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MisCELÁNEA
A Journal of English
and American Studies



**Vol. 15
(1994)**

*Dedicado
en homenaje
a
Carmen
Olivares*



Miscelánea

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Carmen Olivares Rivera,

Catedrática de Universidad,
en los veinticinco años de su labor docente e investigadora
en la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Zaragoza,
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Universidad de Zaragoza
Departamento de Filología Inglesa y Alemana
Noviembre de 1994

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Presentado en homenaje a la Doña

Carmen Olivares Rivera

*Catedrática de Universidad, en los veinticinco años
de su labor docente e investigadora en
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Homenaje a Carmen Olivares

Presentación

EN el curso académico 1992-93 el Departamento de Filología Inglesa y Alemana celebró el 25 aniversario de la concesión de la primera cátedra de Filología Inglesa en la Universidad de Zaragoza, que fue ocupada por la Dra. Doireann MacDermott. Con ella se daba el primer paso para el asentamiento definitivo de los estudios de Filología Inglesa en nuestra Universidad. Unos meses más tarde era contratada como Profesora Ayudante Carmen Olivares Rivera. Otros profesores fueron llegando después, pero sólo ella eligió quedarse todos estos años, uniendo su carrera universitaria al desarrollo del propio Departamento, de tal manera que hoy en día sería imposible separarlos.

Por esta razón, el Consejo de Departamento decidió unánimemente dedicarle, como pequeño homenaje a sus veinticinco años de dedicación, este número especial de nuestra revista, *Miscelánea*, que ella contribuyó a fundar. Con él queremos reconocer y agradecer la abnegada dedicación y la infatigable determinación con que la Dra. Carmen Olivares ha ido emprendiendo a lo largo de estos años innumerables tareas universitarias que no suelen reflejarse en el *curriculum vitae*, pero que perviven grabadas indeleblemente en la memoria de todos sus compañeros.

Es este *curriculum* paralelo, escrito con tinta invisible en la memoria colectiva, el que intentaré sintetizar en unas pocas palabras, aun a sabiendas de la imposibilidad de reflejar, no ya el gran número de actividades e iniciativas emprendidos por la Dra. Olivares desde su entrada en el Departamento en 1968, sino, sobre todo, el espíritu que alentó dichas empresas.

Conocido es el interés de Carmen Olivares por los desarrollos contemporáneos de la lingüística y por la incidencia de la lengua en el comportamiento de los hablantes. De ahí su

temprana atención al lenguaje político, el funcionalismo gramatical y la pragmática. No debe extrañar, por tanto, que se debiera a ella la implantación de la asignatura de Lingüística Teórica en el primer plan de estudios de Filología Inglesa, tras la reforma de los planes de estudios de 1973. Esta reforma, que permitía la escisión de la Licenciatura de Filología Moderna en Filología Inglesa y Filología Francesa, fue llevada a término por la Dra. Olivares y por la entonces Catedrática de Francés de Zaragoza, la Dra. Alicia Yllera, pese a la fuerte oposición de algunas instancias universitarias.

En 1975 la Dra. Olivares obtuvo una plaza de Profesor Adjunto mediante oposición nacional. En 1983, tras la promulgación de la LRU, Carmen Olivares encuentra por fin los cauces adecuados para contribuir a la reforma del sistema universitario que tanto había deseado. A partir de entonces se dedica activamente a la política universitaria, participando en la Plataforma que apoyaría la candidatura del Dr. D. Vicente Camarena para Rector Constituyente. Tras resultar elegido, el Dr. Camarena ofrece a Carmen Olivares el cargo de Adjunta al Rector para Relaciones Internacionales (hoy Vicerrectorado de Asuntos Internacionales), recayendo en ella la puesta en marcha de los programas ERASMUS y COMETT y la organización de un buen número de acuerdos bilaterales de cooperación.

En 1986 Carmen Olivares obtiene la Cátedra de Filología Inglesa, con perfil de Lingüística. Esta nueva situación la lleva a plantearse la necesidad de dimitir de su cargo como Adjunta al Rector, con el fin de poder dedicarse plenamente al Departamento, y asumir de nuevo su dirección. Para dar idea de la cantidad y calidad de su actividad como encargada de Relaciones Internacionales baste una anécdota entre muchas posibles: en el debate para la elección a Rector que siguió al primer mandato del Dr. D. Vicente Camarena, el candidato de la oposición, Dr. D. Javier Otal, no tuvo reparos en elogiar públicamente, durante su alocución en el claustro, a Carmen Olivares por su labor en Relaciones Internacionales, pese a tratarse, obviamente, de un miembro del equipo de la oposición. Esta anécdota es especialmente entrañable porque pone asimismo de relieve la calidad humana y el talante

político del Dr. Otal, a quien una lamentable enfermedad separó poco después, confiamos en que no definitivamente, de la política universitaria.

La reincorporación de la Dra. Olivares a las tareas de dirección coincidió con el complejo proceso de constitución de los nuevos Departamentos según las directrices de la LRU. Es entonces cuando se constituye como tal el actual Departamento de Filología Inglesa y Alemana, en el que se integran todos los profesores del área de Filología Inglesa de los distintos centros de la Universidad de Zaragoza, así como los profesores del área de Filología Alemana, mostrando la Dra. Olivares un gran interés personal en la incorporación de estos últimos y teniendo en todo el proceso una actuación decisiva.

Constituído el nuevo Departamento, la Dra. Olivares decide retirarse de la dirección por razones de salud, permaneciendo, pese a todo, vinculada permanentemente a la organización departamental, bien como subdirectora, bien como miembro de diversas Comisiones, especialmente de la Comisión para la Reforma de los Planes de Estudio que entrarán en vigor en el curso 1994-95. Ni que decir tiene que esperamos poder seguir contando con su colaboración y su sabio consejo mucho tiempo más.

Creo interpretar el sentir general al decir que confiamos en que, cuando Carmen eche la vista atrás y ponga en la balanza los logros y los sinsabores de estos veinticinco años, no se arrepienta de haber sacrificado tanto tiempo, tanta energía y tanto confort personal por el bien común. Que recuerde, como nosotros lo hacemos con ocasión de este pequeño homenaje, de dónde partimos y dónde nos encontramos, y que sepa que nosotros, al menos, sí que lo valoramos y se lo agradecemos.

Susana Onega Jaén
Directora del Departamento
de Filología Inglesa y Alemana
de la Universidad de Zaragoza

Tiempo, palabra, vida.

OTOÑO o primavera, alba o atardecer, todas las épocas de la vida son hermosas. En una vida buena sólo hay días hermosos. En una vida sabia hace siempre buen tiempo. Bien es cierto que también hay días grises en que el peso de la realidad se impone y despertamos abatidos, no por falta de voluntad, sino porque, como dice T. S. Eliot, "human kind / Cannot bear very much reality".

El tiempo va marcando jalones en el viaje de la vida y también surcos en el alma. Porque hay un tiempo de hechos y un tiempo de sentimientos. El tiempo del viaje interior es el más verdadero, porque es acumulativo.

Veinticinco años dedicados a la palabra, por profesión y por vocación. Es como llevar la palabra en las venas, a punto de volar por los labios. Al principio existía la palabra, y por la palabra se crearon todas las cosas. La palabra asumió todos los poderes y fundió esencia con existencia. La palabra más verdadera no es la que expresa, sino la que crea, no ya de la nada, sino de las potencias del ser. Crea, sobre todo, amor entre los seres. Ser manantial maternal de la palabra, concentrando en un punto invisible el maravilloso trueque de una vida de palabras a unas palabras de vida. Porque, si yo hablarla todas las lenguas de los hombres y de los ángeles, pero no tuviéra amor, no sería sino un bronce que resuena o un címbalo que tañe.

El silencio fue integrado en el total de la palabra humana. Incluso se dice que una lengua no se adquiere más que después de largos períodos de silencio. Aprender y ser. Porque el silencio no sólo acoge y acomoda las voces externas, sino que tiene su propia voz. Las voces del silencio, ese silencio eterno de los espacios infinitos, como dice Pascal, no para asustar, sino como invitación permanente a la meditación trascendental.

Desde la Comisión de Doctorado del Departamento apreciamos mucho la inestimable colaboración de Carmen Olivares para la promoción de nuevos doctores, y deseamos perfeccionarnos según advierte esta sentencia de carácter general: *Hay entre vosotros muchos doctores, pero no muchos sabios.*

Los miles de palabras y gestos generosos realizados no se pierden en el espacio impersonal. Quedan adheridos a los árboles, a la sutileza del viento y claridad de la luz, al sabor de la fruta y al aroma de la tierra. Pero están sobre todo presentes en nuestro sentimiento agradecido y en nuestros mejores deseos de felicidad para la Dra. Carmen Olivares Rivera en sus Bodas de Plata con el Departamento de Filología Inglesa y Alemana de la Universidad de Zaragoza.

Macario Olivera Villacampa
Presidente de la Comisión de
Doctorado del Departamento

Nota de la redacción

El primer volumen de esta revista fue una colección de estudios en homenaje a D. Emilio Lorenzo. Es un placer constatar que la publicación se ha asentado, y ver hoy su volumen nº 15 dedicado en esta ocasión a una de las personas que en su momento impulsaron la creación de la revista. La preparación de este número ha coincidido para bien con el nacimiento del primer nieto de Carmen; vaya aquí mi felicitación, que es sin duda la de todos los aquí reunidos. También coincide con la baja por enfermedad de nuestra compañera: me gustaría, pues, que viese en este homenaje nuestro deseo añadido de que se restablezca pronto. Muchos compañeros de Zaragoza y otras universidades han enviado contribuciones para felicitar a Carmen. No hemos podido incluir gran parte de ellas, aunque presentamos, como puede verse, un volumen muy extenso y variado. Gracias en cualquier caso a todos los que han colaborado de una u otra manera. Y gracias a Carmen misma, por habernos proporcionado la ocasión con su trabajo de todos estos años.

José Angel García Landa
Director de la revista



**—HLENKA REGAINED:
IRONY AND AMBIGUITY IN THE NARRATOR OF
WOODY ALLEN'S *ANOTHER WOMAN*¹**

!

**MARIA DEL MAR ASENSIO AROSTEGUI
UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA**

MY discussion of narration and narrators in film requires the previous acceptance of the fact that current narratological theories have primarily had novels as their objects of study. This fact constitutes a serious hindrance for the narrative study of movies which, as a result, have more often than not been inappropriately measured against literary standards.

Novels are not like narrative films. It is true that both are narratives and consequently have the same capacity for telling stories. However, their *modus operandi* is fairly different (see Chatman 1978: *passim*, esp. 146-260; and especially, Chatman 1990: 124-138). Literary story-telling and cinematic story-telling constitute two separate modes of narration because the kind of language used by each mode is also different. The former is based on the symbolic nature of any written linguistic utterance, as it is the role of the reader's imagination and competence to provide the signified of each of the existing signifiers, and of the novel as a whole. The latter, on the other hand, plays with the highly iconic quality of the images it is composed of.² Therefore, while the concept of narration in literature is usually

represented by the necessary presence of an agent, a narrator, who utters linguistic signs thus converting the initial story into the final text with which the reader is presented, the concept of narration in cinema is more complex in the sense that cinematic narration involves other textual components such as *mise en scène*, music score, sound effects or editing among others. Nevertheless this does not imply that such concepts as narrator or narration should be avoided when referring to films (see Deleyto 1991: 161-166). In fact, although narrators in cinema do not enjoy the same preeminence as narrators in novels do, a similar agent to the narrator in a novel may be found in many films. In this article the use of the term "narrator" will accordingly be restricted to the agent that actively tells a story or part of it in linguistic signs.

Graham McCann, the author of one of the most comprehensive books on Woody Allen's life, work, and persona, states that "American movies have always been passionately devoted to story-telling, and Woody Allen has become one of the great modern story-tellers" (1991: 227). In an unusually large number of Allen's films, there is always at least one character who engages in the act of explicitly telling a story. In *Manhattan* (1979), we hear Allen's peculiar voice as that of the extradiegetic narrator (Genette 1980: 228) in the difficult process of beginning his story; in *Annie Hall* (1977), we see him as a character-narrator directly addressing the audience from inside the diegesis and establishing himself as "the master of ceremonies, the person who will summon the characters and arrange the order and duration of the scenes" (McCann 1991: 31); in *Radio Days* (1986), we hear again Allen's voice, as an autodiegetic narrator (Genette 1980: 245) who recounts the golden memories of his childhood and youth from a distance; in *Zelig* (1983), Allen parodies documentaries and thus makes use of an objective extradiegetic narrative voice; even in some of his earlier comedies (*Take the Money and Run* (1969) or some parts of *Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex* (1972), for instance, there is also a certain emphasis on story-telling as a reminiscence of his period as a stage comedian. This agent reappears in his more recent films *Hannah and Her Sisters* (1986) and *Oedipus Wrecks* (1989).

Another Woman (1988) is no exception in this sense. Rather to the contrary, the story reported in this film is narrated by a main agent, a woman, Marion, whose role is quite complex and significant for the development of the story and for its meaning. What I propose in this article is a narratological approach to this narrator's role as a means to explain how voice-over narration generates ambiguity and irony by spreading

inconsistent and incomplete clues all through the film, by transforming the process of narration itself into a source of suspense and emotion, by consistently breaking the coherent temporal order of the events, and by constantly questioning and blurring the limits between different ontological levels.

The beginning of the film is quite interesting for several reasons. The opening scene, which I will analyse in some depth because of its peculiarity and narrative importance, lasts approximately ninety seconds. It is a kind of presentation which comes immediately after the Orion logo. There is no introductory title, no credits. No preliminary clue is presented for the viewer to create her/his framing expectations. On the other hand, what the camera shows —the objective images— is situated in a space and a time other than that of what we are told —the linguistic utterances—, although it may be said that the images visualize what the voice is telling.

In this sense the scene proves to be overtly stylized. Its artificiality is in a way laid bare. On the one hand, during the whole ninety seconds, all we hear is the sound of a clock plus a female voice, a woman who in an intimate, self-confident tone overtly expresses her attitude to life, introduces herself as the narrator and mediator of the story, and gives a quick but exhaustive explanation of her present situation both at a personal and a professional level. At the same time, the camera has been focusing on a long empty corridor until the figure of a middle-aged woman getting ready to leave her house approaches it. Invited by the woman's intimacy, so to speak, the camera follows her as she turns right and looks at herself in a mirror. This shot is followed by a cut to a close-up of her face. The woman is Gena Rowlands, an actress who is not too well-known for the general public and, most significant of all, who is not part of Allen's usual acting crew. Nevertheless, her relationship with the camera leads the viewer to infer that she may well be playing the main character in the story. This inference is further emphasized by the fact that she claims to be telling the story: "My name is Marion Post. I'm director of undergraduate studies in Philosophy at a very fine women's college though right now I'm on leave of absence to begin writing a book," she says, and the camera immediately tracks to the woman we have seen before, thus establishing the final identification of this woman with the voice that we have been listening to for the last few seconds.

Gena Rowlands is not the only unusual actress in Allen's cast, however. The same applies to the rest of the characters the narrator progressively introduces as her close relatives and whose photographs are simultaneously

scanned by the camera: her husband, Ken (Ian Holm); Ken's daughter, Laura (Marta Plimpton); her brother, Paul (Harris Yulin); her sister-in-law, Lynn (Frances Conroy); and her father (John Houseman). None of them had ever worked with Allen before —with the exception of Frances Conroy, who worked with him in *Manhattan* (Girgus 1993)— so once more the viewer's expectations, at least the ones based on previous experiences of Allen's films, are broken.

For Bordwell,

[t]he sequential nature of narrative makes the initial portions of a text crucial for the establishment of hypotheses. Sternberg borrows a term from cognitive psychology, the "primacy effect," to describe how initial information establishes "a frame of reference to which subsequent information [is] subordinated as far as possible" (1985: 38).

It is interesting to note that, for the sake of ambiguity, the opening scene paradoxically and systematically conceals all kinds of background information from the viewer. Besides, speaking in narrative terms and this time for the sake of irony, the information provided is also scarce, superficial and misleading because all of the hypotheses concerning Marion that the viewer may establish as a frame of reference —her security, her success, her declared fulfilment in life— will be invariably proved false by the progressive development of the film.

Ambiguity is consciously searched for in this first scene. There is at least a spatial and a temporal distance between Marion as a character and Marion as a narrator. This is precisely what Sarah Kozloff (1988: 5) names "voice-over narration" which she defines as "oral statements conveying any portion of a narrative, spoken by an unseen speaker situated in a space and time other than that simultaneously being presented by the images on the screen." It is clear that this narrator is, in Genette's terms (1980: 245), a homodiegetic narrator insofar as she places herself in the space of the fabula by means of the possessives she uses. She is also an extradiegetic narrator, a second level character-narrator, telling her story in the retrospect. The implications of this type of narrator are at least two-fold. First, by making the narration explicit, the text foregrounds the interplay between the story and the process of telling it, the discourse. Secondly, the narrating character enjoys a dual status, she is both the experiencing-I and the narrating-I. The final function of the interplay between the story and the discourse, on the

one hand, and the dual status enjoyed by the narrating character, on the other, is in both cases ironic, as this analysis will attempt to demonstrate.

Spatial distance is made evident from the very moment that we hear Marion's voice, as narrating-I, significantly accompanied by the sound of a clock, but we neither see her speaking nor perceive the clock anywhere in the scene. That is to say, both the voice and the clock are extradiegetic elements, they are outside the story which is being told. Later in the film, however, we hear the sound of a clock for the second time as Marion-narrator is speaking. But this time we *do* see the clock, for now the events she is describing do not take place at her home (as it occurred in the opening scene) but in the flat she rents as an office to write her book, the place where her life will be completely changed. So we may deduce that the process of narration physically takes place in that flat.

The question of the temporal distance between story and discourse in the opening scene remains a little bit more ambiguous. The first two sentences the voice-over narrator utters are in the past tense, giving thus the impression that the narration postdates the events on the screen:

If someone had asked me when I reached my fifties to assess my life, I would have said that I had achieved a decent virtual fulfilment both personally and professionally. Beyond that I would say I don't choose to delve. Not that I was afraid of uncovering some dark side of my character, but I always feel if something seems to be working leave it alone.

But then the rest of the monologue is recounted in the present tense. Little by little Marion gives each and every detail of her present situation as if to make her audience believe that the narrative action, the story and the discourse are simultaneous in time. Yet, once the credits have been shown in their entirety, the narrator retakes her narrative and invariably uses the past tense till the end of the film.

In Genette's words, "[t]he use of a past tense is enough to make a narrative subsequent [i.e. the story precedes the discourse], although without indicating the temporal interval which separates the moment of the narrating from the moment of the story" (1980: 220). As it is finally made clear at the end of the film, the narrating-I knows perfectly well from the very beginning how her story is going to end, something which is subtly hinted at in the opening sentence of the film. Then, why does she choose the present tense for the presentation of her personal and professional situation?

In my opinion, two reasons may account for the use of this textual strategy. First, according to Genette, "[a] present-tense narrative which is 'behaviorist' in type and strictly of the moment can seem the height of objectivity" (1980: 219). This presentation scene fulfils a very concrete function which can be summarized as the narrator's attempt to create a strong degree of intimacy with the audience in order to achieve the highest possible degree of complicity. Marion's words have to be objective enough so that the viewer may trust her and suspend her/his disbelief. Furthermore, it is only by appearing as a reliable narrator that the ironic intention of this initial scene can be fully attained. Marion introduces herself as a woman who does not like self-analysis. Yet, all the elements in the story will precipitate her precisely into self-analysis and into the surfacing and acceptance of the actual dark side of her character, a despicable moral stance which has meant the sacrifice of others and of herself for the sake of an apparent success that will prove a fake, a delusion, as the film progresses.

The second reason is a consequence of the first. Once the narrator has gained the audience's confidence, she can manipulate their response to the film. Thus, the first scene in *Another Woman* shows an apparently omniscient secure narrator who controls the story she tells and who directs the viewer's perceptions and emotions. Her controlling power as a narrator is put at a level with the apparent control she has of her own life as a character. The illusion of unmediated reality is broken. Marion is the framing narrator (as we have seen, her voice is simultaneous with the film's opening shots), and for a long while what the viewer receives and accepts is her mediated story. In short, the story's significance will only be clear at the end of the film, its correct interpretation will only be possible when the viewer has patiently gathered all the important information that has been cleverly hidden from her/him till the final moment. Meanwhile the viewer is forced to go through the same experiences and to feel the same emotions as the experiencing-I, Marion as a character, undergoes in her unconscious mediated search for authenticity and truth. The simultaneous anagnorisis of both character and viewer allows for the process of narration itself to become a textual element, a source of suspense and emotion. No doubt, the final function of this strategy is ironic because, as I have already said, Marion's initial self-assurance both as a narrator and as a character is progressively eroded and proved only a mask behind which Marion's true self is hidden.

