

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

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Los originales, escritos en inglés o español, se presentarán por duplicado en hojas tamaño DIN A-4. Estarán mecanografiados a doble espacio por una sola cara y no podrán superar las 25 páginas, incluyendo referencias bibliográficas, esquemas, etc.

En la primera página, en el borde superior izquierdo, figurará el nombre y la dirección del autor. A continuación, más abajo, el título en mayúsculas del artículo y, mediando el suficiente espacio, el texto ya del trabajo. Las páginas irán numeradas consecutivamente en el ángulo superior derecho. Las notas asimismo se numerarán consecutivamente y aparecerán al final del artículo pero antes de la sección de «Referencias Bibliográficas («References»). En cuanto a puntuación, disposición de las citas, subrayados, entrecomillados, etc., los trabajos deberán adaptarse a las normas de presentación de la *MLA Style Sheet*. No obstante, las referencias bibliográficas deberán atenerse a los siguientes puntos:

a) *En el texto y en la sección de Notas (Notes):* Se citará el nombre del autor y, a continuación, el año de publicación y el número de la/s página/s. Por ejemplo:

> It has often been questioned (Adams 1981a: 87-88) whether...
> Hymes distinguishes the following speech functions (1968: 17)...

b) *En la sección final de Referencias Bibliográficas (References):* Esta sección, ordenada alfabéticamente y a doble espacio, se presentará de manera similar a la de los siguientes ejemplos:

Davies, D. J. and S. Isard. 1972. «Utterances as programs». In D. Michie and M. Meltzer, eds., *Machine Intelligence* 7: 57-94. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Fishman, Joshua, ed. 1968. *Readings on the sociology of language*. The Hague: Mouton.

Hymes, Dell. 1968. «The ethnography of speaking». In: Fishman, ed. (1968: 117-21).

Schutz, Alfred. 1953. «Common-sense and scientific interpretation of human action». In: *Texas Review* 14: 13-18.

Winograd, Terry. 1972. *Undertaking natural laguage*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh

Winograd, Terry. 1972. *Undertaking natural language*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

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TRADUCCION TECNICA: ELEMENTOS DISCURSIVOS Y TERMINOLOGIA.

Mª Isabel GONZALEZ PUEYO

INTRODUCCION

Ortega y Gasset [1946:105] definía el lenguaje técnico como la "forma extrema de lenguaje en que la palabra expresa un máximo de idea y un mínimo de emoción", hallándose en ese aspecto, en oposición al lenguaje poético. En efecto, el discurso científico-técnico es más transparente, conciso y directo que el discurso poético, puesto que ofrece una relación más inmediata entre significante y significado, siendo su traducción más fácil, en cuanto a elementos discursivos se refiere. Sin embargo, la traducción de los términos, o unidades discursivas más amplias, como los segmentos nominales, ofrece mayor dificultad. El traductor deberá conocer la realidad designada por el término y el campo semántico en que se integra -la terminología- para su descodificación en L1 y su posterior codificación en L2. Si en la lengua de llegada no existe

un término adecuado, deberá buscar otras características o funciones de la realidad designada por el término en L1, para su posterior codificación en L2. Es pues necesario que el traductor de textos técnicos sea además de un conocedor del lenguaje, un conocedor de la realidad que se traduce.

1.1- No se traducen los significados, es decir los contenidos de la lengua como tales, ni siquiera se traducen las palabras. Coseriu (1976) afirma que la traducción no atañe al plano de las lenguas, sino al plano de los textos. Sólo se traducen textos, y éstos no se elaboran únicamente con medios lingüísticos, sino también con la ayuda de medios extra- lingüísticos.

1.2- En traducción se trata de expresar un mismo contenido textual en lenguas diferentes. Ahora bien, puesto que el contenido de las lenguas (o idiomas) es distinto y el contenido en traducción debe ser el mismo, este contenido no puede ser idiomático, sino sólo inter o supra-idiomático. [Coseriu, 1982: 219]

1.3- Esta es precisamente la finalidad del discurso técnico: permitir la conceptualización y la manipulación de lo extra-lingüístico. Toda ciencia va más allá del lenguaje en dos sentidos esenciales: por un lado, se dirige a la realidad de las cosas mismas y también a otras realidades aún no conocidas en el lenguaje y que éste debe crear o delimitar, y por otro lado conforma y determina una forma especial de lenguaje, que es el lenguaje técnico, el cual, en rigor, es nomenclatura o terminología o manifestación de una ciencia. (Coseriu, 1976: 19).

Características del discurso técnico.

2.1- El discurso técnico se caracteriza por presentar una relación más inmediata entre el significante y el significado, siendo por tanto el tipo de discurso más transparente; en el extremo opuesto se hallaría el texto poético, en el que la relación entre

ambos, significante-significado, se ve mediatizada por el lenguaje, no sólo en virtud de su función designativa, sino también por su función icástica, por el sonido, el ritmo, o sobre la base de homofonías, juegos de palabras, etc., tendiendo por tanto a una opacidad más pronunciada.

2.2- Esta dualidad opacidad-transparencia tiene incidencias considerables en traducción. La traducción desde este punto de vista, no está sujeta a las mismas imposiciones y restricciones que los otros tipos de traducción, sobre todo en lo que concierne a la conservación en el texto de llegada, de las estructuras perifrásticas y discursivas del texto de origen, lo cual supone, para el traductor de textos técnicos, una libertad bastante considerable respecto al texto de origen, en cuanto a entidad discursiva se refiere.

Así, por ejemplo, el texto:

"For this purpose a powerful draught of air is blown over the fire. The steam which is evolved is passed through a super-heater, which raises its temperature and makes it as dry as possible." (de A. Herbert "The Structure of Technical English" 1965: 38).

La última frase puede también expresarse por "The steam is superheated so that (or in order that) it should (or can or may etc.) be fairly dry".

En español, por ejemplo, podríamos decir:

"El vapor desprendido pasa por un calentador el cual eleva su temperatura y lo seca cuanto sea posible".

O bien:

"El vapor desprendido se introduce en un cambiador de calor con el fin de elevar su temperatura y desecarlo al máximo".

2.3- Ambas versiones son válidas en la medida en que dan una descripción correcta y compatible con el punto de vista del texto original, ofreciendo al traductor la posibilidad de elección al pasar de L1 a L2. La traducción poética, por el contrario, deberá

sacrificar los contenidos referenciales inmediatos para poder mantener las estructuras semióticas.

2.4- El traductor de textos técnicos goza además de libertad para verbalizar no sólo el texto de origen, sino incluso los textos simbólicos no verbales, como gráficos, ecuaciones, etc. que suelen acompañar a los textos técnicos y con los cuales se encuentran en una relación de redundancia.

En un pasaje como:

"The line integral of a gradient from one point to another (say from point 1 to point 2) is the difference of the values of the function at the two points. Namely,

$$\int_1^2 D\, q'ds = q_2 - o_1$$

(Feyman, 1971:"lectures of Physics" pag.29)

En español:

"La integral de línea de un gradiente desde un punto hasta otro (digamos del punto 1 al punto 2) es la diferencia de los valores de la función en los dos puntos. "Es decir: hay una clara relación de redundancia entre el texto verbal y el no-verbal.

El término.

3.1- Esta relación de transparencia entre significante y significado se ve, sin embargo comprometida cuando se trata de la traducción de un término. ¿Es posible su traducción? Constantemente encontramos anglicismos en las traducciones de textos técnicos cuya consecuencia puede suponer un progresivo empobrecimiento de nuestro idioma.

3.2- La principal dificultad se halla en la comprensión del propio término, ya que éste se presenta a menudo como un aglutinante, por compresión, de un segmento discursivo; es por tanto parte integrante del texto, y como tal, debemos hacer las mismas consideraciones que hemos hecho respecto a las entidades discursivas del texto. Es decir, que en primer lugar, y principalmente, debemos fijarnos en la relación entre significante y significado.

3.3- El término, en cuanto tal, mantiene una relación estable entre significante y significado, gracias a la importancia de la función referencial. Es como un sucedáneo del significante, lo cual le permite una independencia notable dentro del contexto; así éste no influye en la formación o supresión de semas contextuales. El término, por tanto, se integra dentro del campo de la terminología, la cual, en definitiva, es nomenclatura. Tanto el término como el campo terminológico, en el cual se integra, no hacen más que copiar la realidad, siendo ésta su característica más importante. El término, efectivamente, nos indica las propiedades del significado-forma, función o composición del objeto o entidad referida, apartándose así de los universales lingüísticos que caracterizan al campo léxico. Ortega y Gasset definía los términos técnicos como "palabras cristalizadas, rígidas, de silueta expresiva tan inequívoca, que son ellas mismas como cosas". (Ortega y Gasset, 1946: 105).

3.4- Si observamos los diagramas de los apéndices I y II vemos que tanto los términos como su campo terminológico forman un conjunto, el cual copia la realidad y es explicativo por si mismo. Cada término se refiere a una pieza, un objeto; en conjunto describe la composición o el mecanismo de una máquina.

3.5- Evidentemente, esto trae como consecuencia que la creación en la lengua de llegada de términos homólogos para los ya existentes en la lengua de origen, debe pasar necesariamente por un conocimiento profundo de la realidad que se describe.

Traducción del término.

4.1- En tanto que signo, el término por otra parte se construye para recalcar ciertas características o rasgos del significante, es decir, que tiene un valor descriptivo, y se le puede considerar como unidad aglutinada de un segmento discursivo. Pero a veces describe sólo parte de las características del significante (forma, función o composición), y es necesario acudir a otras estructuras más profundas de significado para su comprensión y posterior codificación. Incluso el esquema más rudimentario de unidades complejas, como es el sintagma nominal, necesita explicitación de unidades más profundas de significado.

4.2- Por ejemplo, el término inglés -Propeller shaft- describe "a strong metal connected to the driven shaft". Esto sólo no basta para describir todo el significante, pues nos falta la función y para ello debemos acudir a una unidad más profunda de significado:

Propeller shaft: Transmits power from gear box to final drive (Mechanical Workbook: 45)

4.3- Todo esto nos indica hasta qué punto es importante que el traductor tenga un conocimiento profundo de los significantes que los términos técnicos describen, para poder interpretarlos correctamente y codificarlos posteriormente en la lengua de llegada.

4.4- La complejidad aumenta a medida que aumenta el segmento. Así: "An ocean going diesel -engined tug"- necesita de

una explicación: "a tug powered by diesel engines and designed for work on the ocean". ("Scientifically speaking": 103)

4.5- Estas unidades compuestas por aglutinación en inglés se traducen al español mediante conectores cuyo contenido referencial es prácticamente nulo (en general "de", pero también "en y para"). Hay algunos como "fuel level indicator" cuya traducción no ofrece dificultades, pero muchos no pueden ser interpretados o descodificados de una manera unívoca tan sólo a partir de las estructuras lingüísticas.

4.6- Para su descodificación en L1, y posterior codificación en L2, la traducción de tales términos debe pasar por un proceso de explicitación, es decir que la reconstrucción del conjunto de los sintagmas, tanto lingüísticos como referenciales, que contribuyen a la comprensión del significante. Así, el término "combustion chamber scavenging" ("Automotive Engineering": 40), necesita la siguiente reconstrucción de sintagmas:

"scavenging (of unburnt portion of fuel charge) (in) combustion chamber".

Igualmente el sintagma

"an uneconomic fuel comsumption"

deberá ser descompuesto en

"a consumption(of fuel)(that) is uneconomic".("Automotive Engineering": 29)

Y por ejemplo el sintagma

"Fail-safe electronics control diesel cars"

la descomposición será:

"some integrated electronic control (sysstems) /for/ (passengers) car diesel/ (which) (are) fail-safe"

para su comprensión y posterior traducción.

En el caso de "I-TEC- Diesel (Izuzu- Total Electronic Control Diesel)" la referencia es "a car which is controlled by a system completely electronic".

L.Trimble (1985) presenta este ejemplo como un record de longitud en los compuestos nominales:

"A split damper inertially coupled passive gravity gradient satellite attitude control system" (Trimble, 1985:134)

Su descomposición en distintos sintagmas se hace imprescindible para su comprensión. Así:

"A system /for/ controlling the attitude/ (of) a satellite / which/ operate with: a split damper/which is coupled (by) inertia and its gradient (is determined) /by allowing gravity to take control".

Todavía es preciso conocer otras características para poder pasar la información a L2, como por ejemplo, que "attitude" se refiere al grado de un ángulo desde la perpendicular; que "couple" tiene el sentido de "joined" (unido), y que "passive gravity" nos indica que no ofrece resistencia a la gravedad. El texto pertenece a la ingeniería naval.

4.7- La descomposición de estos sintagmas en unidades más pequeñas, nos indica que los compuestos nominales están integrados por:

- una oración preposicional
- un gerundio
- una oración de relativo
- una combinación de las tres

El siguiente ejemplo es una muestra de ello:

"a quiescent state fluid bed reactor" (idem)

"a reactor (containing) a fluid bed /which is/ (in a state) of quiescence".

O este otro:

"Minimum-cooled diesel endurance testing advances

("Automotive Engineering: 30")

cuya reconstrucción sería:

a (heavy duty) diesel (engine)/ which has survived 250 hours of testing/ a full rate power / with very little external cooling.

La traducción, por tanto, de un sintagma nominal a L2, deberá pasar necesariamente por un proceso de reconstrucción de las diversas unidades que lo integran.

4.8- A veces, al pasar un término de una a otra lengua, puede ocurrir que en la lengua de llegada no haya término que corresponda, pues es sabido que la compresión lexical no se hace de la misma manera de unas lenguas a otras, ya que las estructuras lingüísticas de éstas pueden impedirlo. El hecho de que las designaciones respectivas en la lengua de llegada y en la de origen puedan mostrar diferencias pertinentes, pero complementarias, puede ser porque el neologismo creado en la lengua de llegada se basa en otros rasgos o características del significante, que son distintos de los de la lengua de partida, pero que son, a su vez, complementarios. Cuando la transposición se hace imposible, por causa de la estructura lingüística de la lengua de llegada, será necesario que el traductor tenga un conocimiento global de la realidad designada por el término, y de su campo terminológico, para poder captar otras características susceptibles de ser verbalizadas en L2, de manera que el término creado ofrezca una descripción alternativa al de la lengua de origen.

4.9- Por ejemplo, el término CVCC motor ("Automotive Engineer"), ofrece las siguientes características, que el traductor debe conocer, si quiere codificar el término en L2; a saber: que una mezcla rica en combustible, ardiendo en una cámara de combustión, se propaga por un conducto estrecho, de manera que

prenda la mezcla pobre; que la forma de la cámara de combustión favorezca la turbulencia, de modo que aumente la homogeneidad de la mezcla, etc. Es decir que para codificar un término en L2, hay que descodificarlo primero en L1.

CONCLUSION

5.- Por tanto, la codificación de términos técnicos, así como la traducción de textos técnicos, debe apoyarse directamente sobre el significante. El término y su campo semántico se integran dentro del campo semántico de la terminología, y juntos constituyen una realidad que es como un microcosmos. Sólo un conocimiento profundo de esa realidad que se describe, permitirá interpretar, codificar y hacer válidas las estructuras discursivas.

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APENDICE I

Tanto el término como el campo semántico en que se integran, forman un microcosmos. En conjunto nos describe un sistema de control por computadora del modelo Toyota.



APENDICE II

La integración del término en el campo de la terminología es evidente.



PRESUPPOSITIONAL IMPLICATIONS IN COMPOUND AND COMPLEX SENTENCES.

John TYNAN

It is clear that an adequate theory of natural language communication must give an account of the implications that we derive from speakers' utterances in particular situations. In what follows, I will try to come to terms with one small set of these implications - what are often called presuppositional implications -when they occur in the context of the traditional logical connectives: 'and', 'or', and 'if...then'. For the most part, I shall concentrate on giving the outlenes of a kind of algorithm for these implications in the contexts just described. While there are innumerable treatments of some of the material contained here, I shall concentrate especially on the types of formal analyses that can be found in Karttunen (1973) and Soames (1982). Towards the end of the article, I will try to give a general explanation for some of the observed facts by drawing on certain general principles of communicative behaviour.

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

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By 'presuppositions' I will understand sets of assumptions which, though not explicitly asserted in an utterance would, unless

cancelled by the context, normally be attributed to the speaker of that utterance. It is important to note that these assumptions may or may not be shared by the addressee; all that matters is that the use of the utterance normally leads to the belief that the speaker at least assumes them. Neither is it necessary that the speaker actually holds these assumptions; there is a difference between actually holding an assumption and giving to understand that one holds it. Both these points will be elaborated on later.

It is usually assumed in semantic and pragmatic analysis that the implications that we derive from what people say must be subdivided into a number of different classes (Kempson 1975 and 1977; Wilson 1975; Sadock 1978; Nunberg 1981). Alternatively, we might consider certain types of implications as having a greater strength or probability than others (Sperber and Wilson 1986). I will assume here that implications are different not only in strength but also in character. For the purposes of this discussion it becomes necessary, then to distinguish three types of implication: entailments, presuppositions, and conversational implicatures. Since the notion of implicatures will only be appealed to at the end, I will concentrate here on the entailment-presupposition distinction.

Taking positive declarative sentences as a base, it is fairly easy to see that two kinds of implications can be derived from them: one type we will call presuppositions, the other entailments. Entailments follow only from the positive declarative; they no longer follow from the negative or interrogative that corresponds to this declarative; neither do they follow from a corresponding epistemic modal. In logical terms, entailments are necessary conditions on the sentences from which they are derived. Presuppositions, on the other hand, while they also follow from positive declaratives, differ from entailments in that they equally follow from the negative or interrogatrive which corresponds to that declarative and from a corresponding epistemic modal. The

presuppositions of negative sentences, however, are somewhat peculiar in that, in a particular context in which we are denying a previously-made assertion, and where the context makes it evident, they no longer follow, i.e. they can be cancelled or made defeasible in certain negative contexts. These differences can be seen in the following examples. Implication (1b), an entailment, follows only from the positive declaratrive (1a), but from none of the other (a) sentences. Implication (2b), on the other hand, a presupposition, follows from each and every one of the (a) sentences in (2). Finally, as we can see in the discourse in (3), implication (2b) can be cancelled in the negative contexts described above. I use the standard symbol (>>) to indicate presuppositional implications and ⇏ to indicate that a presuppositional implication no longer follows.

(1) a. Cain killed Abel
a´. Cain didn´t kill Abel
a´´. Did Cain kill Abel?
a´´´.Cain may have killed Abel

b. Abel died

(2) a. Cain regrets that he killed Abel
a´. Cain doesn´t regret that he killed Abel
a´´. Does Cain regret that he killed Abel?
a´´´. Cain may regret that he killed Abel

b.>> Cain killed Abel

(3) Mary: Cain regrets that he killed Abel
Peter: You´ re assuming far too much, you know. Cain doesn´t regret that he killed Abel, because he never killed him in the first place.

↛ Cain killed Abel

Having made these distinctions, we will now go on to see how these presuppositional implications behave in the contexts that we have described. When composing the meaning of whole sentences from their parts, there are cases, as we shall now see, in which entailments no longer follow while presuppositions do, and vice versa. This analysis of the compositionality of meaning has become known as the projection problem, and has proved extremely controversial, as indeed has the whole analysis of presuppositions (see the references already cited). But here, as elsewhere in linguistic analysis, we expect there to be order and not chaos, and it is to the search for this order that we will now address ourselves.

Langendoen and Savin (1971) proposed that the presuppositions of embedded clauses were inherited by the complex sentence in which they were embedded. This does not mean that they amalgamate in any way with either the entailments or presuppositions of higher clauses. Rather they remain as presuppositions of the whole complex sentence. They based their observations on data such as the following:

(4) a. John accused Mary of beating her husband
b. John claimed that Mary beat her husband
c. John judged that it was bad for Mary to beat her husband

In (4), we can say that (a) entails (b), while it presupposes (c). The same relations seem to hold between (a), (b), and (c) in the following:

(5) a. John stopped doing it
b. After time t1, John didn't do it
c. Before time t1, John did it

If we now embed (4a) within (5a), we get (6a), with the basic meaning entailment (6b) and the presuppositional implications (6c) and (6d).

(6) a. John stopped accusing Mary of beating her husband
b. After time t1, John didn't claim that Mary beat her husband
c. Before time t1, John claimed that Mary beat her husband
d. John judged that it was bad for Mary to beat her husband

Presuppositions (6c) and (6d) are simply the presuppositions of (4a) and (5a), out of which (6a) is formed, i.e. they correspond to (5c) and (4c) respectively.

As we will see, this generalization does not hold. Karttunen (1973) claimed that there were three distinct cases to be anlysed: "holes", "plugs" and "filters". He defined them in the following way:

(i) *Holes* : Contexts in which presuppositions survive, while entailments, generally, do not.

(ii) *Plugs* : Contexts in which presuppositions do not survive.

(iii) *Filters* : Contexts in which presuppositions sometimes survive and sometimes not.

Holes. Negative and modal contexts are, as we have already seen, typical holes. In them presuppositions continue to follow. We have also already noted that in certain negative contexts (contexts of denial) the presuppositions can, however, be cancelled. We note in addition, here, that it is not necessary for the presupposition to be explicitly cancelled in order for it to drop out of the sentence. For example, the following, out of context, seems to imply that John did a Ph.D.

(7) a. John won't have to regret that he did a Ph.D.
b. >> John did a Ph.D.

In a context, in which, for example, it is known that John has just been offered a very good job, thanks to the fact that he has a Ph.D., then the implication in (7b) clearly follows. If, on the other hand, it is known in the context that John has just completed his graduate studies and has decided not to enrol for post-graduate research, then (7a) would be a perfectly acceptable comment, but it no longer carries the implication in (7b); indeed the implication is quite the opposite. We might notice here, too, that contextual factors can also eliminate a certain type of presuppositional implication even in affirmative sentences.

Frege (1892), who was the first in modern times to draw attention to presuppositions, noted that temporal clauses seem to have presuppositional implications attached to them. For example, (8a) seems to carry the presuppositional implication (8b):

(8) a. Mary had to work very hard before she finished her thesis
b. Mary finished her thesis

By changing the matrix predication, however, we can eliminate the implication of the temporal clause. Neither (9a) nor (9b), for example, seem to imply that Mary finished her thesis.

(9) a. Mary emigrated before she finished her thesis
b. Mary left University before she finished her thesis

The presupposition that Mary finished her thesis is cancelled in these cases because we normally assume that a person´s emigrating usually means the total disruption of all their activities in the country in which they have been residing, while, in the second case, leaving University would also usually imply the disruption of the activities that one has been carrying on there.

It is perhaps necessary here to return to our point of departure. What we are claiming is that we can, by examining the

characteristics of the implications can be regarded as speakers´ assumptions or are implications of another type. We are further claiming that implication (8b) above is ultimately an assumption that the speaker of (8a) is taking for granted. This implication contrasts with other implications that we can derive, for example, with entailments, which we can regard as being explicitly asserted. Paradoxically perhaps, in asserting, we lay our claims open to question, while we seem to be so sure of our background assumptions that it is much more difficult for our interlocutors to question them (Katz 1972: 127ff).

