to lose himself].*

SS: (17) *A correspondent [who travelled yesterday within a few miles of Vang Vieng] was told by officers that this village was still held by the procommunists.*

SO: (18) *anything [which physical principles suggested might be relevant] was included, and the advice of experienced forecasters at London Airport was sought.*

SS		SO		OS		OO		TOTAL	
N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
12	17.39	5	7.25	23	33.33	29	42.03	69	100

Table 7. Distribution of relative clauses by the types to which they belong.

Cofer defends the position that the deletion of the relative pronoun in medial relative clauses responds to a psychological principle, since it "aids production and comprehension, because it minimizes the interruption of the higher sentence, thus insuring continuity of form and meaning" (1975: 31). Therefore, the fact that in relative clauses which are embedded in the middle of another clause the zero relative pronoun is preferred over *wh-* relative pronouns and adverbs is also related to the closure strategy. This demonstrates that this cognitive strategy has an effect not only over the position of the relative clause and the function of both NP antecedent and relative pronoun, but also over the choice of the relative pronoun. The data obtained from medial relative clauses in our corpus are misleading at first sight, since there are 21 *wh-* relative pronouns and adverbs (12 *which*, 2 *when*, 1 *where*, 4 *who*, 1 *whom*, 1 *whose*), 7 zero relative pronouns, and 2 instances of *that*, but it must be noticed that some syntactic functions fulfilled by these pronouns, like subject, determiner of prepositional complement preceded by the preposition, cannot possibly be fulfilled by zero. If we consider relative pronouns which function as object, adjunct, and prepositional complement not preceded by the preposition, functions which all the relative pronouns can fulfil (Cf Quirk 1957: 107), the tendency to select zero against *wh-* pronouns in medial relative clauses is self-evident. As Table 8 shows, there are 7 zero relative pronouns,1 *which*, 1 *that*, 0 *who(m)*.

WHO(M)		WHICH		THAT		ZERO		TOTAL	
N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
0	0	1	11.11	1	11.11	7	77.78	9	100

Table 8. Distribution of relative linkwords in medial clauses.

3.2. The Non-ambiguity Strategy

Non-ambiguity is another cognitive strategy which is at work to make the production and understanding of relative clauses easier.

> NON-AMBIGUITY. The language user assumes that the unit being processed is not ambiguous. (Prideaux and Baker 1986: 32)

The fact that the zero relative pronoun hardly ever functions as subject is a consequence of the non-ambiguity strategy. In other words, the fact that a relative pronoun functioning as subject cannot normally be omitted is due to ambiguity reasons, and not to its syntactic role. This can be proved by the fact that a relative pronoun which functions as direct object cannot be substituted by zero if this creates confusion. Thus, an example like ? *They are girls boys don't like to date* (Bolinger 1972: 12-13) is doubtfully acceptable, since it is a source of ambiguity, due to the tendency of nouns to function as premodifiers in English. It seems to suggest a compound *girls-boys* or a Saxon genitive *girls' boys*. According to this, the greater frequency with which the zero relative pronoun is used before a personal pronoun results from the fact that there is no combination noun-noun in that case which can lead to confusion. In this connection, when the relative connective is not a subject and it is followed by a subject personal pronoun, a marked tendency can be observed in this corpus to select zero as relative pronoun. As Table 9 displays, zero has been chosen on 37 occasions (= 68.52%), *which* appears in 8 examples (= 14.81%), *where* in 5 (9.26%), *whom* in 2 (3.70%) and *that* and *when* have been used once each (1.85%).

	WHICH	WHOM	WHERE	WHEN	THAT	ZERO	TOTAL
N	8	2	5	1	1	37	54
%	14.81	3.70	9.26	1.85	1.85	68.52	100

Table 9. Distribution of relative linkwords followed by a pronoun.

	WHICH	WHOM	WHERE	WHEN	THAT	ZERO	TOTAL
N	15	1	3	9	7	4	39
%	38.46	2.56	7.69	23.08	17.95	10.26	100

Table 10. Distribution of relative linkwords followed by a noun phrase.

However, when a noun phrase functioning as subject follows the relative pronoun (See Table 10), the tendency is the opposite one. The relative pronoun *which* is followed by a noun phrase subject in 15 examples (= 38.46%), *when* appears before a noun phrase on 9 occasions (= 23.08%), *where* on 3 (= 7.69%), and *whom* on 1 (= 2.56%). *Who* does not appear in this context, because it fulfils itself the function of subject in all its occurences. With respect to zero and relative *that*, the former is followed by a noun phrase subject in 4 examples (= 10.26%) and the latter in 7 (= 17.95%). Thus, while *wh-* relative pronouns and adverbs precede a noun phrase on 28 occasions (71.79%),*that* and zero do it on 11 occasions (28.21%).

Another consequence which derives from the non-ambiguity constraint is the influence which the length of the relative clause has on the selection of the relative pronoun or adverb (See Tables 11 and 12). In Cofer's opinion (1975: 31), the relation between length of clause and selection of relative pronoun is connected with a psychological principle, ease of sentence processing. In long relative clauses, the use of *who* or *that*, instead of zero, makes the structure and meaning of the clause easier to identify by the listener or reader. If the zero variant is selected, the relative clause structure may not be recognized until the place where the co-referential noun phrase used to be is reached, and by that moment, the beginning of the clause may have been forgotten. Short clauses (1-4 words, excluding the relative connective itself) tend to select zero relative pronoun, whose presence declines slightly in clauses of medium length, from 25 short clauses (= 55.55%) to 19 medium ones (= 42.22%). There is only one clause with more than ten words in

which zero occurs (= 2.22%). All in all, the average length of zero clauses is 4.59 words. This average goes up to 7 words in the case of *which* clauses. *Which* occurs mainly in clauses of medium length (35 ex.= 50.72%). On the other hand, the proportion of *which* clauses that are long (10 words or more) is much higher (15 ex.= 21.74%) than that of zero clauses, while, conversely, the percentage of *which* clauses that are short (19 ex.= 27.54%) is lower. As regards relative *that*, it occurs in the same proportion in short as in medium clauses (9 cases of each), while the occurrences of *that* in long clauses go down to 3. *That* clauses have an average length of 5.90 words. The average length of clauses with *who* is the highest, with 8.52 words, and the percentages of short, medium and long clauses with *who* are respectively 28.57% (6 occurences), 38.09% (8 occurences) and 33.33% (7 occurences). The analysis of these data reveals the length of the relative clause as an influencing factor in the selection of the relative pronoun.

	WHO		WHICH		THAT		ZERO	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
short	6	28.57	19	27.54	9	42.86	25	55.55
medium	8	38.09	35	50.72	9	42.86	19	42.22
long	7	33.33	15	21.74	3	14.28	1	2.22
Total	21	100	69	100	21	100	45	100

Table 11. Distribution of relative linkwords by the clause length.

	WHO	WHICH	THAT	ZERO
Average length	8.52 words	7 words	5.90 words	4.95 words

Table 12. Average lenth of the relative clauses according to the linkword.

The influence which the separation or non-separation of the relative pronoun from the antecedent has on the choice of the relative pronoun seems to be a consequence of the non-ambiguity strategy as well (Table 13). Although relative clauses normally follow their antecedents immediately, when this is not the case, *wh-* pronouns are preferred over *that* and above all over the zero relative pronoun. This fact reflects another cognitive strategy which helps to recognize the structure of the clause, since a relative clause which does not come immediately after its antecedent is more difficult to separate from the material that intervenes if there is no relative pronoun, and on some occa-

sions, it could produce ambiguity, as in *the man at the museum John admires is beginning to speak.*[2] (Cf. *the man at the museum whom John admires is beginning to speak.*). Of the 25 relative clauses in which the relative pronoun is not strictly adjacent to its antecedent, 10 are introduced by *which*, 4 by *who*, 3 by *when*, 3 by *that*, 3 by zero and 1 by *as*. The *wh-* series, with 17 occurences is therefore preferred over *that* and zero, which together total 6 occurrences.

	WHO	WHICH	WHEN	THAT	ZERO	AS	TOTAL
N	4	10	3	3	3	1	24
%	16.67	41.67	12.5	12.5	12.5	4.17	100

Table 13. Distribution of linkwords in relative clauses separated from their antecedent.

4. STYLISTIC FACTORS

As has been mentioned above, three different genres are represented in this corpus: Press, Fiction and Learned & scientific writings. The number of relative clauses which correspond to each of these genres are 51, 82 and 47 respectively. Each genre corresponds to a different style with its own defining characteristics. The aim of this section is to find out to what extent the stylistic differences condition the selection of the relativizer.

The distribution of the relative linkwords over the three genres is shown in Table 14. The percentage of zero relative pronouns in the fictional sample, which is equivalent to 41.46% of the relativizers (34 out of 82), is much higher than in the relative clauses extracted from scientific English, where only 4.25% of the relativizers are zero relative pronouns. The subcorpus which corresponds to a journalistic style occupies a mid-way position in this respect, with 8 zero relative pronouns of its 51 relativizers (= 15.69%). While in the Fiction group, zero is the most frequent relative pronoun, in the Press sample it is the third relativizer in frequency and in the science one it occupies the last position. The distribution of *which* is the opposite one. It is the prevailing relativizer in the scientific subcorpus, with 35 occurrences and 74.47%. The percentage in narrative texts goes down to 20.73% (17 occurrences), even though it is the second relativizer in frequency. The journalistic genre is again in the middle, since the percentage of *which*, with 17 instances, is 33.33%, making it the most used relative linkword. The differences with respect to the distribution of *that* are not so significant. The highest percentage corresponds to fictional texts (13.41%), followed by that of written texts taken from newspapers (11.76%); scientific writings occupy the last position (8.51%).

		WHO	WHICH	THAT	ZERO	OTHERS[3]	TOTAL
Fiction	N	12	17	11	34	8	82
	%	14.46	20.73	13.41	41.46	9.76	100
Press	N	9	17	6	8	11	51
	%	17.65	33.33	11.76	15.69	21.57	100
Science	N	0	35	4	2	6	47
	%	0	74.47	8.51	4.25	12.76	100

Table 14. Distribution of the relative linkwords across the genres.

If the distributions of the *wh-* series and the *that* and zero series are examined across the three genres (Table 15), it will be found out that the differences are quite outstanding. In the Fiction genre the *that*-zero series, with 54.88% overcomes the *wh-* series, with 45.12%. In the other two genres, on the other hand, *that* and zero are surpassed by the *wh-* pronouns and adverbs. However, there are still differences between these two genres, since, while in the scientific style the *that* and zero series (12.77%) is very widely overcome by the *wh-* series (87.23%), in the journalistic style the percentages which correspond to both series are slightly more equilibrated: 70.59% of the relative linkwords belong to the *wh-* series and 27.45% corresponds to *that* and zero.

	WH-SERIES		THAT & ZERO		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Fiction	37	45.12	45	54.88	82	100
Press[4]	36	70.59	14	27.45	51	100
Science	41	87.23	6	12.77	47	100

Table 15. Distribution of the *wh-* and *that*-and-zero series across the genres.

A possible explanation for these divergences in the distribution of relativizers across the different genres is, as De Haan points out, that in fiction texts "very often the dialogue parts are aimed at representing a more collo-

quial style" (1991: 63), which explains the high proportion of zero relative pronouns and the predominance of the *that* and zero series over the *wh-* series. The scientific style, on the contrary, is very formal, and this fact is reflected in the overwhelming supremacy of *wh-* relative linkwords and the very few instances of zero relative pronouns. The journalistic style is also formal, but not as rigidly so as the scientific one. This results in a prevalence of the *wh-* series, but not as absolute as in the case of scientific English.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The main conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis can be summarized as follows:

1) The syntactic function which the relative pronoun fulfils clearly influences the selection of this relative pronoun. Thus, the zero relative pronoun never acts as subject, a function which is mainly realised by *which* when the antecedent is non-personal and by *who* when it is personal. When the relative pronoun occupies the object position, zero is the most frequent pronoun.

2) The most often relativized function is that of subject, which is followed by object, adverb, complement of preposition and determiner. These data confirm the Accessibility Hierarchy proposed by Keenan and Comrie. This hierarchy is nevertheless even more strongly confirmed by the data in Yamashita (1994). This may be due to the fact that the need to lessen the effort imposed on addresser and addressee to process relative clauses is more pressing in spoken than in written language.

3) The realization of the noun phrase antecedent also conditions the choice of the relativizer. Proper nouns tend to be followed by the relativizer *who*, and pronouns by the zero relative pronoun. Singular and plural count nouns, on the other hand, seem to prefer the relative pronoun *which*.

4) Relative clauses which occupy a final position are preferred over those which are embedded in the middle of a superordinate clause. When the relative clause is in medial position and the relative pronoun functions as object, adverbial or prepositional complement not preceded by the preposition, zero tends to be selected (7 zero, 1 *which*, 1 *that*). These two facts are related to the closure strategy, according to which OS and OO types in relative clauses are more frequent than SS and SO types, which is confirmed by the results of this corpus.

5) There is a relation between relative pronoun and length of the relative clause. The shortest clauses are those introduced by the zero relative pronoun, with an average length of 4.59 words, followed by *that* clauses (5.90 words)

and *which* clauses (7 words); the longest are clauses introduced by *who* (8.52 words).

6) Relative clauses strictly adjacent to their antecedent are preferred over those which are separated from it. But when the relative clause does not immediately follow its antecedent, *wh-* relative pronouns occurred in a higher percentage than zero or *that,* 17 occurences of *wh-* pronouns and adverbs and 6 occurences of *that* and zero.

7) In those cases in which the subject of the relative clause is a personal pronoun, zero, with 37 occasions (= 68%), is preferred over any other relative connective.

8) Conclusions 5, 6 and 7 are related to a cognitive strategy which makes easier the production and understanding of relative clauses, the non-ambiguity strategy.

9) Different styles are related to the choice of the relative linkword as well. While in the fictional style zero relative is the prevailing relative pronoun, in the scientific style, which is in the opposite pole, zero is very rarely used, and the prevalence of the *wh-* series is overwhelming.

NOTES

1. As Yamashita states, IO (indirect object) in English corresponds with OBL (complement of preposition). Therefore IO is included in OBL.

2.. Example taken from Cofer 1975: 31.

3. Under the category *OTHERS* the following relativizers are included: *whom*, *where*, *when*, *whose*, and, just in the Press sample, the conjunction *as* used as relative linkword.

4. In the Press subcorpus there is an example of the conjuction *as* used as relativizer which is not included in the table.

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EL PROCESO DE CAPTACIÓN RACIONAL Y SU EXPRESIÓN LÉXICA EN INGLÉS Y ESPAÑOL

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1. INTRODUCCIÓN

El objeto del presente estudio es tanto delimitar la parcela semántica en la que se ubica el proceso de "captación racional" como ofrecer un estudio contrastivo de las unidades léxicas verbales que la conforman en inglés y en español mediante un análisis detallado de las mismas. Este análisis incluye información de tipo semántico y sintáctico y se va a llevar a cabo a nivel intra e interlingüístico, estableciendo las principales semejanzas y oposiciones a ambos niveles. Para ello seguimos las bases del método lexemático-funcional propuesto por L. Martín Mingorance (1984, 1989, 1990), modelo de análisis léxico y descriptivo que integra la Lexemática de Coseriu y Geckeler y la Gramática Funcional (GF) de Dik. Dicho modelo presenta una gran validez en el estudio del léxico—y, por tanto, resulta muy apropiado para nuestro propósito—porque, como afirma su propio autor (1990), consiste en la integración armónica de dos modelos de análisis complementarios: la Lexemática, modelo estructural esencialmente paradigmático de análisis léxico, y la GF, modelo gramatical basado en el lexicón, que proporciona un desarrollo altamente estructurado de las relaciones sintagmáticas de las unidades léxicas.

De la *Lexemática* tomamos los conceptos de estructura de *campo léxico*—o "paradigma léxico que se origina por la distribución de un continuo de contenido léxico en diferentes unidades, dadas en la lengua como palabras, que están recíprocamente en oposición inmediata mediante rasgos distintivos de contenido simples" (Coseriu, 1967: 294); articulación en *dimensiones* y

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1. INTRODUCCIÓN

El objeto del presente estudio es tanto delimitar la parcela semántica en la que se ubica el proceso de "captación racional" como ofrecer un estudio contrastivo de las unidades léxicas verbales que la conforman en inglés y en español mediante un análisis detallado de las mismas. Este análisis incluye información de tipo semántico y sintáctico y se va a llevar a cabo a nivel intra e interlingüístico, estableciendo las principales semejanzas y oposiciones a ambos niveles. Para ello seguimos las bases del método lexemático-funcional propuesto por L. Martín Mingorance (1984, 1989, 1990), modelo de análisis léxico y descriptivo que integra la Lexemática de Coseriu y Geckeler y la Gramática Funcional (GF) de Dik. Dicho modelo presenta una gran validez en el estudio del léxico—y, por tanto, resulta muy apropiado para nuestro propósito—porque, como afirma su propio autor (1990), consiste en la integración armónica de dos modelos de análisis complementarios: la Lexemática, modelo estructural esencialmente paradigmático de análisis léxico, y la GF, modelo gramatical basado en el lexicón, que proporciona un desarrollo altamente estructurado de las relaciones sintagmáticas de las unidades léxicas.

De la *Lexemática* tomamos los conceptos de estructura de *campo léxico*—o "paradigma léxico que se origina por la distribución de un continuo de contenido léxico en diferentes unidades, dadas en la lengua como palabras, que están recíprocamente en oposición inmediata mediante rasgos distintivos de contenido simples" (Coseriu, 1967: 294); articulación en *dimensiones* y

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subdimensiones—que constituyen una especie de "parcelación del campo léxico", es decir, parcelas semánticas de contenido afín dentro de un campo léxico, dentro de las cuales se ubican lexemas que se agrupan en torno a un contenido semántico común que los unifica entre sí y a su vez los opone a otras dimensiones dentro del mismo campo—; *análisis sémico* —descomposición de lexemas en semas o rasgos primarios de nivel inferior, es decir, rasgos semánticos distintivos mínimos en el análisis de contenido, que se revelan por oposición en un conjunto léxico—; y *análisis clasemático,* entendiendo por clasemas una serie de rasgos primarios de nivel superior, de naturaleza más general y abstracta, tanto semánticos como sintácticos (animación, transitividad, etc.), que constituyen una determinación suplementaria del contenido sémico.[1]

La GF, por su parte, nos permite analizar cada lexema a partir del *marco predicativo,* fórmula léxica con los siguientes tipos de información relevante para su uso correcto en las expresiones lingüísticas: forma léxica, categoría sintáctica, valencia cuantitativa—número de argumentos o participantes necesarios para la definición del estado de cosas requeridos—y valencia cualitativa—selecciones de restricción sobre dichos argumentos y funciones semánticas realizadas por ellos—. La segunda parte en la descripción de un lexema o predicado es su *definición semántica,* representada por otro marco predicativo del lexema hiperónimo que funciona como "definiens" o "término definiente" (A = df B). Esta información se expresa mediante el sistema de etiquetas y símbolos de la GF, que explicitamos en un apéndice al final del trabajo.[2] Al realizar esta operación con los lexemas de una misma dimensión obtenemos el sistema de definiciones encadenadas mediante el procedimiento de *descomposición léxico-gradual,* mediante la cual, además de interrelacionar los predicados semánticamente afines, se consigue establecer oposiciones distintivas entre lexemas que comparten un mismo término definiente superordinado a partir de los satélites (participantes opcionales o circunstantes).[3] Vamos a realizar este proceso en el orden "top-to-bottom", es decir, un procedimiento jerarquizado de progresiva hiponimización, partiendo del archilexema o lexema de sentido más genérico hasta llegar al término más específico. Este método evita la posibilidad de repetición innecesaria, de acuerdo con los principios de economía y recursividad semántica, ya que cada lexema presupone toda la información contenida en su definiens; por tanto, sólo los rasgos que diferencian el lexema definido de su definiens serán especificados. A partir de dicho análisis se establecen diversos *estados de cosas* (estados, posiciones, acciones, etc.) según una serie de *parámetros semánticos* que se aplican a cada predicado: [±dinámico] [±controlado] [±experiencia], etc. (Dik 1989: 91 y ss.).

Como resultado de la combinación de ambos tipos de análisis obtenemos información completa sobre cada lexema tanto a nivel paradigmático como sintagmático, lo cual nos permite observar el modo en que se organiza la representación léxica de una determinada parcela semántica en cada lengua por separado y a nivel contrastivo entre ambas lenguas. El estudio nos permitirá asimismo comprobar la estrecha relación existente entre semántica y sintaxis.

2. LA "CAPTACIÓN RACIONAL" COMO PROCESO MENTAL: UBICACIÓN Y DELIMITACIÓN

Antes de entrar de lleno en el análisis de los lexemas verbales procedemos a delimitar la parcela semántica en la que se ubica el proceso de captación racional que, lógicamente, se incluye dentro del campo léxico que engloba todos los procesos mentales y, más concretamente, podríamos afirmar que dentro del conocimiento perceptivo. Llegados a este punto se hace necesario señalar que no es tarea fácil establecer una delimitación clara o tajante entre las parcelas semánticas que pertenecen al campo léxico de la cognición y por tanto entre los lexemas que expresan los diversos procesos cognoscitivos, en cuanto que el objeto de estudio es, a su vez, el instrumento del mismo, dada la indisolubilidad existente entre cognición y lengua.[4] No obstante, podemos establecer una serie de delimitaciones básicas: frente a los predicados archilexemáticos del campo léxico de la "cognición" (L1: KNOW / L2: SABER-CONOCER) que indican un "estado" (posesión de conocimiento), los lexemas—predicados básicos—que expresan el proceso de captación racional (L1: UNDERSTAND, COMPREHEND, GRASP..., L2: ENTENDER, COMPRENDER, CAPTAR...) parecen situarse a medio camino entre *proceso mental,* proceso en el que un sujeto experimentador, entidad animada con el rasgo [+humano], generalmente paciente o receptor, llega a alcanzar gradualmente el sentido de una determinada idea, esto es, va captando o asimilando una serie de ideas hasta llegar a tener conocimiento de su significado, y *estado alcanzado,* en cuanto que estos lexemas implican asimismo la consecución de dicho proceso, el "llegar a saber". En este sentido, se pueden incluir como una subdimensión dentro del denominado "conocimiento perceptivo" (percepción intelectual),[5] con una especificación en el objeto mental: PERCIBIR + <el significado o sentido de algo>:

(L1) KNOW / (L2) CONOCER-SABER: **estado mental**
TENER + *ideas/información* + en la mente

(L1) PERCEIVE / (L2) PERCIBIR: **proceso de percepción intelectual**
(LLEGAR A) CONOCER + *una evidencia* + a través de la mente

(L1) UNDERSTAND / (L2) ENTENDER: **proceso de captación racional**
PERCIBIR + *el sentido o significado de algo* + usando la mente

3. CORPUS DE LEXEMAS

3.1. Dimensión archilexemática

3.1.1. Nivel intralingüístico

Hemos seleccionado como objeto de estudio los lexemas verbales centrales a esta parcela semántica, es decir, aquéllos que contienen los rasgos inherentes a los respectivos archilexemas (L1: UNDERSTAND 1 / L2: ENTENDER 1), a saber: {+PERCEPCION INTELECTUAL} + <sentido/significado> + <aclaración/elucidación mental>, más una serie de rasgos específicos,[6] que se pueden dividir en tres tipos:
a) restricciones en el objeto,
b) satélites (circunstanciales),
c) a ambos tipos de especificaciones, proporcionadas en la fórmula del marco predicativo de Dik, añadimos los rasgos pragmáticos de registro, estilo, etc.

(L1)
Descomposición léxico-gradual:

UNDERSTAND 1$_V$: [(x_1:<+human>(x_1))$_{Proc}$ (x_2:<±abstr>(x_2))$_{Go}$]$_{Pro}$
= df [PERCEIVE$_V$:(x_1)$_{Exp\text{-}Proc}$ (x_2:<meaning/sense>(x_2))$_{Go}$
(y_1: Adv P <through mental elucidation>(y_1))$_{Instr}$]$_{Pro}$
= df [(GET TO) KNOW$_V$: (x_1)$_{Exp\text{-}Proc}$ (x_2:<evidence>(x_2))$_{Go}$
(y_1: Adv P <through the mind/(senses)>(y_1))$_{Mann/Instr}$]$_{Pro}$
= dfKNOW$_V$:[(x_1:<+H>(x_1))$_{Exp\text{-}0}$ (x_2:<±abst>(x_2))$_{Go}$]$_{Sta}$
= df [HAVE$_V$: (x_1)$_{Poss}$ (x_2:<ideas/information>(x_2))$_{Go}$
(y_1: Adv P <in one's mind>(y_1))$_{Loc}$]$_{Sta}$

"GET TO KNOW / PERCEIVE the meaning or sense of sth. by using the mind" = "Reach the meaning of things, form a clear idea of sth."

Como se deduce de la información anterior, el escenario semántico prototípico se definiría del siguiente modo:

(x_1: [+H])Exp
(x_2: [±ABSTR][-PHYS][±H]: <meaning/sense>)Go

Se trata, pues, de predicados divalentes con dos participantes obligatorios: sujeto (x_1), entidad animada [+H] y objeto mental <el significado o sentido que el sujeto capta>. El estado de cosas se define, por tanto, como un *proceso/(estado)* mental con los parámetros [+exp][-dyn][-con].

COMPREHEND$_V$: [(x_1:<+human>(x_1))$_{Proc}$ (x_2:<±abstr>(x_2))$_{Goal}$]$_{Pro}$
= df[UNDERSTAND 1$_V$: (x_1)$_{Proc}$ (x_2)$_{Goal}$
(y_1: Adv P <completely>(y_1))$_{Mann\text{-}Intens}$]$_{Pro}$
UNDERSTAND 1 + <completely>

Este lexema se diferencia del anterior mediante:
a) el satélite modal: (y_1: Adv P <completely>(y_1))$_{Intens}$
b) rasgos pragmáticos: <slightly formal> <freq. emphatic>[7]

GRASP: UNDERSTAND 1 + <sth. important or complicated> + <firmly> <esp. emotive & emphatic>

APPREHEND: GRASP + <completely> <formal>

FATHOM: UNDERSTAND 1 + <sth. difficult or mysterious> + <as a result of thinking carefully about it>.

Este predicado se opone al resto de los lexemas de su dimensión por presentar un estado de cosas +dinámico y +resultativo, en el sentido de que el sujeto llega a entender algo como resultado de una actividad mental (profunda reflexión). *Ejemplo:*

> "Understand 1/ grasp / fathom the meaning of sth."
> —GRASP: aunque implica agudeza mental y perspicacia por parte del sujeto, éste se limita a captar el sentido de algo, sus matices, etc. (Suj-Rec).
> —FATHOM: llegar a entender algo profundizando, penetrando en ello (Suj-Ag: participación activa) = WORK OUT ("*think* about sth. and manage to understand it").

Lexemas de contenido semántico "vacío" como es el caso de GET no se pueden incluir como centrales a esta parcela semántica en cuanto que requieren necesariamente un objeto específico para concretar su significado: GET *the meaning of* (=understand) / GET knowledge of (=learn) / GET a job (=obtain) / GET sth. from a shop (=buy), etc. También se excluyen del estudio los verbos preposicionales (CATCH ON...) y las expresiones perifrásticas (GET THE IDEA...).

(L2)
Los lexemàs centrales españoles desarrollan el mismo escenario semántico y estado de cosas que los predicados ingleses.

ENTENDER 1: PERCIBIR + <sentido o significado de las cosas> + <mediante la aclaración mental de ideas>

COMPRENDER 1: ENTENDER 1 + <en profundidad>

ENTENDER 1 / COMPRENDER 1 constituyen un par de lexemas muy afines semánticamente, considerados frecuentemente como sinónimos. No obstante, nos adherimos a la idea de que la sinonimia total no existe (Fernández Sevilla, 1974, Palmer, 1978, etc.) y siempre encontramos algún rasgo diferencial entre dos lexemas afines, ya sea semántico, connotativo, pragmático, contextual, etc. La diferencia de significado entre ambos lexemas, no apreciable en todos los contextos, se podría establecer mediante el satélite modal de intensidad: COMPRENDER 1 indica una captación racional más profunda de algo (motivos, razones, raíces de un problema...), mientras que ENTENDER 1 puede quedarse en el "(llegar a) CONOCER" simple de los elementos de ese algo.

Ejemplos contrastivos:

—"Entender un escrito" = llegar a saber lo que significa, pero puede ser de un modo superficial: simplemente ser capaz de descifrar la escritura.
—"Comprender un escrito" = llegar a captar totalmente su significado (el mensaje).

Por esta razón ENTENDER 1 se utiliza con más frecuencia en relación a un idioma: "Entiendo el alemán" (entiendo el significado de las palabras pero no implica una comprensión profunda).

No obstante, en la mayoría de los contextos funcionan como completos sinónimos y son siempre intercambiables: "No me has comprendido / entendido", etc.

CAPTAR: ENTENDER 1 + <algo complejo, indicios o matices> + <con perspicacia>. Este lexema aparece frecuentemente acompañado de circunstantes temporales o de intensidad que enfatizan el matiz que le confiere el satélite modal <con perspicacia>: "Captar de inmediato / a la perfección / rápidamente... un mensaje".

APREHENDER: COMPRENDER 1 + <idea> + <puramente: sin hacer juicio> <formal y filosófico>

EXPLICARSE: *llegar a* ENTENDER 1 + <mediante una justificación razonable>. Este lexema equivale a la perífrasis coloquial "CABER EN LA CABEZA" (de acuerdo con la propia ideología o mentalidad del sujeto). Se opone al resto de su dimensión mediante el parámetro semántico [+dyn] en cuanto que el sujeto no se limita a entender algo de un modo pasivo, sino que *"llega a / logra* entenderlo" a través de un proceso activo de pensamiento: búsqueda de una explicación lógica o incluso elaboración de la misma.

CONCEBIR 1: ENTENDER 1 + <idea/hecho/situación> + <adecuación a la propia mentalidad>

ENTERARSE 1: ENTENDER 1 <coloquial>[8]

Antes de pasar a la fase contrastiva queremos hecer constar que, si bien hemos señalado que los lexemas que predican "captación racional" indican un *proceso mental* (GET TO KNOW / LLEGAR A SABER) frente al predicado archilexemático KNOW / SABER-CONOCER, que indica un estado alcanzado, sin embargo esta diferencia se neutraliza en determinados contextos con objeto específico <a language>, en los que predicados archilexemáticos como UNDERSTAND 1 / ENTENDER 1 designan *estados:*

"I understand German = "I know German".
"Entiendo el alemán" = "Sé alemán".

No obstante, hay que señalar que los lexemas hipónimos no pueden funcionar en este tipo de contextos:

(L1) *"To grasp/fathom/apprehend a language" (=*KNOW).
(L2) *"Captar/aprehender/concebir una lengua" (=*SABER).

Este hecho constituye un ejemplo de la naturaleza compleja de los predicados que se analizan y la dificultad que supone establecer delimitaciones nítidas entre ellos.

3.1.2. Nivel interlingüístico



Dada la escasa—por no decir imperceptible—distinción semántica existente entre los predicados L2 ENTENDER 1 y COMPRENDER 1, neutralizada en la mayoría de los contextos, ambos se consideran como archilexemas válidos de su dimensión alternando su uso indistintamente. En contraste, el lexema L1 COMPREHEND, aunque es semánticamente afín a UNDERSTAND 1, no comparte la posición archilexemática en cuanto que se restringe al lenguaje formal. *Ejemplos:*

> The process of family breakdown cannot be fully comprehended without studying other external factors.
>
> There are some things happening on our planet that even scientists do not comprehend.

—Los pares de lexemas GRASP/CAPTAR y APPREHEND / APREHENDER presentan relación de isosemia o equivalencia total.

—La equivalencia de FATHOM se realiza en L2 mediante los archilexemas ENTENDER 1/COMPRENDER 1, con la implicación de un actante objeto restringido cualitativamente <algo difícil de entender> y un satélite modal <+mediante profunda reflexión>, o el lexema PENETRAR en sentido metafórico:

> I can't fathom the meaning of his words = no logro entender 1/comprender 1/penetrar en el sentido de sus palabras.

—EXPLICARSE establece la equivalencia en L1 mediante el archilexema UNDERSTAND 1 (generalmente precedido por el verbo modal CAN/BE ABLE TO) o el verbo preposicional MAKE OUT.
—Para establecer la equivalencia de CONCEBIR 1 también se recurre al archilexema inglés:

> Concibo que quieras dejar de fumar = I understand/ *conceive that you want to stop smoking.

—La equivalencia del lexema coloquial L2 ENTERARSE 1 se realiza mediante el lexema de sentido general GET con un objeto específico:

> He didn't get the joke = No se enteró del chiste.

3.2. Subdimensiones específicas

Dentro de la dimensión léxica que nos ocupa resulta posible establecer tres subgrupos de predicados que, además de compartir el mismo contenido de los predicados centrales arriba enumerados, se reunen en torno a un rasgo común más específico, que sirve como base para establecer cada subdimensión: "+hipotético", "+erróneo", "+afectivo". Veremos además cómo a partir de dichas divisiones se obtienen diversos estados de cosas.

3.2.1. + hipotético

Rasgo diferencial: (L1) <+ attributing a specific meaning> / (L2) <+ atribuir un significado particular>.

Los lexemas pertenecientes a esta subdimensión presentan un estado de cosas clasificado como *actividad* mental [+exp] [+con] [+dyn] en cuanto que el sujeto (Ag) no se limita a entender o captar el significado de algo, sino que "escoge" una de las posibles interpretaciones sobre tal significado basándose en su opinión personal o en la lógica y, en este sentido, formula una hipóte-

sis: UNDERSTAND 1 / ENTENDER 1 + "atribuir un significado probable". Por tanto se sitúan a caballo entre el proceso de captación racional y el pensamiento hipotético (ENTENDER + SUPONER).

3.2.1.1. Nivel intralingüístico

(L1)
INTERPRET 1$_V$: [(x_1:<+human>(x_1))$_{Ag}$ (x_2:<±abstr>(x_2))$_{Goal}$]$_{Act/Pro}$
= df[UNDERSTAND 1_V:(x_1)$_{Proc}$ (x_2:<likely meaning>(x_2))$_{Go}$
(y_1:.Adv P <in a particular/personal way: according to one's personal opinion>(y_1))$_{Mann}$]$_{Pro}$

UNDERSTAND 1 + <in a particular way>[9]

CONSTRUE: INTERPRET 1 <formal>
UNDERSTAND 3: UNDERSTAND 1 + <sth. implicit> + <by logic or supposition>

(L2)
INTERPRETAR 1: ENTENDER 1 + <de un modo particular>
SOBREENTENDER: ENTENDER 1 + <algo implícito> + <por lógica o suposición>

3.2.1.2. Nivel interlingüístico



—En este caso encontramos un ejemplo de lo que Carl (1980: 92) denomina "asimetría interlingüística", provocada por el vacío léxico español correspondiente al lexema inglés CONSTRUE. Por tanto tenemos dos predicados ingleses muy afines semánticamente frente a uno español: (L1) INTERPRET 1, CONSTRUE / (L2) INTERPRETAR 1.

—Entre los lexemas UNDERSTAND 3 / SOBREENTENDER existe una relación de isosemia. La diferencia, esta vez formal, estriba en que un mismo contenido ("entender algo implícito por lógica") se lexicaliza en L2 en un predicado complejo—SOBREENTENDER—formado mediante el procedimiento de prefijación, frente a L1 que no presenta una forma específica: UNDERSTAND (3) (formalmente igual al archilexema).

3.2.2. + erróneo

Sema diferencial: (L1) <+ wrongly> / (L2) <+erróneamente>.
Los lexemas que se incluyen en este grupo, más que la negación de un proceso expresan la *percepción incorrecta* de un determinado sentido o significado. Dichos lexemas no se agrupan bajo un mismo estado de cosas, como ocurre en el resto de las dimensiones establecidas, sino que comparten el estado de cosas de los predicados positivos a partir de los cuales se definen. No obstante, si bien no era necesario establecer esta subdimensión, hemos preferido agrupar juntos a todos los lexemas que comparten un sentido negativo.

3.2.2.1. Nivel intralingüístico

(L1)
MISUNDERSTAND: UNDERSTAND 1 + <wrongly>
MISINTERPRET: INTERPRET 1 + <wrongly>[10]
MISCONSTRUE: CONSTRUE + <wrongly>
MISREAD: MISINTERPRET <a situation, s.o.'s behaviour // or specifically: sth. written or printed>
A estos lexemas centrales se suman los predicados de uso no frecuente: **MISAPPREHEND**: APPREHEND + <wrongly> y **MISCONCEIVE**: MISUNDERSTAND <a situation, plan, method...> <restricted use: usu. pass>. Este último restringe su uso al participio pasado en función adjetiva, y contiene el matiz semántico distintivo: <misunderstood and therefore *unlikely to suceed*>: "The plan to build the road through the forest is wholly misconceived".

(L2)
MALENTENDER: ENTENDER 1 / INTERPRETAR 1 + <de un modo incorrecto>

3.2.2.2. Nivel interlingüístico

L1	L2
MISUNDERSTAND MISINTERPRET MISCONSTRUE MISREAD MISAPPREHEND MISCONCEIVE	MALENTENDER

Esta subdimensión está compuesta en inglés por un grupo numeroso de predicados negativos formados mediante el procedimiento de prefijación (MIS-), frente a un solo predicado español, por lo que existe un fuerte contraste cuantitativo. Todos los predicados ingleses realizan su equivalencia mediante el lexema genérico L2 MALENTENDER, que engloba todos los matices de los lexemas ingleses correspondientes, o mediante perífrasis negativas del tipo "ENTENDER / COMPRENDER / INTERPRETAR MAL" (V + adv negat), "NO ENTENDER BIEN / CORRECTAMENTE / EXACTAMENTE" (V negat + adv).

3.2.3. + afectivo

Por último y a partir del rasgo común (L1) <+ showing helpful interest> / (L2) <+ solidaridad a un comportamiento> incluimos una serie de lexemas semánticamente afines a los anteriores pero un tanto más periféricos al proceso de "captación racional", situados entre la percepción intelectual y el sentimiento. Dichos lexemas predican una *actitud* solidaria del sujeto (Pos) con respecto al objeto que suele estar asociado a una entidad humana: <comportamientos / actitudes / sentimientos...>. Por tanto el estado de cosas se califica de *posición* mental [+exp][+con][-dyn] frente a los lexemas anteriores que designaban un estado/proceso o una actividad mental.

3.2.3.1. Nivel intralingüístico

(L1)
UNDERSTAND 2$_V$: $[(x_1$:<+human>$(x_1))_{Pos}$ $(x_2$:<±abst>$(x_2))_{Go}]$Pos
= df[UNDERSTAND 1$_V$: $(x_1)_{Proc}$ $(x_2$:<person: ideas / actions / feelings / reasons / behaviour...>$(x_2))_{Go}$
$(y_1$: Adv P <finding them reasonable>$(y_1))_{Reas}$
$(y_2$: Adv P <closely>$(y_2))_{Mann\text{-}Att}]$Pro
UNDERSTAND 1 + <a person: feelings, attitudes, behaviour...> + <find them reasonable or justifiable> + <normally feeling close>

APPRECIATE: [UNDERSTAND 2] + <the worth of> + <situation or difficulty> + <being concious of what it involves>
Este predicado incluye una *valoración* por parte del sujeto (UNDERSTAND + VALUE). Se construye con objetos que contienen indirectamente el rasgo [+H]: <reasons, opinions...>: "I appreciate the reasons for your anger", pero no admite objetos directamente humanos: "*I appreciate you" (= hold in esteem / *understand).

SYMPATHIZE: [UNDERSTAND 2] + <s.o.'s feelings / attitude> + <by sharing them>. Semánticamente se sitúa más bien en la periferia del campo, actuando como "lexema puente" entre la cognición y el sentimiento, en cuanto que implica una mayor solidaridad y afectividad por parte del sujeto hacia el objeto: UNDERSTAND + SHARE + IDENTIFY.

(L2)
ENTENDER 2: [ENTENDER 1] + <persona: ideas/actos / sentimientos / razones / comportamiento...> + <encontrarlos razonables o al menos justificados>
La oposición ENTENDER 1/2 se basa principalmente en la diferencia cualitativa de los elementos que integran el segundo argumento:
ENTENDER 1: OD = SN <significado/sentido> [-H]
ENTENDER 2: OD = SN/O.Sub <persona/actitud...>[+H]
Ejemplo: "No me entiendes"→ contexto ambiguo:
a)ENTENDER 1 (mis palabras: porque hablo rápidamente, en voz baja... / o porque no captas su sentido)
b) ENTENDER 2 (mi actitud, mi personalidad...)

COMPRENDER 2: [ENTENDER 2] + (mayor aproximación)

Las diferencias entre ambos lexemas una vez más no suelen aparecer de forma clara en el discurso: "comprender 2 / entender 2 el mundo de los mayores". Podríamos asignar en este caso la posición archilexemática a COMPRENDER 2, en cuanto que, como ya se ha señalado anteriormente, COMPRENDER suele implicar una captación más profunda y por tanto se utiliza con mayor frecuencia en contextos que implican actitud solidaria, más cercano a COMPARTIR: "entender algo con profundidad: frec. los motivos, razones de una determinada actitud", ej: "Te comprendo perfectamente" (1 = tu actitud / 2 = el significado de tus palabras).

3.2.3.2. Nivel interlingüístico

L1	L2
UNDERSTAND 2 APPRECIATE SYMPATHIZE comprehend (2) fathom (2)	COMPRENDER 2 ENTENDER 2

—Entre el par lexemático L2 ENTENDER 2/COMPRENDER 2 (cuya diferencia semántica, insistimos, nunca se delimita de forma clara) y el lexema inglés UNDERSTAND 2 se establece una relación de equivalencia total y a su vez de asimetría (2-1).
—Por su parte, los lexemas COMPREHEND o FATHOM también pueden, en algunos casos, incluir el rasgo <+helpful interest>, construidos con objetos humanos u oracionales:

I can't fathom her (no entiendo por qué actúa así)

I'll never comprehend why she did what she did

pero no hemos considerado necesario establecer una segunda entrada léxica específica ya que no se utilizan con frecuencia en este sentido y generalmente se refieren a la captación de un significado o sentido, por lo que se incluyen en el primer grupo.

—Los lexemas L1 APPRECIATE y SYMPATHIZE contienen matices semánticos concretos y definidos que no aparecen lexicalizados en ningún predicado español, por lo que la equivalencia en L2 se establece de un modo parcial mediante el par COMPRENDER 2 / ENTENDER 2 (implicando tales rasgos distintivos en el contexto):

I appreciate your point of view = entiendo 2 / comprendo 2 (y valoro) tu punto de vista;

I sympathize with your feelings = comprendo 2 / entiendo 2 (y comparto) tus sentimientos".

4. ANÁLISIS SINTÁCTICO

Todos los predicados presentan en ambas lenguas esquemas transitivos con dos argumentos lógicos (sujeto humano [+exp] y objeto mental) y dos o tres actantes (bivalentes o trivalentes) a partir de la estructura de valencia sintáctica general:
SVO (O: nominal/oracional) / SVOC.

4.1. Captación racional

Los predicados en ambas lenguas admiten el esquema sintáctico transitivo divalente con objeto directo.

L1: SVO (O: Noun / Wh- word)
(+) UNDERSTAND 1, COMPREHEND, GRASP, APPREHEND, FATHOM.
(-) MISUNDERSTAND, MISAPPREHEND, MISCONCEIVE.
Ejemplos:

I understood his explanation / what he meant.
They did not comprehend how hard he had struggled
(muy frecuente en oraciones negativas).

I think I managed to grasp the main points of the lecture / I grasped quite soon what was going on.

We often fail to apprehend the real nature of change / I completely fail to apprehend why you're behaving like this.

Can you fathom his plan? / I just can't fathom what she wants to do.

Los predicados negativos se construyen con objeto nominal:

He misunderstood my words, It is all too easy to misapprehend its nature

y MISCONCEIVE restringe su uso al participio pasado en función adjetiva, como hemos señalado anteriormente.

L2: SVO (O: Nominal / (oracional))
(+)ENTENDER 1, COMPRENDER 1, CAPTAR, APREHENDER, EXPLICARSE, CONCEBIR 1, ENTERARSE 1.
(-) MALENTENDER.
Todos los lexemas, excepto CONCEBIR 1 y ENTERARSE 1, siguen el esquema divalente SVO con objeto nominal:

Entendí la explicación.

Leyó la carta pero no comprendió su verdadero significado.

Captó inmediatamente el matiz de tu comentario.

No podemos aprehender los significados de las cosas si no están encarnados en entidades sensibles y concretas.

EXPLICARSE suele restringirse a oraciones negativas:

No me lo explico / No me explico cómo ha podido suceder.

y con menos frecuencia interrogativas:

¿Cómo te explicas sus fallos?

siempre en forma pronominal-reflexiva. En caso de aparecer en oraciones afirmativas, suele ir acompañado de un elemento adverbial:

Ahora me lo explico / ¿*Me lo explico.

—El único predicado negativo se construye asimismo con objeto nominal:

Malentendió mis palabras

y no admite objeto oracional.
—CONCEBIR 1, por el contrario, requiere un objeto oracional:

No concibo que quiera dejar de estudiar / *No concibo sus palabras.

—El lexema pronominal ENTERARSE, por su parte, es el único lexema de su grupo que rige objeto preposicional:

No se enteró de tu explicación.

4.2. + hipotético

En este caso, la mayoría de los predicados L1 y L2 admiten tanto el esquema transitivo divalente con objeto nominal como el trivalente.

L1: SVO / SVOC
(+) INTERPRET 1, CONSTRUE, UNDERSTAND 3.
(-) MISINTERPRET, MISCONSTRUE, MISREAD
—Los pares INTERPRET 1 / MISINTERPRET, CONSTRUE / MISCONSTRUE y el lexema MISREAD siguen el esquema transitivo divalente con objeto directo (SVO) y trivalente (SVO + "as").

He was able to interpret my dream

He interpreted his words as insults

También es frecuente la presencia de un circunstante modal que funciona como elemento obligatorio, necesario en el contexto:

He interpreted my words *correctly*

Estas estructuras equivalen semánticamente a estructuras divalentes en las que el tercer actante (adv-modo) se sustituye por "be able to" / "know how to" precediendo al lexema:

He interpreted my words *correctly* = He *knew how to* interpret them / He *was able to* interpret them.

He misinterpreted my intentions / He saw the smile and misinterpreted it as friendliness.

—CONSTRUE / MISCONSTRUE se utilizan con frecuencia en pasiva:

These phrases are capable of being construed differently / Any change in plan would be construed as indecision.

You know how things get misconstrued in a small cammunity / I said something that might have been misconstrued as an apology.

He misread my intentions / Their behaviour was usually misread as indifference.

—Por su parte, el lexema UNDERSTAND 3, cercano semánticamente a SUPPOSE (by logic) = SUPPLY MENTALLY, aparece en una serie de contextos específicos <referencia a omisiones en discursos o textos>, y presenta un esquema sintáctico divalente normalmente restringido a la voz pasiva:

Some words are missing in this paragraph, but they can be easily understood.

L2: SVO / SVOC
INTERPRETAR 1, SOBREENTENDER.
—El lexema INTERPRETAR 1 funciona como transitivo divalente (SVO) o trivalente (SVOC/A):

¿Cómo interpretaste sus excusas? / Interpretó sus palabras como insultos.

Espero que interprete bien mis palabras.

Este predicado funciona a menudo en estructuras sintácticas trivalentes, acompañado de un complemento ("como" + SN) o de un adverbial de modo ("bien, mal, correctamente", etc.) promocionado a la categoría de actante en cuanto que es necesario en el contexto.
—SOBREENTENDER sigue el esquema transitivo divalente SVO, en forma pronominal:

En este párrafo faltan algunas palabras, pero se sobreentienden.

4.3. + afectivo

Los predicados de ambas lenguas comparten la posibilidad de construirse con objeto nominal u oracional.
L1: SVO (O: Noun / That-Clause)
UNDERSTAND 2, APPRECIATE, SYMPATHIZE.

I don't understand her attitude. / I understand that you want to go away from home.

I appreciate the reasons for you anger. / I appreciate that it's a difficult decision for you to make.

—SYMPATHIZE, en oposición a los lexemas anteriores, se construye con objeto preposicional:

I sympathize with your point of view.

L2: SVO (objeto nominal u oracional)
COMPRENDER 2, ENTENDER 2.

Comprendo tu punto de vista / Comprendo que no le hables después de lo que te hizo.

No entiendo su actitud / Entiendo que quieras marcharte.

Una vez estudiados los esquemas sintácticos prototípicos resumimos los puntos de mayor interés que reflejan la interrelación entre los predicados analizados en ambas lenguas:
—Cuando entradas léxicas diferenciadas toman un objeto nominal, la diferenciación estriba en la restricción cualitativa: UNDERSTAND 1 (+ meaning) / UNDERSTAND 2 (+ reasons/attitude...):

I understood his explanation/ I understand her behaviour.

—Los objetos nominales con el rasgo [+Humano] suelen dar lugar a contextos ambiguos. Así la oración: "I understand you" presenta dos posibles interpretaciones: UNDERSTAND 1 (what you say, the meaning of your words) / UNDERSTAND 2 (your attitude).
—Varios predicados admiten objetos oracionales. En la mayoría de los casos, este objeto oracional va ligado al sentido que hemos clasificado como "afectivo": COMPRENDER + COMPARTIR o SOLIDARIZARSE con una

determinada postura. De este modo, frente a ENTENDER 1 y COMPRENDER 1, que admiten únicamente objeto nominal, ENTENDER 2 y COMPRENDER 2 admiten además el objeto oracional:

> Entiendo / comprendo que quieras pedirle perdón, que deje de fumar, etc.,

lo cual nos muestra la estrecha interrelación entre semántica y sintaxis. No obstante, si bien el esquema sintáctico oracional es típico de los predicados incluidos en la subdimensión "+afectivo", tenemos que apuntar que determinados lexemas como UNDERSTAND, COMPREHEND o GRASP pueden regir asimismo objeto oracional (THAT-clause), pero en este caso suelen implicar significados diferentes. *Ejemplos:*

> I understand that you are interested in borrowing some money from us (= saber, tener entendido, porque alguien lo ha dicho)
>
> I don't think he fully comprehends that she won't be here to help him / Veronica has not yet grasped that to pass exams you have to work hard.

El sentido de los verbos COMPREHEND y GRASP en este tipo de oraciones nos sirve como ejemplo representativo para poder captar la imprecisión de los límites, un tanto borrosos, que se establecen entre la percepción intelectual y la captación racional: "comprender" en estos contextos funciona como sinónimo de "darse cuenta, notar".

—Los predicados que toman objetos oracionales funcionan siempre como "factivos", en cuanto que el sujeto se compromete a la verdad de la proposición objeto:

> I understand [(the fact) that you want to leave that job],
>
> Comprendo [(el hecho de) que estés enfadado],
>
> Concibo que quieras cambiar de trabajo, etc.

5. CONCLUSIÓN

La aplicación de la metodología lexemático-funcional nos ha permitido estructurar en cierta medida un continuo léxico de contenido común. En el marco predicativo todos los predicados analizados presentan dos argumentos

lógicos: sujeto [+H] y objeto mental <el sentido o significado percibido>. Vemos que los lexemas que pertenecen a cada uno de los grupos (+captación racional) (+hipotético) (+afectivo) suelen compartir en ambas lenguas un mismo estado de cosas—marcado por los parámetros semánticos que se asignan a cada predicado—, una estructura de valencia semántico-sintáctica similar y un escenario semántico afín, con los mismos roles semánticos para sus participantes, y a su vez, cada subdimensión presenta una serie de oposiciones respecto a las demás, que se resumen a continuación:

a) 'captación racional'
—Lexemas:
(L1): UNDERSTAND 1, COMPREHEND, GRASP, APPREHEND, FATHOM.
(L2): ENTENDER 1, COMPRENDER 1, CAPTAR, APREHENDER, EXPLICARSE, CONCEBIR 1, ENTERARSE 1.
—Estado de cosas: proceso mental [+exp][-dyn][-con].
—Actantes: x_1 [+H]Exp-Proc
x_2 [±ABSTR][-PHYS]:<sentido/significado>Go
—Esquema sintáctico: transitivo divalente directo: SVO.

b) '+hipotético'
—Lexemas:
(L1): INTERPRET 1, CONSTRUE, UNDERSTAND 3.
(L2): INTERPRETAR 1, SOBREENTENDER.
—Estado de cosas: actividad mental [+exp][+dyn][+con].
—Actantes: x_1 [+H]Ag
x_2 [±ABSTR][-PHYS]:<sentido probable>Go
—Esquema sintáctico: transitivo divalente directo o trivalente: SVO / SVOC.

c) '+afectivo'
—Lexemas:
(L1): UNDERSTAND 2, APPRECIATE, SYMPATHIZE.
(L2): COMPRENDER 2, ENTENDER 2.
—Estado de cosas: posición mental [+exp][-dyn][+con].
—Actantes: x_1 [+H]Pos
x_2 [±ABSTR][-PHYS][+H]:<actitud>Go
—Esquema sintáctico: transitivo divalente nominal u oracional.

No obstante, obviamente, con estas dimensiones no se pretende establecer divisiones de carácter rígido, sino simplemente aproximativo, dado que, como ya hemos apuntado anteriormente, el contenido semántico que nos ocupa no conforma una estructura tipo "mosaico".

Los parámetros semánticos que definen el estado de cosas nos han resultado de gran ayuda a la hora de establecer oposiciones entre lexemas. A excepción del parámetro [+exp], común a todos los verbos analizados puesto que es inherente a todos los lexemas que expresan procesos cognoscitivos, los parámetros de dinamismo y control marcan oposiciones entre unidades léxicas a primera vista afines. Así, UNDERSTAND 1 ("get the meaning of") se clasifica como proceso [-dyn] [-con] frente a UNDERSTAND 2 ("UNDERSTAND 1 + someone's reasons / attitude + normally feeling close") que designa una posición mental [-dyn] [+con] o frente a UNDERSTAND 3 ("UNDERSTAND 1 + by logic or supposition") que implica actividad mental [+din] [+con].

En la fase intralingüística, vemos cómo todos los lexemas de cada dimensión comparten unos rasgos comunes y a su vez se oponen entre sí, lo cual se refleja a partir de la descomposición léxica gradual. En el caso de no encontrar un rasgo semántico diferenciador entre dos lexemas, siempre hemos recurrido a una diferencia de registro. En cuanto a la fase contrastiva interlingüística, si bien es cierto que muchos predicados presentan relación de isosemia, también hemos detectado un gran número de equivalencias parciales, asimetrías y algunos casos de vacío léxico. El contraste cuantitativo más significativo lo constituyen los predicados incluidos en la subdimensión "captación +errónea". En general podemos afirmar que, si bien hemos encontrado discrepancias, ambas lenguas conforman la representación léxica de esta parcela semántica de un modo bastante similar.

Si bien el análisis sintáctico nos ha mostrado la estrecha relación entre semántica y sintaxis, puesto que los lexemas de cada dimensión suelen compartir una estructura de valencia sintáctica similar, también hemos podido constatar que no todos los lexemas de una misma dimensión comparten absolutamente una misma estructura de valencia semántica y/o sintáctica, por tanto las divisiones establecidas presentan siempre un carácter global. Por ejemplo, el análisis nos ha descubierto que lexemas como (L1) FATHOM o (L2) EXPLICARSE se clasifican como "dinámicos" frente al resto de los predicados de su grupo por implicar una mayor actividad mental, o, en cuanto a sintaxis, lexemas como (L1) SYMPATHIZE o (L2) ENTERARSE 1 se oponen al esquema sintáctico prototípico de toda la dimensión (transitivo directo) y se construyen con transitividad preposicional.

En resumen, este tipo de análisis nos parece útil en cuanto que nos permite obtener un mayor conocimiento y comprensión tanto de los lexemas en sí como de su clasificación y delimitación con respecto a otros cercanos.

NOTAS

1. "At a higher level in their semantic structure lexemes are constituted, in the lexematic approach to structural semantics, by a series of features of a more general and abstract nature, classemes, with a double function: semantic, they act as classificatory and delimitating features at a dimension or even at a field level, and syntactic, they control the combinatory properties of lexical items" (L. Martín Mingorance, 1987: 377-78).

2. Para mayor información sobre la GF véase Dik, 1978 y 1989.

3. Véase Martín Morillas, 1985: 704.

4. Para una clasificación detallada de los lexemas verbales que expresan procesos mentales véase Fernández de Bobadilla 1993.

5. A la hora de estudiar la representación léxica del proceso de "percepción" nos encontramos con la imposibilidad de establecer de una forma nítida los límites entre percepción mental y sensorial, dado que en la mayoría de los predicados ambas connotaciones aparecen íntimamente relacionadas. Así, lexemas como (L1) PERCEIVE, NOTE, NOTICE... / (L2) PERCIBIR, NOTAR... pueden indicar ambos tipos de percepción indistintamente. Esta delimitación tan compleja rebasa el tema de nuestro estudio, en el que al referirnos a percepción lo hacemos exclusivamente en el sentido "intelectual": (+mediante las facultades mentales: inteligencia, entendimiento, agilidad mental...).

6. Para la determinación de los rasgos distintivos nos hemos basado en una selección de los rasgos presentes en los diccionarios más representativos de ambas lenguas, enumerados en la sección de referencias bibliográficas.

7. A partir de aquí en adelante, por razones de extensión, nos limitamos a señalar los rasgos diferenciales de cada predicado con respecto al hiperónimo.

8. Partimos de una división en entradas léxicas dentro del campo semántico de la "cognición" a partir de una misma unidad formal que expresa distintos tipos de procesos mentales:

CONCEBIR 1 (proceso de captación racional = ENTENDER): "No concibo que quieras dejar de estudiar"

CONCEBIR 2 (proceso estimativo = CONSIDERAR): "Concebimos el tiempo como un valor relativo"

CONCEBIR 3 (pensamiento innovador o creativo = IDEAR): "Concibió el modo de librarse de él"

CONCEBIR 4 (representación mental = IMAGINAR): "No puedo concebir una revolución ahora".

De igual modo, ENTERARSE 1 (entender) se opone a ENTERARSE 2 (llegar a saber algo que ocurre, generalmente de modo inesperado): "Cuando me explican las cosas no me entero de nada" / "Me enteré de su accidente".

No obstante somos conscientes de que tales distinciones semánticas no siempre se establecen con la nitidez deseada dada la naturaleza específica de los lexemas que expresan procesos cognoscitivos.

En el caso de que existan dos entradas léxicas formalmente iguales pero sólo una de ellas predique "procesos mentales" no hemos considerado necesario establecer divisiones numéricas en nuestro estudio, como en el caso de (L1) GRASP, APPREHEND / (L2) CAPTAR, APREHENDER (1/2: "coger físicamente" / "coger el significado: entender").

9. Partimos de una previa diferenciación entre, al menos, tres entradas léxicas: INTERPRET 1 (verbo de cognición, al que nos referimos en este estudio: "understand the meaning of sth. in a particular way"), INTERPRET 2 ("translate into another language", a medio camino entre la actividad mental y física: implica acto de habla), e INTERPRET 3 (verbo de actividad física: "perform a play, dance..."). En cuanto al esquema sintáctico, INTERPRET 1 es el único que admite el esquema V + O + *"as"*.

10. Frente a la división de varias entradas léxicas para una misma unidad formal (INTERPRET 1/2/3), MISINTERPRET tiene un solo significado: "INTERPRET / wrongly", siempre en referencia a un proceso mental.

LISTADO DE SÍMBOLOS Y ETIQUETAS USADOS

Marcos predicativos
(x_1), (x_2): argumentos o participantes necesarios.
(y_1), (y_2), etc.: satélites o circunstantes (sintagmas adverbiales: Adv P).
df = definiens o término definidor.

Estados de Cosas
Act = Actividad
Pos = Posición
Pro = Proceso
Sta = Estado

Parámetros Semánticos
[±con] = control
[±dyn] = dinámico
[±exp] = experiencia

Roles Semánticos de los argumentos
Ag = Agente
Exp = Experimentador
Go = Meta
Pos = Posicionador
Poss = Poseedor
Proc = Paciente
Rec = Receptor

Roles semánticos de los satélites
Att = Actitud
Ins = Instrumental
Intens = Intensidad
Loc = Locativo
Mann = Modo
Reas = Razón

Clasemas semánticos
[+ABSTR] = ideas y proposiciones no basadas necesariamente en la realidad.
[+CONCR] = conceptos que hacen referencia a aquello que tiene substancia y/o forma por sí mismo.
[+PHYS] = entidad física, tangible.
[+H] = entidad humana.

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STATE OF THE ART IN *LANGUAGE TESTING*: TEN YEARS OF HISTORY OR HOW TO DEAL WITH ASSESSMENT

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1. INTRODUCTION

More than a decade has passed since the *Language Testing* journal (*LT*) was first published. Now it is time to look back and gauge whether it has fulfilled its aims in this interval and whether it has successfully filled the research gap it was intended to fill. In the first issue, the then editors set out their aims as follows:

> This new journal has come into being as a forum devoted exclusively to the issues which concern those involved with, or simply interested in, the assessment of language ability in one form or another . . . the field covered will be a broad one. The journal will consist of contributions from second or foreign language testing, mother tongue testing and the assessment of language disability.... (Editorial board, 1984: 1)

The editors went on to outline their view of the role of the journal: preference would be given to articles on theoretical issues based on empirical

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STATE OF THE ART IN *LANGUAGE TESTING*: TEN YEARS OF HISTORY OR HOW TO DEAL WITH ASSESSMENT

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1. INTRODUCTION

More than a decade has passed since the *Language Testing* journal (*LT*) was first published. Now it is time to look back and gauge whether it has fulfilled its aims in this interval and whether it has successfully filled the research gap it was intended to fill. In the first issue, the then editors set out their aims as follows:

> This new journal has come into being as a forum devoted exclusively to the issues which concern those involved with, or simply interested in, the assessment of language ability in one form or another . . . the field covered will be a broad one. The journal will consist of contributions from second or foreign language testing, mother tongue testing and the assessment of language disability.... (Editorial board, 1984: 1)

The editors went on to outline their view of the role of the journal: preference would be given to articles on theoretical issues based on empirical

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research or otherwise throwing some light on the field of language testing. Time has passed and not much change is to be appreciated in these aims and purposes in the intervening years, though now, once *LT* has come of age and has established its identity, it can be said that its fields of study have widened.

Our purpose in this article is to go through these ten years of *LT* issues, since the underlying philosophy, purpose and range of topics of the first issues of the beginning of the second decade are quite similar to the first one, to review the research done on the different features of testing in second language acquisition, to identify the main topics and to analyse to what extent this journal has been an answer to the needs of the testing community. Aware as we are of the doubts, fears and misgivings most teachers with an arts background have when faced with correlation coefficients, standard deviations, etc., we have attempted to deal in greater detail with the contributions in which statistics are applied to linguistics and have highlighted the efforts made to update the different testing techniques during this decade. A substantial number of the problems we have to cope with in our classroom every day have been dealt with in *LT* pages, and not a few answers to our difficulties can be found there.

In its short history, *LT* has published articles which could be considered an end in themselves, that is, dealing with a particular feature, process or method of testing. Other articles, rather than being concerned with the specific testing technique in itself, study some of the hundred or so issues which may crop up either in the language teaching or language learning field. In the latter case, testing would be just a tool at the service of a learning and teaching hypothesis. The common core of the topics for future articles proposed by the editorial board in this period was the assessment of language ability. The most frequently dealt with topics were acquisition of a second language, methods, testing strategies and certain issues in linguistics fields; not an issue went by without an article on the Item Response Theory (IRT) and on the Testing of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) examination, the two main lines of research in *LT*. The articles published in the first two issues provide the route map to be followed and developed in the subsequent ones.

2. 1984: A KEY MOMENT IN THE TEN-YEAR HISTORY OF *LT*

The 1984 issue of *LT* lays down the main areas of interest which were to be developed in subsequent issues. Thus, the range of topics covered that year—validity and reliability, criterion-referenced measurement versus norm-referenced measurement, the unitary competence hypothesis, specific and technical issues on testing, the introduction to the Item Response Theory (IRT) and the articles on Testing of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL)—may be considered to be the main threads of the story of *LT*.

Reliability—the extent to which the results in a test can be considered consistent and stable—and validity—the degree to which a test measures what it claims to be measuring—in testing are the first two features to be dealt with in depth, in articles by Krzanowsky and Woods (1984) and Davies (1984). The first article, a good introduction to the use to which a linguist may need to put statistics, deals with some simple analysis of variance (ANOVA) models which can be used to define and estimate reliability coefficients: the Spearman-Brown, concerned with within forms and between forms reliability, the Cronbach's alpha, where split-parts estimates of reliability are considered, or the Kuder-Richardson formula 20, a limiting case of Cronbach's alpha when *k* becomes equal to the number of items in the test, and each score then simply takes the value *1* (for correct) and *0* (for incorrect). Davies discusses the process of concurrent and predictive validation for the English Proficiency Test Battery (EPTB), English Language Battery (ELBA), English Language Testing Service (ELTS), using students' grades or examination results and the teachers' or tutors' estimates as criteria for validity purposes. Hudson and Lynch (1984) tackle the reliability and validity issues as well, but this time they focus their research on criterion-referenced measurement (CRM) versus norm-referenced measurement (NRM) methods,[1] that is, they are concerned with the way the results are interpreted.

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the IRT,[2] and the article presents research done from the linguistic point of view on some fundamentals of this theory: the IRT versus the CTT (Classical Test Theory). The IRT is an attempt to overcome the conflict we come across in our traditional tests: Is the test too easy / too difficult for this specific group of students or, on

the contrary, is the level of these students too high / too low for this test? The aim of this technique is to help us to build unbiased tests in which all individuals having the same basic ability are equally likely to get the item correct, regardless of subgroup membership or the testing technique where the item might appear.

The advantages of the IRT, a technique which tries to attenuate discrepancies between student ability and item difficulty, over the CTT are discussed in the contribution of Perkins and Miller (1984). According to their research, the IRT detects more misfitting and weak items than the classical test theory indices. Henning (1984) goes a step further when he studies the advantages of latent trait—the unobservable ability—measurement in language testing. This article presents not only the Rasch Model latent trait procedures as an alternative to classical measurement theory but also the analytical procedures: the Rasch one-parameter logistic model, and the Birnbaum two/three parameter logistic model. The Rasch model is concerned with a single ability-difficulty parameter, while the others incorporate additional parameters of discriminability and guessing. The IRT means that we must cope with probabilistic models since they try to evaluate items and persons, not only in classical terms of difficulty, ability, variance and discriminability, but also in terms of quantifiable deviations from predicted response patterns.

Henning was the first to deal with the IRT from a theoretical point of view in the second issue of 1984. Over the next ten years he was to become the main contributor on IRT. Nevertheless, firm supporter though he is of this theory, we read at the end of his article that in spite of the supposed advantage of the IRT he suggests that the classical measurements should not be abandoned but should be supplemented through the informational advantage of latent trait and item response theory.