Another Woman is a rich, complex narrative and the function of its narrator is not exclusively that of providing external information. Yet, before

engaging in the analysis of the story proper and of the main strategies used in its telling, a brief summary of its fabula (see Bal 1985: 6-9) and its structure seems to be necessary in any narratological approach. *Another Woman's* fabula is fairly simple. Marion Post, a successful philosopher, has taken a leave of absence from her job in order to write a book. Searching for quiet and silence, she sublets a flat downtown as an office. Instead of the expected calm, she finds that due to some acoustic problem she has direct access to the private conversations of a psychiatrist and his patients. Although at the beginning she refuses to pay any attention to them, she accidentally overhears a woman's voice. The intensity of her anguish overpowers Marion and makes her feel sympathetic towards the woman. Her initial curiosity progressively turns into an obsession: she spies on her, she follows her down the street, she even invites her to lunch. But her desire to know about the other woman's problems leads her to become aware of her own personal problems. After a series of encounters with an old friend, her father and her brother and by listening to the anguished commentaries of the other woman, she realizes that her egotistic drives have made her unable to maintain any true relationship with people, not even with those she loves the most, not even with herself. Her life embodies all the dreads and deceptions that the other woman fears so much. Her whole world tumbles down, she even has to go through a divorce. It is then that she recognizes her past mistakes and decides to adopt a more positive attitude to life. The other woman unconsciously engages her in the search for her true self and for the real values of life.

Another Woman is a psychological melodrama. There is very little action. The most important things always happen inside the characters' minds. In fact almost all the elements that make the narrative progress are either shared feelings provoked by common experiences between characters (for instance, Hope's and Marion's melancholic remembrance of a lost true love), or by shocking revelations about past events and unconsciously hurt feelings (Claire's withdrawal from Marion because of David; Paul's decision not to bother Marion any more). The film's symbolism benefits from this fact. Almost all the action takes place indoors. The locations may change — Ken and Marion's house, Marion's flat, her parents' house in the country, a theatre, a pub, a shop, an office, even a restaurant — but they are invariably enclosed spaces, interiors.

Only a few scenes are shot outdoors but they are most of the times mere transitional scenes (Marion and Laura in a car going to visit Marion's father; Marion going to see her brother). Nevertheless, four examples of outdoor

scenes are worth commenting upon for their narrative value. The first occurs very soon in the film. Marion has agreed to meet her sister-in-law but, as she does not show up in time, the protagonist decides to leave. Lynn appears just as Marion reaches the street. The encounter, although brief, takes place outdoors. Lynn tells Marion that she and Paul are going to get a divorce and she asks her for some money. Their conversation uncovers Paul's actual feelings for Marion:

LYNN: You're deluding yourself. Of course, in a way he idolizes you. He also hates you.

MARION: Sorry I don't accept that.

LYNN: You're such a perceptive woman. How come you don't understand his feelings?

MARION: Look. I'm late and ... and, to tell you the truth, I just make it a practice of never getting into this kind of conversations. You know, they're fruitless and people just say things they're sorry for later. Why don't you just tell me how much you need and I'll discuss it with Ken. OK?

This is the first time Marion is asked to get involved, to do away with the amount of self-deceptions that are suffocating her true self.

The next two scenes are interrelated and they develop the symbolism still further. The first one is the scene in which Marion suddenly recognizes Hope, the woman whose voice she has been listening to and, moved by her curiosity, decides to follow her. Paradoxically, she does not learn anything new about Hope but, quite by chance, she meets her old friend, Claire, and her husband. This encounter provokes the second "unpleasant" revelation, another reversal of her golden memories of youth, and her second refusal to face the truth. The second one is the scene in which Marion meets Hope in a shop, while she is searching for an anniversary present for her husband, and invites her to lunch. For the first time, the film shows Marion cheerily walking the street accompanied by someone else. Again the restaurant Hope chooses is the place where Marion discovers that her husband is having an affair with their mutual friend, Lydia.

The final outdoor scene I will be commenting upon is, in my opinion, the most beautiful and touching of all because, in spite of its nostalgic tone, it opens a door to hope. I am referring of course to the last-but-one scene of the film. Marion has resumed her work. Free from any distraction she makes a pause and starts reading about Hlenka, one of the characters in Larry Lewis's (Gene Hackman) novel, which is rumoured to be based on her. The

images on the screen show Larry and Marion walking around on Central Park, taking refuge from the sudden rain and kissing. Meanwhile she reads: "Her kiss was full of desire and I knew I couldn't share that feeling with anyone else. And then a wall went up and just as quickly I was screened out. But it was too late because I now knew that she was capable of intense passion if she would one day just allow herself to feel."

The four outdoor scenes just described constitute in themselves four moments of reversal and recognition of a failure or a lack in Marion's apparently successful life. To such an extent, these four scenes ironically contradict Marion's self-assurance and personal fulfilment overtly stated in the opening scene of the film, and implicitly maintained by the narrative so far. Indeed all traditional human values such as familiar relationships, friendship, love and even self-identity are progressively questioned in Marion's life through these scenes. Thus, far from reassuring Marion's belief in her closeness to her brother, Lynn denounces Marion's self-delusion and misunderstanding of her brother and Paul's resulting feelings of hatred towards his sister; her friend Claire resentfully announces her voluntary withdrawal from Marion in order to free herself from her egotistic drives; Marion's relationship to her husband proves superficial, unstable, and inevitably condemned to failure; finally, she consciously hides her true feelings towards Larry consequently banning her own capacity for emotion and passion. Marion's recognition of failure is progressive, like the viewer's. It ranges from a merely bothering statement (Lynn's) to an unavoidable fact. (Ken's deceit). Yet, there is hope in Larry's final sentence in the last scene mentioned above: "I now knew that she was capable of intense passion if she would one day just allow herself to feel." Thus, only by losing her stability will Marion be able to rediscover herself and become "another woman" as the title of the film foreshadows.

Apart from the symbolic potential provided by the consciously chosen location of the events, one of the most successful strategies used by the narrative as a means to manipulate the viewer's perceptions and understanding of the film is the particular selection and temporal organization of the events themselves. The film primarily consists of a present-day recounting of a set of events that the narrator experienced in a relatively short period of her recent past. One of the functions of the narrator in *Another Woman* consists in aiding the viewer not to lose hold of a complex chronology. Marion's narration, with its past stance, has the role of establishing the necessary points of reference for the narrative. It usually provides expositional and temporal information and it also sets the pace of

the narrative. Thus, while she gives a detailed account of the events that took place during the first five days of the story, her narration does not specify how many more days go by till the end of the film. Her narrative puts a special emphasis on the events that bring about Marion's quest for authenticity. Very precise temporal expressions are used: "that first morning," "all day," "by late afternoon" or "the following morning." However, the decisions she takes after her cathartic experience are frequently condensed in sentences such as "the following days" or "once on a sunny morning."

Those expository chronological sections are complemented by six flashbacks (not in chronological order). Five of them are external, that is, they are prior to the first event represented in the story. Such external flashbacks invariably correspond to Marion's memories although they are motivated by several characters' recollections. For instance, the first flashback is motivated by Hope's confessions to her psychiatrist. She is questioning herself about real love and about whether she has made the right choice: "I've told you there was someone else once. The last time I saw him was several years ago, before I was married, at a party." This recollection makes Marion think of a similar episode in her own life. Her memories are shown onscreen as a flashback while the story is frozen for a while. The "other woman" also acts as a narrator in some parts of the film. She could be said to possess the typical qualities of an embedded or intradiegetic narrator (Genette 1980: 228). Her voice is off-screen and she talks to a concrete person, her psychiatrist. Nevertheless, her words have a wider audience because they are heard not only by Marion but also by the viewers of the film. She is not aware of her role as narrator but she leads Marion both physically and psychologically in her way to self-discovery.

The second flashback is motivated by the old photographs Marion sees at her father's house. This time Marion narrates off-screen and gives an extremely romanticized account of her family life and her youth:

And here I am older. I could go up to the spare room and paint for hours. The time would just fly by when I was doing a picture. And there I am with my friend Claire. You know, she became an actress. We used to be so close but I haven't seen her in years. And there's my mother. She loved strolling round the grounds. And she loved all the beautiful things. She loved nature, music, poetry. That was her whole existence.

I have quoted part of this second flashback because such a dream-like romantic account ironically and painfully contrasts with the more down-to-earth objective revelations later made by the rest of the characters. This flashback is used as a technique to stress the commonly accepted fact that stories depend upon who tells them, and that there is no clear-cut distinction between reality and fiction.

The third and fourth flashbacks are both motivated by Marion herself. They recount two complementary aspects of the story of her first marriage. They are used as a device to add significant information prior to the story. And the last external flashback, which I have already mentioned, is motivated by Larry Lewis's written narrative. Its function is double. First, it is a kind of description of Marion's true self. Secondly, it is the only way of providing the film with a hopeful ending.

The single internal flashback, which tells about those events that occur within the temporal bounds of the story proper, is narrated by Hope, the "other" woman. Her narrative takes us back to the moment when Marion discovers that her husband and her friend Lydia are having a love affair. This information is delayed on purpose in order to provoke a stronger response from the viewer.

Like the previously analysed outdoor scenes, these flashbacks further contribute to establishing the ideology of this film, namely that "real" personal fulfilment lies with the recognition and the acceptance of one's "identity," in this case, a woman's identity, which the film locates at the side of emotion, lack of egotism, comradeship to other women, and motherhood. A series of attitudes that Marion is shown flashback after flashback to have purposefully rejected in her life in favour of personal, social and professional fulfilment.

So far I have referred to the use of incomplete clues, the various functions of narration and the breaking of the chronological order of events as means of generating ambiguity and irony. Now, before putting an end to this essay, I would like to analyse the relationship between fiction and reality and the way in which this relationship is constantly questioned in the film as the last resource to create irony and ambiguity.

One way of underlining that there is no clear-cut distinction between what is real and what is fictional in this film was already pointed out when I referred to the function of external flashbacks. This metafictional aspect of the film is still more clearly symbolized by the fact that, all through the movie, Marion's life is fictionalized not only by herself but also by others in one way or another. First, we are offered Marion's own excessively

romanticized account of her youth and her family, which, as the film develops, proves to be quite far from the truth. Then, three very important passages of her life are literally represented in her dreams as if they were three different scenes from a theatre play. Claire and Marion are the actresses; Ken, Larry and Sam are the actors; Claire's husband is the director; and Hope, the "other" woman, is the audience. We find all the necessary elements to consider it a play within a dream within a film and therefore there is no doubt about its artificiality, about its metadiegetic quality as it is three times removed from reality. Ironically, it is in extreme artificiality that truth about Marion is to be found. This is a common trait of these overtly acknowledged fictional scenes which engulf three different truths that Marion keeps on denying in her deceitful but apparently more "real" life: the fact that her present marriage is coming apart, the fact that she feels she made the wrong choice and resents having lost the man she loved passionately, and the fact that her first husband, Sam, did not die accidentally but rather committed suicide. Finally, Marion's life is also turned into a fiction when Larry Lewis, a character in the film, transforms Marion into Hlenka, the central character in his novel. Again we find a literary narrative within a cinematic narrative and again it is the novel that is paradoxically taken as the revelation of Marion's true self, as the recognition of the other woman within, whose existence she has been systematically denying and slowly suffocating. Thus the film transcends its own fictional boundaries. It constitutes a multiple game of reflections. Woody Allen had already used this strategy in some of his films, as Graham McCann (1991: 40) has pointed out,

As with *The Purple Rose of Cairo* (1985), *Radio Days*'s movie theatre offers a sanctuary from reality, momentary yet memorable, the ever changing images seeming somehow to move to a logic more reliable than the logic of everyday life.

In *Another Woman* this multiple game of reflections, this technique of infinite regress is used in like manner to show that the fictionalization or textualization of reality can be used as a means of coming to terms with our own past and that, when trusted, it can be a good guide to the rediscovery of a hidden reality.

The opening shots of *Another Woman* show Marion looking at herself in a mirror. Being the symbol of self-consciousness *par excellence*, this mirror diegetically foregrounds the complex self-reflective nature of the film.

Simultaneously, Marion's diegetic act of facing her own image in the mirror, while her extradiegetic voice affirms that she is not afraid of uncovering some dark side of her character, contribute to presenting the viewer with an apparently self-assured accomplished woman. Yet Marion's initial self-reliance as a character soon contrasts with the ambiguity generated by the inconsistent and incomplete pieces of information that Marion, as narrator, scatters all through the film, as well as by her breaking of conventional chronology, and by her capacity to transgress the boundaries between fiction and reality. Her self-assurance is finally destroyed when the viewer finds out that indeed Marion has a dark side to un-cover. Ironically, hers is a dark side not because of its negative, potentially dangerous, features but rather because, despite its being her true self, it has unconsciously been suffocated and obscured for the sake of intellectual and social achievement. It becomes, then, noteworthy that the mechanism that firstly sets out the process of uncovering developed in this film is precisely the narration of similar fears and mistakes by "another woman" to her psychiatrist. Significantly, the other woman's name is Hope. Indeed, the final message of this film seems to be hopeful for, even if it is true that Marion loses her stability, it is no less true that, after her cathartic experience, she becomes "another woman," an independent, creative, emotive, new woman who, consequently seems to have gained her true self, and who for the first time in a long while feels at peace with herself. a

NOTES

1. The research carried out for the writing of this paper has been financed by the Consejo Asesor de Investigación de la Diputación General de Aragón.
2. For a recent discussion of this issue, see García Mainar on focalisation (1993: 153-67).

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
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DOUBLES, DECEIT AND REFLEXIVE NARRATIVE IN TWO NOVELS BY VLADIMIR NABOKOV

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Not quite a bed, not quite a bench.
Wallpaper: a grim yellow.
A pair of chairs. A squinty looking-glass.
We enter — my shadow and I.

Nabokov, "Hotel room"

VLADIMIR NABOKOV'S novels show that imagination creates its own reality by giving order and meaning to a subject. They do not reflect reality; instead, they express their own individual reality. Simon Karlinsky formulates a basic principle of Nabokov's writing:

The hero uses his imagination to devise a reality of his own, which he seeks to impose on a central reality. The question of which reality is real, that of the hero or that of the environment, is usually left open. What matters is which of the two realities is the more relevant one for the artistic conception of the story (quoted in Dembo 1967: 3-4)

Nabokov's novels are self-reflexive. Khodasevich, a Russian emigrant and critic, writes about Nabokov's *oeuvre* in 1937: "Sirin not only does not

mask, does not hide his devices . . . but . . . places them in full view" (quoted in Christensen 1981: 37). His language, too, is self-conscious and self-referential. In all his novels one finds jokes and anagrams which require readers to work out solutions. Nabokov commented in an interview:

One of the functions of all my novels is to prove that the novel in general does not exist. The book I make is a subjective and specific affair. I have no purpose at all when composing the stuff except to compose it. I work hard, I work long on a body of words until it grants me complete possession and pleasure. (Nabokov 1990: 115)

One of the main devices used by Nabokov is the use of doubles. The *Doppelgänger*, double or alter ego is a very well known motif. It appears whenever two characters play a symmetrical role in a single narration. There are examples of this motif from the very beginning of literary tradition. Plautus' confusion of twins, which also appears in Molière's and Shakespeare's plays, is a good example. The motif of the double was used to convey ideas about the unconscious and dreams during the Romantic age, for instance in the relationship between Frankenstein and his creature in Mary Shelley's novel. The romantic *Doppelgänger* showed the dark aspect of personality and the repressed personality. For example, Stevenson's *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* is a metaphor of the emotional repression which British people suffered in Victorian age. Moreover, one can infer the meaning of these characters' names: "Jekyll" as "I kill" and "Hyde" as "to hide" (Jackson 1978: 114).

The word *Doppelgänger* was primarily associated with German Romanticism. Writers such as Goethe, Richter and Hoffman were the first to use it. Later in the same century novelists stressed the psychological features of the *Doppelgänger* instead of the physical ones. The plots of the stories dealt with characters who think they have a double but do not. Poe's "William Wilson," Dostoevsky's *The Double* and Gogol's *The Nose* are some examples.

But . . . What is the possible origin of this literary tradition? According to Otto Rank, primitive man's persistent fear of oblivion forced him to create a body-soul which might be located in his shadow or reflection and which is not subject to man's idea of physical life-span but survives death. Primitive man saw the disappearance and reappearance at dawn of his shadow, and assumed that a spiritual self existed somewhere (Dembo 1967: 68). Certain Indian tribes from Canada and South America use the same word for soul and reflection. Besides, one remembers the legend of vampires. They do not have

a reflection in a mirror as they do not have a soul (Ziolkowski 1980: 141). However, modern man makes this double a symbol of death rather than of eternal life. It may be the product of an hallucination or madness. So most narratives using versions of the double end up in madness, suicide, murder or death. Poe's "William Wilson," Hans Heinz Ewers's *The student of Prague*, Oscar Wilde's *Dorian Gray* and most of Nabokov's novels end this way.

Moreover, Nabokov writes in a time in which contemporary science and knowledge problematize the understanding of reality. The traditional concepts of time and space are not valid any more. Fiction starts rejecting pre-formed views of reality, the conventions of the traditional novel. This is a self-conscious rebellion against conventions. The novel must explore its own inward mechanisms. The result is an era of self-reflexiveness or metafiction in the novel. It is the era of what critics have called the self-conscious novel:

the self-conscious novel . . . may be defined as an extended prose narrative that draws attention to its status as a fiction. . . . The self-conscious novel denies that its obligation is "to hold the mirror up to nature." It asserts that art has virtues of its own to admire, and, that if there is any mirroring to be done, the novel should mirror itself. (Stonehill 1988: 3, 11)

For instance, John Fowles writes *The French Lieutenant's Woman*, where the author himself speaks with his characters within the novel and the reader can choose the end of the novel. Doris Lessing writes *The Golden Notebook*, whose structure is divided into several notebooks, written by the same character, which are fragmented and mixed. In each narrative there are accounts of various stories, overlapping occurs and even contradictory versions are formed. Moreover, the reader discovers that the first sentence of the book *The Golden Notebook* is the first sentence of the protagonist's next book within the novel. Where does the protagonist's world start? Where does the reader's world finish?

Self-reflexiveness is attained through the use of different motifs. One of them is the *mise en abyme*. It is a structural device because it is a story within a story which is a small scale model of the whole novel. It offers a means by which the novel can refer to itself. Another motif is the *Doppelgänger*.

As has already been stated, the *Doppelgänger* motif is concerned with characterization. It establishes parallels between characters within the novel and therefore, creates a symmetrical plot due to the two parallel characters. The motif of the *Doppelgänger* allows the novelist to parody consciously and symmetrically the actions of the characters within the book. It is a recurring

design by which the novel refers to itself. Consequently, it can be used as another way for the novel to draw attention to its status of fiction (Stonehill 1988: 28).

Nabokov has denied the use of true doubles in his novels, as there are no two characters exactly alike within a single novel. In fact, false doubles are used. His novels do not deal with two characters which look alike. He stresses the psychological features of the motif of the *Doppelgänger* rather than the physical ones. In other words, one of his characters feels he has a double, but in reality he does not. However, this character and the one which is thought to be his double work as *Doppelgänger*, albeit in a rather different way. What is new in Nabokov's treatment of the double is irony and parody. Nabokov displays a ludic view of literature. In his works, his characters play their role and he plays with the reader. In the metafictional mode, "Literature, like the other arts, is seen as a game in which the goal is aesthetic satisfaction and in which truth to life is irrelevant" (Stonehill 1988: 13).

Nabokov, then, introduces the motif of the *Doppelgänger* in an anti-romantic way. Some examples of this would be: Albinus and Rex in *Laughter in the Dark*, Cincinnatus and Pierre in *Invitation to a Beheading*, Kinbote and Shade in *Pale Fire*, Van and Ada in *Ada* and Hermann and Felix in *Despair*, as well as Humbert Humbert and Clare Quilty in *Lolita*. These last two examples will be the object of this study.

Although *Despair* is one of the first of Nabokov's novels, written in Russian in 1932 and rewritten in English in 1965, it is not one of the best known. Hermann Hermann, like the hero of *Lolita*, Humbert Humbert, has got a double name. It is a name which reflects itself. Moreover, this double name is a symbol of his double life. He is writing the story to give an account of the final events in his life as is Humbert's case too. His story is a kind of reflection of his real life. Hermann narrates his experiences, which are half imagined and half remembered. Moreover, as happens in *Lolita*, his story also involves the murder of a man who is supposed to be very much like himself. The victim falls prey to his distorted perception, although Hermann is driven by greed.

Hermann's relationship with his *Doppelgänger*, whose name is Felix, starts in the first chapter of the novel. However, there is an image of duality which precedes it, and is shown in the form of alliteration.

My mother. . . On hot summer days, a *languid lady in lilac* silks, she would recline in her rocking chair, fanning herself, munching chocolate. . .

Our trademark on the wrapper showed a *lady in lilac*, with a fan.

(D 13, 14; my emphasis) In fact, there are images of duality spread throughout all the novel. They are related to the game of doubles that the narrator has set for the reader.

I remember once seeing a pair of twins at a fair.

. . . that Communism shall indeed create a beautifully square world of identical brawny fellows.

We admired the exact replica . . . The leaf came to . . . its beautiful, lethal reflection.

Looked at two little girls. . . under a double-trunked birch tree.