Plugs : As we indicated above, these are contexts in which presuppositions do not survive. The analysis of these contexts is, however, extremely controversial and we shall only give a very broad indication of the type of argument that has been brought forward in support of the claim that certain linguistic contexts are, from the point of view of the inheritance of presuppositions, blocks or plugs which inhibit a presupposition from surviving into a complex sentence. The possible candidates for this class are verbs of saying, such as "say", "mention, "tell", "ask", "promise", "warn", "request", "order", "accuse", "criticise", etc., verbs of propositional attitude, such as "think", "believe", "doubt", "suspect", "fear", etc., and so-called world-creating predicates, such as "dream", "imagine", etc. The way in which these predicates seem to block presuppositions from ascending into the complex sentence can be seen from the following:

(10) a. Fred wasn´t aware that he had failed the exam
b. >> Fred had failed the exam

(11) a. Fred said that he wasn´t aware that he had failed the exam
b. ↛ Fred had failed the exam

(12) a. Fred kissed Cecilia again
b. >> Fred had kissed Cecilia before

(13) a. Fred asked Cecilia to kiss him again
b. ⇸ Fred had kissed Cecilia before

Filters . As the name indicates, these are contexts in which presuppositions sometimes survive and sometimes do not. The class of filters seems to consist basically of the logical connectives, "if...then", "and", and "either...or". It is clear that presuppositions survive generally in these contexts, just as it is equally clear that entailments do not. The following sentences show up this contrast:

(14) a. The exhibition lasted four days
b. ⊮ The exhibition lasted three days
c. If the exhibition lasted four days, it should be over by now.
d. ⊬ The exhibition lasted three days

(15) a. Fred has stopped beating Zelda
b. >> Fred has been beating Zelda
c. Fred resents Zelda´s infidelity
d. >> Zelda has been unfaithful
e. If Fred has stopped beating Zelda, then Fred no longer resents Zelda´s infidelity
f. >> Fred has been beating Zelda
g. >> Zelda has been unfaithful

This survival property in the case of presuppositions does not, however, always hold true. There seem to be definite contexts, nevertheless, in which the presuppositions are not inherited by the whole sentence. Let us look at the following sentences:

(16) a. All of Jack´s children are bald.
b. >> Jack has children.

(17) a. If baldness is hereditary, then all of Jack´s children are bald.
b. >> Jack has children.

(18) a. If all of Jack´s children are bald, then baldness is hereditary.
b. >> Jack has children.

(19) a. If Jack has children, then all of Jack´s children are bald.
b. ⇸ Jack has children.

In (19), in which the presupposition does not survive, we notice that the antecedent clause "Jack has children" in actual fact is equivalent to the presupposition of the consequent, as is indicated in (16a) and (17a). We can say then that presuppositions survive in conditionals unless the antecedent entails the presupposition of the consequent. That this seems to be the correct prediction seems to be corroborated by the following:

(20) a. Harry´s wife is no longer living with him.
b. >> Harry is married.

(21) a. If Harry is married, then his wife is no longer living with him.
b ⇸ Harry is married.

We can now formulate an initial rule for the projection of presuppositions in conditional sentences as follows:

(22) Where S = A B (A being the antecedent and B the consequent)
then (a) If A >> C, then S >> C
(b) If B >> C, then S >> C, unless A |⊢ C

Unfortunately, this rule will not always work either. As we noted above, presuppositions can also be cancelled where there are purely contextual assumptions which contradict the normal implications of the utterance. We can see this by looking back at (18) above. The implications for presupposition inheritance in this case, we gave as follows:

(23) a. If all of Jack´s children are bald, then baldness is hereditary.
b. >> Jack has children.

Let us suppose, however, that (a) is uttered in a context in which Jack has just got married and somebody is wondering what his future children are going to be like. In such a context, there is clearly no implication to (b). A similar case can be seen in the following:

(24) a. If the Vice-Chancellor invites Felipe González to dinner, then he´ll regret having invited a socialist to his table.
b. If the Vice-Chancellor invites Margaret Thatcher to dinner, then he´ll regret having invited a socialist to his table.
c. The Vice-Chancellor has invited a socialist to his table.

We notice here that, in a context in which it is known that Felipe González is a socialist and Margaret Thatcher is conservative, only (b) carries the implication (c). The reason for this is that we tend to interpret "socialist" in (a) as being anaphoric

to Felipe González. In rule (22) we said that the conditional will inherit the presuppositions of the consequent, unless the antecedent entails the presupposition. We see now that this entailment can be derived from the antecedent plus some set of assumptions made in the context. We will have to change rule (22) accordingly. We will also have to change it to take into account what happens in (23). What has happened in (23) is that the presupposition attached to the antecedent is contradicted in the context. We can bring the two cases together as follows:

(25) Where S = A B⊃
then (a) If A >> C, then S >> C
(b) If B >> C, then S >> C
unless there is some possibly null set X of assumed facts such that {X} |⊢ C in (a) or {X} U A |⊢ C in (b).

We know from logic that the logical connectives are interdefinable. Thus, "if P then Q" is logically equivalent to "It is not the case that P and not-Q are true together". More formally we say:

(26) $P \supset Q = \sim (P \wedge \sim Q)$

We would expect, then, that there would be a similarity in the behaviour of presuppositions in these cases and this does, in fact, seem to be the case. Look at the following sentences:

(27) a. Baldness is hereditary and all of Jack´s children are bald.
b. >> Jack has children.

(28) a. All of Jack´s children are bald and baldness is hereditary.
b. >> Jack has children.

(29) a. Jack has children and all of Jack´s children are bald.
b. ↛ Jack has children.

We say that (29a) does not presuppose that Jack has children, but rather that this sentence, or an utterance of it, asserts that Jack has children. This assertion in the first conjunct seems to cancel the presupposition of the second conjunct. As with the rule for indicative conditionals, it seems to be the case that presuppositions of the individual conjuncts are inherited by the entire sentence, unless a presupposition of the second conjunct is entailed by the first conjunct. As with indicative conditionals also, this rule can be over-ridden where there are contradictory assumptions in the context. Look at the following sentences:

(30) a. The Vice-Chancellor has invited Felipe González to dinner, so he´s going to regret having invited a socialist to his table.
b. The Vice-Chancellor has invited Margaret Thatcher to dinner, so he´s going to regret having invited a socialist to his table.
c. The Vice-Chancellor has invited a socialist to his table.

We can also find contexts in which, if the presuppositions of the first conjunct are contradicted in context, the presuppositions of the first conjunct are also cancelled. Suppose the following sentence is uttered in a context in which Philip has just decided that he won´t go on to do any post-graduate research after graduating:

(31) a. Philip won´t have to regret that he did a Ph.D. and he can look for a job straight away.

Clearly, there would be no implication in this context that Philip has done a Ph.D. The normal assumption from the factive

predicate is cancelled. We can now combine all these observations into a rule for the projection of presuppositions in conjunction:

(32) Where $S = A \wedge B$
then (a) If $A >> C$, then $S >> C$
(b) If $B >> C$, then $S >> C$
unless there is some possibly null set of assumed facts X such that $\{X\} \mid\!\vdash \sim C$ in (a), or $\{X\} \cup A \mid\!\vdash C$ in (b)

We know by the law of material implication that any proposition of the form "If P, then Q" is equivalent to a proposition of the form "Either not-P or Q". Formally we can express this as:

(33) $P \supset Q = (\sim P \vee Q)$

As before, we would expect that presuppositional behaviour under disjunction would show parallels with the behaviour of the other connectives, and this is indeed the case. Consider the implicational relations between the following sentences:

(34) a. Either baldness is not hereditary or all of Jack´s children are bald.
b. >> Jack has children.

(35) a. Either all of Jack´s children are bald or baldness is not hereditary.
b. >> Jack has children.

(36) a. Either Jack has no children at all or all of Jack´s children are bald.
b. ↛ Jack has children.

In (36), where the presuppositional implication no longer holds, we find that the first disjunct negates the presupposition of the second. That this generalization seems to be correct can be seen from the following sentences, where the same result also holds:

(37) a. Either Harry isn't married at all or his wife is no longer living with him.
b. ↛ Harry is married.

(38) a. Either Bill has always refrained from beating his wife or he has stopped beating her.
b. ↛ Bill has been beating his wife.

In the same way we find that where assumptions made in the context contradict the presuppositions of the first disjunct, then these presuppositions are cancelled from the whole assertion. We can now give a rule for the projection of presuppositions in disjunctive sentences:

(39) Where S = A v B
then (a) If A >> C, then S >> C
(b) If B >> C, then S >> C
unless there is some possibly null set of assumptions X such that {X} $\vdash \sim$ C in (a), or {X} U A $\vdash \sim$ C in (b).

An example of a context in which assumptions particular to the context cancel the presuppositions of the first disjunct can be seen in the following. Let us suppose that it is being debated whether Bill should go on to do post-graduate study or should leave University and look for a job. If I am not in favour of Bill's going on to do any more study, and in general have a poor opinion of Bill as a student, then I might very well comment:

(40) Either he will regret the fact that he did a Ph.D. or he will make a complete mess of it.

Clearly, in this context, there is no presupposition that Bill has done a Ph.D.

We can in actual fact make out a kind of formalism for the three cases that we have now been looking at. The formalism would be as follows:

(41) Let S = A x B, where x can be any one of the logical connectives symbolizing implication, conjunction or disjunction: $\supset$ $\wedge$ $\vee$

(a) If A >> C, then S >> C
(b) If B >> C, then S >> C

Unless there is some possibly null set of assumptions {X} such that

(i) {X} $\vdash \sim$ C in (a), or
(ii) {X} U A $\vdash$ C in (b), where x = $\supset$ or $\wedge$, or
(iii) {X} U A $\vdash \sim$ C in (b), where x = $\vee$

We have now found a descriptive rule or formalism which seems to work fairly well, and allows us to assume that presuppositions will always be inherited in sentences involving the logical connectives, unless some of the conditions stipulated above eliminates them.

Let us look now at some of the implications of the analysis that we have been pursuing up to now. First of all we have seen that the presuppositional implications we have been looking at are not either by assumptions which exist in the context of utterance or they

can disappear under certain implications which can be derived from what is explicitly said or stated somewhere in the surrounding context of utterance. It follows from this that if we take a certain sentence which normally carries a certain presupposition, e.g.

(42) a. How narrow is the street at that point?
b. >> The street is narrow at that point,

there is no guarantee that the presupposition implied is necessarily true. The most, it seems, that we are entitled to say is that the *speaker* implies that the presupposition is true. In other words, we are entitled to infer, in certain cases, that a speaker is taking a certain implication for granted. Sentences, as such, either because of their structural form, or because of certain lexical items within them, or because they contain certain semantic predicates, *potentially* carry certain presuppositions. Whether that potential presupposition will actually follow in a particular case in which that sentence is uttered depends ultimately on the context in which it is uttered, and on the assumptions that obtain in that context. Sentence (43a) for example, because of its particular structural form, has the potential presupposition (43b).

(43) a. Harry´s wife is no longer living with him.
b. >> Harry is married.

It should be clear, however, that in a particular context, the speaker of an utterance corresponding to (43a) is simply making a mistake about the relation that exists, or existed, between Harry and a certain woman who was once living with him. The utterance, then, indicates to us that the speaker is taking it for granted, or appears to be taking it for granted, that Harry is married, but clearly, this in no way necessitates that such, in fact, be the case. Of course, if it is, objectively-speaking, true that Harry´s wife is no longer living with him, then it must, objectively-speaking, be true that Harry is married.

The point of view that we seem to be coming round to is that presuppositions are types of background assumptions which it is reasonable to infer that a speaker is taking for granted, unless something in the context indicates that this simply cannot be the case. Language itself, then, in the way it is structured seems to reflect the fact, or else leads us to assume the fact that, whatever speech act we are performing, whether we are describing, questioning, requesting, ordering, or whatever, there is certain information that we can background in certain ways, and each language places at our disposal various means, whether syntactic, semantic or intonational, whereby this backgrounding can be effected. It is probably as well to note that speakers may have various reasons for backgrounding information, the most usual ones being that we take it for granted that the other participants in the exchange either already take the information involved for granted also, or will not find it in any way surprising or controversial. There can, however, be other much more subtle reasons. Suppose that I don´t know whether the woman who was living with Harry was his wife or not, and suppose that I´m the kind of person to whom that kind of information is important, then I may very well start trying to satisfy my curiosity by making a statement such as (43a) above, in the hope that my interlocutor has more information on the subject than I have and may inadvertently give me the information that I want without my actually asking for it.

We can now try to come to grips once more with the projection problem outlined and see if we can account for it in some more general way than we have done heretofore. Following Soames (1982), we can get a more general perspective on the phenomena we have been describing by building an account on the following definitions of utterance presupposition and presupposition inheritance:

Utterance Presupposition: An utterance U presupposes P at t1 if and only if one can reasonably infer from U that the speaker S seems to accept P and regards it as uncontroversial.

Presupposition Inheritance : If P is entailed by some potential presupposition Q of U, then an utterance of U in a conversational context C presupposes P unless:

(i) Q is incompatible with C, or
(ii) uttering U in C conversationally implicates that the speaker is not taking U for granted

We use the notion of entailment in this final definition because we not only want to include the immediate presuppositions of a particular utterance in the list of presuppositions that are attached to it, but also the presuppositions that follow from that presupposition itself. The definition would work in the following way in a context where there are no incompatible presuppositions or assumptions in the context:

(44) a. The King of France is in hiding (U)
b. There is a King of France (Q)
c. There are such things as Kings (entailed by Q)
d. There is a place called France (entailed by Q)

Since every proposition trivially entails itself, the definition that we have given guarantees that, where conditions (i) and (ii) are not fulfilled, the potencial presuppositions will always be actual presuppositions of an utterance, together with all the presuppositions that are entailed by that utterance. Where the context is incompatible, however, then neither the potential presuppositions nor the presuppositions that are entailed by them

become actual presuppositions of the utterance. One case in which this happens is the following:

(45) a. There is no King of France, so the King of France isn´t in hiding (U)
b. There is a King of France (Q)
c. From C (the conversational context), we know that there is no King of France. Since (b) is incompatible with this assumption,neither Q nor any of its entailments follow.

We need the second part of the defining conditions on presuppositional inheritance in order to account for those cases in which presuppositions disappear in sentences involving logical connectives. Let´s look at a few examples:

(46) a. Harry´s wife is no longer living with him.
b. >> Harry is married.

(47) a. If Harry is married, then his wife is no longer living with him.
b. ↛ Harry is married.

Though the consequent of the conditional sentence in (47a) does, when it occurs in isolation in (46a), carry the presuppositional implication that Harry ia married, this presupposition no longer follows in (47a). Clearly, in (47a), the antecedent of the conditional entails the presupposition of the consequent. When we first examined this sentence in (21a) above, and noted that the presupposition of the consequent disappeared, we merely stipulated a rule to this effect and gave a first formulation in (22). Rule (22), however, and the other rules, all of which we collapsed into one fomulation in (41), constitute a mere formalization of the

observed facts. The basic idea that seems to follow from our analysis is that presuppositional implications are generally inherited in the contexts we have been examining, except when certain contextual factors cancel them. The question is, of course, whether we cannot find some kind of unifying explanation for all these contexts.

Semantic analysis has, traditionally, been concerned with accounting for the literal meaning of words and sentences. What has increasingly come to light, however, in the past thirty years or so, is that this is not sufficient if we are to account, as it seems we ought to, for what it is we actually communicate to one another. There is, in our everyday communication through language, a tremendous amount of indirection, with the result that the simple (it is not so simple) interpretation of our literal utterances very often falls far short of accounting for what it is we actually communicate. To take one extreme but, nevertheless, typical example, in ironic utterances we often communicate a meaning which is the exact opposite of what we literally say. Pragmatic analysis has tried to bridge the gap that arises between literal meaning and what is actually communicated.

Accounts of how information is communicated have especially highlighted two factors that seem to play a fundamental role in the processes involved: the recognition of speakers´ intentions, and the utilization of certain general principles of interactive behaviour, what is generally known as the cooperative principle (Grice 1975, 1978; Gazdar 1979; Levison 1983). The maxims contained in this principle enable us to cooperate with one another in our linguistic exchanges in such a way that we do not have to spell out in literal terms what we actually mean on each occasion, but can rely on those maxims, and general cognitive capacities, to imply or infer, as the case may be, what it is we wish to say or that our interlocutor wishes to say to us.

Why is it that we infer from the consequent of (47a) that the speaker assumes that Harry is married, while we do not infer it from the whole sentence? Clearly, in this case, the explanation has to do with the fact that Harry´s being married is conditionalized in (47a). A speaker who takes it for granted that Harry is married would be in a position to assert simply: "Harry´s wife is no longer living with him". The sub-maxim of quality of the cooperative principle says: "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence". Since anyone uttering (47a) does not make such a statement, we conclude that he or she is not in a position to make it. In accordance with the other sub-maxim of quantity which says: "Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange", we can then conclude that the strongest statement that the speaker can make in the circumstances is precisely (47a). Contextual and conversational implications are, we must assume, stronger than presuppositional implications. A virtually identical inferential process would lead to the cancellation of the presupposition in sentences such as (36a). In sentences such as (29a), the presupposition would be cancelled if we assume that assertions are stronger than presuppositional implications. So, the type of explanation that we have arrived at draws upon the two notions regarding meaning implications that we spoke of as being widespread in pragmatic analysis: one, that meaning implications must be subdivided into different sub-classes, and the other that meaning implications differ from one another in terms of saliency or strength.

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AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO SOME " Ø " MORPHEMES IN ENGLISH (DEICTICS AND NUMERATIVES)

José M. ORO

INTRODUCTION

In analysing syntactically sentences of the type,

1.a. It's always the one Ø carries the radio that gets it.

1.b. The one Ø carries the radio always gets it.

linguists are likely to say that *zero* relatives function as the subject of their relative clause and control it, even though the relative nexus is not present in surface structure. It has been reduced, perhaps for economy of speech, to Ø even in such unclear patterns of language where the antecedent and its relative clause should not be linked in order to avoid confusion of fluent meaning in normal speech.

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But linguists, on the other hand, also give a possibility behaving syntactically different from other morphemes which do

normally have their proper and determined function in the normal use of language and on the same level (such is the case of *deictics*, *numeratives* and *superlatives* functioning as *heads* of an NP if this may be so).

Such a variety of interpretations of similar conditions in the same or different levels of language make the study of syntax incongruent. Therefore it is somewhat disheartening that a certain lack of discipline (in following the logical principles upon which an empirical and theoretical science are to be based) can be clearly seen in current literature.

Deictics and Numeratives

Halliday (1985) described a number of important and now well known syntactic constituents of the Nominal Group, taking into account and clarifying the ordering and what the constituents represent within the group. He illustrates the ordering of the NG in the English sentence as follows:

Deictic	Numerative	Epithet(s)	Classifier
Those	two	very	small

Thing	Qualifier
cars	of the headmaster

However, in the course of making this proposal, which I think is quite correct, Halliday (1985: 173) concludes that,

> *There is always a head in the nominal group (unless it is "branched", like " one brown" in "one blue and one brown"),but there may be no thing. It is quite normal to have Numerative or Deictic as Head.*

Thus, Halliday (1985) states that *Head* and *Thing* [1] are not always the same thing. This claim, however, turns out to be somewhat superficial from my point of view, and if not, how can we say that *zero* relatives function syntactically as objects, subjects, etc.?

The examples given by Halliday (1985:173),

2.a. (Look at) those two
2.b. (Look at) those
as well as his illustrations of these two examples:

Deictic	Numerative
Modifier	Head
←	
B	a

Deictic
Head
a

cannot be taken as arguments which lead to a clearer understanding of their theoretical implications out of context and, besides this reasoning is not based upon logical principles.

Although these two constituents (deictic in (b) and numerative in (a)) may be considered, as Halliday does, the *head*

of their respective NPs in uninvariable structure without taking into account the semantic implications of the context in which they are included, the analysis does not show all the inherent properties in the phrase. Thus, Halliday does not take into account one of the most interesting aspects, that of conclusive meaning.

It is, then, worthwhile to note that *the thing* must be easily understood through contextual associations by both the speaker and the hearer, as the utterance without that implicit reference implying an adequate pragmatic interrelation between both interlocutors would be meaningless and, if this is so, what is the function of *the head* of a NP that does not show interactive meaning? This would be the case of such utterances illustrated above when they are to be analysed out of context.

Under this assumption we cannot accept deictics, numeratives or other constituents of the type as *heads* of an NP X considering that *the thing* though not present in surface structure, must be clearly stated through contextual relations.

In fact, it is quite logical in the use of language to elide a morpheme but the functional meaning of that morpheme cannot be elided and neither can its syntactical function.

Thus, from a logical point of view if TH = H when present in surface structure then when absent in surface structure, TH is required to provide functional meaning and, in this way, we may then understand that Ø TH = Ø H. This interpretative hypothesis attempts to explain several aspects omitted by both the univariable and the multivariable analyses taking into account the semantic and pragmatic interaction that must be produced by the contextual implications of which the utterance "in question" is to be, though very important, one more constituent.

Considering these implications, we are to believe that the H of an NG -X- in English and other languages, for example Galician and Spanish, must be represented by TH and consequently we do not accept the possiblity of deictics, numeratives and superlatives

being the head, although they resemble this when they stand alone in surface structure.

The remainder of this paper will give alternative ways of analysing Ø morphemes in NGs in English and other languages in this level of language, in an attempt to account for how they are to be understood.

As we stated above, this elided form and function (i. e. "thing" as a morphological component and "head" as a syntactical component) are represented by the same form integrated by basic meaning assumptions which make it an essential linguistic constituent of a NG X.

Considering that the only phenomenon that takes place, and which is particularly relevant, is that TH is not present in surface structure, probably because of "economy of speech" and due to stylistic factors which form an integrative part of a certain context without altering the given meaning, it is quite normal to assume that both the morphological and the syntactic units must be considered as elided components in their respective analyses.

Thus, we will refer to them as Ø H and Ø TH in order to present a full syntactic analysis where meaning is not left aside.

When Halliday (1985:173) suggests that *it is quite normal to have Numerative or Deictic as Head* , one must be aware, in assuming a principle of this type, of a possible incompleteness of meaning in the given analysis out of any given context.

The first reason for being suspicious of an analysis in which *deictics* or *numeratives* may be considered as the head of a NG is that it will not account for structurally identical sentences which happen to contain the head but are selectionally compatible with one in generalized communicative realizations, or when representing the world according to the speaker (i.e., by means of a personal pronoun).

It is also worthwhile to consider that *one* , for example, is not always compatible as in 3.

3.a. (Look at) Peter and John
3.b. (Look at) them
3.c. (Look at) those
3.d. (Look at) those two
3.e. (Look at) those ones
3.f. (Look at) those two ones
**3.f. (Look at) them ones*

A second reason for believing that *deictics* and *numeratives* cannot be considered as *heads* of NGs is the result of the elided H or TH they represent, which is necessarily very close to the speaker's and hearer's understanding of meaning. Thus, TH/H must be present in a specific situational context and because of that and in terms of *economy of speech* it transfers its properties to a *deictic* , a *numerative* or to other concrete morphemes. In spite of all this transfer of properties, it is quite difficult to justify the necessary conditions for a new and independent syntactical function through contextual insertion.

In these cases, deictics and numeratives stand for Jespersen's secondary function of morphological constituents, i.e., when one morpheme of this type substitutes a N morpheme in surface structure, but something implicit must be there in order to interpret any given meaning. This is, in Halliday's terminology, *the thing* which is not present in surface structure but which can be deduced through contextual interrelations by the interlocutors.

Thus, considering that contextual interaction is a vital part of effective communication it seems that an interpretive approach appears to be more reliable in a full analysis than a functional and syntactical integrative interpretation as it can certainly be considered that an explicit H or TH occurs in underlying representations of NGs with *deictics* , *numeratives* , etc., though apparently, they appear to function as H because of their position in surface structure.

There is, of course, no right or wrong way to focus the problem. However, of the various possibilities that word classes have of acting syntactically, these two are very much related to noun/thing elision and this is easily appreciated as the contextual implications show clear patterns necessary to clarify the given meaning.