The rest of the articles in the 1984 issue discuss either specific theoretical issues (students' reaction to tests, the possibility of characterizing language impairment, etc.) or empirical studies. Thus, Skehan refers to Oller's unitary competence hypothesis, an attempt to demonstrate that one underlying competence, a general factor, accounts for language performance. Other articles are concerned with testing techniques: Shohamy discusses multiple choice versus open-ended questions, Bensoussan studies cloze tests versus multiple choice, and Klein-Braley and Raatz apply themselves to overcoming the cloze drawbacks with their C-Test.

3. THE IRT. A THREAD RUNNING THROUGH *LT*

The 1984 contributions accurately forecast the main areas of interest in the following years. There is no year in which in one way or another the IRT is not considered. It is a thread that runs all through the journal. The range of approaches to this topic is very wide, because everybody endeavours to test their hypothesis with the IRT. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that this technique is a panacea for the mismatch between student ability and item difficulty or the discrimination or guessing problems, corresponding to one-parameter, two-parameter or three-parameter logistic models respectively. There is still much to be done despite the IRT contributions, and the testing community as a whole should be aware not only of its advantages but also of its shortcomings. The effort involved for those with an Arts background in understanding the contribution of this theory to testing may well be worthwhile, whether we are involved in General English or English for Specific Purposes.

The orientation of research on this theory tends to be either theoretical oriented or practical. Among the former type are contributions in which the classical methods are challenged and others in which the meaning of the three models is discussed. There are also studies on the partial credit model,[3] the issue of unidimensionality, and two different approaches to IRT. The practically oriented contributions deal mainly with reading and listening comprehension tests.

a) Theoretical Issues

The IRT, though considered an alternative to the traditional methods, is reduced to the Rasch Model, one-parameter, in the Woods and Baker (1985) contribution. The IRT is presented as a tool to measure on the same scale the ability of the subjects and the difficulty of the items. In the end, the value of the Rasch analysis, according to Woods and Baker, will depend on how much information testers can extract from it, information which using classical methods could not be obtained at all or only with difficulty.

Henning et al. (1985) go further in the analysis of the IRT. They attempt to investigate the robustness and applicability of the Rasch Model for use in language proficiency tests that consist of batteries and subtests in a variety of skill areas. In a second study, Henning tries to demonstrate the utility of Rasch Model scalar analysis when applied to self-ratings of ability

/ difficulty associated with component skills of English as a second language. Hudson (1993) investigates relationships among the IRT one-parameter fit statistics, the two-parameter slope and traditional biserial correlations in terms of the role these indices play in criterion-referenced language test construction.

The Partial Credit model, an extension of the simple Rasch dichotomous model (Rasch 1960, 1980) is discussed by Adams et al. (1987) as an alternative to the classical test theory. This model allows for the scoring of items in any number of ordered categories as the basis for the construction and analysis of an oral interview test. It is also demonstrated in Tomlinson et al. (1988) that item forms, Rasch Partial Credit Model, can be developed for verbal tasks based on grammatical or structural organizing framework. Finally, Pollit and Hutchinson (1987) describe the use of the partial credit form of the Rasch model in the analysis and calibration of a set of writing tasks. For this kind of analysis it is necessary that the tasks be carefully controlled and that the assessment scales and criteria be adapted to suit the specific demands of each task. They conclude that with the availability of the partial credit version of the Rasch model it is now possible to analyse any form of assessment which produces numerical outcomes.

The person-characteristic function (PCF), an opposite approach to the IRT, is developed by John Carroll (1986). It consists in relating the probability of an individual's passing an item to the difficulty of the item, over items, i. e. it depends on the item's difficulty, whereas IRT is concerned with the probability of passing as a function of ability, over individuals, i. e. it depends on the individual's ability. With the item information functions (IIF), Hudson (1993) examines the relationship of three item discrimination indices and the biserial correlation to IRT in order to provide testers with information which will be useful in contexts in which IRT analysis is inappropriate.

In addition to the models and the different approaches to the IRT, Henning et al. (1985) were concerned with unidimensionality. Their study was designed to test the effects of violation of the unidimensionality assumption on Rasch Model estimates of item difficulty and person ability. The results clearly suggested that violations of item unidimensionality produced distorted estimates of item difficulty. The Bejar method was found to be sensitive to such distortions, and results of applying the Bejar Method along with internal consistency estimation and principal components analysis were

mutually confirmatory. Henning (1989) further discusses this topic. In this article it is argued that local independence, unidimensionality, and noninvasiveness are important but distinct concepts that may, but need not necessarily, overlap.

b) Applicability

The purpose of the study by Choi and Bachman (1992) was to examine the appropriateness and adequacy of the 1-, 2- and 3-parameter logistic IRT models for analysing data from two EFL proficiency tests. Theunissen's (1987) study of applicability refers to reading comprehension tests, and so does Boldt's (1989), which deals with the use of IRT method—this time taking into account the population—to study nonlinguistic issues on testing: cultural background, native speakers as raters, speed in dealing with grammatical reasoning, constraints on cloze testing and cognitive strategies in reading comprehension. He discusses the possibility of computerizing the test design, the calibration of items, the Rasch Model and the concept of test reliability replaced in item response theory by the vastly superior concept of test information. Not only reading comprehension tests but also listening comprehension tests are discussed, and de Jon and Glas (1987) have recourse to IRT for their validation.

Beyond the General English Tests concern, we read the McNamara (1990) discussion on the role of Rasch Model IRT in the validation of two sub-tests of the Occupational English Test. He argues for the usefulness of IRT as a tool in the implications of the empirical analysis presented for the validity of communicative language tests involving the skills of speaking and writing. McNamara (1991) is concerned with another skill: a listening test in ESP. The study confirms the appropriateness of IRT approaches to the analysis of data from a ESP test. The useful role of Rasch IRT in the investigation of the content and construct validity of language tests is also confirmed.

4. TOEFL: A SECOND THREAD FOR THE TEXTURE OF *LT*

The articles on the standardised Test of English as a Foreign Language, like those on IRT, are like the weft and woof of *LT*'s texture. Whether it is a

normal or a special issue, articles can always be found either on the item response theory or on this standardised test: the researcher will consider the topic suggested by the editors from the IRT or TOEFL perspective respectively. The studies done on this test are less concerned with theory than with practice. Researchers try either to improve some of the TOEFL batteries, compare it with other tests or refer their studies on reading and listening comprehension and on written English to TOEFL.

Although Spolsky's (1990) is not the first contribution on this topic it is the first from the thematic point of view. As when he studied the three phases of testing he is also concerned here with the prehistory of this test. He presents a report on the origins of the TOEFL and its development, together with the main comments on this battery of tests in the conference held in Washington on May 11-12, 1961. His target is to gain an understanding of how developments in language testing theory are blended with the requirements and possibilities of real life implementations.

Among the contributions, whose purpose is to improve this standardised test, we read Stansfield and Ross (1988) on the one hand and Boldt (1989, 1992) on the other. The former deals with the validity and reliability of the Test of Written English (TWE) commissioned by the TOEFL research committee, where concurrent, predictive, content and face validity, and reliability are discussed. The latter copes with the latent structure analysis of the Test of English as a Foreign Language. Equating[4] studies support the use of IRT methods for TOEFL. This is done separately for each of three sections of TOEFL: Listening Comprehension, Structure and Written Expression, and Reading Comprehension and Vocabulary. The model assumes that a single latent proficiency variable underlies item performance, but the TOEFL candidate population is diverse, perhaps containing many groups with separate latent variables. Later, Boldt (1992) carries out a crossvalidation study in which a proportional item response curve (PIRC) is used to predict item scores of selected examinees on selected items.

A good battery of tests needs constant innovations which take into account social, cultural and linguistic changes if it is to be considered a highly successful test among tests takers and institutions. Thus, the Princeton-based Educational Testing Service encourages all sort of studies that may lead to check its advantages as well as its drawbacks. Consequently, it is not surprising to see that most of the research done on this major modern test of English as a foreign language in these pages has been through the comparative method. Bachman et al. (1988) compare two EFL proficiency test batteries. The Cambridge-TOEFL analysis is based on the abilities measured by the two tests. Bachman et al. focus on the qualitative analysis—the description of the abilities that appear to be measured and of the tasks required of the test takers—rather than on the quantitative examination of test performance. Ryan and Bachman (1992) carry out comparisons and examine the extent to which items from two widely-used EFL proficiency test TOEFL and FCE function differently for test-takers of equal ability from different native language and curricular backgrounds. De Mauro (1992) examines the relationships among the Test of Spoken English (TSE), the Test of Written English (TWE), and TOEFL. The multivariate prediction of each of these tests from the scores on the others is very accurate. Finally, Hale et al. (1989) in their research of four categories of multiple-choice (MC) cloze items take the TOEFL as a point of reference.

Test takers are also taken into account. Powers (1986) studies the listening comprehension section of the TOEFL. In his research, differences between native and non-native speakers in relation to each of the listening skills and the appropriateness of general or specific tasks for evaluating listening skills are discussed. Hale (1988) hypothesizes that the student's academic discipline will interact with the text content in determining performance on the reading passages of the TOEFL. Freedle and Kostis (1993) also deal with reading comprehension but at the item level. They set out to examine whether text and text-by-item interaction variables play a significant role in predicting item difficulty.

5. AUTHENTICITY

Like IRT and TOEFL, another issue which crops up frequently is authenticity, one of the main building blocks of this journal since, in discussing communicative language testing, questions relating to the issue of authenticity—tasks, texts, content and setting—form a recurrent theme. Aware as the *LT* editorial board was of the general principle—the greater the similarity of a test to the performance to be assessed or predicted, the greater the likelihood that the test will a) be predictive of future performance and b) accepted by the test users and test takers—they focused their attention on this topic in the

first 1985 issue and questions relating to authenticity were studied in several articles over the years.

Assuming that the success of communication can only be measured by the degree to which the meaning intended in the mind of the speaker is generated in the mind of the listener, Seliger (1985) draws attention to the problem of meaning. His analysis leads him to consider the types of inequality to be overcome: the adult-child interaction and the native speaker versus the second language learner. Therefore, the utilization of extralinguistic information in developing inferences or hypotheses to resolve conditions of incomprehension at linguistic and pragmatic level are required. Seliger discusses the possibility that language testing should develop tests that focused not on the product but on the successful implementation of the processes. Perspective which would constrain testing to criterion-referenced tests.

Further studies on pragmatics and the testing of communicative competence are carried out by Olshtain and Blum-Kulka (1985). They argue that while most areas of grammatical competence can and have already been translated into operational, dichotomous testing items, the complexity in translating components of communicative competence into testing items stems from the lack of sufficient systematic studies in native language use.

Rather than with interaction or communicative competence problems in testing, Spolsky (1985) is concerned with the limits of authenticity in language testing, since any language test is by its very nature inauthentic. The test taker is being asked not to answer a question giving information but to display knowledge or skill. Shohamy and Reves (1985) on the topic of authenticity distinguish between the language of authentic tests and real life language. They argue that if we insist on eliciting authentic real-life language we should adopt an ethnographic approach. This approach to authenticity, in which the boundaries are not well-defined since we cannot leave aside the pragmatic or ethnographic influence on linguistics, entails some major deficiencies such as the lack of measurement, statistical analysis and limited empirical evidence.

6. SELF-ASSESSMENT

The tester and the testee go together in self-assessment. Literature on this topic was quite new at a time in which students had tools, such as computers, data banks of items, etc., to assess their proficiency in a way that they could not have dreamed of a few decades ago. The fact that technology was so advanced and had become quite fashionable could have been a good reason for the editorial board to propose self-assessment as the central topic of some of its first issues. Before this publication appeared some previous research had been carried out in this field: Oscarson (1977) self-assessment can yield quite informative results and Von Telek (1982) found correlations between self-assessment and follow-up tests. It is worth mentioning Le Blanch and Painchaud's (1985) investigations on the usefulness of self-assessment as a second language placement instrument, and Davidson and Henning's (1985) conclusion that little confidence should be placed in the specific student self-rating they examined.

The beliefs which underlie the idea of self-directed learning—where the learner is learning to do something rather than about something—and consequently self-assessment, and the reasons which can be adduced in support of those beliefs, are examined by Houghton and Dickinson (1988), who put forward a scheme in which they try to reconcile the tensions between self-assessment and institutional assessment leading to certification.

Most of the articles in the first issue of 1989 are devoted to self-assessment. Oscarson outlines the justification for adopting self-assessment principles in language teaching and learning, since he thinks that it should be oriented to formative purposes rather than purposes such as selection, grading and certification. A detailed comparison is carried out between a test of Dutch as a second language for use in language courses for adult learners, and a parallel version of that test in self-assessment format in Janseen (1989). Meanwhile, Bachman and Palmer investigate the structure of an experimental self-rating test of communicative language ability through the use of multitrait multimethod (MTMM) design and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The language abilities intended to be measured comprised three main traits: grammatical competence, pragmatic competence and sociolinguistic competence. The reliabilities obtained were much higher than had been expected, and all the self-rating measurements had strong loadings on a general factor.

Measurements of grammatical competence appear to be better indicators of this trait than measurements of pragmatic and sociolinguistic competence. Finally, the role of response effects—the tendency to respond to factors other than item content—is investigated. Results in Heilenman (1990) indicate that both an acquiescence effect—a tendency to respond positively regardless of item content—and overestimation were present and more evident in less experienced learners.

7. EXTRALINGUISTIC FACTORS

a) Cultural background and affective reactions

The primary aim of Zeidner's (1987) study was to test for ethnic, sex, and age bias in the predictive validity of English language aptitude test scores. Overall, the results of this research are in line with the bulk of previous studies on cultural bias, reporting a slight degree of intercept bias when cognitive indices are used in predicting first year college grade. Chihara et al. (1989) also discuss background and culture as factors in EFL reading comprehension presenting two versions of clozes, one original and the other modified introducing mainly proper names. Not only materials but also the influence of the different types of tests on students are considered as well. Zeidner and Bensoussan (1988) analyse college students' attitudes towards written versus oral tests of English as a Foreign Language; their data are based on students' interests and preferences. No meaningful relationship is observed. Two years later, Bradshaw also takes the issue of the test-takers' attitudes to a placement test. She concludes that some sort of feedback from test consumers should be included together with issues of content and construct validity, statistical reliability and practicality when we prepare a test.

Not only attitudes but also feelings and conditions in which tests are taken are studied in the affective reactions of native Brazilian students to different oral EFL test formats in an achievement testing situation. Scott (1986) assesses factors like format, length, time constraint, testing environment, familiarity with test format, perceptions of test validity, and student anxiety.

b) Strategies

Nevo (1989) reports research whose purpose was to study the processing of reading comprehension tests and to ascertain the cognitive strategies. In his test-wiseness scale, Allan (1992) goes further and finds that students are differentially skilled in test taking and that the scores of some learners may be influenced by skills which are not the focus of the test, thus invalidating their results. Amer (1993) investigates the effect of teaching a test-taking strategy to EFL students on their performance on EFL test. He considers the following components of a test-taking strategy: to read the instructions carefully, to schedule their time appropriately, to make use of clue words in the questions, to delay answering difficult questions, and to review their work in order to check their answers. Components which were summarised in Carman and Adams (1972) "scorer acronym":

S - Schedule your time
C - Clue words
O - Omit difficult questions
R - Read carefully
E - Estimate your answer
R - Review your work

8. TESTING TECHNIQUES

A glance at the inside cover of any issue will confirm that it is assumed that theoretical issues and empirical research must go together, since any hypothesis, if it is to be tested, needs some sort of data base. There is a tendency to measure everything. Apart from IRT, which has been widely commented on, there are all kinds of testing techniques which may help to quantify the central feature of any study. The articles gathered under this heading are more concerned with the "how"—the technique itself— than with the "what"—any aspect of language teaching or learning processes. Although the use of these testing techniques is usually a means, in some cases there is a tendency to consider these techniques as ends in themselves. The articles chosen for comment range from issues such as controversy, reliability and validity of the cloze and multiple choice to the different versions of these techniques.

a) Traditional clozes

Controversy on cloze usefulness is to be found in Lado (1986). He responds to Oller and Conrad's (1971) point of view—they consider the cloze method extremely useful in the placement of non-native speakers of English and in the diagnosis of their special language problems— whereas Lado does not share that perspective since he considers that the ability to restore texts is somewhat independent of competence in a language.

The possibility of improving the reliability and validity of a cloze procedure by applying traditional item analysis and selection techniques is discussed by Brown (1988), who uses classical item analysis techniques to select the best option on the basis of item facility and discrimination indices. Brown (1993) is also concerned with the characteristics of natural cloze tests: scoring methods, length of blanks, frequency of deletions, passage readability, native and non-native performance, and test length are the variables considered. Jonz (1991) takes the cloze item types across the boundaries of the sentence. In his research it is found that intersentential ties are particularly salient in the comprehension process of nonnative speakers and consequently fixed-ratio cloze tests are significantly sensitive to textual variations and continuities at levels well beyond local phrase structure.

b) Versions of clozes

1. C-test

In 1981, Christine Klein-Braley and Ulrich Raatz introduced a new deletion technique, "the rule of 2," which was believed to remedy most of the shortcomings of the classical cloze procedure. According to "the rule of 2," the second half of every second word should be deleted in a test, starting and ending with an intact sentence. Rather than language, Klein-Braley and Raatz (1984) are concerned with the testing technique itself. The former discusses the Classical Latent Additive Test Model (CLA Model) in which the item difficulties and subject abilities can be estimated independently of each other. It has some of the main characteristics of the Rasch Model and is presented as an alternative to the classical discrete-point item tests. In an effort to validate the C-test, Klein-Braley (1985) tries to present her C-Tests as technically superior to cloze tests.

The C-test is evaluated against four different language test among Hungarian EFL learners. Dornyei and Katona (1992) confirm that the C-test is a reliable and valid instrument, and that detailed information can be obtained about issues such as text difficulty and text appropriateness, the role of content and structure words, and the use of different scoring methods.

2. The letter-deletion procedure (LDP): a number of letters may remain undeleted at the beginning of item words; the number varies from 0 to about n/2, when *n* is the number of letters in the item word, depending on the contextuality groups of the rational deletion system, on item system and on item word length. With this technique Kokkota (1988) tries to overcome the scoring problems inherent in the cloze system and the deletion inflexibility of the C-test. His conclusion is that his letter-deletion procedure (LDP) is a more flexible and powerful means of controlling reduction of text redundancy than cloze procedure or the C-test.

c) Multiple choice

It seemed that Taylor's cloze was the answer to all the shortcomings of the multiple choice. Four decades have passed since the cloze technique came out and the multiple choice, in spite of its many detractors, is still used. Economical reasons in its administration, the ease with which it is computerized, or its advantages, especially in reading comprehension, could be the reason for the support it claims.

Sang et al. (1986) recur to the multiple choice technique to confront the unitary competence hypothesis (Oller 1976) with new evidence supporting a multidimensional model of foreign language ability. Their hypotheses were tested using confirmatory factor analysis, but the seven tests (elementary: pronouncing, spelling, lexicon; complex: grammar, reading comprehension; communicative: listening comprehension, interaction) were presented in a multiple-choice form.

Chapelle (1988) studies the relationship between field independence and language measurements to compare the different techniques. She recurs not only to cloze and dictation techniques but also to the multiple-choice language tests. Two years later, as an element of contrast, she introduced the multiple choice again. This time a comparative study was carried out between four different procedures: fixed ratio/rational, multiple choice and C-test. Bachman and Palmer (1989) in their construct validation of self-rating of communicative language ability research use a 21-item multiple-choice self-rating test. Finally, Allan (1992) recurs to this technique in his elaboration of a scale to measure test-wiseness.

Looking for alternative procedures to the multiple choice, Meara and Buxton (1987) discuss the multiple choice technique versus Yes / No questions. They present the Y/N technique as an alternative to multiple choice vocabulary tests. The results obtained suggest advantages over the more traditional multiple choice format for testing vocabulary. Jafarpur (1987) studies some of the traditional criticisms on reading tests and the ways in which an alternative approach—namely, the short-context technique—avoids this defect, though many readers saw it simply as a more contextualised multiple choice. In spite of the advantages of both the Yes / No question and the short-context technique, the student is still required to make a choice and discriminate between alternatives. Finally, in his attempt to present a valid measurement of monitored knowledge Dekeyser (1990) argues that a fill-in-the-blanks format is to be preferred over multiple choice, grammaticality judgement or error correction tasks. Again, not much change is observed in this format in relation to the multiple choice format since it still requires the testee to recover a text, though under guidance. The student does not have to compose or construct an answer either.

9. WHAT WE HAVE FOUND

At this juncture it might be appropriate to comment on the journal's timeliness and the coherence of its editorial policy in the ten years that followed. Although it is probable that most of the topics *LT* has dealt with could have been read or published in a variety of journals, to have a specific forum owing to an ever-growing interest in assessment was justification enough for the launching of this publication ten years ago. The fulfilling of its aims and scope justified its first decade and will no doubt justify its second, since the range of topics discussed has included theoretical issues and empirical research in the domain of the assessment of language ability. It has published articles on:

—research into different batteries of standard tests: EPTB, ELTS or TOEFL
—research into methods of testing: introspection and computer-assisted self-assessment
—research into the different testing techniques: multiple choice, translation, clozes and C-tests
—research into test analysis: the CTT and the IRT

—and attempts to test comunicative competence.[5]

Various questions could be addressed in a discussion of the relevance of this journal and all sorts of answers could be expected. Its detractors might wonder about its specific contribution to the scientific community while its supporters will find it relevant and indispensable. What nobody will dispute is that researchers in this field no longer need to scan the summaries of all the possible journals for articles of the type published in *Language Testing*. The topics discussed in the issues published over these ten years amount to a real state of the art in language testing; *LT* goes beyond the scope of other publications in the same field such as the *Journal of Educational Measurement,* whose concern is to promote greater understanding and improved use of measurement techniques in education rather than in the language domain. Specific though *LT* is, however, it ranges over the following topics: the main features of testing: validity and reliability, item response theory, authenticity—of tasks, texts, content and setting—strengths and weaknesses of the different testing techniques, nonlinguistic issues on testing, cultural background and test tasks strategies, and self-assessment of language proficiency. All of them are topics which we have to cope with whether we are to assess English for General Purposes or English for Specific Purposes, the latter having been largely neglected heretofore in most of our syllabi

10. WHAT WE MISS

—It would be helpful to find something similar to the instructional modules on issues in educational measurement—ITEMS—published by the National Council of Measurement in Education of USA (NCME). Presumably, quite a large number of people concerned with language testing have an Arts background, and although there is quite a lot of literature on the skills in the use of statistics needed for language studies—Butler (1985), Wood et al. (1986), Hatch and Lazaraton (1991), and Weir and Roberts (1994), among others—many readers of *LT* would appreciate some clear examples of how statistics may be used, a matter that is beyond the average reader. Some sort of self-test of the ITEMS type would be welcome especially in those articles that take for granted an advanced knowledge of statistics.

—There are also assumptions on the researcher's side which can mean gaps of information for the reader, since the topic or experiment may fall quite outside his/her field of research, as happens in the IRT contributions, where the researcher thinks that the reader is fundamentally familiar with the models of the latent trait theory, the item characteristic curve, or with the agreement coefficient, kappa coefficient, phi (lambda) dependability index or the short-out method phi coefficient, and for this reason omits material relevant to the final interpretation.

—Most of the empirical research articles offer explanatory appendixes, though, if not an expert, the reader may miss a fuller explanation. This is the case with some scoring processes, especially where the C-test technique is applied.

—We also miss more empirical work on Second Language Acquisition, which paradoxically is a point of reference in most theoretical research concerned with general issues rather than the daily needs that come up in our testing activities. And it must be borne in mind when we take the typical standard batteries of tests as landmarks of testing that neither the cultural background nor the language of "authentic tests" are a true representation of real life cultural backgrounds and language, as claimed by Spolski: "any language test is by its very nature inauthentic for the test taker is being asked not to answer a question giving information but to display knowledge and skill" (1985: 33). They may, however, be taken as data for research, since our classrooms are not an appropriate setting for such research because of the number of test takers required. Given its increasing relevance, little empirical research into ESP has been done over this decade.

These and other shortcomings will probably be overcome in the issues of the coming decade. We see grounds for optimism in the editorial board policy, which after some hesitation about whether or not to change the name of the journal has opted for an expansion of content rather than a change of title. Moreover, the average reader's literacy in statistics may be higher in the near future if applied statistics becomes a compulsory subject in our curricula. For the time being, however, we still need some guidelines on how to test our hypotheses and how to interpret the data we get, despite all the help available to most of us from the computer.

In our opinion, then, *LT* has made a notable contribution over the last 10 years to the debate about how far language testing has gone toward understanding the abilities that teachers and institutions intend to measure. It is

high time we, as teachers/testers of Second Language Acquisition or of Language for Specific Purposes, took advantage of these ten years of language testing research and that lamentations like the following one by Alderson (1988: 87) were progressively outdated: *"It is rather sobering and perhaps depressing to note the minimal attention paid to testing. . . ."*

NOTES

1. Differences between norm-referenced test (NRT) and criterion-referenced test (CRT) are mainly based on type of measurement and type of interpretation, other features such as score distribution, purpose of testing and knowledge of questions are considered. (from Brown 1990: 79)

2. The interest rests upon the individual items of a test rather than upon some aggregate of the item responses such as a test score. A reasonable assumption is that each examinee responding to a test item possesses some amount of the underlying ability tested and that at each ability level there will be a certain probability that an examinee with that ability will give a correct answer to the item. The concept of test reliability is replaced in item response theory by the vastly superior concept of test information.

3. The Partial Credit model is an extension of the simple Rasch dichotomous model (Rasch, 1960, 1980) that allows for the scoring of items in any number of ordered categories. The dichotomously scored test items give way to a rating of 0, 1, 2... according to its degree of increasing acceptability and appropriateness.

4. Equating: a technical term in testing literature, which involves administering a small set of items with an older form as well as the new one in order to identify comparable score levels.

5. While most areas of grammatical competence can and have already been translated into operational, dichotomous testing items, the complexity in translating components of communicative competence into testing items still persists: See Olshtain and Blum-Kulka (1985), Bachman and Palmer (1989), and Swain (1993) among others.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANOVA	Analysis of variance
CFA	Confirmatory factor analysis
CLA	Classical Latent Additive Test Model
CRM	Criterion-referenced measurement

CTT	Classical Test Theory
EFL	English Foreign Language
ESP	English for Specific Purposes
ELBA	English Language Battery
ELTS	English Language Testing Service
EPTB	English Proficiency Test Battery
IRT	Item Response Theory
LTD	Letter Deletion Model
MTMM	Multitrait Multimethod
NCME	National Council of Measurement in Education
NRM	Norm -referenced measurement
LT	Language Testing Journal
MC	Multiple Choice
PCF	Person characteristic function
PIRC	Proportional Item Response Curve
TOEFL	Testing of English as a Foreign Language
TSE	Test of Spoken English
TWE	Test of Written English

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THE TRANSLATION OF IDIOLECTS IN *THE CATCHER IN THE RYE*: AN APPROACH THROUGH LEXICALIZED STRUCTURES

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1. INTRODUCTION

The present study is centred on the process of identification and translation of idiolects by means of the analysis of a corpus comprising different types of lexicalized structures,[1] namely idioms (for example, *be nuts* or *hit the ceiling*), clichés and routine formulae (*you could tell, if you know what I mean*), and the so-called inner terms or non-canonical expressions, that is, structures of the type *How about...?*, also referred to by Lyons (1968: 178) as "schemata." All of them have been termed "word combinations" (Zgusta 1970), "fixed expressions" (Alexander 1978)[2] and "phrasal lexemes" (Lipka 1990). I have grouped them under the expression *lexicalized structures* because, although in different degrees, they all have been subject to a process of *lexicalization*; in Lipka's words, "the process that a complex lexeme once coined tends to become a single complete lexical unit" (1990: 95).

The data that make up the corpus have been taken from Salinger's *The Catcher in the Rye* (1951), and also from two translations of the book, one into Spanish and the other into Galician. Since I intended to verify to what extent those translations had succeeded in identifying and rendering the characters' idiolects, I proceeded to a selection of those structures whose systematic occurrence was so evident that they undoubtedly formed part of the characters' speech habits. The suggestion which I put forward is that, if a particular lexicalized structure occurs so many times (in this case, even more than 100 on some occasions) that it is clearly identifiable as a character's

speech habit, that structure should keep a fixed or almost fixed translation into the TL (target language), and it should be translated as many times as possible. In that way, the character's linguistic idiosyncrasies and the function attached to them will be preserved for the reader of the TL.

2. THE IDENTIFICATION OF RECURRENT LEXICALIZED STRUCTURES

The idiosyncratic structures of the corpus have been identified on the basis of the number of times a certain construction is used to refer to the same concept in proportion to the character's participation in the dialogues (i.e. his speech turns). For example, in Chapter 19 (*CR* 148-55),[3] Holden has a conversation with his former school advisor Carl Luce, who only appears in this chapter. Taking into account that approximately half the chapter is devoted to description and digression, in the remaining pages (those devoted to dialogue), Luce has 33 speech turns, most of them of one or two short sentences (for instance, on page 151: *'Good God, no'*, *'Must we pursue this horrible trend of thought?'*, *'Nobody you know'*, *'I never asked her, for God's sake.'*). The list below—numbered from (1) to (7)—corresponds to the lexical items that are most frequently employed by this character in the dialogue:[4]

(1) **Certainly:** used twice (for example, on p. 151: 'I like a mature person . . . **Certainly'**).

(2) **Obviously:** used twice (*CR* 152: 'No kidding! She Chinese, for Crissake?' '**Obviously**').

(3) **Naturally**: used twice (*CR* 153: '**Naturally.** Your mind is immature').

(4) **(Good) God**: used twice (*CR* 151: 'You still going around with that babe?' . . . '**Good God**, no.').

(5) **Listen**: used 3 times (*CR* 154: '**Listen.** I'm not giving an elementary course in psychoanalysis').

(6) **Simply**: used 3 times (*CR* 152: 'I **simply** happen to find Eastern philosophy more satisfactory').

(7) **For God's sake**: used 7 times. For example:

> 'You mean it's better in China?' . . .' 'Not necessarily in China, **for God's sake** . . . ' 'Why's it better in the East?' 'It's too involved to go into, **for God's sake** . . . ' 'So do I! So do I regard it as a wuddayacallit . . . ' 'Not so loud, **for God's sake**, Cauldfield' (*CR* 152)

Carl's speech habits denote a reluctance to satisfy the curiosity of a sexually inexperienced Holden, together with a wish to appear intellectually superior and more mature than his counterpart. On the other hand, from the list of lexical items it can be inferred that the lexicalized expression *for God's sake* forms part of the character's idiolect as a cliché used with emotional intention to convey an unfavourable feeling of anger or impatience towards his interlocutor.

In the following paragraphs I provide further examples of lexicalized structures that illustrate the speech habits of other characters in the book, namely Holden Cauldfield, his school mates Ackley and Stradlater, his sister Phoebe, Horwitz (the taxi driver) and Sunny (the prostitute). Some of them will be analysed from the point of view of their translation in subsection 3.2. All these characters except Holden have episodic appearances, so the method resorted to in order to identify their speech habits is the same which has been used in the case of Carl Luce.[5]

Ackley and Stradlater's most characteristic lexicalized expressions—illustrated in (8), (9) and (10)—are *for Crissake* and the expletive *the hell* in wh- questions (*What the hell...? Where the hell...?*). They are also the taxi driver's favourite expressions (11). Concerning *for Chrissake*, it could be placed between idioms and clichés: its meaning has lost the compositional quality, and its main function is that of conveying *strong feelings*, usually of surprise, anger or displeasure. The characters' extensive use of this expression turns it into a sort of cliché within their idiolect, as its freshness is obliterated by overexposure. As for the noun phrase *the hell,* it is also far from its original meaning (either literal or figurative: *sinners go to **hell**, she made his life **a hell***). It is used simply as an emphasizer, and therefore with *emotional meaning*. In the same way as *for Chrissake,* its overuse makes the characters' speech expressive but trite and repetitive (that is, typical teenage language). Along with *the hell,*the variant *the heck* (12) is sometimes used by the prostitute.

(8) 'Ackley?' I said. 'Y'awake?' . . . '**What the hellya** doing, anyway?' I said.

'Wuddaya mean **what the hell** am I doing? I was tryna sleep . . . **What the hell** was the fight about, anyhow?' . . . 'Jesus!' he said. '**What the hell** happened to you?' He meant all the blood and all . . .
'You're still bleeding, **for Chrissake.** You better put something on it.'
'It'll stop. Listen. Ya wanna play a little Canasta or don'tcha?'
'Canasta, **for Chrissake**. Do you know what time it is, by any chance? . . . I gotta get up and go to Mass in the morning, **for Chrissake** . . . - **what the hell** was the fight about, anyhow?'
'It's a long story . . . is it okay if I sleep in Ely's bed tonight? He won't be back till tomorrow night, . . .
'I don't know **when the hell** he's coming back'

(*CR* 50-51)

(9) I was sort of in the mood for horsing around . . .
'Cut it out, Holden, **for Chrissake**!' Stradlater said. He didn't feel like horsing around . . . 'You're right in my light, Holden, **for Chrissake**,' . . .
'Where is she? . . . How'd she happen to mention me?'
'I don't know, **for Chrissake**. Lift up, willya? . . .
'I used to play checkers with her all the time.' . . .
'Checkers, **for Chrissake**!'

(*CR* 34-35)

(10) If you knew Stradlater, you'd have been worried, too . . . He came in griping about how cold it was out.
Then he said, '**Where the hell** is everybody? It's like a goddam morgue around here' . . .
All of a sudden, he said, '**For Chrissake**, Holden, this is about a goddam baseball glove.' . . .
'All right, give it back to me, then,' I said . . . I tore it up.
'**What the hellja** do that for?' he said. I didn't even answer him ... finally I said, 'You're back prettygoddam late . . . Did you make her be late signing in?' . . .
'Couple minutes,' he said. '**Who the hell** signs out for nine-thirty on a Saturday night?' . . .
'Did you go to New York?' I said.
'Ya crazy? **How the hell** could we go to New York if she only signed out for nine-thirty?'

(*CR* 44-46)

(11) Old Horwitz . . . looked at me . . .
'**How the hell** should I know? . . . **How the hell** should I know a stupid thing like that? . . . It's tougher for the fish, the winter and all, than it is for the ducks, **for Chrissake**. Use your head, **for Chrissake** . . . **What the hellaya** mean, what do they do? . . . They stay right where they are, **for Chrissake** . . . It's their nature, **for Chrissake** . . . Their bodies, **for Chrissake** . . . Their bodies take in nutrition and all. That's their nature, **for Chrissake.**'

(*CR* 87-88)

(12) 'Sunny,' she said. 'Let's go, hey?' . . . **What the heck** ya wanna talk about?' . . .
'I had an operation very recently . . . On my wuddayacallit—my clavichord'
'Yeah? **Where the hell**'s that? . . . You look like a guy in the movies . . . **What the heck**'s his name?' . . .
'Do you mind cutting it out? . . . I'm not in the mood' . . .
'**What the heck** did you tell that crazy Maurice you wanted a girl for, then?'

(*CR* 100-102)

Phoebe's discourse is characterized by the repetitive use of the structure *and everything* in final position (for example, on page 184: *She breathes all over the food* ***and everything***). It is another meaningless cliché that provides a sense of *looseness* of expression and thought which is characteristic of teenagers and children's speech.

(13) 'How's the play?' I asked her. 'What'd say the name of it was?'
''A Christmas Pageant for Americans' . . . It starts out when I'm dying. This ghost comes in on Christmas Eve and asks me if I'm ashamed **and everything**. You know. For betraying my country **and everything** . . . Guess what I did this afternoon! What movie I saw' . . . 'The Doctor' . . . It was all about this doctor in Kentucky **and everything** that sticks a blanket over this child's face that's a cripple and can't walk. Then they send him to gaol **and everything** . . . He feels sorry for it, the doctor. That's why he sticks this blanket over her face **and everything.**' . . .
'Did they say what time they'd be back?' . . .
'No, but not till very late. Daddy took the car **and everything,** so they wouldn't have to worry about trains' . . .
'So it was a good picture, huh?' I said.

'Swell, except Alice had a cold, and . . . always in the middle of something important, her mother'd lean over me **and everything** and ask Alice if she felt grippey.' . . .
'D.B. coming home for Christmas?' . . .
'He may, and he may not . . . He may have to stay in Hollywood and write a picture . . . It's a love story **and everything**'

(*CR* 169-70)

Among Holden's most obvious speech habits I identified the vague expression *and all / and everything* (with the same value as in Phoebe's speech) and its twin *or something / or anything*. The use of such expressions is often purely arbitrary, with no discernible meaning: *my parents... they are nice **and all*** (*CR* 5); *it was December **and all*** (*CR* 8); *I didn't have any alternative **or anything*** (*CR* 15); *How'bout using the table **or something**?* (*CR* 27). As the rest of the structures selected, they are frequently repeated throughout the book, and they are at the same time idiosyncratic and group representative, in the sense that they help to present the characters both as individuals and as typical exponents of a particular age or social group.

Taking into account their frequency of occurrence within the whole book, I identified the following idioms as the most characteristic of Holden's speech:

—The phrasal verbs *knock out* and *horse around*. The former is used to express the character's favourable attitude towards the object (therefore, it has an emotional meaning):

(14) When she turned around, her pretty little but twitched . . . She **knocked** me **out** (*CR* 77)

(15) I was sort in the mood for **horsing around** . . . He didn't feel like **horsing around** (*CR* 32)

—The expressions *get on somebody's nerves, give a damn, give somebody a pain in the ass / be a pain in the ass* are used to convey the character's strongly *negative feelings* towards something or somebody (impatience, dislike, boredom or indifference). They are grammatically well-formed, but their meaning is not compositional, although they may retain a figurative interpretation.

(16) He was always yelling . . . **It got on your nerves** sometimes (*CR* 11)

(17) People always think something's all true. I don't **give a damn** (*CR* 13)

(18) She had one of these . . . embarrassing voices . . . it always **gave me a pain in the ass**(*CR* 130)

(19) Old Luce. He **was** strictly **a pain in the ass** (*CR* 155)

—The alternative expressions *to shoot the bull / the breeze* and *to chew the rag / the fat* are often used with the meaning "to chat." They are non-compositional and semantically opaque.

(20) I kept wishing I could go home and **shoot the bull** for a while with old Phoebe (*CR* 86)

(21) The old lady . . . and **I shot the breeze** for a while (*CR* 208)

(22) I went round to the can and **chewed the rag** with him while he was shaving (*CR* 31)

(23) I like it now . . . Sitting here with you and just **chewing the fat** (*CR* 78)

The most characteristic non-canonical expression used by Holden (although it is not so frequent as other structures) is the noun phrase *my ass* in final position, which is in fact another expletive with *emotional value*, used to express strong disagreement with respect to his interlocutor's statement. Its equivalents in initial position are *like hell* and *the hell:*

(24) 'Life is a game, boy.' . . . Game, **my ass** (*CR* 13)

(25) 'That's a deer shooting hat.' **'Like hell** it is.' (*CR* 26)

(26) 'Did you give her my regards?' . . . 'Yeah.' **'The hell** he did, the bastard.' (*CR* 46)

Hell is perhaps the most versatile word in Holden's vocabulary. It enters quite a few idiomatic expressions in which it has no relationship to its original meaning, for example in the construction *just for the hell of it* (meaning "without any special reason": *I broke all the goddam windows with my fist, **just for the hell of it***, on page 42) or in the simile *as hell / like hell*, which is a non-compositional expression with intensifying value. The literal

or figurative interpretation that could be ascribed to this structure in examples such as *old as hell* or *hot as hell* is neutralised by the fact that it is also applied to their opposites (*cold / icy as hell, young as hell*). In fact, it occurs as a trite modifier of either positive or negative adjectives in the character's opinion (positive: *casual as hell, quiet as hell, funny as hell*; negative: *rusty as hell, depressed as hell, nervous as hell*), and also as a modifier of antonyms (*sad / blue as hell* vs. *gay / glad as hell; dark as hell* vs. *sunny as hell*) and verbs (*my chest hurt like hell*). *The hell* is also extensively used by Holden as an expletive in wh- questions (on page 45: ***What the hell's*** *the difference if it's about a baseball glove?*).

Holden's alternative to Ackley and Stradlater's *for Chrissake* is the comparatively weaker *for God's sake* (for example, on page 23: *He wanted you to think he'd come in by mistake,* ***for God's sake***). He uses *for Crissake* only when he feels the need for a stronger expression (on page 77: *That annoyed me... 'I'm twelve,* ***for Chrissake'***).

The verb *to kill* is used with a non-literal meaning in the slang expression *It /That kills /killed me.* Holden uses it when he is *emotionally affected,* either favourably (on page 5: *He wrote this terrific book of short stories...* ***it killed me***) or unfavourably (on page 149: *He kept telling her he had aristocratic hands.* ***That killed me.***).

Finally, I will mention a couple of idiomatic similes which also lay between idioms and clichés due to their systematic use: *like a bastard / as a bastard* and *like a madman / like mad.* As *like hell,* they are intensifiers non-compositional in meaning and usually opaque (on page 219: *it began to rain* ***like a bastard***). They mainly occur as verb modifiers (on page 183: *my heart was beating* ***like a bastard****;* on page 77: *I apologized* ***like a madman***).

As stated before, due to their frequency of occurrence all these lexicalized structures form part of the characters' speech idiosyncrasies. They contribute to the characterization of their speech as emotional, imprecise, repetitive and sometimes vulgar or obscene, and they are at the same time personal and representative.

3. THE PROCESS OF TRANSLATION: PROBLEMS, STRATEGIES AND ANALYSES

3.1. Problems and strategies

Lexicalized structures have been characterized as more or less fixed expressions with different degrees of semantic transparency. It is their non-compositional nature that poses particular problems, firstly with respect to their identification and interpretation in the SL (source language), and secondly concerning their translation: as Bassnett (1991: 32) points out, it is not always possible to find a lexicalized structure of similar form and meaning in both the SL and the TL. Other difficulties may arise from the context and frequency of use of these fixed expressions in different types of text (for instance, written vs. spoken). In that sense, Baker (1992) notices that

> [u]sing idioms in English is very much a matter of style. Languages such as Arabic or Chinese which make a sharp distinction between written and spoken discourse and where the written mode is associated with a high level of formality, tend, on the whole, to avoid using idioms in written contexts. (1992: 71)

Baker's remark is highly relevant in the present case, because Salinger's book is a type of text that renders spoken speech, and this kind of speech favours the occurrence of certain idiomatic expressions which would not be allowed in other types of text such as, for example, quality-press news reports. Besides, it must be taken into account that not all languages are equally permissive with respect to the introduction of typically spoken forms in writing. In that sense, the translator should be ready to make any necessary changes to render the message in accordance with the structural and stylistic peculiarities of the TL.

Concerning the methods resorted to when translating lexicalized structures, they fall into four groups: literal translation, translation by equivalence, by modification and by omission. This classification is partially based on Baker (1992: 71-78). The strategy of compensation, that is, the omission of a feature "at the point where it occurs in the source text" and its introduction "elsewhere in the target text" (1992: 78), has been disregarded, as it is hardly used in the translations handled. The rest of the strategies are illustrated in the following paragraphs with several examples taken from the corpus.[6]

3.1.1. *Literal Translation*

It consists of using a lexicalized structure of *similar form and meaning* in the TL. This translation implies a correspondence of structures which is only occasionally achieved. For example, the idiomatic simile *like a madman* in *The Catcher in the Rye* is sometimes rendered as *como un loco* in the Spanish translation and as *coma un tolo* in the Galician one; the semi-cliché *and all / and everything* has the Spanish equivalent *y todo* and the Galician *e todo,* for instance, in

(27) a. They were going to have me psychoanalysed **and all** (*CR* 42)
(27) b. Pensaron en llevarme a un psiquiatra **y todo** (1991: 52)
(27) c. Quixeron psicanalizarme **e todo** (1990: 41)

3.1.2. *Translation by Equivalence*

This translation resorts to the use of a lexicalized structure of *similar meaning but different form.* For example, the idiom *to give a damn* is sometimes translated as *importar un rábano* (Spanish) and *importar un carallo* (Galician); the idiomatic simile *old as hell* (*CR* 11) is rendered as *más viejo que Matusalén* (1991: 14) and *mais vello co demo* (1990: 10).

3.1.3. *Translation by Modification*

It consists of a *translation by means of a paraphrase.* According to Baker, it is used when "a match cannot be found in the TL or when it seems inappropriate to use idiomatic language in the target text because of differences in stylistic preferences of the source and target languages" (1992: 74). For example, on page 165: *that closet's full of hangers that rattle like madmen.* This idiomatic expression is translated into Spanish as *las perchas hacían un ruido terrible* (1991: 193), and into Galician as *percheiros que facían moito barullo* (1990: 144).

3.1.4. *Translation by Omission*

A lexicalized structure may be sometimes omitted in the target text because it does not have a close equivalent in the TL, because its meaning is not easy to paraphrase, or due to stylistic reasons. I came across many examples of translation by omission in both the Spanish and Galician versions, most of them, in my opinion, unjustified. For example, the idiomatic expletive *the hell* in wh- questions, which occurs on 75 occasions in the English text, has several alternative translations into Spanish (*¿Qué demonios...?, maldita sea, ¡a quién se le ocurre...!*) and also in Galician (*¿Que carallo...? ¿a quen se lle ocorre...?*). After a thorough analysis of all the examples I concluded that there was just a small percentage in which the translation by omision could be acceptable (such as, on page 88, *how the hell old are you?*, where any attempt at translation would force the structural rules of the TL). In spite of this, I found out that the translation had been omitted on 55 occasions in the Spanish version and on 51 in the Galician one, which amounts to two thirds of the cases registered.

Most of the inadequacies detected in the Spanish and Galician versions are related to the translations by paraphrase and by omission. In my view, they are due to the fact that the translators have *failed to recognize* the defining features of the characters' idiolect (for example, the systematic use of some lexicalized structures). Apparently, they are not aware of the fact that the writer is *deliberately* resorting to a trite and monotonous vocabulary in order to define the characters and their speech habits. Both translations (but particularly the Spanish one) seem utterly unable to render the characters' idiolects accurately. Instead of trying to convey those idiolects whenever possible (of course adapting them to the peculiarities of the TL), in most cases the translators resort to the systematic omission of recurrent structures, and some other times they translate those recurrent structures in many different ways without taking into account the context, the style and the character who uses them. As a result, the translation becomes expressionless. For instance, the slang idiomatic phrase *chew the fat* (*CR* 112) is sometimes neutrally translated into Spanish as *hablar* (*CR* 134), therefore losing all its force and stylistic connotations.

As mentioned before, I am aware of the fact that some languages are more permissive than others concerning the accommodation of informal lexicalized structures in written discourse. For example, the systematic rendering of the conversational semi-cliché *and all / and everything* as *y todo / y eso / y tal* in Spanish would seem quite unnatural in a written text. It is not possible to translate such colloquial expressions all the time, so they must be omitted or modified so as not to force the rules of the TL. However, if those expressions are *purposedly repeated,* I believe that *they cannot be omitted or modified all the time,* because this repetition is meaningful and has a function in the original.

Once the lexicalized expressions in the SL have been identified, and once it has been verified that their frequency of use is deliberate and significative, the next step should be to find the means to render them, so that the reader of the TL will perceive that the characters are expressing themselves in a peculiar way. One method would be, for example, to keep a fixed or almost fixed translation (of course adapted to the features of the TL) whenever possible.

An illustrative example of the deficiencies of the translations concerning this point is the rendering of one of Holden's most typical idiomatic expressions: the slang phrase *that / it kills / killed me* (whose meaning and intention have already been explained in Section 2). This construction occurs on 33 occasions throughout the book, so that the reader of the SL realizes that it is typical of Holden's speech. At the same time, the use Holden makes of the expression tells the reader something about the character. When faced with the translation of this expression, what both versions do is to *dissolve* this feature of the character's idiolect by means of *dispersion*, that is, by translating it into Spanish in 23 different ways and into Galician in 17 (plus 5 omissions). Both show a total lack of regularity concerning translation strategies and style, as the translations range from the neutral *ser estupendo* or *gustar moito* to the plainly colloquial *¿No te fastidia?* or *escarallarse de risa*, and from the nearly equivalent *para morirse* and *case me mata* to the looser alternatives *menuda cursilería* and *é o que pasa*. The result is that *the meaning conveyed in the original by means of systematic repetition is nullified* in the translations and irretrievably lost for the TL reader.

3.2. Comparative Analysis: Characters

In this subsection the English version of *The Catcher in the Rye* and the translations into Spanish and Galician will be analysed from the point of view of some characters' idiolects. In Section 2 I already provided some examples of the speech habits of different characters and noticed their tendency to use a few lexicalized structures which, due to recurrency, could be recognized as part of their idiolects. I will proceed now to examine how these recurrent structures are rendered in the Spanish and Galician versions, focusing on how many times they are used by each character and on the strategies of translation.

Holden's sister Phoebe appears on Chapters 21, 22, 23 and 25. She uses the expression *and everything* on 10 occasions: Ch. 21 (8), 22 (1) and 23 (1). The Spanish version translates *and everything* as *y todo eso* twice, and omits it on 8 occasions; the Galician translation resorts to 3 alternatives: *e tal* (1), *e todo* (2), *e todo iso* (1), and 5 omissions. Consequently, neither of them recognizes the expression as part of the character's idiolect.

Horwitz, the taxi driver, appears on Chapter 12. On hardly two pages he uses the expletive *the hell* in wh- questions 4 times, and the expression *for Chrissake* 6 times. Both tend to be omitted in the translations:

the hell (**4**)

SPANISH:	
Translation by paraphrase (*¿Cómo quiere que...?*)	= 2
Translation by omission	= **2**
GALICIAN:	
Translation by equivalence (*¿Que carallo...?*)	= 1
Translation by omission	= **3**

for Chrissake (**6**)

SPANISH:	
Translation by equivalence (*¿no te fastidia?*)	= 2
Translation by paraphrase (*¿no irá usted a..., no?*)	= 1
Translation by omission	= **3**
GALICIAN:	
Literal translation (*¡polo amor de Deus!*)	= 3
Translation by omission	= **3**

Carl Luce's characteristic expression *for God's sake* occurs on 7 occasions on Chapter 19. The Spanish version resorts once to the literal translation *¡por Dios!* and omits it 6 times; in Galician the literal translation *¡polo amor de Deus!* is used twice, and omission is resorted to on 5 occasions. Again it can be noticed that this feature of the character's idiolect is lost in both translations.

Ackley appears on Chapters 3 and 7. His favourite expressions are the expletive *the hell* (11) and *for Chrissake* (10). Their translations run as follows:

the hell (**11**)

SPANISH:	
Translation by equivalence (*¿Qué demonios...?*)	= 2
Translation by omission	= **9**
GALICIAN:	
Translation by equivalence (*¿Que carallo...?*)	= 3
Translation by omission	= **8**

for Chrissake (**10**)

SPANISH:	
Translation by paraphrase (*¡Mira que eres pesado!, ¡No me digas!...*)	=5 (different)
Translation by omission	= **5**
GALICIAN:	
Literal translation (*¡por Cristo! = 3 / ¡polo amor de Cristo! = 2*)	= 5
Translation by paraphrase (*nai que te botou*)	= 1
Translation by omission	= **4**

Finally, Stradlater's use of *for Chrissake* (8) and *the hell* (9) on Chapters 3, 4 and 6 is rendered into Spanish and Galician in the following way:

for Chrissake (**8**)

SPANISH:	
Translation by equivalence (*¡no jorobes (por Dios)!*= 2, *¡no fastidies!* = 1)	= 3
Translation by paraphrase (*¿Pero a quién se le ocurre...?*)	= 1
Translation by omission	= **4**
GALICIAN:	
Literal translation (*¡Por Cristo!*)	= 3
Translation by equivalece (*manda carallo*)	= 1
Translation by omission	= **4**

the hell (**9**)

SPANISH:	
Translation by paraphrase *(de una vez, ¿a quién se le ocurre...?)*	= 2 (different)
Translation by omission	= **7**
GALICIAN:	
Translation by equivalence (¿Que carallo...?)	= 6
Translation by paraphrase (¿a quen se lle ocorre...?)	= 1
Translation by omission	= **2**

Summing up, in all cases there is a *high number of translations by omission* which is, in my opinion, *hardly justifiable*, especially if there is evidence that these lexicalized structures form part of the characters' speech idiosyncrasies. The conclusion I gathered from my analysis is that *both translations fail to identify the features of the characters' idiolects.* Nevertheless, it must also be remarked that, in general terms, the Galician translation tends to be more regular and faithful to the original.

3.3. Comparative Analysis: Global Results

The final step in this study will be a review of the list of examples that make up the corpus. I will consider their frequency of use throughout the whole book (independently of the characters who use them) and the methods of translation resorted to by the Spanish and Galician versions. Most of the examples belong to Holden's idiolect and have already been mentioned in the previous section. Holden is the main character in the book, and he tells his own story in the first person. Due to this, he is the character who appears on most occasions, so it is quite easy for the reader to identify his linguistic idiosyncrasies.

I will start with three structures which I regard as synonyms concerning their expressive value: *my ass / like hell / the hell* (for example: *lovely, **my ass***, on page 131, or ***the hell** he did*, on page 46). Their features and meaning have already been explained in Section 2. They are clause initial /clause final expletives which could enter the category of non-canonical expressions. On the whole, they are used by Holden on **6** occasions. The Galician version recognizes their equivalence and provides a *uniform* translation for them (*o carallo*) 5 out of 6 times (for example, on page 117, *bonito o carallo*). The remaining translation is a paraphrase (*non o creo*). On the contrary, the Spanish version is quite *irregular*: it resorts to 6 different translations by equivalence and paraphrase (*un cuerno= 2, de raro, nada= 1, menuda trola= 1, que te lo has creído= 1, mentía como un cosaco= 1*).

Concerning the phrasal verb *horse around,* which occurs **15** times throughout the book, the Spanish version resorts to 11 translations: 4 equivalent alternatives (*hacer el ganso= 2, hacer el indio= 2, tomar el pelo= 2, tener ganas de bromas= 2*) and 7 different translations, some of them quite unrelated to the original (*pasear por ahí, salir*). The Galician version keeps a uniform translation (the equivalent *face-lo parvo*) on 9 occasions, plus one omission, an alternative *xogar* (4), and also *meter man* (1). The last two intend to render the sexual connotations that the expression sometimes acquires in the original.

The phrasal verb *knock out* appears **8** times. Instead of choosing one fixed translation, both versions resort to several synonymous verbs and ex-

pressions. Therefore, in Spanish it is translated in 3 different ways: *volver loco* (3), *gustar (muchísimo)* (3) and *encantar* (2). In Galician there are 4 alternatives: *encantar* (1), *gustar tanto / moito* (4), *enlevar* (1) and *flipar (a tope)* (2).

The idiomatic expression *get on somebody's nerves* (which is used **7** times) keeps a more regular translation into Spanish: the equivalent (although somehow neutral) *poner nervioso* (5) and two more emphatic alternatives: *poner negro* (1) and *poner los nervios de punta* (1). In Galician, the expressive force of the 4 alternatives ranges from *poner nervioso* (1) to *fartar* (4), *tolear* (1) and *cabrear* (1).

More characteristic of Holden's speech (on account of its frequency: **16** times) is the lexicalized structure *give a damn.* Surprisingly enough, in this case there is a slight tendency towards regularity. In the Spanish version the most frequent translations are: *no importar (mucho / nada)*, which occurs 10 times, and *importar un rábano / un pimiento / un pito*, which is used 4 times, although the latter is far more adequate than the former considering the style and the character. In the Galician translation there are 3 omissions, but the expression is accurately rendered as the colloquial *importar un carallo* 7 times, whereas the more neutral *non importar (moito)* is employed on 6 occasions.

The expletive *the hell* in wh- questions is used **75** times by different characters. However, there is a general tendency towards *omission* in both translations (55 in Spanish, 51 in Galician). In the Spanish version, the accurate equivalent *¿Qué demonios / diablos / puñetas...?* is used only on 8 occasions, and the remaining 12 are different paraphrases (*¿A ver, por qué...?, ¿A quién se le ocurre...?*). In contrast with the dispersion observed in the Spanish translation, in Galician there is a systematic rendering of the expression as *¿Que carallo...?* (23).

The synonymous expressions *for God's sake / for Chrissake* occur on **58** occasions. Again a high degree of *omissions* can be noticed on both translations (38 in Spanish, 31 in Galician). There is also a total lack of uniformity in the Spanish translation, with 16 different alternatives (*¡no me digas!, ¡no jorobes!, ¡por Dios!, ¡por favor!...*), neither of them used more than twice. Concerning the Galician version, it is more regular, as it keeps an almost fixed rendering (*¡Por Cristo! / ¡Polo amor de Cristo! / ¡Polo amor de Deus!*) on 21 occasions; *manda carallo* is used 3 times, and the remaining are different paraphrases.

To be a pain in the ass and *to give somebody a pain in the ass* are other idiomatic expressions registered in the corpus. They appear on **7** occasions and have 5 different translations into Spanish, the most frequent being the

equivalent *dar cien patadas* (3), for example, on page 135: *La tal Sally me daba cien patadas* (translated from *She gave me a pain in the ass*, *CR* 112). In Galician, the parallel *facer doe-lo cu* is used twice, and the rest are four alternatives differing in style and expressiveness (*non gustar, amolar, ser un coñazo* and *ser mais parvo ca Abundio*).

The structure *(just) for the hell of it* occurs **7** times. It is omitted once in each version. In Spanish it has 6 different translations (for example: *porque sí, porque le apetecía, porque le salía del alma*). In Galician the dispersion is less noticeable, as the equivalent *porque si* is used 3 times, and the structure *por + infinitive* is used twice (*por ir, por cantar*).

The idiomatic simile *as hell / like hell* is often used by all characters (it appears on **92** occasions) and is also systematically omitted in both translations (30 times in Spanish and 37 in Galician). Its emphatic value is rendered into Spanish by means of the suffix *-ísimo* (*nerviosísima, arrepentidísimo*) 19 times, and by means of the adverb *muy* (*muy deprisa, muy buena persona*) on 9 occasions. Equivalent emphatic similes are used 5 times (*más frío que un témpano, más viejo que Matusalén*) and the rest are 21 different translations. In Galician, the equivalent *coma o demo* is regularly used (19), followed by the adverb *moi* (15), equivalent emphatic similes, such as *serio coma unha pedra* (3), and 12 different translations. In general terms, a considerable stylistic difference between the original and the Spanish version can be appreciated. On the contrary, and despite the dispersion, the Galician translation generally succeeds in keeping the informal, slightly irreverent tone of the original:

(28) a. I was being seductive **as hell** (*CR* 131)
(28) b. Estuve tan seductor (1991: 155)
(28) c. Eu estaba seductor coma o demo (1990: 117)

(29) a. It made me feel sad **as hell** (*CR* 100)
(29) b. Me dio una tristeza horrible (1991: 121)
(29) c. Sentinme triste coma o demo (1990: 90)

(30) a. She sounded sore **as hell** (*CR* 138)
(30) b. Parecía enfadadísima (1991: 163)
(30) c. Estaba cabreada (1990: 121)

Another idiomatic simile, *as a bastard / like a bastard,* is used **12** times. In Spanish it is rendered as the equivalent similes *como un imbécil* (3) and *como un condenado* (4). On one occasion it is omitted, and the 4 remaining are different translations. In Galician the most frequent translations are the

literal *coma un fillo de puta* (4) and the equivalent *coma un cabrón* (3). There are also 3 omissions.

Not so frequent is the simile *like a madman / like mad* (**9**). It is also more irregularly translated: the Spanish version resorts to 9 different translations (comprising the literal *como un loco*= 1, equivalent similes such as *como un condenado,* and paraphrases such as *disculparse como cincuenta mil veces*); in Galician there are 3 omissions, the literal translation *coma un tolo* is kept on 3 occasions and the adverb *moito* is used twice.

Finally, I will consider two of Holden's most typical expressions: the dangling end *and all / and everything* and its counterpart *or something / or anything*, usually in negative sentences. Both are extensively used in the original and frequently ignored in both translations, despite the fact that it would be possible to keep a systematic rendering such as *y tal / y eso, ni nada / o algo* in Spanish, and *e tal /e iso, nin nada / ou algo* in Galician. Once more, omissions and paraphrases should be the exception rather than the rule if there is evidence that the intended effect is that of a repetitive and imprecise discourse.

And all / and everything is used at least on **304** occasions by different characters and mainly by Holden. It is omitted 248 times in the Spanish version and 226 in Galician. In Spanish it is translated as the literal *y todo,* the equivalent *y eso* and the combination *y todo eso* (34) plus 14 different translations (*las historias habituales, y cosas de esas, y todo ese follón...*). The Galician version exhibits more regularity: *e iso / e todo / e todo iso* is the most frequent translation (38), followed by *e tal* (28) and 9 different translations (*e toda esa leria, ou o que sexa...*).

Concerning *or something / or anything*, the Spanish version omits the translation on 93 occasions out of **142**. The literal translation *ni nada (de eso)* is used 25 times and the positive equivalents *o algo / o así / o algo así* occur 14 times. There are also 10 different translations (*al menos, o cualquier cosa, siquiera...*). The Galician version omits the translation on 76 occasions. The most frequent renderings are the literal *nin nada* (37) and the positive *ou algo / ou así / ou algo así* (22). The rest are 5 different translations (for example: *e tal* = 2, *ou calquera cousa* = 2, *ou o que fose* = 1).

4. CONCLUSION

The results of the general analysis seem to support those obtained in the analysis of individual speeches; they reveal the same deficiencies concerning the translation of idiosyncratic lexicalized structures in both the Spanish and the Galician versions of the book (although these deficiencies tend to be more evident in the former). Their origin is, on the one hand, *the abuse of the translation by omission,* and on the other, the fact that in many cases *several synonymous translations* are unnecessarily used in order to render one single structure. In that way, the characters' idiolects, which are mainly created by means of deliberate repetition in the original, are progressively dismantled and destroyed in the translations, and the reader of the target language is deprived of an important instrument of interpretation.

It has been acknowledged that each language has its own peculiarities and possibilities, so that the main aim of a translator must be that of providing the most adequate interpretation of the message within the resources of the TL. In the present case, the translation goes a step further because it also demands the translator's sensibility to realize the function and value attached to the idiomatic structures as well as his aptitude to render them accordingly. As becomes clear from this study, when the translator is not able to keep a careful balance between the expressive resources of the SL and the TL, his work will be not only a colourless reflection of the original; he will also be depriving the message of part of its meaning and purpose.

NOTES

1. The main sources for the identification of the structures compiled are Partridge (1984), Cowie et al. (1978) and Long et al. (1992).

2. Both Zgusta (1971) and Alexander (1978) are quoted in Asher (1994: 3168).

3. The examples in English have been extracted from the 1973 edition of J. D. Salinger's book (abbreviated *CR*).

4. In all the examples —including those numbered from (1) to (30)—the emphasis (bold type) is mine.

5. In order to establish an accurate proportion concerning the frequency of use of the structures, the physical extension of the book (as measured in pages) has also been considered: it is a medium-size novel (216 pages in the English version which I handle).

6. For more examples of all the methods considered, see subsection 3.2.

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POLITENESS PHENOMENA IN BRITISH ENGLISH AND URUGUAYAN SPANISH: THE CASE OF REQUESTS

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INTRODUCTION

"Politeness" has been an important topic for sociology, anthropology, psychology and interrelated social sciences. However, it was not until the 70s that the concept became a major issue in pragmatics. Although linguistically scholars have not yet agreed on a definition of politeness, there appears to be a general agreement by which linguistic politeness is taken to refer to the principles, strategies and choice of linguistic forms involved in "smooth" communication, in other words, the use of verbal strategies in order to keep social interaction friction-free.

The universality of politeness principles has constituted a major concern in pragmatic research. Scholars, mainly through cross-cultural research, have sought to determine to what extent the principles of politeness vary or coincide from language to language. The aim of this article is to present an analysis and interpretation of the realisation patterns of requests in British English and Uruguayan Spanish, establishing the similarities and differences between the conceptualisation of politeness by native speakers of both languages.

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POLITENESS PHENOMENA IN BRITISH ENGLISH AND URUGUAYAN SPANISH: THE CASE OF REQUESTS

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INTRODUCTION

"Politeness" has been an important topic for sociology, anthropology, psychology and interrelated social sciences. However, it was not until the 70s that the concept became a major issue in pragmatics. Although linguistically scholars have not yet agreed on a definition of politeness, there appears to be a general agreement by which linguistic politeness is taken to refer to the principles, strategies and choice of linguistic forms involved in "smooth" communication, in other words, the use of verbal strategies in order to keep social interaction friction-free.

The universality of politeness principles has constituted a major concern in pragmatic research. Scholars, mainly through cross-cultural research, have sought to determine to what extent the principles of politeness vary or coincide from language to language. The aim of this article is to present an analysis and interpretation of the realisation patterns of requests in British English and Uruguayan Spanish, establishing the similarities and differences between the conceptualisation of politeness by native speakers of both languages.

BROWN AND LEVINSON'S THEORY OF POLITENESS

The issue of universality and linguistic relativity in language has always been controversial and appears to be related to earlier considerations such as the Whorfian hypothesis and its views on the relationship between language and thought. In the field of politeness, the issue of universality goes back to principles of language use such as the Gricean conversational maxims, Austin's and Searle's speech act theories and Goffman's notion of "face"; principles upon which the major theories of politeness, Lakoff's (1973), Brown and Levinson's (1987) and Leech's (1983), have been built.

The key notion in Brown and Levinson's politeness model is Goffman's (1967) notion of "face": "the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself." Brown and Levinson claim that human beings have two kinds of face: positive (the desire for every individual's self-image to be appreciated and approved of) and negative (the desire of every individual to have his/her own actions unimpeded by others). The authors claim that face is vulnerable to face-threatening acts (FTAs) such as orders, requests, warnings, remindings and threats, and thus politeness strategies are used in order to reduce the imposition of FTAs. The seriousness of FTAs is assessed according to three social variables: the social distance (D) between the speaker (S) and the hearer (H), the relative power (P) of S and H and the ranking of impositions (R) within a given culture. On the basis of a permutation of these three variables, speakers determine which of the following strategies to employ:

1. Bald on record—without redressive action: saying things directly, such as "Close the window"
2. Positive politeness—expressing solidarity: "Be a nice girl and close the window"
3. Negative politeness—expressing restraint: using conventional indirectness: —"I wonder if you could close the window"
4. Off-record—using non-conventional indirectness: —"It's cold in here"
5. Don't do the FTA

The major criticisms of Brown and Levinson's theory, up to now the most comprehensive politeness model to claim the universality of politeness, are based on their neglect of discourse, their treatment of the sociological variables and on their face-saving model. Fraser and Nolen (1981) and Lavandera (1987) point to the fact that Brown and Levinson's study of politeness is based on individual sentences and structures and that

the politeness of a sentence is not determined by the sentence itself but by the context in which it takes place. Thus, a sentence like "I wonder whether you could keep quiet for a while," if analysed in isolation could be considered to be polite. However, if uttered by a speaker who is trying to watch a television programme while others are talking loudly, it may not have the same interpretation. With respect to Brown and Levinson's three sociological variables, P, D and R, not all scholars agree with their treatment of the variables and the universality of their politeness strategies, in particular the relationship between negative politectatorstrategies (Blum-Kulka 1987).