(D 20, 27, 59, 65; my emphasis)

These examples help to create an atmosphere of doubles throughout the novel. On the other hand, it is known that the narrator of all these examples is Hermann. Consequently, he demonstrates how he visualizes objects in general, in other words how he sees reality in terms of two, double and reflections. This idea is also very clear when dealing with mirrors:

What should I call my book then? . . . 'The Mirror'? 'Portrait of the Artist in a Mirror'? (D 167)

Hermann is conscious of the importance of mirrors within his story. However, his behaviour in connection with mirrors is not very self-confident:

I am going to write that word again. Mirror. Mirror. Well, has anything happened? Mirror, mirror, mirror. As many times as you like —I fear nothing. A mirror. To catch sight of oneself in a mirror. (D 28)

. . . to have the bed reflected in the oblique speculum or *spiegel*. (D 33)

In the first example he tries to show that he is not afraid of mirrors. But the second one which follows almost immediately the first illustrates that Hermann does not dare to pronounce the word mirror though he wishes to say it. That, therefore, shows his lack of self-confidence about mirrors.

At that time I was on admirable terms with mirrors. (D 61)

Far worse was my failure to put up with mirrors. In fact, the beard I started growing was meant to hide me not so much from others as from my own self. (D 147)

If he is reflected in a mirror, an equal self is shown in the mirror. Somebody who looks just like him but who is not him. This frightens Hermann, and he makes up another figure similar to himself, though it is not Hermann:

Thus *we* were reflected by the misty and, to all appearances, sick mirror, with a freakish slant, a streak of madness, a mirror that surely would have cracked at once had it chanced to reflect one single genuine human countenance. (D 81; my emphasis)

Hermann's double is Felix who cannot be another perfect Hermann. Naturally enough, Felix is related to mirrors.

While reading, one discovers that Hermann Hermann keeps a double perspective whilst narrating events. This means that he keeps two different, and even opposite, points of view on the same matter.

Dealing with his wife, he thinks that she loves him deeply and that she is totally faithful to him:

We never quarrelled. (D 30)

To her I was the ideal man: brains, pluck. And there was none dressed better. (D 31)

On Ardalion's bed, half dressed —that is, shoeless and wearing only a rumpled green slip— Lydia lay smoking. (D 92)

Then, all at once, he (Ardalion) gathered up Lydia in his clutch and covered her with juicy kisses. (D 116)

The first two examples show how much his wife loves Hermann and the third example introduces Ardalion as his wife's cousin. However, the last one shows Hermann's confusion is about both Lydia and Ardalion. In reality she does not love him and Ardalion is her lover. The narrator exposes Felix as his double, but there are also instances in which Hermann is able to see Felix without any resemblance to him:

He appeared to my eyes as my double, that is, as a creature bodily identical with me. (D 21)

For a moment I had the impression that it had all been a delusion, a hallucination —that never could he have been my double. (D 68)

These examples show, on one hand, that Hermann is out of touch with reality, and on the other, that he is also capable of understanding reality as it is. Consequently, he can understand that Lydia's lover is Ardalion and that Felix is not his real double. These examples also show how hard he tries to convince himself both of Lydia's love for him and Felix's similarity to him. This is connected to Freud's idea of forgetfulness in which forgetting can be seen in terms of retention of what the subject is trying to forget (Freud 1988: 1684).

This duality makes Hermann see events from somebody else's point of view. So he sometimes narrates events from Felix's point of view as if he were his double. The following examples show how Hermann Hermann thinks as if he were Felix.

What I wished to imagine most, was the impression left upon him by a certain morning in May passed on a patch of sickly grass near Prague. He woke up. At his side a well-dressed gentleman was sitting and staring. . . I gathered it was about likeness. Well, thought I, let then likeness be. No concern of mine. Chance of giving me an easy job.

I killed the bluffer and robbed him. He lies in the wood.

That poor man in his fine overcoat lies dead, not far from his car. I can drive a car. I love violets and music. I was born at Zwickau.

(D 46, 146, 147; my emphasis)

In these examples, Hermann is the one who speaks. However, he describes the scenes from Felix's point of view, as if Felix were the focalizer instead of him, though it is Hermann who is telling the story. This is indeed unusual because the story is based on Hermann's memories, not on Felix's. The focalizer is Hermann, he is the narrator. The reader does not witness Felix's thoughts, they are just described by Hermann. However, these examples show some of the instances in which Hermann describes scenes as if he were Felix, as if the narrator were Felix instead of Hermann. The narrator shows

the theme of the *Doppelgänger* not only by using two characters but also by mixing two different perspectives.

However, Hermann is conscious of his double perspective within the story.

I have grown much too used to an *outside view of myself*, to being both painter and model.

I would be in bed with Lydia. . . but at the same time, incomprehensibly and delightfully, I was standing naked in the middle of the room. . . . *The sensation of being in two places at once* gave an extraordinary kick.

Here it is before me, the *letter I finally wrote*. . . . Thus it would seem that *I were the receiver* —not the sender. Well, so it ought to be in the long run, for haven't we changed places, he and I?

(D 26, 32, 57; my emphasis)

These three examples show three different instances in which he is conscious of being both the model and the duplication. It is a type of metafictional behaviour for a character, as he creates his own double. Apart from that, all these examples show Hermann's sense of dissociation or of double perspective. For instance, the scene of Hermann's description of intercourse with his wife, Lydia, involves schizophrenic dissociations. He stands outside himself and gets aroused by watching himself copulate with Lydia. Moreover, these examples show his lack in the sense of reality due to his belief of his similarity to Felix and his blindness towards the affair between Ardalion and Lydia.

Hermann's dissociations, his double perspective, and his lack of sense of reality characterise his relationship with Felix, his double:

I closed my eyes . . . came Felix. . . . But he faded as before, the moment he reached me, or, better say, he seemed to enter into me, and pass through, as if I were a shadow . . . and again a figure appeared, and again it was he. (D 51)

Here Hermann speaks of himself as a shadow, the one who will finish his double's life. Jung talks about the shadow calling it "our shadow (the dark side of our nature)" (Jung 1968: 73). He goes on to state that "through dreams one becomes acquainted with aspects of one's own personality that for various reasons one has preferred not to look at too closely" (Jung 1968:

174). This is what Jung called the realization of the shadow, and now it often appears in dreams as a personified form.¹

When Hermann describes his first meeting with Felix, the narrator introduces Felix as his double:

He appeared to me as my double, that is, a creature bodily identical with me. (D 21)

However, when they are talking together there is no other character with them. Besides, nobody else is able to see their similarity:

he looked at me, then at Felix. Naturally, owing to my moustache, our likeness did not leap to the eyes; (D 73)

Now it dawned upon me what had shocked me most —shocked me as an insult: not a word was there about our resemblance; not only was it not criticized (for instance they might have said, at least: "Yes, an admirable resemblance, yet such and such markings show it to be not his body") but it was not mentioned at all. (D 155).

Hermann could have imagined the whole story about his double, because his union with Lydia, his wife, is childless. There is no extension of himself in another person. Therefore, he projects his own face upon the body of another person (Dembo 1967: 73).

Andrew Field comments on this relationship:

Despair is a tale of a murder which goes wrong. Felix, the victim, is the necessary and complementary mirror without which Hermann, the murderer, can't be seen in proper focus. Hermann is right-handed, Felix left-handed. In a key sentence added to the English translation of the novel, the relationship is neatly stated as "Narcissus fooling nemesis by helping his image out of the brook" Nemesis is the personification of divine retribution for violation of sacred law. Murder is only one aspect of Hermann's transgression. His despair is predominantly sexual. (Field 1987: 164).

Hermann thinks he has got a *Doppelgänger*. However, nobody notices it. Whenever both of them speak or meet, they are alone. As happens in other *Doppelgänger* stories, Felix signifies everything that Hermann can never have. In a way, Felix is the externalization of Hermann's buried instinctual life. Felix, as a name, means the happy one. Felix, the character, remains

outside the society which has created businessmen such as Hermann. His passport says that Felix is a musician. He is a dirty bohemian tramp who exists without responsibilities. However, this is not Hermann's case. He has a business to run, a wife to take care of. He belongs to the upper middle class and whenever he travels, he uses his comfortable blue Icarus. Felix lives happily without these responsibilities. Hermann's case is not unusual: "El doble en suma, no es sino una proyección de los aspectos reprimidos de su personalidad" (Ziolkowski 1980: 160).

Felix, the happy one, is the man whose death can bring happiness to Hermann. Hermann thinks that with money he can solve all his problems. However, he cannot kill him without being discovered. Obviously, he will not get that money and he will add another problem to his long list. In the end Hermann writes:

I understood that what little life still lay before me would be solely devoted to a futile struggle against that doubt; and I smiled the smile of the condemned and in a blunt pencil that screamed with pain wrote swiftly and boldly on the first page of my work: "Despair"; no need to look for a better title. (D 169)

The result of his situation is despair, a feeling which provokes him to write the story.

The protagonist of *Lolita* has also got a double name. He is Humbert Humbert, something he makes explicit by playing with his name:

Humbert the Terrible deliberated with Humbert the Small. (L 29)

Humbert the Wounded Spider... Humbert the Humble. (L 54)

Mr Edgar H.Humbert. (L 75)

These quotations appear particularly at the beginning of the novel when he is introducing his affair with Lolita. These quotations are proleptic in a way because the reader will later understand that Humbert sees objects with a double vision and personality. In one way he is the lecherous admirer of young girls. In another way he is the normal man who confronts Clare Quilty acting as Dolores Haze's father. His duality is also apparent from the way he views things and narrates them to us:

There was a double bed, a mirror, a double bed in the mirror, a closet door with the mirror, a bathroom door ditto, a blue-dark window, a reflected bed there, the same in the closet mirror, two chairs, a glass-topped table, two bed-tables, a double bed (L 118)

The key words in this short passage are two, doble, duality, and mirror, as this object has the following feature: "el espejo dobla la figura reflejada, ésta surge como si se tratara del doble de quien se pone ante él" (Ziolkowski 1980: 143). When he sees this room in the Enchanted Hunters hotel he knows he is about to have sexual intercourse with Lolita though he also pretends to be her father. He feels a duality which is reflected in the mirror which, in turn, doubles everything within the room. This is related to the traditional meaning of reproduction:

The mirror is employed as a motif or device to introduce a double or Doppelgänger effect: the reflection in the glass is the subject's other. (Jackson 1978: 45)

El cuadro, así desencantado, ha pasado sencillamente a convertirse en una *imagen en la que los hombres proyectan sus sentimientos de culpa*, al estilo de Dorian Gray. (Ziolkowski 1980: 132; my emphasis)

The many reflections in this room, as well as his inability to recognize his double life, seem to dissolve the actual reality of the room itself. With these images the protagonist starts projecting his own feelings of guilt with respect to his behaviour with Lolita. He says that Lolita has seduced him in that room, but she accuses him of having raped her and he feels guilty (L 140). These feelings will end up in an autonomous figure instead of images in a mirror.

Moreover, the protagonist, at one point early in the novel, tells the reader about one of the several occasions when he spent some time in a sanatorium where he was labelled as a potential homosexual and also he confesses his love for nymphets.

Between the age of nine and fourteen there occur maidens who, to they, reveal their nature which is not human, but nymphic (that is demoniac)...

... the boundaries —the *mirrory* beaches and *rosy* rocks— of an enchanted island haunted by those nymphets of mine. . . (L 16; my emphasis)

we who are in the know, . . . we nympholepts would have long gone insane. . . (L 17)

my adult life during the European period of my existence proved monstrously *twofold*. . . I had so-called normal relationships with a number of terrestrial women. . . inside I was consumed by a hell furnace of localized lust for every passing nymphet. (L 18)

He admits being labelled homosexual and being what he calls a nympholept. Both themes are related to narcissism, as a means to double himself. Homosexuality is to be involved with the body of a person similar to his, to a sexuality similar to his or in other words as a feature of narcissism:

no han roto su relación erótica con las personas y las cosas. Las conservan en su fantasía; esto es, han sustituido los objetos reales por otros imaginarios, o lo han mezclado con ellos, y por otro lado, han renunciado a realizar los actos motores necesarios para la consecución de sus fines en tales objetos. (Freud 1979: 8)

Freud's Oedipal stage includes narcissism, which is love for the self, and secondly an attachment to loved objects, which is a love for others (Jackson 1978: 88). Humbert turns an average American teenager into a nymphet. In fact, he is constantly looking for nymphets among European and American teenagers. This is the result of his inability to recognize that the true home of his nymphets is within his mind. All these will accumulate into his horror at recognizing his guilt with Lolita. However, he cannot accept this. His nature makes him first have a double life; later a split personality and, ultimately, a double. Consequently he will be forced to invent another sinister second self, a double, a *Doppelgänger*, who will be responsible for his actions. There are many examples in which his double is related to shadowy places (Maddox 1983: 251):

I was unaware that in the *darkness* next to me there was somebody.

Lo in white shorts receding through the speckled *shadow* of a garden path in the company of a tall man.

. . . its imperious red *shadow*. . . (L 126, 161, 217; my emphasis)

As has been mentioned above, Jung asserts that "the shadow cast by the conscious mind of the individual contains the hidden, repressed, and unfavorable (or nefarious) aspects of the personality" (Jung 1968: 110). Moreover, in dreams, myths and stories, the shadow appears as a person of the same sex as that of the dreamer (Jung 1968: 175). These are the cases of both Hermann and Humbert. Consequently, Humbert Humbert sees as his opponent as Clare Quilty, who is born "clearly guilty" (Fowler 1974: 153).

Before the first true sexual act with Lolita Humbert Humbert had already had relationships of a sexual nature with her at Charlotte's house. It is then that he says that there were two pictures posted on Lolita's bedroom wall, one labelled HH and the other Quilty (L 68). From then onwards the narrator will speak about Clare Quilty. Quilty will be a figure which Humbert will use to isolate evil in a narcissistic and unreal way.

The first explicit allusion made to Quilty is by Lolita in the hotel The Enchanted Hunters. "Does not he look exactly, but exactly like Quilty? said Lo in a soft voice" (L 121). She recognizes him as the man who had dinner in the dining room of the hotel. Prior to having sexual intercourse with Lolita and, consequently, prior to commencing a double life as Lolita's father and lover, Humbert has a little conversation with Clare Quilty, whom he finds in a dark place.

"Where the devil did you get her?"
 "I beg your pardon?"
 "I said: the weather is getting better."
 "Seems so."
 "Who is the lassie?"
 "My daughter."
 "You lie — she is not."
 "I beg your pardon?"
 "I said July is hot. Where is her mother?" (L 126)

Clare Quilty has recognized Lolita and Humbert. Then he initiates a conversation. It seems to be a casual one, but it is not. The important theme is Lolita. They appear to be talking about one thing but they are really talking about Lolita. This conversation has two levels, a double meaning. In fact, it is a symbol of Humbert's double personality and of his relationship with Clare Quilty as his *Doppelgänger*.

The reader is not given a good portrayal of Clare Quilty; instead, when the narrator gives any information related to him, the narrator compares him to himself:

A fellow of my age in tweeds. . . was staring at my Lolita. . . (L 138)

. . . that red ghost swimming and shivering with lust in my mirror . . . a broad thickish man of my age. (L 216)

. . . he swept by me in a purple bathrobe, very like one I had. (L 293).

These examples not only have to do with Jung's previous idea that a double is a person of the same sex as that of the dreamer but also show that the double has similar features to those of Humbert's. He is described as a man about his age and "shivering with lust" as Humbert would do for Lolita and dressed in the same clothes. Clare Quilty is a well-known American playwright who also writes for Hollywood. Meanwhile, Humbert pretends to be writing a novel at Charlotte's. Besides, the reader will see almost at the end of the novel that Humbert and Quilty both write and speak French. He likes young girls as Humbert does and both are interested in Lolita. Moreover, both of them are described as sexually ambiguous. Humbert is labelled as a potential homosexual whereas Quilty is described as having a "strange feminine manner" (L 295). He calls Quilty "my brother" but he is not conscious of his duality with him. Therefore, they reinforce the idea of doubles.

Once Humbert's guilt is exteriorized in Clare Quilty as somebody different from himself Humbert associates him with Lolita, the girl who is the reason for his guilt. Both of them conspire against Humbert. Consequently, Lolita suffers a kind of dissociation (Field 1987: 328) in Humbert's point of view as she behaves in two different ways. She acts in one way with Humbert and in another without him. In fact she is betraying him:

One Friday night . . . the telephone . . . rang and Miss Emperor asked if Lo was coming next Tuesday because she had missed last Tuesday's and today's lessons. . . (L 200-201)

"Who exactly concocted that play?"
 "Some old woman, Clare Something". . .
 "So she complimented you?"
 "Complimented my eye — she kissed me on my pure brow." (L 207)

The starting point of Lolita's dissociation, from Humbert's, is when she meets Quilty. But it is especially stressed when Quilty's red convertible appears. For instance, he finds out that Lolita has deleted Quilty's car number because he had written it down and he is not sure if Lolita is betraying him with the basque nurse in the hospital. I think it is especially stressed then since Humbert knows that Lolita is with him on their second journey without her consent. They have left Breadsley because Humbert was not happy about Lolita performing in a play, *The Enchanted Hunters*, in which Quilty transformed Lolita into an enchantress.

Humbert began his first real sexual intercourse in the hotel *The Enchanted Hunters*. This hotel is as real as his love for Lolita. Clare Quilty starts having sexual intercourse due to her role in his play *The Enchanted Hunters*. He is the second important man in her sexual experiences. He is the second enchanted hunter, as there was one previously, Humbert. Moreover, this play is fictional, it is not real just like Clare Quilty's interest for the teenager is not real. She was just his passing fancy. He does not love her whereas Humbert does. Here lies the difference between Quilty and Humbert. For Quilty the pursuit of Lolita is only a challenging game. When he is fed up with her because she does not cooperate in his films, he banishes her from his life.

Quilty is corrupt as well are the people around him. He tells Humbert that he knows a couple of things about a policeman who makes him his slave (L 300). Moreover, he considers Lolita as an object which will be with him for as long as is necessary. Quilty represents Humbert's old self as a nympholept (Fowler 1974: 155), and his old selfishness, because he forces her to have sex though she is unwilling to. That is why Humbert kills Quilty. Quilty is an unconscious projection of qualities or desires that Humbert refuses to recognize. So, he places these perverse features in another person or thing (Jackson 1978: 66). Consequently, Humbert resolves to kill his double. In so doing, he fulfils one of the features used in this kind of narration dealing with duality.² Humbert goes to Quilty's house only to kill him. However, this task turns out to be a difficult one. Quilty seems to be a ghost which Humbert cannot kill (Field 1967: 349). In fact, Humbert describes Quilty's house at the beginning of this chapter as a "medieval fairy house" (L 292).

Their first conversation at Quilty's starts in a similar way to that in the hotel *The Enchanted Hunters*, but the other way round. This time it is Humbert who recognizes Quilty whereas Quilty does not. Like the first one, their conversation has a double level of meaning:

"So you have not come to bother me about those long-distance calls?"
 "You do make them once in a while don't you?"
 'Excuse me?'
 "I said I had said I thought he had said he had never—" (L 294)

Finally Humbert introduces himself to Quilty as Lolita's father. He also announces that he is going to kill him.

From this point onwards the murder turns out to be a mockery. He has to convince Quilty that he really wants to kill him. "Concentrate. Try to understand what is happening to you" (L 296). Even after having fired at him, Quilty says: "You should be a little more careful!" (L 296), "Ah! That hurts, sir, enough!" (L 302). Moreover, while Humbert fires bullet after bullet into him, he thinks:

I understood that far from killing him I was injecting spurs of energy into the poor fellow, as if the bullets had been capsules wherein a heady elixir danced. (L 302)

This chapter makes the reader question the reliability of Humbert's narration. Is it possible for a person to take so long to die? Ghosts and phantoms do not die easily either. Neither does a hallucination, or a *Doppelgänger* in a story. Apart from the features that both Humbert and Quilty share there are other clues which lead the reader to consider Quilty as a *Doppelgänger*. Quilty calls Humbert ape. An ape is not only a wild animal but also an imitator (Rivers and Nicol 1982: 179). In *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* Mr Hyde plays "apelike tricks" and attacks and kills with "apelike fury" and "apelike spite" and in Poe's "The Murders in the Rue Morgue," the criminal self is literally an ape (Dembo 1967: 132). In this novel Humbert calls his double ape, however in *Despair* the reference to his double is not as clear as in this one. In *Despair* Hermann says "Let us suppose. I kill an ape" (D 175). Besides when Humbert and Quilty fight for the gun, they seem to blend together to form one object.

He was naked and goatish under his robe, and I felt suffocated as he rolled over me. *I rolled over him. We rolled over me. They rolled over him. We rolled over us.* (L 297; my emphasis)

Who is Humbert? Who is Quilty? It is a good example in which the narrator shows that Humbert is, in fact, killing his guilt. Humbert is purged of his crime of having forced Lolita to have sex. Humbert loves Lolita, for

that he must make his dark side disappear, the one who raped her. This is done by killing Quilty.

At the end of this chapter, though Quilty is dead, there are some images of duality: "two dark-haired pale young beauties. . . bringing two glasses out. . . where two or three women. . . two girls on the davenport, both wearing (L 303) . . . two other parked cars were parked on both sides" (L 304). It is as if Quilty, his house and his world meant two, doubles and duality.