This ambiguous use of any given morpheme standing for a noun in syntactic head position in surface structure, may be interpreted by the rule labelled: the rule of functional adequation to contextual conversion and improvement of meaning, explained as follows:

In any given situation where the context is or should be clear enough for both the hearer and the speaker, or the reader and the writer, to understand it, some morphemes of the X type may be used in place of N morphemes or even in place of complete phrases. Within this type of morphological constituents (i.e., pronouns, deictics, numeratives, superlatives and adverbials when substituting nouns, and auxiliaries when substituting verbs) those which replace a noun when it should occur as the syntactical head of a NG are specially relevant.

In this case, first both the semantic and communicative meaning and its syntactic function which represent the thing or person, the second, the implicit meaning and the syntactic function (i.e. indicating the object, signalling the function and giving the meaning), are incorporated into another word by the following rule: Rule of Functional and Contextual Transposition of Function and Meaning by which that morpheme together with its syntactic and semantic implications in a given contextual situation conditioned by interactive pragmatic relationship, is seen as two different acts by both the speaker and the listener:

- The known fact, i.e., the person/thing/who/which is known to both, through the evidence of the situational context, and

- The unknown fact(s), i.e., further comments to be transmitted.

It is because of this semantic interaction of the communicative act between the speaker and his interlocutor, that he, the producer of the enactment, resolves to shorten it by widening the contextual semantic relationship, announcing the known fact without naming the thing by its proper referent; and due to the conditions in which the enactment is involved, it is felt to be unnecessary for the efficient transmission of the message.

The linguist, however, in the analysis of any isolated unit, does not know the exact word the deictic, numerative or superlative stands for. Thus they cannot have the properties of a syntactical H.

On the other hand, in the English language as well as in other languages, in spite of the level or dialect, displayed anomalies in surface structure are quite easily recuperable in Deep Structure by means of contextualization. This happens when an implicit/explicit contextual relationship takes place in the linguistic field by pragmatic interaction rather than by the insertion of their own morphological or syntactic reference.

Up to a certain degree, in a logical reading, what is true for syntax is also true for morphology and semantics. Nouns represent things, persons, places or ideas and they function as H of a NG, a PG or an AG. Deictics, numeratives or even superlatives may sometimes take the position of the noun in the phrase but there might be a clear implicit reference to that noun in order to avoid problems of meaning. Thus, they cannot absorb their function totally. If this special realization is produced, it is, then, important that a rather clear contextual relationship between the thought expressed by the utterance in question and the external circumstances of the medium should be given in the production of the communicative act as a whole.

It is then disputable that a H/TH distinction could be upheld out of the N-system and it is noticeable that isolated patterns in any given language do not produce effective communication, especially when there is a lack of pragmatic interaction, see the dialogue below,

4.a. Look at those
b. Which?
a. Two
b. Two what?

here, the pragmatic interaction between both speakers could only be fulfilled if both interlocutors were well aware of the intended meaning and so other interferences would not be liable. Thus, only in very concrete situations can deictics and numeratives be used alone and using them alone in the sentence implies that there must be a perfect pragmatic interaction between the producer of the utterance and the receiver of the message and it is not easy to observe many possibilities of focusing interactive meaning.

It is, then, important to note that even though the TH may not be present in surface structure, there must be a certain link by means of which some implicit reference is maintained between those two constituents, (i.e., between the TH not present in surface structure and its referent) in order to specify what kind of linguistic meaning is performed and transmitted according to the speaker and hearer competences in contextualized realizations.

Nevertheless, there must be a straightforward relationship between both the syntactic and semantic behaviour and besides there must also exist a strong relationship between morphological and syntactic interpretations with semantic and pragmatic relations in order to establish clear patterns of morphological, syntactic and semantic linguistic behaviour.

I hope to have shown that H/TH in English are represented by a semantically and syntactically definable class: the noun, and/or

replacing it as a proper referent the (personal) pronouns, but under the formula - Pronoun = Ø TH/ Ø H, and that the interpretation of other classes as (being taken as) H in surface structure is just a question of interpreting the situational context in which they are involved.

In a similar but descriptive manner Huddleston (1984:284-5) shows that other phrases can have a double interpretation. In my opinion such phrases (as for example *a lot* in *a lot of books*) are to be considered as complex H and cannot be divided into immediate constituents. It seems quite irrelevant to accept *a lot* as the H and *of books* as *classifier*, as *a lot of* stands for *many* books and this follows the right order of the constituents forming the utterance.

Thus, in the spirit of the work done by Halliday (1985:158-175) lies a clear-cut distinction between both the morphological and syntactic properties of deictics and numeratives in relation to TH; on the contrary, the ideal representation of these categories according to our proposal and taking in Halliday's examples in the following:

5.a. *(Look at) those two (Ø)*



5.b. *(Look at) those (Ø)*



In this hypothetical representation, however, the interactive relationship between H = TH shows that the ideal equipolent representation of morphological categories and syntactic function is to be measured in terms of contextual relationship and interactive meaning.

The H in such cases could be viewed as a function consisting of two forms or members: the conclusive and the hypothetical. To each of these we assign a specific positive value, certainty and ambiguity, (it should be noticed that in isolation, in the written medium, a unique interpretation is often possible but this is not so in the spoken medium). These specific values share the more general aspects of grammaticality, acceptability and interpretability. Needless to say, both forms correspond to a grammatically relevant, *semantic level* , and to a grammatically irrelevant, *pragmatic level* respectively. In the former, there is, inevitably, a one-to-one relationship and in the latter, there is a one-to-many relationship.

The same occurs with the superlative (e.g., the smallest) when the TH is made explicit by means of non-linguistic arguments, as well as when the TH is not made explicit and has the capability of being substituted by one/ones, although in the latter case, as Halliday points out, no doubt is reflected. He states that:

The element we are calling "Thing" is the semantic core of the nominal group. It may be common noun, or (personal) pronoun. (...)There is also a generalized pronoun (one).

The interpretation of these generalized pronominal forms as H may be specified by the inherent semantic and syntactic properties of these forms (i.e., substituting nouns), but even so, in those cases the referent assumes the properties of the eliptical TH that it represents, and the concept that TH expresses as well as the contextual implications implicit in the utterance have to be very clear in order to produce any type of pragmatic interaction, and, besides, this implies a concrete knowledge on the part of both the hearer and the speaker. Thus, even in those cases, and in order to avoid confusion of function and meaning the proper function should be signalled in any type of illustration. As, for example in 6

6 B*uy these ones*



CONCLUSION

We have looked at an interactive process of some Ø morphemes in English and seen the flexibility that can be exploited by users of English. Integrative aspects of syntax and semantics are

not easy concepts to deal with partly because what is seen in surface structure are true morphemes and not Ø morphemes.

It is, however, worth remembering that there exists a relationship in which a word and its function cannot be in free variation in all or most contexts. The closest we come to absolute pragmatic interaction is through contextual relations but even here the choice of one term rather than another indicates an individual preference on the part of the speaker.

Although the choice of one or other form within the communicative act does not have to be necessarily based upon features of good style, they must rely on a contextualized structure being grammatical, acceptable and interpretable.

The result, however, is that effective communication does not allow ambiguity, and, in this sense where syntactic ambiguity may produce ambiguity of meaning, it should be marked in order to show a true interpretation through the interaction of different linguistic levels and, although in speech or in continuous prose such ambiguities are rarely noticed in clear contextual associations because the use of intonation and stress makes one interpretation more probable, the minimum probable wrong-interpretation should be avoided in any type of scientific analysis showing in this way a correlation of different levels of language towards a more scientific foundation.

NOTES

1 The following notational conventions are employed in this paper: NG = Nominal Group, H = Head, of a Nominal Phrase, TH = Thing, N-System = Nominal System.

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OLIVER TWIST : EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN THE VICTIORIAN UNDERWORLD

Chantal CORNUT-GENTILLE D'ARCY

"O for the coming of that glorious time
When, prizing knowledge as her noblest wealth
And best protection, this imperial Realm,
While she exacts allegiance, shall admit
An obligation, on her part, to teach
Them who are born to serve her and obey;
Binding herself by statute to secure
For all the children whom her soil maintains
The rudiments of letters".

(Wordswoth, 1904: lines 293-301)

Wordsworth's lines, which have been quoted again and again by generations of orators and pamphleteers, may have proved more influencial over the years than the educational writings of the economists and political philosophers of the time. This fact may remind us that Dickens was not a pioneer in using literature for educational propaganda. Rather, he was the first important novelist to do so.

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In 1808, six years before "The Excursion", the first of the great religious societies was established, to promote the education of the poor: The Royal Lancasterian Society (later renamed the British and Foreign), soon followed by the Church of England National Society. A few years later, Brougham introduced into Parliament the first of his educational bills. During the 1830s, when Dickens began writing, Parliament rejected four more Educational bills, but in 1833 it took its first tentative step towards financing popular education by voting 20,000 pounds in aid of the school societies.

There is no doubt that the commissioners's reports and subsequent debates sufficiently impressed Dickens who, from the reporters' gallery was jotting down every word said in the House[1]. But the uneasiness he felt about the policies proposed for the betterment of the lower classes must have been enhanced by the great issue of the time -the revolutionary New Poor Law- which the same utilitarians were trying to push through Parliament.

Chadwick and his clique were mainly concerned with demonstrating to Parliament the deplorable effects of the Old Poor Law. But the strong supporters of repealing the poor laws wanted, not simply theoretical evidence against outdoor relief, family allowances and inefficient workhouses, but evidence illustrating their failings of a kind that would circulate over dinner tables, tea parties and gatherings in general. This is why Brougham enlisted the help of Harriet Martineau who, within months of the publication of her *Illustrations of Political Economy*, was the most sought after of the capital's big names. If Harriet Martineau wrote up the New Poor Law proposals in the same way and with the same success as she had popularized political economy, she would help both the Government and the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge which aimed at the expansion of mass Education[2].

The six Poor Law Tales she finally agreed to write had two basic aims: firstly, to show the evils of the old Poor Law, and

secondly to "educate" working men by imbuing them with "true notions of orderliness, sobriety and political economy". (Silver,1975: 44)[3]

The out and out bias and mawkishness of these tales must have inflamed Dickens to such a point that, by means of *Oliver Twist*, he embarked on a scathing denounciation of the New Poor Law and its "education-mad" supporters.

Dickens therefore launched on a story that, unlike Harriet Martineau's idealized world, forced upon the eyes of his contemporaries a vision of existing conditions in the "Poor Law Bastilles" and a panorama of the slum world which society haughtily ignored and scorned at while happily permitting that such drastic measures should direct the lives of the very people they did not know - they WOULD not know. Thus, Dickens unsparingly described the lives of thieves, prostitutes and murderers in all their squalor. The first readers of *Oliver Twist* were shocked and appalled and indignantly refused to believe that the conditions described in the novel had any basis in real life, to such a point that in the preface to the book's third edition, published in 1841, Dickens found it necessary to defend himself by saying that the pictures of the criminal underworld were the simple truth:

> "but it is the truth. I am glad to have had it doubted for in that circumstance I should find a sufficient assurance (if Iwanted any) that it needed to be told". (1976: 37)

He believed that the stark reality of the scenes would prove a more effective deterrent to crime than: "criminal characters (...) in delicate disguise". (1976: 35)

The first eight chapters of *Oliver Twist* therefore represent a direct attack on the utilitarian tainted Poor Law, while the whole novel seems to be a back-kick to the utilitarian patronizing of

Harriet Martineau's romanticized stories, and to the brain-washing type of education they thus proposed to impart to the readers.

Oliver Twist is the story of a sweet and gentle boy who was born in a workhouse. In a previous article[4], we focussed on these opening chapters and determined how the pattern was that of a waif striving for some foothold on existence only to find himself rejected by the so-called "benevolent" society dominated by the utilitarian school of thought. He eventually runs away from his first job as apprentice to an undertaker and goes to London, where he falls in with Fagin's gang.

The first representative of this underworld is the Artful Dodger, whom Oliver meets on his way to London. The swaggering and precocious yougster "adopts" Oliver and takes him to "the dirtiest and most wretched place he had ever seen" (1976: 103). The dominant figure in this den is an "old shrivelled Jew whose villainous looking and repulsive face was obscured by a quantity of matted red hair" (1976:105). Before going to bed, Oliver has the opportunity of observing the "merry old gentleman and his pupils" (1976: 106). The boy's ironic concept of Fagin as a "merry old gentleman", or of Bet and Nancy as "very nice girls indeed" (1976: 111) suggests that Oliver's ignorance and subsequent naivety, like that of so many other pauper children, will make of him an easy prey for wicked people.

Unlike Dickens, the Utilitarians did not enter into the whys and wherefores of ignorance. The main focus of Utilitarianism was to apply a rational solution to existing social problems. They saw ignorance as a fact, but a fact that had to be remedied at once, for they were convinced that only extended and improved education would protect social order. James Mill had referred in 1812 to "the hideous deformity (...) of an ignorant and brutal people in an enlightened age and country" (Burston, 1969: 123). In his opinion, the whole purpose of education was to "render the individual, as much as possible, an instrument of happiness, first to himself, and

next to other beings" (James Mill, 1824: 11). This is why E.G. West remarks:

> "In their view, an action which was bad arose simply from ignorance of the best way of pursuing happiness". (1963:164)

This is precisely Oliver's case, he had no power of reasoning and therefore he was being led by events, but Dickens does not allow his hero to be engulfed into the warped and perverse world of thieves. The child's innocence seems to act as an armour against vice.

In the next scene, we see Fagin conscientiously grounding his boys in the element of their trades.

> "The merry old gentleman (...) trotted up and down the room with a stick, in imitation of the manner in which old gentlemen walk about the streets any hour in the day (...).All the time the two boys followed him closely about (...) at last the Dodger trod upon his toes Charley Bates stumbled up against him behind; and in that one moment they took from him, with the most extraordinary rapidity, snuff-box, note-case, watch-guard, chain, shirt-pin, pocket hand-kerchief, even the spectacle case. If the old gentleman felt a hand inany one of his pockets, he cried out where it was; and then the game began all over again". (1976: 110)

This "game" is considerably more serious than any previous efforts at apprenticeship, and although in J. Manning's opinion, Dickens did not possess any deep knowledge of educational theory (1959: 137), Fagin's school for thieves was certainly conducted along admirable pedagogical lines.

The system used by the Jew, decidedly recalls the pedagogical method advocated by the Utilitarians for the education of the lower classes. We have already mentioned the British and

Foreign School Society founded in 1814 by the Lancastarian Society, which Joseph Lancaster had set up in 1808, and the National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church, founded in 1811 by Dr. Bell. Apart from a purely religious rivalry, there existed further feud between Lancaster and Bell, for they both claimed the credit for inventing the method of instruction known as the monitorial or mutual system. However, we may point out here that, instead of a brilliant innovation, the system in question seems more like a practical adaptation of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon plan, whereby prisons, hospitals, mad-houses and even schools could be supervised and run by a minimum of personnel. The information for each lesson was given by the teacher to the senior or more advanced pupils who, in turn, taught their juniors[5].

The utilitarians supported the Lancasterian Schools because they were undenominational and therefore free from Church control and domination[6]. They saw the Lancasterian Schools as a contribution to social stability, as a barrier against crime, and as a piece of labour-saving machinery. The concept of the whole system is best expressed by an Edingburgh Review contributor who defined it in the following way:

> "Every boy seems to be the cog of a wheel - the whole school a perfect machine". (Silver, 1975: 34)

The "game" played by Fagin and his most "promising pupils" could therefore be seen as reflecting a typical Lancasterian "mechanistic drilling" of the lesson to be taught.

However, if we analyse the details of the scene more closely, it seems that the "game" could also be interpreted as a subtle jab on the part of the author at Jeremy Bentham's darling plan: *Chrestomathia*.

Chrestomathia was a collection of papers which Bentham published in 1816 and in which he stated his views on the organization of a school, the syllabus that should be followed and the general aims and principles of education. The project was intended to meet the educational needs of the growing and pushing "shopcracy" or middle classes and could be summed up as and amalgam of the thinker's Panopticon plan and the teaching method known by then as the Lancasterian monitorial system. It was therefore taken up by the utilitarians as a more up-to-date, practical and realistic alternative - or possible substitute - for what they considered as the completely useless curriculum of the existing grammar schools.

Bentham's plan was composed of two tables of contents: the first contained the details and the order of the subjects to be taught; the second, the principles of the new pedagogic system which he advocated. This last section seems to be the main target of Dickens when he has his character Fagin demonstrate the lesson to be learnt, humour his pupils, reward them and encourage their efforts. As Elissa S. Itzkin's puts it:

> "(...) constant repetition, drilling and testing (...) accounts for much of Bentham's pedagogy such as his 'place-capturing' and 'proficiency-promising' principles". (1978: 312-313)

We find all these elements in the scene Dickens portrays. The 'proficiency-promising' principle, for example, is illustrated when, after Oliver has made his attempt, Fagin pats him on the shoulder and gives him one shilling. As regards the "place-capturing" principle, Elissa S. Itzkin explains:

> "Bentham proudly asserted that the 'place-capturing' principle had converted what were usually 'corporal exercises' into a game, (...) when saying a lesson, the pupils were placed in line according to scholarship (...) the highest scholar (...) would

> begin to say the lesson, in case of error the next highest, until the place of honour for that day was once again determined." (1978: 311)

The Artful Dodger and Charley Bates, as the "best scholars" have the honour of demonstrating the lesson together with the teacher or supervisor who tells Oliver:

> "Make'em your models, my dear. Make'em your models (...) do everything they bid you, and take their advice in all matters." (1976: 111)

Thus, these two model pupils, and especially the Dodger, who, Fagin tells Oliver:

> "will be a great man himself, and will make you one too, if you take pattern by him." (1976: 111)

are to perform the function of "scholar-teachers" or "scholar-monitors", a fundamental feature of Bentham's Chrestomatic school, based, as we have stated previously, on the Lancaster-Bell monitorial system.

What could have "tickled" Dickens into parodying the project in question and applying its main principles to the practical world of thieves were such statements as the following:

> "(Prior to Bentham's Chrestomathia) no plan of instruction has (ever) been adopted for those engaged in active business life (...) and nothing has been done to enable those who are actually to conduct the affairs of the world." (Itzkin, 1978: 313)

The point at hand was that, while the endless hubbub about the educational needs of the middle classes was taking place, thousands of children like Oliver were becoming delinquents through neglect of society. By ridiculing the utilitarian educational

project for the middle classes, Dickens was in fact alluding to society's failing in preventing crime. Like many of his contemporaries, the author was exaggerating the efficacy of education -but sarcastically, for the REVERSE PURPOSE: The Jew was using "practical useful instruction" for his "domestic economy and personal comfort" and that of his pupils or would-be thieves. In other words, by having Fagin "educate" Oliver in order to confine him for ever to the underworld, Dickens was actually adopting a vaguely Rousseauesque notion of the innocent warped and made evil by institutions- "what human nature may be made to be". This was the real and objective social terror the author wished to bring into focus for his readers.

It is noticeable that over and over again, Oliver's relationship with Fagin and the thieves is presented in educational terms. After Oliver's first "lesson", Fagin encouragingly tells the boy:

> "If you go on, in this way, you'll be the greatest man of the time".

He then proceeds to instruct him in another aspect of the trade:

> "and now come here, and I'll show you how to take the marks out of handkerchiefs". (1976: 112)

Oliver's innocence makes him wonder:

> "What picking the old gentleman's pocket in play, had to do with the chances of being a great man. But thinking that the Jew, being so much his senior, must know best, he followed him quietly to the table and was soon deeply involved in his new study." (1976: 112)

When Oliver is kidnapped and dragged back to the old Jew's den:

> "Mr. Fagin took the opportunity of reading Oliver a long lecture on the crying sin of ingratitude". (1976: 117)

The Dodger, trying to break down Oliver's refractory attitude to them, tells him:

> "you've been brought up bad (...) Fagin will make something of you though, or you'll be the first he ever had that turned out unprofitable." (1976: 183)

Fagin was determined to make of Oliver a good and profitable thief:

> "Oliver was seldom left alone; but was placed in almost constant communication with the two boys, who played the old game with the Jew every day, whether for their own improvement or Oliver's. Mr. Fagin knew best. In short, the wily old Jew (...) was now slowly instilling into his soul the poison which he hoped would blacken it, and change its hue for ever." (1976: 185)

It was the hue of Oliver's life that was to change when in the "joint guardianship" (1976: 113) of his scholar-monitors, Oliver was sent out on his first "excursion" which was to prove so disastrous and yet, parallely, so positive for the young child.

When fingered out as the depredator, Oliver is at loss, and Dickens wryly remarks:

> "Although Oliver had been brought up by philosophers, he was not theoretically acquainted with the beautiful axiom that self-preservation is the first law of Nature." (1976: 116)

The author, thus, recalls the fact that in the hands of utilitarian officials, the child had not even been taught what opponents of the philosophy considered to be the practical basis of the pleasure and

pain doctrine. Such dispariging opinions as Dickens's led John Stuart Mill to complain later that:

> "To suppose that life has no higher end than pleasure - no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit - they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine only worthy of swine". (1972: 7)

From the moment Mr. Brownlow, the benevolent old gentleman, takes Oliver to his house (which occurs in chapter eleven) there is a drastic change of direction in the whole theme of the book. As Arnold Kettle explains:

> "Until Oliver wakes up in Mr. Brownlow's house he is a poor boy struggling against the inhumanity of the State. After he has slept himself in to the Brownlow world he is a bourgeois who has been done out of his property". (Hobsbawn, 1981: 45)

We therefore lose the topic of Oliver's domestic and scholastic education as the initial plot gradually disintegrates into a mere Victorian success story. However, the keynote is struck when Oliver's idyllic life with Mr Brownlow is suddenly ended; he has gone on an errand, and is recaptured by Sikes and Nancy:

> "(...) over-powered by the conviction of the by-standers that he really was the hardened little wretch he was described to be; what could one poor child do? darkness had set in; it was a low neighbourhood; no help was near; resistance was useless." (1976: 158)

"What could one poor child do?" -this, is essentially the world of Oliver Twist. The author's vivid account of the criminal underworld into which Oliver (as the representative of neglected children) could have been swallowed up and lost for ever, was

meant to be instructive not only to such sheltered readers as Queen Victoria but also to the spirited utilitarian reformists of the time.

NOTES

1.As a young man, Dickens was determined to better his position in life. He decided that journalism would secure him a more lucrative and exciting mode of living than his duties as clerk to the sollicitors Messrs. Ellis and Blackmore. For this reason he began to study short-hand with great vigour and, on mastering that accomplishment, he became a free-lance reporter. His constant and meticulous work soon won him an appointment as parliamentary reporter for the *Mirror of Parliament*. He threrefore reached the gallery just in time to witness the final stages of the struggle over the Reform Bill of 1832 and, in the following months:

> "(...) he certainly heard the legislators debating the labouring conditions in the factories and the operations of the Poor Law." (Johnson, 1952, 1: 88)
>
> In other words, as reported by Robert Langton:
>
> "In this time Charles Dickens must have listened to and taken down the words of the speeches of nearly every public man of the last generation." (1883: 104)

including Brougham's educational bills.

Whatever hopes the young reporter might have entertained about the Reform Bill, he must have noticed that there still existed in the main, a determined effort to defeat the very measures for which he felt most sympathy, that is, the measures or bills designed to better the lives of the poor and their children.

Dickens was therefore not very impressed with the parliamentary sessions he witnessed. Edgar Johnson describes how the young man steadily grew more sceptical about the ultimate benefits of all the legislative proceedings and that he even came close to abhorrence of the whole parliamentary system (1952: 88)

> Dickens has David Copperfield say:
>
> "Night after night I record predictions that never came to pass, professions that are never fulfilled, explanations that are only meant to mistify (...) I am sufficiently behind the scenes to know the worth of political life. I am quite an Infidel about it, and shall never be converted." (1975: 692)

It must have been during these long sessions that Dickens perceived how reform could be more easily achieved by appealing to men's emotions, humour and imagination, rather than to their intellects through heavy-going and long-winded debates.