Brown and Levinson's claim of the universality of the concept of face has also been questioned. Matsumoto (1988) claims there is a discrepancy between the authors' assumption and the Japanese notion of face. She claims that what governs politeness in Japanese is an acknowledgement of interdependence. Gu also argues that Brown and Levinson's model is not suitable for studying politeness phenomena in Chinese since "in the Chinese context rules for politeness are moral maxims, the breach of which will incur social sanction" (1990: 240). Thus Brown and Levinson's concept of face and their distinction between positive and negative 'face' does not appear to be the same in non-western cultures where the underlying interactional focus emphasises collectivism rather than individualism. Moreover, the authors regard negative politeness as a more weighty consideration than positive politeness. Sifianou (1992) observed that the English place a higher value on negative aspects of face whereas the Greeks emphasise positive aspects of face, while Blum-Kulka (1987), Hickey (1991) and Vázquez Orta (1995) noted the same for Hebrew and Spanish, respectively. Thus it appears that Brown and Levinson's notion of face is not only not applicable to certain non-western collective cultures, but that not all cultures consider the negative aspect of face to be more important than its positive one.

THE SPEECH ACT OF REQUESTING

In Brown and Levinson's framework requests are regarded as intrinsically face-threatening activities and are therefore seen within the realm of negative politeness, since they imply an intrusion into the addressee's territory and thus limit his/her freedom of action. However, requests can also imply closeness and intimacy since the speaker must feel close enough to the addressee to ask him/her to do something (Sifianou 1992) and should thus be considered to be in the realm of positive politeness.

In Spanish and English, requests can be linguistically realised with imperatives, interrogatives, negative interrogatives and declaratives. In English direct imperatives are generally defined as appropriate constructions for commands and instructions (Lyons 1968: 307) and are consequently perceived as unacceptable for expressing requests. In Spanish, however, imperatives are not just employed for commands and instructions, they are also employed to express hopes, desires and wishes, such as ¡Mejórate pronto! (Get better soon), and they are much more frequent than in English. From the data collected by a discourse completion test based on Blum-Kulka et al's (1989) Cross Cultural Speech Act Realisation Project, as part of my MA dissertation, administered to 30 native speakers of Uruguayan Spanish (US) and 30 British English (BE) native speakers, it was seen that the use of imperatives in US is higher than that in BE, 29% and 10% respectively.

This difference could be explained in terms of morphology. While in English imperatives are uninflected and not marked for aspect or number, in Spanish they are more elaborate. They mark the distinction between singular and plural, formality and informality, the distinction between T-form and V-form. Requests and commands can also be expressed in Spanish by means of the present subjunctive or in the present indicative. The distinction in Spanish between *tú* ("you" singular), *vosotros* ("you" plural) and *usted* ("you" singular), *ustedes* ("you" plural) signals a difference in formality. *Tú* and *vosotros* are employed in situations in which there is intimacy and it expresses a feeling of "solidarity." *Vosotros* is also used from a position of superiority—e.g. employed by teachers to address a class. Likewise, *tú* is also employed to address someone who is perceived by the speaker as younger and/or inferior in status. *Usted* and *ustedes* are employed when addressing one or more individuals in formal situations; they are the polite form of address. It should be noted that in Uruguay, Argentina, certain regions of Chile and in Central America there is an alternative pronoun which expresses "solidarity": *vos,*[1] which has almost replaced *tú*. Moreover, *vosotros* has totally disappeared in America. In Latin American Spanish there is no distinction between the solidarity "you" plural, vosotros, and the formal "you" plural, ustedes; there is only one form ustedes (Pedretti de Bolón 1983: 95-98). The inflected verb system in Spanish marks the distinction between vos, usted and ustedes in the different verb endings with the option of dropping the pronoun:

Limpia la cocina
Limpie la cocina
Limpien la cocina

The preference in Spanish for imperative constructions can also be seen, in Brown and Levinson's terms, as an "optimistic" way of performing FTAs since imperatives indicate a certain optimism that the addressee is willing to carry out the act requested by the speaker; thus their frequent use in Spanish can be seen as an indication of positive politeness.

Interrogatives appear to be the most prolific group for requesting in both languages. However, they are more common in BE than in US, 86% and 68%, respectively. In English there is a stronger preference for more elaborate constructions with modals, which express detachment, whereas in Spanish requests are generally realised with the present indicative, which expresses certainty and involvement:

1. ¿Me *das* plata para el boleto?
2. ¿Me *darías* plata para el boleto?

The first example when translated literally into English may either sound like a request for information: *Are you giving me money for the fare?* and thus lose its requestive force, or it may even sound ironic, depending on the context. To convey the same requestive force in English we have to resort to modals: *Can you give me money for the fare?* and *Could you give money for the fare?* The second example makes use of the conditional; it denotes improbability and hence it equates with a higher degree of linguistic politeness.

The use of modals, as previously mentioned, denotes tentativeness and lack of commitment. It could be argued that the frequent use of modals in English provides its speakers with a detachment device which enables them to distance themselves from the requestive act by means of the form's inherent pragmatic ambiguity. In Spanish, however, most interrogative requests are realised with the present indicative denoting certainty and reality. The present tense form of the indicative is used in Spanish as a familiar, rather than "curt" imperative (Butt and Benjamin 1989: 197). Within present indicative constructions in Uruguayan Spanish, interrogative-negative constructions are frequently used as polite requests. According to Brown and Levinson (1978: 179) negative-interrogatives encode polite pessimism. The same could be said about conditional constructions. By using the negative and the conditional the speaker makes it easier for the addressee to refuse and thus there is less risk of loss of face. However, the majority of requests collected by the discourse completion test were realised in the present indicative, thus predicting or counting on the addressee's performing the act:

3. ¿Me prestas los apuntes de la clase pasada?
4. ¿Me das los apuntes de la clase pasada?

5. ¿No me prestas los apuntes?
6. ¿No me arrimas hasta casa?

It should be noted, however, that present indicative constructions can be used as requests in English only when they are negatively phrased and followed by a question tag or when they are indirect:

7. You haven't got a pen, have you?
8. Are you making tea?

The above differences could be explained by the fact that in Spanish everyday tasks are regarded as less imposing on the addressee and thus can be requested with more direct constructions, especially amongst equals. Interrogative request forms in Spanish point to a more positive politeness society whereas those in English point to a more negative politeness society in which social norms make directness inappropriate.

Requests can also be realised in both languages by declaratives. In English 'I'd like' is one of the most widely used conventionalised ways of stating a request. Although declaratives would make the request more direct than interrogatives, the inclusion of the modal would once again enhances the unreal and hypothetical, expressing detachment. In Spanish, however, the verbs 'querer' and 'necesitar' are usually employed in requests of this type without any modals; thus requests of this type, when translated into English, might sound too direct and thus impolite to English speakers:

9. Quiero que limpies la cocina	I want you to clean the kitchen
10. Necesito que me prestes plata para pagar la cuenta	I need you to lend me money to pay the bill

Within this group requests can also be realised by the use of hints, non-conventional indirectness, or to use Brown and Levinson's terminology, off-record strategies, such as "It's cold in here," intended by the speaker as a request for the addressee to shut the window. According to Brown and Levinson this strategy is used when the speaker wants to minimise the degree of imposition. The use of this particular strategy had very low incidence in both languages, 3.4.% in BE and 3.3% in US. Interestingly enough, BE speakers employed this strategy in situations in which the interlocutors were not familiar with each other. On the other hand, US speakers employed the strategy only in those situations in which the interlocutors were friends. It could thus be assumed that the rationale of the off-record strategies is to

provide the addressee with the opportunity to volunteer. In other words, the speaker is leaving the options open to the addressee either because s/he does not want to impose on the addressee, or because the speaker wants to give the addressee the opportunity to offer and thereby indicates consideration for the speaker's needs. Thus it could be said that the use of hints in US is linked to positive politeness whereas the use of the same strategy in BE appears to be linked to negative politeness. Further research is needed in order to substantiate this point.

CONCLUSIONS

The major difference between US and BE requests is a matter of orientation. Uruguayans appear to be more inclined towards positive politeness when requesting as opposed to the British, who seem to be more inclined towards negative politeness. This difference can be traced to the notion of face. The British appear to attach more significance to the negative aspects of face, such as non-imposition and detachment, whereas the Uruguayans seem to attach more importance to the positive aspects of face, such as approval and involvement. Furthermore, as Hickey and Vázquez Orta (1996) point out for Spaniards, Uruguayans not only have an individual desire to be liked and approved of, but they also have a desire for those closely related to be liked and approved of.

Using Hall's (1976) distinction, one could say that the main difference between requests in BE and US is due to the fact that Uruguayans are a high-context culture, a culture in which "stored information" is more stable, hence the directness levels utilised and the involvement. It is a culture in which the expression of feelings is emphasised. The British, on the other hand, have a low-context culture, a culture in which "stored information" is less stable. The level of indirectness employed denote detachment in a culture where the symbolic medium is emphasised. According to Hall, "people raised in high-context systems expect more of others than do the participants in low-context systems" (1976: 98). Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey (1988: 91) claim that

> members of low- and high-context systems negotiate negative-'face' and positive-'face', with members of low-context systems focusing on negative-'face' maintenance process and members of high-context systems focusing on positive-'face' maintenance process...

To conclude, both negative and positive politeness exists in Uruguayan Spanish and British English requests. In terms of the speech act of requesting, Uruguayans, when compared to the British, seem to show a preference for linguistic expressions which emphasise positive politeness aspects, whereas the British appear to prefer linguistic expressions which emphasise negative politeness aspects.

NOTE

1. In Montevideo, in particular, it is almost impossible to find speakers who do not employ vos (Behares 1981:36).

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THE ROLE OF VN IN FUNCTIONAL SYNTAX: SOME OE PATTERNS[1]

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0. INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses the role that should be played in a functional syntax by functional patterns that include V in a position N of the linear order of the clause.[2] We adopt the theoretical framework of Functional Grammar (henceforth FG) as devised by Dik (1978, 1989). More precisely, we make use of the typology of pragmatic functions advanced by Dik et al. (1981: 41ff), de Jong (1981: 89ff) and Dik (1989: 268ff); we also draw on the model of syntactic template and constituent order rule put forward by Connolly (1991). As we shall see, it is possible to take one more step than Connolly, since he does not deal with syntactic discontinuity or duplicated consitituents.

In the methodological dimension, we have opted for OE in order to explore these phenomena, since it exhibits a range of constructions in which exbraciated constituents show up wider than that of P-D (Present-Day) English; moreover, we have concentrated on passive constructions because they are *older* than their active counterparts, that is, they allow for intraverbal constituents more frequently than active constructions do. Our qualitative dis-

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cussion and conclusions are based on a previous quantitative study of a linguistic corpus,[3] much in the way Givón (1984/1990, 1995) does.[4]

This paper is organized as follows: firstly, we discuss the descriptive and explanatory inadequacy of the V2 rule; secondly, we address the question of relative constituent ordering; thirdly, we tackle the problems posed by absolute constituent ordering; finally, we offer some concluding remarks.

1. THE INADEQUACY OF THE V2 RULE

This section deals with the inadequacy of the V2 Rule both from a descriptive and from an explanatory point of view. We resort to the data from several corpora—including ours—to prove the V2 Rule descriptively inadequate; and to a comparison between a pragmatic explanation and a syntactic explanation of an example from our corpus to prove the V2 Rule explanatorily inadequate.

In a formal syntax the VO character of OE clauses follows from the V2 Rule, which moves Vf from its base clause-final position to second position in the clause.[5] As a result, objects and complements follow the finite verb and precede the non-finite verb. OV variants with pronoun objects are accounted for as variants of the VO order.[6] Fischer (1992) has stated that the V2 Rule was a productive device throughout the OE period. Koopman (1992) has argued for an OV rather than a VO order. Although Koopman's data are not available, he insists on the high number of exceptions to the V2 Rule, as shown in Table 1[7]:

	Year	Text	V2 %
Brown	1970	PC	16%
Smith	1971	ASC	45%
Stockwell	1977	ASC	69%
Bean	1983	ASC	50%
Martín Arista	1997	ASC *et al.*	42%

Table 1: Percentage of V2 clauses according to the figures offered by five corpora.

Although there are some divergencies due to the fact that different corpora (based on different texts) are compared, it seems beyond all doubt that

many OE constructions cannot be accounted for by the V2 Rule: even the most *optimistic* figures show up to 31% of exceptions to this rule. Furthermore, the explanatory character of this rule is also questionable. Let us discuss this character in the light of the following example:

(1) Her wæs Cnut gecoran to kynge
here was Cnut crowned king

"In this year was Cnut crowned" (ASC 1014)[8]

Given the linguistic expression in (1), the positions of the finite verb (Vf) and the non-finite verb (Vn) are determined by the V2 rule in the following way:

(2) Vf--->P2
Vn--->P4 or P5

However, if no further condition is specified apart fom the V2 constraint, the following placemnts, which do keep to this constraint, are also possible. Since they are theoretical reconstructions, they have been marked with an asterisk.

(3) a. *Cnut *wæs* her gecoran to kynge
b. *To kinge *wæs* Cnut gecoran her
c. *To kinge *wæs* her gecoran Cnut
d. *Cnut *wæs* her to kynge gecoran
e. *Her *wæs* Cnut to kynge gecoran

At least, these five linear orders follow the V2 Rule. As a matter of fact, (3.d) and (3.e) are the linguistic expressions that most strictly follow the V2 Rule: the complements follow Vf and precede Vn. The presence X in clause-initial position (P1) may explain the existence of an inter-verbal S since X takes up P1 and pushes S towards P3. Nevertheless, the constituent order displayed in (3)—to the exclusion of that in (3.e)—should be justified; in other words, the question is: why does X undergo exbraciation to occupy clause-final position? The presence of X in clause-final position is not the result of the application of the V2 rule which, in fact, predicts the occurrence of X in interverbal position.

A similar problem is posed by the following example. The V2 Rule does not predict the exbraciated character of the linguistic expression in (4):

(4) ðar wearð ofslægen Harold fagera, and Tostig eorl

there were slain Harold Fairhaired, and Tostig earl

"There were slain Harold the Fairhaired and earl Tostig" (ASC 1066)

No formal constraint can be derived from the application of the V2 Rule that acccounts for the occurrence of S in clause-final position in the linguistic expression in (4). So far we have pointed to the inadequacy of the V2 Rule when explaining clauses that *do conform to* this rule. Things are even worse when we come to explain clauses that lack V2 order, like the following:

(5) a. ða se halga wer wæs getogen
then the saint man was brought to an end

"Then the saint man was slain" (V)

b. ða ðæt folc gewearð egesan geaclod
then the people were with fear terrified

"Then the people were terrified with fear" (EDM)

In (5) we have intentionally chosen two clauses introduced by an adverbial to show that not even in these examples is the V2 Rule an explanatory principle of general validity: neither in (5.a) nor in (5.b) does Vf show up in P2, as we might expect, since the V2 Rule predicts the linearization of Vf in P2 and the displacement of S to P3, which is not the case with these linguistic expressions.

In the light of these considerations, it does not seem unreasonable to state that a functional syntax should not make its explanations dependable on the V2 Rule; on the theoretical side, in the remainder of this paper we shall try to improve the model of the functional pattern proposed by Dik (1978, 1989), which, in our opinion, is descriptively adequate but lacks explanatory adequacy.

We have suggested elsewhere (Martín Arista 1994a, 1994b), that the typology of syntactic functions put forward by Dik (1989) should be enlarged in the light of the proposals made in Dezsó (1978), Halliday (1985) and Downing and Locke (1992).[9] In this view, the linear structure of the clause involves the matching of clausal constituents that bear semantic, syntactic and pragmatic functions with parts of the prosodic contour of the clause. As

is stated in Martín Arista (forthcoming), Old-English constituent order favours syntactic discontinuity, which evidences the relevant character in terms of information transmission of the interverbal position: this is the only functional explanation that can be proposed.[10] This situation changes in more recent stages of the language: as is well known, ME and ModE are alike in showing sentence-stress and focus-bearing constituents in clause-final position. In this sense, OE is a period of great change, since the shift SOV-SVO is also finished up in passives, which, being *older*, we have chosen for this study.

A first study of the OE corpus reveals that P1 and P3 are the communicatively most relevant positions (the percentage of TOP and FOC occurrence in these positions may amount to 95% TOPum/FOCm[11] in P1 and TOPm/FOCum in P3). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: we shall speak of TOPm whenever this pragmatic function is assigned to a constituent that does not occupy clause-initial position. TOPum, then, is to be identified with clause-initial position. As regards FOC, its unmarked position (FOCum) is the inter-verbal position, clause-initial, second and final positions being marked ones (FOCm). To illustrate this point, we take, in the light of the evidence provided by the corpus, the most usual template of passive clauses in OE to be as follows[12]:

(6) P1-P2-P3-P4

The placement rules that govern the insertion into this template may be sketched in the following way:

(7) a. Given TOPum and FOCum: TOPum--->P1/FOCum--->P3
b. Given TOPum and FOCm: TOPum--->P1/FOCm--->P4/P2
c. Given TOPm and FOCum: TOPm--->P4/P2/FOCum--->P3
d. Given TOPm and FOCm: TOPm--->P2/P3/P4/
FOCm--->P1/P2/P4

At this point of the discussion, it seems advisable to compare this proposal with other hypotheses than can be found in previous research.

On the one hand, this proposal is coherent with the importance of the *pragmatic mode* in OE (Bossuyt 1985: 15ff; Tejada 1988: 83ff) and with the descriptions of OE constituent order made by Dik (1980: 153) and Bossuyt (1985: 27). As is well known, the order of OE constituents was freer than that of Modern English, which resulted in a higher number of *displaced* constituents due to pragmatic reasons. This evidence, then, suggests that, in a

functional syntax, explanations of a pragmatic character should be primary with respect to syntactic explanations of the kind *insert V into P2*. Moreover, one of the basic principles of FG is that pragmatic rules govern semantic rules, which restrict, in turn, the operation of syntactic rules. Furthermore, FG is constrained in the sense that no transformations are allowed and no explanation can be proposed in terms of a surface order determined by order-changing operations on its underlying order, such as the ones proposed by Malsch (1976: 28ff), Lightfoot (1977: 191ff) or Reddick (1982: 37ff), among others.[13]

Dik has stated that OE was a strong V2 language, that is, a language with basic[14] P1VSO/P1XVSO order in which V is always in second position in the dominant unmarked order of actual sentences. P1 stands for a special pragmatic position to which TOP or FOC constituents are displaced. Bossuyt's description, which is complementary to Dik's, hints at the marked character of FOC when displaced to P1, as well as the unmarked character of TOP in initial position.

On the other hand, our explanation seems to contradict Bean (1983: 136) when she remarks that:

> It could still be argued that OE was a verb-second language simply on the basis of the percentage of verb-second clauses. One could also still argue for a topic-verb language on the basis that SVX was a primary order with topical subjects, VSX with non-topical subjects and SXV with pronominal objects. However, I would like to argue that OE was neither verb-second nor topic-verb but rather that it was verb-third.

Nevertheless, further detailed discussion will show that there are several points of convergence with Bean: firstly, we do not state that OE was a Topic-Verb language; nor do we remark that OE passive constructions were Topic-first. What we argue for is a non-marked initial position of TOP in OE passive constructions. Secondly, although we do not think that the statement that OE was Verb-third is applicable to passive constructions, we do find several instances of Vf/Vn in P3. Nevertheless, we insist on their marked character. Finally, we do agree—although for different reasons—with Bean as regards the inadequacy of the V2 Rule, to which we have devoted this section.

2. VN IN RELATIVE ORDER

The evidence from the corpus suggests that a high percentage of OE passive clauses qualify as discontinuous (see Table 2). Passive continuity can be realized either as Vf-Vn or as Vn-Vf (this topic is dealt with below). We define *continuity* (or *adjacency*, in the terminology used by Connolly (1991: 7)) as the characteristic that shows the constituents, especially the verbal complex, which are not interrupted by other constituents or by elements belonging to other constituents. These examples of P-D English illustrate this definition:

(8) a. The village *was* completely *destroyed* by the army (McCawley 1987: 194).
b. Tom *serves more expensive liquors* than Dick does *to guests* (McCawley 1987: 194).
c. *Everyone* came *who I invited* (Jacobson 1987: 62).

In examples (8.a), (8.b) and (8.c) the constituents in italics are interrupted by the adverbial, the second part of the discontinuous modifier and the verb respectively. These instances conspire against Dik's (1989: 343) Principle of Domain Integrity, which states that domains prefer not to be interrupted by constituents from other domains. It is necessary, however, to insist on the communicative rather than the structural effects of the phenomena of displacement. In other words, we must find a functional explanation for the fact that (8.a), (8.b) and (8.c) are preferred to their paraphrases in (9.a), (9.b) and (9.c), which do not show syntactic discontinuity:

(9) a. The village was destroyed by the army completely.
b. Tom serves more expensive liquors to guests than Dick does.
c. Everyone who I invited came.

The functional explanation for these diplacement phenomena we provide will be based on the special communicative value of the displaced constituents, which we shall explain in terms of pragmatic function assignment. Let us give an example:

(10) Her Herebriht aldormon wæs ofslægen from hædnum monnum
here Herebriht earl was slain by heathen people

"In this year ealdorman Hereberth was slain by the heathen" (ASC 838)

We consider the order of the constituents found in the linguistic expression in (10) a marked one due to its low frequency of occurrence in the corpus. Its marked character may be put down to the presence of FOCm in clause-final position. We assign TOPum to the adverbial in clause-initial position, which seems preferable to assigning TOPm to S, because this alternative assignment would be characteristic of a highly marked construction, which is not the case with the one under consideration.

At this point, we may propose the hypothesis that a Markedness Hierarchy as regards pragmatic function assignment might be put forward. Our proposal is that such a hierarchy might have this form[15]:

(11) *Markedness Hierarchy*
HIGHLY MARKED=TOPm+FOCm
MARKED=TOPm+FOCum/TOPum+FOCm
UNMARKED=TOPum+FOCum

In section 2 and section 3 we try to prove this hierarchy accurate by demonstrating that the constructions we call *highly marked* have a lower frequency of appearance in the corpus than the ones we call *marked*, which, in turn, offer lower percentages of appearance than the constructions we define as *unmarked*. We illustrate the Markedness Hierarchy by means of the linguistic expression in (12), which is modified in (13), for the sake of the argument, in a rather *ad hoc* way:

(12) ðy ilcan geare Tatwinc was gehalgod to arcebisc
that same year Tatwine was consecrated archbishop
"The same year Tatwine was consrcrated archbishop" (ASC 731)

(13) a. UNMARKED=TOPum+FOCum: *ðy ilcan geare* was Tatwine *to arcebisc* gehalgod
b. MARKED=TOPm+FOCum: Tatwine *ðy ilcan geare* was *to arcebisc* gehalgod
c. MARKED=TOPum+FOCm: *ðy ilcan geare* Tatwine was gehalgod *to arcebisc*
d. HIGHLY MARKED=TOPm+FOCm: *Tatwine* ðy ilcan geare was gehalgod *to arcebisc*

Although the examples in (13) have been obtained by applying a functional test of modification to (12), this reasoning is not a gratuitous speculation, since, as we shall see in the following, we find instances of all the levels of the hierarchy we have proposed in our corpus: from unmarked up to

highly marked. This point is suitably illustrated by resorting to cases of discontinuous passive. According to the figures we get from our corpus, OE favoured discontinuous constructions in which ōnly one constituent was displaced outside its proper domain (see Table 2).

Let us consider the following linguistic expression:

(14) ðær weard Ordheh cyninges ðegn ofslægen
there was Ordheh king's thane slain
"There was Ordheh, the king's thane, slain" (ASC 893)

This is an instance of unmarked construction. As we have suggested in the previous section, this example is not described as the output of the operation of the V2 Rule but as the result of the assignment of TOP and FOC: the unmarked character of this construction is justified by the presence of FOCum (*Ordheh cyninges ðegn*) in interverbal position.

OE favoured discontinuity degree 1 in passives (see Table 2). The next question is: which constituent usually breaks into the verb complex? Table 2 shows that more than half of the intrusive constituents bear the function adverbial. S, as is the case with the following example, which constitutes an interesting occurrence, is also inserted into P3:

(15) On ðæm wæron eac ða men ofslægene buton fifum
in this were all those men slain but five
"In this ship were also all the men slain, but five" (ASC 896)

The treatment that we put forward here is to consider the second part of S an afterthought, thus constituting the tail of the utterance. The unmarked character of this construction is based on the presence of TOPum in P1 and FOCum in P3. There is another possibility, although it is a less likely one: if we integrated the constituent *buton fifum* into the clause structure we should have to admit a double focus construction consisting of FOCum + FOCm (*eac ða men... buton fifum*). Since the resulting construction would be a marked one, and this point could not be statistically demonstrated on the grounds of the corpus, this is not the course we pursue.

Intimately related to the appeareance of S in inter-verbal position is the presence of S complement, which is very frequent when *hattan* is involved, as the following example illustrates:

(16) Seo is Legaceaster gehaten
it is Chester called

"It is called Chester" (ASC 893)

From what we have said, it follows that S-COMP in final position is to be analysed as a case of FOCm assignment. This is the case with the example in (16).

As Table 2 displays, more than half of the constituents that enter the verbal complex in discontinuity 1 passives are adverbials. The following example of inter-verbal adverbial is worth commenting on since it shows, in our opinion, TOPm and FOCm:

(17) ðа hergas wæron ðа gegaderode begen to Sceobyrigon
then the hosts were then concentrated at Shoebury

Eastseaxum
in Essex

"Then the hosts were concentrated at Shoebury in Essex" (ASC 893)

We favour the TOPm/FOCm explanation to the exclusion of an alternative explanation consisting of the existence of a double Topic construction (TOPum+TOPm, assigned to the adverbial of time) and FOCm assigned to the adverbial of place. Our point is that the explanation we have provided accounts more accurately for the marked character of the linguistic expression in (17) since the constituents that are central to the informative structure of the clause (*hergas* and *begen to Sceobyrig on Eastseaxum*) are assigned the pragmatic functions FOC and TOP.

Up to this point, we have been dealing with passive clauses that show Vf-Vn continuity or degree 1 discontinuity. Now we deal with clauses in which the Vf-Vn continuum is interrupted by more than one constituent. As Table 2 shows, most discontinuous passives qualify as discontinuity 1 constructions, the cases of discontinuity degree 2 and 3 being statistically marked. In (18) an example of discontinuity degree 2 is given. We account for the low frequency of appeareance of these constructions in the corpus and, therefore, for their marked character, by resorting to the presence of TOPm and/or FOCm:

(18) ðа wæron hie mid metelieste gewægde
then were they by want of food reduced

"Then they were reduced by want of food" (ASC 893)

In (18) TOPm is assigned to S in P3 and FOCum is borne by the adverbial in P4.

The instances of degree of discontinuity 3 we find in our corpus are usually associated with the presence of a constituent which undergoes duplication, as is the case with:

(19) Wæs he se mon in weorulhade geseted
was he this man in a lay condition restored

"He was restored to a lay condition" (V)

Clauses like (19), in which a combination of degree of discontinuity 3 and Vf initial is found, show an extremely low frequency of appeareance in the corpus and, as a result, a highly marked character. Therefore, we describe this clause as having been assigned TOPm and FOCm to S and Vn respectively.

Relative order:			
syntactic continuity	*examples*	*total*	*%*
Syntactic continuity	432	720	60
Syntactic discontinuity	288	720	40
1st. degree discontinuity	166	288	57.6
Interverbal S	56	166	33.7
Interverbal adverbial	23	166	13.8
Other interverbal cons.	87	166	52.4
2nd. degree discontinuity	77	288	26.7
3rd. degree discontinuity	45	288	15.6

Table 2: Syntactic (dis)continuity in the corpus.

We go on to raise another problem concerning relative position in the clause, namely the relative order of Vf and Vn. As Table 3 shows, OE favours a relative order of Vf and Vn in which Vf precedes. Therefore, according to our data, orderings like (20.a) are preferred to others like (20.b):

(20) a. Crist is magenum naman genemned
Christ is by many names called

"Christ is called many names"(V)

b. ... ær sio fierd gesamnod wære
... before his levies divided had been

"... before his levies had been divided" (ASC 893)

The comparison with P-D English is straightforward: the Vn-Vf ordering is restricted to highly emphatic constructions like the following:

(21) The boss ordered that he should be fired; and *fired* he *was*

Our point is that the degree of markedness of Vn-Vf constructions is lower in OE than in P-D English. Let us discuss an example in detail. In (22) we offer an instance of continuous passive presenting Vf-Vn order:

(22) Æðelwulf aldormon wearð ofslægen
Æðelwulf earl was slain

"Earl Eðelwulf was slain" (ASC 871)

This example of constructions involving P1-P3 templates reinforces our remark that when P3 templates are involved, P3 is also considered the unmarked FOC position, P1 and P2 being the marked ones; otherwise we would be forced either to analyse *wearð* as FOCum (which does not bear up to closer examination because Vf is unlikely to carry relevant information) or to characterise *ofslagen* as FOCm (thus describing as marked a Vf-2/Vn-3 clause, which is not advisable on the grounds of the corpus—see Table 3). Let us give another example, this time one involving a P1-P4 template:

(23) Betwux ðam wearð ofslagen Eadwine his eam
while that was slain Edwin his uncle

"Meanwhile his uncle Edwin was slain" (OSW)

As regards (23), we propose assigning TOPm to *Eadwine his eam* and FOCum to *ofslagen*. This explanation is preferable to another stating that TOPum is assigned to X, which falls short when it comes to accounting for the statistically marked character of S-final constructions.

The passive continuity/Vn-Vf combination also appears in the corpus. As Table 3 shows, there is no clear tendency as regards continuous passives showing Vf-Vn or Vn-Vf; both orderings qualify as having similar figures. Let us give an example of Vn-Vf ordering in a continuous passive construction:

(24) Se swiðe gewundad wæs
he seriously wounded was

"He was severely wounded" (ASC 755)

By assigning FOCm to X we draw attention to the fact that this construction is marked, as the evidence extracted from the corpus suggests (see Table 3). The co-existing variant Vn-Vf of continuous passives does not show up in discontinuous passives, in which only the Vf-Vn relative order is found (see Table 3). Two examples of this phenomenon follow:

(25) a. hie wurdon ða gebrohte to ðæm biscope
they were then taken to that bishop

"They were then taken to that bishop "(ASC 1014)

b. ða wurdon hi ofwundrode ðæs wulfes hyrdrædenne
then were they amazed of the wolf's guardianship

"They were amazed at the wolf's guardianship" (EDM)

In our view, (25.b) is more marked than (25.a): as regards the latter, we have assigned FOCm to X (*to ðæm biscope*), TOP remaning unmarked, whereas in the case of the former we assign TOPm to S and FOCm to X (*ðæs wulfes hyrdrædenne*).

Relative order: Vf and Vn	*examples*	*total*	*%*
Vf-Vn	493	720	68.4
Vf-Vn: syntactic cont.	205	493	41.5
Vf-Vn: syntactic discont.	288	493	58.4
Vn-Vf	227	720	31.5
Vn-Vf: syntactic cont.	227	227	100
Vn-Vf: syntactic discont.	0	227	0

Table 3: Relative order of Vf and Vn in the corpus.

3. VN IN ABSOLUTE ORDER

In the previous section we dealt with relative order problems. In the remainder of the paper, we tackle absolute order problems, namely V-initial, V-2 and V-final clauses, as well as S-final clauses. In the first place, we address the question of the order of Vf/Vn-initial clauses.

According to the figures we have offered, only 5% of the clauses in the corpus qualify as V-initial clauses, either Vf-initial or Vn-initial (see Table 5). This percentage reflects, beyond a doubt, the marked status of V-initial clauses. Among these clauses, Vf-initial clauses like (26.a) constitute a vast majority with respect to Vn-initial clauses like (26.b):

(26) a. Wæs todæled in foreweardum Danieles dagum in tua
was divided on the following day of St Daniel's into two

bicscira West Seaxna lond
bishoprics the West Saxon land

"The West Saxon land was divided into two bishoprics on the following day of Saint Daniel's" (ASC 959)

b. Iðonked wurðe he
thanked be he

"May he be thanked" (V)

Since the clause operator OPT is present in the linguistic expression in (26.b), we have found it convenient to analyse *iðonked* as FOCum and *he* as TOPum so as to draw a distinction between marked clauses with clause operator DECL, which are regarded as marked if TOPm, FOCm or both are present, and those with clause operator OPT. One implication of this soution, however, is that the framework proposed above has to be justified: whenever the clause operator OPT is present, the unmarked FOC position is P1 whereas the unmarked TOP position is P3; the marked positions, on the other hand are as follows: P1 and P2 for TOP and P2 and P3 for FOC.

The question we must address is that of how NEG and IMP clause operators are related to V-initial passive clauses. To start with, we focus on NEG OPT clauses in (27):

(27) Ne bið us geborgen
not be we saved

"May we be not saved" (V)

This example shows that our hypothesis holds in accounting for NEG OPT clauses. The assignment of pragmatic functions to NEG OPT clauses may be summarized as follows: P3 is the unmarked position of TOP and P1 of FOC. This description calls for two remarks: firstly, no instances of marked pragmatic functions in NEG OPT clauses have entered the corpus; these clauses undergo discontinuity of Vf and Vn but not of NEG and Vf. In stating this, we do not deny the existence of such clauses: our point is that marked and highly marked NEG OPT clauses, in the way in which we have defined them, are very unlikely to occur. And secondly, we have assumed that NEG--->P1, which is statistically feasible.

As regards the clause operator IMP, which is the only one we have not commented on yet: in principle, it should not trigger a constituent order substantially different from the one triggered by OPT. Let us see to what extent this *a priori* statement is correct. Take, for instance, (28):

(28) Wes ðu gebletsod betuh eall wifa
be you blessed between all women

"May you be blessed among all women" (V)

As (28) evidences, the difference concerning order between OPT and IMP is that TOPum is assigned in P3 in OPT clauses and in P2 in IMP clauses, FOCum being assigned in P1 in both cases and the other possibilities being marked ones. Therefore, the assignment of pragmatic functions in IMP clauses is the same as that of OPT. Now, we will look at NEG IMP clauses. They are identical as regards pragmatic function assignment to clauses that have a clause operator OPT and NEG OPT. There follows an example:

(29) Ne beo ðu, Maria, geunroted
not be you, Maria, sorrowful

"Don't be sorrowful, Maria" (V)

Absolute order: V1	*examples*	*total*	*%*
V1	37	720	5.1
Vf1	31	37	83.7
Vf1: DECL	25	31	80.6
Vf1: NEG	6	31	19.3
Vf1-Vn2	0	6	0
Vf1-Final Vn	18	37	48.6
Vn1	6	37	16.2
Vn1-Vf2	6	6	100

Table 4: V1 in the corpus.

With reference to Vf and Vn in V2 position, the data offered by the corpus evidence that the V2 construction is relatively frequent (43% of the clauses in the corpus qualify as V2) and that most V2 passives are Vf2 ones (see Table 5). Another fairly frequent pattern is V2-VF (see Table 6). It is worth noticing that all the clauses that accommodate to this pattern are Vf-2/Vn-VF. Of course, P1-P3 templates, in which Vf occupies P2 and Vn lies in P3, are included here. As is the case with other possibilities of ordering, no different order is triggered by the use of *wesan* to the exclusion of *weorðan* or viceversa. This point is illustrated, with reference to Vf2, by (30):

(30) a. Seo stow is gehaten Heofonfeld on Englisc
this place is called Heavenfield in English

"The place is called Heavenfield in English" (OSW)

b. Him wearð ðæs getiðod
he was that given

"Him was that given" (OSW)

It has been shown, then, that no different order of the constituents is triggered by either copular verb. The next question is whether the appearance of Vn in P2 can be attributed to the dependent or independent character of the clause. A V2 independent clause with Vn2 is exemplified by (31):

(31) ðær geflemed wearð Norðmanna bregu
there forced to flee was the Northmen leader

"The leader of the Northmen was forced to flee" (ASC 937)

The assignment of TOPm and FOCm and the highly marked character resulting from this assignment are coherent with the low frequency of appeareance in the corpus of these constructions (see Table 5). Therefore, no modification of the proposed framework is demanded by these examples. Let us now look at dependent clauses with Vn2. As a general rule, the dependent clauses in our corpus offer a pattern S/TOP-(X)-(Y)-Vn/FOC-(NEG/FOC)-Vf, as the following example illustrates:

(32) ...ðæt hit bebyrged ne wurde
...that he buried not were

"...that he were not buried" (EDM)

We may state then that no modification of our hypothesis should be put forward if P1-P4 templates are involved. Indeed, the pattern S/TOPum/FOCm-X/TOPm/FOCm-Vn/TOPmFOCum-Vf/TOPm/FOCm accomodates to the general schema we have proposed for DECL clauses, the most common sequence being TOPum-(TOPm/FOCm)-FOCum-Vf. This pattern, however, is based on the assumption that Vf is not relevant from an informative point of view, as is normally the case, and that we always find DECL and P1-P4, which is not always the case. When NEG or P1-P3 templates occur, the unmarked character of FOC in P2 in P1-P3 dependent clauses is due to their dependency. In other words, the difference between dependent and independent clauses with P1-P3 templates is that while independent DECL clauses show FOCum--->P3, dependent DECL clauses qualify as FOCum--->P2 (TOPum occurs in P1 in both types of clause). It might be argued that this is tantamount to saying that Vf appears in P2 in independent clauses and in P3 in dependent clauses while Vn occurs in P3 in independent clauses and in P2 in dependent clauses. Our pragmatic explanation, however, is more comprehensive than the structural one just mentioned, since a structural explanation is not accurate enough to account for clauses that, in spite of being marked, do occur in OE, as the data yielded by our corpus indicate. In a structural explanation, these instances would be described as exceptions to the rule that states that Vf(INDEP)--->P2 and Vf(DEP)--->P3, etc. The framework that we have proposed seems wider since it can account for all these orderings; and more accurate, since no ordering is done away with for

not accomodating to a given pattern. Our proposal has a drawback, though: we must admit that the unmarked character of FOC in P2 in P3 DECL clauses is to be attributed to their subordinate quality.

As regards P4 NEG dependent clauses, on the other hand, no modification is needed if we accept that FOCum is assigned to NEG. Two remarks should be made as regards this solution: in the first place, by assigning FOCum to NEG we avoid assigning FOCm to Vn, which would entail describing as marked a construction which the evidence from the corpus proves to be unmarked (see Table 6). Furthermore, we follow the general pattern FOCum--->P3 (if the template is P1-P4) and no modification of our hypothesis is called for. In the second place, the occurrence of Vf in P4 and Vn in P2 must be explained in terms of dependent vs. independent clauses; otherwise, the alternative order would be equally acceptable, which is not compatible with the basic principle that different patterns are the result of different communicative values.

Absolute order: V2	*examples*	*total*	*%*
Vf2/Vn2	315	720	43.7
Vf2	291	315	92.4
V2-V Final	149	315	47.3
Vf2-Vn Final	149	149	100
Vn2	24	315	7.6
Vn2: independent clauses	13	24	54.1
Vn2: dependent clauses	11	24	45.9
Vn2-Final Vf	0	149	0

Table 5: V2 in the corpus.

We consider V-Final constructions, with special emphasis on the fact that the occurrence of Vf in P4 must be regarded as a result of clause dependency. As the evidence from the corpus suggests, most OE V-Final passive clauses are Vn-VF ones (see Table 6). Vf-VF constructions are either marked independent clauses or dependent clauses. Let us discuss in the first place Vf-VF independent clauses by giving one example:

(33) ðа Deniscan scipu aseten' wæron
the Danish ships captured were

"The Danish ships were captured" (ASC 893)

As we have already remarked, whenever P3 templates are involved, it is necessary to consider P3 the unmarked FOC position, P1 and P2 being the marked ones. In (33), a P1-P3 independent DECL clause, Vn has been assigned FOCm, which accounts for the statistically marked character of these constructions (see Table 6); assigning FOCum to Vf would be unacceptable not only from a statistical point of view but also from a semantic/pragmatic one: Vf-VF independent clauses are very scarce and, moreover, Vf is unlikely to stand out pragmatically. This reasoning makes it unnecessary to revise the framework we have proposed above. Now, let us concentrate on Vf-VF dependent clauses. In (34) a P1-P3 dependent clause is shown:

(34) ...ðe ær wæs forslægen
...who before had been killed

"... who had been killed before" (ASC 1014)

In this example, the marked character of the construction is not defined by the dependency of the clause but by the assignment of FOCm to the time adverbial, for this is a P1-P4 clause (see Table 6).

Once we have explained the presence of Vf in final position both in dependent and independent clauses, we examine marked and unmarked Vn-VF clauses. The clause in (35) is an instance of Vn-VF unmarked order:

(35) ðær wæs micel wæl geslægen
there were many people slain

"There were many people slain" (ASC 823)

In (36) we find an instance of Vn-VF marked clause:

(36) From Offam kyninge Hygebryht wæs gecoren
by Offa king Hygebryth was appointed

"Hygebryth was appointed by king Offa" (ASC 785)

We have attributed the marked character of this construction, which is statistically justifiable (see Table 6), to the assignment of TOPm to S and FOCm to X. This example puts an end to the discussion of Vf and Vn in clause-final position.

Absolute order: Final V	*examples*	*total*	*%*
Final Vf/Vn	340	720	47.2
Final Vf	71	340	20.8
Final Vf: independent clauses	12	711	6.9
Final Vf: dependent clauses	59	71	83.1
Final Vn	269	340	79.2

Table 6: V-Final in the corpus.

We end section 3 by giving an explanation for the instances of S-final clauses in the corpus. S-final clauses are marked constructions resulting from the assignment of TOPm or FOCm, as is the case with the following example, or both TOPm and FOCm:

(37) On ðara Deniscena healfe wearð ofslægen Eohric hira cyng
on the Danish part was slain Eohric their king

"On the part of the Danish Eohric king was slain" (ASC 871)

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper we have argued for a change of perspective in the descriptive and explanatory character of functional patterns in which VN and X show up: the element which constitutes the starting point for formulating expression rules both in synchronic and in diachronic terms is X, not VN. As we have seen, X bears unmarked focus, receives sentence stress and occupies an outstanding syntactic position, in such a way that the syntactic organization of the clause iconically reflects the distribution of the information at the pragmatic level.

NOTES

1. The reseach resulting in this paper has been funded by the Vicerrectorado de Investigación de la Universidad de La Rioja through the research project entitled *Aspectos metodológicos de la investigación lingüística en un paradigma funcional: diacronía y sincronía* (1996).

2. The following abbreviations appear throughout this paper: OE (Old English), ME (Middle English), ModE (Modern English), P-D English (Present-Day English), S (subject), O (object), V (verb) Vf (finite verb), Vn (non-finite verb), VF (verb in final position), X (a major constituent of the clause other than subject, object and verb), NEG (negation morpheme), TOP (topic), FOC (focus), m (marked), um (unmarked), PX (syntactic position number x), VX (verb in syntactic position number x), DECL (clause operator declarative), INT (clause operator interrogative), NEG (clause operator negative), IMP (clause operator imperative) and OPT (clause operator optative).

3. The corpus comprises 800 passive clauses from the following OE (up to 1100 AD) texts: from *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (Macintosh file by Dr. Santiago González Fernández-Corugedo, Universidad de La Coruña, quoted as ASC); from *St. Edmund, King and Martyr* (in Needham 1966: 43ff, quoted as EDM); from Visser (1984: 2091ff, quoted as V).

4. See also Hopper and Traugott (1993: 32ff) and Harris and Campbell (1995: 61ff).

5. For more technical details, see Lightfoot (1991: 42ff) and Denison (1993: 25ff).

6. Thus Mitchell (1985: §3907).

7. Saitz's (1955) figures in Bean (1983: 115) are also worth taking into account:

	9th century	12th century
SVO	49%	72%
SOV	31%	16%
VSO	12%	6%

The figures correspond to full-nominal subjects and objects. With pronominal subjects, SOV is the order found in 70% of the total and with pronominal objects there are no instances of SVO in the 9th century.

8. The translations from ASC have been taken from Garmonsway (1972).

9. For an alternative proposal, see Hannay (1990) and Mackenzie and Keizer (1991).

10. This implies that in Pre-Old English sentence-stress and focus-bearing constituents must have been in interverbal position and that the shift of sentence stress to clause-final position is previous to the shift of focus-bearing constituents to the end of the clause, although this observation might not be entirely original, for several scholars, whose work we acknowledge in this paper, have drawn comparable conclusions.

11. In line with Dik (1989), Croft (1990) and Givón (1995) we use the term *markedness* in such a way that the correlation between structural (qualitative) and statistical (quantitative) markedness is stressed. For more information we refer the reader to Andrews (1990: 9ff).

12. In describing the template in this way, we admit, unlike Connolly (1991), the *variable* status to the syntactic template.

13. Lightfoot (1977: 192) has pointed out that OE was an SOV language with an V-final underlying order and an NP Postposing rule. Malsch (1976: 28) has stated that OE was a VO language having a verb-initial underlying order and a V Postposing rule. Reddick (1982: 54-55) argues for an underlying VO order on which three leftward movement rules operate.

14. As Brody (1984: 711ff) has remarked, the concept of basic constituent order poses several problems as regards the assumptions that all languages have a single basic word order and that basic word order is a basic phenomenon across all languages. Brody's conclusion is that basic word order sentences have different functions in different languages and that therefore the notion of basic word order is not uniform across all languages.

15. This hierarchy is in line with Bossong (1989: 27ff), who has dealt with the (morphemic) marking of TOP and FOC and has drawn the conclusion that partial marking means that TOP alone is marked whereas total marking covers both TOP and FOC.

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NARRATION-PARODY-INTERTEXTUALITY: REWRITING THE PAST IN CHARLES PALLISER'S *THE QUINCUNX* [1]

MARÍA JESÚS MARTÍNEZ ALFARO
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> Come with me now, gentle reader, and let us return to the Victorian heyday of the British novel, a time when villains spoke in Cockney accents and escapes were hair's-breath and maidservants were either traitorous or eternally devoted, where heroes were young and plucky and gained something (as opposed, in the contemporary novel, to losing it) in the process of growing up, when plots hinged on stolen wills and a book had only just finished laying the groundwork when it reached page 300. (Walton 1990: H01)

In this way starts a critique of *The Quincunx,* emphasizing what early British and American reviewers of the novel immediately recognized: its striking Victorian quality. Robert Taylor (1990: 38) describes it as "a Victorian three-decker gone back to the future" and a Ballantine executive calls it "a Wilkie Collins or Charles Dickens novel written by Umberto Eco" (Stephenson 1990: E12).

At the end of the twentieth century, in a world experienced as totally contingent and random, and on a level of consciousness that no longer allows us to regard reality as something to be experienced directly and immediately,

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art and literature could no longer be a simple reflection of an external ontology, the traditional *speculum vitae* and mirror held up to nature. Thus, the "originality" of present-day art seems to lie, eventually, in the way in which it makes use of second-hand materials. Writing over and against what has been written, subscribing and, simultaneously, questioning other forms, expressing the new through the old..., this is what constitutes the essence of most postmodernist literature, a literature which is both enjoyable and disquieting, playful and serious and, above all, aware of its own palimpsestuous (intertextual) quality.

Such a definition applies perfectly to the novel I intend to analyze in this article. Among other things, what *The Quincunx* illustrates is the fact that literary creation involves both making something up and making it up out of previously existing materials. In the case of Palliser's work, this dialectic, central to postmodernist literature as a whole, is mainly based on the relationship that can be established between the novel, on the one hand, and the texts of nineteenth-century literature and history, on the other.

The Quincunx tells the story of a boy of aristocratic origin and his expectations of inherited wealth. At the beginning of the novel, John Mellamphy and his mother are living in reduced but genteel circumstances in the rural north of England in the 1820s. John soon realizes that his mother, Mary, is hiding from "an enemy" whose effects are felt when Mrs. Mellamphy is lured into investing in a land speculation scheme which proves to be a fraud and reduces them to poverty. Then, discovered by the agents of her enemy, she flees with John to London, where they begin a life of progressive degradation with their pursuers at their heels. Finally, in the vein of melodramatic realism, John discovers that his name is not really Mellamphy, but Huffam and that he is entitled to inherit one of the largest estates in England. This is why he and his mother are constantly sought and threatened with violent death.

The Quincunx has all the ingredients of the traditional realist novel. The settings, character depiction, historical background and even style in which the fabula is set are wonderfully accurate. As we follow John Huffam's quest, we see the horrible squalor in which the poor lived in London in the early nineteenth century as well as the social and political structures and attitudes that made these social conditions possible. The realism and accuracy with which all these elements are displayed reassuringly function to enhance the reader's "willing suspension of disbelief." But, in line with what Linda Hutcheon first termed "historiographic metafiction,"[2] the novel's historical tone is counterbalanced by its overtly fictional status. Thus, the episodes that make up John Huffam's quest simultaneously appear as pastiche-ridden and

openly literary, as they strongly recall similar episodes in well-known Victorian novels. This fact effectively works to undermine the illusion of credibility of the created world and it calls into question the easily taken-for-granted referentiality of the novel, making good Jonathan Culler's words that "whenever [the literary work] seems to be referring to the world one can always argue that this supposed reference is in fact a comment on other texts" (1976: 1391).

The "realistic" element of the novel cannot but be perceived by the reader, who may even feel that the actual protagonist of *The Quincunx* is London and the English countryside as they were during the early decades of the nineteenth century. The vivid and persuasive descriptions that crowd the novel give its centre and ground to what might otherwise have been a melodramatic and more than slightly implausible plot. Thus, *The Quincunx* becomes a window onto nineteenth-century law, social conditions, geography and topography. Each section of the novel is accompanied by a street map[3] which constitutes an essential background to the texture of events. Almost every aspect of pre-Victorian England seems to be present in *The Quincunx*, from the begging and riverbed scavenging tactics of the destitute to the brothel-keeping, grave-robbing and house-breaking trades of the criminal class and the far more elegant schemes of the grasping rich; from the endless, exhausting drudgery of service "below stairs" in a fine house to the credit and speculation scams of bankers and moneylenders. To round this feeling of authenticity, each social group, be it the wealthy gentry in the West End, the criminal classes in the Town or the labouring poor in the country, speaks its own sociolect and so we come across a whole gallery of nineteenth-century spellings and idioms that have changed in today's writing and speech. This constitutes a further illustration of the novel's intertextuality, or, rather, of an aspect of intertextuality focused upon by Mikhail Bakhtin above all others. According to the author of *The Dialogic Imagination*, novels obsessively quote other specific works but, in addition, they simultaneously manifest intertextuality in their display of the enormous variety of discourses used in different historical periods and by disparate social classes (Bakhtin 1981: 46-47, 271).

On the other hand, there are literally thousands of references and allusions to Dickens' novels and to his life, as well. In this sense, we may agree with Steven Marcus (1990: 24) when he says that *The Quincunx* is in many ways "a novel written by someone who might have been a cross between Dickens and Wilkie Collins, with Dickens the dominant visible 'influence'." A considerable part of the action of the novel takes place in London in the early 1820s, in the area where Dickens worked in a blacking

factory as a twelve-year-old boy. In addition, the central character and main narrator, John Huffam, bears Dickens' middle names (his godfather's first name was Huffam) and, like Dickens, he was born on 7th. February 1812; though the birth year is never explicitly mentioned it can be deduced, as Susana Onega (1993a: 131) has pointed out, from the reference in Huffam's baptism record to the conquest of Ciudad Rodrigo (19th. January 1812) by Sir Arthur Wellesley (i.e. Lord Wellington) a few days before John's birth.[4]

Overt allusions, not only to literary texts (*The Arabian Tales, The Castle of Otranto, The Monk,* etc.) but to non-literary ones (a nineteenth-century popular rhyme (*Q* 514), or the names of such well-known newspapers as *The Spectator, The Tatler, The Rambler*), and also to persons or events of social and political history (the massive migration from Ireland to England after a series of ruined harvests; the enclosure of the common land; the Poor Laws; etc.) may be regarded as evocative links between the text and the intertextual *déjà* (Hebel[5] 1991: 138). However, it is not always an explicit reference that draws the reader's attention to the novel's intertextual relationships. That is the case with Dickens' own biography, as we have already seen, and also with Dickens' works. The intertextual echoes from Dickens' novels are overwhelming in number and make up a good deal of the actual substance of *The Quincunx*, including some of its key episodes. Simplifying a great deal, we may say that *The Quincunx* tells, like most of Dickens' literary production, the story of an orphaned boy who is chased in his terrors through the countryside (*Copperfield*) and the London underworld (*Oliver Twist*) because of greed (all of Dickens), and whose future is governed by a secret (*Great Expectations*) expressed in a legal document (*Bleak House, Little Dorrit, Oliver Twist*), whose heart is broken by a girl and then woman growing colder, more distant (*Expectations*), with excursions into fallen womanhood (*Copperfield, Dorrit, Dombey*), workhouses and graveyards in the midst of the city (*Oliver Twist, Bleak House, A Tale of Two Cities*). Echoes of *David Copperfield* and *Nicholas Nickleby* abound in John's relationship with his fragile mother and in his temporary banishment to one of the notorious Yorkshire "schools," a bleak rewriting at great length of the immortal comic scenes at Dotheboys Hall in *Nicholas Nickleby*. As in *Bleak House*, the plot revolves around a complex chancery suit that has dragged on for generations, draining the participants of time, health, resources and hope. The characters' memorable names—Digweed, Umphraville, Vamplew, Sancious, Palphramond, Purviance...—also bring to mind those of Dickens' characters. And the same can be said of very concrete and punctual techniques, like the vivifying of the inanimate, a device we associate with Dickens' children when they are frightened and that

affects things like coffins that chase people or a house (in *Little Dorrit*) that "had always had in its mind to slide down sideways." The version in *The Quincunx* is about an inn that "seemed to lean into the road as if peering sideways for possible customers" (*Q* 38); later, the small windows of a few cottages standing along the road were "like eyes that were narrowed to follow us" (*Q* 446).

All these echoes from Dickens' novels are in turn connected by the inheritance-generational-genealogical-legal plot that winds through everything. This plot, however, is less in tune with Dickens than it is with Wilkie Collins. The general shapes of Dickens' plots, however complicated they may be, are memorable because of the immense symbolic weight they carry and generate —all of them are multi-levelled, complex dramatizations of the state of contemporary English society. The plots of Wilkie Collins' novels are much more intricate and labyrinthine than those of Dickens, and indeed resemble nothing so much as later detective or mystery novels —forms upon which they have had a considerable influence.[6] Accordingly, the plot in *The Quincunx* is unimaginably elaborate and is finally, we are made to understand, about plotting itself, in both senses of the term.

However, despite all the echoes and reverberations from other nineteenth-century works that act as intertexts and with which the reader is free to trace relations, we cannot say that Palliser (his name already Trollopean[7]) has created either an innocent imitation of Victorian fiction or a Dickens book, as some critics have defined *The Quincunx* (Lannon 1990: 1L; Hawley 1991: 10). Palliser's novel lacks comic relief or that Dickensian speciality, the punctilious blend of comedy and horror that Colley Cibber synthesized in his influential formula "make 'em cry, make 'em wait, make 'em laugh." On top of that, as Michael Malone (1990: 12) suggests, Palliser seems to be deliberately trying to outdo Dickens rather than imitate him: in *The Quincunx*, the "bad 'uns" are worse, the dangers more dangerous and the periods of relief shorter or practically inexistent. Moreover, he adds, Charles Palliser appears to have set out not merely to write *a* Dickens novel but to write *all* Dickens novels.

This being so, critical readers of *The Quincunx* get engaged in an endless *ars combinatoria* that takes place in what has been variously termed *"musée imaginaire"* (Malraux), *"chambre d'echos"* (Barthes), or *"bibliothéque générale"* (Grivel) (in Plett 1991: 25). Moreover, the configuration of an intertext for the novel is the means by which the text defines itself, since the intertext is presented as that which the novel is not. Ross Chambers (1990: 143) has argued that in proposing itself as "not-X" (where "X" is the intertextual referent), a text claims literary status, but simultaneously

distinguishes itself as a negativity with respect to the discourses that traverse it. This statement corroborates the obvious fact that the relation between a literary text and its intertext is not necessarily one of imitation. Palliser's own comments on the novel are quite illuminating in this respect: he acknowledges having begun the book as a pastiche of Dickens, though he "had the sense to see it as grotesque" and he eventually recommends to read it as "a kind of defamiliarization of Dickens" (Madrigal 1991: 3).

Malone's and Palliser's remarks can be interpreted as pointing to a specific mode of discourse, which is parody. By contrast to imitation, parody marks the intersection of creation and re-creation, of invention and critique (Hutcheon 1985: 101), thus replacing what has become "a matter of course" with what now becomes "a matter of discourse" (Stewart 1979: 19). For Bakhtin (1973: 156), who was among the first to underline the dialogical character of each and every utterance, parody appropriates, as object, an existing discourse, but introducing into it an orientation diametrically opposed to the one it originally had. Thus, what is perceived in a parody is the clash of two voices, while, in an imitation, each of them is confused with one another.

In what follows, I will concentrate on one particular aspect of Palliser's work—the use and patterning of narrative voices in the text—as a means of illustrating the (parodic) nature of the relationship between the novel and its Victorian —mainly Dickensian— intertexts. The variety of narrators and the quality of their contributions constitute a kind of reflection *en abyme* of the way in which literary references and historical data are made to blend in the novel, as has already been pointed out. This fact, in turn, will help us to draw some conclusions regarding the work's attitude towards and final comment on its different—or, perhaps, not so different—intertexts: history, on the one hand, and literature, on the other.

When one thinks of nineteenth-century fiction—the context in which the literary narrator flourished fully for the first time—one of the first conventions that comes to mind is surely that of the omniscient narrator. Playing the role of presiding consciousness, continuously present in the text, the narrators of novels like *Vanity Fair* (1848), *Little Dorrit* (1855-57), or *Middlemarch* (1871-72), among many others, are invariably defined by their privileged access to the story they narrate, their indiscreet inclusiveness and their lack of individual identity. The main discourse of this fiction is that of an interpreting observer—engaged and distanced at the same time, performing a zig-zag between the "minutiae" of individual minds and the wide embracing awareness of a narrator that coincides with the total mind of mankind (Miller 1979: 88). The omniscient narrator is able to remember all the past perfectly,

to foresee the future course of events, and to penetrate with irresistible insight the most secret crevice in the heart of each man. Characters come and go, but the narrator is a constant: a necessity for the text yet only invisibly present.

In addition to the typical Victorian omniscient narrator, there are cases in which the narrative task falls on a character, who is usually the protagonist. This is the case, for instance, of *David Copperfield* and *Great Expectations*, where the main character narrates in the retrospect the earlier course of his life. The texture of both novels is made up of the superimposition of two voices: the *adult* David/Pip re-living his experiences as a *child*. In both novels the older narrator, from the vantage point of a later time, watches his purblind younger self engage more or less naively in relations with other people. Behind this double consciousness may be glimpsed the voice of the (implied) author who is reshaping events to make a novel out of them. From author, to narrator, to youthful protagonists, to other characters, the structure of these novels is also a pattern of harmonized voices.

Novels like *Bleak House* present, in turn, a combination of both methods. Because of the staggering breadth of Dickens' design the selection of a narrative instance is extraordinarily difficult. If the author chooses an omniscient narrator a good deal of emotional charge is lost, particularly if the narrator remains (as he must) sufficiently aloof from the actions and events he describes in order to avoid premature disclosures. On the other hand, a first-person narrator equally suffers from important disabilities. The most immediately obtrusive of these are physical and practical. How can a single character contribute evidence (as opposed to hearsay) of events which take place in London, Lincolnshire, Hertfordshire, sometimes simultaneously? The obvious solution to this dilemma is to have the omniscient and the restricted points of view alternating the narration between them (Donovan 1971: 101-102).

Devised in a similar way, the narrative structure of *The Quincunx* brings to mind that in *Bleak House*, which, in this sense, appears as its most probable intertext among Dickens' novels. Essential for producing suspense is the restricted point of view of the main narrator, John Huffam, who, like Esther Summerson, must give away enough to take hold of the reader's attention but not so much as to do away with the mystery. Like David Copperfield, or like Pip in *Great Expectations*, John Huffam tells the story of his life in the retrospect but keeping the narrowly focalized perspective of the younger, purblind character. Set against John's story we find a series of chapters narrated by Pentecost and Silverlight, two "Punch and Joan" puppeteers who help John round off his account narrating crucial episodes of

the plot to which he could not possibly have had access. These chapters work in a similar way to those told by the omniscient narrator in *Bleak House*, which are equally devised as a complement to Esther's partial account. For some time, as far as chapter 36 exactly, the voice that the reader hears in those sections which are not narrated by John is surrounded by an anonymity that may be misleading. In a review of *The Quincunx*, for instance, John Espey (1990: 3) comments on the complex questions posed by "an omniscient voice that, speaking from time to time, asks: what is the difference between equity and justice?." However, this is not "an omniscient voice" but the voice of the puppeteers. Yet what seems obvious in chapter 36 is not so evident before: the reader finds him/herself with, in all appearance, an impersonal voice that has access to all kinds of places without being physically present. Other features of the narrative technique in these chapters may be linked to what we find in many Victorian novels. One of them has to do with the use of the present tense. A lot has been said about the common Victorian enthusiasm for reading about the present. Conditioned by the common belief, sustained by subtitles and publishers' advertisements, that fiction's primary locale had to be present-day Britain, readers ordinarily opened a new novel expecting it to be indeed a "tale of the times." Even though the story might be set in a time several decades removed from the present, yet it remained topical because it still reflected the ideas, interests, and manners of the time when it was written rather than those of its putative setting and period. But the author could also bring the present as close to the reader as the resources of language permitted. Richard Altick (1991:160) points to the present-tense survey of the fogbound London scene in the opening pages of *Bleak House* as largely responsible for the illusory assumption, sustained by all the chapters narrated in the present tense, that the novel is set in the present. I do not mean with this that the present tense is used for the same purpose in *The Quincunx*, but the fact that it is employed in a considerable number of chapters, with a similar effect and in alternation with John's account in the past tense, strikes a cord in the reader's mind enough for him/her to perceive the intertextual echo. Similarly, other features of the narrative technique in those sections narrated by an initially unknown voice may be regarded as intertextual gestures by the reader. That is the case, for instance, with personal pronouns as they are used in paragraphs like the following:

> For once more *we* are outside Mompesson-house. This time it is ablaze with lights for it is one of Lady Mompesson's "Friday nights." *You* know the kind of thing: Weipert's band is playing

> quadrilles, the livery-servants are in evening dress. . . . (*Q* 203, emphasis added)

The first time the reader comes across these lines s/he may wonder who is behind the "we" and the "you" uttered by the narrator. The reader, perhaps? This would be the obvious answer in a Victorian novel and it is, at least, a probable possibility in a work like *The Quincunx*, which reproduces Victorian techniques with wonderful accuracy. Thackeray's constant use of "we" in addressing his readers was one of the major ways by which he maintained the intimate rapport with them; Meredith also employed the device, and the same goes for Trollope and for most nineteenth-century authors, who ensured in this way the continuity of a convention already parodied in Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*. This particular kind of relationship established between the Victorian (omniscient) narrator and the reader, thanks to which the latter has direct access to both minds and places, has also been parodied by contemporary writers like John Fowles in *The French Lieutenant's Woman*. But this is not the case in *The Quincunx*. The anonymous voice(s) that narrate(s) some of the sections of the novel stop(s) being so in Part Two. What seemed impersonal and external (heterodiegetic) becomes personal and internal (homodiegetic) as the narrators turn out to be characters in the novel. Thus, the already read must be re-interpreted in a new light.

After a number of chapters, some of them retrospectively narrated by John and others by this initially anonymous voice that always speaks in the present tense, the reader comes across two new characters: Mr. Pentecost and Mr. Silverlight, two puppeteers that live and work together, though they hold rather different views on life, society, literature, etc. In one of their endless discussions they start toying with the idea of writing a novel. For Pentecost, the only thing that matters is the plot itself, what the characters do, while for Silverlight action is meaningless without the motives that would help the reader draw the overall design underlining the characters' actions. As Miss Quilliam, Henrietta's ex-governess, comments, Pentecost's and Silverlight's views on fiction are complementary rather than in conflict, and she suggests that they should work together:

> "So perhaps you should collaborate. Mr. Silverlight could take responsibility for describing the motives of the characters (particularly, of course, in the upper ranks) while you, Mr. Pentecost, could concentre [sic] your talents upon the elements of plotting and intrigue." (*Q* 364)

Immediately, the reader is struck by two facts: the "anonymous" voice of previous chapters, and some of those still to come, is now revealed as belonging to the puppeteers. In addition, Silverlight, Pentecost, and John as well, are not only the first-level narrators but also the authors of a novel written in collaboration, the very novel we have in our hands. In the light of all this, the reader may start interpreting some data that can help him/her be more precise with regard to the identity of the "unknown" narrators. Thus, when Silverlight meets John and warns him against "the vulgar error of confusing Law and Equity" the reader should be reminded of the characters introduced by the narrative voice in chapter 1, two characters allegorically called, precisely, Law and Equity. Pentecost's view that only actions and not motives are relevant leads to a similar identification of the narrator in those sections where we find remarks like the one in chapter 14: "Though I shall, of course, not speculate on his motives, it seems that Mr. Sancious now believed that . . ." (*Q* 107). Accordingly, in those chapters narrated by Pentecost the narration concentrates on the things the characters have done, are doing or propose to do, without ever attempting to "speculate" on the motives behind their actions. In a different way, Silverlight uses allegorical names in an attempt to reveal what is most important for him: the abstract principles that motivate the characters' behaviour (Onega 1993a: 136). Sancious, an attorney, becomes "Law"; Barbellion, the Mompesson's solicitor and town agent, "Equity"; Sir Percival Mompesson, "Wealth"; his wife, "Arrogance"; etc. Also useful to identify the narrator(s) (sometimes only one of the puppeteers, other times both of them) are some of their typical remarks, and so, for example, the expletive "Fiddlesticks!" is linked to Pentecost while references to Ireland as "our sad sister-island" are connected with Silverlight.

The alternating quality of John's and the puppeteers' role as narrators is rounded by the fact that the narratees of those sections narrated by John turn out to be Silverlight and Pentecost (John addresses them directly on two occasions: *Q* 1089 and 1178), just as John is ultimately presented as the narratee of the chapters narrated by the puppeteers (this is most clearly seen when the latter are about to end their contribution and give John some advice for the future, though, as could be expected, they also disagree about the kind of advice to give: *Q* 1108 and 1151-2).