Despair and *Lolita* start and end at the same point. Hermann is writing his story in a hotel room and Humbert is in jail charged with murder while writing his story. Hermann Hermann and Humbert Humbert have both double names, which is in anticipation of their stories concerning their doubles. Both kill their *Doppelgänger*. Both stories contain the murderers' confession of their crimes. Hermann thinks he has found his perfect double in Felix, a man who is free of any responsibility, that is a situation totally opposed to that of Hermann's. After meeting his double on several occasions, Hermann kills Felix to obtain money from his insurance company. In *Lolita*, when Humbert was a young boy he met a girl, Annabel, Lolita's double. This makes him long to find her again. He thinks he has done this with Lolita. However, what he does is just to take advantage of a vulnerable girl. This guilt provokes him to invent a *Doppelgänger*, Clare Quilty, whom he kills after accusing him of raping Lolita. Dealing with this, Jung asserts: "In fact, daydreams arise just because they connect a man with his complexes" (Jung 1968: 229). Hermann and Humbert kill their doubles because Felix and Quilty have all they themselves desire. The former has all the peacefulness and happiness that Hermann seeks and the latter is murdered because Lolita has willingly accepted his company. However, there is a difference between them. Humbert committed his crime driven by love while Hermann committed his driven by greed. Nabokov says about them:

Hermann and Humbert are alike only in the sense that two dragons painted by the same artist at different periods of his life resemble each other. Both are neurotic scoundrels, yet there is a green lane in Paradise where Humbert is permitted to wander at dusk once a year; but Hell shall never parole Hermann. (D 11)

Hermann and Humbert tell their story retrospectively. Besides, it is the only way they have in which they can reconcile their outer and inner worlds. This is because they describe their relationship with their *Doppelgänger* and their murder. However, the reader is never sure whether the story of their

double is true or not. As, in both novels the hero and his double are never seen together by another character and there is no reliable clue for the true existence of the *Doppelgänger*. Moreover, both doubles are not real doubles through physical appearance. Hermann is sometimes unsure of Felix's resemblance to him. Also, in *Lolita* the reader does not have a well-defined description of Quilty as he always appears in shadows and darkness. However, the reader can infer their roles as doubles from all the clues that the narrators supply. Felix seems to be Hermann's hidden instinctual life as he is the happy one with no responsibilities and Quilty seems to be a mirror of Humbert's tortured conscience, as the concept of evil is usually attached to the other. The stories of the *Doppelgänger* function as a form of commentary on the main stream of the story. The stories dealing with Felix and Quilty comment on what both Hermann and Humbert would like to have but cannot obtain, that is to say, no responsibilities and Lolita's love. It is a metafictional feature because both subplots comment on the main one, though both of them carry as much importance as the main plot itself. Hermann and Humbert create two characters, Felix and Clare Quilty, in the same way as Nabokov creates Hermann and Humbert. They are in the process of inventing a character. Hermann and Humbert create their doubles. We can argue, following Clancy, that

[a] *Doppelgänger* is an artistic principle which may be used to examine and portray psychological, esthetic and formal artistic problems, such as the relationship of the author to what he is writing. (Clancy 1984: 59)

Hence, the reader begins to wonder whether the both elaborately described murders of Felix and Quilty are in fact just part of Hermann's and Humbert's imaginations. The reader has to decide whether the story is true or not. This is a metafictional feature. Reading becomes a creative process shared with the author. These stories are not a portrait of reality as the realistic novel was. The reader creates the novel as well, when he decides what to believe. In *Despair* Hermann wants to create Felix into something which proves impossible. He strives to make Felix his perfect double. For this they change clothes and identities. Hermann moulds Felix as if he were a sculpture to make him similar to himself. After that Hermann kills his double and adds: "There are mysterious moments and that was one of them! . . . I could not say who had been killed, I or he! (D 144). The final confrontation between Humbert and Quilty acts as the best clue in realizing that the novel deals with duality. Humbert is firing bullet after bullet into Quilty, but he takes a very long time to die. This is unreal. This episode is

more mocking than real; in fact, it makes the reader doubt the narrator's reliability. This chapter has been carefully constructed by the author. On one hand Nabokov has legitimized Quilty's murder because he is perverted, vicious and so unable to love Lolita; on the other hand, Humbert has repented and has fallen deeply in love with her.

Moreover, if those stories are not true, both remind the reader that fiction is an illusion, and not the reality it may seem. Then, here are two stories which draw attention to their status as fiction (Stonehill 1988: 3). They do not mirror reality but themselves. The *Doppelgänger* motif itself is a kind of mirror. Felix and Quilty, symmetrically, mirror the actions of Hermann and Humbert within the novels. The doubles could not exist if they were not presented as a reflection of their originals. They are without doubt mirrors of Hermann and Humbert's actions. "The author confronts the reader, and possibly his own characters, with a form of mirror image" (Hutchison 1983: 57). The *Doppelgänger* is a kind of aesthetic repetition. Both stories turn our attention upon their status as works of art. Besides, by splitting the presentation of a story into two with double characters,

the author forces the reader into much closer scrutiny of the text, into exercising much of the judgement, and also into having constantly to revise that judgement whenever a different perspective forces a different view of plot and character (Hutchison 1983: 35)

As has been said previously the *Doppelgänger* motif is not original. Nabokov knew of Dostoevski's *The Double*, Gogol's *The Nose* or Mann's *Death in Venice*. However, Nabokov uses it in an innovative way. He undermines the familiar convention of the double. As any parodist, he chooses a fairly well-known theme to ridicule. He transforms the theme of doubles by dismissing conventional expectations dealing with the *Doppelgänger* motif and by frustrating the reader's presumption of how the *Doppelgänger* acts. Nabokov's use of the *Doppelgänger* makes reading a game of mirrors where the reader does not know whether the reflection is true or not.

This is in line with Nabokov's place as a writer of the mid-20th century, an age when all novelists are experimenting with the novel's resources and themes.

La exuberancia experimental característica del arte del siglo XX permitió a los escritores hacer un uso libre y humorístico de la

imagen sin verse coaccionados a justificarla racional o psicológicamente en cada caso. (Ziolkowski 1980:174)

Consequently, the use of *Doppelgänger* is used by the novelist in a parodic way. It is set up in contrast the traditional novels based on the *Doppelgänger* motif. Nabokov establishes a parallel, a *Doppelgänger*, but he exploits it in a self-conscious manner in order to accentuate certain features of the original, that is Hermann and Felix, and to accentuate certain differences with other well-known works on *Doppelgängers*. In *Lolita* both of them aim to have sexual intercourse with her, not to gain the girl's love as in *The student of Prague*. The confrontation between Hermann and Felix is not as serious or mysterious as in either *The student of Prague* or *William Wilson*. Even, in *Lolita* the confrontation between Humbert and Quilty is comical. There is no element of terror as happens in Stevenson's short stories (Jung 1968: 25). Humbert and Quilty's confrontation banishes reliability from the story, which has not been the case in the traditional use of the *Doppelgänger* up till then. In *Despair* the narrator tells the reader how he, like a sculptor, is moulding Felix into his perfect double.

Pero desde el momento en que el doble pasa del marco de la realidad novelesca a la mente del protagonista los problemas dejan de ser los mismos: la narración puede llegar al pathos, o a la farsa, a voluntad del narrador. (Ziolkowski 1980: 162)

The reader cannot trust the narrator. The *Doppelgänger* motif attracts the reader's attention to the fictionality of the novel by means of the character's story.

And even concerning Nabokov himself who has mastered two languages, Russian and American one can see his double outlook in life. He was born into the Russian culture but matured with the American one (Nabokov 1990: 10). That division is Nabokov's *Doppelgänger*. As Nabokov himself said to Andrew Field:

Nabokov stopped short in his conversation and said quite simply about himself "*The past is my double, Andrew*" (A. Field 1987: 86)



NOTES

1. However, neither Nabokov nor the narrator speak of a ghostly presence, as Rowe asserts that Nabokov does in different examples throughout the novel (Rowe 1981: 76). I do not agree with him, as his examples and explanations are not literal enough. Nabokov did not agree with him either, since he wrote an article speaking of this critic in these terms: "What I object to is Mr Rowe's manipulating my most innocent words" (Nabokov 1990: 304).

2. Jackson notes that most stories with versions of doubles finish with the madness, suicide or death of the divided character because if he is united with the other he will cease to be (Jackson 1978: 91). Moreover, the idea of death is joined to the motif of the doubles in writers such as Maupassant, Poe, Wilde and Ewers (Ziolkowski 1980: 179) —as we see, Nabokov is using a traditional motif.

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DISCURSIVE CONFLICT IN 'BENITO CERENO': NOBLE SAVAGE VERSUS WILD MAN

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THE criticism of Melville's short novel "Benito Cereno" is full of contradictory interpretations as to the author's position with regard to slavery. An early group of critics sided with Charles Neider in viewing "Benito Cereno" as Melville's "effort to blacken the blacks and whiten the whites, to create poetic images of pure evil and pure virtue" (1948: 10). Sidney Kaplan followed the same tendency of denouncing "Benito Cereno" as "an 'artistic sublimation' not . . . of anti-slaveryism, but rather of notions of black primitivism dear to the hearts of slavery's apologists" (1957: 45). A second group maintained that through the clear presentation of proslavery prejudices, Melville finally undercuts them. Allen Guttmann (1961:42) interpreted Delano's and Cereno's narrow-mindedness, together with the impartial lawsuit, as "*the very thing which Melville is subverting.*" Lately, many scholars have drawn upon the ambiguities and ironies in the text to prove that in fact, as Carolyn Karcher points out, it is Delano who "falls into the language of the southern apologists of slavery" (1980: 132), while Melville himself remains in a much more indeterminate position. Brook Thomas (1984: 119-20) and Eric J. Sundquist (1986: 154) hold a similar position when they defend that Melville finally provides no authoritative perspective or point of view to help the reader determine whether the whites

or the blacks were fighting for a just cause.¹ As these divergent reactions indicate, the text appears ambiguous and complex; it flows among constant ironies and contradictions. It has often been pointed out that the story "starts as a world full of grays only to transform into a world divided between blacks and whites" (Thomas 1984: 119); from the reader's perspective, however, the story remains gray throughout: it never fully ascribes to either pro-slavery or anti-slavery positions. As Brooks Thomas indicates, the silences and ambiguities in the story, and the absences responsible for its final indeterminacy, "can be explained in terms of the historical contradictions which slavery posed to 'enlightened' whites" in ante-bellum America (1984: 124). While this article sides with those critics who defend the impossibility of finding Melville's authoritative point of view within the text, it proposes to analyze the "authority" of Delano's point of view and to study the discursive conflict and ambiguities visible in his rendering of the story.

Delano's perception of the black man in "Benito Cereno" suffers from the contradictions which white America had to face as slave uprisals started to destabilize the image of the peaceful and contented "uncle Tom." Along the first half of the nineteenth century, the slave revolts and the efforts of white abolitionists activated the repressed suspicion that the slaves being brutalized actually shared a humanity with their brutalizers. The debates centered over whether blacks possessed, beneath their animal aspect and behavior, a *human* soul. Eventually, this debate highlighted the confusion present in the white man's mind over the nature of his own humanity. It was not so much a search for the essence of the blacks' soul as a search for the quality of that humanity felt to belong exclusively to the white man. The distinction between a "normal" humanity and an "abnormal" one was being increasingly destabilized, the borders between one and the other, blurred. The indeterminacy of the nature of ontological frontiers separating whites and blacks generated basic discursive conflicts and sites of confrontation that are visible from the Declaration of Independence to the different Slave Acts.²

The instability and fluctuation of the white man's notion of humanity pervades "Benito Cereno." This meaningful inconsistency not only permeates the story as a whole but is also reflected in each one of the characters, whose defining characteristics are either unstable or equivocal. Don Benito fluctuates between being an emblem of pure goodness, an amiable seaman, and "a weak and corrupt sea captain engaged in the trade of slavery" (Bernstein, qtd. in Nnolim 1974: 29). Babo seems to be caught

between his instinctive and natural fight for freedom —together with Atufal, he feels ready to do "what was necessary for their design of returning to Senegal" (BC 226)³— and his evil desire for revenge upon the whites — which could explain his refusal to sail away when he first saw Delano's ship, as well as his suicidal pursuit of Don Benito after he jumped into Delano's boat. The blacks on the *San Dominick* are also a site of contradiction in Delano's eyes: they are slaves, though they wear no fetters. The character who best reflects the discursive conflict of the period in American history is Captain Delano himself. His constant hesitations with regard to the blacks, his image of them as faithful servants while he feels somehow threatened by their presence, do not only reflect his weak and unstable position on board the *San Dominick* but are also the result of a discursive conflict internal to the Euro-American monologue on the black "other." His uncertainty and apprehension are not mainly caused by Babo's masquerade and machinations as much as by opposing historical and ideological discourses fighting a battle in Delano's mind. Through his narration he reflects a historical confrontation between two divergent discourses that shared ideological positions in nineteenth century America.⁴ As this paper pretends to elucidate, Delano apprehends the black man only through metaphors whose submerged meanings he partially misses or represses. Delano alternates between his image of the black as an innocent Noble Savage and as a depraved Wild Man; in adhering to both essentialist metaphors, he utterly misinterprets the slave revolt and totally neglects the blacks' inner motivations. While exposing how Delano adapts these ideological images of the black man to fit his own insecurities Melville underscores the purely discursive nature of both metaphors and discloses them as empty constructions artificially maintained.

In Delano's monologue, the discourse of the Noble Savage and the discourse of the Wild Man are visible as the captain shifts from total confidence on the blacks to quiet distrust and fear. Both had originated much before the nineteenth century, in the classical period, and had traditionally substituted one for the other in a cyclical process. The discourse of the Wild Man, biblical and medieval in nature, identifies the descendants of Ham, who are black and embody "Cain's rebelliousness" (White 1978: 161). The notion of the Wild Man is based on a primitivism which gathers all men's fears of evil and the unknown and projects them onto a corrupted human species. On the other hand, the discourse of the Noble Savage appears much later in time, and is an evolution of the image of the Wild Man. The Noble Savage idea relies on a pastoralism which emphasizes the unblemished and

benign nature of the African, while focusing the capacity for evil specially on the white man and civilization (Cf. White 1978: 183-96).

In the image Captain Delano offers of the blacks, Melville unifies both discourses on the black man. Their constant interplay in the text renders Delano's position as full of hesitation and instability; his attempts at gaining confidence are basically asserted through the continuous repression of meaning. Evidence of the existence of both discourses surfaces only through metaphors and textual absences which point at an unconscious conflict in Delano's mind. In this sense, in Delano Melville puts to the test the unresolved opposition between the discourse of the Noble Savage —which admits the black man within the "civilized world"— and the discourse of the Wild Man —which rejects him— as it evolved in nineteenth-century America.

From the very beginning of the story the narrator emphasizes the special location outside civilization where this test will take place. Delano lies at anchor in the "small, deserted, uninhabited island" of Santa Maria, significantly situated in "the southern extremity of the long coast of Chili" (BC 154). The impression of desolation of the island reverberates and intensifies as the narrator considers "the lawlessness and loneliness of the spot," a clear indication of the suspension of the two basic elements on which civilization is founded, the community and the law. As Walter Herbert points out, the act of travelling outward "beyond the presumed borders of civilized community in order to bring back a report on the savage portions of mankind" (1980: 8) was a fairly natural routine from the middle ages and up to Melville's time. As Melville situates his characters beyond the structural and organizing rules of civilization, he also places them beyond the constraints of civilization, in a perfect spot to prove the validity of the white man's ideological superiority over the African.

However, this natural spot is tainted with the mental and experiential baggage each of the passengers on both ships brings over from the Western world. Significantly, the *San Dominick* itself seems to carry the same unconscious burden as all her passengers. The *San Dominick*, as Benito tells in his deposition, set sail from the port of Valparaiso with a group of slaves; "none wore fetters, because the owner, his friend Aranda, told him that they were all tractable" (BC 224). As Delano first boards Benito's ship, the slaves are still unfettered, as pertains to a natural environment beyond the constraints —fetters— of civilization. Nonetheless, in the *San Dominick*'s hold, the unconscious of the ship —of the text, as well—, as if repressed, the fetters lurk, unused but still equally menacing to the blacks.⁵

Delano enters the narration armed with his civilized discursive defenses against the unknown, his textual fetters. As he perceives the stranger ship approaching from the distance, he gets ready to cast his discursive and perceptive web over the *San Dominick* and its crew. His first impressions on board the ship are of bafflement at the mystery which is contained in it: "The ship seems unreal; these strange costumes, gestures, and faces, but a shadowy tableau just emerged from the deep, which directly must receive back what it gave" (BC 158). This "shadowy tableau," populated mainly by unfettered blacks, is ready for Delano to project his interpretive strategy. Reading signs that have previously been formed and encoded in his mind, Delano's "undistrustful good nature" compels him to adopt the image of the Noble Savage in his interpretation of the unknown Africans on the ship.

Although Eric Sundquist (1986: 154) maintains that "Melville's tale, antislavery though it may be, contains no invocation of noble savagery," the distorting image of the black man as Noble Savage permeates Delano's account. Before even making contact with the blacks on the ship, Delano readily stresses their good-natured and pristine qualities. These "unsophisticated Africans," with their "self-content" and "peculiar love . . . of uniting industry with pastime," (BC 159) bring out Delano's "weakness for negroes." In his understanding of them, they are a mixture of docility and nobility. Delano feels confident as he sees "the affectionate zeal" and "good conduct" (BC 161) of Babo, Don Benito's private servant. The masquerade of Atufal appearing as a noble—although unrepentant—slave, confirms Delano in his impressions of the "general docility" of the blacks. A little later in the narration, the connection is made between the kindness and nobility of the blacks, and their deep links with unspoiled nature. While civilization has generated some evil tendencies in white men, the African remains pure, true to nature, but also subject to the danger of being contaminated by the white man: "if a little of our blood mixed with the African," affirms Delano, "should, far from improving the latter's quality, have the sad effect of pouring vitriolic acid into black broth; improving the hue, perhaps, but not the wholesomeness" (BC 205).

Given his position as captain, Delano is used to classifying his society (as well as his crew) along a hierarchical axis. In his conception of the blacks, he offers a vertical division in which the blacks share certain noble capacities of the whites but occupy an inferior stage in the natural chain of being. The blacks belong within a sphere immediately inferior to the humanity in which the white man is securely settled. In this neoplatonic understanding, the black man is continuous with the white man, but in an

inferior rung of the ladder, a lower species of it. This is partially veiled when Delano feels confident that Don Benito would never ally with the blacks against his own white crew: "Who ever heard of a white so far a renegade as to apostatize from his very species, by leaguing in against it with the negroes" (BC 189). These meditations have the secondary effect of establishing the blacks as a different "species" from the white man. In the blacks Delano recognizes the "limited mind" natural to "indisputable inferiors" (BC 199). The display of topics akin to the Noble Savage stereotype are, at one point in the text, related to one of the many written sources initially responsible for reviving the discourse of the Noble Savage; while meditating on the negresses he sees on the ship, Delano thinks, well pleased: "Ah! . . . these perhaps are some of the very women whom Ledyard saw in Africa, and gave such a noble account of" (BC 176). John Ledyard was the author of *Proceedings of the Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa* (London, 1790).⁶ This work highlighted the nobility and kindness of the Africans, and together with many others helped to revive the discourse of the Noble Savage, which had been long present in classical and Christian thought and was rediscovered during the second half of the eighteenth century (White 1974: 191).

The benevolent and paternalistic image Delano casts of the blacks also contains certain limits to the complete admission of the noble blacks within the superior civilization of the whites. If the border between civilized white and uncivilized slave is to be safely maintained, the boundary line must be securely drawn. Delano willfully depicts the blacks as noble while at the same time he obscures them as ontological "others." The ultimate and insurmountable frontier between whites and "others" is signalled by the black's lack of articulate expression within the story. All the blacks are kept enclosed within Delano's point of view, which forces them to keep silent. They speak with the undefined voice of the "other," a silenced voice that maintains Delano at a safe distance from them. The oakum pickers accompany their task "with a continuous, low, monotonous chant; droning and droning away" (BC 159). Every now and then, "an unknown syllable" (BC 194) is passed between them. An elderly black man utters "some African word, equivalent to pshaw" (BC 190). All these inarticulate attempts at speech amount to a significant negation of language (Early 1982: 195). Besides, Atufal's obstinate silence indicates as much his refusal to ask Don Benito's pardon as his —apparent— submission to him. Babo comforts his master by appearing as "the silent sight of fidelity" (BC 208). Among the blacks, only Babo speaks; his voice, however, does not come naturally from

him, but springs from his mask. As soon as the mask is ripped off when his plot is discovered, he remains silent. Thus, the blacks never achieve real consciousness in the story, that is, they are precluded from sharing Delano's humanity. They never become fully human (Early 1982: 194).