The fact is that he managed to secure a post on the staff of the *Morning Chronicle*, which was then actively supporting the whig party. We may point out here that John Black, the editor of "The Chronicle", was a philosophical radical, a close friend of James Mill and a disciple of Jeremy Bentham. He was, John Stuart Mill said:

> "The first journalist who carried criticism and the spirit of reform into the details of English institutions." (Johnson, 1952: 94)

2. Although, at the time, the public authorities did not yet contemplate the managing and administering of a national system of education, much was being done outside parliament to promote easier access to education for the lower classes. The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge is only one of the many devices which materialized during that period to facilitate literacy to a wider range of people. This society. based on the utilitarian philosophy, was founded in 1826 and had Jeremy Bentham, Brougham and James Mill on its London committee. It was self-supporting and the chief aim of its cheap publications was to foment the acquirement -not of "knowledge" as such, too close in meaning to erudition and culture -but of "useful knowledge", that is, a restricted and controlled accumulation of data, best suited to the interests of the recipients.

James Mill believed that wider diffusion of knowledge would ultimately lead to a loosening of the extremely rigid class divisions. He remarked:

> "All the difference which exists, or can be made to exist,between one body or class of men and another is wholly owing to education. Those peculiarities which sink one man below, or elevate him above the ordinary state of aptitude (...) is undeniably the effect of education." (1824: 19)

In his opinion, the "ingredients of intelligence" were two: knowledge and sagacity. "The one affording the material upon which the other could be exerted" (1824: 17). Education was therefore a sure means of getting on in life and "useful" knowledge an effective short-cut to the attainment of happiness.

The Society for the Diffusion of useful Knowledge was therefore preoccupied with the contents as well as the cost of its publications. This duality of purpose was to be a constant theme throughout the Society's lifetime (1826-1846).

3. Harriet Martineau agreed to write six tales for the Society. In the first place: *Weal and Woe in Garveloch*, which illustrated Thomas Malthus's theory

on population and *Cousin Marshall* , which explained Malthus's arguments against charity. The contents of the remaining four are best outlined by the author herself:

> "I adopt as the ground work of the four tales the four leading queries used by the Poor Law Commissioners as guides in their enquiries. My first tale will be found to exhibit: The persons to whom parochial relief is given. The second: The forms in which relief is given . The third: The persons by whom it is awarded. The fourth: The persons at whose expense it is given." (1833: letter to S.D.U.K.)

4. "Oliver Twist: An Irreclaimable Wretch." *Miscelánea* vol.8, 1987. Departamento de Filología Inglesa y Alemana, Universidad de Zaragoza, 123-134.

5. It is interesting to note here that James Mill used the monitorial system within his own family in an undiscriminating way. His system was to instruct John Stuart Mill and then to set John to teach his sisters and later his brothers, then James Mill would hear the lessons of all of them. (1965: 12)

6. If there were to be only denominational schools, the utilitarians argued, then each town or village would need one for each denomination, and the result would be a large number of small schools, hopelessly uneconomic to run, and which would rob the monitorial system of its cheapness and of its immediate practicability. This led John Stuart Mill to say:

> "Education provided by this public must be education for all, and to be education for all it must be purely secular education." (Gregg, 1973: 249)

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TRADUCCION DE UN POEMA: EL RETO IMPOSIBLE

Carmen PEREZ ROMERO

La traducción literaria se ha convertido, en las tres últimas décadas, en una disciplina que, encuadrada en la lingüística, tal como propugnan Mounin (1971, 1976) y Jakobson (1963) entre otros, ha adquirido una considerable dignidad desde el punto de vista de la propia *Uebersetzungwissenschaft* propiamente dicha a la par que va proporcionando frutos en el plano de la práctica al aparecer traducciones de diversos sistemas lingüísticos planteadas desde perspectivas más serias.

Ahora bien, si bien es cierto que puede considerarse, tal como opina Jean Marie Zemb, que la traducción "fonctionne comme un dispositif contrastif d'investigation grammaticale" (1981: 8), no lo es menos que es preciso plantear este problema desde la óptica de una doble vertiente lingüística y literaria, tal como propugna Steiner (1975), quien afirma que no puede enunciarse una teoría de la traducción que no sea, a la vez, teoría del lenguaje y de la literatura.

De todos modos, si no es posible disociar lenguaje de literatura, tampoco podrán separarse la teoría y la práctica de la traducción. Asimismo, el dominio de la técnica del traductor estará en función del dominio que éste tenga, tanto del sistema lingüístico original y del sistema lingüístico terminal, como de la literatura de una y otra lengua. Sin embargo, el peso específico de los conocimientos lingüísticos requeridos debe ser mayor que el de los conocimientos literarios.

Muchas son las teorías que han surgido y siguen apareciendo en torno a los problemas que plantea la traducción ya sea desde los centros especializados, ya desde la perspectiva de investigadores individuales[1] Sin embargo, en una elevada proporción algunas de dichas teorías surgen de la experiencia propia en el ámbito de la práctica traductora, lo que hace que se basen muchas veces en traducciones de novela que, junto con las tradicionales de los textos doctrinales, es el género que más ha circulado en el marco de la traducción. La poesía, por razones obvias, se ha traducido y se traduce menos, porque traducir poesía es, sin duda, una actividad que provoca, no pocas veces, una intensa sensación de frustración, al menos, en lo relacionado con la traducción como resultado. No obstante, es preciso diferenciar la traducción como resultado del proceso de la misma, es decir del acto de traducir. El proceso de la traducción es algo tan apasionante casi como la propia creación, porque el traductor se convierte en un agudo lector, un lector que debe leer "al sesgo", empleando la expresión machadiana; porque es un lector que "se situe à un niveau différent, car son interpretation aboutit à la recréation" (Connena, 1981: 81). En tales circunstancias, "la traduction est donc un outil supplémentaire pour la lecture, une sorte de loupe que agrandit le texte et en révèle les secrets" (Connena,1981: 81). Y en este aspecto radica precisamente la grandeza de la actividad traductora tan ingrata y gratificante al mismo tiempo: en el hecho de que haya debido llegarse a un alto grado de comprensión del contenido, es decir, en

la actividad semasiológica, antes de intentar pasar al estadio de la expresión, o actividad onomasiológica. Sólo la lectura profunda del texto puede conducirnos a la aprehensión del mensaje oculto tras los significantes del texto poético- entendido en su sentido más lato. El que esto se logre en mayor o menor grado depende de una serie de factores que podrían agruparse en dos categrías: los intrínsecos al propio texto, tales como la ambigüedad existente en el mismo, o incluso "plurigüedad", tal como lo denomina García Yebra (1973: 73); la frecuencia de usos connotativos; la mayor o menor elaboración de los recursos estilísticos, es decir el grado de "extrañamiento", según acepción de Sklovski; la presencia de esquemas rítmicos o métricos, etc. La otra categoría la constituyen los factores extrínsecos al texto, tales como la diferencia lingüística existente entre las dos lenguas, la formación y la capacidad comprensiva y expresiva del traductor, etc. Los factores de una y otra categoría contribuyen a hacer el texto más o menos traducible.

Sobre este particular de la traductibilidad del texto, y tal como sugiere el título de este trabajo, mi postura parece diferir de ciertas opiniones que, por otra parte, me parecen autorizadas en no pocos aspectos. Ya el propio Mounin argumentaba, en un trabajo que es considerado como un clásico en este aspecto, sobre lo traducible y lo intraducible. Ladmiral es incluso tajante al respecto al declarar: "...je veux bien qu'on ne prononce pas le mot tabou *intraduisible* (et même qu'on se plaise à parler de "traductibilité", comme le font G. Mounin et H. Meschonnic)" (1981:14). Puede parecer osadía tratar de contradecir opiniones de dignos representantes de la traductología. Sin embargo, mi actitud dialéctica se basa en torno a lo que puede entenderse por traducible o su antónimo. Está claro que traducir consiste en entender, con la mayor profundidad posible, un texto en la lengua de origen y transportar su contenido, con la mayor "fidelidad" a la lengua receptora "la traduction consiste", dicen Taber y Nida, "a reproduire dans la langue réceptrice le message de la langue source

au moyen de l'équivalent le plus proche et le plus naturel d'abord en ce qui concerne le sens, ensuite en ce qui concerne le style" (1971: 11). Expresado así, de esta forma un tanto simple, parece que la traductibilidad de un texto está asegurada, que todo debe ser traducible, si bien esto nos lleva a un nuevo problema: el de la "fidelidad" al texto literario original.

¿Qué se entiende por fidelidad al texto? No parece que sea discutible la fidelidad como cualidad indispensable a la hora de traducir y que constituya un rasgo digno de tenerse en cuenta cuando se evalúa críticamente una traducción. Ahora bien, ¿a qué tipo de fidelidad nos referimos? Porque no obtendremos los mismos resultados si somos fieles al contenido y a los valores semántico-sintácticos que si lo somos a elementos de tipo rítmico, estructural o métrico, salvo en los casos en que se pueda ser fieles a unos y otros. La Escuela del Sentido, (y con ella Schleiermacher, P. Newman, W. Benjamin y Steiner entre otros) "considera que la traducción literalizante ajustada es teóricamente la forma más perfecta de las traducciones" (Sáez Hermosilla, 1983-84: 46), actitud que, por otra parte, se remonta incluso a San Jerónimo.

De todos modos, y dado que no es fácil llegar a la fidelidad absoluta o al calco perfecto, considero que, como propugna Meschennic, "Un texte serait l'ensemble de ses traductions significativement différentes" (1981: 6). Con ello, un texto original alcanzará mayor grado de justeza cuanto mayor sea el número de las versiones acertadas que de él se realicen, siempre que cada una vaya aglutinando lo mejor de todas las que la precedieron. Tal vez así podremos llegar a lo que Yedra considera como la regla de oro de la traducción: "*decir todo* lo que dice el original, *no decir nada* que el original no diga, y *decirlo todo con la corrección y naturalidad* que permita la lengua a la que se traduce" (1982: 43).

Pese a lo expuesto, existen ciertos elementos que es preciso sacrificar, sobre todo cuando nos encontramos ante un texto poético. A veces hay que optar por alguna de las posibles lecturas

que el término, el sintagma o la oración ofrecen. En el plano denotativo el problema se simplifica, aunque no siempre; pero no ocurre lo mismo en el plano de las connotaciones. Por otra parte, existen registros y niveles lingüísticos, cuestiones de ritmo, de metro o de rima, etc. La traducción ideal, sin duda, sería la que, una vez valorados todos los criterios y llevados a la práctica, hubiera hallado la vía de plasmarlos en la lengua receptora. No obstante, la experiencia demuestra que, desde el punto de vista de los resultados, siempre hemos de pagar determinado tributo en la aduana de la frontera lingüística[2]. De ahí que aflore esa sensación de frustración a la que me refería anteriormente y que tan bien conocen todos los traductores.

A diferencia de lo que ocurre con el resultado, el proceso de la traducción, la actividad traductora, ofrece un sinnúmero de alicientes, entre ellos el polémico concepto de "traductibilidad". Considerado desde el punto de vista del proceso mental que tiene lugar a la hora de traducir, la "traductibilidad", ¿quién lo duda?, debe estar bien afincada en la mente del traductor. Partir de una base contraria sería ir abocados al fracaso que llevaría consigo el iniciar una tarea que, a priori, se considera inútil. El texto está ailí, dispuesto a ser interpretado en sus más mínimos detalles y transportado a otras latitudes. Desde el primer momento, entran en acción fuerzas procedentes de tres campos vectoriales bien definidos: a) el de las ideas contenidads en el mensaje codificado en una lengua específica; b) el de la descodificación que ha de efectuarse dentro del sistema lingüístico original; c) el de la trascodificadión a la lengua terminal. Todo ello teniendo siempre en cuenta tanto el plano del contenido como el de la expresión en la concepción hjelmsleviana. El punto de confluencia de estas fuerzas y la energía que se desprenderá de la unión de las mismas ocasionando un nuevo texto, así como la calidad del texto resultante, dependerá de los factores intrínsecos y extrínsecos

citados anteriormente. Y todo ello se tiñe, de alguna manera, de la personalidad del traductor.

Y entramos, en este momento, en otro de los problemas que se plantean al traducir; el de la presencia del traductor en el texto. Sobre esto, Ladmiral escribe (1981: 29):

> Une traduction littéraire reste toujours entachée, et ennoblie, de la subjectivité proprement 'poétique' qui lui a donné le jour et, plus encore, de celle du texte originel qu'elle imite et dont elle s'*autorise* (...) au terme d'une dialectique qui, dans le même temps, la valide et la relativise puisqu'aussi bien ce n'est ni tout à fait la même ni tout à fait une autre.

Y, más adelante, añade: "La traduction littéraire n'est qu'une version du texte original, une parmi autres". Teodoro Sáez Hermosilla, por su parte, afirma: "...en el texto se esconde la subjetividad del autor, su saber, su querer expresar" (1983-84: 45). Y todo ello, naturalmente, pasado por el filtro de la lectura detallada sobre la que insistiré, aun a riesgo de parecer reiterativa; porque en la lectura del texto poético no puede dejarse nada al azar, ya que cada signo - e incluso la ausencia de signo - es altamente significativo. Juan Ramón Jiménez, que demostró en su vida y en su obra un insaciable afán de búsqueda de lo inefable, comenta en más de una ocasion; "Mi ilusión ha sido siempre ser más cada vez poeta 'de lo que queda' hasta llegar un día a no escribir". (Arturo del Villar: 1975: 183). En poesía, un blanco, un recurso de aposiopesis, etc., pueden ser tan significativos como los propios signos lingüísticos; también lo pueden ser otros elementos tipográficos, que se convierten en lo que Meschonnic denomina "métasigne" (1979: 46).

Por todo ello, la traducción en su proceso cobra un alto grado de importancia en tanto en cuanto es la vía por la que un mensaje, ininteligible para ciertos receptores, se abre camino a través de una

interpretacion "iluminada" del traductor, que se convierte en una especie de medium transmisor del mensaje[3].

El traductor, sin embargo, debe mantenerse en los límites del análisis objetivo - aunque haya de aflorar su personalidad en la opción de términos, en la selección de las estructuras sintácticas o métricas, en la elección de determinados ritmos. Debe, en suma, "être et savoir disparaître"[4]. El traductor debe permanecer en la sombra desde el punto de vista de la ideología y sólo dejar que funcione como suyo propio el buen sentido crítico y la capacidad analítica: sus "dos alas", a pesar de que, según comentan Mirella Connena y Domenico D'Oria, "Le traducteur devient auteur tout en restant perméabilisé par l'écriture originaire" (1981: 80). No puede olvidarse que la traducción es un acto tan social como la lengua y tan individual como el habla, según opina L.G. Kelly (1979: 227). Y, por ende, una escuela incomparable para el rigor intelectual y para la escritura a la par que un beneficio para la formación del traductor.

Por lo que se refiere a la actitud que debe adoptarse existen al menos dos tendencias encontradas en cierto sentido. Ch.R. Taber y E.A. Nida propugnan la opción por lo que denominan "equivalencia dinámica" frente a la "equivalencia formal" (1971:1). Sin embargo, mi punto de vista difiere relativamente de ese criterio, aunque entiendo las razones que mueven a esos traductólogos al tomar esa postura, ya que su actividad gira en torno a textos de carácter doctrinal, como es la Biblia, cuyo contenido debe ser tenido muy en primer lugar. En el campo de la poesía, sin embargo, los aspectos formales cobran la misma importancia que los semánticos, lo que la convierte en el terreno "mas escabroso y más resbaladizo de la traducción literaria" (García Yebra, 1983: 40), razón por la que considero que constituye un reto tanto mas atractivo cuanto más arduo sea el trabajo que hay que efectuar.

Como quiera que teoría y práctica no pueden disociarse en el campo que nos ocupa, trataré de ejemplificar parte de lo expuesto en esta segunda parte, que, emulando a Mounin, me atrevo a titular:

"UN POEMA Y CUATRO VERSIONES"[5]

Para servirnos de modelo he seleccionado, probablemente, uno de los ejemplos en los que la "intraductibilidad" es palmaria. Me refiero al soneto nº 135 de William Shakespeare, que transcribiré íntegramente y comentaré muy de pasada antes de ofrecer cada una de las versiones con un breve comentario crítico.

Soneto nº 135

Whoever hath her wish, thou hast thy will,
And "Will" to boot, and "Will" in over-plus,
More than enough am I that vex thee still,
To thy sweet will making addition thus.
Wilt thou whose will is large and spacious,
Not once vouchsafe to hide my will in thine?
Shall will in others seem right gracious,
And in my will no fair acceptance shine?
The sea all water, yet receives rain still,
And in abundance addeth to his store,
So thou being rich in will add to thy will
One will of mine to make thy large will more.
Let no unkind, no fair beseechers kill,
Think all but one, and me in that one "Will".

El soneto es uno de los tres que Shakespeare monta en torno a la polisemia del término "will", siendo los otros dos el 136 y el 143, si bien la recurrencia de dicho término es mayor en éste, con 14 veces a lo largo del soneto en dos de sus formas paradigmáticas. Presenta el esquema del soneto isabelino, denominado también shakespeariano[6] y su ritmo es ascendente estando formado por la

alternancia de pentámetros y tetrámetros yámbicos. El "conceit" gira en torno a la amfibología de "will" , como cabía suponer, y el predominio de la rima viene impuesto por dicho término también: /il/.

Veamos ahora, muy someramente, las posibles connotaciones de "will". En principio, funcionalmente, se sitúa en dos categorías morfológicas distintas: verbo y sustantivo. Como verbo, podemos considerar que, aunque su función es preferentemente auxiliar, en las postrimerías del siglo XVI[7] o comienzos del XVII, todavía se le encuentra con valor léxico y significación relacionada con la idea de querer volitivo. En cuanto a la función nominal, su significación diverge más, dado que puede interpretarse como "voluntad", "deseo" - y, próxima a esta última idea, deseo sensual, que por ampliación llega a aludir a los órganos sexuales tanto femeninos como masculinos -, "amor' y puede ser, a la vez, el diminutivo de William, nombre del poeta, probable nombre del amigo si la teoría de los pembrokistas es correcta y, para algunos que van más allá, nombre del marido de la "Dark Woman", si ésta es Mary Fitton. Naturalmente, estos dos últimos supuestos han de tomarse con la debida precaución. No obstante, sea como fuere, el término "will" se le presentaba a Shakespeare, tan amigo de "puns" y "quibbles", como considerablemente sugestivo al encerrar, en el ámbito connotativo, tanta significación que le permitía expresar sentimientos de otro modo inexpresables.

El soneto pertenece al segundo de los bloques en que se divide el corpus según la mayoría de la crítica autorizada[8] , lo cual nos permite, a la hora de la traducción, la posibilidad de verter los adjetivos aplicados a la misma en castellano, cosa que hubiera sido arriesgada de no conocer este detalle. Por lo que se refiere a los tres "Will" que aparecen con mayúsculas y entrecomillados, según la edición de Thorpe, parece que el poeta quiere darnos a entender que se trata de nombres propios, aunque quizá los dos del segundo verso

pudieran tener un carácter más genérico que específico, siendo un nombre tan común en el mundo anglófono.

El tema se centra en el reproche que el poeta hace a la amada por los desdenes de ésta. Un tema nada original para quienes hayan leído a cualquiera de los sonetistas del renacimiento europeo. Sin embargo, la originalidad radica en el tratamiento de dicho tema y el trato de que es objeto la amante -y habremos de tener en cuenta la contraposicion amada/amante, porque Shakespeare es bien explícito sobre este particular, tal como puede apreciarse en el soneto nº 130, todo un paradigma de la antítesis de la amada renacentista. La mujer que se nos describe en el 130 y en otros, además de éste, dista mucho de ser la heroína divinizada que propugna el amor cortés. Aquí la vemos más en la línea de una coqueta, casquivana: "thou hast thy will / And 'Will' to boot and 'Will' in over-plus"; "...whose will is large and spacious"; mujer que ha concedido sus favores a más de uno: "shall will in others seem right gracious", aunque no se los conceda al poeta; y que parece despertar el apetito de lo "beseechers". A pesar de toda esa carencia de cualidades positivas, sabemos que el poeta parece amarla "dearly", por lo que no sorprende que cierre el soneto suplicándole que acceda a retenerle a él solo en su pensamiento.

Esto, que no pretende pasar de una pobre peráfrasis, pone de manifiesto que un poema con tal carga connotativa y aun denotativa se convierte en INTRADUCIBLE en su dimensión total, si queremos que responda a la definición: "La traduction consiste à reproduire dans la langue réceptrice le message de la langue source au moyen de l'équivalent le plus proche et le plus naturel d'abord en ce qui concerne le sens, ensuite en ce qui concerne le style", ya mencionada.

A la hora de evaluar el estilo tendremos necesariamente que considerar si el verso es parte del estilo y si, en un caso concreto y nunca de forma generalizada, hemos de traducir un poema rimado en verso o en prosa poética.

No son pocos los traductores y traductólogos que se alinean a una y otra parte en la doble vertiente de la prosa o el verso, y no voy a detenerme a comentar las razones que unos y otros aducen para defender sus posturas, porque la mayor parte de las veces alegan razones de peso. Digamos simplemente que, como García Yebra (1983: 139-40, 142), considero que una buena traducción en verso es mejor que una buena traducción en prosa, porque entiendo que un buen poema merece que el traductor haga el esfuerzo de traducirlo de la manera más "invariante" posible y, en consecuencia, plano del contenido y plano de la expresión deben buscar encontrarse en el nuevo sistema ligüístico. Tagore, que tradujo buena parte de su obra del hindú al inglés- y nunca se sintió satisfecho-, afirmaba que el ritmo es la fuerza creadora puesta a disposición del artista. Y Pope, en uno de los poemas de su *An Essay On Criticism*, significativamente titulado "Sound and Sense", escribe: "The sound must seem an echo to the sense". Recordemos también que la rima dota a la traducción de una cierta pátina arcaizante, sin que esto deba entenderse de forma peyorativa. Nada más propio de un soneto del siglo XVI o del XVII que aparecer, si ello es posible, con la impronta de la versión original. En este caso concreto, ¿qué es lo que hace que el corpus de los 154 sonetos de Shakespeare sea una obra genial difícilmente superable? Es evidente que, desde el punto de vista temático, coinciden con buena parte de los sonetos producidos en su época, si salvamos la circunstancia de ese "ménage a trois" que constituyen el poeta, el "Fair Friend" y la "Dark Woman". Por otra parte, los recursos literarios son, más o menos, los que usan, no sólo los buenos sonetistas del renacimiento inglés, Sidney y Spenser, sino también los de poetas de segunda línea tales como Drayton, Daniel o Constable, por citar algunos. Resumiendo, ¿qué es lo que los diferencia del resto? Sin lugar a dudas, la habilidad del poeta en el uso de dichos recursos, la gracia del estilo, la adecuación de las imágenes, la tersura estructural, la precisión en la elección de cada

uno de los elementos y, todo ello, impulsado por un oído excepcional a la hora de marcar el ritmo.

Y llegados a este punto, hemos de reconocer que verter tales composiciones a una lengua tan alejada del inglés como es el español nos va e exigir dejar en la frontera de las dos lenguas una buena parte del equipaje. Ante tal situación, uno tiene que establecer una escala de valores preferenciales; y las opciones estarán en virtud de la actitud que los distintos traductores adopten ante el texto original. Si se opta por rechazar el verso en la traducción de verso rimado concediendo una mayor relevancia a la semántica se perderá menos del contenido, siempre que se logre una cierta belleza en el ritmo que, si no parejo al del original, produzca una sensación grata en el oído del nuevo receptor. Si, por el contrario, nos decidimos por el verso y con él la rima, la cuestión se complica; inevitablemente nos encontraremos con elementos que hemos de dejar embargados: estructruras sintácticas que se rompen, adición de elementos inexistentes y supresión de otros existentes en el texto original, desplazamiento de lugares relevantes de determinadas palabras en cuyo lugar aparecerán otras, pérdida o modificación de algunos de los recursos estilísticos, etc. Lo único que puede hacerse es procurar que el desbarajuste sea lo más pequeño posible.