In more than one sense, the novel can be said to play with the reader's expectations. The realist-enhancing mechanisms, the narrative instance that can be taken and, in fact, has been taken (Bargreen 1990: L7; Espey 1991: 3) for an omniscient voice, the reader's feeling that such a voice seems to address him/her directly from time to time (Hellmuth 1991: F8), etc., provide

an apparently solid basis for the reader to draw some conclusions with regard to the generic quality of the text. At this initial stage, *The Quincunx* is not only seen as a novel but as a particular kind of novel, a work that resembles nineteenth-century fiction in all except in the time of production, "a book that Dickens himself might have written" (Lannon 1990: 1L). Talking about architextuality—one of the five subcategories of what he terms "transtextuality"—Genette (1989: 13) points out that the text is in no way obliged to acknowledge its generic quality explicitly. It is the reader who has to determine it and, I would add, it is also the reader who runs the risk of doing it wrongly. In the case of *The Quincunx*, the novel plays with that possibility. If, as Kristeva (1980: 66) has put it, intertextuality involves not merely the absorption but also the transformation of (an)other text(s), the reader of *The Quincunx* is led to perceive first the absorption, and only that, and then the transformation. From chapter 36 onwards both processes are seen to work simultaneously and, as things become clear, the contrast between the technique of an omniscient narrative instance and the one used by Silverlight and Pentecost appears more evident than ever: the puppeteers reconstruct the events as they *might* have happened and reveal nothing about the characters' motives (*Q* 973), following Pentecost's belief that only facts are important and that, consequently, speculation is completely irrelevant. The overpowering certainty of the nineteenth-century heterodiegetic narrator becomes a consciously flaunted insecurity with regard to the events in the story as told by the puppeteers, two homodiegetic narrators that, in addition, not only tell but also write the novel in collaboration with the autodiegetic narrator, John Huffam. Such a gap between Silverlight and Pentecost's narrative method and that of the nineteenth-century omniscient voice ultimately presents the puppeteers' contribution as a deliberate critique of the everywhere present and always infallible Victorian narrator.

According to Riffaterre (1987: 381), intertextual cross-references turn each reading into a re-reading, a revised interpretation of a preceding text or generic convention. From this point of view, the reader's perception of the above mentioned gap between narrative techniques leads him/her to reconsider the convention of the omniscient narrator, thus reacting to what can be interpreted as a covert form of literary criticism, a commentary, or even a metatextual relationship, behind the intertextual (or transtextual, if we follow Genette's terminology) gesture. The convention under scrutiny may then appear paradoxically at odds with the philosophy underlying the kind of fiction that gave it such a relevant role. Nineteenth-century literary realism was based on the creation of an utterly convincing illusion of reality, truth and objectivity. But, then, one wonders, what can be more unreal than the figure

of the omniscient narrator? His powers look more divine than human, he enjoys the absolute perfection of knowledge traditionally ascribed to God, and he is even superior to God in the sense that, as J. Hillis Miller (1990: 65) explains, while God's knowledge is of a world and of human souls which He himself has made, the omniscient narrators of Victorian fiction have a perfect knowledge of a world they *have not* made. By contrast to their Victorian counterparts, the two puppeteers display their knowledge of a world that, in important respects, has been "created" by them, as in the process of reconstructing the events that make up the story they are revealed to be both narrators and authors. This being so, Silverlight and Pentecost's account is somehow more realistic, precisely because it is more openly fictitious.

The puppeteers' frequent discussions and their conversations with John, who very soon becomes their pupil, provide a great deal of information about the characters behind such unusual names, rich in metaphorical connotations. Pentecost, the fiery reactionary, is a convinced Hobbesian and Utilitarian and, as John comments, regards society as "a spiderly, cannibalistic, irrational pursuit of self-interest" (*Q* 341). In his view, all social and economic life is governed by the Law of Necessity, and competition makes warfare between individuals and between classes absolutely inevitable since everyone hunts and preys upon everyone else. Far from condemning inequality, he manifests himself against charity, from the State or other sources, since men need the fear of starvation to make them work. These being his basic ideological principles, he sees life as random and arbitrary, hiding no overall meaning: all life is a risk in which there is no order or rationality. Silverlight, on the other hand, is a Deist and a Radical Democrat and so believes in reason as the ordering principle of society. For him, the notion that ideas are determined by economic circumstances is utterly wrong. On the contrary, one must start with abstract principles—Justice, Equality—and condemn society if it falls short when it is measured against them. Only in a society founded upon the Law of Reason, not that of Necessity, can Justice for all be won and society improved to the point of perfection. He defends the argument of a Design as proof of the existence of a Supreme Spirit of Reason, and, accordingly, he believes that there is a pattern in all that exists if only one has the wit to find it. The ideological principles that the puppeteers defend can always be found behind their respective accounts. In this sense, their divergent worldviews are all the more interesting on account of the fact that they include and, in many ways, determine a particular position towards art which explains most of the differences between the chapters narrated by Silverlight and those narrated by Pentecost. As has already been mentioned, Silverlight agrees not to speculate, though not without protest, and gives allegorical

names to the characters as an alternative way of revealing the motives behind their actions. He often feels himself tempted to digress (*Q* 203) and his prose can be more eloquent and vivid than his colleague's (*Q* 789). Pentecost calls the characters by their own names and his narration is more matter-of-fact and distant than that of Silverlight, who sometimes allows himself to express sympathy for some characters (*Q* 1107) or indignation, particularly with regard to the egoism and opulence of the upper classes (*Q* 1101).

However, in spite of the differences, Silverlight's and Pentecost's accounts must be considered as the complementary halves of a whole and should be analyzed in relation to John's narration in order to understand what constitutes one of the key points of the novel: the blurring of ontological boundaries, specifically between history and literature. We have already seen that the novel includes real historical data about the early nineteenth century and also openly literary episodes which enhance the novel's self-reflexive quality, and that, as a consequence, the reader's disbelief is alternatively suspended and re-awakened. The juxtaposition of John's and the puppeteers' accounts has a similar effect on the reader due to the respectively "historical" and "literary" quality of their contributions.[8] While John retrospectively tells events he himself has lived, the puppeteers' account is an overtly fictional reconstruction of the past in which the present tense verbs often point to the fact that they are telling not "what happened" but "what might have happened." It is enough to read the first lines of the novel to realize what their method is going to be like:

> It *must have been* late autumn of that year, and *probably* it was towards dusk for the sake of being less conspicuous. . . . Let us *imagine*, then, how Law *might have waited* upon Equity. (*Q* 3, emphasis added)

The difference between John's and the puppeteers' accounts ultimately recalls Aristotle's distinction between the historian, who tells events as they actually took place, and the poet, who is concerned not with reality but with probability. In *The Quincunx*, however, these two approaches are not presented as mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the juxtaposition of John's "historical" and the puppeteers' "literary" versions, and their intended complementarity, suggests the blurring of boundaries between history and literature and their levelling to the same—fictional—status, a fact that aligns *The Quincunx* with other postmodernist historiographic metafictions like John Fowles' *The French Lieutenant's Woman* and *A Maggot*, Umberto Eco's *Il nome de la rosa*, Lawrence Durrell's *Avignon Quintet*, A. S. Byatt's *Possession*, Rose Tremain's *Restoration*, etc. As Susana Onega (1993a: 133)

> Perhaps if the old lady [Miss Lydia] had lived I might have asked her about the words she had attributed to her Aunt Anna, but probably not. For I understood now that I could continue for ever to hear new and more complicated versions of the past without ever attaining to a final truth. (*Q* 1029)

The reader of *The Quincunx* is left exactly with the same feeling of uncertainty after going through a novel with such a complicated plot and in which the different versions of the past do not cohere in the end. The reader tries to relate these versions in order to find, like John Huffam, the pattern that leads to a sort of definite meaning. But that final truth, like the central part of the quincunxes[9] formed by the lozenges of the Old Hall, seems to recede as one approaches it.

What John Huffam learns about the unattainability of one definite truth, paralleled by what the reader interprets after reading and, perhaps, re-reading the novel, constitutes one of the basic tenets of Postmodernism and its concern with truth or, rather, with the dispersion and multiplication of truths. In Palliser's novel, such a dispersion of truths relies not only on the juxtaposition and intended complementarity of John's and the puppeteers' accounts, but also on the proliferation of narrative instances. The novel combines chapters narrated by five—a quincunx—main narrators: John, the puppeteers, and then, engulfed within John's narration, there are those sections narrated by Mary (mainly through her diary), Miss Quilliam (in the form of a retrospective "confession" addressed to Mary and overheard by John) and Mr. Escreet (another retrospective "confession" with John as narratee). To the complex pattern constituted by these five narrative instances, one should add the accounts of many other characters that contribute to John's quest with the narration of episodes of their own life-stories. From Miss Lydia to Mr. Nolloth, a whole gallery of characters mention these words at some point: "I will tell you my story." Such a proliferation of narrators that contribute with their versions of the past to the gradual unravelling of a design and the clearing out of a mystery acts perhaps as a reminder of the method used in one of the novel's intertexts, *The Woman in White*, except that in *The Quincunx* the result is just the opposite. There are eleven different narrators in Wilkie Collins' novel. The main one, Walter Hartright, explains in these terms the narrative method that is going to be used:

> When the writer of these introductory lines (Walter Hartright by name) happens to be more closely connected than others with the incidents to be recorded, he will describe them in his own person. When his experience fails, he will retire from the position of

> narrator; and his task will be continued . . . by other persons who can speak to the circumstances under notice from their own knowledge. (Collins 1955: 1)

Such a method is explicitly compared with a trial in which a number of witnesses are called to give evidence, thus reinforcing the truthfulness of each and every account. Different narrators contribute, then, in order to offer a version of events as complete and objective as possible. The truth can be apprehended and presented "in its most direct and most intelligible aspect" (1955: 1) and, in the end, the accounts produced by the several narrative instances fit like the pieces of a puzzle, the mysteries of the past are cleared out and a happy future opens before the protagonists at the end.

In opposition to such a smooth and straightforward rendering of events, *The Quincunx* offers a view which is far from the Victorian illusion of a complete world. The reader of Palliser's novel is forced to face, as John Huffam does at the diegetic level, the problematic nature of the past as an object of knowledge. As a child, John was already filled with a desire to belong, to have roots, to know of a time before he was born (*Q* 50). Throughout the novel, he listens to the stories of people who lived the events he is interested in and tries to put them together in order to produce, like the historian, a coherent account of the past. But he cannot; he proves to be unable to separate what is true from what is false, perhaps because all versions are equally true or equally false. Accordingly, the puppeteers' reconstruction of events is as truthful/fictional as John's or any of the other characters' accounts, and the historical data that the novel includes are as literary as those episodes related to other fictional works. In this sense, the novel can be seen as governed by Pentecost's assertion that "there is more truth in the silliest romance than in the most elevated history" (*Q* 363), a view with which Silverlight agrees and which has implications that link *The Quincunx* to contemporary novels like *Famous Last Words, Legs, Waterland, Shame, Hawksmoor, The Passion* and numberless other historiographic metafictions in which the intertexts of history and those of literature are invariably placed at the same—fictional—level.

We can conclude, then, that even if Palliser uses the techniques and conventions of Victorian fiction in general and of Dickens' novels in particular, he does so in order to express ideas and concerns which are not associated with those forms, thus introducing the critical distance required by parody. Palliser himself pointed out that he "wanted to let readers almost think that they were reading a Victorian novel, but then find internal reasons why it couldn't be" (in Onega 1993b: 281). The fact that the novel is crowded with intertextual echoes is, needless to say, relevant, but still more relevant is to

decide what attitude the text takes towards the prior literary corpus which it designates as its intertext. It is then that the reader must find the "internal reasons," as Palliser calls them, why *The Quincunx* cannot be a mere imitation of nineteenth-century literary tradition.

We have analyzed the defamiliarizing effects of parody in relation to the novel's narrative instances and the way in which they are characterized and combined in the text. What at first might be taken for an echo of the Victorian omniscient narrator turns out to be a parodic rewriting of such a convention, which ultimately presents reliability, truth and certainty as unattainable, a mere fiction in a world in which nothing, not even history, can be taken for granted. Thus, even if the book is a conscious homage to Dickens and to Victorian fiction in general, it is also, as the author himself has acknowledged, "a totally different way of seeing the world" (in Baldwin 1990: A30). Many other aspects of the novel support this remark, as is the case with the absence of a final closure, the moral ambiguity of the main character, the complex dialectics established not only between history and literature, but also between order and chaos, freedom and determinism, pattern and randomness, reality and fiction.... Thus, the openly fictional, inconclusive and plurivocal view of the world offered by *The Quincunx* should be interpreted, despite the novel's Victorian appearance, as a reflection of the ambivalent nature of the postmodernist ethos. If, as Patricia Waugh (1984: 67) has pointed out, literature has never been free and cannot be original, Palliser's novel constitutes a remarkable example of the complex dialectics by which the literature of the past can be turned into a wonderful vehicle to express the concerns of the present, forever replenishing, in this way, the apparently exhausted forms.

NOTES

1. The research carried out for the writing of this paper has been financed by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (DGICYT, Programa Sectorial de Promoción General del Conocimiento, nº PS94-0057).

2. She uses the phrase to describe "those well-known and popular novels which are both intensely self-reflexive and yet paradoxically also lay claim to historical events and personages" (1988: 5).

3. It is the first real map to show individual houses in London. It was done by a single man and it took fifteen years. The cartographer engraved and printed this map, which is on twenty two sheets, but then went bankrupt and died in poverty (Madrigal 1991: 3).

4. *The Quincunx* 508. Hereafter the abbreviation *Q* will be used in parenthetical references.

5. Hebel's approach argues for an understanding of allusions—to both literary and non-literary points of reference—as metonymic fragments of the (poststructuralist) *texte général*.

6. In this sense, it may be interesting to recall that Palliser's third novel, *Betrayals* (1994), is a parody of detective fiction and that, as the author has himself explained, he is at present "immersed in the next novel which will be a thriller whodunnit!" (Letter to Susana Onega, Sept. 3 1994). I am grateful to Susana Onega for letting me quote from an unpublished letter.

7. It brings to mind Trollope's *Palliser Novels*.

8. This combination of history and literature appears, then, at many levels within the novel. The reader should not miss the relevance of apparently innocent data, as is the case with John's comments on some of his favourite readings. These include, on the one hand, *The Arabian Tales* and some of the main titles of Gothic fiction, and, on the other hand, much more matter-of-fact accounts of reality like Defoe's *Journal of the Plague Year* and Goldsmith's *History of Greece and Rome*. These contrasts are finally synthesized in Sir Walter Scott's romances, "those works in which narrative and history are so adroitly blended and made to change places" (*Q* 49). Such a remark could perfectly be applied to *The Quincunx* itself and supports the metafictional fact that John is the co-author of the novel as well as its protagonist and autodiegetic narrator.

9. The quincunx is not only the title of the book, it is also an important element of the plot that keeps on appearing throughout the story (thus, for instance, different versions of the quincunx of roses constitute the coats of arms of the *five* branches of the Huffam family). Moreover, the quincunx is the pattern that governs the novel's formal structure. For a detailed explanation of the way in which the work's twenty five books (five times five) are arranged as well as of the symbolic dimension of the quincunx, see Onega 1993a.

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SUBJECT CLAUSES IN OLD ENGLISH: DO THEY REALLY EXIST?*

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1. INTRODUCTION

In recent accounts of Old and Middle English syntax (e.g. Traugott 1992: 234; Fischer 1992: 312-3), the existence of complement clauses in subject function has been denied, basically on the grounds that, in these early periods, complement clauses failed to occur in sentence-initial position.[1] Accordingly, clauses which could on the basis of their Present-day English (PDE) counterparts be regarded as subjects have been provided with alternative analyses. In this paper, I will first raise my objections to the alternative analyses put forward in the literature. Secondly, I will show that there are indeed certain complement types in Old English (OE) which are best analysed as subjects. And, finally, I will argue that position is not a valid criterion for subjecthood in this early period. The examples which will be presented in the course of this discussion have been primarily drawn from a corpus of OE prose comprising ca. 100,000 words from King Alfred's *Cura Pastoralis* (*CP*) and Ælfric's *Lives of Saints* (*ÆLS*) (Méndez Naya 1995).[2] The *Helsinki Corpus of English Texts. Diachronic and Dialectal* (Rissanen *et al.* 1991) has also been used as a source for additional material.

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Let us start by considering one example in which the subordinate clause could be analysed as a subject:

(1) Me ȝincȝ **ȝæt ȝu bæde ȝinum bearnum fyrstes. to ȝi ȝæt**
to-me seems that you ask(ptsb) for your children time so that

ȝu gelyfdest. heora leasum gedwyldum. (*ÆLS* V, 163)
you believe their false heresies

"It seems to me that you have asked a respite for your children so that you may believe their lying heresies"[3]

When it comes to deciding the function of clauses such as the one in bold type in (1), which depends on a so-called impersonal verb, the position of the subordinate clause within the larger construction has been taken to be a crucial piece of evidence against its subject status. As Fischer and van der Leek put it (1983: 349), in the "assumption that the *ȝæt*-clause functions as subject, there is not a readily available explanation why such clauses never occur *in initial (=canonical subject) position*" [emphasis added]. There is also, in their opinion, a strong "theoretical reason for analysing [the *ȝæt*-clause] as object and not as subject," namely that SOV languages like OE, generally place clausal objects in the rightmost position. Similar statements are frequently found in the literature. Thus, for instance, Visser states that the probability of clauses depending on impersonal verbs "not being a causative complement is slight, *since [they are] never placed before the verb"* [emphasis added] (1963-73: §32).

Furthermore, the issue, that clauses could not be subjects in OE, is not restricted to clauses depending on impersonal verbs. Traugott (1992: 234ff), in her discussion of finite complements in OE, also denies subject status to clauses such as that in (2), which shows a NP in connection with the verb BEON, and (3), her example (165), which involves an AdjP + BEON.

(2) Forðon hit is ungecyndelicu ofermodgung **ðæt se mon wilnige**
therefore it is unnatural presumption that the man want(sb)

ðæt hiene his gelica ondræde, (*CP* 108/11)
that him his equal fear (sb)

"Therefore it is unnatural presumption for a man to wish to be feared by his equals"

(3) dyslic bið **ȝæt hwa woruldlice speda forhogie for manna**
foolish is that someone worldly goods despise for of-men

herunge
praise (*ÆCHom* I, 4·60.32)

"It is foolish to despise worldly goods in order to win the praise of men"

Again, the only explicit argument against a subject analysis for such sequences is that "unlike in PDE, noun clauses cannot occur in sentence-initial position" (Traugott 1992: 234). Alternatively, she claims that the clause in (2) may be regarded as a complement of a NP, while that in (3) "could be an oblique NP functioning as a stimulus" (Traugott 1992: 235; see also Hopper and Traugott 1993: 189).

Let us now focus our attention on the alternative analyses posited for (1)-(3), that is, clauses as objects of impersonal verbs, clauses as complements to nominal predicates and clauses as complements to adjectival predicates.

2. CLAUSES AS OBJECTS OF IMPERSONAL VERBS

In order to deny subjecthood to clauses depending on the so-called impersonal verbs, a further argument to that of position has been adduced, that is, that a construction such as that in (1) above already has a subject or, at least, a "pseudo-subject," the experiencer NP, *me*. In the opinion of some scholars (e.g., Elmer 1981: 8, 48; Allen 1986, 1995), oblique experiencers[4] of impersonal verbs are endowed with some subject properties, despite their accusative or dative marking.[5] They behave like subjects under certain syntactic processes (e.g., coordinate subject deletion or deletion of subjects of dependent infinitives, cf. Elmer 1981: 63; Allen 1986: 393) and they share at least one of the semantic properties of prototypical subjects in that they denote animate beings.[6] Moreover, they only fail to show one of the three main coding properties of subjects, namely nominative marking,[7] while they show already initial position in OE and can also trigger verb agreement in late Middle English (ME) and early Modern English, (see Butler 1977). Thus, if the experiencer is in fact the subject of the construction, the subordinate clause must serve, therefore, a different function, which is generally agreed to be that of object (see Visser 1963-73: §32; Fischer and van der Leek 1983: 348-9).[8] So far the argumentation is rather convincing. Nevertheless, it comes into conflict with the linguistic facts, since not all

structures showing an impersonal verb in construction with a clause have experiencer NPs. Some of them lack this element. Alternatively, they may show the pronoun *hit*, as in example (4) below (from Traugott 1992: 236, her example [166]):

(4) **Hit** gedafenað þæt alleluia sy gesungen (*ÆCHom* II, 9.74.78)
it is-fitting that Alleluiah be sung

"It is fitting that Alleluiah should be sung"

However, such instances posit no problems, since *hit* can be seen as a dummy subject with no cataphoric reference to the complement, whose only function seems to be to keep the verb in the second position.[9] However, problems do arise when, as in (5) below, an experiencer NP (*nanum ricum cyningce*) and *hit* co-occur in the same clause. In such cases subject-assignment is not straightforward. Which of the two elements is to be analysed as the subject? Both of them?

(5) Nu cweðe we þæt **hit** ne gerist **nanum ricum** cyningce þæt hi ealle
now say we that it not befits no powerful king that they all

beon þeowe menn ðe him þenian sceolon. (*ÆLS* XVII, 260)
be slave men REL him serve must

"then say we, that it becometh not any rich king, that they all should be slaves who serve him"

For these structures Elmer proposes the subject analysis for the pronoun *hit*, while the "experiencer" NP is seen as the indirect object, something which is not very consistent with his analysis of (4) and similar examples (1981: 51).[10] Allen (1995: 140 fn 49) states that, in a case such as (5), *hit* and the clausal argument share the subject function, and thus explicitly admits that "the propositional Theme can be assigned to the subject role" (1995: 140).

Along with the different structures we have just seen, there are also cases in which a so-called impersonal verb takes a clause as sole argument, thus lacking both experiencer and *hit*. On such occasions, could we put forward that the construction is subjectless? Or is the clause to be analysed as subject? The latter opinion is held by Molencki, who claims that the existence of examples such as (6) "provides even stronger evidence for treating the extraposed clause as the subject of the whole sentence" (1991b: 59).

(6) Betwux ðysum gelamp þæt of life gewat þære wudewan sunu.
in the meantime happened that from life departed of-the widow son
(*ÆLS* XVIII, 69)

"In the meantime it befell that the widow's son departed from life"

In addition to position, a further argument against subject analysis for clauses depending on so-called impersonal verbs is found in Fischer and van der Leek (1983). These authors show that there is evidence that, in some cases at least, the clauses under study cannot be subjects, since they correlate with pronouns in the oblique case. (7) below, from Fischer and van der Leek (1983: 348, their [8]), illustrates one such example:[11]

(7) hwæt, we genog georne witan ðæt nanne mon(ACC) **þæs**(GEN) ne tweoþ
well we enough readily know that to no man of this not doubt is

þæt se sie strong on his mægene þe mon gesihð þæt
that he is strong in his strength whom one sees that

stronglic weorc wyrcð. (*Bo*; Sedgefield 1899: 38)
strongly works perform

"Well, we know readily enough that for no one there is doubt about this, that he is strong who can be seen to perform powerful works"

According to Fischer and van der Leek, (7) would be a genuine case of impersonal or subjectless construction (type [i] in their terminology), with an "experiencer" NP marked for the accusative case (*nanne mon*), a verb in the 3rd person singular (*tweoþ*) and a "cause" surfacing as a clause parallel to the genitive pronoun *þæs*. The pattern of type (i) constructions is summarised in (8) below:

(8) **Type (i) true impersonal or subjectless construction** (cf. Fischer and van der Leek 1983: 355)

"experiencer"	**V**	**"cause"**
dat/acc NP		gen/acc NP/PP clause

I do agree with Fischer and van der Leek in that in (7) the clause is indeed an oblique object and not the subject, but what about (1) and similar examples, which lack the oblique pronoun correferential with the clause? Or those ex-

amples which show a provisional *hit* or *þæt*, marked for the nominative, apparently in apposition with the clausal "cause," as in (4) and (5)?

It seems to me that to argue for the objecthood of all clauses depending on impersonal verbs on the evidence of (7) is not a convenient solution, particularly as it relies on the evidence of a most uncommon pattern in OE. Yet, the object analysis would be possible if the occurrence of impersonal verbs were restricted to structures of type (i). However, this is not the case. Along with type (i), another syntactic pattern is available in which the "cause" shows nominative marking. This is what Fischer and van der Leek term type (ii) or the "cause-subject" construction, which is illustrated in (9):[12]

(9) **Type (ii) "cause- subject" construction** (cf. Fischer and van der Leek 1983: 355)

"experiencer"	V	"cause"
dat/acc NP		nom NP clause

From the comparison of (8) and (9), it should become apparent that when the "cause" is conveyed by a clause, the construction is indeterminate between type (i) and type (ii). As Anderson puts it (1986: 175), "the distinction [between the two types BMN] is obliterated." This leads Denison (1990) to posit the existence of what he calls type (i/ii), which includes, not only cases such as that in (1), but also constructions in which the argument "cause" is conveyed by a morphologically ambiguous NP. This indeterminate construction is so frequent in the OE material that Denison claims that it "should be given due recognition in [its] own right" (1990: 119).

From what we have seen so far, it seems that we cannot determine the status of clauses depending on impersonal verbs in most cases, with the exception of patterns such as that in (7), unless we are willing to accept that the only reason for their not being subjects is that they fail to occur sentence-initially.

3. CLAUSES AS COMPLEMENTS TO NOMINAL PREDICATES

Let us now turn to the consideration of examples involving an NP and the verb BEON, as illustrated in (2), which is repeated here for convenience:

(2) Forðon hit is ungecyndelicu ofermodgung ðæt se mon wilnige ðæt
therefore it is unnatural presumption that the man want(sb) that

hiene his gelica ondræde, (*CP* 108/11)
him his equal fear (sb)

Traugott suggests that in such a construction the clause might be a complement of the noun "in the absence of evidence that the complement must be a subject" (1992: 235) (one would imagine that the evidence she is referring to is the fact that it fails to occur preverbally).

Let us now consider (10) below, which is a clear instance of noun complementation:

(10) [...] and forcearf his mentles ænne læppan to tacne ðæt he his
and cut of-his coat one lappet as sign that he of-him

geweald ahte.
power had (*CP* 196/21)

"...and cut off a corner of his coat, as a sign of having had him in his power"

Although there is an obvious similarity between (2) and (10), namely both of them involve an NP and a clause, the construction in (10) differs from that in (2) in several respects. Firstly, the type of NP involved is not necessarily the same. Predicates taking nominal complementation (henceforth NomCOMP) are typically associated, both from a derivational and a semantic point of view, with transitive verbs with clausal complements. The noun TACN "sign, symbol, indication" is thus related to the verb TACNIAN "show, indicate." However, such a relationship does not necessarily hold in the case of nouns occurring in connection with the verb BEON (henceforth NP+ BEON) in examples such as (2). The noun OFERMODGUNG "pride, presumption" in (2) is indeed related to a verb, OFERMODGIAN "to be proud, arrogant." This verb, however, is intransitive.[13] Secondly, the crucial difference between (2) and (10) is that the *þæt*-clauses involved are complements at different levels. Whereas the subordinate clause in (2) is a complement at clause level, its predicate being NP (*ungecyndelicu ofermodgung*) + BEON, the embedded clause in (10) cannot be said to be part of the argument structure of the verb *forcearf*. It clearly functions as a complement within NP structure. The existence of examples similar to (10) in which the clausal complement of the noun TACN is parallel to a genitive

pronoun *ƿæs*, as in (11) below, testifies to the status of the *ƿæt*-clause as a complement to a noun:

(11) **ƿæs** is to tacne, ƿæt he mid ƿone biscop in ƿæt foresprecenan wicum
of-that is as sign that he by the bishop in the aforesaid office

for his wyrðnesse & for his geornfullnesse betweoh ƿa broðor wæs
for his integrity & for his diligence among the brothers was

hæfd.
had

(850-950. Bede, *Ecclesiastical History*, p. 264)

"It is a sign of this, that he was well considered by the bishop among the brothers in the aforesaid office for his integrity and for his diligence"

This difference as regards levels of complementation becomes evident in cases of double embedding, such as the one reproduced in (12):

(12) Ðæt is to tacne ƿæt mon endebyrdlice ðone biscepdom halde, **ƿæt he**
that is as sign that one orderly the bishop's office hold that he
hiene on godum weorcum geendige. (*CP* 52/22)
it in good works end

"It is a proof of a bishop's holding his office well for him to end it with good works"

Here we cannot argue that the *ƿæt*-clause in bold type is the complement of the noun TACN, since this predicate already has a complement, namely the clause *ƿæt mon endebyrdlice ðone biscepdom halde*. It seems, rather, that it is an argument of the predicate *to tacne*...BEON, i.e. the subject. It is also worthy of note that in (12) the pronoun correlating with the clause (*ƿæt*) is not marked for the genitive, as in (11) above, but shows nominative marking. This constitutes a further argument for the subject status of the clause.[14] Moreover, to analyse the first *ƿæt*-clause as a complement to TACN and the second *ƿæt*-clause as the subject of the construction also explains why they cannot be interchanged without variation in meaning.

4. CLAUSES AS COMPLEMENTS TO ADJECTIVAL PREDICATES

A structure similar to the one just discussed is illustrated in (3), repeated here for ease of reference, which shows an AdjP in connection with the verb BEON (henceforth AdjP+BEON):

(3) dyslic bið **ƿæt hwa woruldlice speda forhogie for**
foolish is that someone worldly goods despise for

manna herunge. (*ÆCHom* I, 4 60.32)
of-men praise.

For such cases, Traugott claims that "the clause could be an oblique NP functioning as a stimulus" (1992: 235). However, here the case for recognising two different structures (clauses as complements to adjectival predicates (henceforth AdjCOMP) and clauses as subjects of the predicate AdjP+BEON) is stronger than in the case of NP+BEON. Alongside the syntactic difference as regards levels of complementation, there is a remarkable semantic difference between the adjectives entering the two constructions. Thus, while adjectives in AdjCOMP normally refer to an animate—usually human—being and generally denote a mental activity or attitude on his/her part, those in the construction AdjP+BEON have the whole proposition in their scope and frequently involve an evaluation (see Elsness 1981: 292, 294; Quirk *et al.* 1985: §16.73). These two types of adjectives are labelled by Bolinger (1961: 377) "personal" and "impersonal" respectively. An "impersonal" adjective, DYSLIC "foolish" can be seen in example (3) above. In (13) we find a specimen of AdjCOMP. As can be seen, the adjective WYRÐE refers to *ic*, and not to the whole of the proposition. It is, then, a "personal" adjective if we use Bolinger's terms.

(13) Heo cwæð ic wat geare ƿæt ic wel wyrðe eom. ƿæt min swura beo
she said I know verily that I well worthy be that my neck be

geswenct mid swylcere untrumnysse. (*ÆLS* XX, 54)
afflicted with such malady

"She said, I know verily that I am well deserving that my neck should be afflicted with so great a malady"

Furthermore, as was the case with NomCOMP, where an instance of AdjCOMP shows a pronoun correlating with the clausal complement, this is inflected for the genitive case (see [14] below). By contrast, in the construction AdjP+BEON the pronoun is invariably nominative *hit* or *þæt*, as in (15):

(14) hwonne he ðæs wyrðe sie ðæt he hiene beswican mote.
when he of-that worthy be(sb) that he him deceive may
(*CP* 226/11)

"when he is fit to be deceived"

(15) **Hit** is swutol þæt heo wæs ungewemmed mæden (*ÆLS* XX, 107)
it is evident that she was unspotted virgin

"It is evident that she was an unspotted virgin"

Given the abovementioned differences, I hope to have shown the convenience of positing the existence of two distinct structures, AdjCOMP on the one hand, and one involving AdjP+BEON, on the other, in which the clause is the subject of the whole construction.

5. CLAUSES DEPENDING ON PASSIVE MATRICES

In her discussion of finite complements in OE, Traugott does not mention one particular construction in which, from my point of view, the clause can be analysed as subject. Here I am referring to clauses depending on passive matrices, as illustrated in (16) below:

(16) Hit is awriten on Paules bocum **ðæt sio Godes lufu sie geðyld.**
it is written in Paul's books that the God's love be(sb) patience
(*CP* 214/21)

"It is written in Paul's books that the love of God is patience"

(16) can be viewed as the passive counterpart of (16a), an invented example:[15]

(16a) Paulus awrat ðæt sio Godes lufu sie geðyld.

Taking equivalence to NPs as a criterion for function, we should conclude that the subordinate clause in this invented example is the object of

AWRITAN, since it is equivalent to an accusative NP object, as becomes clear if we compare it to (17) below, in which AWRITAN takes an NP complement:

(17) Petrvs se apostol awrat **twegen pistolas**(ACC)
Peter the apostle wrote two apostolic letters
(950-1050. Aelfric, *Letter to Sigeweard,* p. 56)

As is well known, in OE only accusative objects could be promoted to the subject function under passivisation (see Mitchell 1985: §748). Thus the passive counterpart of (17) would be (17a), in which the NP *twegen pistolas* becomes the subject.

(17a) Twegen pistolas wurdon/sindon awriten...

If the *þæt*-clause in (16a) is seen as equivalent to an accusative NP, I cannot think of any other plausible analysis for the embedded clause in (16) than that of subject.

6. PREVERBAL POSITION, A CRITERION FOR SUBJECTHOOD IN OLD ENGLISH?

It seems then that the only reason why the clauses under discussion should not be regarded as subjects is that they fail to occur sentence-initially. In Hopper and Traugott's words, "the crucial evidence for the emergence of subject complements is the presence of complements in subject [i.e. initial BMN] position" (1993: 189). In other words, clausal complements in final position cannot be regarded as subjects because they do not have preverbal counterparts.

We should now consider whether initial position is such a strong piece of evidence for subjecthood in OE. Is it evidence enough to deny subject status to sequences that never occur preverbally? It seems convenient to turn now to NP subjects and see whether they were typically preverbal in the period under study. Some statistics may be of use here. Bean (1983) reports that, in her material,[16] the percentage of preverbal subjects in main clauses amounts to 57.1% as opposed to 42.9% of post-verbal subjects, a figure, however, far from negligible (1983: 67, Table 4.2). Moreover, her two major patterns in main clauses, X'VS (in which X' is an adverbial) and SVX are found in almost the same proportion (30.4% vs. 31.8% respectively) (see Bean 1983: 67). In the light of this evidence, it seems, firstly, that we

cannot posit the existence of a canonical position for subjects in OE and, secondly, that initial position cannot even be considered the statistical prototype.

Example (18) is an illustration of pattern X'VS, with a postverbal subject.

(18) Her cuomon **twegen aldormen**(NOM) on Bretene. Cerdic & Cynric
here came two noblemen to Britain Cerdic & Cynric

his sunu, mid v scipum. (850-950. *Ango-Saxon Chronicle*, p. 10)
his son with 5 ships

"In this year two noblemen came to Britain, Cerdic and Cynric, his son, with five ships"

Examples such as (18) can easily be accounted for by the so-called "verb second" order typical in main clauses. In OE subject-verb inversion is very common when a constituent, typically an adverbial, occurs in initial position. But what makes this postverbal NP a subject, if not its position in the clause? In this connection, the following quotation from Traugott is particularly enlightening:

> Subjectivalization in OE is a grammatical process by which one NP is assigned nominative case; it then determines the number in the verb. [...] In NE [New English] subjectivalization is a grammatical process by which one NP is assigned a particular position (usually the left-most NP slot in the sentence) and then determines the number in the verb. *The difference in the two characterizations is the result of changes in the case system and in word order that have occurred between OE and NE.* [emphasis added] (1972: 81)

In other words, subjects in OE are not assigned a specific position in the clause, as opposed to PDE. In OE, a NP can be considered the subject of its clause provided that it is marked for the nominative and triggers verb concord.[17] Now, if, as seen, preverbal position is not a necessary condition for NP subjects in OE, why should it be given such an emphasis when the candidate for subjecthood is a clause instead of a NP?

Some studies on OE word-order, such as Koopman (1996) show that inversion after an initial constituent is almost the rule with nominal subjects, while pronominal subjects do not necessarily undergo inversion.[18] The weight of the constituent in subject function may play a role in such a tendency, since in OE heavy material tends to be shifted to the end of the sentence by the so-called principle of end-weight (see Stockwell 1977: 305ff.; Traugott 1992: 276). If the principle of end-weight has such an effect on NPs, its effect on subordinate clauses, which are, by definition, heavy material, should be more even powerful. It will be so strong as to obligatorily place clausal subjects in sentence-final position. In fact, the force of the principle of end-weight in OE is such that it even applies in one of the constructions for which extraposition is absolutely precluded in later periods, namely in the case of double embedding, of which (12) above is an illustration.

ME instances of subject clauses in initial position are also very rare (see Dekeyser 1984: 193; Fischer 1992: 313), though some examples have been found (see Warner 1982: 107-8). It is worth noting that some of these early examples, as (19) and (20), entail double embedding,[19] which seems to suggest that the tendency towards end-weight was not as strong in ME as it had been in the OE period. Particularly telling is example (19), since it shows exactly the same syntactic structure as (12), with one clause in subject function and another clause as complement of a nominal predicate, BITACNUNG "sign, symbol," the only difference with (12) being the position of the subject clause.

(19) Þet þis scheld naveð siden, is for bitacnunge þet his deciples, þe schulden stonden bi him and habben ibeon his siden, fluhen alle from him ant leafden him as fremede. (*Ancrene Wisse*, 513).

(20) And þat Crist touchide þis leprouse techiþ us now þat þe manhede of Crist was instrument to his godhede. (*Wycl.Ser.* i.90.3; from Warner 1982: 108).

In laying so much emphasis on preverbal position, scholars have applied a criterion which is valid only for PDE to earlier stages of English, disregarding "changes in the case system and in word order that have occurred between OE and NE," to use Traugott's expression.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the foregoing discussion I have dealt with the alternative analyses posited in the literature for clauses which could be considered subjects on the basis of their PDE counterparts. I have shown that there exist some clauses which are best analysed as subjects, namely those depending on passive matrices of verbs taking accusative objects. I have also shown that, pace Traugott, not

all clauses found in connection with nouns or adjectives should be analysed as instances of NomCOMP or AdjCOMP. In some cases the subject analysis seems preferable, given the type of noun or adjective involved and the difference in levels of complementation (clausal vs. phrasal). With clauses depending on "impersonal" verbs the analysis is, in most cases, problematic. Only a few of them can positively be shown not to be subjects (those with an oblique pronoun correlating with the clause). These are best analysed as objects. In most cases, however, conclusive evidence against their subject status is lacking. Finally, I have argued that preverbal position is not a valid criterion for subjecthood in OE, and therefore, the fact that clausal complements fail to occur pre-verbally cannot be taken as a key argument to deny their subject status. Thus, paraphrasing Traugott, we can conclude by saying that the clauses under discussion can be analysed as subjects "in the absence of evidence" that they could be something else.

NOTES

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1. It must be pointed out, however, that this is not a generalised opinion. In early studies on impersonals, such as van der Gaaf (1904) or Wahlén (1925), clauses depending on the so-called impersonal verbs are regarded as subjects. Such an analysis, also applied to structures containing AdjP BEON or NP BEON, is found in recent historical accounts on complementation, such as Warner (1982) or Molencki (1991a).

2. The editions used in this article are, for *CP*, Sweet's (EETS Original Series No. 45) and for *ÆLS*, Skeat's (EETS Original Series Nos. 76 and 82, reprinted in one volume in 1966). The Alfredian selection includes the whole of Cotton MS; citation will be made by page and line. As for *Lives of Saints*, my selection comprises the preface to the whole collection and the following *Lives*: *St. Alban, St. Apollinaris, Ash-Wednesday, St. Æthelthryth, On Auguries, St Basilius, St. Eugenia, St. Julian and his wife Bassilissa, From the Book of Kings, St. Maur, Memory of the Saints, Nativity of our Lord Jesus Christ, The Forty Soldiers*, and *St. Swithun*. Citation is by number of *Life* in Skeat's edition and line.

3. Translations of *CP* and *ÆLS* are Sweet's or Skeat's respectively. The remaining translations are mine unless otherwise stated.

4. As a general rule, experiencers are coded in the dative case. Occasionally, they may be marked for the accusative. E.g., *hine hyngreþ* 'he is hungry'.

5. In considering the experiencer NP as a pseudo-subject Elmer and Allen follow a line of thought which emerged with Keenan (1976), according to whom the function "subject" is conceived as a prototypical category defined by a series of properties (coding, behavioural and semantic), such that if one NP in a clause has a clear preponderance of subject properties, then it will be considered the subject of that clause.

6. In her 1995 monograph on so-called subjectless constructions, Allen further elaborates her claim about the subjecthood of some experiencer NPs. Evidence from coordinate subject deletion shows that the only experiencers which can always be regarded as subjects are those of verbs which only occur in genuine impersonal constructions of the type *oððæt him* (dat) *wlatode þære gewilnunge* (gen) "until there was nausea in him for the desire" (*ÆHom* 21 89, quoted from Allen 1995: 70) and those in construction with a clause, as in *þonne ðam menn* (dat) *ne lyst on his life nan god don* (inf. clause) "when the man does not wish to do any good in his life" (*ÆLS* XVI, 297, quoted from Allen 1995: 86) (see Allen 1995: 112-3). Experiencers of verbs such as LĪCIAN, which also take a nominative NP, as in *ðam wife þa word wel licodon* "those words pleased the woman well" (950-1050. *Beowulf*, p. 21), allow, in Allen's view, a double analysis as objects or as subjects (see Allen 1995: 114-5).

7. Non-nominative subjects have been proved to exist in a number of languages. See Shibatani (1977) for Japanese and Korean; Klaiman (1980) for Bengali; Shridhar (1977) for Kannada; Andrews (1976), Thráinson (1980) and Maling (1980) for Icelandic.

8. Elmer, however, does not make it clear what the function of the clausal complement is. Apparently, he does not regard the clause as an object —he speaks of "sentential complements" in "intransitive constructions" (1981: 9).

9. Elmer views *it* as a "purely formal syntactic element," which is "semantically empty" (1981: 52-3). Traugott speaks of "an empty element without any anaphoric or cataphoric properties," although she also recognises that "when a sentential complement is involved, the syntactic analysis is not always so clear" (1992: 217). In my opinion, *hit* can be regarded as an anticipatory or provisional subject, with cataphoric reference to the postposed clause, which is the genuine subject of the construction.

10. In order to make amends for this inconsistency, Elmer proposes to analyse the experiencer as "a 'squishy subject', allowing it to take several values on a scale between pure subject and object status, without necessarily reducing it to either" (Elmer 1981: 51).

11. Fischer and van der Leek also adduce an example of a coordinate construction where an oblique pronoun in one conjunct parallels a clause in the second conjunct as evidence against the subject analysis (1983: 349, their example [9]). Parallel elements generally have the same case form.

and **þæs** us ne scamað na, ac us scamað swyþe **þæt we**
and of-that us not shames never but us shames very that we

bote aginnan swa swa bec tæcan.
atonement begin as books teach
(*Wulfstan*; Whitelock 1967: 91)

"and to us there is no shame at all in that, but there is shame to us to begin atonement as the books teach us"

12. It should be noted that impersonal verbs can also occur in the so-called "experiencer-subject" construction, in which the experiencer is marked for the nominative

case, as in *gif we ðonne scomiað ðæt we to uncuðum monnum suelc sprecen hu durre we ðonne to Gode suelc sprecan?* "If we are ashamed to speak like that to strangers, how dare we speak like that to God?" (*CP* 63/5). In this construction the clause is unambiguously an object.

13. It should be admitted, however, that in many cases a noun may enter both constructions. Such is the case of ÞEARF "need," which appears in NomCOMP in *Ac ðæs is ðearf ðæt mon ðone frefre þe on ðæm ofne asoden biþ his iermða* (*CP* 184/2) "But there is need of this, that he who is melted in the furnace of his miseries be consoled," and in connection with NP+BEON in *Hit is ðearf ðæt sio hond sio ær geclænsod þe wille ðæt fenn of oðerre aðerran* (*CP* 74/22) "It is necessary for the hand to have been cleaned beforehand which is to wipe off the dirt from the other."

14. Provided that we assume that *þæt* could be used as an anticipatory subject. Otherwise, the clause could be seen as an appositive clause.

15. (16a) is a perfectly grammatical example, on the basis of instances such as *Eac se apostol Paulus awrat þæt he wæs gelæd oð þa ðriddan heofenan, & he ðær gehyrde ða digelan word ðe nan man sprecan ne mot.* "The apostle Paul also wrote that he had been taken to the third heaven and that there he heard the secret words that no one is allowed to utter" (Aelfric, *De Temporibus Anni*, p. 2).

16. Bean (1983) studies word order patterns in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*.

17. It must be admitted that such criteria do not apply for clauses, since they are not marked for case and they invariably trigger 3rd person singular concord.

18. Koopman (1996) shows that the order XVS, with the subject in postverbal position was particularly common for nominal subjects. In Koopman's material, which comprises *ÆCHom* I and II, *ÆLS* and *Or*, postverbal nominal subjects occur in 82% of all cases when X is an object, in 78% of cases if X is a PP and in 65% of all cases if X is an adverbial (*þa* excluded). By contrast, inversion with pronominal subjects takes place in 1% of cases if X=O; in 2% if X=PP and 42% of cases if X=adv.

19. Warner reports that instances of subject clauses in initial position are found "as subject of BE (with various predicates), BITOKENE, TECHE, TELLE" (1982: 198). The example he quotes, reproduced here as (20) is one of double embedding.

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"O SOLE MIO!"

THE SUN IN PROUST'S "SÉJOUR À VENISE"·

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Paul de Man (1979: 69) speaks of a "solar myth" in *A la recherche du temps perdu.*[1] Solar images are often involved in rhetorical displacements bearing on some of the novel's central subjects, such as love, desire, memory, and identity. The solar passage from Proust's novel I want to examine here is perhaps the most extraordinary of all, and the most complex. It comes at the end of the "Séjour à Venise."[2] This section is presented as the third stage in Marcel's "nearing total indifference with regard to Albertine" after her death (F4:1108; E3:637; this sentence is relegated to a footnote in the new Pléiade edition). Marcel's account of his visit to Venice has a complex three-dimensional existence. It is complicated both in the sequence of its episodes and in the layers of previous drafts that underlie each episode. It has that three-dimensional depth in space and time that Marcel says, in a passage from "Le temps retrouvé," he wants for the novel he is going to write. That passage (F4:608; E3:1087) uses a figure of planetary revolution to describe the way Marcel is related to his past self and to the various characters who have figured in his life.

The intricate structure of final text, variants, and drafts is also a good example of the usefulness a hypertext version of the *Recherche* would have. Even with its appendices of notes, variants, and drafts, the Pléiade edition preserves the illusion that the ideal for a printed book is a single line of words leading from the first word to the last, to be read in that order. The

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variants and drafts were steps toward the achievement of a final univocal, linear order. They can be jettisoned now that order has been achieved. On the contrary, what we have, particularly in the posthumous volumes, is a construction of the editors, with many arbitrary editorial decisions hidden under the apparent coherence of the finished product. A hypertext version would suggest more truthfully that the *Recherche* exists only factitiously as a completed whole. It is actually a vast mobile unfinished assemblage of words. This assemblage is not even adequately imaged as a spatial movement like that of planets around the sun, since words are not things and are not related to one another as things are related. A hypertext version of the *Recherche* would allow the reader to move by a series of mouseclicks back through the layer of drafts that accumulated through time, like layers of snow on a glacier, from the earliest existing version down to the "finished" text. Or the reader could move sideways through the drafts of the various episodes that existed at a given moment in time. Or the variants of a given phrase or word could be called up instantly on the screen, rather than laboriously searched for in the notes. A multi-dimensionality like that Marcel wanted for his novel could be realized in a new technological model of which Proust could have had no inkling. He lived rather in the now distant era of the telephone, the telegraph, and the typewriter, of "aerial navigation and wireless telegraphy" (F4:239; E3:676). Nevertheless, what he produced calls out for translation into the new electronic medium and already anticipates it.

The "séjour à Venise" is in its episodic form a fractal miniature of the whole novel. It treats of love, gastronomy, diplomacy, landscape, or rather urbanscape, art, the magic of names, Marcel's relation to his mother, memories of Combray, Marcel's fading recollections of Albertine, the law of substitution that governs desire, and so on. Its roots go deep in Proust's creative life. The trip to Venice already figures in the notebooks that became *Contre Sainte-Beuve,* written before *À la recherche du temps perdu* was even conceived. Each episode and theme of the Venice visit would merit a long analysis—the opening comparison of morning sunlight in Combray and in Venice; sightseeing with his mother or alone; visits to Saint Mark's, full of Ruskinian echoes; Marcel's solitary walks and gondola excursions in Venice; his discovery at night of a vast moonlit *campo,* hidden in the labyrinth of Venetian streets and canals, a magic place that he can never find again by daylight; the wonderfully comic episode of Norpois's meeting with Prince Foggi and Norpois's magic speech act that creates a new Prime Minister of Italy: "And has no one mentioned the name of Signor Giolitti?" (F4:214; E3:650); Marcel's visit to the Arena Chapel at Padua, already discussed; the episode of the telegram from Gilberte mistakenly read as coming from an

Albertine brought back from the dead; Marcel's pursuit of Venetian women as substitutes for Albertine; the climactic episode of his refusal to join his mother on her departure from Venice; the final scene in the train when Marcel and his mother read the last letters they received in Venice and Marcel discovers that his telegram was not from a resurrected Albertine but from Gilberte announcing her forthcoming marriage to Robert de Saint Loup. The Venice sojourn forms a miniature version of the whole novel. It is a small masterpiece within the greater one that cunningly mirrors the whole.

One curious feature of the trip to Venice is more or less invisible in the finished novel. Proust worked during a considerable period, in five different notebooks, on an episode that was in the end excluded: the story of his assignation at Padua with the Baroness Putbus's chambermaid. "Putbus" was "Picpus" in the early drafts, an even more grotesque name. The suppressed story remains covertly present in the way Marcel's reading in the register of guests expected at his hotel the notation "Mme Putbus and attendants" triggers his refusal to join his mother for the train trip back to Paris. Nothing, in the final version, tells the reader that one of those attendants would have been Mme Putbus's chambermaid. As a result, the intensity of Marcel's refusal to leave Venice in the final version seems more than a little unmotivated. If the affair with the chambermaid had been included, his desire to stay would have been explicable. What can one say about the relevance to our reading of an episode that was almost, but not quite, suppressed?

The Pléiade editors compare this episode to a scaffolding that is necessary for the construction of a building but is then removed when the edifice is complete (F4:710). A literary work, however, is not made of wood, bricks, and plaster, but of words. A better comparison might be with those secrets that Albertine eternally keeps from Marcel, sealed ultimately with the silence of death, an enclosure like those Piombi, or leadlined prison cells, that incarcerated Venetian political prisoners and that Marcel imagines imprison his memories of the dead Albertine deep within him.[3] Marcel, too, it would appear, has secrets he keeps from his readers. A better way to put this would be to say that Proust attempted to keep this episode secret from readers. In any case, the final text of the novel has its secrets. These secrets are true secrets. They are impenetrable. They can never be revealed, but in a peculiar sense in this case. Just as it is impossible ever to know whether the coin the protagonist of Baudelaire's "La fausse monnaie" gives the beggar was or was not counterfeit,[4] so it is impossible ever to know whether the reader should or should not use fortuitous knowledge of the omitted episode about Baroness Putbus's chambermaid. If it was left out, it was left out. The novel has closed seamlessly over the effaced secret, like a door over a lead-

lined prison cell. To take it into consideration is illicit, impertinent, unwarranted. The episode is not part of the finished book. On the other hand, all those drafts of the omitted episode have now been exposed, the door of the prison-cell opened. What use should the reader make of those drafts? No answer other than an arbitrary one can be given. What might justify a choice remains secret.

My chief interest here, however, is in the solar resonances of the Venice sojourn's final episode. As the reader will see, this episode too has something to do with secrets. After his mother, accompanied by all his belongings as well as hers, sets off for the train station, Marcel, now a guilty and disobedient child, impelled by "that old desire to rebel against an imaginary plot woven against me by my parents" (F4:230; E3:666), stays behind. He orders a drink to be brought to him on the hotel terrace overlooking the canal and settles down there to watch the sunset. From a boat that has stopped in front of the hotel a musician sings "O sole mio." Marcel's misery at causing his mother trouble and his sense of solitude bring about a curious transformation in his perception of his surroundings. Just as he is alienated from himself, torn between his desire to go and his desire to remain, his fidelity to his mother and the imaginary pleasures of staying, so he is alienated from his surroundings. The link between person and scene that is so important a presupposition of the *Recherche* is broken. The result is a disintegration of the scene. The word "Venice" is detached from Venice. Venice is detached from the mendacious dream of the magical city that has motivated so many of Marcel's deisres to travel. Before Marcel's eyes Venice is dismantled, or, as one might even dare to say, "deconstructed." Marcel recognizes that "Venice" has been no more than a fiction imposed by will or habit on a meaningless substratum. Venice is reduced to its material base. It becomes no more than hydrogen and oxygen fortuitously combined to make water and adjacent heaps of stones, "the stones of Venice" in a sense not absolutely different from the meaning Ruskin gave that phrase. All the elements that are usually combined in one inextricable whole, the person, the name, and the place, are separated from one another and lie side by side in alien proximity:

> The town that I saw before me had ceased to be Venice. Its personality, its name, seemed to me to be mendacious fictions [*fictions mensongères*] which I no longer had the will to impress upon its stones [*le courage d'inculquer aux pierres*]. I saw the palaces reduced to their basic elements, lifeless heaps of marble with nothing to choose between them, and the water as a combination of hydrogen and oxygen, eternal, blind, anterior and exterior to Venice, oblivious of the Dogues and of Turner. And yet this unremarkable place [*ce lieu quelconque*] was as strange as a place at which one had just arrived, which does not yet know one, or a place which one has left and which has forgotten one already. I could no longer tell it anything about myself, I could leave nothing of myself imprinted upon it [*se poser sur lui*]; it contracted me into myself until I was no more than a throbbing heart and an attention strained to follow the development of "O sole mio." (F4:231; E3:667; trans. slightly altered)

This disintegration of elements that are normally held together in a unit joining figure to scene in an act of intimate inculcation or superposition causes a radical paralysis of will. It is as though Marcel were hypnotized. Though he knows that if he waits much longer he will miss all chance to join his mother and catch the train, he can do nothing but listen to the singer repeat once more and yet again the banal words of "O sole mio." These have now come to be identified with his paralysis. The song almost seems to be causing his delay and his suffering. It even seems to be causing the disintegration of Venice into a heap of stones:

> And it was perhaps this melancholy [*cette tristesse*], like a sort of numbing cold, that constituted the despairing but hypnotic [*fascinateur*] charm of the song. Each note that the singer's voice uttered with a force and ostentation that were almost muscular stabbed me to the heart. When the phrase was completed down below and the song seemed to be at an end, the singer had still not had enough and resumed at the top as though he needed to proclaim once more my solitude and despair. (F4:233; E3:669)

Why "O sole mio"? Why did Proust choose just this song to have Marcel listen with fascinated attention as he sits hypnotized on the terrace watching the sun sink toward the horizon? "O sole mio" is a popular Italian love song in Neapolitan dialect. It is the "Your Are My Sunshine" of Italy. Anyone who has listened to a Luciano Pavarotti concert will, most likely, have heard him "bellow" (Proust's word) the song, not unlike the way the reader imagines Proust's Venetian boatsinger to have sung it. In the song the sovereignty usually ascribed to the sun is transferred to the beloved. Her face becomes the source of radiance for all the world. Here are the words in dialect, followed by an approximate translation: "Che bella cosa 'na iurnata'e sole, n'ària serena dopo 'na tempesta! pe' ll'aria fresca pare già 'na festa... Che bella cosa 'na iurnata'e sole. Ma n'atu sole cchiù bello, ohi ne', 'o sole mio sta nfronte a te! O sole, sole mio sta nfronte a te, sta nfronte a te! (What

a beautiful thing a sunny day [is], calm air after a storm! Because of [or: in] the fresh air it already looks like a feast... What a beautiful thing a sunny day [is]. But another sun, a more beautiful one, my sun, is in your face! My sun, my sun, is in your face, is in your face!)."[5]

"O sole mio," the reader can see, is, like the passage from Baudelaire Saint Loup quotes,[6] another version of Proust's "solar myth." Here the power usually ascribed to the sun is transferred to a substitute, according to the Proustian law of substitute desire I have identified. Since Marcel's hearing of the song comes at a moment when he has finally forgotten or has almost forgotten his love for Albertine and is shifting rapidly from one substitute to another, to various Venetian working girls, to various other women, mostly from Austria, he meets at the hotel, and since the conflict between these momentary infatuations and his abiding love for his mother has been brought into the open by his refusal to join her in leaving Venice, he is, for the moment, demystified. He can see all these objects of desire as factitious substitutes for one another and all these as replacements for a personified sun that now no longer has the power to dominate everything with its light. The sun stands amazed as it listens to a song that now is explicitly said to dismantle Venice. The song also deprives the sun, verse by verse, of its kingship. Marcel's experience comes to a climax in another of those solar sentences that is impossible because in it the referential and the allegorical separate out, just as all the other usually combined elements of the scene have been detached from one another. In this case the shift of the sun's power so that it now "stands (*sta*)" in the face of the beloved paralyzes the sun, as Marcel is paralyzed. This defiance of the sun causes it to stand still in the sky, as the sun stood still when Joshua commanded it to do so, against all naturalistic probability (Josh. 10:12-3).[7] The sun watches in amazement, by the light of its own fading, the disintegration of the scene. This disintegration is figured, at the end of the passage, in the way the elements of the once golden Venetian scene have now become an "equivocal" alloy of baser metals artificially combined. If the sun remains fixed in the sky it will never be able to set. Therefore it will never be able again to bathe itself in those profound gulfs where lies that lost homeland the sun gives fresh news of every day:

> I was gripped by an anguish that was caused me by the sight of the Canal which had become diminutive now that the soul of Venice had fled from it, of that commonplace [*banal*] Rialto which was no longer the Rialto, and by the song of despair which "O sole mio" had become and which, bellowed [*clamé*] thus beside the insubstantial [*inconsistents*] palaces, finally reduced them to dust and ashes and completed the ruin of Venice; I looked on at the slow realization of my distress, built up artistically, without haste, note by note, by the singer as he stood beneath the astonished gaze of the sun arrested in its course beyond San Giorgio Maggiore [*par le chanteur que regardait avec étonnement le soleil arrêté derrière Saint-Georges-le-Majeur*], with the result that the fading light was to combine for ever in my memory with the throb of my emotion and the bronze voice of the singer in an equivocal, unalterable and poignant alloy [*alliage*]. (F4:233; E3:669)

This passage is a nadir in all Proust's work, a low point beneath which it is impossible to sink. The self, for once, confronts what is "really there," something wholly inimical to continued human life. Everything that is normally integrated is separated out into disconnected regions. The external world becomes a heap of stones. The self, deprived of all the usual fictions that have constituted it, is without will to impose its ordering power on the external world, on other people, and on itself. Time stops. All contact with the hidden homeland of otherness is lost. Even the sun will no longer go to those depths on its diurnal rounds.

At that prolonged lowest moment, a moment that might, it seems, continue for an eternity, suddenly, out of nowhere, what Proust here calls "habit" reasserts itself. Time begins again, the will to action is restored, the power to impose fictions returns, the sun moves again, Venice is once more Venice, and everything returns to normal:

> But suddenly, from caverns [*antres*] darker than those from which flashes the comet that we can predict—thanks to the unsuspected defensive power of inveterate habit [*de l'habitude invéterée*], thanks to hidden reserves which by a sudden impulse it hurls at the last moment into the fray—my will to action [*mon action*] arose at last; I set off in hot haste [*je pris mes jambes à mon cou*] and arrived, when the carriage doors were already shut, but in time to find my mother flushed with emotion and with the effort to restrain her tears, for she thought that I was not coming. (F4:233-4; E3:670)

The reader will see what is extraordinary and unexpected about this passage. Marcel's recovery of an active will is ascribed to habit. "Habit [*habitude*]" here names all those superficial and baseless fictions that give the self and its environment a semblance of interconnected wholeness. Marcel asserts that the break in his paralysis is caused by "l'insoupçonnable puissance défensive de l'habitude invétéree." Habit has a power to defend us from the vision of what is "really there," in this case a senseless heap of stones with much hydrogen and oxygen in chemical combinations sloshing around them.

For Pater, whose dictum about our failure being to form habits is cited as an epigraph for this chapter, habit is a barrier against lifing, as we should do, in proximity to that eternal moment of unique sensation that is all there is. For Proust, on the contrary, in a way more Nietzschean than Paterian, it is impossible to live with a clear vision of what is really there, so Proust's definition of habit is quite different from Pater's. "Habitude" is a key word in Proust's vocabulary. A search by way of the Internet database of French texts called ARTFL brings up fifty uses of the word in "Albertine disparue" alone, many of great interest, but this passage gives the clue to its Proustian meaning.

Habit for Proust, surprisingly, has its source in those same dark depths, that same lost and unknown homeland, unique to each person, that gives its force to to lies and to works of art like Vinteuil's septet. Habit is grounded in the realm of otherness the sun visits when it sinks into the sea. Just as each great artist, Elstir or Vinteuil, Vermeer or Hardy, has his or her own unique accent, nostalgic echo of each artist's singular lost homeland, and just as each person, Albertine for example, has his or her own special way of lying, a way that gives us unique access to "unknown worlds," so "habit" is Marcel's name for the special way each person, artist and non-artist alike, organizes himself and the circumambient world in perdurable patterns that make continued life possible. "Habit" names both the power and what the power makes. No doubt there is much irony in calling this constructive and constructed energy "habit," since the word admits what is superficial and factitious about what holds each human life together. Habit, however, or rather the will to action, habit's "hidden reserves" that form habits, is not baseless. it comes "from caverns darker than those from which flashes the comet which we can predict."

Proust perhaps knew that there are two kinds of comets, parabolic and hyperbolic ones. Parabolic comets, for example Halley's comet, return in predictable periods in their rotation around two centers, far distant from one another, one the sun, the other, perhaps virtual, a point in space. Hyperbolic comets flash once around the sun and then speed off forever, never to return. In either case, however, the comet's trajectory is lawful and predictable. The comet's trajectory, here negatively compared to the will to action, makes it analogous to the sun in its regularity and in its swinging into unsoundable gulfs. Moreover, a comet is governed by the sun. This passage is another oblique version of Proust's "solar myth."

Marcel's will to action, however, the defensive power of inveterate habit, comes from caverns darker than those gulfs from which a comet comes and into which it plunges again. They are darker in the sense of being wholly

unknown and unknowable. This means that the return of the power of action is entirely unpredictable, in its form and in its time of coming, even though, when the will to action has asserted itself again, it can be seen to take patterns that are characteristic of the person's whole life.

NOTES

* This essay is drawn from a forthcoming book entitled *Black Holes,* copyright Stanford University Press.

1. Marcel Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu.* Ed. Jean-Yves Tadié, éd. de la Pléiade, 4 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1989); *Remembrance of Things Past,* trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, 3 vols. (New York:: Vintage, 1982). Further reference will be to these texts, indicated by "F" and "E" respectively.

2. This segment is printed in the new Pléiade edition as chapter three of "Albertine disparue," the new name for the fifth section of *À la recherche du temps perdu.* The fifth section was called "La fugitive" in the old Plédiade edition, "The Fugitive" in the Moncrieff/Kilmartin translation.

3. "Sometimes at dusk as I returned to the hotel I felt that the Albertine of long ago, invisible to my eyes, was nevertheless enclosed within me as in the *Piombi* of an earlier Venice, the tight lid of which some incident occasionally lifted to give me a glimpse of that past [*une ouverture sur ce passé*]" (F4:218; E3:654).

4. See Jacques Derrida's admirable discussion of "La fausse monnaie" (1991: 95-217). Derrida makes this particular secret the emblem of a universal connection of literature to unfathomable secrets.

5. I am grateful to Anna Pfeiffer for providing a copy of the words and music, to Georgia Albert for the translation and to Wendy Hester for help with "Piombi" and other details of Marcel's Venice sojourn. The music for "O sole mio" is by Eduardo di Capua (d.1917), from an original melody by Alfredo Mazzucchi (1879-1972). The words are by Giovanni Capurro (d. 1930). Ms Albert says she does not know what to do with "ohi ne'," except to assume that it is probably an interjection. If she, who has fluent Italian, does not know, neither do I.

6. "...du gouffre interdit à nos sondes / Comme montent au ciel les soleils rajeunis / Après s'être lavés au fond des mers profondes?" (F4:340; E3:782). The citation comes from Baudelaire's "Le balcon" (1954: 110-11), slightly altered at the beginning.

7. An earlier reference to Joshua's miracle appears thousands of pages earlier, at the beginning of "Du côté de chez Swann," in an odd passage about the strange psychological ef-

fects of insomnia and the way it puts time out of joint when sleep comes at odd hours: "Suppose that, towards morning, after a night of insomnia, sleep descends upon him while he is reading, in quite a different position from that in which he normally goes to sleep, he has only to lift his arm to arrest the sun and turn it back on its course [*il suffit de son bras soulevé pour arrêter et faire reculer le soleil*]" (F1:5; E1:5).

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RICHARD MULCASTER'S ALLEGORY:

A HUMANIST VIEW OF LANGUAGE AND STATE

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In *The Elementarie*,[1] written in 1582 by Richard Mulcaster, a prominent pedagogue and spelling reformer, the case is put against the radical overhauling of the English spelling system. His was a lone voice in an age clamouring for a phonemic spelling as the sole path out of the marshlands of uncertainty in which the language had become mired.

Mulcaster prefaces his suggestions as to how and on what basis English spelling is to be reformed with a political allegory which traces the development of writing from its inception, democracy, through oligarchy to his own time, represented by monarchy. The importation of the political metaphor into a discussion of an orthographic and linguistic nature highlights the humanist concept of language as a social institution, based on an act of consent, shaped by and for man. It also provides a crucial insight into the theory of language behind Mulcaster's spelling policy, based on the twin pillars of custom and change. Finally, the relation established between the commonweal and spelling allows Mulcaster to resoundingly denounce the attempts of the phonemic reformers as subversive acts which upset the process of natural evolution.

Mulcaster was not the first to place language and politics in a direct relationship. His vision of good government is influenced by his predecessors, Sir Thomas Elyot and Thomas Starkey. Mulcaster had read *The Book Named the Governor* (1531), which became a manual of political and educational

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theory in the sixteenth century, as is evident from his critical allusions to Elyot's educational theory in the opening pages of *Positions* (1581).[2] Mulcaster was more ambivalent and less blindly committed to reverence for the classics than Elyot. He had a greater affinity with the political thinker Thomas Starkey whose *Dialogue between Cardinal Pole and Thomas Lupset* (1538)[3] was outstanding in its day for the pragmatism and the global vision it presents of a society in the throes of change. Cultural relativism and an acute awareness of each nation's specific circumstances were becoming the norm for the appraisal and application of classical doctrines. Mulcaster and Starkey belong to a generation of humanists who "are able to go well beyond mere imitation of the ancients and to adapt classical precept and precedent to the realities of divergent cultures" (Ferguson 1963-64: 22).

Mulcaster has been praised for his "most liberal and independent mind" (Jones 1926: 281). Leo Weiner states that "Mulcaster was beyond his age" (1897: 66) in his treatment of spelling reform and his theory of language. Analysis of *The Elementarie* in the light of Starkey's text reveals that Mulcaster's ideas are neither as innovative or ground-breaking as they first appear. This is not to detract from his achievement, however. As Terence Cave points out, "the publication of a particular point of view at a particular moment has an importance which bears little relation to its originality . . . when seen in a wider context" (1979: 75). Mulcaster brought to bear on problems of a linguistic nature, opinions which had first been aired within a political context. His application of political theory to linguistic issues confirms the eclectic nature of his philosophy and supports the view that his main contribution to the language debate in the closing decades of the sixteenth century was his capacity for synthesising a global and comprehensive vision of society and language. Querying the standing of classical authority, attempting to incorporate change into a paradigm characterised by stability and achieving a balance between the two were, ultimately, challenges to be faced in all spheres of life (Ferguson 1963: 11). This is the mood that Mulcaster brings to his discussion of language. He is treading the precarious middle ground, charting a course characterised by compromise and synthesis.