In Delano's understanding, the noble blacks are closer to animal nature than the white man is. Delano's discourse continuously dehumanizes the slaves by attaching animal imagery to them. First of all, as the narrator mentions, "Delano took to negroes, not philanthropically, but genially, just as other men to Newfoundland dogs" (BC 199). The groups of blacks in an old boat are "like a social circle of bats, sheltering in some friendly cave; at intervals ebon flights of naked boys and girls . . . darting in and out of the den's mouth" (BC 195-96). When Babo looks up at Don Benito, he is "like a shepherd's dog," (BC 160) whose grins denote "mere animal humor" (BC 179). These references to the animal nature of the slaves serve not to reject them as nonhuman, but rather to admit them within the white community in their position as docile servants —the image of the dog, domesticated animal, is significant in this context. At the same time, their animality accounts for their incapacity for being totally free. This description is in keeping with the conception of the slaves as Noble Savages, in that it admits them into the civilized world. They become the personification of Aristotle's "natural slave," an inferior species capable of occupying their given position in the world without threatening the existence of "civilized" men (White 1974: 189). The notion of the Noble Savage implies a hierarchical division of nature in which the white man occupies one of the superior levels in the chain of being. According to this organization, Delano appears much worried about how authority is kept on the *San Dominick*, since authority is fundamental to maintaining the hierarchy which Delano longs to see "in armies, navies, cities, or families, *in nature herself*" (BC 160).

As Hayden White indicates, traditionally the inscription of the "the other," —the slaves, in this case— within the stereotype of the Noble Savage occurs only after the confrontation between the "civilized man" and "the other" has been decided and when, therefore, the idolization of the pristine virtues of the "savages" can no longer hamper the exploitation of the latter by the former (1974: 186). In nineteenth-century America, slavery had been established long enough to afford a harmless —though cautious— appropriation of the image of the Noble Savage. Thus, the idea of the nobility of the black man in Delano's discourse is in consonance with his safe position as a "menial" and servant, content with its place in the civilization of the white man. However, the explosion of the slave revolts at

the end of the eighteenth century and all through the nineteenth century represented a threat to that *status quo*. Along the first half of the nineteenth century, the American civilization was caught in an unstable position with regard to slavery. The threat of overspread slave uprisings pervaded the 1850s. The outbreak of the slave revolution in Haiti (then called Saint Domingue, reminiscent of the *San Dominick*) in the 1790s was a clear point of reference to American slaveholders (Sundquist 1986: 147). Slave revolts were also frequent on the high seas; the mutinies on board the *Amistad* (1839) and the *Creole* (1841) were specially noted. To account for this new threat, the American advocates of slavery gradually deployed the discourse of the Wild Man to exorcise the image of the black man. In this new image of the blacks as Wild Men, the whites projected the brutality and degeneracy they began to think the blacks represented. An article in the *Democratic Review* in 1853 declared the blacks in Haiti to be "a horde of black savages, whose grandfathers murdered their brothers . . . and [who] would as readily exterminate every white man, as would their ancestors in the jungle of Africa" (qtd. in Sundquist 1986: 160). Even the abolitionists silenced the slave revolution in Haiti, while most Americans considered the island to be lost "into the lowest state of poverty and degradation" (qtd. in Sundquist 1986: 149).

In order to counteract that ominous threat, the literature of the period repressed all images of slave insurrection. The Plantation literature, which originated in the 1830s, spread the southern myth of the contented slave, the Noble Savage, in his plantation. However, lurking behind that discursive myth artificially imposed, the myth of the Wild negro was slowly arising. In a microscopic reproduction of that *status quo*, Delano enters the *San Dominick* armed with his myth of the docile servant, but also aware, although somewhat unconsciously, of the potential bestiality hidden in the black man's soul. This potential for destruction and revenge remains veiled in Delano's discourse previous to his discovery of Babo's plot, but there are certain traces that point at Delano's unconscious reflection upon the myth of the Wild Man; a repressed fear that emerges openly as soon as Delano apprehends the full meaning of the masquerade.

The passage that best inscribes the discourse of the Noble Savage is, significantly enough, also where Delano first unconsciously hints at the discourse of the Wild Man. As Delano walks around on board the *San Dominick*, he catches sight of a negress motherly nursing his baby. The imagery which Delano pours on his description of the edenic scene reveals

how behind the image of the Noble Savage, full of innocence and charm, the threatening shadow of the Wild Man lurks:

His attention had been drawn to a slumbering negress, partly disclosed through the lace-work of some rigging, lying, with youthful limbs carelessly disposed, under the lee of the bulwarks, like a doe in the shade of a woodland rock. Sprawling at her lapped breasts was her wide-awake fawn, stark naked, its black little body half lifted from the deck, crosswide with its dam's; its hands, like two paws, clambering upon her; its mouth and nose ineffectually rooting to get at the mark; and meantime giving a vexatious half-grunt, blending with the composed snore of the negress.

The uncommon vigor of the child at length roused the mother. She started up, at distance facing Captain Delano. But as if not at all concerned at the attitude in which she had been caught, delightedly she caught the child up, with maternal transports, covering it with kisses.

There is naked nature, now; pure tenderness and love, thought Captain Delano, well pleased.

This incident prompted him to remark the other negresses more particularly than before. He was gratified with their manners; like most uncivilized women, they seemed at once tender of heart and tough of constitution; equally ready to die for their infants or fight for them. Unsophisticated as leopardesses; loving as doves. (BC 186)

In this passage, Delano is well pleased to describe an edenic scene of pristine innocence as seen from the distance. From his position as the onlooker, he renders a natural sight of the Noble Savage in nature, who carries on peacefully and unconcerned about the stranger. The animal imagery which pervades Delano's discourse emphasizes the natural innocence and tenderness of the Noble Savage: "doe," "fawn," "dam," "doves;" all seem to connote the innocence and maternal care common to these animals. However, among such animal images of innocence, certain unexpected signs of savagery appear: the child is depicted as climbing up on his mother on his "two paws," which does not follow from the previous description of the child as a "doe." The mother, previously a "wide-awake fawn," appears suddenly transformed into a "leopardess." As William Richardson indicates, Delano does not seem to perceive the duality in nature suggested by this double-edged imagery (1987: 80). That is why, surprisingly, he feels relieved at the sight of the negresses—"these natural sights somehow insensibly deepened his confidence and ease" (BC 187); they reaffirm all his conceptions of the Noble Savage. However, the image

of the Wild Man, capable of springing up at any time, is already present: although Delano represses the potential threat of the blacks and forces it into his unconscious, the fear comes out through metaphors whose submerged meaning the Captain fails to apprehend.

Later, after Delano discovers the slave revolt plotted by the blacks, the idea of the Wild Man flows consciously in Delano's discourse. His "flash of revelation" allows him to perceive "the negroes, not in misrule, not in tumult, . . . but with masks torn away, flourishing hatchets and knives, in ferocious piratical revolt" (BC 217). The slaves are now by nature not innocent or docile but "ferocious," wild. In Delano's perspective the negro has suffered a metonymic change: the signified "negro" shifts from Noble Savage to Wild Man. The animal imagery changes from signifying the blacks' innocence and contentment in a natural world to symbolizing their savagery and evil nature. In the final battle between the slaves and Delano's crew, "the blacks now fought in despair. Their red tongues lolled, wolf-like, from their black mouths" (BC 221). The blacks who had previously been characterized as "Newfoundland dogs" and "shepherd's dogs" are now "wolf-like."

The vertical distinction along the natural chain of being that Delano used previously to submit the slaves to his own understanding of the world now appears inadequate. If the slaves occupy a lower rung in the chain, in the position of Noble Savages, they cannot be accountable for any evil doings. From the very early Greek philosophy and through the Christian world, the capacity for evil appears peculiar to human conduct. Delano acknowledges this idea several times in his meditations:

The whites, too, by nature, were the shrewder race. A man with some evil design, would he not be likely to speak well of that stupidity which was blind to his depravity, and malign that intelligence from which it might not be hidden? Not unlikely, perhaps. But if the whites had dark secrets concerning Don Benito, could then Don Benito be in any way in complicity with the blacks? But they were too stupid. (BC 189).

Still within the discourse of the Noble Savage, Delano finds the blacks "too stupid" to participate in any evil schemes. Quite on the contrary, he always feels ready to imagine all kinds of machinations on the part of Don Benito, a representative of the human species, thus capable of evil plots: "To think that, under the aspect of infantile weakness, the most savage energies might be couched—those velvets of the Spaniard but the silky paw to his fangs" (BC 176).

When Delano discovers the blacks' plot, his discourse of the Noble Savage is utterly unsuitable to account for their behavior. That vertical neoplatonic conception of nature is revealed as inherently ambiguous and problematic. The hierarchical disposition of the species "presupposes a common stuff or essence shared by the various creatures dispersed across its ranks or some common source from which all of the creatures so dispersed derive, a common goal toward which they all tend, or a single cause of which they are all effects" (White 1974: 189). In this sense, the animal world, as well as the human world, equally derive from God and aspire to return to Him; that is, they equally participate in the divine essence. That means, all the species are somehow protected —either from a natural or religious understanding of the hierarchy— by the law that governs the functioning of the whole and its parts. Delano's conception of the blacks occupying a lower position by nature as well as in the social hierarchy is found inadequate when he realizes the hierarchy in the ship has been overturned. Babo, the representative of an inferior species, has transmuted into the commander. In Delano's vertical understanding of nature and society, that situation is merely unthinkable and requires a totally new understanding of the slaves. Delano seeks to find an explanation for that situation, as well as to sanction his anxiety to impose himself by force upon the blacks, even to slay them if necessary. So long as the discourse of the Noble Savage remains, that can not be done; the vertical conception of nature implies a continuity between human beings and the animal world, since what holds together the chain must be the common essence shared by the diverse species. Delano is, thus, forced to change into a horizontal understanding of the slaves. He effects the shift into the idea of the Wild Man, a human species contiguous with "civilized" humanity but physically and mentally corrupted. His conception of this Wild Man that separated from the ideal of humanity and turned evil is closely linked to his religious understanding. In Babo's final pursuit of Don Benito, Delano describes him as "snakishly writhing up" (BC 217) from the bottom of the boat. The metaphor conveys a clear reference to the biblical devil, disguised as a snake, and also connotes the depravity and evil of the fallen.

Originating in classical times, the metaphor of the Wild Man reflects the existence of a group of people who have degenerated; unlike the Noble savage, Wild Men belong in the realm of human beings. In the secular version of the myth, they have undergone the same evolutionary motion as the white man, but due to a process of species corruption as the result of certain faulty genetic combinations, they have fallen below the condition of

animality itself (White 1974: 160).⁷ In the Christian tradition, the Wild Man was a descendant of Ham, the accursed son of Noah, who, according to biblical exegetes, was also black. His physical attributes are in themselves clear evidence of his evil nature (White 1974: 162). With the sole exception of Cain, in the Christian tradition the Wild Man can be punished and slain with impunity (White 1974: 191). He embodies depravity, "motiveless malignity;" all of man's vices are focussed upon him. His belonging in humankind accounts for his intelligence, while his corruption is responsible for his evil use of those capacities.

As a result of the increasing fear of brutal slave uprisings in the first half of the nineteenth century, white Americans deployed the stereotype of a depraved and vicious race—the Wild Man stereotype—and projected it on the black man. In time, it turned into a discourse maintained ideologically and institutionally. In 1854 John C. Calhoun, a senator for the state of South Carolina (and former vicepresident of the United States), declared the blacks to be a "low, degraded and savage" race (1837: 13). Such works as J. H. van Evrie's *White Supremacy and Negro Subordination*, and Nott and Gliddon's *Types of Mankind* testified to the marks of inferiority and evil in the black man's complexion and attempted to trace their whole genealogy. Van Evrie even predicted the "ultimate extinction" of the black race as a result of its inferiority and degradation (van Evrie 1868: 115-24).

Given this new interpretation of the slaves as wild and degraded men, they are now capable of evil in a much higher degree than "normal" people. If the myth of the Noble Savage admitted the black man within the civilized world—although in the position of "the other"—, the myth of the Wild Man serves to deny admission of this inferior and corrupted breed of people within the human community. While the black man appeared as docile and humble servant, the idea of the Noble Savage fitted him; as soon as he appears as a threat to humanity, when he refuses to comply with his position as servant, the same society that previously accepted him now discloses the myth of the Wild Man to keep him away. As Cain, the children of Babel, or the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, the corrupted blacks are readily rejected from the human community. Along the nineteenth century, as slave revolts and protests grow, "the [negro] stereotype shifts from safe to unsafe, acceptable to unacceptable, and blacks are increasingly depicted as uncontrollable animals with emotions that need to be disciplined. Accordingly, the mode changes from humor (which includes) to satire and grotesque (which rejects)" (Ostendorff 1982: 74). Delano simply follows a trend already present in the American society of the first half of the

nineteenth century when he releases this conception of the blacks as evil brutes. In adopting this new image of the black man as wild and depraved, Delano sanctions his pursuit of the slaves and even his annihilation of some of them. Delano's punishment of the slaves is in keeping with nature —it does not imply a distortion of the chain of being, but rather a natural purification of the human species—as well as with the Christian religion he professes.

After discovering the true facts that have taken place on board the *San Dominick* —as well as before— Delano has enclosed the slaves within essentialist discourses in which their true essence has remained always silenced. The images of Noble Savage and Wild Man are metaphors which obscure their referent, the blacks, to such an extent that they never come to consciousness within the text. In the same way as Don Benito's deposition at the end of the story obscures the slave revolt on board the *San Dominick* by turning it into a bloody act of motiveless malignity, Delano falls into the prison house of his own metaphoric language and perspective. That narrow perspective enables him to bind the black man to the position of ontological "other," but at the cost of losing his understanding of the blacks' soul. Thus, the motiveless malignity which they impersonate in Delano's eyes is limited to their corrupted race. However, Melville goes beyond Delano's ideological enclosure of the slaves within the notion of the Wild Man. As the story ends, Delano is ready to forget the evil doings of the blacks—as pertaining to a degraded breed of humanity: "the past is passed; why moralize upon it? Forget it" (BC 238). His previous metaphoric discourse has enabled him to exclude the barbarous savagery from the humankind to which he belongs. His sense of civilized humanity remains pure and positive; that optimistic vision accounts for the hopeful "human-like healing" (BC 238) that he ascribes to the trade winds. Meanwhile Don Benito remains gloomy and sad. Delano wonders as to the cause for Don Benito's sadness: "You are saved; what has cast such a shadow upon you?" Don Benito's answer, "The negro," (BC 238) suggests his apprehension of the shadows the blacks have cast not only upon Don Benito but upon humanity itself. In a sort of quiet understanding, Delano remains silent. Both men realize that evil is not only the intrinsic essence of the wild black but also lurks in men in general. Thus, both men prelude the future development of the notion of the Wild Man, which suffered a process of interiorization. For many centuries the Wild Man was always thought to exist out there, in the wilderness, where the "dark" repressions of "civilized" men were also kept hidden. As all the unknown areas of the world are increasingly discovered and explored along

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Melville was a renowned explorer himself), the notion of the Wild Man becomes interiorized. As Hayden White indicates, by the end of the nineteenth century, the conception of the Wild Man had utterly changed: "Wildness and barbarism are regarded, in general, as potentialities lurking in the heart of every individual, whether primitive or civilized, as his possible incapacity to come to terms with his socially provided world. They are not viewed as essences or substances peculiar to a particular portion of humanity *out there* in space or *back there* in time" (1974: 179). This new direction is already implied in Don Benito's gloomy answer at the end of "Benito Cereno." The story seems to suggest that the Wild Man "is lurking within every man, clamoring for release within us all, and will be denied only at the cost of life itself" (White 1974: 154). In the end, Babo quietly offers his life so that Don Benito —and, partially, Delano— can understand. To make sure that the reader can also understand, Melville places Babo's execution at the end of "Benito Cereno," thereby emphasizing it. As the reader sees Babo "dragged to the gibbet at the tail of a mule," (BC 239) ready to be beheaded and burned to ashes, while his head will be for many days "fixed on a pole in the Plaza," the white man is made to appear as savage as the blacks. In this final scene, Melville reveals the brutality of the whites and makes it match the ferocity of the blacks; this way, the writer dramatizes the savage impulse lurking in the soul of every man. a

NOTES

1. Aware of the racial strife in the 1850s, Melville could not possibly risk indicting openly either blacks or whites: "Especially in the present transition period for both races in the South, more or less of trouble may not be unreasonably anticipated; but let us not hereafter be too swift to charge the blame exclusively in any one quarter" (*Battle-Pieces of Herman Melville*, qtd. in Grejda 1974: 161).

2. Initially, it was radically contradictory for men like Thomas Jefferson and many others to sign the Declaration of Independence —one of whose principles sanctions that "all men are created equal"— while they kept numerous slaves. It is also worth noticing here the contradictory position of the American Supreme Court in the *Amistad* case. The *Amistad* was a Spanish slave ship whose slaves had revolted and taken hold of the ship on its way from Africa in 1805, only to be captured later by an American ship. In the lawsuit, the Spanish owner demanded the ship's cargo to the American government. The United States Supreme Court finally granted the Africans their freedom claiming that the blacks had been unlawfully enslaved and could not be treated as property. Contrarily, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 guaranteed American slave owners their right to bring back to slavery any runaway slave captured on American soil.

3. Herman Melville, "Benito Cereno," in *Billy Budd and The Piazza Tales* (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 226. All subsequent references to this edition appear parenthesized in the text.

4. My understanding of "discourse" is based on Foucault's use of this term. I define "discourse" in this particular context as a series of ideas about the slaves which after existing in fragmented form for a certain period were later gathered into a discourse by the mainstream culture and were maintained by a certain ideological and institutional context.

5. Although no reference is made to the fetters on the San Dominick, the reader can surmise that Aranda couldn't possibly have taken enough fetters for 160 slaves with himself. Besides, being the San Dominick a "negro-transportation ship" (158), it was only natural for it to have a good supply of fetters ready.

6. Melville initially became confused with names and, in the first edition of "Benito Cereno," he wrote the name Mungo Park instead of Ledyard. Mungo Park was a Scottish traveller who in his *Travels in the Interior of Africa* frequently made reference to Ledyard's work (Baym 1989: 2245).

7. The discourse of the negro as a different species of mankind, as the result of a different genetic mixture and separate human origins, was inscribed in antebellum America in a series of studies which supported racist ideologies. Possibly the most notable of these was Josiah C. Nott and George Gliddon, *Types of Mankind* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1854), which traced the evolution of the different types of mankind to conclude with the superiority of the Caucasian. Equally important were Samuel G. Morton's, *Crania Americana* (Philadelphia: J. Dobson, 1839) and *Crania Aegyptiaca* (Philadelphia: John Pennington, 1844).

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**EL NARRADOR DE *PEARL*
A LA LUZ DE LA
*CONSOLATIO PHILOSOPHIAE***



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PEARL es sin duda alguna uno de los más relevantes poemas religiosos de la literatura medieval inglesa, pero al mismo tiempo es también uno de los más enigmáticos, de ahí las numerosas publicaciones que han centrado su interés en el análisis e interpretación del texto desde que fue editado por primera vez por R. Morris para la E.E.T.S. en 1864.¹ Ciertamente estamos ante una obra compleja, como nos dice Spearing: "Probably the most complex poem written in England" (1989: 207), y tal vez por esto es una obra que no se lee con la frecuencia e intensidad de otros poemas narrativos medievales; además, su lengua, estructura y significado hacen que esta obra sea difícil y poco apetecible para el lector moderno. Sin embargo, su valor literario nunca ha sido puesto en duda por la crítica especializada y "tiene un gran interés como paradigma de ciertas convenciones literarias medievales", en palabras del profesor F. Galván.² Por su parte, J. A. W. Bennett, uno de los más relevantes estudiosos de la literatura medieval inglesa, no duda en elogiar a este poema narrativo, del que llega a decir:

Dante's *Comedy* apart, no medieval poem can rival *Pearl* in brilliance of surface, tightness of texture and complexity of construction, range of language and freshness of metaphor and spiritual vision.

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(1990:236).

Una gran parte de los estudios críticos sobre este poema se han centrado en el análisis de la naturaleza y significado de Pearl, uno de los dos personajes principales de la narración, mientras que la investigación literaria ha sido mucho menor con respecto al narrador, que es el otro personaje central de la obra.³

El poema comienza describiendo el lamento del narrador que ha perdido una perla en un jardín al que vuelve con la intención de recuperarla; mientras se lamenta queda dormido y en sueños pasea por un maravilloso paraje donde descubre una hermosa dama, que dice ser la novia de Cristo, y que el poeta parece identificar con su pequeña hija que ha muerto recientemente, siendo éste el motivo de su dolor y lamento. El poema discurre en forma de diálogo moralizante pleno de alusiones bíblicas y referencias teológicas, especialmente sobre la gracia santificante y la necesidad o no de justificar la gracia por medio de las obras, por ejemplo, a través de la plegaria. Tras un intenso y extenso diálogo didáctico en el que Pearl instruye al narrador, éste llega a contemplar al Cordero divino así como a su cortejo de doncellas, una de las cuales es la propia Pearl. Al final de la obra el narrador se despierta cuando se disponía a cruzar el arroyo que le separaba de Pearl.

Cualquier interpretación del poema, así como de la persona del narrador, que es nuestro objeto de estudio en este trabajo, debe tener en cuenta en primer lugar la naturaleza de Pearl. Todo parece indicar que Pearl es una figura alegórica: "The Pearl itself is manifestly the central symbol of the poem", dice Spearing (1989: 208). No podemos olvidar que la naturaleza alegórica será un rasgo muy común en otros muchos personajes de la literatura medieval, como nos recuerda el propio Spearing, que considera que en la literatura del Medievo una gran parte de las obras presentan un fuerte componente alegórico o tipológico.