Veamos, ahora, cuatro versiones del soneto transcrito, que nos permitirán comprobar en la práctica las teorías que se han comentado.

Versión nº 1

Sea el que fuere tu deseo, tú tienes tu *Will* (voluntad).
La *Voluntad* de ganar y la *Voluntad* (Will) en demasía;
sé demasiado bien que te contrarío, viniendo así a
añadirme a tu dulce *Voluntad.*¿No quieres tú, cuya

voluntad es vasta y espaciosa, consentir por una vez en
que *Voluntad* se oculte en la tuya?
Will (la voluntad) ha de ser siempre bien acogida con
los otros y nunca mi voluntad se verá honrada con una
bella aceptación?
El mar, que es todo agua, recibe, no obstante, la
lluvia, que añade a los tesoros de su abundancia;
dígnate, pues, tú, que eres rica en voluntad (*Will*),
unir a tu voluntad, para devolverte tu *Will* más vasto
aún.
No mates más a los suplicantes con tu cruel belleza.
No pienses más que en un solo *Will.* »

Esta traducción de Astrana Marín, pionera y, por lo tanto, meritoria, puesto que la cultura inglesa estaba entonces mucho más alejada de lo que lo está hoy de la nuestra, es un ejemplo de lo que ocurre cuando se opta por el contenido. El carácter prosaico es lo más destacado, al que contribuyen las explicaciones parentéticas. Por otra parte, el traductor no parece haber profundizado en los valores de "will", ya que en nota a pie de página explica tres de los valores: el de verbo auxiliar, el de voluntad y el diminutivo de William, con lo que se ha perdido también buena parte del contenido, empobreciendo los matices existentes en el original. Es cierto que el propio Astrana Marín reconoce la dificultad que el texto entraña y su insatisfacción por el resultado.

Veamos ahora, aquellos otros aspectos en los que la versión no se ajusta al contenido, intentando comprender cuáles fueron las razones que movieron al traductor a elegir una determinada palabra o expresión. El primer verso presenta un error que puede haber pasado inadvertido al traductor porque en el texto original es una incógnita. Me refiero al sintagma "her wish" del soneto inglés y que el traductor ha vertido como "tu deseo". Efectivamente, esa parece

que debería ser la forma más lógica, dado que a lo largo del soneto nos es imposible descubrir la identidad de esa tercera persona -femenina- que se encierra en el "her' y que no vuelve a aparecer en los catorce versos que giran en torno al "I" y al "thou" estrictamente. La interpretación del verso nº 3 no parece muy exacta: entre otras cosas, traduce "am I" por "sé", que no es lo que dice el texto original. "Voluntad" y "Will" se alternan de una forma que es difícil de explicar. En el verso nº 12 "to make" no está correctameente interpretado, y al verterlo por "devolverte" se percibe que el traductor no captó la idea de sexo presente en el poema. Por último, parece innecesario el haber añadido al "no mates", que traduce bien al verbo "kill", "con tu cruel belleza", que no existe en el texto.

Versión nº 2

Otras tuvieron lo deseado, tú tienes tu "Deseo",
un "Deseo' para ganar y un sobrante "Deseo";
sé bien que estoy de más, siempre persiguiéndote
para que me añadas a tu dulce deseo.
¿Desearás tú, cuyo deseo es tan vasto y espacioso,
conceder por una vez que mi deseo en el tuyo se
esconda?
¿El deseo de otros te parecerá recto y agraciado,
mientras a mi deseo ninguna bella aceptación lo ilumina?
El mar, todo agua, aún acoge a la lluvia,
y, con tanta abundancia, acrecienta su mole;
así tú, siendo rica en "Deseo", añade a tu "Deseo"
un deseo mío, para hacer más grande tu amplio "Deseo".
Que una negativa descortés no mate a tus gentiles
suplicantes:
acoge a todos en uno, y a mí en ese único "Deseo".[10]

Los traductores de esta versión han optado por el término "Deseo" como única traducción de "will", que, si bien responde a algunos de los posibles valores de la palabra inglesa, abandona cualquiera de los restantes.

Asimismo han elegido la prosa como marco formal y tampoco puede decirse que sea una prosa poética propiamente dicha, ya que no presenta un alto grado de lirismo.

En cuanto a los detalles particulares de aspectos que no presentan ni correspondencia formal ni dinámica[11], tenemos, en primer lugar, que la propia elección del término "deseo" obliga a los traductores a buscar otra versión para "her wish", del primer verso, y han elegido "lo deseado", sintagma que se encuadra en la misma área semántica que la primera opción y cuya diferencia es sólo funcional. Con ello desaparece el juego dialéctico elaborado por Shakespeare en torno a la dicotomía "wish"/"will" con sus afinidades y diferencias, su aliteración, etc. La expresión "Sé que estoy de más", del verso nº 3, me temo que no traduce con exactitud "More than enough am I": el sintagma "de más" equivale a "estar de sobra", en tanto que el texto inglés sugiere la idea de suficiencia para algo en grado superlativo. Probablemente es sólo una cuestión de subjetividad en la apreciación de estos dos conceptos en los que la línea divisoria es difusa, pero debería mantenerse la idea expresada en el soneto original por razones obvias, máxime cuando no se está ceñido por razones de rima o metro.

Por otro lado, "gracious" (v. nº 7) no debiera haber sido traducido por "agraciado"; la voz inglesa alude a cualidades anímicas y la española, por el contrario, se refiere al aspecto físico. "Gracious" puede interpretarse en este contexto como benevolente, generoso, etc. y apunta hacia una cierta consideración específica respecto de la amante a la que, con ese adjetivo, se la identifica en cierta medida con la figura regia: el epíteto en custión aparece reiteradamente en los dramas históricos del poeta inglés. El hecho de que aquí lo haya aplicado a la "Dark Woman" la sitúa más

en consonancia con la heroína de los sonetos renacentistas, aunque sólo sea por un momento, puesto que ya sabemos que no es precisamente ese el tratamiento que recibe por parte de Shakespeare[12].

El verso nº 8 tiene en castellano el deseo como objeto directo, siendo en inglés un complemento circunstancial. Y no habiendo las limitaciones que ya se han comentado debería tenderse a la fidelidad, no sólo al texto sino también al discurso.

"Mole" (nº10) parece poco adecuado para traducir "store". En inglés este término se halla dierectamente ligado, por su contenido semántico, al concepto de abundancia con idea de acumulación, lo cual no ocurre con "mole", que presenta un carácter más estático, frente al dinámico de "store".

Por último "Think" (nº14) se ha traducido por "acoge", que no responde a la idea del verbo inglés; además, "Think all but one" tiene idea de excluyente; "no pienses sino en uno" pudiendo entenderse el "all" como un mero elemento enfatizante. La versión española apunta hacia un concepto incluyente entre el todos y el uno, idea bastante extraña, si se interpreta de forma literal el "acoge", en el contexto del soneto.

Versión nº 3

Tenga otra lo que tenga, me tienes a mí,
y MI tienes de abasto y MI de demasía:
yo estoy de MI tan lleno, que te cargo así,
sobre tu dulce MI, más MI por cuenta mía.
Oh, ¿no querrás tú, cuyo TI es tan espacioso,
dignarte un punto recibirme a mí en tu TI?
¿Cualquier MI de los otros se verá gracioso,
y nunca gracia alcanzará mi propio MI?
El mar, que es toda agua, aún recibe en sí

la lluvia, que a aumentar su inmensidad se abate:
tal tú, de TI tan rica, añádele a tu MI
un MI de mí venido que tu MI dilate.
Que un fiero 'No' no mate
a los que piden mansamente entrar en ti:
ve en todos uno solo y en el uno a mí[13].

Esta versión presenta de entrada una actitud diferente del traductor, puesto que la enfoca desde otra perspectiva: la traducción en verso con rima predominantemente consonante (lo que indudablemente le va a restringir en gran medida las opciones) y con un cierto metro próximo al esquema shakespeariano: tres serventesios y un pareado final. Ahora bien, el pareado final no lo es, ya que aparece en forma de terceto en cuanto al número de líneas: la primera de ellas enlaza con el último verso del tercer serventesio y las otras dos ya sí equivaldrían al pareado. En cualquier caso, se habría añadido, o bien una línea de menor número de sílabas que las restantes, o en el pareado tenemos un verso de 20 sílabas frente a las 13/14 de los demás. Sin embargo, he de reconocer que el intento de García Calvo es meritorio.

Por lo que se refiere al detalle, existen una serie de factores que evidencian escasa calidad poética a pesar de la rima. El traductor explica en una nota la dificultad que entraña traducir dicho soneto al castellano y añade que cree haber encontrado una buena versión para todos los valores del "will" mediante el pronombre *MI*, con el que quedaría el "will" "decentemente" traducido. Luego veremos que usa también el pronombre de segunda persona; así, nos encontramos con la alternancia del MI y el TI, ambos como elementos sustantivados. Ciertamente, estos dos pronombres se acercan, fonéticamente hablando, al original "will", pero considero que se ha sometido el sistema lingüístico español a una violencia considerable con tal sustantivación: el oído de un

hispanohablante registra la dureza de una situación extremadamente forzada, en tanto que el oído de un individuo del mundo anglófono no recibe la menor sensación de sorpresa. Todo lo más percibe la utilización anafórica del término, rasgo típicamente utilizado en poesía.

Por otra parte, de la lectura de la versión española, y con la ayuda de las notas, uno saca la impresión de que se han cargado las tintas en la alusión erótica, ya considerablemente densa en el original, pero no imperante en solitario.

Desde el punto de vista de las observaciones parciales, habrá que tener en cuenta que son más disculpables por las exigencias impuestas por el metro. No obstante, será preciso enumerarlas. "De abasto" (nº 2) como traducción de "to boot" no se acerca ni semántica ni sintácticamente, aunque no podemos ignorar que el monosilabismo dominante de la lengua inglesa frente al polisilabismo de la española pone las cosas muy difíciles cuando hay que tener en cuenta el número de sílabas. El sintagma español establece un paralelismo sintáctico con "demasía" inexistente en el verso inglés siendo, además, desde el punto de vista rítmico dos sintagmas poco afortunados.

Otro tanto podría decirse de "te cargo así" (nº 3); el verbo "cargar" parece encuadrarse en el registro lingüístico de nivel coloquial -según este contexto de la versión. Por el contrario, "vex" en el original, tiene connotaciones que se adecúan mejor en otros registros, aunque no sea más que por su procedencia etimológica.

El verso nº 4 traduce "To thy sweet will" como "sobre tu dulce MI". La preposición "sobre" no es la más ajustada, y sospecho que viene impuesta por el significado del verbo "cargar" -nótese cómo con ello se introduce una intensificación del contenido erótico que no aparece en el texto base. El sintagma transcrito funciona en inglés como complemento indirecto de "making".

El verso nº 7 nos dice "se verá gracioso". No es fácil sustraerse a la idea de interpretarlo como "parecerá gracioso", y en consecuencia "parecerá cómico". "Gracioso", sólo podría ser entendido con la idea que tiene en el soneto si fuera acompañando a un sintagma tal como "Su graciosa Majestad", pero fuera de ése u otro similar el español percibe algo bien diferente. Por otra parte, vemos en la versión de la línea que sigue a la citada, "gracia", habiéndose utilizado otro término perteneciente al mismo lexema, en tanto que Shakespeare usa dos lexemas distintos: "gracious" y "acceptance".

El verso nº 10, con su final "se abate", da una idea que no responde al original "addeth", traducido por "se abate a aumentar", añadiendo algo que no existe en el texto inglés.

Otro tanto puede decirse del "venido", del nº 12 en donde "a will of mine" se vierte por "un MI de mí venido", cabe suponer que por exigencias del número de sílabas.

"Fair beseechers", del nº 13, se ha traducido, con innegable libertad, por "los que piden mansamente entrar en ti" con un número mayor de palabras de las que la propia versión exige y en donde se insiste en la idea erótica de nuevo.

Finalmente, "Think", del último verso, se ha traducido por "ve", que no es muy desacertado, pero que no dice lo que dice el verbo utilizado por Shakespeare.

No quisiera entrar en la transcripción y comentario de mi propia versión sin aclarar algo: pese a la crítica efectuada respecto a las versiones precedentes, creo que es de justicia reconocer que cada una tiene derecho a existir, y yo declaro mi deuda con aquellos que me han precedido en estas tareas[4]

Versión nº 4

Tenga alguien su deseo, tú tienes tu querer,
y "Will" para guardar y más "Will" en exceso;
soy más que suficiente y aún habré de ofender
a tu dulce querer tal añadido haciendo.
¿No querrá tu querer, que es vasto y espacioso,
dejar que mi querer en el tuyo se esconda?
¿Parecerá el querer para otros dadivoso
y en mi querer no brilla una aceptación sola?
Toda la mar es agua, y aún recibe a la lluvia,
y en lo que ya tenía en abundancia añade,
y, rica tú en querer, a tu querer adjunta
este querer de mí y tu querer se ensanche.
Que no mate a tus fieles un desabrido no;
piensa sólo en un "Will", que es el mismo que yo[15]

Es indudable que la calidad poética de esta versión dista mucho de aproximarse a la del creador de los sonetos que causaron las traducciones comentadas, pese a que no sea uno de los mejores de los 154. Sin embargo, considero que tiene cierta musicalidad.

De lo que sí puedo dar noticia exacta es del proceso que se ha seguido hasta llegar a entregar el manuscrito a la imprenta. En realidad inicié la versión de algunos de los sonetos del poeta de Startford-on -Avon como ejercicio de clase con los alumnos de 5º curso que terminarían en junio de 1982. Para ejemplificar mi teoría de la traducción en verso y de la traducción en prosa, vertí de diferentes formas una veintena de sonetos de Shakespeare y se discutieron soluciones y variantes en diversas sesiones de clase. Ese sería el primer paso para un trabajo de varios años.

Cuando decidí inclinarme por la traducción sometida a metro y rima, decidí, al mismo tiempo, que sería aconsejable reflejar el

esquema métrico del soneto isabelino para que el posible lector percibiera formalmente el marco shakespeariano. Para ello tenía las estrofas básicas en la métrica española, y ambas perfectamente entroncadas en nuestra tradición literaria: el serventesio y el pareado. Además, Rubén Darío y el resto de los modernistas, al introducir el alejandrino, aportan instrumento de compensación del desequilibrio silábico existente entre las dos lenguas. Así pues, de los 154 sonetos de Shakespeare se encontrarán con este esquema 153, ya que el nº 126, que no es un soneto, aunque sí sea un "sonnet"[16], está traducido en verso libre.

Las razones que me indujeron a optar por "querer" para la versión de la mayoría de los significados de "will" -los "Will" que aparecen en el texto inglés entrecomillados y con mayúscula los he interpretado como diminutivo de "William" y, por consiguiente, no los he vertido, indicando las razones a pie de página- son las siguientes: la voz española "querer" es considerablemente rica tanto en valores polisémicos como en funcionales. Desde el punto de vista funcional, lo hallamos en las categorías de sustantivo y verbo, como ocurre con "will" en inglés. Y en su función verbal denota tanto el carácter volitivo como el afectivo, es decir, puede indicar acciones relacionadas con la voluntad y acciones relacionadas con el amor. Bien es cierto que las connotaciones eróticas se perdían en buena medida, y era preciso disociar el nombre propio del resto de los otros "will", pero tengo la impresión de que sería difícil encontrar una palabra más versátil dentro de esta idea. Ahora bien, esta opción me ha obligado al uso de rimas pobres como son las de infinitivos verbales, que comentaré a continuación, junto con otros defectos que evidentemente presenta.

En el verso nº 2, "para guardar" no traduce con exactitud el "to boot" que, de acuerdo con el OED tiene idea de aprovecharse o tomar ventaja y que debiera haberse traducido por algo más parejo. En cualquier caso, Shakespeare lo utiliza como sinonimia de "over-plus", aunque no presente paralelismo sintáctico.

El verso nº 3 muestra una ruptura del esquema sintáctico que, en el soneto inglés, es una oración relativa -tal vez podría aceptarse la idea de posible consecutiva- con nexo "that" y el verbo de la proposición subordinada en presente. La versión, por el contrario, da dos oraciones independientes enlazadas por la conjunción "y" y el verbo en futuro de forma perifrástica.

El nº 6, por el contrario, ha dejado en la frontera "once vouchsafe", que significa "dignarse una vez", "conceder una vez al menos", y que, por razones métricas, no aparece en la versión.

"his store", del verso nº 10 está vertido como "lo que ya tenía", que pierde en cierto modo, la idea acumulativa de "store".

Y la expresión "a tu querer adjunta", con que se traduce "add to thy will", si es semánticamente ajustada, rítmicamente deja bastante que desear.

El verso nº 12 con "to make thy will more", también ha variado de la estructura subordinada final a la versión paratáctica en castellano. El verso nº 13 es de difícil interpretación, pero la mayoría de las versiones parecen haber coincidido en lo esencial del contenido, por lo que prefiero no entrar en una polémica que no sería adecuada en el ámbito de la traducción. Sin embargo, el modificador de "beseechers" ha quedado fuera en esta versión, y el propio sustantivo evidencia una traducción libre: "fieles".

El verso final ha variado el orden sintáctico y añadido un "mismo" que no está en el texto inglés y que ha sido impuesto por el obligado número de sílabas del metro elegido.

Por último hacer notar que la rima se ha visto empobrecida en algún momento al existir tal abundancia de "querer", ya que era prácticamente inevitable que no se provocara rima de infinitivo en tales circunstancias. Asimismo, debo precisar que la rima interna existente entre el verso nº 3 y el primer hemistiquio del 4º hubiera sido sumamente fácil de eliminar, pero me pareció más pertinente conservarla porque refleja una circunstancia pareja en el texto base.

Así es, "still" del verso tercero rima con el final del primer hemistiquio del 40, que termina con "will".

De todo cuanto se ha comentado a lo largo de estas páginas, quiero recalcar simplemente que, en consonancia con todo lo dicho, no me siento satisfecha de la versión que he hecho de los sonetos de Shakespeare más que por el hecho de haber tenido que leerlos con suma atención, lo cual, sin duda me ha permitido un mejor conocimiento de la lírica del poeta de *A Midsummer Night's Dream* .

NOTAS

1 Las Escuelas de Interpretación y Traducción, tanto españolas como extranjeras están dando buenos frutos en este campo como lo prueban las múltiples publicaciones periódicas que salen tanto de estos centros oficiales como de círculos más o menos independientes. Del mismo modo, se percibe su labor en la mejor calidad de las propias traducciones.

2 Ortega y Gasset también acude a este uso metafórico de la frontera y su aduana cuando dice: "Los idiomas tienen sus fronteras, sus límites y en ellos su aduana", "Gracia y desgracia de la lengua francesa", en *Obras Completas*, Tomo V, Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1970, p. 267.

3 Véase Ladmiral y Meschonnic 1981:17

4 *Id*., p. 15.

5 En efecto, Mounin tituló su ponencia en el simposio homenaje a Mario Wandruska, "Un poeme et cinq traductions", en 1971. En García Yebra 1983: 145.

6 Véase Carmen Pérez Romero, 1986.

7 La mayoría de la crítica autorizada está de acuerdo en que los sonetos debieron de escribirse entre 1598 y 1601 ó 1603. En ellos no aparece "will" como verbo léxico, pero sí podemos encontrarlo en alguna de las obras del dramaturgo creador de estos poemas.

8 Los críticos, casi unánimemente, dividen los 154 sonetos en dos grandes bloques: los 126 primeros son los que dedica Shakespeare al "Fair Friend" y los restantes van dedicados a la "Dark Woman". El que estudia este trabajo pertenece, pues, al segundo bloque.

9 Luis Astrana Marín, *Obras Completas de William Shakespeare* ,Madrid, Aguilar, 1969.

10 *William Shakespeare. Poesía Completa* , Edición bilingüe, por Fátima Auad y Pablo Mané Garzón, Barcelona, Ediciones 29, 1977.

11 En cuanto a la exactitud de correspondencias entre el texto original y el resultado de la traducción del mismo, Beekman ofrece un interesante esquema en el que establece la valoración de las mismas. Vid., Kelly, 1979: 24.

12 Véase si no el retrato que hace de la amante en el soneto 130,ya citado: "My mistress eyes are nothing like the sun,/ Coral is far more red, than her lips are,/ If snow is white, why then her breasts are dun:/ If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head:/ I have seen roses damasked, red and white,/ But not such roses see I in her cheeks..." Y concluye indicando que si la amada idealizada, etérea,del momento es capaz de andar sin posar los pies en tierra, "My mistress when she walks treads on the ground". La riqueza expresiva de cada una de las líneas de este soneto hace que huelgue toda glosa.

13 Luis García Calvo: *Sonetos de Amor* , Barcelona, Anagrama, 1983.

14 No quisiera dejar pasar la ocasión de mencionar la traducciónde 50 sonetos de Shakespeare realizada por Mújica Láinez: *William Shakespeare. Sonetos* , Madrid, Visor, 1983. El 135 no está entre esos 50 y por ello no aparece aquí, pero he de reconocer que la versión de este traductor es de una gran musicalidad poética aun cuando no los haya traducido en forma rimada.

15 Carmen Pérez Romero, *Monumento de Amor* , Cáceres, Univ. de Extremadura, 1987, p. 289.

16 En inglés "sonnet" alude, por igual, a la composición de 14 versos a la que el español llama soneto y a cualquier composición de tipo amoroso y de un número indeterminado de versos, según definición del OED, en la acepción nº 2 de la entrada correspondiente.

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THE HANDKERCHIEF AS A SUGGESTED SYMBOL IN VIRGINIA WOOLF'S *THE WAVES*

Oscar SANZ MATEO

It is a well-known fact that the handkerchief has always been a symbolic element conveying a wide and different interpretation throughout the ages. Its use is most significative in Renaissance literature especially amongst the Italians, and the climax of its importance is traceable in the literature of courtly love, when the apparently innocent young dame unwillingly allows her delicate handkerchief to drop in the presence and sight of the male whom she desires to convert into her lover. He, who in turn is honoured by the opportunity to prove his manliness, stoops before her and tenderly picks it up, considering it as a token of her love, yielding to her plead and consequently understanding the message aroused by that 'accidental' drop.

The appearance of the handkerchief in literature is thus not a mere coincidence and even less an element to be disregarded. It conveys a deep meaning which many times can trigger off the action between sexually complementary characters depending on

whether the handkerchief is shared or has succeded in establishing a type of contact between both or not.

Nevertheless, this archaic element or traditional symbol has somewhat been disregarded in 20th Century literature in which the handkerchief seems to lack or hardly bear any meaning whatsoever.

My attempt will be that of demonstrating that the handkerchief indeed appears in 20th Century literature, more precisely in Virginia Woolf's *The Waves*, with such a weight of meaning that it certainly deserves to be regarded as an element worthy of consideration and study.

Before going on to value the handkerchief in literature, it is necessary to have a clear notion of what is precisely a handkerchief. According to Webster's *Dictionary*, the handkerchief is:

1: a piece of cloth usually square and often printed,edged, or embroidered that is used for various usualpersonal purposes (as the wiping of the nose or eyes) or as a costume accessory.

2: kerchief.

The *World Book Dictionary* adds that it is 'a soft, usually square piece of cloth for wiping the nose, face, eyes, etc., or carried or worn as an ornament.'

The *Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary* gives further details and states that the form "handkercher" was common in literary use in the 16-17th Centuries and remained the current spoken form, because some time after "handkerchef" was commonly written, around the 1860's.