Mulcaster's eclecticism has been commented on before (Donawerth 1983: 82: Dobson 1968: 122) and is confirmed by the allegory. It illustrates the dilemma of the late Elizabethan humanist who attempts to construct a theory which would incorporate the opposing factors of change and stability in language and society. His writings are shot through with a "painful awareness of the need to reconcile the absolute with the contingent" (Ferguson 1963: 20). The symbiosis between social well-being and linguistic form underlies much of humanist writing on language. Roger

Ascham, William Bullokar and Elyot all work on this basis. Mulcaster, however, was perhaps the first to carry this parallel to its final, pragmatic conclusion through his insistence that the vernacular be at the core of the reformed curriculum outlined in *Positions* and *The Elementarie*.

Mulcaster has not enjoyed the attention he merits as a linguist. Moreover, the key function of the extended allegory has not been recognised. R. H. Quick in his 1888 edition of *Positions* dispatches it as "his very curious and interesting allegory" (Mulcaster 1888: 306). R. F. Jones offers no comment and merely paraphrases the tale (1926: 281-82; 1953: 159). This line is followed by Demolen (1970: 157) while Scragg (1974: 60-63) makes no reference to it. Notwithstanding these omissions, it is one of the key pieces in the groundwork of *The Elementarie*, allowing the twentieth-century reader a glimpse "through the glass darkly" of the sixteenth-century mind.

Mulcaster begins his arguments against the invention of new signs, the excision of superfluous ones and the relandscaping of English orthography[4] by illustrating the historical process whereby Sound lost its dominion over the form of written words and was joined in a position of shared power by Reason and Custom. Later, with the intervention of Art as supreme sovereign, the system reached its zenith.

Initially Sound was elected "soueraine and iudge" (*E* 73), a situation which quickly degenerated into chaos as all speakers became a law onto themselves. Alarmed at Sound's overbearing attitude, a delegation was sent to persuade him to share his power with Reason, based on observation and comparison, and Custom, holding the scales of linguistic justice and mediating between the forces of change and continuity. Together they would forge into law those practices which had been etched out over time and through their joint action, regulate spelling. The order established was, however, precarious until the supreme monarch, Art, using artificial method, bestowed stability on writing. The template chosen by Art was the late sixteenth century, a period when the language had reached the height of perfection.

The influence of the lively debates which had raged in Europe over the merits of the different forms of government was not felt in England which remained relatively free from the immediate pressures of Continental politics (Ferguson 1963). As Eccleshall remarks, "In the sixteenth century there was no need to raise questions of sovereignty. There was a need to justify the co-operation of the crown with influential groups in parliament" (1978: 100). There was in fact a strong trend in the late 16th and 17th centuries towards mixed constitutions as a guard against tyranny although, according to A. B. Ferguson (1963) in England only Starkey and Smith raised fundamental questions concerning the forms of government. The debate, he maintains, was di-

verted towards specific areas such as trade and international policy rather than a careful examination of fundamentals. A more searching analysis would only develop in the seventeenth century when the unstable political environment and the change in dynasty livened the debate.

This complacency is evident in both Mulcaster and Starkey, confirming J. Hankins's (1996) claim that the humanists were not intellectuals committed to a single political ideology. When Mulcaster numbers the three forms of government available to a people in *Positions*, he explicitly refrains from recommending one or the other (1888: 150). Like Starkey, he implies that the best form is decided "according to the nature of the people" (Starkey 1948: 60). This was to be his policy also as regards spelling and borrowing: necessity, circumstance and custom were the three parameters by which an innovation or reform was judged. In the allegory, however, elective government is represented as characteristic of primitive societies; it is continually in danger of degenerating into tyranny. The abuses perpetrated by Sound are attributed not to his own person but to an error of judgement in those who elected him (*E* 76). This comment suggests that Mulcaster was sceptical of the wisdom of the masses. In this respect he was within the mainstream of humansit political thought, "If the humanists had any common political prejudice, it was against purely popular regimes" (Hankins 1996: 120). Moreover, by the end of the sixteenth century, debate over the virtues of popular sovereignty had outgrown its historical context. The rediscovery of Aristotle's *Politics*, which placed monarchy as the best form of government, further contributed to the decline of support for republicanism. Sound's mandate comes from the people, who "give him alone the authoritie over the pen" (*E* 74). He acts like a prince but, as the source of his might is human, Mulcaster suggests, it is seriously undermined. Popular suffrage is not rejected, but seen to be insufficient on its own.

Mulcaster's description of the era of Sound's reign is designed to create the maximum impact on his readers. Chaos was the great bugbear of Tudor society: "without order may be nothing stable or permanent" (Elyot, *The Book Named the Governor* [1531], qtd. in Rollins and Baker 1992: 107). Sound behaves with "great uncertaintie, naie rather with confusion" (*E* 74). Mulcaster attributes this "odious" and "uncomely" lack of order to the plebes or communality, where there is no "discrepance of degrees" (qtd. in Rollins and Baker 1988: 107). Like Elyot, Mulcaster subscribes to the view that the "public weal" and the "common weal" are mutually exclusive, if not contradictory.

Sound is "in autoritie tyrannous" (*E* 75), and violates the humanist ideal of the good ruler by placing self-interest before the general good. It is arbitrary, a destructive force, governed by neither rule nor reason. The concession of power to Reason and Custom is dramatised to show the characteristics of the bad ruler. Sound's thirst for power and his reluctance to relinquish it for the common good make him prey to the false advice of those friends who fan his resentment and incite him to rebellion.

Sound is modelled on the tyrant that appears in Elizabethan literature, "allowing no mercy, or pitie but death, no pardon, no forgiveness, no misericordia" (*E* 74). The description invites comparison with the figure of Machiavelli, who, as Wyndham Lewis asserts "was at the back of every Tudor mind" (qtd. in Praz 1966: 118). Although a translation of *The Prince* was not available according to Praz (1966, 93) until 1602, he had been known to the Elizabethans with the publication of Gentillet's *Contre-Machiavel* in 1576. Whether the Machiavellian or the Senecan tyrant inspired the characterisation of Sound is irrelevant: both exploit their positions to exert power for their own private ends (Praz 1966: 111).

By equating Sound with tyranny Mulcaster strikes at the heart of phonemic reform. Sir Thomas Smith, John Hart and William Bullokar had attempted to thoroughly overhaul English spelling, following Smith's maxim, "ut pictura, orthographia" (qtd. in Jones, 1953: 145). Speech should mirror sound. In Mulcaster's opinion this represented a regression rather than an advance and would open the doors to anarchy, an anarchy more fearsome than that which ruled before their intervention. Where these reformers had run aground was in failing to adapt their reforms to time and place. As the English language was at that time further along the evolutionary scale, their efforts would overthrow any advantages won and endanger the commonweal. Moreover, in language as in politics, consent is the prerequisite for just government. The "private conceit" has no validity, no matter how well intentioned. Chaos and sedition therefore loom menacingly over the work of the phonemic reformers.

When discussing the reformers elsewhere in *The Elementarie*, Mulcaster extends the idea of rebellion and disruption. The verbs associated with this group suggest battle and violence: "thwart," "force," "cross" and "hinder." Mulcaster is exploiting the social and economic circumstances of an age haunted by the spectre of disruption and disorder, especially from internal conflicts. The border counties were a source of political unrest and over-ambitious members of the gentry were constantly hatching plots. Ireland, too, presented a persistent challenge to the harmony of the state. In spite of the optimism of the period, in the background loomed impending disaster.

The concept of an original "pure" language is also questioned. While the English humanists were, by and large, dominated by the Cambridge group in

their theory of language, Mulcaster, as W. L. Renwick (1925) points out, begged to differ and allied himself, through his contemporary Du Bellay, with a body of thought which extended back to Speroni, Castiglione, and Dante. The idea that a pure, God-given language had been undergoing a relentless necrosis and degeneration still held out in England long after it had been abandoned on the continent where the vernacular was invested with the capacity to grow and develop. The strongest voice emerging was that which favoured the view of language as a construct of man, and consequently, saw in change the possibility to prosper rather than to decline and decay. Behind Mulcaster's scalding criticism of the phonemic reformers lies the conviction that the linguistic sign is conventional and arbitrary in origin. This in turn, invalidates the necessity to return to the original state in order to perfect the language.

The analogy between the growth to maturity of society symbolised by its evolving forms of government and the increase in the number of factors governing right writing highlights the necessity for change. This is Mulcaster's rallying call: circumstance is all, and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances is the sign of a mature and responsible people. As society grows more complex, what formerly served must be, if not discarded, at least substantially modified . He attempted, like Starkey, to reconcile the changing condition that was part of the human lot with absolute unchanging verities. Therefore, "bare and primitive inventions, being but rude" (*E* 75) must yield to more sophisticated devices. Starkey had essentially voiced the same opinion, "To say that a custom was reasonable in origin is not to say that it must remain so in an enlightened society" (Ferguson 1963: 23) There must be constant adaptation, revision and review.

Both Starkey and Mulcaster wrestle with the dilemma facing all humanists. Working within a conservative framework, philosophers, linguists and politicians were forced to expand the boundaries of traditional thought in order to account for and analyse the new patterns emerging in society. The economic penury generated by agrarian crises, social and religious radicalism and inordinate ambition in the professional and landed classes all raised questions in the more enquiring minds as to the adequacy of the sacrosanct social model championed by the humanists and reinforced by the Tudor dynasty. The tensions and ambivalence which Ferguson (1963) maintains provided a stimulus for political debate in the last decades of the sixteenth century also inform the linguistic issue, concentrated almost exclusively on the sole bone of contention—spelling reform. It is here that attitudes to custom and change are crystallised and enact on the stage of spelling the larger drama in which English society was involved. Mulcaster bolsters his defence of tradition in

spelling with arguments which appear repeatedly in the debate on common law and its relation to the figure of the monarch.

Mulcaster was the sole defender of custom in the English spelling debate.[5] It is, he staunchly proclaims, the "surest guide," the first variable to be taken into account when considering reforms in spelling. Change meant growth but only when firmly rooted in tradition and operating within its clear but unwritten parameters. His spirited defence of custom is in sharp contrast with his contemporaries, who referred to it as a "venom and poison," as being "corrupt," "filthie" and "vile." On the other hand, common law enjoyed the sanction of custom and as Ferguson claims, it (common law) fostered "a more tolerant, because a more historical, attitude toward custom" (1963: 21). Custom, the cumulative wisdom of a people, was exalted in the defence of common law. Mulcaster relied on this to build up a compelling argument in favour of tradition in spelling practices.

Both Mulcaster's and Starkey's defence of custom are couched in similar language and highlight the same qualities. Language and common law represent the culmination of the customs devised by men. They are diverse and variable, reasonable and natural, simple and flexible, adapting facts of pure reason to the facts of the time. Custom or tradition mediates between change and stability, innovation and stagnation and thus ensures regulated growth. Laws based on custom were framed according to the exigencies of everyday life and the requirements of the particular community, with its unique traditions and practices. The legal system and the language find a common denominator in custom. The spelling rules Mulcaster proposes can thus rest confidently on custom, foundation of common law and therefore guarantee of commonweal; foundation of spelling and hence, the establishment of right writing.

Mulcaster's attempts to modify English spelling following the road between the poles of custom and change are a practical illustration of the compromise he adopted—one which is also evident in the Cambridge humanist's attempts to adopt a policy on borrowing which would allow for following classical principles in a modern society. This too was the conundrum which attracted the attention of Castiglione and Speroni. All humanist writings bear the same stamp. Flexibility and stability are, therefore, the characteristics which define Mulcaster's spelling amendments. Two examples will serve to illustrate his approach. While on phonemic grounds the digraph <ou> has no justification, Mulcaster concedes as it has been used by the wise, those who form custom. As to the invention of new characters (proposed by Smith and Hart), they are found unacceptable on the grounds of their strangeness and lack of historical background. Mulcaster was aware that language is essen-

tially conservative but simultaneously formed through continuous and imperceptible changes. This is what he calls prerogative, the quicksilver and lifeblood of language: its ability to change, to shape itself to new circumstances and serve new purposes.

A close correspondence between the commonweal and the state of the language, a focus for nationalistic sentiments is established.[6] Language was seen as a moral barometer by which the virtue and "genius" of a people could be measured. It is therefore commonplace to find in texts of the period, pleas for orthographic reform which appeal to nationalist sentiments and protests against borrowing, which see it as a slur on national honour. Bullokar states that his efforts were intended "To no small profit and credite to this our nation" (qtd. in Jones 1926: 279). Defence of the language and attempts to improve it were only one manifestation, among many, of active citizenship. Mulcaster, in one of his most widely quoted aphorisms says, "I honor the Latin, but I worship the English" (1925: 269) He proposes to display his commitment to his country by making every endeavour to perfect that language.

A further example of how terms of state and language are interchanged appears in the analogy made between borrowed words and the enfranchised citizen. Mulcaster transposes the term "enfranchised" to the borrowed lexical item to display that the word, once incorporated into the language acquires all the rights and duties of the natural citizen "as the stranger denizens be to the lawes of our cunntrie" (*E* 174). These analogies are carefully crafted rhetorical devices designed to emphasise the links between language and nationhood. They also explain the urgency and energy invested in the issue of spelling reform. English spelling was described as chaotic and unruly. Chaos was a consequence of unsound government and a primitive society. A more logical writing system, therefore would benefit the nation as a whole—it was the commonweal that was at stake. Reform, whether agrarian, social, economic or linguistic was of prime importance for efficient statehood.

In the evolution from chaos to order, from arbitrary rule to divine right, from communality to hierarchy, oligarchy is placed on the second rung of the ladder, representing a half-way stage in the ascent to perfection. The order follows the grading given by Aristotle and in turn adopted by Elyot, the state "that hath mo cheif governours than one" is not perfect. "It is a monster with many heads." (qtd. in Rollins and Baker 1992: 108). What is lacking is an all-encompassing authority, which comes in the guise of Art. It is stressed, however, that its function is not to create but merely to implement and codify those laws which have been forged through time and consolidated in custom so that people can work with assurance of what is right and wrong.

There is clearly a similarity between the concept of the Tudor state and the perfection of the writing system. They share the common traits of order and obedience, security and service. In short, stability both linguistic and political is assured under the monarch. This conforms to Elyot's maxim, "one sovereign governour ought to be in a public weal. And what damage hath happened where a multitude hath had equal authority without any sovereign" (qtd. in Rollins and Baker 1992: 108)

The circumstances of Mulcaster's life would appear to confirm the fact that he was a monarchist. He enjoyed the patronage of the Queen, presented plays at Court with the boys of Merchant's Taylors and through his participation in the Tudor propaganda machine managed, at least temporarily, to alleviate his persistent financial embarrassments. In the allegory, however, he opts for limited monarchical power, a choice which was in consonance with the predominant trend of his time.[7]

Just as Art rested on the pillars of Reason, Custom and Sound, so too the monarch in theory was advised by the members of the Privy council. They represented, like their counterparts in language, the forces of tradition and common sense whose roots stretched downwards and backwards to embrace and strengthen its authority. During the Tudor dynasty its members were chosen by the monarch. This perverted its original function, making it no more than a puppet and confirmed a trend towards political centralization, represented as an act of national unity. As early as 1540, Starkey claimed that it mitigated against the common good, "to him must be joined counsel, by common authority, not such as he will, but such as by the most part of the parliament shall be judged to be wise and mete thereunto" (1942: 155). Mulcaster too advocated that the absolute monarch should "qualify his gouernament, and . . . use the assistance of a further councell" (*E* 75). The general feeling in England in the period was that,

> the English monarch could not govern in an arbitrary fashion because he or she was hedged about with communally beneficial restrictions. So long as the parliament was vigilant in using its privileges, the monarch could do nothing of national importance without its assent. (Eccleshall 1978: 38)

The structure and selection procedure of the advisory council that appears in the allegory follow closely on that recommended by Starkey. Art inherits a three-member council who have earned their place by merit not by royal favour. No law passed has any legitimacy unless signed by all four parties. It is therefore not over-audacious to suggest, on the basis of this evidence, that Mulcaster favoured a system of limited rather than absolute monarchy. This

echoes Pole's maxim that "the authority of the prince must be tempered and brought to order" (Starkey 1948: 165). His power had to be ratified from below but did not entail doing the bidding of the intemperate masses. Unquestioning obedience was demanded only on those issues which were already established by tradition and reason.

Just as the divine origin of language was being subjected to searching analysis, so too was the role of the monarch. Adam it was believed had not been given a language but the ability to name: the monarch was not divinely appointed but assigned the role of administrator. Starkey emphasises his purely remedial role, "to see to the administration of justice to the whole community" (qtd in Ferguson 1963: 18). In questions of a linguistic nature, royal intervention was frequently sought: John Baret, compiler of *An Alvearie* (1573) maintains that "true" writing will only be achieved by monarchical intervention. This is the role attributed to Art in the allegory. Art is a " beaten lawyer" (*E* 84) and a "notarie" (*E* 82).

Mulcaster's spelling amendments as outlined in the seven general precepts are designed to amend those things capable of rectification within the bounds of established use. They are the fruit of hindsight. Over-zealousness, it had been seen, only caused social upheaval in the form of the agrarian and corn revolts, misery, homelessness and an ensuing crime wave. Moderation was the lesson to be learned from past mistakes, and Mulcaster, who was a man who never lost touch with the common people, was able to apply these social lessons to what he conceived to be a social institution—language.

Mulcaster's writings demonstrate that the issues of state and language were coterminous, just as they are today. Spelling reform was, and is, a high-priority political issue. He exploits this relationship in order to reinforce his vanguard views on language and to denounce those who championed alternative and, in his view, anachronistic approaches to the issue. It is chiefly by means of his political allegory that he illustrates how the well-being of the state was so closely related to the linguistic issue and introduces into the debate the non-quantifiable factor of custom, the foundation of so much that was considered intrinsically English.

NOTES

1 The full title of the work *is The First Part of the Elementarie which entreateth chefelie of the right writing of our English tung.* All references to the work are from E.T. Champacnac's 1926 edition (abbr. *E*).

2. *Positions*, Mulcaster's first work on education, puts the case for reform of the educational system in order to adequate it to the changed and changing circumstances of the times and in true humanist fashion identifies a sound educational policy as the basis for social harmony.

3. *A Dialogue* was composed between 1536 and 1538 and was presented to the king in June 1538.

4. Linguistic unease in the sixteenth century developed around this theme. The beginning of the seventeenth focused on grammar, but awareness of syntax did not develop until the latter half of that century. See Salmon (1986).

5. Other spelling reformers saw custom as an insurmountable obstacle to the implementation of their new systems. Hart rated against "vile custom" and Sir Thomas Smith and Sir John Cheke, William Bullokar and John Baret express their frustration at people's clinging to tradition. It should be noted, however, that their treatment of custom is not consistent and is characterised by more than a shade of ambivalence.

6. The close parallels established in the allegory between the well-being of the state and language, between language and national sentiment are further corroborated by Mulcaster's own use of literature as a propaganda tool. He was the author of the précis of the 1559 pageant of Queen Elizabeth's entry into London on coronation day. It is used as an instrument of persuasion, highlighting the positive aspects of the young queen and the continuity she represents.

7. Mulcaster's portrayal of the Queen in the 1559 passage presents a different view of the monarchy. Here, it is the Queen's power, not its contingency or dependence that is stressed. The apparent inconsistency between these two representations is found in much humanist writing and did not pose a moral problem for them. In fact, they all display a doublethink between their functions as propagandists or statesmen and their humanist ideology. See Hankins (1996) pp. 118 - 141.

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THE ROLE OF THE EVENT STRUCTURE METAPHOR AND OF IMAGE-SCHEMATIC STRUCTURE IN METAPHORS FOR HAPPINESS AND SADNESS

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since the appearance of cognitive linguistics around the mid-1970s, studies on the way our conceptual systems are organized have been a primary focus of attention in linguistics. One of the areas in which most efforts have been made is the study of metaphor. Such scholars as Lakoff, Johnson, Turner, and others have been able to unravel many of the intricacies of the English metaphorical system. In so doing, they have been able to determine to a large extent the nature of conceptual systems and their interrelations. One of the important breakthroughs in their research has been their understanding of metaphor as a conceptual rather than a merely linguistic phenomenon. For them, metaphor is a conceptual mapping of a source domain to a target domain, where aspects of the source are made to correspond with the target. Such correspondences allow us to reason about the target domain using our knowledge about the source domain (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Lakoff 1993a, 1993b).

One of the areas of special emphasis in recent cognitive studies is the determination of generic-level structure for metaphor (see Lakoff and Turner, 1989, and particularly Lakoff 1993a).[1] A well-known example of generic-level structure is the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 162-166), which maps a single specific-level schema onto a potentially indefinite number of specific-level schemas which share the same generic-level structure as the source-domain schema. This mapping is typically applied in the understanding of proverbs when used in particular situa-

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tions. For example, from the situation depicted in the common saying *A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush* we derive the generic information that we are wise not to risk something we already have for something—no matter how valuable—which we might try to obtain. This information may be mapped to specific situations where someone is becoming involved in that kind of risk. Another well-known generic metaphor is what Lakoff (1993a) has called the Event Structure Metaphor. in it, the source domain is space and the target domain is an event. Some of the correspondences are: states are locations; changes are movements; purposes are destinations; means are paths; difficulties are impediments to motion; external events are moving objects. Some aspects of this general metaphor, as will be seen, are related to image-schematic structure. As an example of the power of this metaphor, consider the range of applicability of one of its correspondences: purposes are destinations. This would explain why a sentence like *We're going nowhere* makes sense whether said by a businessman who is worried about the development of his business, by an angry secondary school teacher talking about the little progress made by her students, or by a lover who is about to break off her engagement.

The increasing interest in the study of generic level in metaphor coincides with the discovery of other generic-level conceptual constructs, like image schemata. Image schemata have been investigated by Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1989, 1990, 1993a), among others, and can be defined as abstractions or generalizations over spatial concepts. The clearest examples of image schemata include the container, path, and orientation schemata. Each image schema consists of a number of structural elements and a basic logic which can be applied for abstract reasoning. For example, the container schema consists of an interior, an exterior, and a boundary; also, its basic logic tells us that everything is either inside or outside a container, and that if A is inside container B, and B inside C, then A is inside C (see Lakoff 1989: 116). Image schemata have been found to structure various semantic domains, (like the field of visual perception; see Faber and Pérez 1993); they have also been found to lie at the base of a large number of metaphorical constructions (see Fornés and Ruiz de Mendoza 1996). Following up this line of thought, it is my intention to give an account of the metaphorical expression of happiness and sadness in English in terms of the conjunction of the generic Event Structure metaphor, as analysed by Lakoff (1993a), and the container, path, and orientation image schemata. The domain of sadness (and indirectly, the domain of happiness) has already been analysed in great detail in Barcelona (1986). However, our own analysis differs from Barcelona's in several respects; in that ours attempts to be more explanatory than descriptive, which is achieved by the use of generic-level structures where possible.

2. METAPHORS EXPRESSING HAPPINESS AND SADNESS

According to Lakoff and Turner (1989: 52), "metaphors are the principal way we have of conceptualizing abstract concepts." The concepts of happiness and sadness are no exception. In Barcelona (1986) there is an exhaustive description of the concept of depression in American English. Barcelona posits two types of metaphorical correspondences that structure the concept: one, perceptual; the other, ontological. The perceptual metaphors emerge directly from our experience and are divided into three types:

(i) HAPPY IS UP, UNHAPPY IS DOWN (e.g. *John is really down*);
(ii) HAPPINESS IS LIGHT, UNHAPPINESS IS DARKNESS (e.g. *These are black tidings*);
(iii) HAPPY IS WARM, UNHAPPY IS COLD (e.g. *Those are really bleak prospects (i.e. 'cold and cheerless prospects').*

The structural metaphors, according to Barcelona, are used to structure aspects of other concepts besides depression and they constitute a vast array, among which we have THE CAUSE OF DEPRESSION IS A VIOLENT FORCE (e.g. *that event crushed him*); HAPPINESS IS HEALTH, DEPRESSION IS ILLNESS (e.g. *She had a fit of depression*); DEPRESSION IS A LIVING ORGANISM (e.g. *His unhappiness is growing*); DEPRESSION IS AN ENEMY OR OPPONENT (e.g. *He was seized yesterday by a violent depression*); DEPRESSION IS A BOUNDED SPACE (e.g. *I fell into a deep depression*). As an example of the way the source domains of these metaphors can be applied to structure other target domains, take the case of violent forces. If we speak of *a blow for* a cause (or an ideal, belief, etc.), we think of positive action that helps it to succeed (ie. causes it to succeed). Something is said to have *a punch* if it is particularly effective. A *hit* at someone is a clever remark or sarcasm intended to be harmful. And so on. These are instances of the more general metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES.

Our classification of happiness/sadness metaphors, however, will differ from the twofold division mentioned here. Our method will be to try to establish as many degrees of generality as possible with the purpose of endowing our account with a higher degree of simplicity and explanatory power. This will have two effects: first, this metaphorical domain will be explained

in terms of more general domains which ultimately respond to the general Event Structure metaphor; second, the internal logic of the metaphors in the domain will be understood in terms of the general logic for image-schemata. The result, it is hoped, will be the combination of these two general conceptual constructs.

According to Lakoff (1993b), in the Event Structure metaphor CHANGE IS MOTION and CAUSES ARE FORCES. However, the metaphor is based on two different conceptualization systems. One is the *location system*, and the other the *object system*. In the former, change is the motion of the thing-changing from one place to another, while in the latter change is the motion of an object to, or away from, the thing-changing, in such a way that change is seen as the acquisition or loss of an object. Thus, in *I'm in trouble*, trouble is a location, but in *I have trouble*, trouble is a possession. In both cases, trouble is being attributed to the subject.

The Location System

Container Metaphors

A. ENTITIES ARE CONTAINERS (BOUNDED REGIONS)

It is possible to think of any entity as a bounded region in space. This has important implications which derive from the internal logic of the container image-schema. Its basic logic has already been outlined by Lakoff (1989) and was sketched above. Of this internal logic Fornés and Ruiz de Mendoza (1996) have provided an expanded version, which is presented below with some modifications:

a) If A is in B, and B in C, then A is in C.

b) Being a bounded region a container has a limited capacity. An excess of something inside it may alter or even damage its structure or functionality (eg. an excess of fluid may burst out by breaking the container walls or it may simply overflow).

c) In a container may be found two types of cognitively basic entities: people and things (animals and plants may enjoy either status, as required; events and situations are usually treated as things).

d) The interior of a container may protect the entity or entities inside it from any harmful exterior conditions. Conversely, harmful interior conditions may affect the entities inside the container negatively.

e) The interior of a container may prevent the entity or entities inside it from enjoying beneficial exterior conditions. Conversely, beneficial interior conditions may affect the entities inside the container positively.

f) If the entities inside a container are dynamic, they may interact more easily than if they are outside or than if some of them are separated off by the container boundaries. If some entity has will-power it may want to control (that is, to set behavioural restrictions over) all or part of the others. Control may be prevented by container boundaries.

g) The type of entities found in its interior may affect the container either positively or negatively.

This expanded version is the result of combining the basic container logic with other experientially basic concepts like control, harm, and benefit.[2] The various aspects of the resulting logic lie at the base of a large number of metaphors dealing with emotions, and more particularly with the domains of happiness and sadness. We discuss many of these metaphors below.

A.1. ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE CONTAINERS

Aspects (e) and (f) of the container logic are relevant here. Sometimes we can think of ourselves or of other people as being inside a container. The conditions inside the container are then seen as having an effect on us, which may be either positive (causing happiness) or negative (causing sadness). In order to establish the axiological orientation of these conditions, this metaphor usually interacts with others like the HAPPY IS UP, UNHAPPY IS DOWN metaphors (see below).

Examples:

To be in a black mood, to be in a good/bad mood, to put somebody in a good/bad mood, to be in high/low spirits.

A.2. EMOTIONAL STATES ARE CONTAINERS

This metaphor is a specification of the former more general one. In it, the target entity is a particular emotional state. When people are inside a container, they are potentially affected by what they find in it. One can enter a state or go out of it just as one can enter or leave a container or bounded region.

Examples:

To enter a state of euphoria/happiness/sadness, etc., to be in mourning, to fall into a depression, to emerge from the catatonic state one has been in, to wallow in self-pity/despair/misery, etc.

A.3. PEOPLE ARE CONTAINERS

Here we are dealing with aspect (g) of the container logic. Since in this metaphor the container is an experiencing entity endowed with feelings, the positive or negative quality of the entities found in its interior will cause feelings of happiness or sadness.

This may be put in relation to what Lakoff (1993b) has called the DIVIDED PERSON metaphor. In it we conceive of people as an ensemble of two separatable entities, called the Self (the bodily and functional aspects of a person, including our emotions) and the Subject (our experiencing consciousness and rationality), the Subject being inside (or in possession of, or above) the Self. In application of this metaphor, we may argue that the PEOPLE ARE CONTAINERS metaphor is in fact THE SELF IS A CONTAINER metaphor. Emotions are usually seen as fluids[3] located inside the Self and controlled by the Subject. Any non-controlled change in the normal emotional balance of a person is consequently pictured as having some sort of physical effect on the Self. This agrees with the nature of the examples we have found. For example, the metaphorical expression *burst with pride* suggests a violent physical reaction of the Self which has gone unchecked by the Subject. This happens in application of aspect (g) of the container logic.

Examples:

To feel/be full of joy, joyful, cheerful, gleeful, mirthful, sorrowful, mournful, rueful, doleful, woeful, painful, joyless, cheerless, etc., to contain one's joy, to burst into tears, to be crushed, to be broken, to burst with pride/happiness, etc.

The basic-level metaphor PEOPLE ARE CONTAINERS can be further specified. As a consequence, we find some specific metaphors which can be grouped under the heading DIFFERENT (RELEVANT) PARTS OF THE SELF ARE CONTAINERS FOR THE EMOTIONS. by means of perspectivization (see Taylor 1989), we can highlight some parts of a container and hide others (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980). For instance, if people are containers, the different parts of the body or Self are containers as well. Thus, attention can be focussed on the head disregarding such other parts as the trunk, limbs and so on. This is what Lakoff and Johnson call the used and unused parts of the metaphor.

A.3.1. THE HEAD IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS

The eyes are a functionally prominent part of the head. Much of what we experience and learn—as we say—comes through the eyes. Different eye positions are taken as signs of different emotions. Thus,

the eyes become containers for emotions. Since the eyes are located in the head, the head may be felt as containing the same type of emotions as the eyes.

Examples:

Somebody's eyes can be filled with happiness/sadness; there can be happiness/sadness in somebody's eyes; happiness/sadness shows in somebody's eyes; eyes brim with tears, tears well up, etc.

We can also come across related cases where we focus our attention on the surface of the container: for instance, someone's face.

Examples:

A smile leaves someone's face; wipe that smile off your face (cf. "To shake off one's depression," where the surface is the whole body).

A.3.2. THE HEART IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS

Johnson (1987: 88) observes that Lakoff and Zoltan Kövecses have argued that emotions like anger can be regarded as a model of hot fluid within a container. In this way, several metaphors can be constructed: emotions can simmer, well up, overflow, boil over, erupt and explode when the pressure builds up. In order to reestablish an equilibrium one can express, release or let out the emotions. We try to attain an emotional balance by repressing, suppressing, holding in or putting a lid on our emotions. On the other hand, there can be too little emotional pressure. As a result, lethargy, dullness and lack of energy appear.

The heart is often seen as the place where emotions are located (probably because our experience tells us that when we are sad or worried about something we feel as if our chests were oppressed). Thus, like our bodies, our hearts can be filled with anger, bitterness, pride, happiness, sorrow, etc.; or they can be empty of emotions, or these emotions may overflow, and so on.

Emotional distress is often expressed in terms of heart trouble. Thus, to have a broken or a bleeding heart is a clear sign of unhappiness. This conceptualization is interesting for two reasons: first, it is based on a metonymy according to which the entities inside the container (the emotions) stand for the container (the heart); second, it also responds to another metaphorical mapping, where—as suggested by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 58)—happiness is seen as health and life, and sadness as sickness and death.

Examples:

To be heartbroken or brokenhearted, to be sick at heart/heartsick, to have a heartache, to have an aching heart, to have a bleeding heart.

Verticality Metaphors

Two important correspondences are regulated by the up/down orientational image-schema:
Euphoria and happiness are being up/ in a high location.
Depression and sadness are being down/ in a low location.

A.4. HAPPY IS UP, SAD IS DOWN

Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 15) have attempted to explain the experiential basis for this metaphor: "drooping posture goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state." But this provides only a partial explanation of this metaphoric mapping. For example, while it accounts neatly for a metaphor like *She's a bit crestfallen*, it cannot deal well with such a common expression as *She's down*. We may suggest a complementary explanation for cases like this in terms of the notion of control: if one is/goes up, one is in a higher location than if one is/goes down; a high location provides the person with a vantage point and consequently with control over other people or things, but a low location involves the subject's inferiority with respect to other people or things. Therefore, high locations are positive (or good) and related to happiness, whereas low locations are negative (or bad) and related to sadness.

Examples:

—Explicit *Up-Down* orientation:

To perk up, to cheer up, to brighten up, to feel up.

To be/feel down, to be downcast, to be downhearted, to be down in the mouth, to be down in the dumps, to be bowed down.

—Implicit *Up-Down* orientation:

To be on top of the world, to be over the moon, to make somebody's day rise, to lift somebody's spirits, something gives someone a lift, to boost somebody's spirits, somebody's smile keeps someone else soaring, somebody's spirits rise, to be on cloud nine.

To be crestfallen, to be chapfallen, to fall into a depression, somebody's spirits sink, to be depressed, to be dejected.

A slight variation on this metaphor is HAPPY IS HIGH, SAD IS LOW. This metaphor appears either in isolation (that is, based exclusively on the up/down orientation schema) or in combination with the container logic. When this happens, it yields the more specific mapping TO BE HAPPY IS TO BE IN A HIGH LOCATION / TO BE SAD IS TO BE IN A LOW LOCATION.

Examples:

To be in high or fine feather, to be in high spirits, to reach new heights of ecstasy, to be high as a kite, to be in Paradise, to be in Heaven, to be in one's seventh Heaven (also, to be in Eden/Elysium, Arcadia, which, interestingly, are sometimes thought to be, like Heaven and Paradise, high places).

To be in low spirits, to be low, to be (down) in the dumps, to be in the depths or bowels of despair, to be in the pits, to be in Hell.

Some of these metaphors combine with aspects (d) and (e) of the container logic. Thus, low places like a pit (or Hell, in our culture) affect the person inside negatively. A pit is dark and difficult to escape from. High places, in contrast, are often associated with pleasant conditions.

The Object System

B. EMOTIONAL STATES ARE POSSESSIONS

Emotional states are often treated as physical entities that can be transferred. Transfers involve the path schema. However, the logic of this schema (eg. each point on the path must be passed through before reaching the destination) plays a much less important role for these metaphors than the container logic for the location system. This is mainly due to the fact that the emphasis here is on control, as will be made clear below. The general mapping is:
—Something abstract (emotions) becomes something concrete (possessions)
—To take, get or have an emotion is to possess something concrete.
—To shake off, lose or banish an emotion is to lose or get rid of something concrete.

Typically, possessions are controlled entities. The possessor may get rid of them at will. However, it is often the case that someone becomes a possessor unwittingly. Thus, sometimes a harmful entity may affect the possessor for a certain amount of time without the possessor being aware of it; or there are cases in which a person, though aware of the potential harm, is not

really doing anything effective about it. These are situations which pertain to our knowledge about possession and that have found their way into a number of metaphorical expressions.

Examples:

To take heart from something, to take (great, little, no, etc.) pleasure in something, to take (great, little, no, etc.) delight in something, to have the blues, to have depressions, to shake off one's depression, to lose heart, to banish the blues.

In the case of "take/lose heart," meaning 'take or lose courage' we have a metaphor which is based on a metonymy which is, in turn, based on a metaphorical application of the container image-schema. The heart is thought to be the container for our feelings, emotions, and attitudes, as we indicated above. Courage is, in this view, an emotion to be found in the heart. If one takes heart, one is (metaphorically) taking the container for the thing in the container (this is the metonymy). The result is the possession of a beneficial entity which, once within the control sphere of the possessor, endows the possessor with positive qualities.

Complementary Metaphors

These metaphors respond to requirements from either of the two systems. For example, one noteworthy complementary system is based on the weather. On some occasions, people talk about a weather-related mood. The weather is a visible event which pervades everyday experience and affects our lives. There is, therefore, an experiential correlation between good weather conditions and a good mood (for example, on a sunny day people can leave home and enjoy outdoor activities), and between bad weather and a bad mood (during bad weather people are usually confined to their homes).

Examples:[4]

A happy person has a sunny disposition, to be in a dark/black mood, to brighten up, to be dull (not sunny and thus, sad), to be bleak (cold, cheerless, depressing), to be a bit under the weather (a bit ill and therefore, sad).

The metaphorical mapping involved here, apart from the location and object systems already referred to, is:

C.INTERIOR EMOTIONS ARE EXTERNAL WEATHER CONDITIONS
The mapping consists of the following two correspondences:

-Happiness is good weather conditions
-Sadness is bad weather conditions
This metaphor, in turn, interacts with the following one:

D. HAPPINESS IS LIGHT AND LIGHT COLOURS, SADNESS IS DARKNESS AND ALL DARK COLOURS
The previous metaphorical mapping interacts with this one because good weather conditions are related to light colours and therefore, to happiness. On the other hand, bad weather conditions are associated with dark colours and therefore, with sadness. As a consequence, sadness is related to such dark colours as black, grey, leaden, drab, dull, and to other adjectives associated with darkness such as dismal, dreary, sombre, grave, lugubrious, and so on.

3. FINAL REMARKS

Johnson (1987: 45-48) deals with seven of the most common force structures that are usually found in our experience. Four of them are relevant to this consideration of happiness and sadness:

1. Compulsion. Sometimes we feel as if we were driven by external forces. In such cases, the subject has no control over the emotion.

2. Removal of restraint. When something such as a container is opened, we are free to come into it (for instance, "I entered a state of euphoria") or to get out of it (for example, "I emerged from the catatonic state I had been in for a long time"). On such occasions, the subject has some control over the interior of the container (the emotions).

3. Enablement. When people become aware that they have some control or power to carry out some action: for instance, "to banish the blues," etc.

4. Attraction. We are attracted to good or beneficial forces or emotions such as happiness and try to get rid of or to be far from harmful emotions or forces such as sadness so that they cannot control us because the further the subject is from the harmful force, the less control such a force has over the subject. For example, "I tried to emerge from the catatonic state I had been in, since it was driving me mad"; "I entered a state of euphoria."

This description reinforces our argument in favour of the importance of the notions of benefit, harm, and control for an account of metaphors dealing

with emotions. By way of conclusion, it may be noted that he effect of these notions on the container schema logic is the following:

A PERSON IS A CONTAINER (AND AN EMOTION IS AN INTRUDER)
—If a positive emotion (such as happiness) enters the container, such an emotion will affect the subject in a positive way.
—If a negative emotion (such as sadness) enters the container, such an emotion will affect the subject in a positive way if the subject controls it and in a negative way if the subject does not control it.
—If a positive emotion leaves the container, that will be harmful for the subject because he/she will not be affected by such a positive force any more.
—If a negative emotion leaves the container, that will be beneficial for the subject because the further away the emotion is from the subject, the less it will affect such a subject (in the same way, the nearer the emotion is to the container, the more such a container—the subject—is affected by the emotion).

AN EMOTION IS A CONTAINER (AND A PERSON IS AN INTRUDER)
—If a person enters "a positive emotion," either willingly or moved by some external force, that will be beneficial for the subject.
—If a person enters "a negative emotion," either willingly or moved by some external force, that will be harmful for the subject.
—If a person leaves a container, which stands for a negative emotion, that will be beneficial for the subject.
—If a person leaves a container, which stands for a positive emotion, that will be harmful for the subject because it will not be affected by such a positive force any more.

Finally, the logic underlying such emotions as happiness and sadness is intimately bound up with the Gestalts for force and control, with image-schemata, and with metaphoric and metonymic mappings, something which we tend to take for granted to such an extent that we are not easily aware of it.

NOTES

1. Such generic structures have been related by Fauconnier and Turner (1994) to the theory of mental spaces (see Ruiz de Mendoza, 1996, for a review and criticism). Within the framework of pragmatics, the importance of postulating such generic structures has been stressed by Ruiz de Mendoza (1997) and Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (1996). In general, it may be safely admitted that the use of generic structures in language production and processing works in favour of the economy principle. It has further been noted that generic-level metaphors combine well with other generic conceptual models, like image-schemata (see Fornés and Ruiz de Mendoza, 199y).

2. Lakoff and Johnson have also expanded the basic logic of the container schema by means of what they like to call the "entailments" of the *in-out* orientation (see Johnson, 1987:22). They propose at least five: 1) protection; 2) restriction; 3) fixity of location; 4) accessibility to the view of some observer; 5) transitivity of containment. However, the version outlined by Fornés and Ruiz de Mendoza, and our expanded version above cannot be considered a "basic" logic but simply a generic logic resulting from the combination of generic conceptual constructs.

3. The correspondence between emotions and fluids derives from our everyday experience. Fluids build up pressure and break out of a container more readily than other physical entities.

4. Apart from happiness and sadness, there are other feelings which can be spoken of in terms of weather conditions. For example, warmth is related to friendliness (Warm means friendly in a pleasant way. Examples: *They gave us a very warm welcome, He was aware of the warmth of his feelings*. Moreover, *to be warm-hearted* means to have or show warm and friendly feelings). Broadly speaking, *Warm Is Friendly, Cold Is Unfriendly*. Thus, we have expressions like:

To be cool (not particularly friendly)
To be cold (very unfriendly)
To be warm (friendly)

This metaphor could be related to the *More Is Up* metaphor where the higher the temperature, the more friendly the situation or the person is and the lower the temperature, the less friendly the situation or the person is.

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THE "MEMO" PAGES OF FRANKLIN'S *AUTOBIOGRAPHY*: ON THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LIFE WRITING

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Benjamin Franklin did not live to finish his autobiography, which at the moment of his death in 1790 had grown into a sequence of four drafts written over a period of eighteen years.[1] Although a great deal of attention has been paid to the history of this truncated manuscript, such has not been the case with the transitional fragment that links the first two parts. The so-called "Memo" pages are structured around the two letters that Abel James and Benjamin Vaughan wrote to Franklin in 1783 urging him to continue the narrative of his life begun in 1771.[2] It is my contention that these pages function in the text of the *Autobiography* as a rite of institution and a *mise en abyme*, since they consecrate in a public context Franklin's first autobiographical effort while also featuring him in all the creative roles in which he appears in the rest of the narrative—author of his own life, of his life story, and of his nation.[3] In the "Memo" pages life writing is treated as a conservative instrument of reproduction for transmitting certain values by means of print technologies, and as a disciplinary device for fashioning Americans after Franklin's example. Such values remain unexamined to the extent that Franklin succeeds in ventriloquizing his own thoughts through the voices of two characters (James and Vaughan) who praise him unreservedly and unanimously, and in demonizing other types of self-narration and other versions of his career that might have circulated concurrently with his own.

In the the first two parts of the *Autobiography* Franklin speaks privately to his son and to his friends James and Vaughan at the same time as he sends an institutional message to the generality of fellow Americans. The duplici-

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In the the first two parts of the *Autobiography* Franklin speaks privately to his son and to his friends James and Vaughan at the same time as he sends an institutional message to the generality of fellow Americans. The duplici-

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tous status of Franklin's narrative as both a spontaneous conversation and an act of legislation is enhanced by his repeated use of an epistolary formula of address: the "Dear Son" with which the *Autobiography* begins, and the corresponding "My Dear and Honored Friend" and "My Dearest Sir" with which James and Vaughan begin their letters. In this connection, an adroit practitioner of autobiographical and epistolary fiction, Camilo José Cela, has observed that a personal letter can function simultaneously as a "documento privado" (it is meant primarily for private circulation), an "enxeño legal" (it binds two people into an implicit contract), and a fabricated expression of "deseleixo e espontaneidade" (1990: 8). Since all three rhetorical effects are also intrinsic to the Puritan literary tradition in which Franklin began his acquaintance with books, a brief discussion is in order of how the *Autobiography* exploits certain features of Puritan writing to create an illusion of sincerity and moral rectitude that is in fact part of a contrived rhetoric of seduction.

The stated occasion of Part I of the *Autobiography* is Franklin's desire to inform his illegitimate son William of the history of their family.[4] Here Franklin follows two conventions of Puritan autobiography: he apostrophizes one of his children as his explicit addressee; and he insists on the didactic dimension of his writerly endeavor.[5] Unlike earlier Puritans, however, Franklin also emphasizes the sheer pleasure he obtains in relating his own life as well as the carefree situation in which he writes, "expecting a Week's uninterrupted Leisure in [his] Country Retirement."[6] What is more, he uncharacteristically privileges worldly "Felicity" and "Happiness" (he uses each word twice in the first two paragraphs) over spiritual salvation. In fact, it is often argued that the greatest rhetorical feat Franklin achieves in the *Autobiography* is the transformation of entrepreneurial success, first into a moral "duty" and an "obligation," and later into a sign of divine favor.[7] Franklin subtly invests a self-serving economic concern with the authority of a moral imperative. This shift is complemented by the notion that, while economic success suggests moral improvement and divine favor, individuals are nevertheless free to choose which way they want to live their lives. In Franklin's case, this freedom entails challenging the authority of his father and his elder brother, another uncharacteristic course of action for a Puritan. Providence is thus made compatible with free will. In summary, Franklin presents an absolutist principle in the guise of an individual choice.

Franklin can afford to publicize these adaptations of the Puritan code to the demands of an increasingly more progressive age because when he sits down to write Part I he has become an international celebrity: he has been hailed by David Hume as the first American philosopher and man of letters,

and by Mather Byles as the most brilliant letter writer in the Colonies. By 1783, when he begins Part II, he has also been acknowledged, by Royalists and American patriots alike, as the father of the Revolution.[8] Franklin's doctrinal relaxation in fact became a source of uneasiness for the first reader of the four-part narrative, the English divine Richard Price, who in 1790 complained to the author that the general tone and intent of the manuscript was not religious enough, and that given Franklin's popularity across the nation, this secularizing ethos might be a bad influence on young minds (Franklin 1986b: 242). By contrast, Vaughan writes in his letter that the strength of Franklin's personal narrative resides precisely in the novelty of "discovering" the sources of virtue in "a man's private power" (*A* 80).

From the standpoint of genre classification, Part I looks like a conventional letter of advice written by an experienced father to his estranged son. Yet there is also something odd about a 65-year-old man writing an advisory letter to his successful 45-year-old son, who had held the office of Governor of New Jersey since 1760, when he became the first royal appointee in George III's rule. As William H. Shurr has shown, in 1771 it was Benjamin not William who was is need of protection, since the former "was becoming more and more alienated from the British establishment and the London bureaucracy" (1992: 442). Had the planned Revolution failed, Franklin would have needed loyal friends in high places. On the surface, then, Franklin's good-will gesture of writing to his son indicates that he was appealing to the presumed bond of loyalty between a father and a son, one which should prevail over their mutually conflicting political commitments. This conciliation letter accordingly begins with an affectionate "My Dear Son," but ends reminding William that he is not so much a beloved and respected child as he is legally a bastard, and that his mother was a prostitute: "that hard-to-be-govern'd Passion of Youth, had hurried me frequently into Intrigues with low Women that fell in my Way, which were attended with some Expense & great Inconvenience, besides a continual Risk to my Health" (*A* 75).[9] When Franklin characterizes William's conception as an "erratum" and a "sinister Accident" (literally, a deviation to the left, like the mark indicating bastardy in heraldry), he is alienating his son, as if in the course of that "Week's uninterrupted Leisure" in which he writes he had decided against seeking his son's protection. The autobiographical letter was never sent to its intended addressee through the colonial postal system of which Franklin was himself Postmaster General. Instead, it circulated privately—in manuscript form—among political allies and admirers of Franklin, progressively acquiring some kind of authority over an ever expanding circle of readers, the sons (young and old) of the newly-created Republic. The epistolary Part I of the

Autobiography, whether it is seen in 1771 as a premeditated yet ultimately aborted attempt by a father to blackmail his influential son, or after 1783 as a conduct book designed to discipline all young Americans, functions as a quasi-contractual document in that it seeks to impose on its readers a certain identity (they are treated as children in need of parental advice) and to legislate for them a certain course of behavior. The exact terms of this disciplinary enterprise can be further ascertained through a more detailed study of the composition process and publication history of the *Autobiography*.

Why had Franklin deferred the continuation of his autobiography in the first place? Part I stops in the year 1730, when Franklin set up household with his common-law wife, Deborah Read, whom he did not formally marry. William had been born in 1729 from a previous liason with a prostitute, but was raised by Deborah, whom William loved and cared for as the only mother he had known. If Franklin had finished his work in that first sitting in 1771, leaving out the embarrassing details of his governor-son's birth, the autobiography could have functioned as a ritual of succession by which a father asks his son to continue his work. Yet to Franklin's chagrin, William remained a Royalist through the years of the Revolution, thereby disqualifying himself as the natural depository of his father's trust and therefore also of his personal narrative. As his involvement in politics became increasingly more pressing in the early 1770s, Franklin put on hold the continuation of the narrative, and during the war he lost his own copy of the first draft.

A second copy of this manuscript was happily recovered by Abel James, a Quaker politician and inheritance lawyer, who found it among the effects of another Quaker client, Grace Galloway. James wrote to Franklin informing him of the discovery:

> My Dear and Honored Friend,
> I have often been desirous of writing to thee, but could not be reconciled to the thought that the letter might fall into the hands of the British, lest some printer or busy body should publish some part of the contents, and give our friend pain, and myself censure. (*A* 78)

Here we find an important commonplace of eighteenth-century biographical practice: the famed man of letters does not take any steps toward finding another author who can write his biography; on the contrary, he circulates his letters and confessions privately (for didactic purposes) because he rejects the notoriety of public exposure.[10] Accordingly, Franklin had deposited the draft of Part I with his Quaker acquaintances, Joseph and Grace Galloway, perhaps

even with the conventional instructions that she should one day burn it (as Johnson modestly said he *expected* Boswell to do with his personal letters).

James's mention of the "hands of the British" suggests that he had kept the draft since at least the time of the Declaration of Independence, and that he had not returned it to Franklin (who stayed in France from 1776 to 1783) for fear that a Royalist printer might read and lampoon it. As soon as Franklin returned to America James mailed to him the manuscript along with the letter that would eventually become part of it. James seems aware that one's self-image can be appropriated and manipulated by whoever gathers first-hand information about one's life. Vaughan expresses a similar concern when he warns that, should Franklin fail to write his own life, "somebody else will certainly give it; and perhaps so as nearly to do as much harm, as [Franklin's] own management of the thing might do good" (*A* 79).[11] In late-eighteenth-century England and America, the spread of printing and literacy contributed to creating a reading public interested in learning about the life of the new professional writer.[12] Thus, the person who could control Franklin's image would also control the representation of the Revolution, since Franklin had already been depicted as precisely the "author" of this nation-building event. Vaughan recognizes as much when he asserts that "the immense revolution of the present period, will necessarily turn our attention towards the author of it" (*A* 83).

Now Franklin says explicitly in his text that what allowed his self-transformation into a successful tradesman and ultimately into the father of the Revolution was his writing ability: "Prose Writing has been of great Use to me in the Course of my Life, and was a principal Means of my Advancement" (*A* 14). Since self-making is equated with nation-building, then life writing becomes the instrument whereby America is endowed with an identity of its own.[13] Autobiographical reading and writing can thus function as an institution. The concept of "institution" is here being used in the sense given to it by Wlad Godzich: "An institution is first and foremost a guiding idea, the idea of some determined goal to be reached for the common weal; it is this goal that is sought according to prescribed behavior and by the application of set procedures" (1987: 156).

As Franklin institutionalizes a model of American biography, he also endows the details of his particular existence with some kind of general value. I think William C. Spengemann is right in asserting that "the aim of [Franklin's] *Autobiography* . . . is not so much to explain how his life is justified by some universal principle as to justify his life by persuading others to make its conclusions universal" (1980: 54). In other words, Franklin can deviate from the restrictive conventions of Puritan life writing on the

condition that he provides an alternative form of life planning and life writing in keeping with America's own self-transformation from rebellious daughter of England into a divinely ordained sovereign state. Franklin is characterized by Vaughan as an exceptional "individual" who embodies in his person the very essence of America's virtue: "When [the English] think well of individuals in your native country, they will go nearer to thinking well of your country" (*A* 84). This hypostatizing of Franklin's self into the totality of America entails an occultation or naturalization of a discrete agency, a key operation at the root of all institutionalizing processes.[14] Vaughan himself seems to grant the possibility of alternative modes of life writing when he argues that Franklin's narrative will "make a subject of comparison" with other autobiographical forms.

Just what other forms? Throughout much of the eighteenth century, first-person accounts remained associated with the four types of life writing (whether factual or fictional) that Vaughan emphatically decries in his letter: "the lives of various public cutthroats and intriguers, and . . . absurd monastic self-tormentors, or vain literary triflers" (*A* 83).[15] Here Vaughan delivers a blow to criminal biography (e.g. Defoe's *Moll Flanders*); to the immoral life writing of courtesans and "intriguer[s]" (from Cleland's *Fanny Hill* and Teresa Phillips' *Apology* to Lord Chesterfield's *Letters to His Son* and Lord Hervey's *Memoirs*); to Puritan conversion narratives (from John Bunyan to Jonathan Edwards); and to the egotistical "literary triflers" (Colley Cibber's *Apology* and Sterne's *Tristram Shandy* would qualify as such).[16] These biographical types were more popular in England than in Puritan America, and in fact forms of social interaction such as "intriguing" were considered by some as effeminating European vices. Thus Thomas Jefferson writes in 1785 that an American youth who exchanges his native values for those acquired through a European education "is led, by the strongest of all the human passions, into a spirit for female intrigue, destructive of his own and others' happiness" (1944: 533).[17]

Of the autobiographical models mentioned by Vaughan, the most prestigious one is that of personal accounts by "monastic self-tormentors." It is no wonder that Vaughan, who was raised as an orthodox Protestant and soon embraced the Enlightenment ideal of secular progress, should not like autobiographies by religious fundamentalists.[18] This type of literature was best represented at the time by Jonathan Edwards, whose *Personal Narrative* had been published by Samuel Hopkins in Boston in 1765. There Edwards depicts himself as an ostensibly tormented individual who can only find momentary relief to his chronic bouts of self-loathing when he retires to "particular secret places of [his] own in the woods" (1962: 57, 60, 61). There

are five such places in the first five pages of the *Narrative*. This solipsistic attitude could not be farther removed from Franklin and Vaughan's Enlightenment project of devising forms of collaborative action so as to improve the material conditions and the social integration of all Americans.[19] Vaughan must have intuited what a formidable rival Franklin had in Edwards in his quest for appropriating the autobiographical form as a vehicle for shaping Americans.[20] Sacvan Bercovitch, in an incisive comparison of Edwards's *Personal Narrative* and Franklin's *Autobiography*, has argued that these two works feature "alternate modes of identity" and "mirror inversions of each other." In so doing, they function as interlocutors in the same "intra-cultural dialogue" on how to "resolve the contradictions between self and society" within a culture where "individualism" and other ideologies of self-help threaten to damage the notion of community (Bercovitch 1982: 141).

But Edwards is not just another interlocutor in an open cultural dialogue, as Bercovitch asserts; at least for Vaughan, he is someone whose religious radicalism (i.e. his notion that human beings are fallen creatures beyond complete redemption) might lead his readers to choose a solipsistic, self-serving, and ultimately un-American way of life. These "good people," says Vaughan, "will cease efforts deemed to be hopeless" (efforts, that is, toward reforming and improving themselves within the cultural bounds set up by the religious community), and "perhaps [will] think of taking their share in the scramble of life, or at least of making it comfortable principally for themselves" (*A* 84).

Competitions among life models had been dramatized in English fiction since at least *Joseph Andrews* (1741), an encyclopedia of life patterns that self-consciously pits the development of Joseph's life against those of Colley Cibber, the young Mr. Wilson, and the squire-huntsman, among others; and the development of Fanny's life against the models furnished by her sister Pamela and by the servant girl Betty.[21] Vaughan further discloses his own literary and moral affinity with Fielding when he writes:

> I have always maintained that it is necessary to prove that man is not even at present a vicious and detestable animal. . . . I am anxious to see the opinion established, that there are fair characters existing among the individuals of the race. . . . (*A* 84)[22]

The idea that man is "a vicious and detestable animal" appears in Edwards's *Freedom of the Will* in the form of "the total depravity and corruption of man's nature." This debasement places all human beings "wholly under the

power of sin," rendering them "utterly unable, without the interposition of sovereign grace . . . to do anything that is truly good" (1962: lxiv, 301).

By contrast with Edwards and earlier spiritual autobiographers, Franklin and Vaughan are optimistic about the perfectibility of human character.[23] Throughout the *Autobiography* Franklin provides numerous instances of various habits leading to self-improvement, such as industry, frugality, and sociability.[24] However, it is only in the self-referential moment of the "Memo" pages that reading and writing are extolled as the two most important technologies through which Americans can improve themselves as individuals and as a nation. The only critic who has dealt with these pages in some detail, G. Thomas Couser, has argued persuasively that the kind of text James and Vaughan hope for when they urge Franklin to complete his narrative is "a master text that will serve to discipline present and future Americans," that is to say, "a counter-revolutionary text that would account for the past revolution in such a way as to forestall future ones" (1989: 45).

But how could Franklin's autobiography institutionalize a new form of subjectivity that remains uncontested for generations to come? To do that Franklin would have to avoid the suspicion that his life could have followed any number of other possible paths. Vaughan unwittingly exposes this maneuver of concealment when he tells Franklin: "[Your life] will show that you are ashamed of no origin; a thing the more important, as you prove how little necessary all origin is to happiness, virtue, or greatness" (*A* 82). If in Franklin's life there is no teleological connection between origin and actuality, then his successful career is (despite his solid Puritan credentials) as arbitrary a reality as the Revolution by which thirteen colonies developed into a prosperous nation. What authorizes and naturalizes both processes is the existence of a consensus on the course of action devised by a single "author." Just as he had called Franklin the engineer or "author" of the Revolution, Vaughan also insists that Franklin changed his life by means of a "plan": "As no end likewise happens without a means, so we shall find, Sir, that even you yourself framed a plan by which you became considerable" (*A* 82). For Vaughan as for Franklin, then, a life story without a "plan" is one that openly proclaims its own contingent nature, admitting that its "end" is not the effect of any definite "means."

To recapitulate, the "Memo" pages outline a context of competition among rival modes of life writing in a nation where the concepts of citizenship and Americanness are being defined for the first time. In a changing environment like this, nothing could seem more important than to present the parallel progress of that nation and of individual lives according to a preconceived plan. Vaughan appropriately claimed that the salutary effects of this

plan had been tested to his satisfaction in the person of none other than the father of the Revolution. If Franklin and Vaughan were to succeed in inculcating the inevitability of both processes (nation-building and self-making) and their mutual connection, then all other biographical forms would be effectively driven from the field of competition. In this manner, Franklin's model would reign uncontested as both a recipe for individual success and a disciplinary instrument for social homogenization.

The practice of this biographical discipline seems to have begun at Franklin's own home, with one of his grandsons. Benny (Benjamin Franklin) Bache emulated his grandfather and namesake in many important aspects, from spending part of his youth in Europe and becoming a printer to advocating Enlightenment pedagogical projects. He even went so far as to write an exact replica of the *Autobiography*. As personal secretary to his grandfather between the years 1785 and 1790, Bache not only took care of Franklin's correspondence, but made several clean handwritten copies of the extant drafts of the *Autobiography*.[25] This extraordinary feat of emulation invites the following two questions: did Benny Bache "improve his mind" by endlessly copying Franklin's original manuscript, as Vaughan thought a prolonged contact with the *Autobiography* would do to young and impressionable minds? And did Franklin use Bache as simply a blank page on which he could inscribe a repeated fantasy of self-perpetuation and mastery?[26] These may be unanswerable questions, but the very possibility of their being asked in connection with a reader who so closely resembled Franklin reinforces the idea that in the *Autobiography* the practices of life writing function as an instrument of reproduction—in short, an institution.

I have tried to show how the "Memo" pages, being a highly self-reflexive moment in the *Autobiography*, open a window into the inner workings of a narrative whose very emplotment rehearses the narrator's discovery of three plans. These are a plan to conduct his life, another to build a nation, and a third one to write his life.[27] It is Abel James and Benjamin Vaughan who provide an internal readership eager to see a correlation drawn among the three endeavors. In addition to their role as readers, James and Vaughan fulfill three other important functions in the intitutionalization of a particular version of American autobiography: first, they stigmatize alternative forms of life planning and writing; second, they constitute themselves, in the egregious company of Franklin, into an ecumenic spiritual community (James is a Quaker, Vaughan an Anglican, and Franklin a Puritan); and third, they contribute sketches of Franklin's character which themselves become part of the *Autobiography*. These functions are precisely the ones alluded to by Godzich in his outline of what he calls the "instituting path" that a proposed "guiding

idea" must follow: "The idea itself is adopted by a group of individuals who become its public possessors and implementers. This group becomes then an institution as a result of the combining of the guiding idea with the set procedures" (Godzich 1987: 156).

Finally, James and Vaughan also envision the lives of future Americans in the act of either reading Franklin's narrative or taking up the pen to represent themselves in the manner established by the *Autobiography*. It seems ironic that the first young American to undergo this disciplinary process were another Benjamin Franklin, and that his own contribution to the institutionalizing of the *Autobiography* consisted in making faithful reproductions of the original manuscript. In Godzich's own words: "Institutions are fundamentally instruments of reproduction . . . in that they ensure that regulative processes take place" (Godzich 1987: 157). Institutions tend to repress their own origin as simply another deviation from standard procedures or as a moment of subjective interpretation. This is so because the main task assigned to the guardians of an institution is to hide the arbitrariness and provisionality of its regulations. If Franklin and Vaughan were to declare openly this unmotivatedness (and of course they do not), they would be encouraging an open competition for representation among rival biographical modes. As it is, however, they discourage other writers from trying to interpret their American experience, outlaw counter-versions of that experience, and contribute to the presentation of a seemingly decentered narrator who speaks *in persona aliorum*—through the voices of his friends. In so doing, Franklin naturalizes and consecrates—i.e. institutionalizes—a particular model for interpreting the life of individual Americans, the craft of American letters, and the history of the American nation.

NOTES

1. The word "autobiography" is a romantic coinage that can be traced as far back as to Friedrich Schlegel in Germany (who uses it approvingly in 1798) and William Taylor in England (who considers using it, but finally rejects its validity in 1797). The actual words that Franklin and his earliest posthumous editors used in the title of his personal narrative were "memoirs," "remains," "notes," and "history," each normally followed by the modifying phrase "of my life" or "of his life."

2. James's and Vaughan's letters constitute one of five external documents that Franklin decided to interpolate into the manuscript of the *Autobiography* (Franklin 1986b: xviii-xix).

3. For the concept of "rite of institution," see Bourdieu 1991: 119. I follow Prince in his brief discussion of the history and function of the *"mise en abyme"* (1987: 53).

4. Franklin does not specify which son it is. That it should turn out to be an illegitimate child is ironically significant, as is the fact that in 1771 William was already a middle-aged man and the Governor of New Jersey. On Franklin's pretense that he is addressing an ingenuous and inexperienced youngster, see Griffith 1974: 79-80.

5. For the conventions that Franklin borrowed from the Puritan tradition of Bunyan, Shepard, and Mather, see Shea 1988: 239-41. The presence of Bunyan and Defoe in the *Autobiography* is masterfully treated in Wilson 1989: 33-40.

6. Franklin 1986a: 3. All subsequent references to this edition of the *Autobiography* (abbreviated *A*) will appear incorporated into the text. I quote from the Penguin edition because of its general availability.

7. This understanding of the *Autobiography* derives from Max Weber's famous reading in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Franklin 1986b: 282-85). For the influence of Franklin's entrepreneurial teachings on the "economic romanticism" of the first American pioneers, see Charles L. Sanford's remarks in "An American *Pilgrim's Progress*" (Franklin 1986b: 308-12).

8. All these testimonies are now readily available in Lemay and Zall's Norton edition of the *Autobiography* (1986b: 231-32, 241-42). Warner elaborates on the idea that Franklin was the first American man of letters in the narrower sense of an intellectual who acquires literary renown in a print-culture environment (1990: 76).

9. A chronology of the principal events in the life of William Franklin appears in Franklin 1986b: 183. For a brief discussion of William's sense of social inferiority on account of his illegitimate birth, see Shurr 1992: 443-45.

10. This topos of humility is nowhere better enacted than in Boswell's *Life of Johnson*. See, for instance, 1.344, 355, 374.

11. Reising (1994) observes that Franklin was by no means a paragon of virtue, and that the lies he fabricates and the roles in which he casts himself in the *Autobiography* are meant to forestall the eventual disclosure of the ugliest aspects of his life. The best clinical and literary discussion of why and how a first-person narrator feels compelled to "impersonate" any number of characters takes place in Bruner (1993).

12. A detailed account of the growth of a biographical industry in eighteenth-century England is presented in chapter 3 of Caffarelli (1990). Being Franklin's British publisher, Vaughan writes to him in awareness that life writing can also be a lucrative venture: "your biography . . . would secure attention to your former writings" (*A* 83; phrasing adjusted).

13. Imagining the return home of a European-educated American, Jefferson argues vigorously for the interrelation of nation and writing: "He returns to his own country . . . speaking and writing his own tongue as a foreigner, and therefore unqualified to obtain those distinctions, which eloquence of the pen and tongue ensures in a free country" (1944: 533).

14. As Godzich writes, this operation consists of "the reconduction of what appears particular through the paths of the general, or, more precisely, through the instituting insightful path which is no longer treated as particular" (1987: 157).

15. Compare Friedrich Schlegel's fragment 196 of the *Athenaeum* (1798): "Pure autobiographies [Ger. *reine Autobiographien*] are written either by neurotics who are enthralled by their own egos—a class that includes Rousseau; or out of robust artistic or adventurous self-love, like that of Benvenuto Cellini; or by born historians who consider themselves nothing more than the raw materials of historical art; or by women who are playing the coquette with posterity as well as with their contemporaries; or by worrisome people who want to clean up the least little speck of dust before they die and who can't bear letting themselves depart this world without explanations" (1971: 188).

16. Shurr (1992: 449) highlights a number of features shared in common by Chesterfield's *Letters* and Part I of the *Autobiography*. For the scandalous memoirs, see chapter 8 of Nussbaum (1988). Cibber's *Apology* (1740) was considered the work of a "vain literary trifler" by its earliest critic, Henry Fielding, who ridiculed it in chapter 1 of *Joseph Andrews* (1742), entitled "Of Writing Lives in General." Like Vaughan, Fielding praises Plutarch.