It is certainly true that in the Middle Ages some stories were generally accepted to possess allegorical or typological meanings. This was particularly common with Biblical stories: The Song of Songs . . . was normally read as telling of the loving relationship between God and the soul, or the Church, or the Blessed Virgin. . . . Such interpretations might be so widely accepted that they could be merely alluded to rather than directly stated (1989:73).

A lo largo de la historia crítica del personaje Pearl, las primeras

interpretaciones fueron de carácter autobiográfico, en las que la figura femenina se identificaba con la posible hija recientemente muerta del poeta; así Schofield (1909) y Moorman (1955-6) entre otros. Cabe destacar también otras interpretaciones. Así, el personaje Pearl es una alegoría de la castidad (Schofield 1909; Luttrell 1962); un símbolo de la inocencia (Fletcher 1921); representa la unión mística con Dios (Madaleva 1925); es una imagen del alma (Hillman 1945); de la Virgen, (Fletcher 1921; Robertson 1950); de la Eucaristía (Garret 1918). También se ha interpretado a este personaje como reflejo del conocimiento teológico u otras interpretaciones de tipo religioso. M. Hamilton, por ejemplo, llega a decir que Pearl

typifies the soul made pure by sacramental grace through the merit of Christ, and as such speaks with authority for the entire company of the blessed, whether living or dead, for God's Kingdom. (1955: 806)

Pero cualquiera que sea la interpretación del personaje Pearl, no resuelve la interrogante sobre la naturaleza del narrador, que en medio de un sueño es instruido y consolado, ni del significado último de la obra.⁴ Este poema, en su sentido literal, es básicamente la narración de un sueño en el que hay un diálogo entre un instructor, una figura femenina tipológica, y el narrador que es consolado de su desgracia mediante la doctrina y los consejos que le imparte su instructor, la figura alegórica. Desde esta perspectiva, el poema *Pearl* se podría encuadrar en el género literario conocido como *consolatio*, perteneciendo así a la tradición clásica de poemas que presentan un diálogo moralizante para instruir y consolar al narrador, y que tienen en la *Consolatio Philosophiae* de Boecio el modelo y ejemplo supremo.⁵

La *Consolatio Philosophiae* es una obra filosófica y literaria escrita por Boecio poco antes de ser ejecutado el año 424. La obra se divide en cinco libros en los que se combina la prosa y el verso. En el Libro I el autor expone los motivos de su aflicción. Entonces se le aparece una dama de porte majestuoso, la Filosofía, que le hace ver que su mal consiste en haber olvidado cuál es el verdadero fin del hombre. El libro II nos presenta a la diosa Fortuna y los bienes ficticios y caducos que procura, y cómo éstos pueden desaparecer con el destino adverso. En el libro III la Filosofía enseña al narrador que todos los hombres desean la bienaventuranza, pero que su fin no debe estar en los bienes particulares, sino en el bien universal y supremo, Dios. El libro IV trata de armonizar la bondad divina con la existencia del mal en el mundo. En el libro V se nos informa que la omnisciencia providente de Dios y la libertad de la voluntad humana son compatibles.

Numerosos libros y artículos se han escrito durante este siglo examinando la influencia de Boecio especialmente en la literatura medieval: la huella de la *Consolatio Philosophiae* se puede ver en Guillaume de Lorris, Jean de Meun, Dante, Boccaccio, Chaucer, Thomas Usk, Lydgate, James I de Escocia, Hawes, etc. Una gran parte de los estudios críticos de la primera mitad del siglo han intentado demostrar dicha influencia, pero en casi todos los casos tales estudios se han centrado en el análisis de las ideas, especialmente en el *Roman de la Rose* y en Dante.⁶ En las últimas décadas también se ha estudiado la influencia de Boecio en algunos de los más relevantes poetas y textos medievales ingleses del siglo XIV, tales como *Pearl*, *Piers Plowman*,⁷ *Confessio Amantis* y en algunas obras de Chaucer como *Troilus and Criseyde*, *The House of Fame*, *The Parliament of Fowls*, y *The Book of the Duchess*,⁸ así como en varios poetas del siglo XV. Sin embargo, predomina la confusión sobre la adscripción de las obras citadas a la *consolatio*, así como la propia definición de este género; de hecho, se le suele confundir e identificar con la elegía, el lamento, la sátira menipea, el debate moralizante o la visión alegórica.

La *consolatio* propiamente dicha se puede definir como el género literario que tiene por modelo a la *Consolatio Philosophiae*, según ya se ha indicado, y de esta obra toma aquellas características que definen su naturaleza. De ahí que la obra que se interprete como *consolatio* ha de basarse en un diálogo filosófico o escatológico entre uno o varios instructores alegóricos, generalmente femeninos, y un narrador que se encuentra ante una adversidad de la fortuna o la pérdida o ausencia de un ser querido físico o espiritual. El narrador es reconciliado con su adversa fortuna mediante dicho diálogo y es así instruido progresivamente a lo largo de un diálogo moralizante hasta el final de la obra. Esta definición de la consolación requiere obviamente un mayor análisis para que pueda aplicarse a los diferentes poemas pertenecientes a este género. No es este el momento de profundizar en el análisis de este género literario; creemos que es suficiente tener en cuenta que la estructura puede ser diferente en las distintas consolaciones. De hecho, en algunas obras hay sólo un instructor, como en el caso del poema *Pearl*, mientras que en *Piers Plowman* son varios los personajes que desempeñan tal función. Asimismo en *Pearl*, al igual que en la *Divina Comedia* de Dante, el instructor es una figura tipológica en lugar de ser un personaje alegórico como sucede en el *Roman de la Rose* o en el poema de Lydgate *Reson and Sensuallyte*. Por otra parte, en algunas *consolaciones* el carácter filosófico o teológico predomina en la enseñanza

del instructor, por ejemplo en *Pearl* o en *Piers Plowman*, mientras que en la *Confessio Amantis* de Gower o en el *Kingis Quair* es más relevante el tópico del amor cortés.

Volviendo al poema *Pearl*, y antes del comentario que pretendemos presentar sobre el narrador de esta obra, creemos conveniente hacer una reflexión sobre la "persona" Pearl. Al comparar la obra de Boecio con el poema narrativo inglés, observamos que las mayores diferencias no radican en el narrador sino en el instructor. En *Pearl* el instructor femenino no es la personificación de una figura de la mitología clásica, como en Boecio o en otros poemas pertenecientes a este género, Pearl es un personaje tipológico que tuvo una realidad, fue una niña, posiblemente la hija del narrador, que murió cuando aún era muy pequeña, pero aún tiene una "realidad" en el cielo como doncella del Cordero divino; es cierto que como novia de Cristo es un símbolo, pero un símbolo de una realidad que transciende la descripción humana, algo que se ve como indescriptible, como diría San Pablo. Por otra parte, la figura de la Filosofía de Boecio es un ser distante y ajeno al narrador aunque sea su instructor y guía, mientras que Pearl es un personaje mucho más próximo al narrador del poema y no es sólo un ejemplo de virtud e inocencia, sino que en la visión final, en la procesión de las doncellas, ella es también símbolo del amor perfecto que el narrador debe imitar, y para ello Pearl instruye a su "discípulo" consolándole y ofreciéndole una vida superior. Esta relación directa entre el instructor Pearl y el narrador nos da pie para profundizar en la progresiva enseñanza moral y doctrinal que servirá de consuelo al personaje del narrador, proceso idéntico al que aparece en la *Consolatio Philosophiae*, como veremos a continuación.

Ya desde el principio del poema inglés se observa que las analogías entre el narrador de *Pearl* y el de la *Consolatio* son sumamente significativas. Los dos personajes expresan su lamento por algo que han perdido, una perla (la hija del narrador), y la buena fortuna respectivamente. El tono elegíaco será una constante, pero, mediante el consuelo, el lamento se tornará en esperanza en una vida espiritual mejor a lo largo del desarrollo de ambas obras.

El poema *Pearl* se divide en veinte secciones.⁹ Las cuatro primeras constituyen la introducción y exposición del estado pesaroso del narrador.

En la primera sección el narrador relata la pérdida de una perla, "Alas! I leste hyr in on erbere",¹⁰ así como su dolor, y cómo cae rendido por el sueño; en la segunda él descubre el lugar celestial donde se desarrolla su visión; en la tercera el narrador nos cuenta que su alma estaba feliz en aquél sueño-visión, y en la cuarta él encuentra y reconoce a su joya, "Ho watz me nerre

then aunte or nece". Basándose en este verso muchos críticos han querido asociar la relación del narrador con la doncella, que aparece en el sueño, con la del padre y la hija, relación que parece consistente desde una interpretación literal del texto, aunque, como apuntan M. Andrew y R. Waldron,

It is probably significant that an explicit statement of their relationships is not made; the reader is thereby encouraged to see the theme of loss in a more general light. (1981: 68)

Lo cierto es que el narrador cuenta la pérdida de su perla como si se tratase de una joya personal. El lector debe interpretar este pasaje como una alegoría, pues hay una relación entre la perla perdida en el jardín y la desaparición del ser querido, Pearl. El lector debe interpretar cómo Pearl y la perla son la misma cosa que después se aparece en sueños al narrador como su instructora. Así pues, estamos ante una alegoría en la que la perla como joya es un símbolo de Pearl, que será la figura celestial que instruya al narrador al igual que la diosa Filosofía lo hace en la obra de Boecio cuando actúa como nodriza.¹¹

Itaque ubi in eam deduxi oculos intuitumque defixi, respicio nutricem meam, cuius ab adulescentia laribus obuersatus fueram, Philosophiam.

Et quid, inquam, tu in has exsiliis nostri solitudines, o omnium magistra uirtutum, supero cardine delapsa uenisti? An ut tu quoque mecum rea falsis criminationibus agiteris?¹²

La tristeza mostrada por la pérdida de la joya, según se nos cuenta en los primeros versos del poema, no es un mero recurso literario, es algo real que el poeta describe con gran dramatismo ya desde el principio de la obra.

Allas! I leste hyr in on erbere;
Thurg gresse to grounde hit fro me yot.
I dewyne, fordolked of luf-daungere
Of that pryuy perle wythouten spot.

(ll.9-12)

El dolor que aquí se describe es algo real y profundo, pero al mismo tiempo es egoista. La imagen que aquí se proyecta es sólo la de una hermosa joya que se ha perdido. Sin embargo, aunque *luf-daungere* podría tener un

significado religioso, aquí tiene un sentido más próximo al que aparece en la tradición del amor cortés y en concreto en el *Roman de la Rose*, y el *hyr* del verso nueve admite la posibilidad de que el objeto perdido sea un ser femenino. El *luf*, por lo tanto, no parece que tenga un sentido de la *caritas* cristiana sino de *cupiditas*, el amor gobernado por el deseo y el pecado.

El narrador de *Pearl*, al igual que el narrador de Boecio al comienzo de la *Consolatio*, está sumido en la aflicción cuyo consuelo en un principio es sólo el lamento.

Sythen in that spote hit fro me sprange,
Ofte haf I wayted, wyschande that wele
That wont watz whyle deuoyde my wrange
And heuen my happe and al my hele.
That dotz bot thrych my hert thrange,
My breste in bale bot bolne and bele.
Get thogt me neuer so swete a sange
As styllle stounde let to me stele.
Forsythe ther fleten to me fele.

(ll.13-21)

En la obra de Boecio, también ya desde el principio de la *Consolatio*, el narrador expresa su dolor mediante el lamento:

Carmina qui quondam studio florente peregi,
flebilis, heu, maestos cogor inire modos.
Ecce mihi lacerae dictant scribenda Camenae
et ueris elegi fletibus ora rigant.

(I, 1-4)¹³

En términos parecidos se nos mostraba el narrador de *Pearl*. Ciertamente, se han dado distintas interpretaciones al *swete sange* del verso 19, pero nos parece lógico, desde nuestra perspectiva de la *Consolatio Philosophiae*, relacionar esta expresión con las falsas musas que consolaban a Boecio y que la crítica ha identificado con la Literatura; en la obra latina se nos dice: "Has saltem nullus potuit peruincere terror / ne nostrum comites prosequerentur iter": "Ellas siquiera no me han abandonado por fútiles temores, ellas, que siempre fueron la compañía de mis caminos".

El lamento y el mero llanto no constituyen en *Pearl* la verdadera consolación espiritual del poeta como tampoco lo es en la *Consolatio Philosophiae* de Boecio; sin embargo, en estos primeros versos este llanto y lamento son el único consuelo, y así los tristes pensamientos que aparecen en

los versos 22 y siguientes, con la descripción de la tumba de Pearl, sugieren una tumba humana real y no un mero símbolo.

To thenke hir color so clad in clot!
 O moul, thou marrez a myry juele,
 My pruyu perle withouten spotte
 That spot of spysez mot nedez sprede,
 Ther such rychez to rot is runne . . .
 (ll.22-6)

El llanto y el lamento del principio de la obra, que el narrador tiene en el jardín donde se queda dormido, contrastan con el consuelo moral y cristiano que el narrador tendrá después a lo largo del poema. En opinión de Andrew y Waldron,

The contrast between the responses prompted by reason and those prompted by passion anticipates the theme of the central debate between the Dreamer and the Maiden, through which he is brought by reason to an understanding of Christian doctrine and acceptance of God's will. . . . (1981: 56)

El poeta de *Pearl* expresa estos sentimientos de naturaleza espiritual en los siguientes versos:

A deuely dele in my hert dennen,
 Thag resoun sette myseluen sagt.
 I playned my perle that ther watz penned,
 Wyth fyrce skyllez that faste fagt.
 Thag kynde of Kryst me comfort kenned,
 My wretched wylle in wo ay wragte.
 (ll.51-6)

El carácter didáctico moral de *Pearl*, y por lo tanto una de las características más genuinas de la *consolatio*, se desarrolla a partir de la sección cinco cuando el narrador se dirige a Pearl y él es informado sobre su desconocimiento de la verdadera naturaleza de ella.

O perle, quoth I, in perlez pygt,
 Art thou my perle that I haf playned,
 Regretted by myn one on nygte?
 (ll.241-43)

Boecio también es ignorante de la naturaleza de la doncella que se dispone a instruirle y de las enseñanzas de su instructora, y no comprende la causa de sus males y de la aparente injusticia del Ser supremo.

At ego, cuius acies lacrimis mersa caligaret nec dinoscere possem
quaenam haec esset mulier tam imperiosae auctoritatis, obstupui
uisuque in terram defixo quidnam deinceps esset actura exspectare
tacitus coepi. (I, 1,13)¹⁴

Pero el diálogo didáctico-teológico comienza propiamente en la sección ocho cuando el narrador pregunta si la corona que la dama lleva sobre su cabeza es la corona de María, la respuesta es negativa, aunque se le informa que todos los seres que están en el cielo son reyes y reinas, mas María es la reina de todos.

Art thou the quene of hauenez blwe
That al thys worlde schal do honour?
(ll.423-4)

El desarrollo de la obra en forma de diálogo didáctico sobre las verdades de la fe cristiana será una constante en todo el resto del poema. Así, cuando el narrador pregunta cómo Pearl que es tan joven, "two ger", y que ni siquiera sabía rezar, "ne neuer nawther Pater ne Crede", puede ser una reina en el cielo, el poeta introduce la parábola de los jornaleros que fueron a la viña del señor según se nos cuenta en Mateo 20, 11-16, y comenta la doctrina de los méritos para lograr el cielo, así como la doctrina sobre la justificación de la gracia mediante las obras. La presentación de esta doctrina tiene lugar en las secciones nueve y diez del poema. En la exposición que hace Pearl para instruir al narrador, ella utiliza la técnica propia de los sermones de la época y que aparece, por ejemplo, descrita en el poema *Patience*; es decir, se expone una reflexión moral apoyada por un texto de las Sagradas Escrituras.

El narrador sigue haciendo preguntas sobre la posible contradicción entre la ausencia de buenas obras y la recompensa divina e incluso recurre a la Biblia para objetar los razonamientos de su instructora.

Me thynk thy tale vnresounable;
Goddez rygt is redy and euermore rert,
Other holy wryt is bot a fable.
In sauter is sayd a verce ouerte

That spekez a poynt determynable:
 "Thou quytez vchon as hys desserte,
 Thou hyge Kyng ay pertermynable".
 (ll. 590-6)

La respuesta que recibe el narrador se encuentra desarrollada en las secciones once y doce, y se puede resumir en estos versos:

Hys fraunchyse is large: That euer dard
 To Hym that matz in synne rescoghe
 No blysse betz fro hem reparde,
 For the grace of God is gret inoghe.

(ll. 609-12)

Aunque estas líneas tienen distintas interpretaciones según han apuntado diferentes críticos, creemos que en cierta manera estas ideas son las mismas que podemos leer en la *Consolatio Philosophiae* en el libro V, cuando Boecio escribe:

Ex quo illud quoque resoluitur quod paulo ante posuisti, indignum esse si scientiae dei causam futura nostra praestare dicantur.

Haec enim scientiae uis praesentaria notione cuncta complectens rebus modum omnibus ipsa constituit, nihil uero posterioribus debet.

Quae cum ita sint, manet intemerata mortalibus arbitrii libertas nec iniquae leges solutis omni necessitate uoluntatibus praemia poenasque proponunt. (V. 6, 42-44)¹⁵

A lo largo de la sección trece Pearl sigue instruyendo al narrador en la doctrina de la Iglesia, siendo de notar los versos en los que la doncella asocia la gran perla que lleva puesta con la que aparece en la parábola que se narra en Mateo 13, 45-6, y ella insta al narrador a que compre esta perla de infinito valor, puesto que interpreta la perla de la parábola como símbolo de la salvación y de la patria celestial, siguiendo así la interpretación más común en la exégesis cristiana medieval.

Ther is the blys that con not blynne
 That the jeuler sogte thurg perré pres,
 And solde alle hys goud, bothe wolen and lynne,
 To bye hym a perle watz mascellez.

This makellez perle that bogt is dere,
 The joueler gef forse ale hys god,
 Is lyke the reme of heuennesse clere
 So sayde the Fader of folde and flode
 For hit is wemlez, clene, and clere,
 And endelez rounde, and blythe of mode,
 And commune to alle that rygtwys were.

(ll. 729-39)

En la *Consolatio Philosophiae*, sin embargo, en lugar de adquirir el narrador una instrucción teológica, éste recibe una enseñanza moral basada en una filosofía elaborada a partir de Platón y los neoplatónicos, de una parte, y los estoicos de otra, y en menor grado de Aristóteles y San Agustín, pero ordenada con vistas a una teología racional o a una metafísica no necesariamente cristiana. Es de advertir, sin embargo, que en la instrucción de la diosa Filosofía no se puede reconocer una doctrina proclamada ni enseñada por la Iglesia ni los Santos Padres, ni se recurre a la revelación para hacer descansar en la vida sobrenatural el consuelo definitivo de toda aflicción en este mundo terrenal. En líneas generales puede decirse que la *Consolatio* es el espejo de la influencia de Platón en Boecio, especialmente a través del *Timeo* según el comentario de Proclo. Así, es continua la referencia al carácter inefable del Ser divino y su absoluta bondad, de la tendencia de todas las cosas de la creación hacia el Ser supremo, del valor y distinción del espíritu, que es inmortal, y el cuerpo, que es materia corrupta. Además, se subraya el carácter monoteísta y se niega la teología panteísta y emanatista de Plotino. Así pues, no se puede hacer un análisis de las analogías entre los narradores de una y otra obra en el campo de la teología cristiana propiamente dicha, sino de la teología que podríamos considerar natural y universal.

Una vez concluida la sección trece de *Pearl*, se observa que el narrador ha hecho ya un considerable progreso espiritual tanto desde la teología cristiana, como también desde la doctrina natural, sobre la vida y la muerte como analiza en un trabajo Charles Moorman (1968). El narrador ha pasado ya desde la ignorancia y la incomprensión causada por la "cupiditas" de la que se habla en la sección cinco.

Jueler, sayde that gemme clene,
 wy borde ge men? So madde ge be!
 Thre wordeg hatz thou spoken at ene:
 Vnavysed, forsothe, wern alle thre.

(ll. 289-92)

Igualmente, el narrador ha pasado de un período en el que sus preguntas revelaban un cierto orgullo intelectual, como era su aseveración de que Dios no permitiría la injusticia de hacer a una niña de dos años, que aún no sabía rezar, reina del cielo.

Thyself in heuen ouer hyg thou heue,
To make the quen that watz so gonge.
(ll.473-74)

That cortayse is to fre of dede,
Gyf hyt be soth that thou conezy saye.
Thou lyfed not two ger in oure thede;
Thou cowthez neuer God nauther plese ne pray,
Ne neuer nauther Pater ne Crede;
And quen mad on the fyrist day!
I may not traw, so God me spedē,
That God wolde wrythe so wrange away.

(ll. 481-88)

Esta aparente queja del narrador en *Pearl* es en cierta manera muy parecida a la que hace Boecio en la *Consolatio* cuando el narrador se lamenta de la injusticia del Ser supremo.