Joseph T. Shipley explains (1984: 50) the origin of the term (hand + kerchief) as a cloth held in the hand to cover the head and puts forward that the first kerchiefs in England were probably used by King Richard II, who reigned from 1377 (aged ten) to 1439.

'Handkerchief' is a compound word by hand + kerchief, and according to most dictionaries, kerchief is a square piece of cloth worn over the head or around the neck or shoulder, normally by women. (French: couvrir (to cover) + chief (head); Old French: cuevrechief, couvrechef, courchief, cuerchief; Middle English: courchef, kerchef, covercheif).

The aim of this brief display of the etymology of the term 'handkerchief' is to justify that the centerpoint of this study can be, besides the handkerchief as such, any other piece of cloth that can be carried or used to cover the head, such as a towel, turban, scarf, etc., for they are basically handkerchiefs, but not to be carried in the hand.

An interesting point linked to the symbol of the handkerchief is often, if not always, associated to women; that is, it can be regarded primarily as a symbol of feminity.

The *Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary* explains the meaning of the old saying which is in fact in current use: 'to drop (or throw) the handkerchief'. It refers to young people's games in which he (or she) to whom it is thrown runs after and tries to catch the other; hence, allusively to signify that one may be run after, to invite courtship.

This is probably the main allegorical interpretation of the term when used in poetry and especially prose, which implies that the handkerchief is indeed a symbol for it has a distinct meaning depending on the context in which it is used.

According to Carl G.Jung (1978: 3), what is estimated as a symbol is: "...a term, a name, or even a picture that may be familiar in daily life, yet that possesses specific connotations in addition to its conventional and obvious meaning. Implies something vague, unknown, or hidden from us.' This precise definition implies that a word, in this case the handkerchief, becomes symbolic when it points to something else than its obvious and immediate meaning,

and not necessarily must it point to the same image, but it can have a vast variety of interpretations. Surprisingly enough, Virginia Woolf handles the term "handkerchief" over twenty-five times throughout *The Waves*, including eight synonyms of the word kerchief and the difference between handkerchief and pocket-handkerchief.

Orlando and *The Voyage Out* , two other literary creations by Virginia Woolf, also reveal the appearance of the handkerchief several times. The appearance of this term is not common in novels, but in Virginia Woolf its use indicates that she wasn't so much obsessed, but rather had a noticeable weakness for the handkerchief, as she demonstrated, consciously or not, in her novels, especially in *The Waves*.

The most traditional interpretation attached to the symbol of the handkerchief is, as previously stated, the one that gives way to courtship; i.e., the handkerchief as a pretext to a promise of love on behalf of the woman,

> 'It was she who had the supreme right to his attentions. Yet she might drop all the handkerchiefs in her wardrobe (of which she had many scores) upon the ice and Orlando never stooped to pick them up.' (Woolf. 1960: 41).

In this quote the dame proves to behave as a typical young girl in search for love with the uncontrollable urge to lure Orlando into her arms. Despite Orlando's refusal to yield to her plead, her method to attract his attention is exclusively with the handkerchief which is traditional in courtly love.

This young lady seems to be an expert at either making men fall in love with her or flirting around, for she appears to possess a great deal of handkerchiefs which she presumably makes use of.

The following quote also refers to courtly love and the process it conveys, somehow encouraging the young people to

behave as genuine characters of courtly love, for it is only in youth when this can be carried out ',

> 'To see him hand the Muscovite (as she was called), to her sledge, or offer her his hand for the dance or catch the spotted handkerchief which she had let drop, or discharge any other of those manifold duties which the supreme lady exacts and the lover hastens to anticipate was a sight to kindle the dull eyes of age, and to make the quick pulse of youth beat faster.' (Woolf. 1960: 41)

As we can observe, it is the woman who allows the handkerchief to drop hinting an offer of love to the gentleman who picks it up. It would be ridiculous and illogical for the man to try to attract the lady's attention by dropping the handkerchief himself. This implies that the handkerchief can be considered strictly as a feminine symbol; i.e., an element that pertains to the woman and marks her feminity as revealed in the following quote:

> 'These broad thoroughfares -Picadilly South, Picadilly North, Regent Street and the Haymarket- are sanded paths of victory driven through the jungle. I too, withmy little patent-leather shoes, my handkerchief that is but a film of gauze, my reddened lips and my finely pencilled eyebrows, march to victory with the band.' (Woolf. 1980: 131).

The handkerchief is simply another feature of the young woman in search for love, being as important as wearing a new pair of shoes, lips painted in red and having the eyebrows made up.

Even primitive people associate the handkerchief to the female, thus distinguishing her from the male as exemplified by the native women who wore brightly coloured handkerchiefs as a means of rebounding their beauty in *The Voyage Out* (1972: 88).

By means of these last few examples, it is most likely that

Virginia Woolf manifests her feminism, estipulating to the woman what is hers, clearly differenciating both sexes by the aid of elements such as handkerchiefs or lipstick. Whenever the handkerchief appears associated to the female, it bears a meaning of delicacy and tenderness, either forming part of that fine, discreet game of courtly love or simply making proper use of that delicate piece of cloth, the handkerchief, as such. What else can be more gentle and delicate than a handkerchief providing shelter for frail butterflies?

> 'Lord, let them lay their butterflies on a pocket handkerchief on the und.' (Woolf. 1980: 8).

Many cultures have considered the handkerchief to be a feminine element which implies delicacy and perhaps virginity. Such is the case in the Arabic culture where the young girl wears a handkerchief or veil covering part of her face which, besides bringing out her feminity and tenderness, for she is a young girl, it also bears a religious and sexual meaning, for she is still a virgin, and he who uncovers the veil will be the one whom she wil marry[2].

The handkerchief can also be associated to the male, but contrary to the idea of delicacy hinted by linking the handkerchief to the female, Virginia Woolf gives a different and sometimes negative meaning to the handkerchief when dealt in terms of masculineness.

Woolf's feminism becomes again manifest, consciously or not, in this case, for it is an element belonging to the female, and it is only she who can put it into good use, whereas when the male interferes with something that does not identify him as such, it is only to make ill use of it or to readjust its genuine meaning to another which is at the same level as the masculine mind, normally bearing sexual connotations.

If we consider the napkin, a type of kerchief, to be similar to a handkerchief, the sexual symbolism in the following quote is easily traceable:

> 'Bernard moulds his bread into pellets and calls them "people". Neville with his clean and decisive ways has finished. He has rolled his napkin and slipped it through the silver ring.' (Woolf. 1980: 17).

James Joyce (1980: 693) allows Molly Bloom to fuse the idea of a man sleeping with his wife and the napkins as if the latter were forming part of this couple's bed-time love affair:

> '...I suppose he used to sleep at the foot of the bed too with his wifes mouth damn this stinking thing anyway wheres this those napkins are ah yes I know I hope the old press doesnt creak ah I knew it would hes sleeping hard had a good time.'

It is in the following quote where sex is more closely related to the handkerchief, which in turn can be a parody of courtly love where the woman, in this case Molly Bloom, offering her handkerchief to the male as a promise of love certainly keeps her word although not without teasing him, which nevertheless forms part of the game of courtship.

> '...yes O yes I pulled him off into my handkerchief pretending not to be excited but I opened my legs I wouldnt let him touch me inside my petticoat I had a skirt opening up the side I tortured the life out of him first tickling him I loved rousing...' (Joyce. 1980: 682).

Another possible sexual interpretation can be hinted by Woolf (1980: 69) in which clothing seems to be a primary element by means of which another person can be attracted or even lured to fall into the trap of appearence-reality.

> 'The black and white figures of unknown men look at me as I lean forward; as I turn aside to look at a picture, they turn too. Their hands go fluttering to their ties. They touch their waistcoats, their pocket-handkerchiefs. They are very young.'

The only apparent interest of these young males is the female who they are observing; they have no interest whatsoever in the picture, but they are rather more concerned with the girl who is looking at the picture or if they are properly dressed or not. The fact of being young is also significative, for it is the typical behaviour of most young men who try to enchant lonely young dames.

There are other times when the handkerchief or the kerchief and its synonyms (towel, napkin, etc.) become a delight for the voyeur who seems to trace or imagine the sight of bare flesh, provoking the sexual instinct to become interested in figuring out what is partly hidden behind that piece of cloth [3],

> "As he stood there, the silver trumpets prolongued their note, as if reluctant to leave the lovely sight which their blast had called forth; and Chastity, Purity, and Modesty, inspired, no doubt, by Curiosity, peeped in at the door and threw a garment like a towel at a naked form which, unfortunately, fell short by several inches. Orlando looked himself up and down in a long looking-glass, without showing any signs of discomposture, and went, presumably, to his bath.' (Woolf. 1960: 127).

But it is only with the male figure where this sexual interpretation is observable, perhaps because Virginia Woolf intended to describe the mind of the male with the aid of a female element, which is the handkerchief.

On the whole, it helps to give the reader an idea of how Woolf depicts the virility of the male almost always in sexual terms.

Also associated to the notion of sex is the stained handkerchief, either with blood or other organic substances:

> 'I hate your greasy handkerchiefs -you will stain your copy of *Don Juan* . ' (Woolf. 1980: 59).

The unison of the stained handkerchief and *Don Juan* can give way to a wide interpretation very much connected to sexuality.

Virginia Woolf seems to disapprove very much of unclean handkerchiefs indicating that the person who possesses a dirty handkerchief is as hateful and ugly as the handkerchief itself. In this case the handkerchief becomes a negative symbol representing a person or a negative feature of the person concerned:

> 'I feel your disapproval, I feel your force. I become with you, an untidy, an impulsive human being whose bandanna handkerchief is for ever stained with the grease of crumpets.' (Woolf. 1980:56)

> 'Yet Byron never made tea as you do, who fill the pot so that when you put the lid on the tea pot spills over. There is a brown pool on the table - it is running among your books and papers. Now you mop it up, clumsily, with your pocket handkerchief. You then stuff your handkerchief back into your pocket - that is not Byron; that is you; that is so essentially you that if I think of you in twenty years' time, when we are both famous, gouty and intolerable, it will be by that scene...' (Woolf. 1980: 58-59).

The fact of the character stating that she will always remember the person whom she is with by simply imagining a handkerchief mopping up spilt tea assures the reader that the handkerchief is indeed a symbol in Virginia Woolf.

A handkerchief stained especially with blood reveals the cruelty and sarcasm of its owner, contrary to the meaning hinted by the spotless and delicate piece of cloth, granting yet another interpretation to the handkerchief which in this case would refer to anything dealing with destruction, pain or agony:

> 'But they leave butterflies trembling with their wings pinched off; they throw dirty pocket-handkerchiefs clotted with blood screwed up into corners. They make little boys sob in dark passages.' (Woolf. 1980: 32).

James Joyce (1980: 10-11) also mentions a stained and creased handkerchief which coincides with Virginia Woolf's, depicting the filth and rottenness suggested by a handkerchief of the same features, brought down even lower by Joyce, naming it 'noserag':

> 'He came over to the gunrestand, thrusting a hand into Stephen's upper pocket, said:
> - Lend us a loan of your noserag to wipe my razor.
> Stephen suffered him to pull out and hold up on show by its corner a dirty crumpled handkerchief.
> Buck Mulligan wiped the razorblade neatly. Then, gazing over the handkerchief, he said:
> - The bard's noserag. A new art colour for our Irish poets: snotgreen. You can almost taste it, can't you?'

The message in these last few examples is that Virginia Woolf unmistakably applies a negative meaning to a creased or stained handkerchief. A handkerchief is unclean only because the person who owns it is of a similar personality, and in very much the same way, a crumpled handkerchief can represent a crumpled or torn heart. This implies that Woolf establishes a direct association between the handkerchief and the personality of the character to whom it belongs. On the other hand, as we have observed so far, a clean, colourful or uncreased handkerchief symbolizes positive things such as shelter, tenderness, decorative uses, feminity and, most important of all, love.

The following quotes portray well enough that a screwed or crumpled handkerchief implies that something unpleasant has happened to the character concerned. The handkerchief thus becomes a symbol of rage, agony, pain or anything that provokes an affliction to the heart of the character.

> 'I saw her kiss him. I saw them, Jinny and Louis, kissing. Now I will wrap my agony inside my pocket handkerchief. It shall be screwed tight into a ball.' (Woolf. 1980: 9).

> 'Then she comes to the dip; she thinks she is unseen; she begans to run with her fists clenched in front of her. Her nails meet the ball of her pocket-handkerchief. (...) Susan has spread her anguish out. Her pocket-handkerchief is laid on the roots of the beech trees and she sobs, sitting crumpled where she has fallen.' (Woolf. 1980: 10).

> 'There is also a blue scroll of needle-work embroidered by some old girl. If I do not purse my lips, if I do not screw my handkerchief, I shall cry.' (Woolf. 1980: 22)

> 'That I observed even in the midst of my anguish, when, twisting her pocket-handkerchief, Susan cried: "I love; I hate".' (Woolf. 1980: 168).

After observing these examples, the handkerchief may be regarded as a useful and perhaps necessary element, for it is the only means by which the affected characters can ease their hearts and minds without collapsing, consequently becoming an aid of support to withstand the tremendous pressure they seem to be going through.

We can estimate that the main goal of the handkerchief as synonym of agony in Virginia Woolf would be the will to be free from agony, an urge to escape the affliction caused by any depressing situation, and the only means by which a character can be freed from their torture seems to be by transmitting their feelings to the handkerchief and twisting it up into a ball or simply by clutching it with might. In this sense, the handkerchief may be understood as a symbol of release or liberation, speaking in terms used by Henderson (1978: 156).

This symbol of relief is not strictly applied to the handkerchief, but it can also be extended to anything susceptible of

screwing tight into a ball. The following quotes reveal that Virginia Woolf's characters many times feel the need to relieve their anguish or release their tension by clenching a piece of paper or simply fiddling with bread, for instance:

> 'How you snatched from me the white spaces that lie between hour and hour and rolled them into the waste-paper basket with your greasy paws. Yet those were my life.' (Woolf. 1980: 138).

> 'So each night I tear off the old day from the calendar, and screw it up tight into a ball.' (Woolf. 1980: 27).

This is just another of the many interpretations attached to the handkerchief rebounding its importance and how its symbolic meaning extends to other apparently meaningless elements.

It would be necessary to draw a chart to summarize and explain the possible interpretations of the handkerchief in Virginia Woolf. The chart would be as follows:



This chart has the aim to demonstrate that the handkerchief is indeed a symbol, which at this stage can be considered as such, susceptible of having a wide range of meanings according to the different contexts in which it appears, therefore becoming an important and recurrent feature in Virginia Woolf, probably more significative or at least more frequent than her other well-known symbols such as seven sided flowers, the flow of water or other elements of Mother Nature.

It is not a mere coincidence that Virginia Woolf turns many times to the handkerchief to express the feelings of her characters at a certain moment (hence the recurrent appearance of the term throughout her novels), but a lost tradition of using the handkerchief as a symbol that not only Virginia Woolf, but other modernist writers, such as James Joyce and T.S. Eliot, have retaken into account after becoming aware of the vast and yet precise range of meaning which this symbol provides.

The initial suggestion of regarding the handkerchief as a symbol in Virginia Woolf is at this stage justified, for the handkerchief has proved to be an interesting element which can provide a clearer or at least another way of approaching the contents of Woolf's novels, thus giving way to a wider scope of understanding.

The identification of the handkerchief as a symbol in the literary production of Virginia Woolf, more precisely in *The Waves* , is perhaps a difficult and daring task to carry out, but it is at this very last point where a further research becomes all the more worthwhile.

NOTES

1 Frank Kermode and John Hollander (1972: 481) comment on "The Waste Land" by T.S. Eliot who also mentions the handkerchief possibly hinting courtly love or rather the loss of love games played by young couples amidst a party or perhaps a picnic due to the presence of elements such as empty bottles, sandwich papers, cardboard boxes or cigarette ends.

The river, which is a symbol of life in Eliot, no longer transports all these objects, no longer does it supply happiness nor it is a witness of youngsters playing joyfully by its banks, for this river is in the waste land and is no longer alive. The nymphs of this land are, as Eliot very well states, departed and have left the land to perish.

> 'The river's tent is broken; the last fingers of leaf
> Clutch and sink into the wet bank. The wind
> Crosses the brown land, unheard. The nymphs are departed.
> Sweet Thames, run softly, till I end my song.
> The river bears no empty bottles, sandwich papers,
> Silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, cigarette ends
> Or other testimony of summer nights. The nymphs are
> departed.' (T.S. Eliot. 1976: 58).

T.S. Eliot provokes an impression with the handkerchief implying that it can also convey other meanings, many times expressing sadness. This is the use of the handkerchief when waving good-bye to those who are departing perhaps never to return. It is a well-known scene that which represents travellers on a ship, for instance, leaving abroad to a distant country, and friends and relatives bidding farewell with their handkerchiefs sadly from land. The handkerchief is therefore a symbol for sorrow, necessary in situations like the one described, perhaps to have the handkerchief close at hand to wipe away unavoidable tears of sadness.

2 The handkerchief has always had a religious connotation, in fact the London Gazette, Nº 6056/1, in 1722 expressed that "The Santo Sudario (or Holy Handkerchief) is to be exposed' (*The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary*) referring to the Holy Shroud in which Christ was enveloped.

James Hall (1987: 245) gives yet another religious meaning to the handkerchief or piece of cloth, in this case portraying the face of Christ, which symbolizes Veronica.

In the celebration of Mass, it is customary for the priest to cover the Chalice with a handkerchief after having offered Holy Communion to all the parishioners perhaps to maintain and protect the Blessed Host for further consecration.

Jung (1978: 4) provides a possible explanation for the use of symbols (be it the handkerchief or other symbols) in religion:

> 'Because there are numerous things beyond the range of human understanding, we constantly use symbolic terms to represent concepts that we cannot define or fully comprehend. This is one reason why all religions employ symbolic language or images.'

3 I again seek the aid of Carl Jung (1978: 38) who expresses that there are many motifs or single symbols that are typical and often occur. He goes on explaining that:

> 'Among such motifs are falling, flying, being persecuted by dangerous animals or hostile men, being insufficiently or absurdly clothed in public places, being in a hurry or lost in a milling crowd, fighting with useless weapons or being wholly defenseless, running hard yet getting nowhere.'

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ON THE NATURE OF SCOTTISH "GHOSTS": SCOTTISH HISTORY AND SCOTTISH LITERATURE.

Rubén VALDES MIYARES

When one begins to wonder about what mythologies are made of, the first things that come to mind are either the gods and heroes of the classical world, or the supernatural beings of the particular folklore one feels closest to. We usually forget that mythologies are being created all the time (see Roland Barthes's study of modern *Mythologies*), just like history is happening every minute, although we can only grasp this history properly once it is past. As Ernest Cassirer and Lévi-Strauss argued, both history and mythology work as systems, and both are closely related to language, which is, of course, also the substance of literature. The arguments provided below should serve to put Scotland forward as an example of how mythologies are absorbed by literature, and of how these can be seen to derive from historical myths, that is, from imaginative, and often mystical, interpretations of history.

All over Scotland a great wealth of folk tradition has been preserved in legend and song. Each people that occupied the land

contributed with their own hoards of culture. The ancient Pictish and Celtic mythologies were at the base, particularly at the Highlands. Then the Vikings brought their Norse mysteries to the Northern islands, while the inhabitants of the Lowlands celebrated in the so-called "border ballads" their heroic defence against Southern peoples, such as the Romans, then the Anglosaxons, then the English.

It has been said that there was a time in Scotland when Green Ladies -or "Bansheers", that is, mortals transformed into fairies, who served as tutelary beings- were a matter of every day life. People grew so accustomed to them that, when they saw one, they just remarked: "There she goes again!" (McNeill 1977: 116). Undoubtedly, this must have been a golden age for poets. One of them, known as Thomas the Rhymer in the 13th century, was believed to owe his prophetic gifts as poet and seer to his intercourse with the Queen of Elfland (McNeill 1977: 111).

To the modern historical mind this period seems at once obscure and bright, a "timeless" Golden Age. But there was an end to it. The Reformation of the 16th century came to Scotland by the heavy hand and intemperate rhetoric of a harsh Calvinist called John Knox. His work and his clashes with the Catholic monarch Mary Queen of Scots, whom he gave over to the hated English for execution, were to remain an indelible memory in the national mythology of the country. Knox brought to Scotland what MacDiarmid called the "hard fact", "the inoppugnable [sic] reality" (Watson 1984: 98), against the fancies of poets. It has been recognized that he alone shouldn't be blamed for institutionalizing all the puritanical and constricting aspects already existing in the national psyche. Yet many Scottish poets have found it difficult to forgive him for the revolution he commanded. Edwin Muir said that his main guilt was to have robbed Scotland of all the benefits of the Renaissance (Muir 1930: 309), an epoch which gave the

neighbour country, England, the genius of Shakespeare, among so many other things. But perhaps the most generalized claim is that of the modern poet, George Mackay Brown, who blaims Knox for having killed the songs and the ballads, in other words, the symbols that his people lived by. It should be recognized, however, that Knox himself provided, through his multi-layered historical personality, a symbol for literature, although a negative one. Few important modern Scottish writers have failed to express, at one time or another, their more or less agitated opinion on this controversial figure. Furthermore, it is not completely true that Calvinism murdered the fairies of Scotland. Suffice it to say that a remarkable book dealing with this ancient faith was produced and published by one Reverend Robert Kirk in 1691 under the suggestive title of *The Secret Commonwealth of Elves, Fauns, and Fairies*, where he gives a detailed account of the nature and customs of these elusive people, treating them as generally recognized physical phenomena (McNeill 1977: 105).

In fact, the really deadly blows against the fairies were to strike the fated nation in the 18th century. Two apparently unrelated events contributed to this, showing up the internal divisions that had characterized Scotland since the Lowlands had developed as a kingdom with much of the inevitable Anglosaxon and Norman influence from England, while the Highlands had remained, in actuality, the stronghold of the primitive Celtic clans. In many respects Highlands and Lowlands had been one single nation only for opposition to the ever richer and oppressive England. The two decisive events are the Union of Scotland and England in 1707, and the Jacobite risings of the '45. The Union was an economic manoeuvre of the Lowland businessmen, who wanted to have a share in the English prosperity. But most of the Scots, and particularly the Highlanders, wouldn't forget old grievances and ambitions so easily, and this was one of the main reasons for the

Jacobite revolt that ended up at Culloden Moor (near Inverness), where the chieftains of most of the Celtic clans gave their life for their ready-made hero and leader, Bonnie Prince Charlie. His attempt to conquer England with a primitive army was probably the last and most anachronistic act of "chivalry" (for such has been the word used to conceal his concrete aims) in British history. The very absurdity of his endeavour undoubtedly contributed to make him a suitable hero of Romance.

Nor did the Scottish national identity die at Culloden, unless by this identity we meant the clan system, a bellicose organization at a reduced scale that had no place in modern Europe. The worst came with the aftermath of the defeat, when the winners set out to repress Celtic language and custom, so as to thwart the possibility of any further nationalistic rise. Local traditions were eradicated in many areas of Scotland, for not only Gaelic was prohibited in the Highlands, also Lowland Scots was despised as an uncouth dialect, and David Hume published a list of "Scotticisms" that all learned Scots should get rid of. What they couldn't get rid of was the historical imagination of the people. Bonnie Prince Charlie, the myth who has little to do with the historical Prince Charles Edward Stuart and his down-to-earth dynastic ambitions, inspired as many beautiful songs as any Queen of the Fairies had done before. The real change is that now we can trace the historical origin of the myth monarch. On the other hand, the Enlightenment bore more intellectual fruits for Scotland than possibly for any other European nation. It is at this stage that what professor David Daiches (1964) has called the Scottish cultural paradox is most noticeable. The Scottish writers reacted to the Union in two opposite ways: they either returned demonstratively to Scottish traditions, using Scots language, as Robert Burns did, or they set about proving that Scotsmen, independence or not independence, could still be in the vanguard of European thought, using English, as a widely

acceptable language, more effectively than the English themselves. This was the case with David Hume and Adam Smith. The paradox was, therefore, between an emotional and a rational response to the loss of Scottish political identity. It was the emotional reaction that produced a characteristically Scottish Literature. From that moment on it was to find its material in the past, where all the Scottish dreams and nightmares seem to remain. Even Carlyle's historical writing in the 19th century appears haunted by the irrecoverability of the past. His studies on the character of heroes are, to the modern reader, attempts to transform history into mythology. For the past to become alive and present, it had to be reinvented again and again. This is how mythologies are born.