17. In Ketcham's anthology of Franklin's political writings there are many instances of shorter pieces showing a marked anti-European bias. See for instance his 1775 letter to Joseph Galloway on political corruption in England as well as his famous "Dialogue between Britain, France, Spain, Holland, Saxony and America" (Franklin 1965: 282, 283-88). The attacks on the general decay of European mores are part of an orchestrated patriotic campaign for the publicizing of American emancipation. Yet Franklin's public condemnations of Europe are belied by his own nine-year sojourn in Paris and his personal decision to have his grandsons educated in Switzerland.

18. Johnson thought that the "monastick life" was most readily embraced by individuals who were "glad to supply by external authority their own want of constancy and resolution . . . when long experience has convinced them of their own inability to govern themselves" (Boswell 1933: 1.243).

19. A very readable introduction to the Enlightenment ideals shared by Franklin and his grandson, Benjamin Franklin Bache, appears in Smith (1990).

20. The one truly popular spiritual autobiography antedating Edwards's *Personal Narrative* is Elizabeth Ashbridge's *Account of the Life of E.A.* (c. 1755; publ. 1774). For the milestones in the development of Quaker journals and Puritan autobiographies, see Shea 1988.

21. This competition occurs in the main subtext of Fielding's novel, Cervantes's *Don Quijote*, between the eponymous hero and the chivalric models he both emulates and criticizes, and between himself and other characters in the novel such as Ginés de Pasamonte and Sansón Carrasco.

22. Compare Fielding's contention than in real life there are "many Exceptions" to the general moral decay that he depicts in his novel, and that these people's virtuous lives are an "honour" to their respective ranks (1971: 169).

23. I am puzzled by Dauber's gloss of Vaughan's above-quoted passage as an expression of "apocalypticism" and "fundamental pessimism" (1990: 12).

24. Shea explains that Franklin adopted what D. H. Lawrence called the persona of "the dummy American" in order to convince his readership "with indulgent irony" that the "dummy of patterned behavior . . . is willing to sacrifice the ideal of perfection in exchange for the more realistic aim of moral improvement" (1991: 39).

25. This fact is mentioned in Smith 1990: 101. All the information on Bache used in this essay comes from Smith's book, especially chapters 4 and 5.

26. Warner notes Franklin's use in the *Almanack* of Poor Richard as a "ghostwriter," a fictional being with whom the empirical author can engage in a textual game, "a fantasmatic self-splitting or self-objectification that results in a concealed or absent subject behind a manipulated surface" (1990: 78). The terms of this game are greatly altered when another persona, Titan Leeds, takes possession of Richard's mind and body to write his own opinions through Richard's "hand": "the Hand written is mine, tho' wrote with yours" (qtd. in Warner 1990: 77). I think a similar game takes place in a real-world context with Bache as unwitting participant.

27. Franklin mentions the American Revolution only in terms of the impact that it had on the successive stages of writing the *Autobiography*. The effect of these seemingly tangential comments are: (1) to emphasize that "Franklin's act of conceiving, discovering, or inventing himself almost exactly coincides with the birth of America"; and (2) to make "Franklin's personal history *stand in place of the revolution*" (Cox 1989: 16; emphasis in the original).

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THE HUNCHBACK AND THE MIRROR:

AUDEN, SHAKESPEARE, AND THE POLITICS OF NARCISSUS*

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1. A MIDDLE-AGED MAN WITH A CORPORATION

"Hic et Ille," W. H. Auden's 1956 sequence of aphorisms in the journal *Encounter*,[1] later collected in *The Dyer's Hand* (1963) under the section heading "The Well of Narcissus,"[2] adds a droll new inflection to the intellectual history of narcissism. In Auden's version

> Narcissus does not fall in love with his reflection because it is beautiful, but because it is his. If it were his beauty that enthralled him, he would be set free in a few years by its fading.
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> 'After all,' sighed Narcissus the hunchback, 'on me it looks good.' (Auden 1956: 33; 1963: 94)

Self-love can handle a hunch back. Auden may have in mind here the fawning self-regard of Shakespeare's Richard III. Certainly, the section which follows "The Well of Narcissus" in *The Dyer's Hand*, "The Shakespearian City," scrutinises Shakespeare's history plays in a series of complexly reasoned essays which frequently return to the theme of narcissism.[3] One

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essay, indeed, first published in *Encounter* in 1959 as "The Fallen City" (Auden 1959: 21-31; 1963: 182-208) adds the pot belly to the hunch back as an identifying feature of Narcissus, by nominating Shakespeare's Sir John Falstaff as the improbable epitome of primary narcissism. It also draws an immediate link between Falstaff's libidinal realm and the order of politics.

If a producer were to cut the Falstaff scenes from the Henry IV plays, the essay suggests, they would become "The middle section of a political trilogy which could be entitled *Looking for the Doctor*," in which the action would be dominated by the quest to find a suitable physician to restore health to the "body politic of England," an "Ideal Ruler," able to establish and maintain "Temporal Justice" (Auden 1959: 23; 1963: 186-7). But the plays are in fact much more than this. In what way, Auden indicates in his change of essay title when reprinted in *The Dyer's Hand* from "The Fallen City" to "The Prince's Dog." Using the title Falstaff bestows whimsically on himself, Auden thus shifts the trilogy's centre of gravity, so to speak, from the body politic to the carnal body. Falstaff is the real heart and guts of the trilogy because he represents all that is left over, left out, when the super-ego has had its say about law, governance and justice:

> For Falstaff, time does not exist, since he belongs to the *opera buffa* world of play and mock-action governed not by will or desire, but by innocent wish, a world where no one can suffer because everything they say and do is only a pretence.

There are, however, two places in the plays "where the incongruity of the *opera buffa* world with the historical world is too much, even for Shakespeare, and a patently false note is struck." These are the occasions when Falstaff runs through Hotspur's corpse with his sword, and when he jests, brutally, with the honorable Colevile, who has surrendered to him, and whom he then betrays to execution. "The Falstaffian frivolity and the headsman's axe," Auden notes, chilly, "cannot so directly confront each other" (1959: 22; 1963: 184-5).

The essay goes on to speculate about how Falstaff would react to a Falstaff-less *Henry IV* if he were a spectator in the audience (1959: 25-7 *passim*; 1963: 192-6 *passim*). He would not, Auden suggests, be able to understand the total commitment with which individuals in both camps devote themselves to abstract principles of right and wrong. "Anger and fear he can understand, because they are immediate emotions, but not nursing a grievance or planning revenge or apprehension, for these presuppose that the future inherits from the past." Falstaff exists in a realm of primary narcissism where "to wish and to do are synonymous." He and Hotspur

represent antithetical forms of selfhood. Each obeys the impulse of the moment, saying what he thinks without prudent calculation, "Falstaff because he has no mask to put on, Hotspur because he has so become his mask that he has no face beneath it." But they inhabit different moral universes. "If Falstaff belonged to the same world as Hotspur, one could call him a liar, but in his own eyes, he is perfectly truthful, for, to him, fact is subjective fact, 'what I am actually feeling and thinking at this moment'"; and, in an allusion to *Peer Gynt*, he describes Falstaff as "pure troll," quite able to believe a cow is a girl if it suits him, whereas Hotspur, totally identified with his ideological mask, "is so lacking in imagination that the troll kingdom is invisible to him."

Falstaff, as the embodiment of a self-absorbed, pre-political humanity, innocently and conveniently believing his own lies, becomes for Auden, in "his neglect of the public interest in favor of private concerns . . . an image for the justice of charity" which "speaks for all the insulted and injured of this world" (1959: 30; 1963: 204). That is, "in the comic world of play" (1959: 29-30; 1963: 203) Falstaff becomes "a Lord of Misrule" (1959: 27, 31; 1963: 198, 207-8), embodying the id's perpetual rejection of the super-ego's obsession with governance and order, his corpulent flesh standing for the irruption of Narcissus into the political realm:

> Once upon a time we were all Falstaffs: then we became social beings with super-egos. . . . [But] there are some in whom the nostalgia for the state of innocent self-importance is so strong that they refuse to accept adult life and responsibilities and seek some means to become again the Falstaffs they once were. The commonest technique adopted is the bottle, and, curiously enough, the male drinker reveals his intention by developing a drinker's belly.

And, adds an Auden increasingly conscious of his own middle-age spread,

> The Greeks thought of Narcissus as a slender youth but I think they were wrong. I see him as a middle-aged man with a corporation, for, however ashamed he may be of displaying it in public, in private a man with a belly loves it dearly: it may be an unprepossessing child to look at, but he has borne it all by himself.[4]

2. THE CURSE OF NARCISSUS

"Hic et Ille" opens with a traditional commonplace of psychoanalysis, that "Every man carries with him through life a mirror, as unique and impossible to get rid of as his shadow." Narcissus need have no high opinion of his own good looks, physical or moral, which makes his self-regard all the more vulnerable: "Most, perhaps all, our mirrors are inaccurate and uncomplimentary. . . . Some magnify, some diminish, others return lugubrious, comic, derisive, or terrifying images." The essay contrasts the strategies of psychoanalyst and politician in dealing with such negative mirror images. The psychoanalyst offers your average Narcissus in the street a therapy of personal reassurance:

> The psychoanalyst says: 'Come, my good man, I know what is the matter with you. You have a distorting mirror. No wonder you feel guilty. But cheer up. For a slight consideration I shall be delighted to correct it for you. There! Look! A perfect image. Not a trace of distortion. Now you are one of the elect. That will be £666, please.'

That sum (altered in *The Dyer's Hand* to "five thousand dollars") jovially recalls the Number of the Beast, underlining the diabolic insufficiency of such personalised temptations, as the essay at once spells out: "And immediately come seven devils, and the last state of that man is worse than the first." The frustrations of Narcissus cannot be taken away by personal therapy. To "the last state of that man" (the word "state" tugged between psychological and political discourses), the politician then offers the temptation of fascism's ultimate political State:

> The politician, secular or clerical, promises the crowd that, if only they will hand in their private mirrors to him, to be melted down into one large public mirror, the curse of Narcissus will be taken away. (1956: 33; 1963: 93-4)

It's not hard to detect here the influence of such "Left Freudian" 1930s theorising about the popular, libidinal appeal of Nazism as that of Wilhelm Reich in *Listen, Little Man!* and *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, and of Erich Fromm in *The Fear of Freedom*. The politician triumphs by melting down the multitudinous narcissisms of the masses into a collective fantasy, articulating all that private frustration, anger and fear in some orgy of national self-admiration and vengeance. Auden's toned-down language might

lead us to miss the point.[5] His concern, in 1956 as twenty years earlier, is to explain the sorcery by which totalitarian political movements mobilise the Falstaffian self-love of what the poem "September 1, 1939" calls "the sensual man-in-the-street" in a project which is ultimately not only self-destructive but world-destroying.

Such, indeed, had been a major preoccupation of Auden's 1936 collection *Look, Stranger!*, a volume superficially much concerned with the idea of "love," which repeatedly turns the private obsessions the word implies into a central political fixation. "The earth turns over," for example, written on a Christmas visit home in 1933, links the comically terrifying images in the mirror over the parental mantelpiece with the world of contemporary politics. The young man's own reflection seems initially the externalised "portrait" of self in a world of which it is master, able to find "what view I wish for" in "the mirror world where logic is reversed."[6]

But this is an illusion. The first stanza had already indicated a much more negative view of the external order of things, and this stanza's reference to "the heaven of failures" stresses just how much the mirror world is one of fantasy fulfilment like Alice's (a recurrent figure in Auden's thought). The parental imagos, reflected in the mirror's well of Narcissus, are not only comic but menacing, grotesque, "enormous comics, drawn from life." The mother "chasing letters with a knife" hardly needs spelling out. It's noteworthy, though, that in a late lecture on Freud, "Phantasy and Reality in Poetry" in 1971, Auden recalled childhood terrors at Hoffmann's story of "Little Suck-a-Thumb," relating the figure of the "great long-legged scissor-man" in classic Freudian terms to his domineering mother's prohibitions on nail-biting and to what he calls "the castrating vagina dentata."[7] A few months earlier in 1933 Auden had published a poem in which the Scissor Man put in an appearance with a whole company of scalpel-wielding hunchbacks:

> The bolt is sliding in its groove,
> Outside the window is the black remov-
> er's van,
> And now with sudden swift emergence
> Come the women in dark glasses, the hump-backed surgeons
> and the scissor-man.[8]

In "The earth turns over" such personal anxieties are inserted into a daytime world where Eros is the dictator in a totalitarian state:

> Love's daytime kingdom which I say you rule,
> The total state where all must wear your badges,

Keep order perfect as a naval school:
Noble emotions organised and massed
Line the straight flood-lit tracks of memory
To cheer your image as it flashes by;
All lust at once informed on and suppressed.

Hitler had assumed dictatorial powers in March 1933. For such young leftists as Auden, looking uncertainly towards the new year, such imagery was not merely fanciful. A subsequent poem in *Look, Stranger!*, written less than a year later, in November 1934, draws an explicit link between obsessive personal love and the key symbolic event which made possible Hitler's seizure of power, the Reichstag Fire. Poem XXI, originally published in *The Listener* in February 1935 under the title "A Bride in the 30's," opens with the suggestion that both self-love and love of the other fall under the order of politics, under all the sixteen (nationally distinct) skies of Europe. It speaks of an Eros finding its luck in every "policed unlucky city" of those "bankrupt countries where they mend the roads" (an allusion to Hitler's facile solution for German unemployment). But it also talks, prefiguring the remarks on Falstaff, of how Eros can convert "these lands of terrifying mottoes" into daydream "worlds as innocent as Beatrix Potter's" (the unconvincing off-rhyme stirring our unease). And it takes, as emblem of Narcissus' *opera buffa* desire to convert wish into actuality, the half-mad Dutch communist Marianus van der Lubbe, whom the Nazis, after a show trial, executed for the Reichstag burning. Van der Lubbe's inane giggling at his trial becomes, in the poem, a figure of the vaingloriousness and vanity of any politics founded in the wish-fulfilment and histrionics of the nursery:

Summoned by such a music from our time,
Such images to audiences come
As vanity cannot dispel nor bless. . . .

Ten thousand of the desperate marching by
Five feet, six feet, seven feet high:
Hitler and Mussolini in their wooing poses
Churchill acknowledging the voters' greeting
Roosevelt at the microphone, Van der Lubbe laughing
And our first meeting.

Demagogues and dictators alike woo the public by appealing to its deepest, most infantile wishes, constructing hunger, love, desperation and vanity into theatrical daydreams of national self-aggrandisement.[9] They thus reproduce the trickery of Eros, which appears to do tricks "at our proposal,"

fulfilling the programme we want, while in fact all the time working its "public spirit," like Hegel's "cunning of Reason," through "our private stuff." Stanzas 8 and 9 of the poem liken this to the way in which childhood frustrations and repressions transform the innocent narcissism of every infant Falstaff into that of an adult bitter and resentful of lack, angry at being denied "certain prizes for which we would never compete," "Desires to which we could not yield," and brooding just those "Schemes for a life and sketches for a hatred" which Reich and Fromm saw as the raw material for fascism. Fascism succeeds because it offers practical fulfilment for such infantile revenge fantasies: "hatred would proffer her enormous pleasure, / And glory swap her fascinating rubbish / For your one treasure." This reading elucidates the widely remarked obscurity of that final request to the beloved, to be deaf

To what I hear and wish I did not:
The voice of love saying lightly, brightly—
'Be Lubbe, be Hitler, but be my good
Daily, nightly.'

Significantly, this is the voice not of the Tempter but of the Betrayer. Both speaker and addressee respond to his seductive tones, for betrayal is always both suffered and volunteered, externally imposed and internally chosen. Self-insulting, we long for that which will destroy us, agents as well as victims of

The power that corrupts, that power to excess
The beautiful quite naturally possess:
To them the fathers and the children turn:
And all who long for their destruction,
The arrogant and self-insulted, wait
The looked instruction.

This is what Auden later means by that public mirror which is the politician's spurious cure for the curse of Narcissus, to which (as "The Fallen City" would put it twenty years later) "all the insulted and injured of this world" are the eager recruits. The question to the beloved, "Will you join the lost in their sneering circles . . . ?," is also addressed to the lover himself. Each Narcissus falls in love with the "engaging face" of a beloved which gives back the mirror-image of his extrojected self-love, and is always, therefore, "the face of the betrayer."[10]

The choice between false and real loves is focused in the closing lines of the poem as one between self-consuming cancer and a metaphoric dove which

hovers between Aphrodite and Noah, "'Crooked to move as a moneybug or a cancer / Or straight as a dove.'" "Crooked" like Shakespeare's Richard Crookback or the "hump-backed surgeons" of that 1933 poem, this cancerous love looks forward to the plight of "Miss Gee" in a brutal little poem written in 1937, where ovarian cancer is seen as the ageing spinster's surrogate for the child she never conceived. The image thus links subliminally to the identification, in "The Prince's Dog," of "fatness in the male" with narcissistic self-love, "the physical expression of a psychological wish to withdraw from sexual competition and, by combining mother and child in his own person, to become emotionally self-sufficient."[11]

Such deluded Narcissi are everywhere in *Look, Stranger!* "Now the leaves are falling fast," for example, which immediately precedes "The earth turns over," telescopes nursery pleasures into fascist nightmare, the prams which go rolling on turning into tanks, its selfish babies, grown up and plucked from the real libidinal delight, seeking a renewed infantile warmth for frozen adult hands, "Lonely on the separate knees," in the Nazi-saluting, goose-stepping ranks where Eros and Thanatos embrace:

> Dead in hundreds at the back
> Follow wooden in our track,
> Arms raised stiffly to reprove
> In false attitudes of love.
>
> Starving through the leafless wood
> Trolls run scolding for their food;
> And the nightingale is dumb,
> And the angel will not come.

The Falstaffian sensual man, described by Auden twenty years later as "pure troll," finds that King Belly will not be filled unless such nursery desires are projected outward into the "one large public mirror" of collective aggression. Driven by appetite and wish, such lost souls are self-betrayed to the false fascist solution of which Auden wrote in the Notes to *New Year Letter* in 1940: "Fascism is Socialism that has lost faith in the future. Its slogan is Now or Never. In demanding a dictator it is really demanding the advent of the Good Life on earth through a supernatural miracle" (Auden 1941: 118).

Such are the politics of Narcissus.

3. IMPERIALISM'S FACE

In the "Epilogue" to *Look, Stranger!* those lost souls have already enlisted in what Auden in a contemporary review called "the great Fascist retreat which will land us finally in the ditch of despair" (1996: 61-2):

> The feverish prejudiced lives do not care, and lost
> Their voice in the flutter of bunting, the glittering
> Brass of the great retreat,
>
> And the malice of death.

But, although these feverish prejudiced lives are in one sense betrayed by their leaders, they are also *self*-betrayed, their own longing and prejudice succumbing to the false promises of the dictators. Or rather, since Auden does not exclude himself or his readers from the charge, we all are, for "The rumours woo and terrify the crowd, / Woo us. The betrayers thunder at, blackmail / Us," and, preferring the crooked path, we have turned our faces from the real liberators,

> Who without reproaches shewed us what our vanity has chosen,
> Who pursued understanding with patience like a sex, had unlearnt
> Our hatred, and towards the really better
> World had turned their face....

—liberators who include Freud and Georg Groddeck, Lenin, D. H. Lawrence and Kafka, and "Proust on the self-regard."

Narcissism, then, lies at the heart of "the great Fascist retreat," and it leads directly to that merging of Eros and Thanatos in the death-wish which haunts the whole of *Look, Stranger!*, a death-drive directed inward and outward simultaneously, as the closing question and answer insist: "Are they dead here? Yes. / And the wish to wound has the power." D. H. Lawrence, Auden observed in his review, showed us that "the Western-romantic conception of personal love is a neurotic symptom only inflaming our loneliness, a bad answer to our real wish to be united to and rooted in life." It is in reality an extrojected narcissism, in which the beloved is merely a mirror-image of a self which wants to drown in its own reflection. No longer does the subject seek, as in the poem "1929,"[12] to "Be weaned at last to independent delight," separating itself from the mother. At the heart of Fascism's totalitarian drive

lies the infantile urge to repossess the (m)other, engulf the other in the well of Narcissus.

Surfacing in New York in October 1939, Auden versified Freud in the charmingly innocent light verse of "Heavy Date":

> Love requires an Object,
> But this varies so much,
> Almost, I imagine,
> Anything will do:
> When I was a child I
> Loved a pumping-engine,
> Thought it every bit as
> Beautiful as you.

"Heavy Date" was to appear as a section leader in his first American volume, *Another Time* (1940). Only a month before, however, he had written what was to become the most famous poem of that whole volume, "September 1, 1939," a despairing vision of the real, public consequences of indulging such nursery passions. This poem speaks of those "Waves of anger and fear" now circling the globe, obsessing our private lives, as Hitler invaded Poland. "Anger and fear," one recalls, are emotions Auden was later to attribute to Falstaff, "because they are immediate emotions." Now, however, the face in the mirror is that of the real Dorian Gray:

> Into this neutral air . . .
> Each language pours its vain
> Competitive excuse:
> But who can live for long
> In an euphoric dream;
> Out of the mirror they stare,
> Imperialism's face
> And the international wrong.

"Vain" here is usually read as meaning "in vain," "pointless"; but set next to "Competitive excuse" in the context I've constructed it also, perhaps predominantly, means "issuing from vanity," from the child's narcissistic misperception of its self in the mirror.

In "Hic et Ille," Auden was to observe that "It is impossible to approach a mirror without composing or "making" a special face, and if we catch sight of our reflection unawares we rarely recognise ourselves. I cannot read my face in the mirror because I am already obvious to myself" (1956: 38; 1963: 104). This is how those faces along the bar still manage to "Cling to their

average day" in "September 1, 1939." The process corresponds closely to Louis Althusser's account of how the human subject is interpellated to its subject-role in ideology:

> As St Paul admirably put it, it is in the 'Logos', meaning in ideology, that we 'live, move and have our being'. It follows that for you and me, the category of the subject is a primary 'obviousness'. . . . [But] the 'obviousness' that you and I are subjects . . . is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect. It is indeed a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes . . . obviousnesses as obviousnesses, which we cannot fail to recognize. (1994: 107)

Admiring our hunch backs and pot bellies in the bar mirror, we see that ideologically constructed self ("free, ethical, etc") as "obvious." The self-made "special face" of the poem's "Collective Man" is here not, however, some invention of Soviet or Nazi totalitarianism, but of American mass democracy. Catching sight of our reflection unawares, we see without recognition what we really are: "Imperialism's face / And the international wrong." But the euphoric haze recomposes itself:

> Faces along the bar
> Cling to their average day:
> The lights must never go out,
> The music must always play,
> All the conventions conspire
> To make this fort assume
> The furniture of home;
> Lest we should see where we are,
> Lost in a haunted wood,
> Children afraid of the night
> Who have never been happy or good.

Lest we should see where—and who—we are. But the bar is not some larger nursery where we can hide from the ogre forever, even though we have behaved like irresponsible children throughout "a low dishonest decade," conniving at "Mismanagement and grief." Now that "We must suffer them all again," as for Hansel and Gretel abandoned in a haunted wood, the only real option is to grow up quickly.

That means, certainly, unearthing, through accurate scholarship, what has created the psychopathology of Nazi Germany: "the whole offence / From Luther until now / That has driven a culture mad," unearthing, even, what it was in the childhood of Hitler himself ("Find what occurred at Linz")

that attuned his own narcissism so astutely to the national psychosis. But what that is is, in fact, "obvious" to all:

> I and the public know
> What all schoolchildren learn:
> Those to whom evil is done
> Do evil in return.

What is most needed on "September 1, 1939" is not knowledge of the other, the enemy, but of the self, the betrayer within. For what makes us all equally vulnerable to "The windiest militant trash / Important Persons shout" is precisely that crudest of narcissistic wishes, the craving not for "universal love / But to be loved alone," the "folded lie" of an ideology "bred in the bone / Of each woman and each man." In this ideological discourse, the lies of "the sensual man-in-the-street" and the lie of Authority are mutually supportive, the "curse of Narcissus" taken away and melted down into one large public mirror. Throughout a low, dishonest decade, the "private lives" of all those Falstaffs-in-the-street had conspired with the "compulsory game" of "helpless governors," to sustain a comforting pretence that a fort—an embattled military defence—was really a home. The "euphoric dream" of ideology had fantasised "a world where no one can suffer because everything they say and do is only a pretence."

4. A LOVE WE HAVE NEVER OUTGROWN

"September 1, 1939" is placed in *Another Time* in a final sequence of six "Occasional Poems" which begins with "Spain, 1937," newly revised in 1939 after the final defeat of the Republic. Already, this poem records, "On that tableland scored by rivers, / Our fever's menacing shapes [had been] precise and alive," for those with eyes to see. The preceding sections had been preoccupied with the consequences, for the personal as for the public life, of selves collectively arrested in primary narcissism, from the "deliberate man" of the opening poem, who finds "Fresh loves betray him, daily," through the vision of an Oxford full of creatures "so deeply in love with their lives" and the various sketches of frozen emotion in "A. E. Housman," "Brussels in Winter," "Rimbaud," "Pascal" and "Matthew Arnold," to the chilling injunction to a crooked Narcissus at the end of "As I walked out one evening":

> 'O look, look in the mirror,
> O look in your distress;
> Life remains a blessing
> Although you cannot bless.
>
> O stand, stand at the window
> As the tears scald and start;
> You shall love your crooked neighbour
> With your crooked heart.'

The shift from mirror to window, looking outward rather than inward, points towards the revelation expressed in the final poem of the opening section, which attempts to reconcile narcissism and love of others in a life-enhancing ratio:

> Nowhere else could I have known
> Than, beloved, in your eyes
> What we have to learn,
> That we love ourselves alone. . . .

But the "menacing shapes" of the narcissistic fever do not go away. They haunt the allegedly "Lighter Poems" of the second section, which, opening with the playful verses later called "Heavy Date" that expound Freud's theory of infantile eroticism, then proceeds to the cautionary tales of a destructive self-love, more callously comic than anything in Hilaire Belloc, of "Miss Gee," "James Honeyman," and "Victor," to end with a series of poems which spell out the political consequences of such introversion, "Epitaph on a Tyrant," "The Unknown Citizen," and "Refugee Blues." This last, with its vision of "Hitler over Europe, saying: 'They must die'" and of "Ten thousand soldiers march[ing] to and fro: / Looking for you and me, my dear, looking for you and me," opens the way to the poems of public occasion of the concluding sequence, bringing together Eros and Thanatos to record a time, in the words of "In Memory of Sigmund Freud":

> When there are so many we shall have to mourn,
> When grief has been made so public, and exposed
> To the critique of a whole epoch
> The frailty of our conscience and anguish.

The sequence is carefully orchestrated to gather together the themes of the preceding sections. "Spain, 1937" is followed by two elegies, one for W. B. Yeats, "silly like us," a self-absorbed old man obliquely associated with "cowardice, conceit," notorious exponent of fascist ideas, "hurt" into poetry by a "mad Ireland"; and one for Ernst Toller, German revolutionary, "too in-

jured to get well" by "the Europe which took refuge in [his] head," who had recently committed suicide in New York, seeking refuge in "the big and friendly death outside." Both writers can be seen in different ways as victims of a misdirected primary narcissism, their loves arranged "by powers we pretend to understand." "September 1, 1939" then offers a critique of how that process takes place in the construction of "each woman and each man," driven by a crude narcissistic wish that "Craves what it cannot have, / Not universal love / But to be loved alone."

The final elegy in *Another Time*, "In Memory of Sigmund Freud," extols the "One rational voice" whose insights into the subject's construction out of such narcissistic cravings might have deposed "the ancient cultures of conceit" in all our heads, returning our innocent primary narcissism to us transformed into a genuine "universal love":

> ...show[ing] us what evil is: not, as we thought
> Deeds that must be punished, but our lack of faith
> Our dishonest mood of denial,
> The concupiscence of the oppressor.

The elegy's concluding reference to the mother-child duo of "Eros, builder of cities" and "weeping anarchic Aphrodite" as mourners at Freud's funeral, ties the poem back in to that Eros evoked at the end of "September 1, 1939," and leads on to the volume's closing marriage hymn, "Epithalamion." In 1960, in a review of Erik Erikson's *Young Man Luther*, Auden was still speculating on those processes in German history which had created the "huge imago" of Nazism and its "psychopathic god" (Auden 1973a). In *The Enchafèd Flood* in 1950, still in the shadow of the recent war, he had discerned the essential lesson of the fascist era, that "The further civilization moves towards the open condition," in which every moment is one of personal choice not determined by tradition and authority, "the sharper becomes the alternative: *either* personal choice and through the sum of such choices an actual community, *or* the annihilation of personality and the dissolution of community into crowds" (Auden 1951: 36). Auden later dismissed as meaningless the terse aphorism of "September 1, 1939", "We must love one another or die" (1964: viii). But in the context provided by his struggle, throughout the 1930s, with the devil of primary narcissism, it makes perfect sense: we shall die spiritually, as individuals, unless we learn to love others; but, now, on the brink of global war, we shall also die actually and collectively, unless we can transcend such introverted self-absorption.

"Epithalamion," a hymn for the cross-national marriage of Giuseppe Borgese and Elizabeth Mann, celebrates their personal union in insistently

public and political terms, casting "this quiet wedding" as one which may possibly have "Planted human unity" and initiated "Modern policy," reconciling "Hostile kingdoms of the truth," melting "all national frontiers ... / In a true imperium," and symbolising "the rebirth / Asked of old humanity" in "a common love." The hyberbole of all this is understandable, at the end of a volume permeated by the misery of a world poised before global conflict: it is a programme, out of Freud, for healing the fractures and griefs of a world in which "the kingdoms are at war." A volume deep in collective distress ends with an improbable dream that the human race might emulate Wagner, who "Organised his wish for death / Into a tremendous cry," the book's very final words expressing a desire that "all / wish us joy." But poem XXIV of *Another Time*, later given the title "They," had already set the collective context of this wishful thinking:

> For a future of marriage nevertheless
> The bed is prepared; though all our whiteness shrinks
> From the hairy and clumsy bridegroom . . .
>
> . . . and the crooked that dreads to be straight
> Cannot alter its prayers but summons
> Out of the dark a horrible rector. . . .

In April 1939, three months after the fall of Barcelona and only weeks after the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, Auden's poem sees fascism's invading batallions as the storm-troopers of a deadly, politicised Narcissus:

> Where do they come from? Those whom we so much dread
> As on our dearest location falls the chill
> Of the crooked wing....
>
> Terrible Presences that the ponds reflect
> Back at the famous, and when the blond boy
> Bites eagerly into the shining
> Apple, emerge in their shocking fury.

Narcissus drowned in his own image. "They" are all those internal impulsions by which the modern self learnt its identity, learnt to become the spawning ground of fascism. But "They" learnt all that they know "In a mother's distorting mirror"; they come (note how the correlation of lie and mask in the Falstaff / Hotspur contrast is prefigured here) "With lies to unmask the least deception"; "And towards us their hate is directed." Now, self-absorbed, "Our tears well from a love / We have never outgrown." Narcissus

the Hunchback, embracing his pot-belly like a bride, looks in the mirror for an "*opera buffa* world of play and mock action governed . . . by innocent wish." But when it enters the political realm, such innocence turns murderous. On the night of September 1, 1939, the "romantic lie in the brain" of the "sensual man-in-the-street," mutated, smashed through the mirror of history as invading batallions. Now, as "They" had warned, "even our armies / Have to express our need of forgiveness."

NOTES

* This is a revised and extended version of a paper given at the symposium on "Images of Narcissus" at the French Institute, London, July 1997.

1. Auden 1956. This issue of *Encounter* opens with an article called, significantly, "Innocent Abroad" (pp. 3-16), a personal account by Auden's acquaintance and Oxford contemporary Goronwy Rees of how his generation reacted to the political situation of 1930s Germany.

2. Auden 1963: section III, "The Well of Narcissus," pp. 93-167.

3. Auden 1963, section IV, "The Shakespearian City," pp. 171-274.

4. 1959: 26-7; 1963: 195-6. This was a motif Auden was to repeat more positively in one of his very last poems, the posthumously published "Lullaby," written in 1972 (Auden 1974: 41-2), in which he addresses himself as a "Big Baby," fondling his own "almost feminine flesh," "snug in the den of yourself" in the bed's womblike seclusion, and observes:

> The old Greeks got it all wrong:
> Narcissus is an oldie,
> tamed by time, released at last
> from lust for other bodies,
> rational and reconciled.

But such an Eros is intimate still with Thanatos, for to return to "the domain of the Mothers" is to seek "oblivion: let / the belly-mind take over." The comparison of a drunk with a beer-belly to a woman with child also appears in Stephano's song from "The Sea and the Mirror" (Auden 1945: 7-60), a text which reworks that other play discussed at length in "The Shakespearean City," *The Tempest*. The song (pp. 19-20) , which begins "Embrace me, belly, like a bride," converts the whole topos into a metaphysical conceit for mind/body relations. There is much more to be teased out of this complex filiation of associations.

5. Published in April 1956, in a journal edited by his friend and 1930s Communist fellow-traveller Stephen Spender, and subsequently revealed to be funded by the CIA, this essay appeared only a couple of months after Nikita Khrushchev's secret but widely leaked denunciation of Stalin to the XXth Congress of the CPSU. Auden's reflections here are not exactly historically innocent, coming as they are charged subliminally with all the guilts, remorse and anxieties of a born-again one-time fellow-traveller.

6. Cf. "Hic et Ille": "As seen reflected in a mirror, a room or a landscape seems more solidly there in space than they look themselves. In that purely visual world nothing can be hailed, moved, smashed, or eaten, and it is only the observer himself who, by shifting his position or closing his eyes, can change" (1956: 36; 1963: 101).

7. Auden 1995: 184-5. Elsewhere he confided to his friend Alan Ansen that his circumcision, aged seven, at his mother's insistence had been "really something" (cited in Auden 1995: 164). See also "Castration Complex," in Auden 1971: 52-3.

8. *The Listener*, July 1933. Significantly, perhaps, the very page on which this is raised in the original manuscript of his lecture has been, one might say, cut out, and an incomplete replacement starts with the Hoffmann poem, beginning "One day, Mamma said" and going on to outline the maternal threat.

9. Auden's politics here fellow-travel the Third Period orthodoxy of contemporary Stalinism, in which Churchill was seen as a potential, more dangerous because more popular Mosley, and Roosevelt as a capitalist demagogue who had stolen the Left's state-interventionist clothes and whose New Deal programme emulated Hitler's strategy for economic recovery.

10. Auden restored the original *Listener* title of "A Bride in the Thirties" in his first collected volume, *Collected Shorter Poems 1930-1944* (1950). Interestingly, it is here preceded by a newly collected poem, "Alone," which alludes to Proust (cf. "Epilogue"), observes that "Narcissus disbelieves in the unknown; / He cannot join his image in the lake / So long as he assumes he is alone," and concludes that "every lover has a wish to make / Some other kind of otherness his own." The poems in this 1950 volume are organised, capriciously, according to the alphabetical sequence of opening words, so it is perhaps merely gratuitous that "A Bride in the 30's" should be preceded in this way. Since, however, "Alone" is a new, previously uncollected poem, it may be that its own first line was carefully spelt out by Auden to place it where we find it, thus subverting the aleatory principle on which the volume is ostensibly organised. Such deviousness would not be unusual for Auden. The original *Listener* title of "A Bride in the 30's" was deployed to conceal the fact that the poem derives biographically from a homosexual relationship, doubly and dangerously illegal in that the young man involved was probably under age. Auden himself, following Freud, traced the origin of homosexuality to a displacement of primary narcissism, and this supplies the "crooked" subtext of many of these poems. In 1947 he confided to Alan Ansen that he regarded "all homosexual acts [as] acts of envy." But he also argued elsewhere, as for example in his essay on "Shakespeare's Sonnets," that gender-specific biography assumes a universal, ungendered status in poetry. On this, see Stan Smith, "A Faultless Love," (1997: 70-78).

11. Auden 1959: 26; 1963: 196. "The Prince's Dog" (1959: 25; 1963: 192) explains Falstaff's infatuation with "the Prince of this World," "'The lovely bully'" Prince Hal, by referring to the Shakespeare sonnet, "They that have power to hurt," which also lies behind the closing stanzas of "A Bride in the 30s." The sonnet, which reflects on beauty as a corrupting coldness, and, in the lines quoted in "The Prince's Dog," speaks of those "That do not do the thing they most do show, / Who, moving others, are themselves as stone," was discussed at length in 1930 in a book Auden much admired, William Empson's *Seven Types of Ambiguity*.

12. Originally Poem XVI in Auden 1930.

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VIEW (1940-47), THE AVANT-GARDE, AND THE UNCERTAIN LIFE OF OBJECTS: CRITICISM AS IF FRAGMENTS MATTERED

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MODERNITY, THE AVANT-GARDE, AND THE CULTURE OF OBJECTS

Like its twin aesthetic, modernism, the avant-garde can be read as a response to the daily life of modernity. In German and Anglo-American scholarship, the term "modernity" has often been used to designate the historical stage succeeding the nineteenth-century bourgeois revolutions. It was characterized by increasing secularism, massive technological and industrial growth, urbanization, and the democratization of culture—dependent in turn on widespread literacy and the boom of the culture industry (Habermas 1986: 2-5; Frisby 1985: 20-43). Turn-of-the-century sociologists such as Max Weber and Fernand Tönnies have argued that one result of these developments was the dissolution of pre-modern organic communities and of their religious, social, and ideological alibis (Weber 1958: 17-27, Tönnies 1955: 5-12). At the same time, due to the speed of contemporary changes and to the general instability of social and political life, no new cohesive set of beliefs seemed capable of taking the place of the former ones. Instead, the social realm appeared splintered into multiple ideologies and subcultures to the extent that, in the words of critic Charles Russell, most modern writers and intellectuals live and work with the awareness that "a commonly assumed collective vision has not been possible since the Romantic period" (1985: 6).

While totalizing narratives receded, the material environment experienced a cyclopean growth in the form of proliferating consumer products and mass-manufactured cultural artifacts. In a well-known characterization of modern

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While totalizing narratives receded, the material environment experienced a cyclopean growth in the form of proliferating consumer products and mass-manufactured cultural artifacts. In a well-known characterization of modern

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metropolitan life, the German philosopher Georg Simmel diagnosed the contemporary hypertrophy of the "objective spirit"—that is, material civilization, the objectual realm—and asserted that the magnitude and intricacy of the material environment was not counterbalanced by a parallel development of communal forms of practice able to endow it with meaning. Furthermore, as social aggregates were more and more transient and arbitrary, argued Simmel, communal culture lacked the complexity and flexibility necessary to assimilate material forms and publicly circulated narratives into the conceptual and experiential horizon of individuals (Simmel 1970: 421-22). Echoing Simmel's ideas, Walter Benjamin proposed that modern life produced fragmentary rather than "integrated" experience. Integrated experience (*Erfahrung*) had a communal dimension, as it was anchored in commonly held memory and belief. However, experience in modernity tends to be subjectivized, reduced to a succession of individual sensations and memories with a tenuous social dimension (Benjamin 1969: 159-60, 163). (In this respect, Benjamin regards Marcel Proust's monumental *A la recherche du temps perdu*, about an individual sifting through his memories in search of highly personalized moments of illumination, as a paradigmatically modern situation—and modernist work). Modern fragmentation and individualization also affect the reception of history and tradition, which are progressively seen as relative, susceptible of inflection, and unable to hold uniform, unequivocal lessons for all. A substantial part of modernist and avant-garde artistic production rejected tradition in toto and purported to create the culture anew. But even when tradition was vindicated, it was done in personalized and contingent forms lacking the weight of communal sanction. Familiar examples are T. S. Eliot, who claimed that each individual creative act implied a reassessment and realignment of tradition (Eliot 1951: 13-22), and Ezra Pound, who saw past culture as a repository of esoteric references through which he mediated his own poetic accounts of his life and ideas.

The profusion of seemingly unassimilated objects, images, and narratives made the modern social and cultural landscape into a funhouse of drifting signs and enigmatic clues devoid of immanent meaning. Walter Benjamin explains that Charles Baudelaire tried to recreate the world as "a forest of symbols" which looked back at the poet "with their familiar glances" (Benjamin 1969: 181). Yet familiarity, the token of a certain "connectedness" and intelligibility, had to remain confined to the province of the aesthetic in a radically estranged modernity whose enigmatic nature was underlined, from widely different perspectives, by other modernist thinkers. Thus, for Baudelaire's contemporary Karl Marx, modernity was characterized

by the overdevelopment of capitalism and the reified and mystified social relations it enthroned; an important part of these were woven around the "fetishism of commodities," which he described as "hieroglyphs"—"mysterious" and "very queer thing[s], abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties." (Marx 1978: 319, 320) For a later thinker like Sigmund Freud, daily life was equally hieroglyphic, as seemingly innocuous everyday objects and gestures could be seen as multi-layered messages inscribed with psychological latencies. Common to these views is the notion that, because of the free-floating quality of its objects and fragments, modernity presents a problem of legibility: it is a period whose meaning is problematic to itself; whose social forms constantly demand to be read; whose culture endlessly requires evaluation and interpretation.

The artistic cultures of modernism and the avant-garde inhabit this environment of meaningless objects, broken stories, and mysterious clues, yet they react differently to them. On the basis of their inhabitation of modernity, we can hypothesize that while modernism is a discourse of order, precarious and arbitrary as this order may be, the avant-garde is one of disorder. Modernists try to integrate objects and fragments into new symbolic arrangements, an impulse that underwrites the frequent resort to myth. Symptomatic in this respect is T. S. Eliot's assessment of James Joyce's *Ulysses*: "In using myth . . . Mr. Joyce is pursuing a method which others must pursue after him. . . . It is simply a way of ordering, of giving shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility which is contemporary history" (Eliot 1975: 177). And even when modernists took fragments as their point of departure or medium, as did the imagist poets or T. S. Eliot himself, it is often in order to propose new plenitudes, or, in the last instance, to assert the integrating and restorative capacity of their craft.

The avant-garde, for its part, makes of dispersal its main strategy for inhabiting the modern. Its exemplary products are carefully designed to blast the presumed organic unity of the art work. The enjoining of the disparate and the dispersion of the contiguous are central tactics to this effect. Avant-garde manifestos, for example, routinely combine self-explanation and self-erasure, this last in the form of irrecoverable conceptual scattering. As Tristan Tzara fulminated in his first dada "Manifesto of Mr. Antipyrine" (1917): "Dada is for and against unity and definitely against the future" (1951: 75). And a subsequent "manifesto on feeble love and bitter love" (sic) performs dispersal through a nearly psychotic language, devoid of connections or logic. It opens:

preamble=sardanapalus
one=valise
woman=women
pants=water
if=mustache
2=three
cane=perhaps . . . .
or all of this together in any arrangement at all whether savorous soapy brusque or definitive—picked at random—is alive. (Tzara 1951: 86)

Without reaching the virulence of dadaism, other avant-garde movements also evidenced an analogous desire to inhabit the disconnected object. This is the case with Russian constructivism, which championed an industrial aesthetic based on the assemblage of detachable parts. Some of its best known manifestations are Sergei Eisenstein's 1920s films, ruled by the dialectic of montage, which emphasized film's ability to convey concepts and ideas by editing together discontinuous shots. For their part, the surrealists defended a similar conception of the poetic image as the combination of "two distant realities" (Breton 1972: 36); the emblematic example was the Count of Lautreamont's paradigm of the beautiful: "the fortuitous encounter of an umbrella and a sewing machine on an operating table." In Germany, Bertolt Brecht's left-oriented theater opposed the "culinary" unity of traditional theater and sought to split the dramatic representation into its basic components in order to shock spectators into political awareness. And, to add just one more example, the Italian Futurists' experiments with "simultaneism"—the bringing together of unrelated actions unfolding at the same time—bespoke an analogous fascination with the disparate and disconnected.

Despite this emphasis on disgregation and on prying objects loose from their usual cognitive and narrative frames, critical discourse has yet to confront the avant-garde object on its own terms—without reducing it to a part in an overall narrative. The production of continuity and order has ruled critical and historical discourses on the avant-garde. These have attempted to systematize plural mechanisms of subversion and formal experimentation into a coherent front of dissent. Hence a wide range of modes such as collage, performance, the *détournement* (rerouting) of found objects, scandalous forms of public presence, the emphasis on style, the fascination with the fragmentary and unfinished, and the championing of different forms of marginality have frequently been subsumed under overarching projects. Some of the most familiar have been the turning of form into the subject matter of the artwork

(Greenberg 1961); the sublation of art and life (Bürger 1985); anti-traditionalism (Poggioli 1968); a utopian orientation toward the future (Calinescu 1987); or the practice of a form of cultural activism peculiarly aligned with revolutionary politics and science (Russell 1985). These readings are ruled by the imperative of order, which tries to produce continuities over discontinuities; wholes over holes. In Michel de Certeau's terms, these readings turn the avant-garde from a repertoire of tactics—sporadic, fragmentary, improvisatory—into a strategy—a holistic plan with well-defined means, goals, localities, and protocols (De Certeau 1984: 34-42). But the tropism toward totality appears singularly oblivious to the avant-garde obsession with the isolated object and the fragment, an obsession which frequently translates into a wilful refusal to cohere and signify. This is why, paradoxically, critics like Matei Calinescu (1987) and Hans Magnus Enszenberger (1974), who berate the avant-garde's incoherence and fragmentariness, are able to register certain frequencies in its spectrum that are routinely missed by those who take it too seriously, so to speak, and try to ascertain from its traces a holistic rationale. We could perhaps say that, reverent towards the irreverence of its object, the critical discourse on the avant-garde is modernistic—ordering antitraditionalism into a tradition of sorts, striving for the critical myth that might disclose a pattern out of an "immense panorama of futility" and randomness. Seeking to challenge this bias, our goal here will be to produce an avant-garde criticism of the avant-garde.

We will attempt to reread and rewrite the avant-garde as a discourse of disconnected objects and splintered remains; our goal will not be to sublate these into a generality, but to try to maintain them in their proper dispersion. One reason for doing this is simple curiosity about the shape that avant-garde criticism would take if it adopted the avant-garde strategy of refusing to cohere into any organic metanarrative. A second reason is the suspicion that the reexamination of these vestiges outside totalizing schemes might suggest alternative points of entry into our field of inquiry. We will seek out in avant-garde production undigestible residues unassimilated by traditional hermeneutics—the debris extant once holistic paradigms have done their work labeling, tabulating, classifying, tidying up. These residues will not be the loci of meanings to be unveiled but obtrusive kernels which produce effects. By focusing on them, we are suggesting a reorientation of critical discourse away from meaning and toward apprehending and conveying the opaque and enigmatic nature of objects and parts. A critical discourse bent on opacity will not pursue "truth"—explanation, a "more faithful" depiction of the object. Its intended objective will not be "coverage"—the subsumption of the largest number of particular instances under a general principle—but

"singularity": Alfred Jarry's "pataphysics," or the science of exceptions. It will operate through *performance*: the combination and circulation of images and affects across a textual field—in this case, the avant-garde. Our models for this exploration will be two critical paradigms based on the cognitive potential of the fragment and the irreducibility of singular objects: Walter Benjamin's use of montage and Roland Barthes's concept of the "punctum." Both Barthes and Benjamin endeavored to devise new forms of writing which would incorporate avant-garde strategies into the rhetoric of criticism. Finally, the object chosen for testing the scope of our approach will be the discourse of the American surrealist journal *View*.

WALTER BENJAMIN AND MONTAGE

Striving for order and continuity and ignoring the avant-garde's penchant for the singular and disconnected, most critical discourse disregards what Walter Benjamin considered the avant-garde's most valuable lesson: how to exploit the experiential and cognitive potentials embedded in fragment-ridden modernity. In the words of Susan Buck-Morss, "[For Benjamin] The effect of technology on both work and leisure in the modern metropolis had been to shatter experience into fragments, and journalistic style reflected that fragmentation. Could montage as the formal principle of the new technology be used to reconstruct an experiential world so that it provided a coherence of vision necessary for philosophical reflection? And more, could the metropolis of consumption, the high ground of bourgeois-capitalist culture, be transformed from a world of mystifying enchantment into one of both metaphysical and political illumination?" (Buck-Morss 1989: 23). Benjamin's answer to these two questions was affirmative; and the avant-garde provided valuable leads in this project. Working on fragments, exploiting the mobility of objects and the expressiveness of the new visual media, the avant-garde mimed central traits of the modern *and*, at the same time, was able to extract moments of criticism and knowledge from the "fantasmagoria" of public life. Montage, the recombination of disparate fragments, was the eminent formal and conceptual tool for attaining this goal. Much of Benjamin's criticism can be read as an attempt to import avant-garde montage into critical discourse. To this effect, and soon after completing his first book, an idiosyncratic academic study entitled *The Origin of the German Tragic Drama*, Benjamin forswore "the pretentious, universal gesture of the book" and devoted himself to exploiting "the 'ready language' [of] leaflets, brochures, newspaper articles, and placards" (Buck-Morss 1989: 17). These brief, fragmentary forms were the

only ones capable of "immediate effectiveness" and of using to advantage the languages of his time. Consequent with this idea, and impelled by the need to make a living in the literary marketplace, the bulk of his subsequent production took the form of occasional writing: radio talks, narrative and quasi-autobiographical essays, aphorisms, and fragmentary observations. Subtly incorporating the principle of montage, they draw on a wide array of rhetorical modes, from fairy tales to newspaper headlines, from surrealist metaphors to the language of advertisements. His magnum opus, to which he devoted over a decade of intense research and which (perhaps appropriately) remained dispersed in drafts and notes at the time of his death, was the *Arcades Project* (*Passagen Werk*): a "montage" history of Paris as cultural capital of the nineteenth century.

Montage as a research and writing strategy gives in to the fragmentary character of modern material culture and simultaneously internalizes the disruptive effect of the new visual media of film and photography. These had the ability to wrench objects, spaces, and actions from their original contexts and to re-present them in new settings and combinations. "Every day the need grows more urgent to possess an object in the closest proximity, through a picture or, better, a reproduction," and photography and film stepped in to fulfil this need (Benjamin 1972: 20-21). They "priz[ed] the object from its shell," making it infinitely movable. In the process was destroyed the object's "aura"—that is, its symbolic or geographical distance, remoteness, and uniqueness. These are eroded when locations, artworks, objects, no matter how distant or precious, are seemingly at hand by virtue of their reproduction through newsreels, films, and the print media. Rather than lament the loss of integrity and authenticity such developments entailed, Benjamin interpreted the loss of aura as a progressive political development presaging "a salutary estrangement between man [sic] and his environment, thus clearing the ground for the politically-trained eye before which all intimacies serve the illumination of detail" (1972: 21). The fading of the aura then plunges into crisis concepts such as ontology, originality, or artistry, whose relevance wanes in the present regime of the image; at the same time, it encourages interrogation of the social and political uses of images. (See also Benjamin 1969: 217-252)

In the same way that mechanical reproduction dissolved the "aura" of objects, montage dissolved the "aura"—uniquenes, authenticity—of present ideologies and social relations. With its ability to reshuffle found elements ad infinitum, montage implicitly exposed the arbitrariness of the existing order of things; the (mystified) "naturalness" of contemporary life was "interrupted," portrayed as a historical—hence relative and mutable—stage.

Furthermore, the relocation of fragments yielded knowledge: as they entered new constellations, objects and traces evidenced meanings and potentials which remained dormant in their former arrangements. An additional epistemological advantage of montage derived from the fact that it allowed a non-discursive mode of criticism, one where contents would arise from the collision of individual fragments, and where the tensions ensuing from such clashes would not be smoothed over by theoretical gloss. Benjamin described his montage-history, the *Passagen Werk*, as a "construction out of facts. Construction within the complete elimination of theory. . . . This work must develop to the highest point the art of citing without citation marks. Its theory connects most closely with that of montage" (cited in Buck-Morss 1989: 73).

The idea underlying Benjamin's montage method was that philosophical-historical constellations of meaning could be conveyed by significantly chosen "dialectical images"—basic units of montage—rather than by argumentation. Dialectical images were "small, particular moments"—whether verbal or visual—in which "the total historical event" was to be discovered (cited in Buck-Morss 1989: 71). They were emblematic moments "blasted" out of the historical continuum—an urgent imperative, since "all historical continuity is that of the oppressors" (cited in Buck-Morss 1989: 290); the historian's task was to underline in these images the overlay of a number of unreconcilable tensions. These arose, first, from the conflict between transitoriness and permanence. All new historical developments contained *en abyme* the repetition of ever present conflicts and forces, which, like psychoanalytic symptoms, would continue to emerge until their satisfactory resolution. The celebration of the new mystifies progress as the motor of history, an idea constantly undercut by the obstinate return of what, in the form of suffering, injustice, and domination, remains unresolved. A second source of tension resulted from a struggle, informing all culture and history, between revolutionary potential and immobilism. While the historical unfolding perpetuated, most of the times, an unjust state of affairs, there lurked, at any point in this process of perpetuation, the potential to explode the continuity of "the history of the victors" and to catapult history into Messianic time. "The authentic concept of universal history," Benjamin argued, "is a Messianic one"—that is, one traversed by the promise of redemption, or in materialist language, of the revolution: "every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter" (Benjamin 1969: 264). A final source of tension resulted from the notion that present and past are interlocked in a mutually illuminating constellation. The present is always already foreshadowed in past history, frequently in the faint traces and negligible details that most often attracted Benjamin's attention. Conversely, the past is constantly mediated by present awareness and interests, since "every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably" (Benjamin 1969: 255). The confluence of these tensions within dialectical images added up to a fundamentally unreconciled "totality" (a "totality" under erasure) of the historical event(s) under scrutiny.

While preparing his history of the nineteenth century, one of Benjamin's research methods was the assemblage of dialectical images in the form of vast repertoires of citations and illustrations, which he later recombined in the attempt to produce materialistic history and criticism. The best-known examples of this working method are Benjamin's essays on Charles Baudelaire (1973 *passim*). At once scholarly and naggingly elusive, they advance by analogy and contiguity. Often pursuing suggestions buried in the poet's own writings, Benjamin connects Baudelaire to the contemporary figures of the revolutionary, the ragpicker, the *flâneur*, and the detective, with whom he shared peculiar ways of reacting to the phenomena of contemporary life. Important among these phenomena were the urban masses, which are alternatively seen by Baudelaire as a source of anxiety; a vast repertoire of images; an enigma; a formidable historical agent; and a spectacle. Living in the thick of this sea of people prompts mechanical, reflex behavior and a new type of "tactile," shock-driven perception anticipating that later institutionalized by the cinema. The machine-like character of modern existence arouses in Baudelaire a simultaneous nostalgia for and disparaging of the natural. This last is of a piece with his fascination with non-organic, "non-natural"—for him, that is—sexualities, prominent among which was lesbianism (Benjamin 1973: 90-94). On the basis of this idea, Baudelaire, always in Benjamin's reading, connects lesbians with automata. Besides being highly suggestive, these chains of association are infinitely expandable. Thus we might add that Baudelaire's association of female deviancy with automatons foreshadows Villiers de L'Isle Adam's Hadaly; and, more distantly, Maria, the rabble-rousing robot in Fritz Lang's film *Metropolis*; the contemporary queer aesthetic of the leather dykes (textualized in Pat Califia's short stories, for example) cased in shiny latex, studded jackets, and vinyl boots; and even Donna Haraway's 1985 "Manifesto for Cyborgs."

What kind of history-criticism is this? Does it show randomness or acumen? The word is ultimately Benjamin's, who was perhaps indirectly explaining himself when he stated: "Charles Baudelaire was fond of placing his theses in context crassly. *It was part of his theoretical shrewdness to obscure*

the connections between them—where one existed" (My italics, Benjamin 1973: 75).

The similarities of this collage method with the avant-garde extend to the language Benjamin used to describe his own work, a language often laden with a certain manifesto-like combativeness:

> Materialistic historiography . . . is based on a constructive principle. Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock by which it crystallizes into a monad. (1969: 262)

Avant-gardist here is the suggested rough handling of the researcher's materials—in words like "arrest," "shock"; the interest in dissociation, dismantling into component parts (influenced perhaps by Benjamin's friend Bertolt Brecht); and the "constructive" nature of historical analysis, a word which evokes, in German even more than in English, mechanical assemblages, articulated wholes.

This type of criticism subverted modernity from within. If the discrete, flattened-out images and objects of modernity shortcircuited the possibilities for sustained autonomous thought, Benjamin showed that these mystified forms could be appropriated as levers for dialectical analysis. Such dialectical reversal rested largely on the currency and popular accessibility of the iconic: "Only images in the mind vitalize the will. The mere word, by contrast, at most inflames it, to leave it smoldering, blasted" (cited in Buck-Morss 1989: 290). Benjamin's historical work was as daring and unconventional then as it still seems now, and he paid dearly for his idiosyncracies. Seeking financial support for his *Passagen Work*, he sent a sample of his work in progress to his friend Theodor W. Adorno, who held a prominent position at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (the Frankfurt School). Adorno, whose philosophy is analogously "dissonant" yet more conventionally discursive in form, turned Benjamin down. The Arcades Project, Adorno wrote back to his friend, "tends to turn into a wide-eyed presentation of mere facts" lacking adequate theoretical mediation: "one could say that your study is located at the crossroads of magic and positivism. That spot is bewitched. Only theory could break the spell" (cited in Wolin 1982: 130). Benjamin has known a belated *succès d'estime* which started in 1955 with the publication of a two-volume edition of his writings compiled and prefaced by Adorno. His ideas on the cultural and social impact of mechanical reproduction and his descriptions of modernity have become inevitable reference points in the understanding of the avant-garde. And yet this acceptance is mostly based on

contents, or (to mime Adorno's language) on the reified, fetishized idea severed from the revolutionary form in which he often embedded it. This despite the fact that for Benjamin content was hardly separable from form; ideas insinuated themselves in the very process of dismantling-collating dialectical images; and, furthermore, by the critic's own veiled confession, it was theoretically shrewd to obscure conceptual connections through montage. Benjamin's work then still presents us with the challenge of assimilating not only his conclusions but his working method, something that we will try in a later section. The questions this experiment will try to answer is: what would a montage history of the avant-garde look like? What could it teach us?

ROLAND BARTHES AND THE PUNCTUM

Like Benjamin's, Barthes's writing was centrally shaped by the desire critically to inhabit modernity. This he described as a combination of two forces: "on the one hand, a mass banalization (linked to the repetition of language)—a banalization outside bliss but not necessarily outside pleasure—and on the other, a (marginal, eccentric) impulse toward the New—a desperate impulse that can reach the point of destroying discourse: an attempt to reproduce in historical terms the bliss [*jouissance*] repressed beneath the stereotype" (1975: 41). In order to break up with the oppressive (i.e. stereotyped, repeated) half of the modern, Barthes aligned his critical work with the generation of the New. This was synonymous with producing "texts" as opposed to the more conventional "works." And for the most part, Barthes's texts took the form of deconstructive critiques purporting to destabilize the seeming coherence of classical aesthetic and cognitive paradigms. The (work turned into) "text" disrupted mystified totalities and established discourses; it questioned the continuity of language and the hierarchical ordering of the sentence; its main operating principle was the fragment: "words, tiny sintagms, bits of formulae, and *no sentence formed*." (1975: 49). This embracing of the fragment manifested itself in a constant desire to transgress the presumed totality of the critical enterprise, a goal that led him to formulate his thought in brief, essayistic pieces and to work with a number of theoretical metalanguages without completely assuming any single one of them. He described himself once as

> a subject torn between two languages, one expressive, the other critical; and at the heart of this critical language, between several discourses, those of sociology, of semiology, and of psychoanal-

> ysis—but . . . by ultimate dissatisfaction with all of them, I was bearing witness to the only sure thing that was in me ... a desperate resistance to any reductive system. For each time, having resorted to any such language to whatever degree, each time I felt it hardening and thereby tending to reduction and reprimand, I would gently leave it and seek elsewhere: I began to speak differently. (1981a: 8)

Barthes's inspiration for inhabiting the fragment came from the avant-garde. We could say that while Walter Benjamin adapted montage from Brecht, dadaists, and Russian constructivists, Barthes inherited many of his interests and methods from surrealism (I am following here Robert Ray's suggestion, Ray 1995: 94-119). He shared with André Breton and his coterie a reflective fascination with such phenomena as fashions, film, photography, advertisements, and mass-produced commodities. Particularly in his later work, Barthes combined autobiography, fiction, and speculative thought, all the while experimenting with the form of the critical essay. In this respect, his production harks back to such unclassifiable texts as Louis Aragon's *Paysan de Paris,* André Breton's *Nadja* and Breton and Philippe Soupault's *Les Champs magnétiques*. A further tie to surrealism is Barthes's project of "joining writing ever more emphatically to the body" (Wahl 1986: v), and thus opening up the text to the disseminating intermittence of desire and eroticism.

An eminently surrealist concern in Barthes's work is the obsession with those textual details and features ("obtuse" he once called them) which defy intelligibility and mark the limits of semiological and semiotic analysis. Barthes's *S/Z*, his analysis of Balzac's novella "Sarrasine," ends with a lexia—"And the Marquis remained pensive"—about which Barthes writes: "Pensive, the Marquis can think of many of the things that have happened, or that will happen, but about which we shall never know anything: the infinite openness of the pensive (and this is precisely its structural function) removes this final lexia from any classification" (1974: 216). After the semiotic machinery has crunched down all components of the story, Barthes closes his analysis with this nod towards the meaninglessness perched on the brink of a perfectly meaningful system: "the pensive . . . is the signifier of the unexpressible, not of the unexpressed" (1974: 216). This closing gesture seems prophetic in retrospect. What in *S/Z* was a last-minute bow towards opacity, soon took center stage in most of Barthes subsequent writings, largely concerned with the constant imbrication of meaning and non-meaning in visual and verbal messages. Each of these terms stands at the beginning of a conceptual chain which traverses Barthes's late oeuvre. Meaning entails

pleasure, the pheno-text, the analyzable, the "obvious," the informational and symbolic level of the sign, "the labors of knowledge," and signification. On the edges of these formalizable contents, Barthes constantly sought to whip up the "meaningless" froth of bliss (*jouissance*), aligned with the geno-text, the "obtuse" or "third meaning," "the labors of writing," and signifiance. And propping himself up on this second train of concepts he sought to dislodge "the main categories which found our current sociality: perception, intellection, the sign, grammar, and even science" (1981b: 44).

This striving after what lies beyond signification yet intricately connected with it informs much of surrealism. Take, for example, one of its most emblematic works: Breton's *Nadja*, an autobiographical narrative of sorts mainly concerned with "facts of quite unverifiable intrinsic value [and of] absolutely unexpected, violently fortuitous character . . . facts which may belong to the order of pure observation, but which in each occasion present all the appearances of a signal, without being able to say precisely which signal, and of what" (1960: 19). Attention to such signals without codes became for surrealists a way of inhabiting the surrounding material culture. In these clues they discovered flashes of poetry and mystery pervading the everyday. Flea markets and the old-fashioned arcades, with their accumulation of dated, useless, and often surprising objects, became repositories of the marvelous; and so did seemingly banal photographs and popular films, which portrayed a familiar nature suddenly laden with enchantment. What surrealists most valued in these visual media was, in Breton's phrase, their "power to disorient" (1978: 43)—that is, their capacity to defamiliarize ordinary perception. In Louis Aragon's words:

> All our emotion exists for those dear old American adventure films that speak of daily life and manage to raise to a dramatic level a banknote on which our attention is riveted, a table with a revolver on it, a bottle that on occasion becomes a weapon, a handkerchief that reveals a crime, a typewriter that's the horizon of a desk, the terrible unfolding telegraphic tape with magic ciphers that enrich or ruin bankers. . . . [O]n the screen, objects that were a few moments ago sticks of furniture or books of cloakroom tickets are transformed to the point where they take on *menacing or enigmatic* meanings. . . . (My italics, 1978: 29)

How did common things become terrible and enigmatic on the screen? By which mechanism did the prosaic turn mysterious, threatening, incommunicable? Since Aragon concentrates on shots of items of the mise-en-scene rather than on action or movement, it seems plausible to argue that

they were the result of the material basis of film: photography. In it, the surrealists, and Barthes after them, found an intriguing mixture of the knowable, anecdotal, and "obvious" together with the unknowable, enigmatic, and "obtuse." This vexing paradox at the center of the photographic image was trenchantly formulated by German critic Siegfried Kracauer, a friend of Adorno and Benjamin, in a 1927 essay titled "Photography" (a piece probably unknown to the surrealists and to Barthes, but peculiarly apposite to their ideas). In it Kracauer contrasts memory and the photographic image on the basis of their manner of capturing the past. Memory orders, selects; its images are "not a multitude of opaque recollections, but elements that touch upon what has been recognized as true." (1995: 51) It garners details out of the continuum of experience and rearranges them guided by the perceived truth value of specific remembrances. As a result, memory is "full of gaps" (1995: 50); it retains significant features and lets go of random, meaningless ones. It is then on the side of history, art, and "transparency"—that is, meaning, intelligibility. Photography, on the other hand, is a cipher of disorder and "opacity." Its automatic recording of time and space unselectively captures details that are relevant together with others that are irrelevant to present consciousness. In the absence of the ordering work of memory, "the photography dissolves into the sum of its details, like a corpse" (1995: 55) and "assembles in effigy the last elements of a nature alienated from meaning" (1995: 62). However, in the semiotic dross of the picture traces of meaning remain. This mixture of the transparent and opaque is (and here Kracauer seemingly modulates into surrealist language) a "terrible association" which "evokes a shudder" as the photo "conjures up anew a disintegrated unity. This ghost-like reality," he adds, "is unredeemed" (1995: 56). Like remnants of a ciphered text whose code has been lost, random details resist meaning and evoke a disgregated unity. We can conjecture that in these unassimilated particulars resided the surrealist potential of photography, and, by extension, of film, literature, of any other cultural object or medium.

Precisely these details are the focus of Barthes's *Camera Lucida*, an investigation of photography that is exemplary of his interest in the incommunicable and unintelligible, and that we will propose as a model for the study of the avant-garde. Like Kracauer, Barthes discerned in photographs a mixture of two signifying orders. Photography captured orderly, communicable, "generalizable" material; yet this appeared enmeshed with "the absolute Particular, the sovereign Contingency, matte and somehow stupid, the *This*" (1981a: 4). Such extreme singularity plunged images in "the vast disorder of objects" and forced the observer "to confront in [photographs] the wakening

of intractable reality" (1981a: 6, 119). Barthes called these two orders of meaning the *studium* and the *punctum*. "The studium is a kind of education" (1981a: 28). It consists of what an earlier essay (1977b) called "obvious meanings"—those that belong to "culture" and convey information: what the photo is about, what it tells us about its object and about the intentions of its author. But an erratic, obtuse order of contents, the punctum, occasionally disrupts the civilized studium. The punctum is a random detail which "rises from the scene, shoots out from it like an arrow, and pierces me" provoking "a wound, a prick, a mark made by a pointed instrument" (1981a: 26). In the punctum the photograph remains *pensive*: it looks back, thus involving us in its gaze; thinks without telling its thoughts; it signals without revealing. A substantial part of *Camera Lucida* is taken up with descriptions of puncta: wayward features of clothing, atmosphere, gesture, or physique that arrest Barthes's gaze without yielding to his analytical stare or to his language. The punctum can only be encircled yet hardly explained or named. "What I can name cannot really prick me. The incapacity to name is a good symptom of disturbance"—hence, of the punctum (1981a: 51).