Sed ea ipsa est uel maxima nostri causa maeroris quod, cum rerum bonus rector exsistat, uel esse omnino mala possint uel impunita praetereant, quod solum quanta dignum sit ammiratione profecto consideras.

At huic aliud maius adiungitur; nam imperante florenteque nequitia uirtus non solum praemiis caret, uerum etiam sceleratorum pedibus subiecta calcatur et in locum facinorum supplicia luit.

Quae fieri in regno scientis omnia, potentis omnia, sed bona tantummodo uolentis dei nemo satis potest nec ammirari nec conqueri. (IV. I. 3-5)¹⁶

Observamos en ambas obras que el narrador ha sufrido un proceso de enseñanza moral por parte de una institutriz, y mediante dicho aprendizaje pasa de un período de incomprendión e ignorancia al conocimiento y aceptación de la voluntad de un ser superior benévolos. En el narrador de *Pearl* es evidente este desarrollo de su espíritu que pasa de una conducta

egoísta de los primeros versos hasta la comprensión de la voluntad de Dios. Su estado espiritual se observa al final de la sección doce cuando, no teniendo más objeciones, pide con humildad a Pearl que le hable del Cordero divino.

Why, maskellez bryd that brygt con flambe,
 That reiatez hatz so ryche and ryf,
 Quat kyn thyng may be that Lambe
 That the wolde wedde vnto hys vyf?
 Ouer alle other so hyg thou clambe
 To lede wyt hym so ladyly lyf.
 So mony a comly onvnder cambe
 For Kryst han lyved in much stryf;
 And thou con alle tho dere outdryf
 And fro that maryag al other depres,
 Al only thyself so stout and styf,
 A makelez may and maskellez.

(ll.769-80)

El personaje Pearl se dirige al narrador en las secciones catorce y quince para instruirle sobre el Cordero de Dios según se nos describe en el *Apocalipsis* de San Juan, Cap.19. Es sabido que los escritores medievales dividían las visiones místicas en distintas categorías, corporal, espiritual, etc. En la primera, por ejemplo, el vidente obseva físicamente un objeto que es invisible al resto de los hombres; en la espiritual, un hombre durante su plegaria o en sueños ve imágenes a través de la revelación divina; la terminología empleada por el poeta de *Pearl* sugiere que la visión de San Juan en el *Apocalipsis* ha de considerarse como una visión de la segunda categoría y ésta es la misma que tiene el narrador del poema.

En la sección dieciséis Pearl informa al narrador de la Nueva Jerusalén y al igual que en las secciones anteriores su descripción se basa en el *Apocalipsis*, capítulos 21 y 22. En esta sección se le comunica al narrador que se le ha concedido la gracia de poder contemplar la Nueva Jerusalén. La descripción de la ciudad celestial está basada en las típicas descripciones de ciudades medievales con un castillo o fortaleza rodeada de casas que se encuentran dentro de un recinto amurallado.

Haf ge no wonez in castel walle,
 Ne maner ther ge may mete and won?
 Thou tellez me of Jerusalem the ryche ryalle,
 Ther Dauid dere watz dygt on trone,

Bot by thyse holtez hit con not hone,
Bot in Judée hit is, that noble mote.

(ll.917-22)

En las secciones diecisiete y dieciocho el narrador cuenta aquella visión que él tiene del cielo, y en la sección diecinueve él ve la procesión de las doncellas que acompañan al Cordero celestial y entre ellas se encuentra la propia Pearl. Esta visión es lo más importante y el objetivo más espiritual al que un ser humano puede aspirar en su vida aquí en la tierra, y que en cierta manera es lo que se describe en el *Apocalipsis* de San Juan. Cuando el narrador así arrebatado intenta cruzar el río de la muerte, que le separa de la procesión de las doncellas, él se despierta y así termina la sección veinte y última del poema. El narrador se siente triste ante la pérdida de la visión, pero enseguida comprende aquel sueño espiritual y acepta humildemente la voluntad de Dios a quien alaba y al que se encomienda, y pide la protección de Cristo que se manifiesta todos los días durante la santa misa como él mismo lo expresa en estas líneas:

To pay the Prince other sete sage
Hit is ful eth to the god Krystyn;
For I haf founden hym, bothe day and nagte,
A God, a Lorde, a frende ful fyin.
Ouer this hyul this lote I lagte,
For pyty of my perle enclyin,
And sythen to God I hit bytagte
In Krystez dere blesyng and myn,
That in the forme of bred and wyn
The preste vus schewez vch a daye.
He gef vus to be his homly hyne
Ande precious perlez vnto his pay.

(ll. 1201-12)

Al igual que el vidente en *Pearl* es consolado al final del poema, el narrador en la obra de Boecio es consolado por el personaje encarnado en la Filosofía, la cual pide a éste que ponga su esperanza en el Ser superior que está por encima de todos los seres, pues éste recompensa a los justos y castiga a los perversos.

Manet etiam spectator desuper cunctorum praescius deus uisionisque
eius praesens semper aeternitas cum nostrorum actuum futura
qualitate concurrit bonis praemia malis supplicia dispensans.

Nec frustra sunt in deo positae spes precesque, quae cum rectae sunt inefficaces esse non possunt. Auersamini igitur uitia, colite uirtutes, ad rectas spes animum subleuate, humiles preces in excelsa porrigit.

Magna uobis est, si dissimulare non uultis, necessitas indicta probitatis cum ante oculos agitis iudicis cuncta cernentis. (V. 6, 45-48)¹⁷

Hemos visto cómo el narrador en *Pearl* es instruido en la doctrina de la fe y en la salvación; por medio de esta enseñanza cristiana él se consuela de su desgracia y al final acepta la voluntad de Dios. El narrador ha sido instruido de una forma progresiva por un ser superior, se podría decir que divino; de esta manera su consuelo no ha sido un mero lamento o llanto, su verdadero consuelo ha sido la instrucción moral y religiosa a través de un diálogo con un ser al que sólo se puede contemplar en sueños.

El narrador en la *Consolatio Philosophiae* es asimismo instruido; en este caso, sin embargo, la enseñanza no se fundamenta en las verdades de la fe cristiana o en la teología de la gracia como sucede en *Pearl*, de ahí que el personaje que hace de instructor, la *Filosofía*, sea la personificación de una diosa de la literatura clásica. Pero, en cualquier caso, se mantiene la misma estructura alegórico-didáctica que en *Pearl*, pues está basada en un diálogo que pretende consolar al narrador mediante una instrucción moral.

En las dos obras que comentamos la enseñanza que se deriva de la instrucción moral es el único remedio y consuelo del narrador, y por extensión de los lectores. La instrucción en *Pearl* concluye con la última estrofa "close-packed in its symbolic implications; it seems to compress into a few words a new understanding of the meaning of the whole poem", en palabras de Spearing (1989: 215), que a continuación nos recuerda el carácter didáctico de la obra, pues al final el poema nos ha mostrado a todos, al narrador y a los lectores, un camino nuevo: "We have been shown a new way of looking at things". a

NOTAS

1. El poema *Pearl* fue editado por primera vez por R.Morris (1864) para la *Early Middle English Society* en su primer volumen junto a *Cleanness* y *Patience*. Desde entonces han sido

numerosas las ediciones de esta obra tanto por separado como en unión de los otros poemas aliterativos del *Ms. Cotton Nero A x*. Una de las más recientes y conocidas ediciones es la de Malcolm Andrew and Ronald Waldron (1981 [1978]) donde se incluye una bibliografía de los poemas aliterativos del manuscrito *Cotton Nero A x*, entre los que se encuentra *Pearl*.

2. El único trabajo relevante sobre *Pearl* escrito en lengua castellana y del que tenemos constancia es el ensayo del profesor F. Galván (1985).

3. Se han escrito diferentes estudios sobre el papel del narrador en *Pearl*, pero uno de los más interesantes es el artículo de Ch. Moorman (1955).

4. En la obra *The Middle English Pearl: Critical Essays* de Conley (1970) se encuentran numerosos estudios sobre las distintas interpretaciones que se han formulado para el poema y el personaje *Pearl*, y que complementan las ya citadas anteriormente.

5. La inscripción del poema *Pearl* al género de la *consolatio* tiene ya una larga tradición, y entre otros trabajos sobre este tema podemos mencionar a V. E. Watts (1963) y John Conley (1955).

6. Hay numerosos estudios que relacionan a la *Divina Comedia* con la *Consolatio Philosophiae*. Una de las obras más relevantes es la de L. Alfonsi, *Dante e la Consolatio Philosophiae di Boezio* (Como, 1944).

7. No es amplia la bibliografía en la que se relacione de alguna manera *Piers Plowman* y la *Consolatio de Boecio*; pero es de destacar el artículo de Robert H. Bowers, "Piers Plowman and the Literary Historians", *CE* 21(1959): 1-4, y dos trabajos de Morton W. Bloomfield, "Piers Plowman as a Fourteenth Century Apocalypse", *Centennial Review* 5(1961)281-95, y *Piers Plowman as a Fourteenth-Century Apocalypse* (New Brunswick [NJ], 1962).

8. Son muy numerosas las publicaciones que han analizado la influencia de Boecio en la obra de Chaucer desde la publicación *Chaucer and the Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius*. de Bernard L. Jefferson (Princeton, 1917). Entre otros estudios de la bibliografía de Chaucer en los que se mencionan algunas obras sobre este tema es de destacar el de Leyerle y Quick de 1986.

9. La composición numérica ha sido objeto de varios trabajos entre los que cabe destacar a los de Kean (1965) y MacQueen. (1985).

10. La edición que hemos utilizado para presentar los textos es *The Poems of the Pearl Manuscript*, ed. M. Andrew y R. Waldron (1981).

11. El texto latino que empleamos está tomado de la edición de L. Bieler (1957), y la traducción al castellano de Pablo Masa (1964).

12. Trad.: "Así pues, volví mis ojos para fijarme en ella, y vi que no era otra sino mi antigua nodriza la que desde mi juventud me había recibido en casa, la misma Filosofía. Y ¿cómo, le dije, tú, maestro de todas las virtudes, has abandonado las alturas donde moras desde el cielo, para venir a esta soledad de mi destierro? ¿Acaso para ser también, como yo, perseguida

por acusaciones sin fundamento?" (I, 3,3).

13. Trad.: "Yo que en mis mocedades componía hermosos versos, cuando todo en mi alrededor parecía sonreír, hoy me veo sumido en llanto, y ¡triste de mí!, sólo puedo entonar estrofas de dolor. Han desgarrado sus vestiduras mis musas favoritas y aquí están a mi lado para inspirarme lo que escribo, mientras el llanto baña mi rostro al eco de sus tonos elegíacos".

14. Trad.: "Yo, que con la vista turbada por las lágrimas no podía distinguir quién fuese aquella mujer de tan soberana autoridad, sobre cogido de estupor, fijos los ojos en tierra, aguardé en silencio lo que ella hiciera".

15. Trad.: "Queda así resuelta la cuestión que antes proponías, a saber, que parecía indigno de Dios el suponer que nuestros actos fueran la causa determinante de la presciencia divina. Porque ésta es tan poderosa que abarcándolo todo en su conocimiento presente, por sí misma impone a las cosas su manera de ser, sin que en nada dependa de los hechos futuros. Siendo esto así, los mortales conservan íntegro su libre albedrío; es decir, la voluntad está exenta de toda necesidad, y por lo tanto, no hay ninguna injusticia en las leyes que determinan los premios o los castigos".

16. Trad.: "Pero lo que más me apesumbra es que, aun cuando haya un ser supremo lleno de bondad, que todo lo gobierna, pueda existir y quedar impune el mal en el mundo; y ciertamente no dejarás de comprender lo extraño que he de considerar un hecho semejante. Pero hay algo peor: mientras la perversidad sube y prospera, a la virtud no sólo se le priva de recompensa, sino que se la ve a los pies de los malvados que, aplastándola, la condenan al castigo que sólo el crimen merece. Que esto suceda en el reino de un Dios que todo lo puede, que todo lo sabe y sólo quiere el bien, es lo que suspende el ánimo y nunca se lamentará bastante".

17. Trad.: "Dios que está por encima de todos los demás seres, contempla nuestros actos; y con su presciencia y su mirada eternamente presente conoce la calidad de cada uno, recompensando a los buenos y castigando a los malos. Por lo tanto, no es vana la esperanza que el hombre pone en Dios, ni son inútiles las oraciones: las cuales si brotan de un corazón recto, no pueden menos de ser eficaces. Apartaos, pues, de los vicios; practicad la virtud; elevad vuestros corazones en alas de la más firme esperanza; que suban al cielo vuestras humildes oraciones. Si no queréis engañaros a vosotros mismos, tened la probidad y honradez como ley suprema, ya que en todo en cuanto hacéis estáis bajo la mirada de un juez que todo lo ve".

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'THE THREE HOSTS OF DOOMSDAY

IN CELTIC AND OLD ENGLISH-'

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"BETTER to feel shame for your sins before one man now," runs an Old English maxim on making confession to a priest, "than to feel shame for them before God and all angels and all men and all devils at Doomsday." This formula has been analysed by Malcolm Godden, who speaks of a "peculiarly Anglo-Saxon character of the motif. Not only did it circulate widely in Old English writings, but the only two Latin works in which I have been able to find it were written by Anglo-Saxons —Alcuin and Boniface."¹ This view of Professor Godden's (and this view only) is criticized here. C. D. Wright has already shown that, far from being "peculiarly Anglo-Saxon," the formula has Irish origins, and what follows defines these more closely.

Fifteen Old English examples of the formula are known, none in a manuscript much predating 975. Seven of them, following the pattern "betere is ye yæt ðe scamige nu beforan me anum, yonne eft on domes dæge beforan gode, and beforan eallum heofenwaran and eorðwaran and eac helwaran," occur in these texts:

(a) An *Ordo Confessionis*, found in three manuscripts (Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, 190; Oxford, Bodleian Library, Junius 121; London, British Library, Cotton Tiberius A. iii), and associated with the Old English

Confessional and *Penitential* by pseudo-Egbert. Junius 121 is from Worcester, Tiberius A. iii from Canterbury.

- (b) A short address for confessors in MS Tiberius A. iii.
- (c) An address for a private confessor in part of a Salisbury pontifical (now BL, MS Cotton Tiberius C. i) copied at Sherborne.²
- (d) An address to a congregation, also copied at Sherborne, in the same manuscript.³
- (e) An address (now fire-damaged, but apparently taken from the Tiberius version of *a*) for confessors in the eleventh-century MS Cotton Galba A. xiv, probably from Winchester.
- (f) Homily XXIX of Napier's edition of homilies ascribed to Wulfstan, from the eleventh-century Worcester manuscript, Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Hatton 113.
- (g) The third "Lambeth Homily" in London, Lambeth Palace Library, MS 487 (of c. 1200).

In a second group the motif is used not to give advice, but a warning. Ælfric foretells that the man refusing to make confession now, will at Doomsday feel shame before God and before his hosts of angels and before all men and before all devils ("ætforan his engla werodum, and ætforan eallum mannum, and ætforan eallum deoflum"); the man unable to confess sins now before one man, will be put to endless shame before heaven's inhabitants and earth's inhabitants and hell's inhabitants ("ætforan heofenwarum, and eorðwarum, and helwarum"). Examples of this occur in six texts:

- (h) Ælfric's *De Penitentia*.⁴
- (i) A copy of *h* (with the end of Blickling Homily X added) in CCCC MS 198.
- (j) A quotation from *h* in Homily XII of Ælfric's *Lives of Saints*.
- (k) Part of *j* added to a version of Ælfric's *Catholic Homily* (first series) on the paternoster in London, Lambeth Palace, MS 489 (an Exeter manuscript).
- (l) A passage, like that in *h*, in Napier's Homily XLVI (in Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 419, and Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 343).
- (m) A passage in part identical to *l* in an interpolated version of Ælfric's *Catholic Homily* (second series) for the sixteenth Sunday after Pentecost in London, BL, Cotton Vitellius C. v.⁵

Passages on shame at Judgement occur in two other texts.

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(n) Vercelli Homily VIII, where an allusion to the Three Hosts has apparently been cut from a passage otherwise close to *m*.

(o) The poem *Christ III* in the Exeter Book, at lines 1298-1305, where a reference to *Tha folc* seems to replace one to Three Hosts.⁶

At least five other Old English texts mention the Three Hosts of Doomsday with no allusion to shame.

(p) Napier homily XLIX (occurring as Blickling Homily IX, now almost entirely lost; Vercelli Homily X; and in Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MSS 302 and 421; and Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS Bodley 343 and Junius 85).

(q) Vercelli Homily IV.

(r) Blickling Homily VII.⁷

(s) The poem *Lord's Prayer II*, lines 93-95.⁸

(t) Wulfstan's homily on the Catholic Faith.⁹

The view of the theme as purely Anglo-Saxon has, as noted, been criticized by C. D. Wright, who quotes Hiberno-Latin and Irish references to the Three Hosts of Doomsday, and concludes that "the Anglo-Saxons learned the expression from the Irish, although the motif subsequently developed independently within the vernacular homilies."¹⁰ The following takes this approach one step further.

The crucial text here is the pseudo-Isidorian *Liber de numeris*, an eighth-century work not to be confused with the seventh-century pseudo-Isidorian *Liber numerorum* (possibly of Irish provenance).¹¹ *Liber de numeris* is a Hiberno-Latin guide to scriptural and other themes which can be counted by a number from one to eight, such as the six ages of the world, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the eight deadly sins. It has never been edited in full.¹² Its unpublished final part includes a statement: "Tres turme in iudicio erunt, .i. ualde boni, hoc sunt angeli et sancti: ualde mali, .i. demones et impii; nec ualde boni nec ualde mali, hii tales per ignem purgabuntur."¹³ This, the earliest instance of the Three Hosts of Doomsday formula, reinforces Wright's arguments for the theme's Irish origins, even though he does not mention it.

The circulation of *Liber de numeris* proves that the Three Hosts of Doomsday motif achieved wide circulation in eighth-century Germany. The textual history of *Liber de numeris* is as follows. The oldest manuscript is Colmar, Bibliothèque Municipale, 39, from the monastery at Murbach eleven miles away. Dated *c.* 775, this copy of the text has many Irish palaeographical features. Its script has been located in Alsace or in the Lake

Constance region; the manuscript is in any case mentioned in a ninth-century Murbach library catalogue. There is a copy of Colmar MS 39 (probably a direct one) in Zurich, Zentralbibliothek, MS Car C. 123, of c. 800.¹⁴

Further evidence for diffusion of the Three Hosts motif comes from the Rhine, Danube, and Loire regions. *Liber de numeris* occurs in a part completed in that city in 805 of Cologne, Domkapitel, MS 83.¹⁵ Slightly later is Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14392, from Regensburg, of c. 825.¹⁶ Orleans, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS 184 (161), of c. 800, contains *Liber de numeris* and *Liber de ortu et obitu patriarcharum*. Evidence from pen trials of neumes suggests Orleans 184 was at nearby Fleury in the ninth or tenth century; it was certainly there by the early eleventh.¹⁷ Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica, MS Reg. lat. 199, of c. 1100 and obscure provenance, is the incomplete and unreliable source of the *Patrologia Latina* edition.¹⁸ There is a late copy of *Liber de numeris* in Paris, Bibliothèque Ste-Geneviève, MS 208.¹⁹

The manuscripts reveal early diffusion of *Liber de numeris* in South Germany, the Rhineland, and perhaps the Loire valley. Later influence of the text is indicated by London, British Library, MS Royal 5 E. VI, f. 54, an English manuscript of the early twelfth century also containing the *Disputatio Iudei et Christiani* of Gilbert Crispin and *Elucidarium* of Honorius Augustodunensis.²⁰ This manuscript is the source of the quotation from *Liber de numeris* given above; the text occurs with other works of Honorius in London, BL, MS Royal 6 A. XI, a twelfth-century Rochester manuscript.²¹ *Liber de numeris* is known to have remained popular in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century England.²²

Liber de numeris was written about the middle of the eighth century, probably in the Salzburg circle of St Vergil (d. 784), by an unknown Irishman who also wrote *Liber de ortu et obitu patriarcharum*, modelled on an authentic work of St Isidore, *Liber de ortu et obitu patrum*.²³ An eighth-century Hiberno-German provenance for *Liber de numeris* and its reference to the Three Hosts accords with a first appearance of the "Anglo-Saxon" penitential theme in Anglo-Latin writing on the Continent (and not in England) between c. 792 and 804. In a letter of that date to Irish monks, Alcuin says that it is better to have a single confessor witness of one's sins, "quam spectare accusationem diabolicae fraudis ante Judicem omnium saeculorum et ante angelorum choros, et totius humani generis multitudinem."²⁴ The letter refers to an Irishman called Dungal, perhaps the recluse of this name at St Denis, Paris, consulted by Charlemagne about the

eclipses of 810, and founder of a famous school at Pavia about 825.²⁵ If the penitential phrase were of Irish origin, its appearance in a letter of Alcuin with strong Irish links would not be surprising.

Closer to the expression in *Liber de numeris* is one in a homily attributed to St Boniface (c. 675-754), declaring that it is better to confess sins to one man, "quam in illo tremendo judicio coram tribus familiis, coeli terraeque, et infernorum, publicari" and by them be lost for ever.²⁶ Godden accepts the attribution of the homily to Boniface ("two Latin works . . . written by Anglo-Saxons —Alcuin and Boniface"), though acknowledging that others have doubted its authenticity.