From the 18th century the major achievements in Scottish literature were to become reflections on what is Scotland, and elegies on the loss of cultural identity, in works full of characters who have reminiscences of the heroes and villains of Scottish history. The heroes are often representatives of the old Scottish communities, or even the whole community as a collective character. This helps to explain why Jung's theories of the collective unconscious had a great influence on some of the writers in the first Scottish Literary Renaissance of our own century. The villains in much Scottish fiction are those who bring change, the servants of the great god Progress who will kill the small rural communities, drawing mainly on the historical fact of the Highland Clearances during the Industrial Revolution. When these stories do not end in destruction and defeat, as they usually do, they end in a dream of renewal, in a resurrection of the communities of the past, as they are imagined by the authors. However, historical change alone shouldn't be thought to have given any new life to the Scots. Maybe historical circumstances only spurred on feelings that had long been at the heart of the Scottish people: one is that primitive sense of community (the Presbyterian organization is an

outstanding example of this); secondly, the common place of the melancholic character of the Gael (although this might have been overemphasized by the writers of the Celtic Twilight), and thirdly, a belief in fate, which is older than Calvinism, and maybe derives from the Vikings, as George Mackay Brown has suggested (1969: 48).

Since mythologies in Scottish literature after the 18th come mainly from history, these mythologies are easily palpable: there is a deep sense of reality in Scottish fiction and poetry. When fantasy is introduced, it is always as a true part of reality, or in order to explain this reality. There is little escapism as an aim in most of the best Scottish literature. Even the most apparently superficial poetry and song of the major poets, like that of Robert Burns, comes as a seriously passionate response to historical problems. As Maurice Lindsay, a modern Scottish poet and critic, says of Burns:

> He is part of the human personality suppressed by Calvinism, Burns is the poet and fornicator, the creator of music, the inspirer of dancing (the kirk for centuries discouraged dancing), summing up in himself all the elements in the Scotsman that the kirk, unable to destroy them, for they are essential parts in our nature, has suppressed. (Lindsay 1977: 233)

In other words, we could say that Burns is the Edward Hyde of the 18th century, the outcast of a repressive Calvinist society.

As for Sir Walter Scott, just like Burns before him, he had to deal with the dichotomy which has faced all the Scottish writers since 1707. On the one hand, his common-sense nature made him support the industrial changes that came with the Union; on the other hand, he devoted his talents to the appreciation of the heroic or anti-heroic drama of Scotland's history. Thus he definitely established in literature the mythology and the attitudes of the Scots novelists that came after him: their overall theme would still be the

persistence of the past. It is hardly surprising, then, that the historical novel was born in Scotland.

The seriousness of Scottish fiction and its lack of escapist fantasy is most noticeable in the character of the Gothic novel in Scotland. A meeting with the English Gothic horror-novelist M.G. Lewis (1775-1818) seems first to have aroused Sir Walter Scott's interest in collecting ballads, an interest which resulted in the publication of his *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Ballads* (Kelso, 1802). However, in the introduction to this, his first book, Scott declares what will remain his intentions throughout his writings, that is, to "contribute somewhat to the history of my native country; the peculiar features of whose manners and character are daily melting and dissolving into those of her sister and ally" (Lindsay 1977: 277). He argues serious historicism, yet Gothic inclinations are evident in his novels, which verge on the borderland between history and romance, because in fact the historical Scotland is alive with dark Macbeth-like Gothic landscapes, with Gothic stories of witches and demons, with Gothic historical characters, such as the fanatical Covenanters of the 17th century or the spirited Jacobites of the 18th century, and because the antiquarian taste of the Gothic had become a natural tendency in the Scottish character.

Now we could take this argument even further and say that there is hardly any fantasy in the Scottish Gothic novel, for the Gothic element is a part of the history of the nation. Sir Walter Scott used history at the service of romance, with the result that history is romanticized, and fantasy, the Gothic, assimilates a real significance (this explains why, for instance, the English "Wars of the Roses", a term invented by Scott in his novel *Ann of Geierstein*, chapter VII, taken from an episode in Shakespeare's *Henry VI*, is still widely used by history books). Such is the case that Francis R. Hart makes out, after discussing the necessity to "understand Gothic less reductively" (1978: 19), if we don't want to exclude

novelists like Scott and Smollett from this tendency. The other Scottish representative of the Gothic to be recalled here is James Hogg, who published his *Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner* in 1824. Together with the thrill of the demonic presence, there prevails a psychological tension that is only human: the primitive fear of being bewitched, of the guilt of having the devil inside, a complex that derives from Scottish Calvinism. Likewise, in James Hogg's other most important novel, *The Brownie of Bodsbeck* (1817), there is no such brownie, only a desperate Covenanter in disguise. The paradox in the Scottish Enlightenment seems to have produced a rationalization of the traditionally recurrent preternatural.

Contemporary with this tendency, and equally defining of the Scottish attitude, is the grief for the passing of irrecoverable ways of living. John Galt is as much interested as Scott in the end of the past; his best known novel, *Annals of the Parish* (1821), laments the gradual extinction of rural communities, the already mentioned subject that will be central to two of the most important Scottish writers of the 20th century, Lewis Grassic Gibbon and George Mackay Brown. Needless to say that there is the myth of a Golden Age, that is, of a perfect way of life that was lost, implicit in this.

With the exception of the Victorian novelist George MacDonald, whose novels convey a kind of "transcendental nationalism" (Hart 1978: 105), and the numerous works of the "Kailyard" school, much disparaged for their sentimentality and provincialism, the second half of the 19th century marks a comparative lull in the production of Scottish literature, until Stevenson reaffirms the romance tendency in Scottish fiction. But some significant phenomena are prominent:

First, Gaelic literature, with its old propensity for elegy and lament, found a bitter enough subject in the Highland clearances,

when the territory of the Scottish Gaels was being literally emptied of them, to place sheep there instead. Protest for these abuses, and the leavetaking, a part of actual social history, became the motif for their literature, in place of the old legends and mythologies. But the renewed mythologies of the "Celtic Twilight" were soon to follow.

Secondly, history itself was being cleared from Scottish public life, and substituted by myths to preserve national pride or old institutions, such as the Kirk of Scotland, which went as far as to insist on the Presbyterianism of the Celtic church. Religion entered the universities, and the history chairs for teachers were either left empty, or unsalaried. Many practical Scots felt that the death of Scottish history meant freedom and progress.

Thirdly, then: while nationalism had become a revolutionary force in Europe, Lowland Scottish culture remains complacent. Patriotic appeal for Burns and Walter Scott became conservative and romantic, a free-time activity. The consequence was a provincialist and sentimental literature collectively known as the Kailyard (J.M. Barrie, Ian Maclaren, S.R. Crockett). The best Scottish works (of Scott, Hogg, Galt, Stevenson) were motivated by the passions of the past and the cruelty of change; their greatness lies in the universal applicability of these dramas. But the Kailyard is simply against change, and when it looks to the past - usually no further than one generation back- it describes timeless isolated rural communities, whose only dramas are domestic events, which always reach a happy ending, when things are restored to their usual order and the "good" triumphs. Still the Kailyardists are projecting a mythology, but a very limited one.

By the 1890's the literary revival known as Celtic Twilight arrived in Scotland, although it would never have the impact it had in Ireland. The most relevant writer is William Sharp (writing under the pseudonym of 'Fiona Macleod'), who introduced motifs that would remain central in 20th Scottish fiction. One of them is

the figure of an old lady who stands for the land, its tradition is magic, and the eternal feminine principle; another is the suggestion of a lost Golden Age of the remote past. Both subjects belong with a tradition that has been continued, in different degrees and form very varied approaches, by Edwin Muir (only the second subject), Lewis Grassic Gibbon, Neil M. Gunn and George Mackay Brown.

When the Scottish novel, due to predominance of the Kailyard, was close to becoming too sentimental and complacent, it was given a radical turn by the publication of George Douglas Brown's *The House with the Green Shutters* in 1901, a novel that includes a crude, naturalistic family tragedy, whose main responsible is a tyrannical father with features that are reminiscent of the Calvinist patriarch, John Knox. It is the story of a divided community and, as such, a reflection of the story of Scotland itself (for the feeling that the Lowlanders had betrayed the Highlanders in the events of the 18th century was strong). The Scottish gossips are modelled on the chorus of classical Greek tragedy. If we combine the crudity of this novel with some supernatural elements of spiritual depth, we have the typical Scottish novel of the 20th century.

The Scots have become fiercely critical of their bad habits, such as heavy drinking. However, the drink, which brings the House with the Green Shutters to destruction, has very different consequences in Hugh MacDiarmid's long modernist poem, *A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle* (1926), where it is the excuse for an alcoholic, imaginative odyssey, as strange as any undertaken by Burn's "Tam O'Shanter", or by Thomas the Rhymer in the land of the Elves. At one dramatic stage of the voyage, the Drunk Man finds himself crucified on the Thistle, the emblematic symbol of Scotland, which is at once beautiful and covered with thorns, proud and painful. So is Scottish history to modern Scottish writers.

Hugh MacDiarmid became for Scotland in the 1920's what Yeats had been for Ireland at the turn of the century. He dominated

the literary scene from the journals, and through his poems and essays, propelling nationalist politics with national culture and renewed mythologies. But the Scottish mythologies, as I am trying to make clear, were of a different order, more influenced by history than by folklore. In addition, the following decade, during which the first Scottish Literary Renaissance fully developed through a variety of young writers, had its own peculiarities in the whole of the Western world, that in turn were to influence this Renaissance. "Even before they were quite over, the thirties took on the appearance of myth", says Robin Skelton on opening the introduction to his anthology of the poetry of this decade (Skelton 1985: 13). And the mythologies of the thirties, skillfully adapted to Scotland, was to produce the ideology of the Literary Renaissance. The universal archetypes evoked all over Europe, were given Scottish embodiments. The figure of the saviour, of the leader, or the martyr for humanity, for his race, or for the working-classes, so common in the 1930's (sometimes with unfortunate results, like the workship of the "Führer"), comes up in Lewis Grassic Gibbon's novel *Spartacus* (1933) and in MacDiarmid's "Hymns to Lenin" (1931-2), and they are explicitly compared to Bonnie Prince Charlie by the novelist Naomi Mitchison. Fionn MacColla's radical novels are born out of a Catholic (he was a convert) and Gaelic consciousness, and they try to explain the unhappy plight of the Celt throughout history, showing the characteristic revulsion against Scottish Calvinism. On a more satirical vein, the novelist Eric Linklater incorporates the myth of Don Juan (with Byron in mind) to stand for the Quixotic Scottish cavalier travelling to modern America, and the provincial Scot, "Magnus Merriman", trying his hand at nationalistic politics, and failing. Linklater is perhaps best remembered as a comic novelist who provided the anti-heroes as counterparts of so many heroes, but, like the rest of his generation, he took an interest in both popular history (he wrote

biographies of "demigods" of the Scottish history such as Bonnie Prince Charlie and Mary Queen of Scots) and the historical novel. Neil Gunn began to explore the past of the Highlands in his historical novels, while Grassic Gibbon wrote about the swan-song and the final death of the Scottish rural life, where the last traces of a Golden Age of hunters had lain. All these writers were, to some extent, mythmakers; most of them held jobs of public administration, many became engaged in nationalist politics, and all of them (except Grassic Gibbon) were bitterly disappointed at the failures of Scottish nationalism in gaining enough public support.

Then in 1936 Edwin Muir pronounced an indictment on the Scottish writer in his book *Scott and Scotland*. Here Muir pictured the Scottish people as divided between their Scottish feelings and their English thoughts, a division made by history, which it was too late to solve by resurrecting the Scots language of the 15th century, as MacDiarmid was doing in his poems. The ever spirited Hugh MacDiarmid couldn't allow this defeatism, and he quarrelled with his old friend. This was perhaps a new version of the old divisions among the Scottish people. Muir and MacDiarmid couldn't be hoped to understand each other, because apart from their opposite temperaments, Muir came from the Northern islands, where Norse culture had been the most influential, whereas MacDiarmid came from the Anglo-Scottish border.

In spite of these differences of character, Edwin Muir was as interested as MacDiarmid in mythology. Like Lewis Grassic Gibbon, Muir believed in a kind of Golden Age, or "Eden", previous to civilization. He absorbed Jung's theories of the collective unconscious and professed a faith in the inherited experience. So did Neil Gunn, who continued to recreate the mysteries of the Highlands and to make wide use of archetypes in his highly symbolical novels, until the 1950's. The most

representative Scottish writers were still motivated by the study of the new and old mythologies of their land, when a second wave of the Renaissance occurred in the mid-twentieth century. This Renaissance coincided, again, with a revival of the Scottish National Party, after the Second World War. It produced novelists such as Robin Jenkins, who in *The Thistle and the Grail* (1954) - the Grail is none other than the cup of football championship-, examines this sport as a surrogate for religion. In 1961 another novelist, James Kennaway, published *Household Ghosts*, wherein the main character suddenly realizes that he is, in his real life, playing the old game of Mary Queen of Scots and John Knox with his girl friend. This is the true nature of Scottish ghosts that Kennaway wants to show in his novel: they consist in the persistence of mythologized history in the Scottish mind.

By 1969 an outstanding poet, Norman MacCaig, was still lamenting the historic betrayal of the Clearances in "A man in Assynt: A poem for television" (included in *A Man in My Position*), an elegy on the delerict landscape that his ancestors had inhabited, and that was ruined by English businessmen and the indifference / of a remote and ignorant government... (King 1971: 101). However, the latest tragedy in the history of Scotland took place after the prosperous 1960's, when oil was discovered in the North Sea. "It is Scotland oil!", was the cry of the nationalists (Watson 1977: 328). For other Scots, like George Mackay Brown, poet and story-teller of the Northern islands, it meant the coup-de-grace against the old ways of life that had been preserved in his Orkney islands: the victory of the many-headed monster Progress, whose earliest blow against natural life (that is, the orderly ritual of the seasons, broken by the irruption of historical change) had been the Reformation. Destruction by Progress in the form of speculation provides the realistic background of his most popular novel, *Greenvoe*, an otherwise deeply symbolic work. Although

Brown's books deal with universal human concerns, they use the history of his land as their basic material, so that perhaps they were initially benefited by a fresh effervescence in Scottish nationalism, which, as ever before, got some impulse from literature, from the re-telling of the "auld sangs", although probably less than in the 50's, and even much less than in the 30's. In 1973 John MacGrath and his Scottish 7:84 Theatre Company toured Scotland with their tragi-comedy of Scottish history, T*he Cheviot, the Stag and the Black, Black Oil* , where they joined music hall sketches, songs, jokes, anecdotes and plain political propaganda to remind their acclaming audiences of the iniquities of the Highland Clearances. This general outburst of nationalism in the 70's failed to reach its final aims at the referendum of 1979, where only 33 per cent of the total British electorate voted 'yes' to Scottish devolution. Although this result has been regarded as unfair by some (for only the Scots should have been allowed to vote), and this decentralization still seems a necessary issue, since Scotland remains a country with distinct law, social problems and political tendencies, maybe some of the Scottish nationalists, among whom there are so often the artists, have come to the sad realization that the old soverign Scottish nation, today, is the dream of a few dreamers: those who are able to see the ghosts inhabiting the empty Highlands; it is, in other words, a mythology well preserved in the rich literature that it stimulates. From the earliest epic fragments, which celebrate the defeats inflicted on Edward I during the Wars of Independence (circa 1296), to *Lanark* (1981), a magnificient post-modernist novel about real and imaginary life in Glasgow, the literature of Scotland has evolved in many different ways, but it is still one of the best ways to approach the Scottish reality, with its characteristic presence of the past, and its blend of myth and history.

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CHAUCER EN ESPAÑA: EDICIONES, TRADUCCIONES Y ESTUDIOS CRITICOS

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EDICIONES Y TRADUCCIONES

Sorprendentemente, la obra de Geoffrey Chaucer, el más conocido poeta del medievo inglés, no aparece en español hasta bien entrado el siglo XX, lo que no hace sino subrayar la secular desatención que en este país han sufrido las letras inglesas. Una primera tentativa, verdad es que indirecta y por muchos motivos fallida (entre otros, el público al que estaba dirigida) fueron las HISTORIAS DE CHAUCER: CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY RELATADOS A LOS NIÑOS POR JANET HARVEY KELMAN, CON ILUSTRACIONES DE W. H. ROBINSON, en traducción de Manuel Vallvé, que publicó en Barcelona la editorial Araluce en 1914 (Colección Araluce: Las Obras Maestras al

Alcance de los Niños, nº 15), 116 pp., y que ya en 1956 contaba con cinco ediciones, alguna de ellas bajo el título de LEYENDAS DE PEREGRINOS (Bibliot. Nacional, edición de 1943, 4/7361).

La primera traducción llegaba a comienzos de los años veinte:

===1921.- Godofredo Chaucer: LOS CUENTOS DE CANTORBERY. Versión directa del inglés antiguo con una introducción y notas por Manuel Pérez y del Río-Cosa. Prólogo de Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín. Madrid: Editorial Reus S.A. (Biblioteca Literaria de Autores Españoles y Extranjeros), Imprenta de Argel Alcoy, 2 volúmenes: 371 y 413 pp. (Observese la 'adaptación' del nombre de pila del autor. Antonio Palau y Dulcet no recoge bajo el nombre de CHAUCER ninguna traducción española en su 'Manual del Librero Hispano-Americano': un error de imprenta o quizá de lectura presenta esta única versión bajo la forma CHANCER, Godofredo). Del traductor de esta primera versión de los CUENTOS apenas nada se sabe. En el 'Manual' de Palau encontramos tan sólo una obra suya original, ANDANTE CON VARIACIONES: VIAJES Y ENSAYOS DE CRITICA, publicada en Madrid en 1933.

Durante veinticinco años, hasta 1946, ésta fue la única traducción que conoció el público español.

===1946.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan G. de Luaces, Barcelona: Iberia-Joaquín Gil Editores, 2 volúmenes. Consta, al igual que la anterior, nada menos que como traducción del 'inglés antiguo'. (Bibliot. Nacional, 1/204174-5). Juan G. de Luaces fue -posiblemente- el más prolífico traductor español de los años cuarenta y cincuenta, autor de más de cien versiones de obras de Wodehouse, Christopher Marlowe, Dos Passos, Saroyan, Pearl Buck, Emily Bronte, Dickens, Swift, etc.

Desde esta fecha hasta la actualidad se registran en nuestros archivos, salvo involuntario error u omisión, las siguientes ediciones, reediciones, adaptaciones y traducciones:

===1958.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan G. de Luaces. Barcelona: Edit. Iberia, 2 vols., 2a. edición.

===1961.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan G. de Luaces. Primera parte del volumen "Maestros Ingleses" [en el mismo, obras de Defoe, Swift, Richardon...]. Barcelona: Planeta, 2055 pp. Bibliot. Nacional, 5 / 23372.

===1961.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Adaptación al texto original por Antonio Jiménez-Landi Martínez. Madrid: Aguilar (Colección "El Globo de Colores"), 74 pp. Bibliot. Nacional, 7/51386.

==1967.- LOS CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Versión de Josefina Ferrer. Barcelona: Editorial Marte, 256 pp. Bibliot. Nacional, 7/76649.

===1969.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan Canti Bonastre. Estudio preliminar y bibliografía de Caridad Oriol. Barcelona: Bruguera (Colección 'Libro Clásico', nº 63), 448 pp. Bibliot. Nacional, 7/80279.

===1970.- POESIA MENOR. Selección, traducción y prólogo de José María Martín Triana. Madrid: Alberto Corazón (Colección Visor de Poesía, 6), 93 pp. Contiene, entre otros poemas: 'Quejas a la amada', 'Palabras de Adán, escribano del autor', 'Contra las mujeres inconstantes', 'Quejas de Venus', 'Envío al rey Ricardo', 'La antigüedad', 'A Rosamunda', 'Quejas del autor a su monedero vacío'... Sin duda ninguna, la peor

traducción de cualquiera de las obras de Chaucer que haya podido ver la luz en nuestro idioma, con errores que ya denuncié en EL DELITO DE TRADUCIR (León 1985) y en los que difícilmente caería un estudiante. Baste recordar, a guisa de perla cultivada, que ya en el prólogo José María Martín Triana traduce una de las obras de Chaucer, THE PARLIAMENT OF FOWLS, por "El Parlamento de los Tontos", cuando debiera haber traducido "El Parlamento de las Aves".

===1971.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan G. de Luaces. Barcelona: Salvat (Biblioteca Básica Salvat, 59), 183 pp. Bibliot. Nacional, 7/85565.

===1971.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan Canti Bonastre. Barcelona: Bruguera. Reimpresión de 1969 (vide).

===1972.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Josefina Ferrer. Barcelona: Círculo de Lectores, 500 pp. Bibliot. Nacional, 7/88490.

===1972.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan Canti Bonastre. Barcelona: Bruguera. Reimpresión de 1969 (vide).

===1973.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. "Traducción directa del inglés antiguo de Juan G. de Luaces". Barcelona: Edit. Iberia (Colección Obras Maestras), 2 vols: 316 y 287 pp. (3a. edición). El tomo I va precedido de tres páginas con un 'prólogo de la edición española' firmado por el traductor, en el que puede leerse: "Me ha parecido muy preferible, para facilidad de todos, y en especial del lector, traducir en prosa el conjunto de la obra... La

presente (traducción) posee, si otros no, tres méritos no en absoluto desdeñables: es fiel (y fiel sobre todo al sentido y al concepto); es, como ya apunté, comprensible y clara y mantiene algo del sabor de época; y es, particularmente, íntegra..." (pp.5-6).

Primeras líneas del Prólogo de Chaucer:

"En el tiempo en que las suaves lluvias de abril, penetrando hasta las entrañas la sequedad de marzo, hacen brotar las flores con el riego de su vivificante licor; en el tiempo en que Céfiro, con su grato aliento, anima los renuevos de todo árbol y planta; en el tiempo en que el Sol ha recorrido en Aries la segunda mitad de su curso; en el tiempo, en fin, en que las aves cantan y, estimuladas por la Naturaleza, pasan toda la noche sin cerrar los ojos; en ese tiempo, digo, suelen las gentes ir en peregrinación a remotos y célebres santuarios de apartados países. Y es entonces cuando desde los límites de todos los condados de Inglaterra acuden muchos romeros a Canterbury, a fin de visitar el sepulcro del santo y bienaventurado mártir que en sus enfermedades les acorrió" (p.9).

===1973.- CUENTOS DE CANTORBERY. Traducción de Josefina Ferrer. Madrid: Círculo de Amigos de la Historia. 2 vols.: 310 y 310 pp.

===1974.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan Canti Bonastre. Barcelona: Bruguera, segunda edición, revisada (vide 1969).

===1975.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan Canti Bonastre. Estudio preliminar y bibliografía de Caridad Oriol. Barcelona: Bruguera, 3a. edición, 555 pp.

===1977.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Spencer Booll & al. Barcelona: Editorial Naper, 52 pp. Traducción del italiano (?).