This enterprise rises at the limits of conventional semiotics and cultural analysis. Rather than to explain, it seeks to isolate the incommunicable by reading texts at a slant. So doing entails doing violence to the text—fragmenting it, highlighting the off-center details in blatant disregard for "civilized" reading protocols, with their respect for order and totality. This violence is motivated by the belief that the (a)semiotic material neglected by traditional hermeneutics may yield information in the form of paths of reading and affect that differ from the ones contemplated by the studium. For one, punctum-like details cast on the text a certain shadow, which reminds us that the enterprise of knowledge is never complete; hence its most "complete" picture should maintain ajar a door that gives on to unexplained latencies of image, language, and concept. The obtuse details also encourage a personalized narrative in which subjectivity mediates exploration and interpretation. The very intractabilty of this non-signifying substance forces the reader to mobilize nonce epistemologies and idiosyncratic conceptualities with the purpose of multiplying the possible points of entry into the text.

Hence the very "disorder" of his subject, photography, prompts in Barthes the following methodological stand: rather than explore the official canon of this art, he will tease out a few general considerations out of a number of favorite snapshots: "Nothing to do with a corpus: only a few bodies. . . . I decided to take myself as mediator for all Photography. Starting from a few personal impulses, I would try to formulate the fundamental feature, the universal without which there would be no Photography" (1981a:

8). The goal, he continues, is to "extend this individuality to a science of the subject, a science whose name is of little importance to me, provided it attains . . . to a generality that neither reduces nor crushes me" (1981a: 18). And thus the book advances driven by his personal interests and associations, which are eventually raised, through theoretical reflection, to a critical discourse on the medium. However egotistical and/or arbitrary this procedure might seem, it uncovers a neglected yet structuring condition of *all* knowledge: the fact that it operates from out of a body endowed with its own biography, desires, whims, and handicaps. In Barthes's words: "The work proceeds by conceptual infatuations, successive enthusiasms, perishable manias. Discourse advances by little fates, by amorous fits" (1977a: 110).[1]

Barthes's and Benjamin's methods then import intro critical discourse the avant-garde's unruly semiotics, based on fragmentation and on a fascination with asignifying substance. Their procedures refuse the bid for order of traditional hermeneutics and cultural criticism, and try to elicit a critical impetus from contemporary cultural conditions and modern media. Their methods will be seen here as complementary. One guides us to the incommunicable and opaque; the other, to the self-fractured historical vignette that can be collated into provisional aggregates. In what remains, the point will no longer be to talk about these methods, but to use them as models for research; the ultimate goal: to apply avant-garde reading methods to the analysis of the avant-garde itself.

VIEW MAGAZINE

Perusing through *View*, like through any of the little magazines that punctuated the history of the avant-garde, feels somewhat like walking through a junk store, or through one of the arcades that so inspired Walter Benjamin: objects accumulate, disjointedly, unequal in value and appeal, many of them ludicrously old-fashioned. And yet these objects have a biography; they had values and prompted attachments invisible to us in their present "fallen" state. Likewise, *View* presents a jumble of disordered fragments: articles, interviews, illustrations, reviews, book notices, and reports from the literary and art worlds. Faced with this clutter, historians usually seek to uncover these ruins' buried histories, to elicit meaning from them. One way to do so is finding a label that will unify and order the dispersed fragments. If we yield to this compulsion, the label that most readily comes to mind in relation to *View* is *surrealism*.[2]

Published between 1940 and 1947, *View* was coedited by Charles Henri Ford and Parker Tyler, both of whom were active in the New York literary scene since the late 1920s. Ford was mainly a poet and editor. Barely out of high school, he had published the short-lived poetry magazine *Blues. A Magazine for New Rhythms* (1929-30), which showcased established talent (like William Carlos Williams, H. D., Alfred Kreymborg) together with rising stars (such as James T. Farrell, Erskine Caldwell, and Paul Bowles). Tyler was also a poet and a prolific and highly idiosyncratic essayist and film and art reviewer. Together, Ford and Tyler had published a novel, *The Young and Evil* (1933), which combined experimental techniques derived from James Joyce and Gertrude Stein with the camp idiom of gay street culture. Both editors claimed as *View*'s predecessors such well-known surrealist periodicals as *Minotaure*, *Verve*, and *London Bulletin*, all of which had disappeared with the onset of the war. *View* also shared the stage of surrealist activity in New York with *VVV*, the organ of the French surrealist group during their war exile in the United States. Edited by André Breton and the American David Hare, this short-lived journal (its two issues came out in 1944 and 1946) served as a nexus between the French group and the local avant-garde. *VVV* evoked *View* in name and graphic design. Both journals shared contributors (Max Ernst, Edouard Roditi, Kurt Seligmann, David Hare, Roger Caillois) and interests (mythology and magic, experimental writing, non-Western art and cultures). *View* was the more eclectic of the two, however, interested in untagged experimentation rather than in enforcing any form of surrealist orthodoxy, as the Breton group was notorious for doing.

Inquiry might (and usually does) proceed from there, subjecting the dispersion of the journal to the unifying power of the name ("surrealism"). This label justifies the nature of *View*'s contributions, among them, the first interview with Breton published in America; short stories by Leonora Carrington; critical essays by Nicolas Calas and Roger Caillois; illustrations by Joseph Cornell and Man Ray; and the special issues devoted to artists Yves Tanguy, Marcel Duchamp, and Max Ernst. Surrealist affiliation also explains the abundant references to mythology and magic, such as Kurt Seligmann's essay "Magic Circles" (1942) and his drawing "Microcosmological Chart of Man" (December 1944); Wallace Fowlie's "Narcissus" (1943); and Ossip Zadkine's piece on the Minotaur (1944). Concern with magic and myth is typical of this stage of surrealist history. In the aftermath of their conflictive attempts during the 1930s to establish an alliance with left politics (with the Communist Party and the Popular Front), many members of the group chose, in the 1940s, to retreat from

contemporary entanglements into the interrogation of the eternal and transhistorical in myths, non-Western religion and art, ethnography, and anthropology.[3] Yet in addition to its unifying, explanatory power, the surrealist affiliation of *View* produces a certain dispersion. As soon as the label is proposed, the picture taken, odd fringes, punctum-like details, dialectical images, and lateral montage-like connections start to insinuate themselves.

In addition to its interest in magic, myth, and experimental transatlantic culture, *View* put forward a peculiar vision of America evidenced in issues such as "Tropical Americana," "Americana Fantastica," and "The American Macabre," and in numerous writings and illustrations which conferred on the nation a peculiar enchantment owing little to myth and magic, and much to a mixture of violence, grotesqueness, and despair. Take, for example, the following montage of quotations: In the November 1940 issue, Edouard Roditi's "California Chronicle" conveys a sense of everpresent danger having to do with vigilantism, virulent xenophobia, fanatic conservatism, and squalor. "In Los Angeles one faces the facts: the garish illusions and conflicting ideas which give our age its neurotic drive. . . . Los Angeles poverty is more sordid than the sunlife [sic] of any other city except Shanghai." And further,

> The notion has got around, amongst vigilantes in Modesto, Visalia, Salinas, Ukiah, and elsewhere, that all immigrants from the dust-bowl are undesirable aliens, that all aliens are homosexual, that all homosexuals are Jews, that all Jews are nazis, that all nazis are communists and that all communists are dangerous drivers. So drive slowly if you come to California." (1940: 3)

And in a later issue, Troy Garrison's "Plaza of the Psycophathic Angels" (1941) reinforces this dystopian view of the golden state, as he describes a park at the intersection of several old Los Angeles neighborhoods:

> The southward tides of traffic and pedestrians move past rotted ancient structures whose windows reflect no light, past what must be the oldest cafe (where an Arab serves fairly good Mexican food at very reasonable prices) and, some five or six blocks away, flow through the backwash of "B-girl" cafes, burlesques, pawnshops, and human wreckage. Around the square, peculiar soapbox prophets hold forth. (1941: 4)

A similar perception informs Brion Gysin's "That Secret Look," (1941), a hallucinated view of New York city:

> The streets below are like the stream of "The Old Mill" or "The Tunnel of Love" at Luna Park or Coney Island through whose fog of carbon monoxide you are swept clutching your neighbor, past bright tableaux; the desert island, the cemetery by moonlight, the axe murderer in the kitchen or famous scenes from fiction. (1941: 7)

These and similar descriptions scattered throughout the journal[4] cast localism in a menacing light.

An important component of these contributions is a radical defamiliarization of city spaces that can be related to the surrealist practice of "psychogeography": an extremely subjective inhabitation of urban space centered on the search for "magnetic fields"—spots that prompted singular attraction or repulsion on the basis of the associations they triggered off. The city was lived as a vast spatialized unconscious seething with coincidences, surprising juxtapositions, and intimations of eroticism and death. Surrealists studied it with the hovering attention of the analyst as they pursued and amplified those details which intimated powerful latencies "from beyond." A similar defamiliarized view of the city was presented at the time in film noir, a genre contemporary with *View* and narrowly connected with surrealism.[5] (*The Maltese Falcon* [Huston, 1941], usually taken as the "first" and one of the most representative titles of the genre, premiered the same year as *View*, and Parker Tyler published an essay on the film—"Every Man His Own Private Detective"—in an early issue.) The atmosphere of floating danger in which film noir unfolds impregnates common objects and situations with an aura of threat. This makes the city a deceptive space where harmless everyday appearances hide an underworld of deranged sexuality, corruption, and violence. This seething underside can be peculiarly enthralling: under its influence, the city becomes tinged with tragedy and heroism as the possible setting for an unnerving discovery, a decisive coup, a murder.

The hallucinatory geographies of *View* and film noir stand in stark contrast to more official portrayals of urban space at the time. The celebration of the 1939 World's Fair in New York provided a showcase for the utopian dream of the rational city. One of the most successful exhibits at the Fair was the General Motors-sponsored "City of the Future": a huge model display of skyscrapers among large park areas traversed with separate traffic routes for vehicles and pedestrians. This futuristic fantasy imagined a city which had finally solved its problems of pollution, crime, and congestion, and which struck a perfect balance between technological development and the welfare of its dwellers. The documentary film *The City* (Willard Van

Dyke, 1939), commissioned by the American Association of Urban Developers to be screened at the Fair, also evidenced this utopian perspective. It forcefully proclaimed the bankruptcy of the industrialized megalopolis, which was at present unable to provide its inhabitants with clean air, play space, good housing, and a clean environment. The solution the film proposed is decentralization into suburbs—indeed the main trend in post-war urban development in the United States. Both models for the city of the future dreamt up maximally legible and ordered spaces, devoid of threat or mystery. Their openness, spacious layout, and rational design seemed intent on erasing from the face of the city all the obtuse details, murky hide-outs, and deadly latencies that magnetized the imagination of the surrealists and served as a background for film noir.

The disturbing readings of urban spaces in some of *View*'s contributions have a continuation in the journal's peculiar perception of folk art and culture. The main exponent of this attitude is the special issue "Americana Fantastica" (January 1943). It opened with a short essay by Parker Tyler which defined the fantastic as "The city of the irrational. The irrational plus architecture" (5). The fantastic is "an uninterrupted series of exceptions"—an expression that evokes the irreducible singularities, "absolute Particular, the sovereign Contingency" which, according to Barthes, involved photography in "the vast disorder of objects." Its sociological roots were "the imagination of the underprivileged aware of a fresh and overpowering strength. . . . The fantastic is the inalienable property of the untutored, the oppressed, the insane, the anarchic, and the amateur, at the moment when these feel the apocalyptic hug of contraries" (ibid.). Rather than art by the underprivileged and untutored, however, the rest of the issue is taken up with somber bizarreries by a number of highly self-conscious professionals: photographs by George Platt Lynes and Helen Levitt, a short written piece by Paul Bowles, and two "albums" (i.e. collections of texts, found illustrations, and collages) by Joseph Cornell: "Fantastic America, or the Land We Live In" and "The Glass Cage: Portrait of Berenice." Subsequent issues adhered closer to Tyler's definition of the fantastic and published art by children and amateurs. This included several poems by Joe Massey, a convicted murderer who submitted his contributions from the Ohio State Penitentiary (1943); the short stories "Dark Sugar," by Paul Childs (1944a), "The Watermelons," by Leo Poch (1944), a miner from New Jersey, and "Traffic Will Be Heavy" by Joan Doleska (1944), a housewife from Berwyn, Illinois; and "The Alienation of Language: Letters from a Corsican Boy to his English Sweetheart," which exploits the incongruous English of a poorly educated foreigner (1946). On other occasions, *View* writers rescued past exponents of the fantastic. This

was the goal of Edouard Roditi's essay "William Harnett, American Necromantic," (vol. 5, no. 4, Nov. 1945), about the nineteenth-century American painter; or of "Visions of the Comte de Permission," a transcription of the hallucinations of an illiterate sixteenth-century French court jester. ("Visions of the Comte de Permission," Vol. 5, no. 5, December 1945)

Through all these examples of the untutored fantastic runs a powerful streak of violence and morbidity. Massey's poems are intensely necrophilic and Poch's "The Watermelons" contains moments of unabashed sadism. Even the children's poems often seem selected for their salacious evocativeness; thus Ithell Colquhoun, aged six, writes, "He said / O my head [!!] / Is so red / Then he led me / To his bed . . ." (1944). This penchant culminates in "Tropical Americana," guest-edited by Paul Bowles (May 1945). In Bowles's own words, the issue "offers the tragic, ludicrous, violent, touching spectacle of a whole vast region still alive and kicking, as here it welcomes, there it resists the spread of so-called civilization." This form of resistance is, in his eyes, allied with the avant-garde, which, as a result, "is not alone in its incomplete war against many features of modern civilization; with it are the ponderous apathy and the potential antipathy of the vestigial primitive consciousness." (5) The issue is largely a collection of found texts (most probably apocryphal, although their sources are scrupulously credited), pictures, and collages which showcase violence and grotesquerie as tenors of everyday existence in a geographically vague "Tropical America." In the section "2 Documents," for example, a journalistic piece from *Cuadernos Americanos,* March 1944, tells the story of a woman who, in order to get rid of her skin disease, had eaten a human heart every day for the last few years; on the facing page, a report from the journal *El Occidente* narrates "a horrendous crime"—"Gabino Chan, 48 years of age, murdered his mother, a paralytic" (9). Further on, an ethnographic text (avowedly extracted from Bernard Flornoy's *Haut Amazone*) describes an impossibly gruesome head-shrinking ceremony in lush detail; and a reportage on the *chicleros* (rubber harvesters) expatiates on the sickly jungle environment in which they are forced to live: "An odor of organic matter in fermentation assails one's nostrils. It is hard to tell whether this smell is the precursor of the new life or a symptom of constant death. . . . When one is in contact with this kind of nature, one feels the danger of physical degeneration and moral perversion" (14). In these vignettes of tropical America, not just the work of folk artists but everyday life itself is a stage for a ghastly variety of the fantastic.

Invoked by literary scholar Marius Bewley, the ghastly reappears in the next issue, this time as the basis for a literary mode, "The American Macabre," (October 1945). In Bewley's definition, the macabre deals with the "coquetry of decay" and presents "death contemplating himself [sic] in the conviction he has a legitimate physical existence" (1945: 7). This mode shows a "steady line of development that has consistently been in close communication with the changes in national temperament, and which has arrived at its fullest definition in our own time" (ibid). One of its characteristics is its "promiscuous compoundability," which makes it appear in a variety of genres and authors—from Hector St. Jean de Crévecoeur, Hawthorne, Poe, and Mark Twain to Dick Tracy comic strips and contemporary pulp fiction. Bewley illustrates his arguments with quotes of singular savagery; besides, his intervention acquires a sharper edge by virtue of the pictures of mangled limbs and scarred faces which accompany it. One of these shots is captioned: "Photograph your injuries at once. You cannot photograph your pains but you can photograph the wound. Time heals everything—so photograph it now." Hence, in addition to describing and theorizing the macabre, Bewley's article performs it as well. The point which aligns his article with *View*'s sinister localism is the notion that the macabre is an "endemic American growth," owing much of its persistence and versatility to the brutality of life in the country. As he puts it: "The limits of American expansion were achieved by the exploitation of humans, the degradation of slaves, the extermination of natives, the careful cultivation of brutality and callousness. . . . But it was necessary that such rugged characteristics should appear, not as perversions, not as macabre, but as the natural expressions of a robust spirit" (1945: 18).

These explorations of the sinister element of folk seem a grim reversal on New Deal-sponsored attempts to document local American art and culture. Developed in the mid-to-late thirties within the frame of the Work Projects Administration, numerous government programs sent hundreds of folklorists across the country with the purpose of recording songs, transcribing oral history and traditions, and sketching and photographing samples of autochthonous design and architecture. The result of these efforts were such monumental works as the American Guide series of the Federal Writers Project and the WPA Index of American Design, a collection of over 10,000 paintings and illustrations documenting the decorative arts in the United States. Interest in Americana was intensified through the 1940s by the nationalism encouraged first by the war effort, then by post-World War II international hegemony. By documenting the rich textures and variety of preindustrial material culture, these forays bore witness to the ingenuity and

creativity of "the people." *View*'s writers, some of whom had taken part in WPA projects, spurned the patriotic, optimistic overtones of such reception of folk culture. Under their eyes, folk art warps the wrong way; instead of national essences and community spirit, it yields horror; rather than a foundation and origin, it is an endpoint, a vortex of death. This frightening potential of folk culture still circulates under several guises, not the least of which is the contemporary horror film. Think of *The Texas Chainsaw Massacre*, *Friday the Thirteenth*, or the more recent *Kalifornia*, to name just a few, where rural communities appear as theaters of terror.

View's way of connecting folk art with violence and the macabre has a gender politics that can be attached to an extra-textual detail: Parker Tyler and Charles Henri Ford's flamboyant gayness. They flaunted it with graceful abandon throughout their lives. In fact, during the years of *View*, Ford lived with painter Pavel Tchelitchew in a very public union started in 1934 and that would last until the latter's death. From the vantage point allowed by this subcultural filiation, we could conjecture that Ford and Tyler's championing of untutored art and culture might have been prompted by a gay-informed sense of kin with the culture of other disenfranchised groups. In addition to identification, there is in their reception of folk a strong voyeuristic fascination with the tough masculinity expressing itself in this artistic culture. When showcasing amateur art in *View*, they stressed the rough backgrounds of the men who produced it—Massey was a barely literate prison inmate, Poch a miner, Paul Childs a porter and construction worker (see his autobiographical sketch, Childs 1944b). In the light of such homoerotic fascination, the violence and death ethos that emanates from folk culture at large can be attributed to the sense of threat which gay cultural producers have frequently attached to rough straight maleness. Examples of this oscillation between enthrallment and dread abound in Jean Genet's early novels, which often dwelled on the mingling of violence and eroticism embodied in the amoral world of street toughs, prisoners, and criminals. This is a central concern in *Journal du voleur* or *Notre-Dame des fleurs,* for example, a fragment of which (titled "It's Your Funeral") appeared in the "Paris Issue" of *View* of March 1947. In the American context, Kenneth Anger's *Fireworks* (1947), a short film depicting the sadomasochistic dreams of an adolescent erotically fixated on sailors, is an articulate exploration of the violent underside of butch beefcake.

Ultimately this montage of images and contextual determinants forms a type of studium, a cumulative context for the discourse of the journal; traversing this field, the punctum which, for me, obtrudes in the above images is the pervasiveness of violence and death. It emerges in the unjustified

cruelty of Marius Bewley's quotations illustrating "the American macabre"; in the photographs of injuries accompanying this article—one of which prominently shows fresh stitches on a woman's blood-smeared forehead; in the pictures of "Tropical Americana" freaks; in the uneasiness emanating from Joseph Cornell's albums and from George Platt Lynes's and Helen Levitt's pictures. The insistent pulsion of death shows for me, above all, in Paul Eaton Reeve's "Homage to Battling Siki" (1942). This piece describes the rise and fall of a Senegalese boxing champion who moved to America, where he lived in grand style: he "transformed Broadway by appearing there in a full dress suit, high hat, tan shoes, two monocles, and attended by two giant Senegalese carrying jars of whiskey for presentation on demand" (1942: 22). Reeve's account suggests that the boxer eventually became mixed up in a criminal racket and was gunned down by the mob. The piece is illustrated with pictures of Siki on the ring, celebrated by fans, arguing with a policeman, and, lastly, dead in the morgue, his immense body laid out under the indifferent gaze of two stocky middle-aged men. Something evades me in such examples of the journal's insistence on deadly violence. I cannot easily bind this opaque compulsion by invoking surrealism's romance with death; by resorting to received truths about the historical moment—War anxiety, the dawn of the Atomic Age, contemporary anomie—nor by regarding it a stark refusal of the country's official mood, characterized by the smugness and complacency of the victor. The scars remain too tender and vulnerable, the brutality too oppressive, Siki's dead body too haunting.

And yet, as I have tried to suggest throughout, in such unruly details and objects the magazine's—and by extension, the avant-garde's—project largely resides: in moments that defy interpretation and evade the reader's questioning gaze; in fragments that short-circuit the bid for totality. To them I have turned my critical efforts here—not in order to make them signify but to prolong their opaqueness, and in doing so, to try out alternative inroads into our textual past.

NOTES

1. Much so-called post-modern epistemology develops from the assumption that knowledge and discourse are always locally situated, inflected by singular contexts, bodies, and desires. Think of the contemporary proliferation of "situated criitques" (in the form of gay and lesbian studies, post-colonial studies, feminism, race studies) and of their influence in the realm of science studies (Harding and Hintikka 1983, Haraway 1989, Toulmin 1990)

2. The existing literature on the journal is rather scarce. See Myers 1981, 1983 for an autobiographical account by an insider. The extent of the critical literature is: Neiman 1991, a succinct but informative introduction to Ford's anthology of the journal (Ford 1991); Wollen's and Sawin's passing but thoughtful mention of *View*'s presence in the post-war New York art scene (Wollen 1992, Sawin 1995); and Dickran Tashjian's more complete treatment in his history of New York surrealism (1995). These are totalizing accounts; they describe the brand of surrealism that the journal showcased, and—particularly in Tashjian 1995—compare *View*'s surrealism with that practiced by the group of exiles led by Andre Breton. My focus in what follows is not totalizing as much as "disseminative": I will be connecting some writings that appeared in *View* with other contemporary cultural discourses on the basis of analogy and contiguity, thus tracing underground connections between them.

3. A result of the crossing of ethnography and surrealism is the appearance in *VVV* of some pieces by Claude Lévi-Strauss, written during his New York exile, and by Roger Caillois. This blend is also evident in Wolfgang Paalen's journal *Dyn*, irregularly published in Mexico in the 1940s, and, less connected with official surrealist circles, in Maya Deren's studies and documentaries of Haitian religion and folklore.

4. Along these lines, see also Forrest Anderson (1941), an hallucinated account of a cross-country journey, and Leonora Carrington (1942).

5. While post-war existentialism is routinely invoked in relation to the French reinvention of some American films as noir, most critics and historians have neglected the "genre's" surrealist filiation. As James Naremore points out in a recent article, "what needs to be emphasized is that French existentialism was intertwined with a residual surrealism, which was crucial for the reception of any art described as *noir*." The name film *noir*, he continues, derives from the *série noire*, a collection of hard-boiled fiction conceived and edited by Marcel Duhamel, a former surrealist active in the Breton group during the late 1920s and early 1930s. In addition, Hollywood thrillers were

> admired and discussed in *L'Age du cinéma*, a surrealist publication of 1951, and in *Positif*, which maintained strong connections to surrealism throughout the 1950s and 1960s. They were also given their first important study in a book that was profoundly surrealist in its ideological aims: Raymond Borde and Etienne Chaumeton's *Panorama du film noir américain* (1955), which has been described as a 'benchmark' for all later work on the topic. (Naremore 1995-96: 18)

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UNPLANNED VOCABULARY INSTRUCTION:

A CASE STUDY OF THREE SECOND LANGUAGE CLASSROOMS

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1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Within the field of second language learning and teaching, little attention has been paid in the past to the acquisition and instruction of vocabulary. The emphases in the late 70s and early 80s on syntactic structures and generative grammar gave rise to a number of studies on comparative semantics, componential analysis and the organization of the mental lexicon at the expense of a pedagogical perspective. Paradoxically, the notional/functional syllabuses and the communicative approaches from the last decades called for both careful vocabulary grading and a more complete look at the needs of language learners, who have always tended to consider the learning of words as the key to mastering a second language. Thus, already in the late 70s and especially in the 80s we hear voices concerned with how second language vocabulary is learned and how it is to be best taught (Allen 1983; Carter and McCarthy 1988; Judd 1978; McCarthy 1990; Meara 1980; Nation 1982; Richards 1976; Wallace 1982, to cite a few). Today, teacher training programs often include courses on how to improve learners' comprehension of vocabulary and how to help them with the storing and retrieval of words (for a review see Victori 1994). Thus, many teachers include in their lesson plans a varied

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repertoire of vocabulary activities. Nevertheless, much vocabulary instruction by second language teachers occurs in an unplanned manner, either because it is spontaneously requested by the learner or because, without any planning, the teacher considers during the lesson that the situation calls for a lexical clarification. However frequent this teaching practice may be, it is surprising to see a dearth of classroom studies on unplanned vocabulary instruction, the topic of the present study.

There are only three descriptive data-driven studies that have looked into unplanned vocabulary instruction in the second language language classroom, although each dealt with the topic from a different perspective (Baker 1991; Chaudron 1982; Wagner and Yee 1985). Chaudron's main purpose in analyzing vocabulary was that of determining what features could enhance learners' comprehension and what features could impede it. Out of the analysis of 19 subject-matter lessons by seven teachers, he developed an extensive taxonomy of teaching strategies and examined their linguistic and discoursal features in order to determine the intervening factors in comprehension.

Wagner and Yee's study shared Chaudron's concern with the factors that facilitated comprehension in a study that involved six hours of classroom instruction and six teachers. But this time the researchers' aim was to determine how the sequence of both lexical and grammatical explanations related to comprehension. The study addressed a wide range of aspects since it compared (a) lexical with grammatical explanations, (b) instruction in advanced with basic ESL classes, (c) differences between planned and unplanned explanations, and (d) differences across teachers. This study's main quality was the development of six categories to describe the teachers' explanations and the design of a diagram to show their sequence. However, furthering this line of research was justified because Wagner and Yee did not analyze planned and unplanned vocabulary instruction separately.

To this purpose, Baker focused his study (1991) on unplanned vocabulary instruction. He adapted Wagner and Yee's analysis to his data and sought to find out what triggered instruction and how it was treated. One strength of the study is that the analysis was not only based on classroom transcripts but also on brief interviews with the three teachers involved, thus providing validity to the researcher's interpretations. However, this study could have gained in reliability if these interpretations had been based on a wider number of teachers' explanations, and not only the 20 explanations that were identified in the course of the 12 hours of classroom instruction.

Ground-breaking as the three studies above were, further work on this topic seemed to be necessary for mainly two reasons. The three studies were more interested in identifying the elements of vocabulary instruction by

means of linguistic- and discoursal-based analyses than in describing teaching methodology. In addition, the above studies gave only secondary attention to teaching styles because not enough lessons were usually observed from one same teacher.

2. METHOD OF THE STUDY

2.1. Purpose of the study and data collection

This study is a contribution to existing research on classroom interaction (for example, see Chaudron 1986 and Day, ed., 1986) and its major objective was to analyze classroom events where some lexical instruction was given in an unplanned manner by the teacher or a student. These instances will be referred to from now on as "unplanned vocabulary instruction" (UVI). The term "unplanned" refers to the times when such instruction occurred outside an activity with a primary focus on vocabulary, either addressed to the whole class or to groups or individuals. The term "vocabulary instruction" refers both to occasions on which the meaning of a word is made clear (through a translation into the L1, an explanation, an example, etc.) as in Excerpt 1, as well as to the communicative strategy where a learner is given a word in the L2 that he needs to express himself, as in Excerpt 2.

Excerpt 1 [1]
LEARNER: What is temperate?
TEACHER: Temperate is a mild moderate climate.
LEARNER: Yes, but it's an adjective?
TEACHER: Yes it's an adjective.

Excerpt 2
LEARNER: How do you say barba[2]?
TEACHER: Beard.

The present study on UVI was conceived to find out: a) if different styles could be observed in EFL classes taught by different teachers; and b) if different styles could be observed between the UVI events of which the teacher was a participant (teacher-student interaction) and those where he or she was not (student-student interaction).

The data for this study are observational and consist of audio recordings of EFL lessons, where the teachers involved were never asked to do anything special, nor were they informed about the purpose of the study. After the recordings, instances of UVI were identified and transcribed and then a system

of codes to describe them was developed (see section 3). Next, the transcripts were coded according to the typology that emerged from the data and analyzed with NUD·IST, a software package designed to aid the analysis of qualitative data sets. This process was inductive and recurrent throughout. The results of the analysis include a description of the events accompanied by tables with frequency counts and percentages.

2.2. Context of the study and participants

The present study analyzes the occurrences of UVI that took place in the course of eighteen lessons in three intermediate-level EFL classes (six non-consecutive lessons from each class). These classes were taught at a language school at a major public university in Spain and there were seventeen, eleven and eighteen undergraduate students in each group. Each class was taught by a different teacher, Bob, Sharon and Mark (pseudonyms), all of whom were native speakers of English and had taught for at least three years at the school.

Bob, in his late twenties, obtained a Postgraduate Certificate in Education specializing in ESL. When the data were collected, he had been in the teaching profession for four years and at the university for three. Sharon, in her mid-thirties, had obtained an RSA certificate while working at a private language school six years ago. Later, she had started leading some of the in-service training seminars at that school. At the time of this study, she had been teaching English in Spain for nine years and it was four years since she had started working at the university. Mark, in his forties, had received no formal training in EFL besides in-service seminars. He had been teaching English for nine years and it was four years since he first started working at the university.

The majority of students attending Bob's, Mark's and Sharon's classes were undergraduates (19-24 years old). Mark's and Sharon's classes took place at the School of Physics and most of their students were pursuing a degree in this field or in chemistry (taught in the same building). Bob's class took place at the School of Economics and most of his students were pursuing that degree. The students in the three classes received four hours of instruction weekly. In spite of the fact that the study is based on six lessons from each class, a different number of hours were recorded from each class. More hours from Mark's class were transcribed (9h. 30') because his class met twice a week for two hours, while five hours were recorded from both Bob's and Sharon's classes because they met four times a week for one hour.

The data collected from Bob's, Mark's and Sharon's classes were from an intermediate 120-hour course. At that level, basic grammatical structures and

communicative skills were consolidated and complex ones were introduced. All level-three classes in the school were required to use the same textbook, although this was the only restriction for teachers who had a wide degree of freedom to present the syllabus in the way they considered best.

3. RESULTS

A preliminary count of the instances of unplanned vocabulary instruction already showed differences and common traits in the three classes. In Bob's class there were nearly twice as many occurrences of vocabulary instruction as in Sharon's class and four times as many as in Mark's class (see Table 1). The common trend in the three classes was that the instruction tended to occur in activities that were content-oriented (i.e. role-plays, discussions, listening comprehension) in contrast to those that were form-oriented (i.e. grammar exercises, pronunciation practice) or dealt with classroom management; however, only in Bob's class was a significant difference in the distribution of UVI's found for types of activity, χ^2 (2, N = 759) = 18.1, $p<.01$.

TABLE 1
Percentages of UVI (unplanned vocabulary instruction) instances per type of activity.

	Bob (n = 40)	Sharon's class (n = 25)	Mark's class (n = 21) [11]*
Content-oriented	75%	60%	66.7%
Form-oriented	25%	36%	33.3%
Management	—	4%	—

* Since the number of occurrences in Mark's class (n = 21) comes from more hours of instruction, this figure has been levelled [11] so that it is comparable with Bob's and Sharon's classes.

3.1. When did the instruction occur?

The instruction of vocabulary was triggered either by a learner explicitly showing the need for some type of vocabulary instruction, as illustrated in Excerpt 3, or by the teacher without receiving any verbal evidence that learners needed such instruction, as illustrated in Excerpt 4:

Excerpt 3
LEARNER: How do you say marina?
MARK: Marina? Navy.

Excerpt 4
LEARNER: And the ice ice block must have melted.
BOB: Very good. That's the word. The ice block must have melted. And melt is the verb. Melt means to change from a solid to a liquid when the temperature changes. So ice melts at . . . at what temperature?

Teachers seemed to have several motivations for initiating UVI. In some cases, teachers anticipated the students' need for such instruction either because they thought students were likely to get confused with the usage of two words, as was the case with false friends, or because one or several students had already previously showed during group work that they were in need of lexical instruction. In other cases, teachers initiated a review of vocabulary dealt with in previous lessons. Finally, teachers also focused on vocabulary instruction when they considered that some word lent itself well to introducing others which were semantically related, and which were therefore taught in association. For example, the teaching of the word "suitcase" motivated the teaching of "bag," "briefcase" and "handbag," and "trip" triggered the teaching of "journey".

In analyzing the proportion of learner- versus teacher-triggered UVI instances, it was found that the former appeared to be the most frequent trigger in the three classes. However, there were some differences in these proportions between Bob's and the other two teachers' UVI's. For every teacher-triggered occurrence in Bob's class there was a ratio of only 1.8 learner-triggered occurrences, whereas the ratio in Sharon's and Mark's classes was of 4 and 4.2 occurrences of learner-triggered to teacher-triggered, respectively (see Table 2). The frequencies of these two teachers were found to be significant, χ^2 (1, N = 25) = 5.12, $p < .005$ for Sharon's class and χ^2 (1, N = 21) = 4.6, $p < .005$ for Mark's class. The higher proportion of teacher-triggered UVI instances in Bob's class leads us to think that, to provide instruction, Bob did not wait to have evidence of the need for such instruction as the other teachers did.

TABLE 2
Percentages of UVI instances per type of trigger.

	Bob's class (n = 40)	Sharon's class (n = 25)	Mark's class (n = 21) [11]*
Learner-triggered:			
Request	32.5%	68%	66.7%
Incorrect production	25%	4%	4.8%
L1	7.5%	8%	4.8%
Incorrect translation	—	—	4.8%
Total Learner-triggered:	65%	80%	80.9%
Teacher-triggered	35%	20%	19%

* Since the number of occurrences in Mark's class (n = 21) comes from more hours of instruction, this figure has been levelled [11] so that it is comparable with Bob's and Sharon's classes.

Under the category of learner-triggered instruction, four subcategories were identified according to the type of evidence that revealed the need for assistance. In some cases learners asked for the meaning of a word by means of a direct question or of its repetition with a rising intonation [*Request*][3] (see Excerpt 3 above). Sometimes, they used a lexical item incorrectly or in a hesitant way [*Incorrect Production*] (see Excerpt 5). On other occasions, they used the L1 for a word they did not know in the foreign language [*L1*][4] (see Excerpt 6). Finally, learners' incorrect translations also triggered lexical assistance [*Incorrect Translation*] (see Excerpt 7).

Excerpt 5
LEARNER: Pig.
SHARON: Pork . . . Pig, no. Pig is the animal . . . Pork is the meat.

Excerpt 6
LEARNER: Probably Lady Margaret eh would . . . es- espantarse.
BOB: Espantar. Yeah. Can't think of a word for espantar in English there. [. . .] You could say disgusted.

Excerpt 7
MARK: Do you often buy your friends presents? [. . .]
LEARNER: Si compras a los amigos presentes.
MARK: What are presents?[5]
LEARNER: Gifts. Regals.
MARK: That's right.

As to the frequency of occurrence within these four subcategories, very few instances of the last two (Incorrect Translation and L1) were found in any of the three classes (see Table 2). As for the other two, a request was by far the most common trigger in Sharon's and Mark's classes, whereas it was as frequent a trigger in Bob's class as incorrect productions. This shows that this teacher took more advantage of students' lexical errors in order to create occasions for teaching vocabulary.

In the following two sections, a distinction will be drawn between those occasions when the instruction on vocabulary came from the teacher (teacher-student interaction) and those when it came from a learner (student-student interaction). However, it must be kept in mind that the latter did not occur with the same frequency in the three classes as the former. In Bob's and Mark's classes a student provided instruction on a smaller number occasions in relation to the teacher (with a ratio of 1 to 4). In contrast, this ratio was more even in Sharon's class (with a ratio of 2 to 3), thus showing her students' quite active role as providers of lexical information (see Table 3).

TABLE 3
UVI instances in teacher-student interaction versus student-student interaction.

	Bob's class (n = 40)	Sharon's class (n = 25)	Mark's class (n = 21) [11]*
Teacher-student	32	15	17
Student-student	8	10	4

* Since the number of occurences in Mark's class (n = 21) comes from more hours of instruction, this figure has been levelled [11] so that it is comparable with Bob's and Sharon's classes.

3.2. Teacher-student interaction: How was instruction treated?

Two aspects about the treatment of vocabulary instruction between teacher and student have been analyzed: mode of interaction and type of strategy (defined as an instructional action). As for the mode of interaction, the three teachers employed both eliciting and informing. When teachers made use of eliciting, learners participated verbally under their guidance (usually through questions), as illustrated in Excerpt 8. When teachers made use of informing, teachers were the source of all the lexical information without requiring the learners' verbal involvement,[6] as can be seen in Excerpt 5 above.

Excerpt 8
LEARNER: Colin and Lady Margaret they will sit beside because=
BOB: =Beside who?
LEARNER: Beside each other.
BOB: Right. Yea.

As regards the use of these two modes, some observations are in order. Sometimes the teachers' attempts to elicit information were unsuccessful because they met only an unsatisfactory response, murmur or silence from students. On such occasions, teachers usually reacted by responding to their own questions or by narrowing down the question, as is illustrated in Excerpt 9. As regards informing, even if the teacher did not make the learners participate, it was often the case that they made contributions by asking further questions or making comments.

Excerpt 9
BOB: . . . A suitcase. Yea? . . . A suitcase, do you know what it is? ((Learners' murmur)) No? When do you use a suitcase?
LEARNER: A suitcase.
LEARNER: To go to travel?
BOB: To go on a journey or to travel.

The teachers in this study did not make use of the two modes of interaction to the same extent (see Table 4). Bob preferred eliciting to informing, while Sharon used both strategies with a similar frequency. Mark's preference for informing over eliciting shows that the discourse devoted to UVI tended to be more teacher-centered in this class.

TABLE 4
Teacher-student interaction: Percentages of UVI instances per mode of interaction.

	Bob's class (n = 32)	Sharon's class (n = 15)	Mark's class (n = 17) [8,9]*
Informing	40.6%	53.3%	70.7%
Eliciting	59.4%	46.7%	29.3%

* Since the number of occurences in Mark's class (n = 17) comes from more hours of instruction, this figure has been levelled [8.9] so that it is comparable with Bob's and Sharon's classes.

As for the second aspect related to the treatment of vocabulary instruction, a range of ten strategies were used by one or more teachers:

1. *Definition* of a term by means of an explanation of its meaning or through synonyms.

> *Excerpt 10*
> LEARNER: What does it ready for bed mean?
> BOB: OK. Ready for bed. It's the idea of taking all your clothes off, putting on your pyjamas, brushing your teeth, yeah? . . . and preparing yourself for bed [. . .]

2. *Association* of an item with others and thus creating a semantic mapping (e.g.: BOB: "Signs is something different. I'll explain that in a minute. But this is a notice board. Right. This is a blackboard which is green unfortunately and this is a notice board and these for example els parcials [midterms] ((Reading from a notice)) [. . .] This is a notice.")[7]

3. *Usage,* that is, illustrating the meaning of a word through examples. These examples can be classified into four types:

a) *Present context:* the teacher referred to the immediate context of the classroom (e.g.: MARK: "This is a window pane here. This is a window pane. Right? A window. One window pane, two window panes, three window panes, four window panes.")

b) *Past context:* the teacher referred to a past experience in the classroom (e.g.: BOB: "Do you remember yesterday the problem? . . .There was a person who was locked in a room. She picked up the phone and the caller hung up.")

c) *World Knowledge:* the teacher appealed to the students' knowledge about the world to create a context in which the word would be used. Often, these appeals were quite elaborate, as in the following example:

> *Excerpt 11*
> BOB: Urge! Could you give me an example of when you might urge another person to do something? . . . Imagine somebody is in a race, yeah? . . . in a marathon, yeah?. . . and yeah yeah. It looks pretty good after two kilometers but after, after after ten kilometers, yea it's getting desperate there. Ehm. You can see this person at the point of falling on the floor, yeah? and everybody says: Come on, come on! You can do it. You can do it. Everybody urges the person to continue, yeah? Go on. Continue. Yea? And that's in a context of a competition, yeah?

d) *Collocations:* through decontextualised combinations of words the teacher showed how a word could be used (e.g.: BOB: "He is *untidy.* Yeah. You can have an *untidy person.* You can have an *untidy room.*")

4. *Translation into L1* of the word whose meaning wants to be shown (e.g.: BOB: "Good. So we want the third conditional. Just let me tell you. In the exam teachers teachers are particularly *twisted,* yeah? which means *retorcido,* yeah?")

5. *Dictionary Use,* a resource which the teacher directs the learner to:

> *Excerpt 12*
> LEARNER: ¿Cazador furtivo?
> MARK: I guess it would be- Wouldn't it be furtive hunter? ((Writes it on the blackboard)) What do you think? ((3 seconds)) Yes, look it up in the dictionary.

6. *Unknown,* an acknowledgment of the teacher's own inability to provide for the sought lexical information. Curiously, in the following example the teacher and the learner jointly find out what the word in English is:

Excerpt 13
LEARNER: Eso es lo de la dote, ¿no? que les daban. [This is the dowry, isn't it? What they used to give them]
SHARON: I think so. *I don't know the word in Spanish* . . . And traditionally what happens?
LEARNER: The woman puts money and bueno, her mothers, no? ... If if they don't put the money, they don't they don't marry.
SHARON: Aha. And that's. Aha. So the money is called a dowry. There's the word. ((Spells the word)) Aha? A dowry. Right.

7. *Metastatement-Function,* which covers comments on the situational constraints governing the use of a word (Richards 1985), such as its frequency of use or the register it belongs to (e.g.: SHARON: "Octopusy for me is like a diminutive. Aha? . . . So when you talk to children and you say. Ah, look. There is an octopusy. . . *It's the talking to for children.*")

8. *Metastatement-Form,* which covers actions or comments through which the teacher directs the students' attention to spelling, pronunciation, grammatical constraints of a word or its syntactic relationships, as in the following example:

Excerpt 14
SHARON: How do you spell it?
LEARNER: I don't remember.
SHARON: How do you think?
LEARNER: P - E - A - L ((Spelling the word))
SHARON: That would be possible. That's intelligent. But OK good. E-E, two E's, exactly.

A frequent procedure consisted in the writing of the target word on the blackboard, often accompanied by the teacher's saying the word out loud and sometimes followed by attention getters such as "This is the word" or "Be careful with that."

9. *Metastatement-Study,* which covers comments on the newness or difficulty of the word for the learner, as in the following example:

Excerpt 15
BOB: How do you say realizar plans? Is it do or make or another word?
LEARNER: Another word.

BOB: It's another word, yeah. Carry out. ((Writes the word down)). Carry out plans. This is the word. *Probably it's not a word you will know.*

10. *Provision of L2,* when the teacher supplies the English word that the learner is seeking (see Excerpt 2 above).

Turning now to the frequency of use of these ten strategies, some common traits were detected. Three strategies, *usage, metastatement-form,* and *provision of L2,* were among the four most frequent ones for the three teachers while *metastatement-function, dictionary* and *unknown* were among the four least frequent strategies in the three classes (see Table 5). As for usage, two subcategories, *present context* and *world knowledge,* were utilized by the three teachers, who showed a preference for the latter (see Table 6).

In spite of these common traits, there emerged both quantitative and qualitative differences in how the three teachers treated vocabulary. As to the number of implemented strategies, Bob tended to include more of them per vocabulary item than the other two teachers (Bob, 3; Sharon, 2.1; Mark 1.8). These ratios resulted from dividing the total number of strategies by the total number of vocabulary items attended to.

Among the qualitative differences, one teacher, Sharon, made a rather balanced use of her top four strategies whereas the other two teachers were predisposed to implement one particular strategy over the others. Mark stood out for his prevailing use of *translation into L1* (25%) in contrast to Bob's (7.2%) and Sharon's (0%), as well as for the paucity in his use of *definitions* (6.4%) in contrast to Bob's (13.4%) and Sharon's (22%), a teacher for whom this was one of the two most frequent strategies. In turn, Bob was a teacher who showed the strongest preference for one strategy as shown in Table 5; his preference for *usage* (32%) is striking because it represents one third of his total strategic actions. Bob also appeared to be the teacher with a wider variety of strategies. First, Bob implemented the four types of strategies of *usage* while Mark and Sharon only made use of two of them, *present context* and *world knowledge.* In addition, Bob was the only teacher who systematically made *metastatements* on *study* (9,3%) intended to have a positive psychological effect on the students.

TABLE 5
The four most frequent UVI strategies per teacher's class.

	Bob's class	Sharon's class	Mark's class
1	Usage (32%	Definition (22%)	Translation into L1 (25%)
2	Provision of L2 (16.5%)	Meta-form (22%)	Usage (21%)
3	Meta-Form (15.5%)	Usage (18.7%)	Meta-form (15.6%)
4	Definition (13.4%)	Provision of L2 (18.7%)	Provision of L2 (15.6%)

TABLE 6
Teacher-student interaction: Percentages of UVI instances per type of strategy.

	Bob's class (n = 97)	Sharon's class (n = 32)	Mark's class (n = 31) [16.4]*
Definition	13.4%	22%	6.4%
Association	4.1%	12.5%	3.2%
Usage:			
Present context	6.2%	6.2%	9.4%
Past context	3.1%	—	—
World knowledge	14.4%	12.5%	12.5%
Collocations	8.2%	—	—
Total Usage:	32%	18.7%	21.9%
Translation into L1	7.2%	—	25%
Dictionary use	—	—	3.2%
Unknown	—	3.1%	6.4%
Metastatement:			
Function	—	3.1%	—
Form	15.5%	22%	15.6%
Study	9.3%	—	—
Total Metastatement	24.7%	25%	15.6%
Provision of L2	16.5%	18.7%	15.6%

* Since the number of occurences in Mark's class (n = 31) comes from more hours of instruction, this figure has been levelled [16.4] so that it is comparable with Bob's and Sharon's classes.

3.3. Student-student interaction: How was instruction treated?

Two aspects about the treatment of vocabulary instruction (*mode of interaction* and *strategies*) have been analyzed in the talk between learners. As regards mode of interaction, eliciting was never employed by the students. If these data are compared with those from the teachers' (see Table 4), eliciting appears as a tool belonging exclusively to the teachers' repertoire.

The teachers' pedagogical repertoire was also more extensive than the students' as far as the number of types of strategies employed (Bob, 10; Sharon, 8 and Mark, 9), although Sharon's students used more of a range of strategies (6) than the students in the other two classes (2 in each of them). This wider repertoire in Sharon's class could be a result of the higher student participation in this class. Appendix B shows examples of student-student interaction for each of the strategies.

Students' repertoire consisted mostly of these two strategies: *provision of L2* and *translation into L1* (see Table 7). Thus, students helped each other when speaking or writing through the provision of words in the L2 and when reading or listening through the translation of problematic words. So the frequent use of the latter strategy was made at the expense of other—probably less direct—means to decode meaning that their teachers used, such as usage, definition and association. It should be added that metastatements were only mentioned on occasion.

4. DISCUSSION

The present study intends to be a contribution to previous work in this field in two respects. On the one hand, the data on which the analysis is based come from a considerabe number of lessons (18 hours), whereas previous studies were based on fewer hours of instruction (12 in Baker's [1991] and 6 in Wagner and Yee's [1985]). Analyzing a higher number of lessons was advantageous since more instances of UVI could be recorded (a total of eighty-six) in contrast to a total of twenty-two in each of the above-mentioned studies. This fact facilitated the development of descriptive categories and it also allowed us to capture patterns depending on whether the interaction was between a teacher and a student or between two students. On the other hand, the present study has recorded several lessons from the three teachers participating in the study (six lessons from each), in contrast to the fewer number of lessons per teacher in other studies where one same class was usually observed no more than two or three times. This fact also allowed us

to be able to point out common traits and differences in the styles of the three teachers analyzed.

If we compare the analysis of the UVI instances between teacher-student and between student-student, some comments are in order. In some respects there were practices in which both parties scored low. For example, the use of

TABLE 7
Student-student interaction: Percentages of UVI instances per type of strategy.

	Bob's class (n =8)	Sharon's class (n = 10)	Mark's class (n = 5) [2,6]*
Definition	12,5%	10%	—
Association	—	—	—
Usage			
Present context	—	—	—
Past context	—	—	—
World knowledge	—	10%	—
Collocations	—	—	—
Metastatement			
Function	—	—	—
Form	—	—	—
Study	—	—	—
Translation into L1	25%	40%	40%
Provision of L2	62,5%	30%	40%
Dictionary use	—	—	—
Unknown	—	10%	20%

* Since the number of occurences in Mark's class (n = 5) comes from more hours of instruction, this figure has been levelled [2.6] so that it is comparable with Bob's and Sharon's classes.

dictionaries was not frequent and the metastatements on functions scarce. However, in other respects what happened during student-student UVI instances systematically differed from their teacher-student counterparts. Students had a preference for more straightforward methods of instruction such as the mode of informing, the translation of the L1 or the provision of the L2, leaving more indirect techniques to the exclusive use of the teachers (such as the mode of eliciting, and the use of metastatements and association).

In comparing common patterns among our three teachers with those of previous studies, some common traits and differences in the results deserve to be mentioned. Both in our study and in Wagner and Yee's the instances of teacher-initiated instruction predominated over learner-initiated instruction. However, this was not the case in Baker's study, which described a class in which learners took a more active role in the pursuit of meaning. As regards the use of strategies, the teachers in our study made more frequent use of metastatements as well as a more balanced use of definition and usage than in Wagner and Yee's, where definition was more frequent than usage. Nevertheless, it must be said that some strategies such as association and meta-function were quite infrequent in both our study and in Wagner and Yee's, even if some of the less frequent strategies are highly encouraged by authors like Nuessel and Cicogna (1994: 525).

Perhaps the most revealing part of the analysis has been that where the teaching styles of the three teachers in the study were revealed. It was shown that teachers differred not only in the amount of UVI instances per lesson but also in how these were treated and the amount of explanation that was given. Bob was clearly the teacher who paid more frequent and extensive attention to vocabulary in an spontaneous manner. He stood out for his use of the strategy of usage where he frequently asked for student participation during eliciting. Mark's lessons differed from Bob's in that the UVI instances were much less frequent and the explanations shorter. He gave information in a more straight foward way than Bob, since he made the least use of eliciting and the most use of translation, two features that were characteristic of student-student UVI. Finally, Sharon seemed to be in the middle of the road between the two teachers. Unplanned vocabulary instruction occurred less often than in Bob's class but more often than in Mark's. Like Bob, she made use of rather indirect strategies to explain meaning, although her explanations were similar in length to Mark's.

Even though the purpose of this study has not been to evaluate the teachers' practices, they may be compared to current pedagogical trends in the teaching of vocabulary. On the one hand, there was one aspect in the three classes that is not in line with these trends. The three teachers used strategies to solve on-the-spot problems of comprehension and production without complementing them with other strategies to help retention while both types of strategies are equally recommended (Carter and McCarthy 1988). On the other, there were aspects of Bob's style that seemed to follow some other recommendations more closely than Sharon's and Mark's. Bob's frequent resort to sage seems to be a rich strategy since it not only develops vocabulary, but also comprehension through the development of the learners'

inferring skills (Kang and Golden, 1994). In addition, Bob's higher number of strategies per word guarantees that students become familiar with the different types of knowledge that are entailed in the knowing of a word (Maiguashca 1993; Richards 1976).

Both learning and teaching vocabulary are complex tasks for teachers and learners. Because of this complexity, we acknowledge that the present study is limited to the extent that it has not taken the teachers' and students' interpretations into account. The analysis of a wider number of teachers and lessons would allow for a richer description of this complexity. Nevertheless, we hope that the portraits of these classrooms and the analyses that we have conducted of these three pedagogical styles have shed some light on how words are taught in ESL classes and will serve both as a spur and a tool for those teachers who may want to reflect on their own practice.

NOTES

1. See transcription conventions in Appendix A.

2. In some excerpts students use their L1, which may be either Catalan or Spanish. Translations in brackets will be provided in those cases in which the meaning is not clear within the same excerpt.

3. For easier reference from now on we will indicate in italics the names of the categories as they appear in the tables.

4. Sometimes students "foreignized" the L1 word by, for example, changing its stress or pronunciation.

5. In this excerpt the learner was ironically playing with the double meaning of the word "presentes" in Spanish ("gifts" and "people who are present") but the teacher did not grasp this and interpreted the learner's translation as an error.

6. Provided there was a minimum of one question from the teacher, the section was coded as "eliciting," even if the teacher "informed" before or after the elicitation sequence, as was often the case.

7. Short one-speaker turns have been embedded in the body of the text..

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APPENDIX A: Transcription conventions

. . .	A one-second pause.
[. . .]	Part of a turn that has not been transcribed.
=	No gap at all between two turns, an interruption.
(( ))	Non-verbal and paralinguistic information of the utterance preceding the parenthesis.
It would be-	False start.

APPENDIX B: Examples of Student-Student Interaction

EXAMPLE OF *DEFINITION*
LEARNER: To greet is to say hello.

EXAMPLE OF *USAGE: WORLD KNOWLEDGE*
LEARNER 1: Què és advice? [What's advice?]
LEARNER 2: Advice is. . .
LEARNER 3: Help more or less?
LEARNER 2: Yes. I have a problem and I explain my problem to you and you say I think you should.

EXAMPLE OF *TRANSLATION INTO L1*
LEARNER 4: Què vol dir pattern? [What does pattern mean?]
LEARNER 5: Los patrones.

EXAMPLE OF *PROVISION OF L2*
LEARNER 3: Sobre todo, com es diu? [how do you say that?]
LEARNER 6: Moreover.

EXAMPLE OF *UNKNOWN*
LEARNER: Courtyard. No ho sé però com que no podia mirar al diccionari. [I don't know but as I couldn't look it up in the dictionary.]

ABERRATIONS AND EXCESSES: SRI LANKA SUBSTANTIATED BY THE *FUNNY BOY*

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Shyam Selvadurai's *Funny Boy* consists of six discrete episodes that deal with what could at first seem two very different issues. As the title suggests, Selvadurai's focus is a narrator growing up to an awareness of his own homosexuality in an unsympathetic and often hostile society. However, the novel also deals with the ethnic violence that has dominated Sri Lankan society and politics for the last fifteen years, and shows the manner in which the minority Tamils were increasingly treated as outsiders so that in the end they had no option except to consider themselves as such.

Put like that, of course, the thematic connections within the work can be seen quite readily. Unfortunately, however, the illumination the different sections of the book shed on each other has not generally been appreciated.[1] This is in part perhaps because of the manner in which Selvadurai initially introduces the personal element. The first chapter of the book, "Pigs Can't Fly," deals with the narrator in an early childhood in which he enjoys dressing up in a saree and playing together with girls instead of other boys in a game called "Bride-bride" which he has invented himself. The extraordinary nature of this performance seems to the reader to emphasize that the book, in dealing with homosexuality, is concerned with something aberrant; and though such dressing up in childhood may not be unusual, and though Selvadurai manages to introduce real pathos into the awareness of the narrator at the end of the loneliness that awaited him—"I would be caught between the boys' and the girls' worlds, not belonging or wanted in either"[2]—the im-

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pression is created that the writer is dealing with strange exoticisms that are of no great concern to the average reader.

This cannot of course be said about the chapters that deal with the ethnic issue and the violence that has accompanied it. The second chapter deals with the love affair of the narrator's aunt, a Tamil, with a Sinhalese boy; though she withstands family pressures, indeed is to some extent spurred on to the affair by her determination to resist what she sees as unreasonable prejudice, she is overcome when she herself is hurt in one of the attacks that became increasingly common in the early eighties.

The third chapter introduces yet another aspect of the violence in making clear the manner in which the government promoted it. The protagonist here is a Burgher, a Sri Lankan of mixed European descent. Like many other Burghers in the period immediately after independence, Daryl Brohier had emigrated to Australia, but now he comes back as a journalist, to investigate the rising racial tension. Earlier he had had an affair with the narrator's mother, but this had come to nothing because they were of different races. Now the affair is resumed, clandestinely.

The need for secrecy is one factor that prevents her pushing for an investigation when Daryl is murdered, obviously by government security forces when he had become too curious about the burning of the Jaffna Public Library, one of the measures instigated by government politicians to intimidate the Tamils. Another factor is fear, the awareness of what the police had done to the servant boy they decided to make a scapegoat at first, the anxiety about what might be done to her and to her family.

The fourth chapter deals with Jegan, the son of a friend of the narrator's father who gives him a job in his hotel business for sentimental reasons. Jegan had however been involved with the terrorist Tiger movement earlier and, though he had left it, when the connection is found out and he is attacked on that account, he has to be got rid of. The novel brings out clearly the problems the hostility causes the business so that, even though it is suggested that the father might have been more heroic, we can also understand that he should have had to sacrifice Jegan. What is more critically presented is the vicious advantage taken of the situation by rival businessmen, and the attitude of the government which, in allowing the propagation of half-truths, encouraged such discrimination.

The fifth chapter reverts to homosexuality as its principal subject in recounting the narrator's first affair with his Sinhalese fellow schoolboy Soyza. I would suggest however that it needs to be read in the light of the three preceding chapters too if its impact is to be properly appreciated.[3] The affair develops at a time when both boys are being tormented by the principal

of their school, and the climax of the story is when, to show his solidarity with Soyza, Arjie defies the principal, Black Tie, and thereby risks an excess of the physical punishments that were inflicted as a matter of routine in the school. The episode itself is trivial, but the language Selvadurai uses emphasizes its thematic importance—

> "I did it for you," I said. "I couldn't bear to see you suffer any more."
>
> There was a look of surprise on his face, then understanding. He moved to me and I put my arms around him. . . . My eyes came to rest on my parents. As I gazed at Amma I felt a sudden sadness. What had happened between Shehan and me over the last few days had changad my relationship with her forever. I was no longer a part of my family in the same way. I now inhabited a world they didn't understand and into which they couldn't follow me. . . . We stood for a moment, each lost in his own thoughts, then we began to walk together towards the stairs that led down to the auditorium. (*FB* 284-5)

At first sight it would seem that this episode does not really connect very closely with the political theme of the book. Of course Soyza and Arjie do belong to two different communities, and the fact that they are in the same class is unusual, due only to Arjie's father's desire to have his son educated in what he saw as the dominant language of the nation. Otherwise Arjie would have been in the Tamil medium class and therefore barely in communication with Sinhalese boys. Again, Black Tie's cruelty is presented in the context of his rivalry with his deputy, who wanted the school to be identified with Sinhalese and Buddhism. Yet this factor barely figures in the deliberations that lead Arjie to defy Black Tie; and though it is made clear that Soyza was not one of those who engaged in communal hostilities, such hostilities amongst the boys are also merely peripheral to the story.

Though ethnic tensions are not central to this episode, I would argue that there is an even more important thematic link in terms of the violence that is wielded so unreflectingly by authority. The placing of this chapter before the final one, which is a diary of Arjie's experiences during the riots of 1983, the government-sponsored attacks on Tamils that contributed more than anything else to increased support for Tamil terrorism, seems to me therefore particularly significant. The arguments put forward in that chapter about the involvement of the government in the riots, as well as the characterization of the President's speech, finally made the narrator's father accept what his wife had been trying to tell him for some time, that "It is very clear that we no longer belong in this country" (*FB* 304). There seems to me no doubt then

about the parallels Selvadurai draws between Black Tie and the President, both of whom rely on violence alone and have no scruples while in pursuit of their own ends about treating others as instruments without any rights or feelings of their own.

Throughout the work Selvadurai shows that such arbitrary excess on the part of authority generally goes unchallenged. So, in the earlier episodes, injustice had been accepted because to fight against it would have caused trouble. Arjie's mother gives in at the first hint of ridicule and tries to straitjacket Arjie within the world of the boys. Radha, his aunt, briefly resists family pressure about her Sinhalese boyfriend but feels in the end that the effort would be too much. His mother tries to find out what happened to Daryl but gives up almost at once, after she learns that the servant boy's arm had been paralyzed and realizes the hostility her initial involvement had roused. And Arjie's father, though he at first quelled his qualms because of sentimentality about his old friend, in the end sends Jegan away. It is only Arjie who in the end is willing to risk his own skin, literally, given Black Tie's prowess with the cane, to stand by his friend. Though the particular context of his defiance of authority might seem a trivial one, he decides in the full knowledge of the suffering he would have to undergo, suffering he has already experienced as intense. In this sense, Selvadurai suggests, Arjie has fulfilled his father's original purpose in sending him to "the best school of all", namely that "The Academy will force you to become a man." (*FB* 210) His act of commitment then shows up the inadequacies of all the others who had acquiesced in violence and authoritarianism and thereby perhaps allowed them to grow to the excesses of 1983.

My argument then is that both Selvadurai's major subjects are skilfully presented in terms of what is almost a didactic theme, the importance of asserting individual feelings and relationships in defiance of the dictates of authority. This presentation with regard to the homosexual element has been obscured as noted previously by the obviously peculiar nature of "Bride-bride," and the apparently funny, i.e. ridiculous rather than simply exceptional, nature of the protagonist. In chapter five however the theme of defiance is much more forceful; at the same time the thematic connections have not received as much attention as either the account of the ethnic differences that form the background or the vivid description of adolescent sexuality. And it was predominantly this latter, the sexuality seen too in relation to the first chapter, that prompted the criticism of the book as filth by Sri Lankans, and most significantly by a writer who should have been more sensitive, and to whose viewpoint I shall return.

With regard to Selvadurai's other subject too there has been some confusion, caused I think by the intensity of the passions the ethnic conflict has roused on either side. The subject is seen as that of ethnic violence in itself, though as I hope I have made clear above his scope is in fact broader in that he is concerned with the wider issue of political violence, and the involvement therein of the government and government media. In the early eighties, the period with which the book deals, such violence was most obviously directed against Tamils, though the account of Daryl's death and of the suffering of his servant boy, and before that the boy's brother, makes clear its wider provenance. For some Tamils, however, the book is seen as simply a moving justification for the violence Tamil Tigers (amongst them the fictional Jegan) have unleashed in turn, while some Sinhalese respond by claiming that the book presents only one side of the story. Thus, Selvadurai suggests in the novel, in the obviously autobiographical—indeed almost documentary—last section, that his own family home was burnt by the mobs. Certainly the Selvadurai home was burnt, but it was confidently claimed in some quarters that the book gave a false picture in attributing this to mob violence, and that the "truth" was that Selvadurai's father had set fire to it himself to claim the insurance.

Such claims are typical of the manner in which Sri Lankans respond to criticism. The question of whether the book presented an accurate picture of what had in fact occurred was not even considered. To that question there could have only been an affirmative answer. Instead, rumour was given precedence over the realities of fiction, to provide an evasion of the moral issue raised. Such an approach was of a piece with the claim often heard in Sri Lanka at the time that, though of course not all Tamils were responsible for the terrorism of the Tigers, many were, and the rest were sympathetic, and therefore it did not really matter that they had been hurt in the violence.

Such attitudes are connected with the collectivizing streak that has characterized modern Sri Lankan society. It could of course be argued that this is nothing new, that it arises almost necessarily from some of the basic characteristics of that society. It is generally acknowledged for instance that shame is a far more prominent socializing factor than guilt in Sri Lanka, in common with most South Asian or indeed Asian societies.[4] Selvadurai certainly pays due attention to this in his depictions of the way in which the adult world reacts to the idea of nonconformity—"'. . . if he turns out to be the laughing-stock of Colombo, it'll be your fault', my father said in a tone of finality" (*FB* 14); "'What's wrong?' Ammachchi said. 'I'll tell you what's wrong.' She paused for effect. 'People will talk'" (*FB* 58); "I recalled Mr. and Mrs. Siriwardena and his running away with the next-door servant woman;

how people on our road stared at Mrs. Siriwardena, when she passed them, and sometimes even laughed openly at her. Their son had been in my class and the boys had teased him until he cried" (*FB* 118); "'Be careful, Nalini', she said, 'Society is not as forgiving as a sister is'" (*FB* 125); "'The trick is not to make yourself conspicuous. Go around quietly, make your money, and don't step on anyone's toes'" (*FB* 173); "'Either you take it like a man or the other boys will look down on you'" (*FB* 211). Yet in addition to this relentless depiction of the manner in which public perceptions are canonized, Selvadurai equally importantly also suggests the way in which the classifications that permit condign criticism are made so easily, without any attempt at discriminatory analysis.

This is perhaps obscured by the fact that the ready categorization of the first chapter, in which Arjie is identified as different, cannot be questioned, and is indeed the substance of the author's claim to attention. What is challenged in that chapter is not the categorization itself but the judgments that flow from it, the criticism of the difference, the social urge to belittle it. The categorizations that follow however are more complex. Radha's family's insistence that Anil be seen as simply a Sinhalese and not as a young man paying court to a young lady with whom he has much in common is of a piece with the school bully's declaration that Arjie is not wanted in their class because he is Tamil; Soyza's simple question— "'But Salgado, aren't you always saying that Tamils should learn Sinhalese?'" (*FB* 216)—pinpoints the state of mind that insists on punishing differences even while exacerbating them. It was this sort of attitude that separated Daryl and Arjie's mother long before distinctions between Sinhalese and Tamils became intense, and it is this sort of attitude that drives Jegan back to the Tigers by allowing him no refuge when he had come to Colombo to try to escape them.

And Selvadurai's characterization of such attitudes has indeed been amply borne out by reactions to his book. The dismissal of the book as filth by the distinguished writer and journalist Maureen Seneviratne is a phenomenon that I think deserves some closer attention, given that Mrs. Seneviratne's own writings had dealt with sensitivity previously on the torments of childhood. Her present approach however perhaps owes something to her very successful emergence in recent years as an activist with regard to the issue of child prostitution that has recently bedevilled several Asian countries. Having done some invaluable work to highlight the abuse of children, not only by tourists but also by locals, Mrs Seneviratne has however gone on a crusade even against what in an earlier incarnation she might have recognized as qualitatively different. Inveighing against a

proposed gay conference in Sri Lanka, she declared that it had to be prevented, since otherwise paedophiles masquerading as homosexuals might be able to slip into the country; and a recent letter of hers to a magazine called *Lanka Woman,* that despite scantily dressed young ladies on its cover purports to uphold traditional Sri Lankan values, needs to be quoted at some length:

> Today I have . . . come to know not only about lesbianism but *also* of paedophilia and homosexuality, having been chosen to *work in* areas where those sexual expressions are only too common and in some cases are wreaking havoc on the lives of children everywhere . . . there ARE some all too many—GAYS and LESBIANS—as do [sic] some heterosexuals, not so many, who use children as sexual partners.[5]

Mrs Seneviratne's letter does indicate an awareness of a distinction with regard to paedophilia, though her argument ignores this; understandably so for her letter was in support of an editorial which was even more neanderthal in its approach:

> Make no mistake—homosexuality is unnatural. It is immoral and goes against all religious teachings as well as civil law. . . . Just because homosexuality has been looked upon with a benovolent eye by law enforcement authorities in Scandinavian countries, it doss not mean that a country such as ours, the palladium of Buddhism with large segments of Christians, Hindus and Muslims with a centuries-old culture behind them are going to do likewise. The true and evil nature of homosexuality and lesbianism has been blurred by certain laws passed, in Britain, particularly, which allowed two consenting males to indulge in their immoral practices in private. . . . President Robert Mugabe . . . recently condemned homosexuals strongly, even calling them "pigs". . . . At a time when rape and child abuse are rampant in Sri Lanka and law enforcement authorities are attempting to review the relevant laws which are totally inadequate, a new and festering sore erupts in our midst. . . . The very heart of all our religious and moral teachings is at risk, and we will be wanting in our duty to future generations of unspoilt children if we were, not only to condone these practices, but also legalise them. It is up to thinking people to speak out and condemn these people unreservedly. A plethora of words can confuse and blur the issue as we are all too aware, and a strong stand must be taken against deviants who would worm themselves into and destroy the very fabric of society.[6]

Such hysteria accords with the characterization of *Funny Boy* as filth. Ironically, Mrs Seneviratne's outrage extended too to another writer gaining prominence around the same time whose subject matter was less alien. This was her cousin Carl Muller, whose trilogy of novels about the Burghers was undisguisedly based on his own family. In this case, Mrs. Seneviratne's indignation, in common with that of many other Burghers, was with regard to the very earthy manner, involving an excessive degree of sexual activity of all sorts, in which Muller had presented his community.

The indignation can to some extent be understood since Muller, or rather his publishers, had presented his account as a faithfully comprehensive account of the Burghers; and this was a tremendous shock to the community in a context in which previous literary presentations had depicted them as genteel and proper. The fact however was that, whereas Burghers had contributed distinctively to what was termed respectable society, there was also another side to the community, which was celebrated for its less restrained *joie de vivre* too. This was most marked with regard to sexuality, in the sense that, when I was at school for instance, it was generally assumed with more of envy than scorn perhaps that Burghers, boys as well as girls, were more readily available for the more advanced levels of experimentation. This was of course only an aspect of the truth, but it was an aspect that was suppressed in literary accounts of the community until the publication of Muller's work.

The criticism then by its leading lights that Muller had insulted and betrayed his community was typical of a society with a collectivizing outlook that could not discriminate about details. This is not the place to go into any greater detail about the absurdity of a debate that does the Burghers themselves no service, in detracting from Muller's actual literary/autobiographical achievement, as opposed to his building up of a sociological record that was never intended to be definitive. It is worth noting here however that, in the context of what has been characterized as filth, Muller's work presents a contrast to Selvadurai's that more discriminating criticism might have used to focus on their very different perspectives. Muller, for instance in his treatment of homosexuality, which figures at regular intervals if not very prominently in the trilogy, adopts what might be termed a ruthlessly practical approach wherein it provides a purely physical outlet, occasionally for predatory bachelors or men deprived of their wives (such as the narrator's father when his mother embarked upon a lenghty affair with another man), more often for preposterous perverts such as the squint-eyed schoolmaster who achieved orgasm by digging into the boys he was caning. Such

excesses, it might have been thought, would have highlighted by contrast the romantic nature of Selvadurai's presentation which is primarily concerned with human responses; but no such discrimination was to be found.

This however is not surprising, in a context in which, as elsewhere on the subcontinent, homosexuality continues to be an embarrassing issue. In literature in English it has barely figured, except with regard to two works, the reactions to which are indicative of the anomalous nature of the situation. In 1971, in her novel *Giraya,* which is widely considered one of the most important recent works of fiction, Punyakante Wijenaike made it clear at the end that the husband of her narrator, whose problems with her marriage and her inheritance form the substance of the novel, was homosexual; when the book was turned twenty years later into a very popular television serial, it was decided by the authorities (and the decision was agreed to by the director, Lester James Pieris, the best known Sri Lankan director and one widely regarded as liberal in his own outlook), that homosexuality was unacceptable[7] and the man had to be epileptic instead. This change completely subverted Wijenaike's very subtle account of the relations between the husband and his mother, but artistry had to be sacrificed to convention.[8]

In the case of my own political novel *Acts of Faith,* which dealt as far back as 1985 with the 1983 riots, a lot of energy was expended in Colombo in trying to identify the originals of the characters portrayed, in particular the homosexual ones. I had tried, in dealing with both overt and clandestine sexuality, to tie the latter to the undercover terrorism in which the government was engaged. Unfortunately the political content of the book seemed of less concern in some quarters than what was thought sexual innuendo. In that respect, though for very different reasons, in Sri Lanka itself the book suffered in a similar way to Selvadurai's, though again, albeit to a much smaller readership, the message got through abroad.

It should be registered though that, in the other works mentioned above, homosexuality was peripheral to the main concerns of the novels; and though I have argued that Selvadurai's political concerns and his moral theme are at least as important as the topic his title emphasizes, it is clear that those are substantiated by his central homosexual subject. In that respect *Funny Boy* is as important for the debate about sexuality to which there are already signs that it has given rise as for its wider content. It is regrettable if that content gets belittled in the controversy; but it may be hoped that that controversy itself will lead to a more open outlook, in which the excesses that pass for normality will no longer be able so readily to divide people up for destruction.

NOTES

1. See for instance the review by Manique Gunesekere, of the University of Kelaniya (1996).

2. Shyam Selvadurai, *Funny Boy,* Penguin India 1994, p. 39. All page references to the book henceforth will be to this edition (abbreviated *FB* in parenthetical references).

3. I would in fact suggest an even closer connection in that the boy with whom the narrator has his affair is intended I think, in terms of physical description as well as his name, Soyza, to recall Richard de Zoysa, the journalist who was murdered by government forces in 1990. Though the earlier episode involving Daryl Brohier is dated to 1981, a period which did not in fact see murders of that nature, the discovery of Brohier's body, washed back to shore, is clearly reminiscent of what happened with de Zoysa.

4. See Obeyesekere, Gananath, *The Cult of the Goddess Pattini,* for a vivid account of the phenomenon. Rushdie's *Shame* is of course the most engaging account of the possible consequences of an excessive delicacy confronted with increasing social dislocation.

5. Maureen Seneviratne, in *Lanka Woman,* 10th January 1996: 7.

6. Clare Seneviratne, Editorial in *Lanka Woman,* 11th October 1995. The two Seneviratnes, both ladies, are not related, though the former does contribute regularly to the journal the latter edits.

7. See the account of what occurred during production in Lester James Pieris' article in *The Sunday Observer* (Colombo, 1996).

8. Ryhana Raheem and Siromi Fernando (1979) characteristically claim that *Giraya* is sensationalistic.

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REVIEWS

RESEÑAS

LOVE AND LONGING IN BOMBAY: FOREVER LISTENING

Vikram Chandra,
Love and Longing in Bombay.
London: Faber and Faber, 1997. 257 p.*

Those passionate poets and storytellers
melt the chains of worry
with the warmth of their song
Ali Sardar I'afri, Urdu poet

Love and Longing in Bombay (1997) is the second book written by the young Indian author Vikram Chandra. His first work, the novel entitled *Red Earth and Pouring Rain* (1995), which has received great critical acclaim, has been awarded the David Higham Prize for Fiction and the Commonwealth Writers Prize for the Best First Published Book. Now Chandra comes back with a work that corroborates his mastery as a modern storyteller.

Love and Longing in Bombay is a collection of five interrelated stories set in contemporary India, displaying a rich variety of plots, characters and dénouements that are, above all, essentially human. *Dharma* is the story which opens the collection, establishing the frame for the whole book, a frame that confirms the important presence of traditional Indian oral storytelling in Chandra's intertextual and highly polyphonic fiction.

We face the voice of a first-person narrator whose name, Ranjit Sharma, will remain unknown until the very end. He speaks in past tense and seems to be depicting events that happened some years ago, when he had just started

* I can never thank Vikram Chandra enough for his kindness, his support, his stories, his voice. This review is also in debt to Dr. Mary E. Farrell, who gently read the final draft.

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working at a software company in Bombay. Ranjit introduces another narrator, Subramaniam, represented as an oral teller, one who "had a small whispery voice, a departmental voice" (*LLB* 3). Subramaniam is a retired civil servant who goes to a bar in Bombay, the Fisherman's Rest, and delights everybody there with his stories. One of the members of his audience, our first-person narrator, recounts the storytelling for us. Nonetheless, in order to do so, many voices are recovered, so that, in addition to the two narrators being presented, we hear a rich multiplicity of voices that speak both in present and past time.

In *Dharma,* the first story of the collection, Subramaniam tells us about Major General Jago Antia, who was forced to save his own life through self-mutilation. Then he returns to his home in Bombay, where he is haunted by a ghost, the spirit of a small boy, who turns out to be himself as a child. This man, a lonely human being above all, hears the voice of the boy who constantly asks one same question: "Where shall I go?" At the end, when he is really able to see this spirit who comes from the past, he realizes that he himself is the boy, and then he can answer his haunting question: "Jehangir, Jehangir, you're already at home." Indeed, the ghost of the boy is the remembrance of lost innocence, comfort, love, home. It is a spirit that follows Antia when he comes back home being not Jehangir the boy, but the adult Jago, the mutilated soldier, the man who "knew he was still and forever Jago Antia, that for him it was too late for anything but a kind of solitude" (*LLB* 28). There is hope at the end: "yet he felt free" (*LLB* 28).

Shakti tells us about a love story, between the son and the daughter of two powerful business families, which in the end are able to overcome the conflicts, due to appearances, power and money, that only love seems to make disappear. Sheila Bijlani and Dolly Boatwalla, the two matriarchs, incarnate the struggle for power and material gain. However, this is left behind by Sanjeev, Sheila's son, and Roxanne, Dolly's daughter. The intervention of another character, Ganga, who works for both businesswomen, is definitive in order to make the marriage possible. Nonetheless, this relationship, as historical marriages did, serves to fulfill the two matriarchs' desire for wealth, when they create the sucessful B.B.B.I. (Bijlani-Boatwalla Bombay International Trading Group), the beginning of many economical and political events. Fortunately, this began, despite all, as a true love story.

Kama is a murder story about the secret passions of common people. Its main character, Sartaj Singh, a Bombay police inspector who belongs to a family with police tradition, agrees to investigate the murder of Chetanbhai Ghanshyam Patel, a well-positioned man. The case gets increasingly more and more complicated until Sartaj discovers the secret passions of Patel and

his wife, and how their son, Kshitij, is completely unable to face that truth. Kshitij is presented as a Rakshak, that is, a member of a fanatic group which claims to be a cultural organization. This group believes in coming back to a "perfect" past of virtue and strenght, and in order to achieve their purposes they do not care if they kill. The intimate life of his parents seems unbearable to Kshitij, who, nevertheless, is let free. Why? A suspect murderer dies in the hospital and Kshitij is the victim's son. But Sartaj knows.

Artha is a love story between two men, or, better to say, it is how a love story is destroyed by the desire for money of one of them. Iqbal works as a programmer for a computing company where a sort of embezzlement has been discovered. At the same time, Rajesh, Iqbal's lover, has disappeared. Iqbal starts looking for him, and in the way he discovers how the possibility of fast and easy material gain can change one's life, and how a dear friend can reveal himself suddenly as a complete stranger. Interwoven with these happenings, there is also the importance of Art and Beauty, represented by the paintings of an artist, the lover of a friend of Iqbal. Perhaps here Beauty is like the test of our human condition, the exploration of its abyss and limits, as the Argentinian author Ernesto Sábato would say. At the end, Iqbal cannot find Rajesh. But he knows that "life never does what it should."

Shanti is the closing story of the collection, and also the one which ends the storytelling frame set up in the first story. Subramaniam, the oral teller, finds Ranjit walking, thinking about his girlfriend, Ayesha. And, of course, he tells him a story. However, here the setting is not the smoky bar, but Subramaniam's own house. The story he tells occurred in 1945, just two years before the paradigmatic and problematic date of the independence of India and Pakistan. And it takes place mainly on a train. Shiv (Subramaniam) meets Shanti by chance and falls in love with her, with her name.[1] The assistant station master, Frankie Furtado, is the witness of the development of their relationship. Shiv listens to the tales Shanti tells him on the train, creating a spiralling structure of stories within stories that amazes Shiv. We should not forget that the frame in which the five stories of the collection are included is also one of oral storytelling.

Finally, he tells her a story, one he is not able to tell anyone else, so that it is Shanti herself who recounts Shiv's story to Frankie. After that, when Shiv asks Shanti to marry him, she accepts with no hesitation. Of course, the Shiv Subramaniam of the story is the oral teller. The listener of

1 As Chandra told me, "*Shanti* is Sanskrit for 'peace', or, as T. S. Eliot footnoted it in 'The Waste Land', it is 'the peace that passeth understanding'" (personal communication, 25th July 1997).

his stories, our narrator, is Ranjit Sharma, whose name we only learn at the end, when Subramaniam's wife appears. The real *tour de force* comes when she tells Ranjit: "You mustn't believe a word he says." Thus, Subramaniam appears to be an unreliable narrator, one that has been making stories up. Indeed, a real storyteller.

The whole frame of the collection finishes as it began, with Ranjit's voice, completing a circular narrative. Between the beginning and the end, many voices, many stories are heard. At the very end, Ranjit is walking in his city, Bombay, thinking, listening to the music in his head, filled with longing, and love. But, above all, in constant search of life.

In *Love and Longing in Bombay* we face a double narrative which juxtaposes, within the context of oral storytelling, past and present. Interspersed with the frame story in the past time, that of a group of people gathering in a Bombay bar, where they listen to Subramaniam's stories, we have memories of the past and also narrations of the past which catch up with the present. The situations, set in contemporary Bombay, allow the use of a wondrous up-to-date language, a reflection of the English spoken in present-day India, fifty years after independence. It is a language full of references to meals, computer systems, music, and present-day customs. However, what remains above all is the open frame of oral storytelling, traditional in India, a special compositional feature to which Chandra gives birth with his unmistakable hedge, "Listen." Here, skillfully, the author updates the context and makes it appear, in a natural way, an almost familiar one. After all, what really matters is the fact of storytelling, as in his first work, the novel *Red Earth and Pouring Rain.* The trace of the Indian oral traditions unifies the narrative work of Chandra hitherto.

Therefore, above all, *Love and Longing in Bombay,* as a fictional depiction of oral narration, recovers the relevant presence of the oral storytelling tradition in contemporary India. Through these brilliant and enticing pages, three elements connected with orality relate to each other: voices, music and silences. They define how the *speaking person,* as Mikhail Bakhtin would say, feels in each moment. The dialogue created among voices, music (chiefly *ghazals*) and silences surrounds the stories of the collection, creating a curious sense of comfort and confidence. For instance, he depicts a voice "wrapped around silences like a call from the other side of the moon" (*LLB* 231), a music "ethereal and distant, which must have been always there but only now in my ears" (*LLB* 174), or a silence which was "wet and fresh and everywhere green" (*LLB* 231). Definitely, it is poetry that moves Chandra's pen.

Furthermore, in a novel written in English, Chandra introduces a lot of Indian words, mainly from Hindi (his mother tongue). To begin with, the story titles are, metatextually, Indian cultural referents. At the same time, different accents from some of the many languages spoken in India are mentioned, accents that make this English sound different. Indeed, Chandra's English reflects the language used by Indians, not the norm depicted in British grammar books. It is, we would say, the English used by somebody who fells chiefly in Hindi, a language that reveals that the intimate bond between language and ethnic identity is inseparable. It is not in vain that one of his characters, probably voicing Chandra's own thought, says that "ethnic means real" (*LLB* 169).

In his second book, this collection of short stories, Chandra places at the centre of his narrations such universal human feelings as love and longing, displaying a varied range of love relations, revealing his broad-minded vision, comprehensive and deeply human. The stories of *Love and Longing in Bombay* represent romantic love, filial love, perverted love, damaged love, lost love, found love and absolute longing.

As the author behind the writing of this collection, which he lets flow in the characters' own voices, Chandra displays a profound psychological capacity to describe feelings, emotions and thoughts, more than actions and happenings. He is able to enter the personality of each one of his characters. He knows them very well. And that allows us to understand their life stories as if they were real people, mainly because they have been depicted from within.

Once more, as in *Red Earth and Pouring Rain,* Vikram Chandra shows us the power of stories as memory, both of past and present time; stories like life, stories like India herself, a contemporary India which is multicultural, pluralist, heterogeneous, half-caste, transcultured, a huge magical meeting place of races, cultures, tales, voices and times. Throughout these stories, Vikram shows us his present-day India, a country that fifty years after its independence from the British domination lives a complex reality of poverty, overpopulation and tremendous social differences, while, at the same time, it is able to reveal, among these shadows, its own artistic expressions as double-rooted in modernity and tradition. It is this legacy of the past which seems to remain after all, namely, the importance of storytelling, voices heard, face-to-face conversations, human touch. A tradition that young generations, plunged into our paradoxical modern times, still trust. In other words, by means of Chandra's writing, in which oral performances are emphasized above all, India is represented as a multiplicity of voices telling universal human stories. On the other hand, he also shows us the memory of traditional India, which is not in books and official "Histories," but in

everyday stories of the people, in their daily conversations, those which are not written but told, retold, and above all, lived.

Finally, conclusions are left open to the readers' imagination, perhaps as an attempt to make them also feel the need to retell them, in order to make them tell stories of their own. Vikram Chandra is a real storyteller indeed, one who goes on giving us stories in an endless process that, hopefully, has just begun. Perhaps, as one of the characters in this collection, he is "silenced by stories that appear abruptly in his head" (*LLB* 183), stories that, written on paper, we are also able to listen to, somehow.

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UNIVERSITAT JAUME I DE CASTELLÓ

Chantal Cornut-Gentille D'Arcy and José Angel García Landa, eds.,
Gender, I-deology:* *Essays on Theory, Fiction and Film.
Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1996. 465 p.

While collections of new critical writings are inevitably subject to editorial contingencies, their strength is that they can provide readers with varied constellations of fresh perspectives and complementary new departures. *Gender, I-deology: Essays on Theory, Fiction and Film* (Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1996) is such a volume. Edited by Chantal Cornut-Gentille D'Arcy and José Angel García Landa, it contains twenty-nine essays which offer readers a textured overview of the theoretical questions and textual analyses one can bring to bear on intersections of gender and ideology within literary and film studies. Organized in three roughly equal sections—"Theory," "Fiction," and "Film"—these essays at once cover diverse materials and yet come across as focused and dialogically reenforcing. Most were written by members of the Zaragoza university faculty, which may partly account for the volume's cohesion. But this sense of unity is also indebted to the editors' effort to guide

and organize their diverse contributions within a shared discourse that aims to elucidate a common subject matter.

While all three sections of *Gender, I-deology* are informed by recent developments in critical and gender theory, the essays included in the "Theory" section pursue them centrally, and in so doing provide a foundation for the subsequent "Fiction" and "Film" sections. "Theory" concerns the agendas, methodologies, and ideologies which have been informing contemporary debates about literary and filmic representations of gender, notably variants of poststructuralist and New Historical thinking. The "Fiction" and "Film" sections apply these and related theoretical strands to specific texts, and do so in a flexibly eclectic manner. As such, these two sections provide readers with case studies against which one may assess the applicability and potentials of the theoretical approaches probed in the first section. Furthermore, with "Fiction" and "Film" focusing on narrative media, and with "film" limited here to fiction film, these two sections dovetail and echo one another despite the fact that the two media consitute radically different modes of representation (or "languages," or "signifying systems"). Instead of being torn asunder by such multiple undertakings, the volume is held together by a selection and organization of essays which end up constituting a whole made up of mutually elucidating parts.

As the inclusion of "Gender" in the title signals, this book's project is to elaborate a feminist orientation towards filmic and literary representations of gendered identities. Significantly, this orientation is not theoretical or critical in the sense of semiotics, psychoanalysis, deconstruction, New Historicism, or for that matter New Criticism. Feminism is a politics, and as such it gives direction to theories and practices of textual interpretation. The questions it raises concern the social use of textual production and reception. It fosters attention to ways texts help shape the collective ideological imaginary, to the position of texts within specific historic contexts, and to the meanings which emerge from texts as they are considered singly and in relation to one another. The essays assembled here respond to these questions by unmasking the inscription of gender in fiction and film. Using the tools made available through recent developments in theory and criticism, they stand as interventions in the political consequences of social ideology.

In part, such demystification invokes and expands European and American feminist work on literature and film as it has evolved over the last three decades. Published in 1996, this volume participates in a project which has been transforming the ways we understand art and cultural production—notably in terms of how cultural artifacts and social relations (political and

everyday stories of the people, in their daily conversations, those which are not written but told, retold, and above all, lived.

Finally, conclusions are left open to the readers' imagination, perhaps as an attempt to make them also feel the need to retell them, in order to make them tell stories of their own. Vikram Chandra is a real storyteller indeed, one who goes on giving us stories in an endless process that, hopefully, has just begun. Perhaps, as one of the characters in this collection, he is "silenced by stories that appear abruptly in his head" (*LLB* 183), stories that, written on paper, we are also able to listen to, somehow.

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Chantal Cornut-Gentille D'Arcy and José Angel García Landa, eds.,
Gender, I-deology:* *Essays on Theory, Fiction and Film.
Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1996. 465 p.

While collections of new critical writings are inevitably subject to editorial contingencies, their strength is that they can provide readers with varied constellations of fresh perspectives and complementary new departures. *Gender, I-deology: Essays on Theory, Fiction and Film* (Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1996) is such a volume. Edited by Chantal Cornut-Gentille D'Arcy and José Angel García Landa, it contains twenty-nine essays which offer readers a textured overview of the theoretical questions and textual analyses one can bring to bear on intersections of gender and ideology within literary and film studies. Organized in three roughly equal sections—"Theory," "Fiction," and "Film"—these essays at once cover diverse materials and yet come across as focused and dialogically reenforcing. Most were written by members of the Zaragoza university faculty, which may partly account for the volume's cohesion. But this sense of unity is also indebted to the editors' effort to guide

and organize their diverse contributions within a shared discourse that aims to elucidate a common subject matter.

While all three sections of *Gender, I-deology* are informed by recent developments in critical and gender theory, the essays included in the "Theory" section pursue them centrally, and in so doing provide a foundation for the subsequent "Fiction" and "Film" sections. "Theory" concerns the agendas, methodologies, and ideologies which have been informing contemporary debates about literary and filmic representations of gender, notably variants of poststructuralist and New Historical thinking. The "Fiction" and "Film" sections apply these and related theoretical strands to specific texts, and do so in a flexibly eclectic manner. As such, these two sections provide readers with case studies against which one may assess the applicability and potentials of the theoretical approaches probed in the first section. Furthermore, with "Fiction" and "Film" focusing on narrative media, and with "film" limited here to fiction film, these two sections dovetail and echo one another despite the fact that the two media consitute radically different modes of representation (or "languages," or "signifying systems"). Instead of being torn asunder by such multiple undertakings, the volume is held together by a selection and organization of essays which end up constituting a whole made up of mutually elucidating parts.

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In part, such demystification invokes and expands European and American feminist work on literature and film as it has evolved over the last three decades. Published in 1996, this volume participates in a project which has been transforming the ways we understand art and cultural production—notably in terms of how cultural artifacts and social relations (political and

economic as well as gendered) intersect in the production of ideology. While the "Theory" section of *Gender, I-deology* reviews and critiques the theoretical foundations of these developments, the "Fiction" and "Film" sections supplement past work with additional case studies that further document ways those same cultural artifacts which nourish social and political formations can also create ideological formations can also create ideological spaces for change. That this work is brough to bear on two of the most accessible media—media that blur the "high/low" culture divide and use verisimilitude (in plot, character, etc.) to promote identification and empathy—makes it all the more useful.

An additional strength of this particular anthology is the clarity and accessibility of its essays. While the volume is just about bursting at the seams with its 465 pages which contains a richness of essays, the essays are clear and mostly short. Even the theoretical ones are clear and concise in a genre of scholarship notorious for its obscurantism. The commitment here is clearly to readability—to familiarizing readers with difficult but nonetheless important debates which have been guiding feminist cultural work since the 1960s, and to providing us with models of approaching these debates through applied critical readings. This goal is further assisted by a comprehensive introduction which lays out the book's concerns in a systematic manner. As José Angel García Landa explains at the conclusion of this essay, at issue is ultimately the demystifying capabilities of literature, of feminist criticism and theory, and of cultural semiotics. In this volume, such demystification has a liminal function, for it helps expand readers' awareness of ways figurative discourse guides our understanding and action.

At the same time, the availability of appropriate materials is almost always a challenge for editors of such collections, and all the more so when the goal is to be comprehensive when what the field yields at a given point in time may not make that possible. As an American reviewer, I am struck by ways the scholarship published in this collection, including the helpful bibliographies appended to each essay, is at once inflected through a fresh European perspective I find very salutary, and yet is also insufficient in the space given to considerations of race, social class, and other kinds of social marginalization as inextricable from the social constitution of gender. While this volume's emphasis on semiotics in particular is stronger than one would find in representative American texts, attention to social marginalities is mostly tokenist. Ironically, this imbalance ends up essencializing gender in contradistinction to this volume's obvious effort to de-essentialize. Treating gender as universal—as mostly detached from its specific social, historic,

economic, and political inscriptions—the volume takes a step back from its goal of demystifying it as a factor within social relations.

This caveat aside, the issues raised in various essays are important. Among them, Pilar Hidalgo's laying out of the potentials and difficulties entangled in New Historical approaches is helpful in making explicit ways cultural artifacts and their reception are embedded in evolving material history and social formations. Furthermore, the inclusion of perspectives on masculinity (e.g. by JoAnne Neff van Aertselaer), cross-gender identification (Juan A. Suárez), androgyny (Ana Zamorano and Hilaria Loyo), and lesbian identity (in essays about Jeanette Winterson's fiction by María del Mar Asensio, Susana González and Susana Onega) reminds us that "gender" includes much more than a binary male-female organization of sexual and social identities and relations. Though none of these essays makes this argument explicitly, the thrust of this work is to suggest that "feminism" itself needs to be reassessed in relation to a more complex understanding of diverse gender constructions and their ideological function within social and political appropriation.

This point is evident most clearly in the "Film" section, where critical analysis rests on a bedrock of scholarship concerning ways the viewing relations films set up for their audience's gaze end up destabilizing the meaning of "gender." That essays in the "Fiction" section lean towards thematic criticism while those in the "Film" section lean towards an emphasis on spectatorship and reception is to be expected, considering that literary and film scholarship have followed somewhat divergent paths in this respect. Though the two media share a concern with narrative arts given to verisimilitude and reader identification, there are specific historic reasons why critical work in the two fields headed in different directions, including material differences between the two media as discourses, and the differing reception they therefore necessitate. Still, a comparative reading of the differences between the "Fiction" and "Film" sections of *Gender, I-deology* is illuminating precisely because highlights the different assumptions each critical tradition makes and the different questions each brings to bear on its texts. For beyond the usefulness of reading specific novels and films with an eye to gender, or ideolgoy, or for that matter any conceptual framework, the juxtaposition of the fiction and film criticism in this anthology helps us consider these two disciplines afresh.

This notion of seeing things afresh is addressed centrally in Beatriz Penas' discussion of "making strange" (*ostranienie*) as Julia Kristeva adapts it from Roman Jakobson in her work on desire and language. Key to here is the idea of taking the familiar and revisiting it from a perspective that renders

it unfamiliar, and so, capable of providing new kinds of understanding. This concept, so fundamental to modern and postmodern theories of art, reception, and social appropriations, is useful both as an approach to film and fiction and as a lens through which one may consider *Gender, I-deology* fruitfully. Though to date film scholarship on the operations of desire tended to be anchored in sight-based Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theories of reception (as initially elaborated by Christian Metz and Laura Mulvey), while word-based theories of reading have largely turned to linguistics, semiotics, and deconstruction (which are less concerned with desire, and certainly less with sight-based desire), an integrating reading of the essays gathered in this volume nudges us towards making both of these traditions "strange" and revisiting each with a mind open to re-assessing its capabilities.

LINDA DITTMAR
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Janet Holmes,
Women, Men and Politeness.
New York: Longman, 1995, 254 p.

Gender is a crucial factor to take into account when dealing with politeness phenomena. Holmes' book explains through nice examples and interesting experiments how gender differences may influence and affect linguistic politeness. She reviews studies and research on this topic by a great number of authors and she adds her own experiments and results obtained from speakers of New Zealand English (although one would expect the New Zealand evidence be dealt with in more detail, she fails to elaborate it thoroughly). The topic of research and the data used seem to be very well-connected since New Zealand culture has been described as a "gendered culture, . . . gender is the motif and preoccupation of New Zealand society, as class is in Britain" (*WMP* 27). This may be an advantage for her study or it might be a

drawback since it may lead to simplistic conclusions as I will comment on later.

Holmes bases her analyses and investigations on grounds defined in their essence by Brown and Levinson (1987). Concepts such as face (in its two modalities: positive and negative face), FTA (face-threatening act), positive and negative politeness, and the social variables influencing politeness have been treated in this book basically following Brown and Levinson's first drafts but adding some new touches. The main new stroke here is the addition of one social factor not included in Brown and Levinson's fine analysis of politeness: gender. This variable will give rise to two different politeness styles: a positively-orientated politeness identified in women's discourse and a rather negative politeness style in men's interaction.

The main idea from which the book starts is that women and men have different ways of talking and hence, of realizing and interpreting speech acts. In the first chapter ("Sex, politeness and language"), Holmes points out the feasible reason why this is so. Women and men use language in a different way because they have different perceptions of what language is for. Whereas men use language as a tool to give and obtain information (the referential function of language), women see language as a means of keeping in touch (the affective or social function). Holmes includes politeness, which is defined as "an expression of concern for the feelings of others" (*WMP* 4), within the affective or social function of language, and hence, the women being the ones who use language more in this way, women are more polite than men.

These two different perceptions and usages of language cause different norms of interaction, which is—as Holmes points several times—the most plausible reason why women and men interact differently. In other words, she explains in the second chapter that what is perceived as rude to the women may be perfectly polite to men and vice versa (*WMP* 53). Nevertheless, according to this, there is something that does not quite fit into the picture. On the one hand, there are different patterns of politeness due to gender differences, and the most plausible reason why this is so is that women and men have different perceptions of language. If perception of language implies what is polite or rude to both women and men, politeness is being regarded as a factor and as a consequence at the same time. In other words, politeness is being considered as a factor that contributes to the assessment of what is appropriate in each context by each gender—"politeness, or sensitivity to the needs of others, may be another contributing factor" (*WMP* 37)—and as the result of that assessment—"New Zealand women tend to be more polite than men" (*WMP* 70)—since she draws this conclusion after assessing the results

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of others' and her own experiments and data. So, it seems to be somewhat contradictory that the result of the assessment—the politeness of women and men—might be due to precisely different ways of evaluating interaction—evaluating what is polite and what is not. It might be that politeness is extralinguistically motivated and then, as Mey (1993) says there would be a metapragmatic level.

The idea presented in the first chapter pervades the whole book: women and men have different ways of interacting because women are more positively polite than men in talking cooperatively and supportively. This is developed throughout the book and supported by a wide range of linguistic evidence. In the second chapter, it is shown how male interviewers talked more than female interviewers whereas male interviewees talked less than female interviewees, who were more sensitive to their interviewer's needs. Moreover, men ask more response-restricting questions that focus on the content, while women ask more facilitative questions which function as supportive elicitations rather than as information seekers. Another piece of linguistic evidence is the fact that men interrupt more than women, who use a lot of back-channeling "to encourage others to continue talking and reflects concern for their positive face needs. . . . Back-channeling is typical of a good listener" (*WMP* 56-57).

In chapter 3, Holmes analyses the use that women and men make of some linguistic devices which serve to increase or reduce the force of an utterance. These are hedges, boosters, tag questions, and pragmatic particles such as "you know," "I think," "sort of," "of course." Their interpretation in verbal interaction will depend on their function in a specific context. All these linguistic means can be orientated either towards a referential, content-focused function or an interpersonal and affective function. Men tend to emphasise the former function while women prefer the latter.

The next two chapters—chapters 4 and 5—show how two different speech acts, compliments and apologies, can render useful insights about gender differences in politeness behaviour. On the one hand, compliments are paid, realized and received differently by women and men. Women in general pay and receive more compliments than men. Interpretation of compliments also varies depending on the person who receives it. Females tend to regard compliments as positive and affective politeness devices and hence they pay and receive more than men who tend to consider them not as positive as women. Males often see compliments as face-threatening or at least not as unambiguous in intentions as women do. The content of compliments is also another point of divergence. While men usually compliment on ability or performance, women compliment more on appearance. The reason seems

to be the subordinate status of women in society, which plays a relevant role in both the linguistically realization of speech acts and in the interpretation of them. On the other hand, apologies constitute another field to study how women and men differ in dealing with speech acts. Females apologise more than men do and for different reasons, and they also respond differently.

Finally, in the last chapter—chapter 6—Holmes explains why politeness matters by pointing to the implications of these differences in women's and men's politeness behaviour in two contexts: the educational and the professional world. All the linguistic devices seen in the previous chapters are now analysed in the classroom and at the office. Getting to know the different strategies women and men use and getting familiar with the different ways in which they interpret speech acts can help a lot in our private and public lives. Personal relationships between women and men could be improved if the different politeness patterns males and females use were known. A lot of misunderstanding could be avoided—Tannen (1990) explains this problem very well. In public spheres as well, public discussions and decision-making could benefit from knowing male and female types of discourse. Holmes adds that, apart from knowing all this, women's style of discourse should be applied to all these spheres since it is more supportive, cooperative, just more polite. This however should be analysed more carefully.

Thus, Holmes' conclusion is that in the same way as there seems to exist positive and negative politeness cultures (Brown and Levinson 1987; Sifianou 1989; Hickey and Vázquez Orta 1994) there are positive and negative politeness genders. Females express more appreciation towards the other in their discourse (positive politeness), whereas males show consideration and respect (negative politeness). According to Holmes, women are more polite using this type of politeness, that is, she equates politeness with positive politeness. Also, women are more affective and social, so politeness is enhanced in the affective or social function of language. These two assertions, however, should be pondered cautiously.

Firstly, saying that women use a more positively-orientated style of discourse and patterns of politeness, and therefore are more polite than men in general—of course Holmes says there are always exceptions—seems to be a very simplistic conclusion. Or it may just seem to be simplistic because data and results come from a very gendered-biased society, as was said above. Perhaps in other cultures and societies, the outcome would not be so clear-cut. In any case, positive politeness is just one side of politeness. Negative politeness is as important and as necessary. Some authors think one type of politeness is more important than the other. Leech considers positive politeness as "somewhat less important" than negative politeness (Leech 1983:

81). Yet, showing concern about the addressee's own territory and freedom of action (negative face) is as polite as showing interest, admiration or common grounds with her/him (positive face). So, the fact that women use positive politeness devices more than men do does not just mean that they are more polite. Secondly, it seems to be true that women are more affective and social than men. It is also true that politeness seems to be linked to the social function of language. But the latter statement does not have to derive from the former. In other words, the fact that women show more affection and consideration toward the other in verbal interaction does not mean that this is politeness; it might be something else.

Reading Holmes' book, one can have the feeling that women ("other-oriented") are the good "guys" and men ("self-orientated," almost, selfish) are the bad guys of the movie. There are some examples in which Holmes seems to be bringing facts to her own territory even when the evidence is not so much in her favour. One example of this can be found in chapter 5, when she is dealing with the different strategies women and men use to apologise. She presents the different strategies used to apologise by women and men. One of the paramount differences emphasised by her takes place within the broad mechanism of acknowledgement of responsibility (one of the three main devices to apologise). Within this, there are five strategies. Two of these: *accepting the blame* (e.g. "It is my fault") and *expressing self-deficiency* (e.g. "I was confused") are more used by men than women. Yet other two strategies, *recognising the other is entitled to an apology* (e.g. "You are right") and *expressing lack of intent* (e.g. "I didn't mean to") are just used by women—although in her data the figures are not very significant: just 2 women for the former strategy and 7 for the latter out of 214 females. Holmes says that this shows that "women tend to use strategies which focus on the harmony of their relationship with the other person. . . . Men, on the other hand, tend to use more strategies which focus on the relative status relationship with the other, accepting blame and expressing self-deficiency" (*WMP* 163). However, it can also be said that the strategies of recognising the other is entitled to an apology and expressing lack of intent focus on the relative status relationship with the other since there is really no difference between saying "You are right" or saying "It is my fault." It is just the perspective—the functional sentence perspective: theme/rheme—that changes, not the meaning. Similarly, the strategies of accepting blame and expressing self-deficiency can establish harmony in the relationship since one is acknowledging responsibility and hence trying to repair a damage.

In short, Holmes' analyses of female and male discourses are appropriate from a formal and functional perspective. Her assessments of female and male patterns of politeness are adequate as well. Yet her final conclusion about women using more positive politeness than men and hence being more polite than males, and her final advice about adopting women's style of discourse in all spheres in life should be taken very cautiously. Holmes sustains that women's style of discourse have all these features (*WMP* 222): being active listeners, giving support their addressees, disagreeing in a non-confrontational manner, asking facilitative questions, using pragmatic particles in their affective function, complementing and apologising frequently, etc. Yet if all these features were used by women and men, wouldn't verbal interaction be— apart from dull and boring—artificial? I do not really know why but I refuse to think all politeness is about can be reduced to that. I am not sure this is the authentic and real linguistic politeness. We might be mixing up deference —or even mere flattery—and politeness. And I like to think that politeness is something else, something deeper than mere sycophancy. Perhaps real politeness actually loses its spirit when it is linguistically realized. Perhaps authentic politeness is non-verbal. If this is so, we might as well do research on another topic and forget about linguistic politeness altogether. Or perhaps we should rather investigate why what we call "polite" acts, sentences or phrases often seem to be more insincere praise than real politeness.

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George P. Landow, ed.
Hyper/Text/Theory.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994. 381 p.

George P. Landow (Brown University) es uno de los pioneros del desarrollo de herramientas informáticas aplicadas a la enseñanza y teoría de la literatura. Quizá mejor que intentar resumir la variedad de proyectos en que ha trabajado remitiré a su página personal en Internet, donde se pueden encontrar conexiones a muchos, algunos de los cuales detallo (ver Referencias), además de las ediciones electrónicas de varios de sus libros sobre temas victorianos. La página de Landow es interesante porque desde hace tiempo ejemplifica lo que es muy posiblemente el futuro de la página personal académica en Internet, una vez se difunda esta modalidad de acceso y edición entre un colectivo en general tan refractario a la cibernética como es el de los literatos.

El libro que reseñamos aquí remite inevitablemente al anterior *Hypertext* de Landow, un texto crucial entre cuyas traducciones ya se cuentan la española y catalana, así como las versiones hipertextuales en disco y en Internet que reseñamos. Los estudios de Landow tienden a proliferar en versiones cibernéticas, explotando en la práctica el instrumento que teorizan; son pues una referencia de gran interés para quien se interesa por las implicaciones de la informática para la literatura y la teoría literaria. También del volumen que nos ocupa hay edición española (Barcelona: Paidós Ibérica, 1996); aunque en el área en rápido desarrollo que nos ocupa, originales, traducciones, *hardware* y reseñas se difunden ya desfasados por los avances técnológicos.

Podríamos definir la hipertextualidad como *intertextualidad cibernética:* una manifestación específicamente contemporánea de la intertextualidad, dado que la base material para esta modalidad intertextual se ha desarrollado sólo recientemente, especialmente en lo que toca a sus aplicaciones críticas y literarias (Nelson 1981, Delany y Landow 1991). Como herramienta informática la hipertextualidad ya tiene la venerable antigüedad de unas tres décadas, y su prehistoria se remonta de hecho a los primeros años de la cibernética (Bush 1945).

En comparación con el optimismo y el tono profético de *Hypertext,* los artículos de este volumen suenan menos ambiciosos, y la confrontación de la teoría hipertextual con distintas áreas de la teoría literaria problematiza muchos de los aspectos supuestamente revolucionarios de la hipertextualidad. A la vez, se ve más claramente que la problemática de la hipertextualidad no es en última instancia radicalmente nueva: es la de la (inter)textualidad moderna

en general, con algunos condicionamientos genéricos y técnicos cuyo alcance preciso ayudan a determinar los artículos aquí publicados. Así, un estudio narratológico del concepto supuestamente tan revolucionario de "no linearidad" relativiza bastante su novedad y alcance. Un análisis de los elementos "liberadores" y "democráticos" del hipertexto a la luz de la teoría de la acción comunicativa de Habermas (escrito por Charles Ess) mantiene un tono optimista pero recuerda que la libertad comunicativa no es inherente en última instancia al medio sino al contexto social de su utilización (*HTT* 252). Análisis de las nociones de clausura narrativa o lógica tal como funcionan en el hipertexto encuentran paralelismos en formas literarias vanguardistas (Pynchon es una referencia favorita aquí, aunque Beckett o Robbe-Grillet quizá sean más adecuados); también filosofías como las de Nietzsche o Wittgenstein—a la vez que insisten en la necesidad de mantener en el acto de lectura o interpretación hipertextual una coherencia narrativa o lógica que no se disuelva en la galaxia infinita de conexiones. Uno de los aspectos más interesantes del volumen es el contemplar la relevancia que sigue teniendo la reflexión crítica (post)estructuralista en un área que podría parecer tan revolucionaria: Barthes, Genette, Eco, Freud, Lacan o Deleuze y Guattari son aquí referencias tan constantes como los son teorizadores de la informática propiamente dichos (como por ej. Michael Heim, Theodor H. Nelson, J. David Bolter o el propio Landow). La confrontación con un material tan candente suele resultar tan beneficiosa para la teoría como para el objeto de estudio; en este sentido este libro y esta área de reflexión son fascinantes e imprescindibles. Se encontrarán aquí artículos que ofrecen nuevas perspectivas en la teoría de la lectura y la actividad del papel del lector, anunciándose por ejemplo la llegada del "wreader" ("escrilector?") hipertextual que combina efectivamente los papeles de autor y de lector. Hay artículos magistrales en su uso de la interdisciplinariedad, y que merecen de por sí el conjunto del volumen. Martin E. Rosenberg ("Physics and Hypertext: Liberation and Complicity in Art and Pedagogy") explica los paralelismos entre distintas teorías del (hiper)texto por un lado y los paradigmas físicos de la dinámica y la termodinámica por otro, sobre la base de sus concepciones del tiempo reversibles o irreversibles (una reflexión fundamentada sobre conceptos de Bergson y Prigogine). Interés comparable en su propia línea tienen los ensayos de Stuart Moulthrop ("Rhizome and Resistance: Hypertext and the Dreams of a New Culture"), de J. Yellowlees Douglas (sobre la problemática de la clausura) o de Gunnar Liestøl, quien confronta los conceptos de la teoría hipertextual con la retórica clásica y la narratología. Otros trabajos hay que aun siendo de indudable interés adolecen de oscuridad y complicación innecesarias, como el de Terence Harpold (una

reflexión lacaniana sobre la actuación hipertextual), o de una curiosa irrelevancia para los propósitos de este volumen, como el de Gregory Ulmer. Se hubieran agradecido índices de nombres y materias (la sección más "hipertextual" de un volumen impreso falta aquí, aunque sí hay notas abundantes y muchas referencias bibliográficas de utilidad).

En casi todos los ensayos hay una concentración demasiado exclusiva en sistemas hipertextuales "delimitados" y contenidos en sí mismos, como son los archivos Hypercard, la novela de Michael Joyce *Afternoon,* elaborada con el programa hipertextual Storyspace, o las bases de datos de Landow. Aunque su interés es innnegable, estos textos ofrecen quizá una versión limitada de las posibilidades del hipertexto. Lo que podríamos llamar al actuación hipertextual por definición tenderá a ir más allá de los límites de *Afternoon* u otro texto, y expandir la red hipertextual en el sentido de una intertextualidad más generalizada. Internet es, por supuesto, el hipertexto por excelencia, y se echa en falta en este volumen una teorización de las modalidades hipertextuales en red y de los programas de búsqueda (*web browsers*), entre los que destacan actualmente el Navigator de Netscape y el polémico Explorer de Microsoft.[1] Las capacidades técnicas de las herramientas actualmente en pleno desarrollo serán un condicionante importante de las formas que asuma la hipertextualidad en los estudios literarios como en otros campos (un efecto saludable de la hipertextualidad será favorecer la interdisciplinariedad). Como algunas posibilidades de desarrollo interesantes, mencionemos los buscadores "inteligentes" o personalizados que seleccionan la información preferida por el usuario a lo largo de las diversas sesiones, o bien sistemas de transformación automatizada de texto electrónico en hipertexo mediante el establecimiento sistemático de conexiones e información en el marco de un servidor, de un conjunto de servidores seleccionados o en el conjunto de la red, mediante sistemas estadísticos más o menos personalizados. El Word 97 de Microsoft, por ejemplo, ya incluye la posibilidad de editar un documento como hipertexto, y el Netscape Communicator está equipado para permitir al usuario medio la edición de páginas HTML.

A pesar de los límites inherentes al concepto de hipertexto manejado en el volumen, su lectura es muy recomendable a todas las personas interesadas en la interfaz entre teoría literaria y cibernética, un área que casi por definición tiende invariablemente a estar infradesarrollada. En este sentido, y aunque no se pueda estar de acuerdo con todas las concepciones o valoraciones

1 Para uno de los últimos episodios en la batalla por el espacio informático puede verse Levy 1997. Aunque todo pronóstico en este terreno pronto resulta patético, parece realista viendo las actuales cotas de mercado (Netscape 54,6%, Microsoft Explorer 29,5%) que serán las compañías mayoritarias quienes determinen mediante el desarrollo de los programas más usados cuáles serán las posibilidades hipertextuales que se generalicen.

sobre la hipertextualidad aquí expuestas (que ya son de por sí divergentes), las reflexiones y trabajos de Landow y sus colegas tienen una importancia histórica.

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* La fecha de consulta de todas las referencias en Internet es el 10-2-97.

Stan Smith,
W.H. Auden
(Writers and Their Work).
Plymouth: Northcote House in Association with the British Council, 1997. xiii + 107 pp.

This new title of the series *Writers and Their Work* aims to introduce W. H. Auden and his context to a wide academic reading public. The book takes into consideration some interesting biographical material, and includes a detailed list of biographical, bibliographical and critical studies on the poet. Furthermore, it offers a concise, thorough, and distinctly personal reappraisal of Auden's major literary production, while making constant references to his main literary and ideological influences—the Icelandic sagas, Old English poetry, the Bible, Shakesperare, T. S. Eliot, W. B. Yeats, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud and Bertolt Brecht, to mention but some of the most relevant—and brings to the fore the influence he exerted upon other important literary intellectuals such as Christopher Isherwood, with whom he wrote plays in collaboration, and his three colleagues at Christ Church (Oxford), who eventually came to be labelled as the "Auden group": C. Day Lewis (named Poet Laureate in 1968), Louis MacNeice and Stephen Spender, who printed by hand the first collection of Auden's poems in 1928.

Stan Smith's book strives, on the whole, to offer a chronological scrutiny of Auden's literary and personal evolution. Accordingly, Smith divides the outline of his literary life of Auden into five chronological phases, respectively entitled "We are Lived by Powers," "On the Frontier," "Truth is Elsewhere," "The Inconstant Ones" and "Going Home," which are in turn subdivided into smaller sections, whose headings have the merit of highlighting the most important aspects or circumstances of the particular period under analysis. However, and in spite of Smith's efforts to stick to a strict chronological criterion, his strong familiarity with the poet's works occasionally makes him move backwards and forwards, which, no doubt, allows him to establish illuminating associations and relate apparently different or disconnected aspects of Auden's production. Yet, what may be of great interest for readers who are already familiarized with Auden's writings might conversely contribute to puzzling newcomers to his work, who might at times find it difficult to make sense of these connections.

Finally, although the book may at first sight seem a merely introductory study, this is not quite so. Smith's awareness of modern critical approaches, together with his extensive knowledge of Auden's work, leads him to corroborate his continuous assessments of the literary, social, and cultural climate in which Auden lived and wrote by quoting at ease from most of his poems, thus assuming that the reader is minimally acquainted with the poet's life and writings. Yet, however difficult it may sometimes be for newcomers to Auden's work to follow, they will nonetheless easily manage to understand the reasons why he has been, and still is, regarded as a crucial and controversial twentieth-century critic, man of letters and poet. Not only was he politically committed—he tried to interpret the times and deal with intellectual and moral problems of public concern—but also succeeded in expressing his own inner world of fantasy and dream. As can be deduced after reading Smith's book, although Auden's poems, when taken individually, are often obscure, they create, when taken together, a meaningful poetic unity crammed with symbolic landscapes and mythical characters and situations, which undoubtedly manage to encapsulate and illustrate the worries and meditations of a left-wing writer and thinker whose lifetime was as intense as to span two world wars, the Russian and Chinese revolutions, the rise and fall of fascism, and three decades of cold war.

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VV.AA.
Colección **"Taller de Estudios Norteamericanos".**
Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de León, 1992-

Esta singular colección de textos norteamericanos merece ser destacada, entre otras muchas cosas, porque su interés primordial reside en presentar textos que han podido caer en el olvido de editoriales comerciales por su falta de ganancia económica a corto plazo. Se pretende sacar textos claves, algunos antiguos, no confundir con anticuados, textos con aspectos que a veces sorprenden por su actualidad.

Se presentan textos en edición bilingüe, cosa rara de encontrar en el mercado de hoy en día, ya que compromete de manera especial a los traductores: no pueden saltarse ni una sola coma, ni traducir según les convenga o parezca, ya que el texto original está impreso al lado de su traducción. Por todo el mundo es sabido que existen muchas formas de traducir correctamente un mismo texto, y esto precisamente hace a esta colección interesante para estudiantes, o aficionados a la traducción, pudiendo de esta manera ejercitar y practicar este difícil arte. Otra ventaja de la presentación de la obra en edición bilingüe es la de que se pueden acercar textos a quienes no saben o no dominan la lengua inglesa, teniendo así la colección un carácter interdisciplinar tanto a nivel universitario como de secundaria.

La colección, que empezó a publicarse en 1992, consta de cuatro secciones reflejadas en cuatro diferentes colores: azul, rosa, verde y salmón, que corresponden a su carácter literario, histórico, socio-político, y textos misceláneos respectivamente.

Dentro del grupo azul, es decir, dentro del grupo literario de textos publicados encontramos a Whitman: *Una mirada retrospectiva a los caminos recorridos*; Sinclair Lewis: *El miedo americano a la literatura*; Henry James: *El arte de la ficción*; Philip Rahv: *Rostro pálido y piel roja* y Michael A. Rockland: *Redescubriendo América*; Melville: *Bartleby, el escribiente*; Dean Howells: *La crítica y la ficción*; Charlotte Perkins Gilman: *El empapelado amarillo. La wisteria gigante*; Maxwell Anderson: *Textos sobre el teatro norteamericano I*; O'Neill y Thornton Wilder: *Textos sobre el teatro norteamericano II*; Raymond Chandler: *El simple arte de matar* y Henry Adams:*La dinamo y la virgen*. Textos acompañados por introducciones de Derrick, Lopéz Gavilán, González de la Aleja, Rodríguez Celada, Rosado Castillo, González Groba, Díaz Sánchez, y Coy Ferrer.

En el grupo de textos históricos podemos encontrar textos como *La declaración de la independencia* y *La declaración de Seneca Falls*; William Bradford: *De la plantación de Plymouth (una selección)*; Varios Presidentes: *Discursos inaugurales*; Margaret Fuller: *El gran proceso judicial*; o Sui Sin Far: *Páginas del archivo mental de una euro-asiática*. Estos textos vienen con introducciones realizadas por Hernández Sánchez-Barba, Beltrán Llavador, Fernández Rabadán, Muñoz-Torrero, Baena y G. Davis.

Dentro del grupo de textos socio-políticos están: Lincoln Steffens: *La vergüenza de las ciudades*; Olaudah Equiano: *Autobiografía, (Selección)*; Zora Neale Hurston: *¡Mi gente! ¡Mi gente!*; Thomas Nelson Page: *Los sureños durante la reconstrucción*; W. E. B. Du Bois: *Las almas del pueblo negro*; George Washington Cable: *El sur silencioso*; Gerald Vizenor: *Literatura india nativo americana*; y Jarana Lee: *La vida y experiencia religiosa de Jarana Lee*. Con introducciones que corren a cargo de Rodríguez Celada, Polo Benito, Manuel Cuenca, Benito Sánchez, Manzanas, Fraile Marcos y Sabán Godoy.

El último bloque, o grupo, corresponde a los textos misceláneos: Emerson: *El intelectual americano*; *Discurso a la Facultad de Teología*; Nathaniel Hawthorne: *Prefacios*; John Kouwenhoven: *Qué tiene América de 'Americano'*; Thoreau: *Una vida sin principios*. Van introducidos por Derrick, Lopéz Gavilán, Montes Mozo, Rockland, Coy Ferrer.

También están en preparación entre muchos interesantísimos títulos: Robert Brustein:*Si un artísta quiere ser rico, famoso y popular, y la vez serio y respetado, sufre de esquizofrenia cultural*; William Kennedy: *Una entrevista*; M. L. King: *Sermones y discursos*; L. Hughes: *Oscuridad en España*; John Smith: *Historia general de Virginia*; Sacco y Vanzetti: *Discurso final*; Booker T. Washington: *Ascenso desde la esclavitud*; Harriet Jacobs: *Incidentes en la vida de una esclava*; o Mrs Mary Rowlandson: *Narración del cautiverio indio*.

Se intenta englobar bajo la etiqueta, tan general y al tiempo específica como es la de "American Studies", (sin excluir a Canada), las raíces ocultas de lo contemporáneo en la historia del pensamiento social, cultural, literario o político de norteamerica. Cada obra tiene una introducción y notas realizadas por un especialista, poniendo la obra en su contexto con matices políticos, sociológicos, económicos, ideológicos, literarios, etc. Pero el traductor o el introductor no es lo esencial de esta Colección, no existe la intención de vender ningún ejemplar por él o ellos, lo que aquí tiene importancia primaria es el texto, que luego ha sido traducido e introducido como ayuda para el lector. Como prueba de ello no aparece en portada ni el nombre del introductor ni del traductor; para averiguarlo hay que adentrarse en las primeras páginas del libro. No hay que olvidar que el crítico no ofrece más que una

opinión más a la lectura de un determinado texto, es una herramienta más que podemos utilizar si nos convencen sus argumentos. Así estos textos pueden provocar interesantes debates, polémicas, y discrepancias, que demasiadas veces brillan por su ausencia en las aulas.

Resumiendo, es una colección interesante por su variado contenido, por su aparición en edición bilingüe, y por qué engañarnos, por su precio, ya que hoy en día, y más para los estudiantes, puede resultar un lujo el comprarse un libro. La colección del "Taller de Estudios Norteamericanos" es de algún modo utópica al no seguir recomendaciones económicas, ideológicas o de ningún otro tipo a la hora de seleccionar los textos que van a ser publicados. El único criterio seguido es de su importancia en la cultura norteamericana, y por ello son interesantes para cualquiera que quiera acercarse a esta cultura.

ELVIRA JENSEN CASADO
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Alice Thompson
Justine
Edinburgh: Virago Press, 1997. 137 p.

In 1996 Alice Thompson became the first female Scottish writer to win the James Tait Black Memorial Prize for Fiction with her first novel, *Justine*. In 1991, when she was a student at Oxford University, *Killing Times*, a novella, was published by Penguin. After completing her PhD on Henry James, she moved to the Shetland Isles where she wrote *Justine*. Nowadays, she is a novelist in residence for St. Andrew's University.

Justine investigates the world in which fiction works, a fiction which needs the help of the reader to interpret its full meaning—and which also needs the reader to open the uncut pages of the novel with the paper knife supplied with it; a fiction printed with gaps and spaces (blank pages, ellipses, flashbacks and -forwards) in an attempt to create a written account of the narrator's unconscious mind.

In this new way of writing "what to express" and "how to express it" are blended in the same framework. Alice Thompson approaches closer and

closer the way in which the human mind works, trying to find a new way of expression for the psychological novel. This new way is as hermetic as the human mind can be to us, and as elliptical as the human mind is. The novel is therefore an attempt to create a unified meaning which can no longer be achieved within its fiction, because only the reader can supply the ultimate meaning: "That's for you to find out" (*J* 136). And though her narrative style is very descriptive and profusely decorated with over-adorned gothic adjectives, the whole story goes round a certain unknown truth one is never able to discover, round the unknown which is hidden in the darkness of one's mind. Therefore, to a certain extent, the reader is caught in "the black art of manipulation and the casting of spell" (*J* 1), in the manipulation of the author's prose, in the dichotomy of the prose which allows readers to know everything and the prose which makes them ignore the main facts:

> The style in which my flat [novel] is decorated gives everything away about me. A gift to you which includes the fact that there is something about me that will never be given away. (*J* 1)

Justine is a dream, a two-faced woman, a painting, but above all an object of desire, especially a projection of male desire. *Justine* is the story of a man in a continuous search for Beauty, both spiritual and physical, pleasant and hurtful, not ethereal but sexual, a beauty which transgresses every aesthetic theory because of its masochism.

It is in his continuous search for Beauty, in his role of collector, that he creates his own hallucinations. This collector must be collected or possessed by someone else; he is a man who wants to possess the last object of his desires: Justine or Juliette? Or both?

For Justine pretends to have a twin sister, Juliette, and step by step, as the story begins, the opium-dazed narrator becomes more and more insecure, not only about the identity of the woman he is chasing (Justine or Juliette), but about his own feelings and desires. Besides his life in London, he lives his "Midsummer Night's Dream," as the prologue to the novel reads:

> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping fantasies, that apprenhend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends (*A Midsummer Night's Dream*, V.1.4-6)

Everything is a dream, a fantasy created by a madman or a lover whose self has dissolved and merged into new characters, in the Gothic house he is living, a decadent scene in which characters and events are exaggerated beyond

opinión más a la lectura de un determinado texto, es una herramienta más que podemos utilizar si nos convencen sus argumentos. Así estos textos pueden provocar interesantes debates, polémicas, y discrepancias, que demasiadas veces brillan por su ausencia en las aulas.

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Justine investigates the world in which fiction works, a fiction which needs the help of the reader to interpret its full meaning—and which also needs the reader to open the uncut pages of the novel with the paper knife supplied with it; a fiction printed with gaps and spaces (blank pages, ellipses, flashbacks and -forwards) in an attempt to create a written account of the narrator's unconscious mind.

In this new way of writing "what to express" and "how to express it" are blended in the same framework. Alice Thompson approaches closer and

closer the way in which the human mind works, trying to find a new way of expression for the psychological novel. This new way is as hermetic as the human mind can be to us, and as elliptical as the human mind is. The novel is therefore an attempt to create a unified meaning which can no longer be achieved within its fiction, because only the reader can supply the ultimate meaning: "That's for you to find out" (*J* 136). And though her narrative style is very descriptive and profusely decorated with over-adorned gothic adjectives, the whole story goes round a certain unknown truth one is never able to discover, round the unknown which is hidden in the darkness of one's mind. Therefore, to a certain extent, the reader is caught in "the black art of manipulation and the casting of spell" (*J* 1), in the manipulation of the author's prose, in the dichotomy of the prose which allows readers to know everything and the prose which makes them ignore the main facts:

> The style in which my flat [novel] is decorated gives everything away about me. A gift to you which includes the fact that there is something about me that will never be given away. (*J* 1)

Justine is a dream, a two-faced woman, a painting, but above all an object of desire, especially a projection of male desire. *Justine* is the story of a man in a continuous search for Beauty, both spiritual and physical, pleasant and hurtful, not ethereal but sexual, a beauty which transgresses every aesthetic theory because of its masochism.

It is in his continuous search for Beauty, in his role of collector, that he creates his own hallucinations. This collector must be collected or possessed by someone else; he is a man who wants to possess the last object of his desires: Justine or Juliette? Or both?

For Justine pretends to have a twin sister, Juliette, and step by step, as the story begins, the opium-dazed narrator becomes more and more insecure, not only about the identity of the woman he is chasing (Justine or Juliette), but about his own feelings and desires. Besides his life in London, he lives his "Midsummer Night's Dream," as the prologue to the novel reads:

> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping fantasies, that apprenhend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends (*A Midsummer Night's Dream*, V.1.4-6)

Everything is a dream, a fantasy created by a madman or a lover whose self has dissolved and merged into new characters, in the Gothic house he is living, a decadent scene in which characters and events are exaggerated beyond

reality to become symbols, monsters, ideas and passions. As J. E. Fleenor remarks, "Monsters are particularly prominent in the work of women writers, because for women the roles of rebel, outcast, seeker of truth, are monstrous in themselves" (Fleenor 1983: 83). The monster here is the misshapen narrator who explores the obsessive emotions, forbidden by society, arising from pain, masochism and murder, once the traditional roles of victim and abuser have been turned completely upside-down. According to Fleenor,

> [n]ew writers are changing the female Gothic symbols of victimhood and persecution into new sources of strength. Undergoing journeys that lead to a personal integration, their heroines rejoice in the exploration of their full human potential, and transform social stigma into power. (1983: 83)

This is what happens in *Justine*. The narrator believes that everything is under his control, that the story belongs entirely to him. He is the owner, a collector of characters: he would want to take them home, touch them, lock them up, take them out, look at them, stroke them whenever he wishes, as if they were objects of art. But he must come to grips with reality to find that he is another character who must fulfil his author's will, Justine's will. He painfully discovers that he cannot behave as a human feeling because his story has been written by the woman whom he dreamed to possess: "My plot had been rewritten by her and I didn't like it one bit" (*J* 39). His plot has been written by Justine and Juliette, by the projections of his masculine fantasies, the fantasies of a man who wants to live in a masochistic relation to his mother.[1] For that purpose, the figure of the son (the narrator) must be stripped of all virility (of his deformed foot) to be "reborn as a new sexless figure" (Silverman 1992: 73) out of the castle, out of the uterus-room in which he was enclosed. Otherwise, the figured mother could not be invested with the phallus.

From the very beginning, the narrator is associated with his mother in sexual and masochistic terms. His mother is fully conscious of her beauty and her sexuality:

> My mother worshipped at her mirror's shrine; she adored beauty and her own was no exception. She would gaze at herself for hours and I would catch her gazing. Idolaters came from all over the country to pay her tribute. They came in the form of men. (*J* 5)

[1] As Kaja Silverman points out, "Masochism is entirely an affair between son and mother, or to be more precise, between the male masochist and a cold, maternal and severe woman whom he designates as the oral mother" (1992: 73). There is no need for her to be the biological mother, she may be another woman performing that role.

But she refuses to touch his deformity and his body. She fully enjoys her sexuality, whereas he is punished for his deformity and is sexually separated from his mother. His mother is so active and phallic that she will turn into a destructive woman when she becomes unable to attract men. She will destroy anything she is unable to achieve, and a symbolic way to do that is to cut off every prominent body part, as she does by mutilating all the statues, one by one, with surgical precision: legs, teeth, hands and ears—everything that protrudes is cut off:

> The activiy of these [castrating] women constists in castration. Heads, noses, feet, anything that protrudes is cut off by them. (Theiveleit 1996: 65)

In spite of being such a strong woman, she is never named, but is called only "mother"; a mother shown to be protective, but also an iron mother who can administer torture slowly and gruesomely. The narrator is only attracted to Justine and Juliette because of their resemblance to his mother, although the incest taboo makes such feeling towards his mother painful and impossible. Hence, the only way to have sexual relationships is with women who do not resemble the mother, and degrading the love object. If Justine and Juliette had not been degraded they would still resemble the mother, and would not be acceptable as sexual partners.

The narrator often remembers being a child, and being bathed by his mother, though she refuses to touch his deformed foot, the result of a foreshortened leg. And she even turns her head. But as time goes by, and his mother is getting old, another woman has to fulfil her mother's role as a sadistic mother. This new unpredictable woman is a red-haired woman, who is even more aggressive and castrating, because she is a whore. She is able to do what his mother did not dare: to cut his foot off, removing his deformity, leaving him physically immaculated. She is the woman who transforms all his masochistic obsessions (punishment, castration, whippings, sadism and masochism) into literal truth. And, although what he desires is to be tortured, to be raped, a kind of struggle takes place in his unconscious, because on the one hand, he wants to be sexually possesed, but on the other hand, he is repelled by this woman, because of her repugnant temptations, for being too much of a woman for him.

All his relations are defined by the sexual element he is able to establish with the different feminine characters. This relation is not based on love, un-

less it is at the same time redefined or used ironically, but on pain and sufferings. And though Justine is not a sensual woman, what really makes her so powerful and so attractive is her obssesion with power, politics and possesions. She is a character who celebrates women's sexuality as well as the pleasure of the female body. She does not hesitate in trapping the narrator in a circle of impossibilities in which his reality and personality dissappear when he is not able to understand what is going on.

> Who are you? I asked, suddenly realizing that this was the point to everything, everything has gone through, the point to the story of Justine (*J* 136).

This is the very end of the novel, when the narrrator is fully-conscious of his impossibilities as a character, as a narrator and as the owner of the story. He has been deceived by a two-faced woman, a woman who pretended to be Justine and Juliette, by the beautiful object that he had been eager to possess, and about which we do not know anything else. At the very end of the novel she still remains a mystery, because we discover that she is neither Justine nor Juliette, but a mixture of both, a character living somewhere between Justine and Juliette, between the needy virgin and the powerful whore. She is the only character who is able to cross the frontier between reality and fiction whenever she pleases, being the only true writer of her own story and destiny, whereas the narrator is only used as a ghost-writer, as the slave that has to write for her. Thus the novel finishes in the place where it starts: in the library where the narrator is writing for us the story of Justine. And the only conclusion that the narrator as well as the reader can reach is that reality, all that has been written, is the product of imagination, because there is no single true view of any of the events depicted.

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ABSTRACTS

FRENCH FEMINISTS AND ANGLO-IRISH MODERNISTS: CIXOUS, KRISTEVA, BECKETT AND JOYCE

Jennifer Birkett

This essay discusses the importance ascribed to the work of Samuel Beckett and James Joyce by two major French feminists: the philosopher and psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva and the creative writer and philosopher Hélène Cixous. An introductory section gives a short account of the controversy in English feminist academia over the importance attributed to the founding fathers of modernism, which does not appear to have arisen in the French feminist tradition. In Joyce and Beckett, Cixous and Kristeva have acknowledged imaginative models that developed their understanding of the socio-political structures that operate through the family and through language, through deep processes of repression, to construct individual subjects, male or female. These writers helped shape their perception of the extent to which the Law of the Father is the organising structure of society and its language. And most of all, they have stimulated reflection on the possibility of a language in which to think and talk differently about such things, with the intention of changing them: a language that might subvert patriarchal discourse.

FE DE ERRATAS

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P. 244. Reseña de *Narratology* (ed. Susana Onega y José Angel García Landa). Londres: Longman, 1996. Por error no apareció tras la reseña el nombre de su autora, María Jesús Martínez, de la Universidad de Zaragoza.

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