===1978.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan Canti Bonastre. Barcelona: Bruguera (Colección 'Joyas Literarias Bruguera'), 555 pp.

===1978.- LOS CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Introducción, cronología, bibliografía, notas y traducción inédita de Pedro Guardia Massó. Barcelona: Bosch (Colección Erasmo-Textos bilingües), 729 pp. Edición bilingüe de texto original en inglés medio y traducción castellana en página opuesta. La edición, sin embargo, es incompleta. En la nota inicial del libro ya se advierte que "la versión íntegra de LOS CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY hubiese rebasado con mucho la importancia del presente volumen. Se hacía, pues, imprescindible, la selección. Para efectuarla se ha intentado seguir un criterio de representatividad y no de valoración estética..." Faltan de hecho en esta versión las secciones III, IV, V y VI de los CUENTOS, que incluyen entre otras las intervenciones de la mujer de Bath, alguacil, mercader, escudero, bulero, etc. Véase el comienzo del Prólogo:

"Las suaves lluvias de abril han penetrado hasta lo más recóndito de la sequía de marzo y empapado todos los vasos con la humedad capaz de engendrar la flor; el delicado aliento de Céfiro ha avivado en los bosques y campos los tiernos retoños; y el joven sol ha recorrido la mitad de su camino en el signo de Aries, y los pajarillos, que duermen toda la noche con un ojo abierto, han comenzado a trinar, ya que la naturaleza les despierta los instintos. Entonces la gente siente el ansia de peregrinar, y los piadosos

viajeros desean visitar tierras y distantes santuarios en extraños países; y especialmente desde los más reconditos lugares de los condados ingleses llegan a Canterbury para visitar al bienaventurado, santo mártir que les había ayudado cuando estaban enfermos..." (pp. 59 y 61).

===1979.- Versos 118-162 del Prólogo de LOS CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY, pp. 6-9 de POESIA INGLESA: ANTOLOGIA BILINGÜE, Barcelona: Edición de José Siles Artés, julio de 1979. Traducción de José Siles Artés. Los versos traducidos corresponden a la descripción de la Priora:

"Había también una monja, Priora
de honesta sonrisa,
que 'por San Eloy' juraba todo lo más;
y se llamaba Madame Eglantyne.
Cantaba muy bien los oficios divinos,
entonando por la nariz con decoro,
y hablaba un francés exquisito,
el francés de Stratford atte Bowe,
pues el de París le era ignoto.
En la mesa mostraba buena crianza.
No se le caía pizca de los labios,
ni metía los dedos en la salsa del todo.
Sabía comer
sin salpicarse el pecho.
Se tomaba muy en serio la urbanidad..."

===1979.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan Canti Bonastre. Barcelona: Bruguera (Colección 'Joyas Literarias Bruguera'), reimpresión de 1978 (vide).

===1981.-(?)- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Santiago de Chile: Andrés Bello.

===1981.- TROILO Y CRISEIDA (Libro I). Introducción, traducción y notas de Antonio León Sendra. Córdoba, s.e., s.a., 75 pp. Edición no venal. La introducción (pp. 5-36) estudia el texto, manuscrito, ediciones, fecha, fuentes, sentido y mensaje del poema, justificación de la versión, etc. La traducción del libro I, en endecasílabos no rimados, ocupa exclusivamente las pp. 41-74. Cada estrofa se ofrece dentro de la misma página en original y traducción, acompañada de las notas pertinentes. Véanse las dos primeras (p. 41):

"Antes de separarme de vosotros,
es mi intención narrar de los amores
de Troilo, hijo de Príamo, el monarca
de Troya, la desgracia: cómo fue
del pesar a la dicha, para luego
sufrir el infortunio. Oh, Tesifón,
ayúdame a escribir los tristes versos
que uno tras otro de mi pluma brotan.

Te invoco, pues, oh diosa del tormento,
Furia cruel, en aflicción penando.
Haz que yo pueda ser el instrumento
que ayude a los amantes a quejarse,
pues, a decir verdad, es conveniente
un triste acompañante al melancólico
y a un cuento de dolor doliente porte."

===1982.- EL PARLAMENTO DE LAS AVES. Estudio crítico y traducción de Luis Costa Palacios. Córdoba: Imprenta

Astur, 137 pp. Las páginas 9-61 contienen una introducción acerca del autor, poema (manuscritos, fecha de composición, fuentes, etc.) y proceso de traducción. La versión propiamente dicha ocupa las pp. 64-103. Siguen las notas críticas (pp. 105-129) y la bibliografía (133-136). La traducción de las cien estrofas del poema, traducción en prosa, va acompañada en página adjunta del original en inglés medio. Sirvan de muestra las estrofas 13 y 14 (p.69):

"13. El día comenzó a declinar y la oscura noche, que aleja a los animales de su actividad, me privó de mi libro por falta de luz y comencé a prepararme para la cama, lleno de inquietud y angustiosa tristeza: pues tenía lo que no quería y no tenía lo que deseaba.

14. Pero por fin mi espíritu, cansado del trabajo del día, descansó, lo que me hizo dormir profundamente, y en mi sueño soñé que, mientras yacía, el Africano con la misma apariencia con que Escipión lo había visto antes, había venido y se encontraba al lado de mi cama."

===1982.- "El prólogo de los Cuentos de Canterbury: Una traducción en verso". Publicada en GADES: REVISTA DEL COLEGIO UNIVERSITARIO DE FILOSOFIA Y LETRAS DE CADIZ (Cádiz), nº 10, 1982, pp. 47-73. La traducción, realizada por Manuel Alvarez de Toledo Morenés ocupa las pp. 52-73 y va precedida de unas indicaciones previas relativas a la traducción: "He conservado el mismo número de versos que existen en el texto original inglés: los 858 del prólogo. He conservado la misma estrofa: pareados consonantes... La unidad de sentido es el pareado, de modo que, en la traducción, los contenidos ideológicos se encuentran siempre dentro de las fronteras de dos versos..." Véase el comienzo del poema en esta versión rimada:

"Cuando el mes de abril con su dulce aguacero
penetra la sequía de marzo por entero;
y baña cada vena dentro de ese licor
con cuyo beneficio se engendra la flor;
y también cuando el Céfiro con su dulce aliento
inspira por los montes y bosques el contento,
sacando tiernas puntas; cuando el sol juvenil
corre su medio curso en el Aries de abril
y los pájaros chicos entonan sus conciertos
y duermen con la noche con los ojos abiertos,
porque tales instintos les da naturaleza,
peregrinar entonces se sube a la cabeza;
y buscan los romeros, en playas apartadas,
lejanos santuarios por tierras variadas;
y muy especialmente, de todos los condados
de Inglaterra, a Canterbury marchan alborozados,
para buscar al santo, al mártir bendecido
que les dio la esperanza cuando andaban caídos."

===1983.- THE CANTERBURY TALES. Edición de Pedro Guardia Massó. Madrid: Editorial Alhambra (Colección Clásicos de la Lengua Inglesa, 13-14), 2 vols.: 384 y 374 pp. Unica edición española impresa en Inglés Medio sin traducción adjunta. La introducción (pp. 5-18), notas a pie de página (abundantísimas, de carácter léxico) y glosario (pp. 371-381 em el primer volumen y 361-371 en el segundo) son de Pedro Guardia Massó.

===1983.- TROILO Y CRISEIDA (Libros IIy III). Traducción y notas de Antonio León Sendra. Córdoba, s.e., s.a., 105 pp. Edición no venal. Continuación de la traducción del Libro I (vide: 1981). Cada página sigue presentando el original en Inglés Medio y la versión de A. León, que en esta segunda ocasión ya no es en verso, sino en prosa. Estrofas iniciales de la versión (p.3):

"El tiempo empieza a clarear, oh viento, oh viento, para navegar sin estas olas negras, pues en esta mar el barco encuentra tal dificultad que apenas lo controlo, a pesar de mi destreza. Entiendo por esta mar el estado tempestuoso de desesperación que Troilo tenía en su interior. Pero ya comienza el primer día de esperanza.

Oh Soberana mía, que te llamas Clío, de ahora en adelante sé tú mi ayuda y mi Musa para rimar bien este libro hasta que esté concluído. Aquí no necesito utilizar ningún otro arte, por lo que a cada amante me excuso de que no lo componga a partir de experiencia personal alguna sino que en mi lengua lo transcriba partiendo del latín."

===1983.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Barcelona: Salvat Editores (Biblioteca Básica Salvat, 56), 2a. edición, 183 pp. Además del prólogo general, presenta tan sólo los cuentos del molinero, priora, Don Thopas, bulero, mujer de Bath, fraile, estudiante, mercader y escudero con sus respectivos prólogos, a pesar de lo cual no hay indicación alguna de que se trata de una edición incompleta. Es traducción en prosa. En ningún momento se menciona el nombre del traductor, que es de nuevo Juan G. de Luaces:

"En el tiempo en que las suaves lluvias de abril, penetrando hasta las entrañas de la sequedad de marzo, hacen brotar las flores con el riego de su vivificante licor; en el tiempo en que Céfiro, con su grato aliento, anima los renuevos de todo árbol y planta; en el tiempo en que el Sol ha recorrido en Aries la segunda mitad de su curso; en el tiempo, en fin, en que las aves cantan..."

===1983.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Barcelona: Ramón Sopena (Biblioteca Sopena nº 929), 354 pp.

===1983.- EL PROLOGO DE LOS CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción en verso, introducción y notas de José Siles Artés. Madrid: Indec/Iniciativas de Cultura (Colección 'El Marco Naranja', 59 pp. La traducción ocupa las pp.13-59 y va precedida de una breve introducción y bibliografía. En la introducción se hace notar que 'el metro elegido (para la traducción) es el dodecasílabo, un poco más largo que el decasílabo de Chaucer, ya que la frase inglesa alarga por lo general al ser vertida al español... He conservado la distribución de los versos en pareados. A cada pareado en inglés corresponde un pareado en español. Y la rima es unas veces consonante y otras asonante..."

Versos iniciales de esta edición:

"Cuando las apacibles lluvias de abril
empapan del seco marzo la raíz,
y toda vena bañan de aquel licor
en virtud del cual engendrada es la flor;
y cuando el céfiro con su dulce aliento
inspirado ha por todo bosque y sembrado
a los tiernos retoños, y el joven Febo
alcanza en Aries la mitad de su curso,
y las avecillas entonan sus cantos
y de noche están con los ojos abiertos
(tanto les punza natura el corazón);
va entonces la gente en peregrinación
y el romero marcha a costas foráneas
y a lueñes templos, de fama en tierras varias;
y en especial desde todos los confines

de Inglaterra hacia Canterbury se parten,
en busca del sepulcro del mártir santo,
el que en la enfermedad les ha ayudado..."

===1984.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan G. de Luaces. Edición a cargo de Jordi Lamarca (introducción, bibliografía, cronología y notas). Barcelona: Planeta (Colección Clásicos Universales, 90), xxvi + 402 pp. Comienzo del 'Prólogo General':

"En el tiempo en que las suaves lluvias de abril, penetrando hasta las entrañas la sequedad de marzo, hacen brotar las flores con el riego de su vivificante licor; en el tiempo en que Céfiro, con su grato aliento, anima los renuevos de todo árbol y planta; en el tiempo en el que el Sol ha recorrido en Aries la segunda mitad de su curso; en el tiempo, en fin, en que las aves cantan y, estimuladas por la Naturaleza, pasan toda la noche sin cerrar los ojos; en ese tiempo, digo, suelen las gentes ir en peregrinación a remotos y célebres santuarios de apartados países. Y entonces cuando, desde los límites de todos los condados de Inglaterra, acuden muchos romeros a Canterbury, a fin de visitar el sepulcro del santo y bienaventurado mártir que en sus enfermedades les acorrió..."

===1984.- EL CUENTO DEL MOLINERO. Traducción, comentario y notas de Amadeo Alaez Rojo. Prólogo de Gonzalo Torrente Ballester. Madrid: Indec (Iniciativas de Cultura), 64 pp.

===1984.- CUENTOS DE CANTORBERY. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor (Biblioteca Básica Universal).

===1984.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan G. de Luaces. Edición e introducción de Cándido Pérez Gállego. Madrid: Sociedad General Española de Librería (Colección Clásicos Universales, 19), 496 pp.

===1985.- TROILO Y CRISEIDA. Traducción de Antonio León Sendra. Córdoba: A.L.S. (Colección Biblioteca de Estudios de Anglística, 2). 337 pp.: Introducción (pp. 1-35), bibliografía (pp. 36-39), traducción (pp. 40-336), con notas al término de la versión de cada uno de los cinco 'libros'. La traducción, toda en prosa esta vez, resulta considerablemente distinta de la publicada en 1981 y 1983 (vide). Compárese el comienzo de la obra en esta edición con el incluido en la referencia de 1981:

> "Antes de separarme de vosotros, es mi intención narrar la desgracia de los amores de Troilo, hijo de Príamo, monarca de Troya. De cómo pasó del pesar a la dicha para, finalmente, sufrir infortunio.
> Oh, Tesifón, ayúdame a escribir los tristes versos que brotan de mi pluma uno tras otro. Te invoco, pues, oh Diosa del tormento, a ti, cruel Furia, penando siempre en aflicción. Haz que yo pueda ser el instrumento doliente que ayude a los amantes a quejarse, pues, a decir verdad, tan conveniente es tener un doliente porte para un asunto de dolor como un triste acompañante para el melancólico..."

===1986.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Traducción de Juan G. de Luaces. Barcelona: Salvat Editores (Biblioteca Básica Salvat, 56), 3a. edición, 183 pp.

===1986.- THE CANTERBURY TALES. [Prólogo General y Cuento del Molinero]. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca/ICE (Folia Pedagogica, nº 5), 28 pp. Edición a cargo de María Concepción González Herrero y Dolores Alonso Mulas.

===1987.- CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY. Edición, introducción, notas y traducción de Pedro Guardia Massó. Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra (Colección Letras Universales, 83). 633 pp. Muy extensa introducción (pp. 9-60). Sigue el texto completo de los CUENTOS en traducción en prosa, con estas líneas iniciales (p. 65):

> "Las suaves lluvias de abril han penetrado hasta lo más profundo de la sequía de marzo y empapado todos los vasos con la humedad suficiente para engendrar la flor; el delicado aliento de Céfiro ha avivado en los bosques y campos los tiernos retoños y el joven sol ha recorrido la mitad de su camino en el signo de Aries; las avecillas, que duermen toda la noche con los ojos abiertos, han comenzado a trinar, pues la Naturaleza les despierta los instintos. En esta época la gente siente el ansia de peregrinar, y los piadosos viajeros desean visitar tierras y distantes santuarios en extraños países; especialmente desde los lugares más recónditos de los condados ingleses llegan a Canterbury para visitar al bienaventurado, santo mártir que les ayudó cuando estaban enfermos..."

Con respecto a la propia traducción, que nos dice basada en el manuscrito Ellesmere según transcripción de Fisher (1977), Pedro Guardia nos hace notar también en la introducción (pp. 57-58): "Antes de iniciar su tarea el traductor de una composición poética medieval, además de fijar el texto base, tiene ante sí una

doble opción: intentar imitar los versos del original o realizar una versión prosificada... Traducir en prosa. Con un objetivo primordial: el de desvelar el significado del original de la forma más literal posible, de modo que la traducción sea un reflejo de su contenido. Esta es la opción que se ha tomado en el presente caso."

ESTUDIOS CRITICOS

Si las traducciones españolas de Chaucer son tardías en comparación con las versiones de otros idiomas del área occidental, más aún lo es la crítica de cualquier clase, tenor y extensión, toda ella (salvo leves alusiones) posterior a los años cincuenta y sesenta. Y ello, como se ha visto, a pesar de las varias traducciones que para esas fechas ya había en nuestro idioma, y a pesar también de que la editorial Poblet publicara en 1933, en traducción de M. J. Barroso Bonzón, la obra de G. K. Chesterton CHAUCER.

De hecho, hasta que no comenzaron a recogerse los primeros frutos académicos de los estudios universitarios de Filología Inglesa, la crítica española sobre este autor inglés puede darse por inexistente.

Bastante representativos, sin embargo, son los siguientes títulos:

1950

Del Hoyo, Arturo:
—"De Chaucer a Shakespeare"
En INSULA, 55 (julio de 1950), p. 8.

1960

Clavería Combelles. M. T.
—GEOFFREY CHAUCER SEGUN LOS CANTERBURY TALES.
Tesis de Licenciatura, Univ. de Barcelona (inédita).

1963

Aparicia Catalina, Blanca:
—LA HISTORIA DE TROILO Y CRÉSIDA EN CHAUCER Y EN SHAKESPEARE: EVOLUCION Y PSICOLOGIA DEL PERSONAJE PANDARO.
Tesis de Licenciatura, Univ. de Barcelona (inédita).

1966

Pérez Martín, María Jesús:
—"El tono de voz en 'The Nun's Tale' "En FILOLOGIA MODERNA (Univ. Complutense), nos. 23-24.

Sánchez Calderón, Antonio:
—GENERAL STUDY OF THE 'PROLOGUE' TO THE 'CANTERBURY TALES'
Tesis de Licenciatura, Univ. de Salamanca (inédita).

1969

García Alvarez, Ricardo:
—LA CARACTERIZACION DE LOS PERSONAJES EN LOS 'CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY'
Tesis de Licenciatura, Univ. de Barcelona (inédita).

1974 (?)

Sagi Alvarez-Rayón, Emilio:
—ESTUDIO CRITICO DE "TROILUS & CRISEYDE", DE CHAUCER
Tesis de Licenciatura, Univ. de Oviedo (inédita).

1975

Pérez Gállego, Cándido:
—CIRCUITOS NARRATIVOS
Zaragoza: Departamento de Lengua y Literatura Inglesas (338 pp.)

1976

Pérez Gállego, Cándido:
—"Informática en los Cuentos de Canterbury"
En REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE LA OPINION PUBLICA, 46 (oct.-dic. 1976), pp.33-63

1977

Bardavío Gracia, José María:
—"En torno a cuatro poemas de Chaucer"
En ESTUDIOS DE FILOLOGIA INGLESA (Univ. de Granada), nº 3.

1979

Sánchez Escribano, Francisco Javier:
—"Los maridos en THE CANTERBURY TALES"
En CUADERNOS DE INVESTIGACION FILOLOGICA (Colegio Universitario de La Rioja, Logroño), 5/1, 1979, pp. 129-144.

1980

Otal Campo, José Luis:
—SISTEMA Y ESTRUCTURAS DIALOGALES EN 'THE CANTERBURY TALES'
Tesis de Doctorado, Univ. de Zaragoza.

Sola Buil, Ramón:
—MODELOS DE ACTUACION SOCIAL EN 'THE CANTERBURY TALES'
Tesis de Doctorado, Univ. de Zaragoza.

Otal Campo, José Luis:
—"Sistema de indicadores gráficos del estilo directo en varios manuscritos y ediciones de THE CANTERBURY TALES"
En HOMENAJE A EMILIO LORENZO, Zaragoza: Departamento de Inglés.

1981

Sola Buil, Ricardo (ed.):
—THE CANTERBURY TALES: LITERATURA Y SOCIEDAD. Soria: Diputación Provincial. 104 pp. (Con contribuciones, entre otros, de Pilar Hidalgo ("El debate sobre el matrimonio en THE CANTERBURY TALES", pp. 41-48).
(Reseña, firmada por María Jesus Pérez Sanz, en ARBOR, tomo CXIII, nº 443, noviembre de 1982, pp. 119-120).

Sola Buil, Ricardo:
—DINAMICA SOCIAL EN LOS CANTERBURY TALES, de Ricardo Sola Buil. Zaragoza: Departamento de Inglés. (Edición de la Tesis de Doctorado, vide: 1980).

Bardavío Gracia, José María:
—"El tema de la visión en THE CANTERBURY TALES"
En ESTUDIOS DE FILOLOGIA INGLESA (Univ. de Granada).

1983

Bardavío Gracia, José María:
—"El Paraíso de Chaucer: Caín y Eva"
Conferencia pronunciada (1.6.83) en el ciclo "Las Voces del Texto Literario", organizado por el Departamento de Inglés de la Universidad de Zaragoza.

Barbeito Varela, T. Manuel:
—"Dos problemas formales en THE CANTERBURY TALES"
En ATLANTIS, 5/1-2 (junio-noviembre 1983), pp. 39-53.

1984

Pujals, Esteban:
—"Chaucer"
En su HISTORIA DE LA LITERATURA INGLESA, Madrid: Gredos, 1984, pp. 37-44.

Otal Campo, José Luis:
—"Aspectos de la estructura dialogal en THE CANTERBURY TALES"
En ACTAS DEL VI CONGRESO DE LA ASOCIACION ESPAÑOLA DE ESTUDIOS ANGLO-NORTEAMARICANOS,
Salamanca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Salamanca, 1984, pp. 107-121. (El Congreso se celebró los días 18 a 21 de diciembre de 1980).

Galván Reula, Juan Fernando:
—"Chaucer, narrador moderno y ejemplo de clasicismo"
En EPOS: REVISTA DE FILOLOGIA (Madrid: U.N.E.D.), n.1, 1984, pp. 19-34.

Galván Reula, Juan Fernando:
—"The Modernity of the 'Nun's Priest's Tale': Narrator, Theme and Ending".
En LORE AND LANGUAGE (University of Sheffield), 3/10, 1984, pp. 63-69.

León Sendra, Antonio
Guerrero Hortigón, Josefa y
Costa Palacios, Luis:
—"La función de Pandaro en el segundo libro del poema TROILUS AND CRISYDE de Geoffrey Chaucer"
En ESTUDIOS DE FILOLOGIA INGLESA, edición a cargo de Antonio León Sendra, Córdoba: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Córdoba (Textos e Instrumentos, nº 6), 1984, pp. 211-228.

Vila de la Cruz, María Purificación:
—CARACTERES SOCIALES EN LOS 'CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY'
Tesis de Licenciatura, Univ. Complutense (inédita).

1985

Guardia Massó, Pedro:
—"Tensión astrológica y la Comadre de Bath"
En ESTUDIOS LITERARIOS INGLESES: EDAD MEDIA, edición de J. F. Galván Reula. Madrid: Cátedra, 1985, pp. 107-119.

Martínez-Dueñas Espejo, José Luis:
—"La prosa científica de Geoffrey Chaucer: Estudio textual y gramatical de A TREATISE ON THE ASTROLABE"
En ESTUDIOS LITERARIOS INGLESES: EDAD MEDIA, edición de J. F. Galván Reula. Madrid: Cátedra, 1985, pp. 121-137.

Alvarez Amorós, J. A.:
—"El punto de vista narrativo y la paradoja de la verosimilitud en el 'General Prologue' de THE CANTERBURY TALES"
En REVISTA CANARIA DE ESTUDIOS INGLESES (La Laguna), 11 (noviembre de 1985), pp. 47-68.

1986

Siles Artés, José:
—"El prólogo de LOS CUENTOS DE CANTERBURY: Una traducción del verso al español".
En ACTAS DEL VII CONGRESO DE LA ASOCIACION ESPAÑOLA DE ESTUDIOS ANGLO-NORTEAMERICANOS, Madrid: U.N.E.D., 1986, pp. 215-218. (El Congreso se celebró en Madrid, 19 a 22 de diciembre de 1983).

Gómez Soliño, José Secundino:
—"La utilización humorística de rasgos dialectales en 'The Reeve's Tale' y en 'The Second Shepherds' Play': Interpretación sociolingüística"
En HOMENAJE AL DR. REGULO, La Laguna: Publicaciones de la Universidad de la Laguna, 1986.

Coletes Blanco, Agustín:
—"An atypical fabliau: Genre and Expression in 'The Miller's Tale' "En CUADERNOS DE FILOLOGIA INGLESA (Murcia), 2, 1986, pp. 63-81.

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