This homily is crucial for the history of the penitential motif. Its authenticity is scrutinized in a paper which Wright does not mention, but which again strengthens his arguments for the formula as Irish.²⁷ The homily exists in only one known early source: Paris, B. N., MS lat. 10741 (tenth century), where it is the fourth of fourteen sermons attributed to Boniface. Fragments of these sermons in Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica, MS. Reg. lat. 214, and Paris, B. N., MS nouv. acq. lat. 450, which are surviving parts of a manuscript of c. 900 dismembered in the eleventh century, prove the existence of another copy of the collection. In addition, homily four occurs in Vatican City, Bibl. Apost., MS Reg. lat. 457, written in the twelfth century, perhaps at Mainz. MS Reg. lat. 562 in the same library is a sixteenth-century copy of this. The sermon collection attributed to Boniface is otherwise known only from Paris, B. N., MS lat. 340 (twelfth century), where it appears in a recast and disordered form, no doubt due to accidents in the transmission of the text. These sermons did not have wide circulation, and there seems to be no evidence for their influence in England.

The fourteen sermons are not original compositions but the work of a compiler. They were composed not for liturgical purposes or as exegesis of the readings at mass, but to give a general account of Christian faith and practice. Nothing in their text links them with Boniface's mission, and they do not read as addresses to the newly-converted or baptized. Their manuscript tradition goes back no further than the mid-ninth century. Their appearance with a text on baptism of 811 or 812, perhaps added by the compiler himself, in B. N., MS lat. 10741 and the dismembered manuscript, suggests the collection may be little older than 850. Bouhot calls it a preacher's handbook, whose contents (which follow the canons of Carolingian synods) were placed under Boniface's patronage to enhance their authority. On Boniface's proposed authorship Bouhot remarks that its

defenders seek to link aspects of the saint's life with details of the sermons, "mais la banalité de ceux-ci et leur utilisation de sources nombreuses affaiblissent les rapprochements proposés."²⁸

Bouhot's arguments for the date and the compilatory nature of the sermons receive support from another quarter. Sermon four contains the phrase "quam in illo tremendo judicio coram tribus familiis, coeli terraque, et infernum, publicari." As Wright points out, this is all but identical with a phrase in the Hiberno-Latin handbook *Catachesis Celtica* (perhaps of the ninth century), which speaks of Christ as "princeps familiae caeli et terrae et inferni," and of the woe at Doomsday for the wicked man "si prius ei non eueniat dies confessionis peccatorum suorum antequam exierit de corpore suo" when the Lord will pass judgement "coram tribus familiis caeli et terrae et inferni."²⁹ *Catachesis Celtica* survives only in Vatican City, Bibl. Apost., MS Reg. lat. 49, of Breton provenance.³⁰ Its contents display marked Irish characteristics, as well as evidence for contacts with Cornwall and Wales. The compiler of the pseudo-Boniface sermon must, therefore, have had access to a Celtic-Latin source closely related to *Catachesis Celtica*. Not only must belief in the sermon as the work of Boniface the Englishman thus be rejected, but the earliest full instance of the motif derives in part from a Hiberno-Latin text.

The theme of the Three Hosts at Doomsday occurs, then, in the eighth-century Hiberno-Latin *Liber de numeris* circulating in South Germany and beyond. It appears in the context of shame in a ninth-century homily by pseudo-Boniface, certainly of Continental provenance, which shares phrases with the Hiberno-Latin *Catachesis Celtica*. The theme of the Three Hosts of Doomsday is also common in Welsh vernacular texts up to the fourteenth century, and Irish ones to the seventeenth.³¹ The evidence thus suggests that the penitential motif (frequent in late Old English texts) of shame before a confessor being better than shame before the three hosts of Doomsday was in fact devised either by an Irishman, or, less probably, a Continental scholar well-read in Hiberno-Latin. a

NOTES

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1. Godden 1973: 238.
2. Ker 1959: 276.
3. Ker 1959: 279.
4. Thorpe 1843-6: 2.602, 604.
5. Pope 1967-8: 2.779; cf. Godden 1979: 271 n. 103-4.
6. Cook 1900: 49; Krapp and Dobbie 1936: 39.
7. Morris 1874: 83.
8. Dobbie 1942: 73.
9. Bethurum 1957: 162.
10. Wright 1989: 56-58.
11. On *Liber numerorum* see Aldhelm 1979: 32, 187 nn. 4, 5, 7, and Lapidge and Sharpe 1985: 332.
12. On *Liber de numeris*, incompletely edited in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 83, cols. 1293-1302, see Díaz y Díaz 1959: 32-3; McNally 1961: 312-6; Dumville 1973: 314-5; Kelly 1976: 15; Lapidge and Sharpe 1985: 209; and Brunhölzl 1990-1: 1/1.227-8.
13. Lewis 1931: 139.
14. Lowe 1934-66: 6.15; McNally 1961: 312; 1965: 169.
15. Lowe 1934-66: 8.38; Stegmüller 1950-80: 3.476.
16. McNally 1961: 313.
17. Lowe 1934-66: 6.31; McNally 1965: 169; Parkes 1972: 213 n. 4. I thank John Edwards of Oxford for information on the Orleans manuscript.
18. McNally 1965: 169.
19. Stegmüller, 3.476.
20. Southern 1963: 90-1; Gibson 1978: 242. I thank G. C. G. Thomas of the National Library of Wales for information on this manuscript.
21. Ker 1964: 162 and McNamara 1975: 56.

22. Brunhölzl 1990-1: 1/1.228.

23. McNally 1965: 168-9; Dumville 1973: 314; Kelly 1976: 15.

24. Godden 1973: 235.

25. Lapidge and Sharpe 1985: 173.

26. Godden, 235-6.

27. Hauck 1887-1920: 1.446 n. 3; Bouhot 1980: 184-91.

28. Bouhot 1980: 191, n.50.

29. Wilmart 1933: 46, 110-11; Wright 1989: 56. Diarmuid Ó Laoghaire argues for this text's Irish provenance in *Ireland and Christendom: the Bible and the Missions*, ed. Próinséas Ní Chatháin and Michael Richter (Stuttgart, 1987), unseen by me.

30. Jackson 1953: 64; O'Dwyer 1981: 166-7; Lapidge and Sharpe 1985: 268.

31. Lewis 1931: 139-40; Wright 1989: 56-8; McKenna 1991: 104, 147, 189, 203.

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WEIGHING DELIGHT AND DOLE IN CANADIAN POETRY-,

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THE analysis of the impact of the wilderness on the poetic imagination constitutes an interesting avenue of entry into Canadian poetry. It shows that the relationship between man and nature is a recurrent theme in Canadian literature and reveals the way in which nature has entered imaginatively and mimetically into Canadian poetry serving as the figure and focus for much that has been important for individual poets and for the Canadian consciousness. More precisely, such analysis indicates that Canadian artists have traditionally been both attracted and repelled by the awesome nature of the Canadian landscape and, consequently, have described their land as both heaven and hell, a matrix of life and a source of terror and death.

The aim of this article is to highlight this dialectic of opposites, which gives tension and muscularity to Canadian poetry, by opening an angle on the poetic production of Canadian artists such as the Confederation poets, Edwin John Pratt (1882-1964), and John Newlove (1938-) who are outstanding figures in the history of Canada's literary panorama.

The phrase "Confederation poets" refers to a group of writers who were almost born with the nation since none of them was more than nine years old at the time of Confederation in 1867. Their work constitutes a very important part of Canada's cultural heritage because they were the first to produce a new and independent perception of their country by adapting European cultural trends to the particulars of the Canadian scene.

INSULATION VS. DISSOLUTION?

AN INTERVIEW WITH ERIC KRAFT —

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FOR the scholar of literature who is interested in American fiction, the issue of ordering or "labelling" the different trends existing in this very moment has become a very hard one indeed. Many critics think that the forms of radical experimentation operative in the 1960s and 1970s —that gave a substantial impulse to postmodernism— are definitely over or have been replaced by a "postmodern realism" of sorts, where metafiction has effectively hidden —although not completely— its presence. To the list of postmodern realists — Kennedy, DeLillo, Morrison, Doctorow...—, there could also be added that of the practitioners of a type of more "realistic" prose, inheritors of new journalistic practices and/or in need to stand for the rights of minority groups —Tama Janowitz, Gloria Naylor, Chris Offut... But, is there any place left for a writer who seems to put forward again a particular combination of realistic writing with the best metaphysical and metafictional arguments defended by authors like Borges and Nabokov? It seems there is: such is the case of fiction producer Eric Kraft, a writer who, in these times, happens to be white, male and a New Yorker!

Kraft has a very good friend called Peter Leroy. Supposedly, Peter is "fictional" and acts as narrator –and frequently as protagonist– in all the works Kraft has written up to date: a collection of earlier novellas recently compiled under the title of *Little Follies: The Personal History, Adventures, Experiences & Observations of Peter Leroy (so far)* (1992); and four novels, *Herb 'n' Lorna* (1988), *Reservations Recommended* (1990), *Where Do You Stop? The Personal History, Adventures, Experiences & Observations of Peter Leroy (continued)* (1992), and *What a Piece of Work I Am* (1994), all of them published by Crown (New York). According to the creator of Peter Leroy, the frontiers between fiction and reality seem to be very clearly cut in his narrative, but Kraft's interviewer does not see the boundaries so clear. He received me in his house in Long Island in April 1994. By the end of the interview, I was not so sure we were still in Long Island. Perhaps it was only daydreaming but I thought we could as well be in Small's Island, in the residence of a funny fellow called Peter Leroy that one day, dozing off in the College library –that's what libraries are for, isn't it?– had a dream that eventually led him to the beginning of his career as a writer...

* * *

QUESTION.- Kraft's favorite character, alter ego, and narrator is Peter Leroy, whose adventures are quite often the product of the author's remembrances. However, Peter seems to dissolve at times in a metafictional haze. Very recently I also had the opportunity to interview novelist Russell Banks and he seemed convinced that the days of radical metafiction are over and that we are coming back to a type of realism that tries to reflect the new conditions of the contemporary human being. Do you also think that radical experimentation in the American novel is over?

KRAFT.- I think that I may agree with that opinion. At least, I've found for myself that what has happened to me is that I have become increasingly interested in my characters and their lives, and less interested in the narrative about narratives, that is to say, in formal experimentation. I don't say that I am no longer interested in these aspects. I think that I may object to the term realism applied to my writing, but I have become as attached to my characters as I am to many people in my life and, to quickly answer this question, I have begun to have what I think is quite an old-fashioned

novelist's relationship with his characters: that is, I have certain responsibilities for them, an interest in their stories, their motivations, their passions. That is stronger than my interest in the structural elements of a novel.

However, this also surprises me to a certain degree because I think that my characters were nearly manifestations of certain ideas and they could have been objects as easily as people. I suppose that I wanted to write a sort of Flaubertean book about nothing, sometimes, a book called *Book*: "this is my Preface, this is my first sentence...," this sort of thing. But that has now receded from me, and it surprises me.

QUESTION.- However, your characters, Peter in particular, are frequently crossing narrative levels, your novels are also metafictional...

KRAFT.- Right, they are, and here is my objection to realism. I don't imagine myself ever writing anything that I would think as simply *realist*. There are even ways where I, quite deliberately, close doors to a kind of realism: such as never describing a character's appearance. That is something that I reject, something that I would like to have the reader do. And this has become more and more deliberate for me, an invitation to the reader to come into a space that I have made, where we can imagine together, where our imagination can work together to make the book.

In the annotations that Mark Dorset [one of Kraft's fictional characters] is preparing for the electronic version of my writings, one of the essays in his topical guide is called "The Mighty Reader," and it is about the role of the readers not merely interpreting, but also participating in the book. Of course, this also means, at times, *misinterpretation* from the point of view of the author, but not being able to predict the reader's response is part of the pleasure, too. Well, I suppose I wish the reader would respond in ways that are more narrowly predictable for me.

QUESTION.- Talking about the reader: your words now and also some notions that you put in your books remind me of some ideas particularly popular among many contemporary critics. I am thinking about poststructuralist theories, and more specifically about Derrida and the extreme attention he has paid to the role of the reader. Do you think that you have been influenced by Derridean theories?

KRAFT.- I don't think so. I have made no special efforts to read Derrida or other thinkers of that field. I think I did in my work what was in the air. I did read one of Derrida's books on truth and painting [*Truth in Painting*] and I think that it is an *oddly* written book. It gives you almost a headache with all those terms that I thought were a little preposterous; but still I was sympathetic towards some of the ideas in the book, for example, the ideas about framing... But they did not seem terribly new to me, although he is still provocative. His notion that the text may disappear under the influence of the reader, I want to believe that it does not happen to my books. I think it does not even happen when I am reading them. The books still stand, they define the boundaries within which the imagination works. One of the reasons why I enjoyed books most as a child is that they always have gaps, places where the mind could wander. And that is what I try to provide in my writings. But, if there are those places for the mind to wander, then of necessity there must also be something that defines the creator's space.

QUESTION.- *I suppose that, in a sense, we may apply the term "deconstructive" to many contemporary authors even if they have not read Derrida or do not share his main ideas. However, your works are clearly metafictional for a time in which metafiction is not so popular any longer. Which are your main literary sources?*

KRAFT.- Of my metafictional style or mood? Well, certainly Nabokov. I think that *Pale Fire* was the first book in which I saw that metafictional structure and I quickly became attracted to it. John Barth, also. I have read all his works with the exception of *Letters*, and I have to say something here about reading the works of contemporary writers: for the last few years I have almost deliberately avoided it. I'm starting now to drift back to reading contemporary fiction. I recall picking up *Letters* and flipping through it a little bit and then I said to myself: "I don't want to read this book because I can see there are things that I am going to hear in my own work, things that I will know I have acquired here." And for a period of time, really for the period since I've been pushing my work more widely, I've heard at times the sound of another writer's writing or I've heard echoes of another writer's ideas, and I find that it takes me a long time to eradicate those ideas from my own work. Now, I don't mean a deliberate reference or a little homage to someone, I mean the sort of thing that clips in insidiously and isn't welcome. So I've been very conscious about that. There was even a period when I was

very worried about writing in larger form, and there were moments when I might not be able to control my voice over such a kind of influence...

QUESTION.- Your voice or Peter's voice?

KRAFT.- Or Peter's voice... Whichever voice! [Laughing]. I believe that I am now in command of that, especially after having finished *What a Piece of Work I Am* [1994]. In this book I had to work with three voices: I had Peter the narrator, Peter the interlocutor on stage with Ariane, and then Ariane herself who, since she's a figment of Peter's imagination, has to sound like Peter but she has still also to be herself. So having finished that, I think I am in control, and I want to come back and read some contemporary fiction again.

QUESTION.- However, even if you have not read much contemporary fiction later, your characters, especially Peter, share many interesting features with some fictional figures created by other contemporary novelists. Peter, despite what you may think of him, still seems to me a very unstable personage, characteristic of a kind of fiction that has already been classified by critics as "postmodern realism." Are you sure you would not like to comment a little longer on some other aspects of contemporary fiction?

KRAFT.- Well, OK. There is a tendency in contemporary American fiction that I have come to deplore: it is a kind of flat effectless depiction of the lives of characters who appear to be overwhelmed by insignificant details. This type of fiction really annoys me. Is the father of this, I wonder, Alain Robbe-Grillet? The interior scenery in these novels is frequently so cluttered with precisely depicted details that there is no room for their human occupants or for any action that they might undertake. This kind of writing seems to me either an abandonment or the surrender of the authorial function —I think that it is almost a duty for me to expose myself, to dare to go into the narrative and to have myself visible here and there and making statements, showing my hand, announcing my intentions, letting my feelings for the characters show because, otherwise, what good is the writer? Is the writer only a set decorator or someone who delivers the plots to the scene and then vanishes and lets the reader walk around in some sort of empty virtual reality? No, that's not interesting for me to do. It's too easy and it's not daring, not open enough.

QUESTION.- But, that's Peter, the one who does all these things in your novels...

KRAFT.- Right, that's Peter! Well, I've said often that I couldn't do all that without Peter being here. At least, I was too careful of myself and I still am very careful of myself. However, I think that I no longer can hide that it is easier to see me standing behind Peter, not Peter standing before me. It is easy for anyone now to see how the strings go from my hands to Peter's limbs. I am on display now: there I am and I have to take the comments of the critics, there is no turning back. In fact, this is one of the themes in *What a Piece of Work I Am*. It is part of the risk but it also leads to one of the rewards of writing: the response of the reader, even if the reader reacts in a way that you had not intended. However, it also may lead to the disappointment of having someone who doesn't care for what you've done.

QUESTION.- In your new novel we again have a multiplicity of voices, there is even more technical complexity, but we can still see that sense of fragmentation in your text and in your characters. Why fragmentation?

KRAFT.- Well, the fragmentation began for me almost as a way of shocking myself out of taking one thread too far, to a tedious point. Each day, when I was starting to write, I made myself to begin in at a new point. The result was that, when I was working at a narrative, it would become deliberately disjointed so that I would look at it anew each day, and I really thought that all I was doing there was trying to give myself a fresher view of what I was working on. It was just a kind of motivational trick to keep myself going on. But it became intriguing and surprising to me.

However, I think that although the text is apparently disjointed, I hope I have achieved an assembly of these parts. One of the things I pride myself on now is that, when I read through the book as it is coming to completion, I find there a number of parts that fit together to make a structure. So, although perhaps it seems too disruptive the first time, I hope that on subsequent readings that is not the impression, but one of unity.

QUESTION.- Parts and unity. They seem to be among your favorite literary motifs, and fragmentation is also one of the most recurrent topics in postmodern fiction.

KRAFT.- Yes, you can say that it is almost a favorite theme of mine: making something out of some parts and pieces. I think that we are coming to a *junk* experience of life. Maybe I even let the workings of this tendency to show a little too much. In fact, it is a tendency of mine that I am beginning to deplore [laughing].

There is a pair of famous magicians in this country. They are comic magicians and one of the main points in their performance is that they often give the tricks away. They tell the audience how a trick is done and then they perform it so brilliantly that you cannot believe that you know how it is done because it still looks impossible. Sometimes I think that they use that telling actually to mislead their audience into seeing things the way they want the audience to see them. I think that there is also in me a tendency to explain how the trick is done in my writings.

QUESTION.- Yes. However, you are not usually a very overt metafictional writer such as John Barth, for instance, proves to be in some of his works.

KRAFT.- No, I am not. And I have to say that when metafiction becomes so overt it is a little tedious. In my case, I think that metafiction is part of my recognizing how strong my interest in the characters is.

QUESTION.- Together with metafiction there is also in your books a reiterative topic centered on very specific scientific notions that refer to a diffuse interpretation of life: Peter Leroy, for instance, is frequently using the term "fuzzy"; and there are also many occasions in which the notion of unpredictability appears. You seem to have very clear scientific sources for providing in your books this notion of life...

KRAFT.- Yes, there are many things referred to this type of scientific concepts. In fact, one of the notions I am also using in the electronic version of my work is the idea of fiction like an object with fine tingles radiating from it, a *fuzz* reaching out, little "hairs" of allusions that attach the fiction to the ambient reality. Pure fiction is at greater remove from reality because its allusions are planted in other fiction, and so we come to this fuzziness: Peter, I think, is for me the purest fiction, and the border between him and things that are real has to be maintained by a shell of other fictions. That is like insulation, or a fuzziness, or a haze, or something like that. That is the reason why Peter lives in an island, isolated from reality, and that is why I have tried to reinvent the trappings of life around him. There are a few things that are

real objects and references, like Studebakers and clams. When I use real things, I try to exaggerate them so that they lose some of their reality; and so everyone drives a Studebaker in Babbington or clamping becomes the entire basis of the economic success in Peter's community. On the other hand, I don't particularly like to use real brands of things because they often carry with them all the guilt and associations that we have from our dealings with them in real life, and that's not what I try to make in my fiction: I'm making an alternative to real life, and so I need alternative objects and... anyway, I wouldn't have used the term *fuzziness*. I think *insulation* is something I'm using for that phenomenon.

QUESTION.- However, borders are transgressed in your work. Insulation does not seem to be very effective in Peter's case at the end of Where Do you Stop, does it? He may go on, expanding his self forever...

KRAFT.- Yes, you are right there. But my concept of insulation would refer to something different. The Universe within which Peter is going to radiate that way can't be ours since he doesn't exist in ours except as a character in a book.

QUESTION.- Perhaps that is so, but the arguments that you give in the novel are purely scientific, aren't they?

KRAFT.- Yes, it seems as if the same science holds in Peter's Universe as holds in ours, that is true; but it is paradoxical. The place where Peter lives can't be reached from here except through the imagination. So I think that both opinions may be right: what you say about the dispersal, the continuum, the crossing of borders, the radiation of the reflected light in the work of the imagination, all that is there. And I believe all that also with regards to ourselves, to our world. I would like to think that by writing my books I'm extending my self in the same way that Peter says at the end of *Where Do You Stop?*

QUESTION.- I can also notice the influence of chaos theory in some of the arguments you use in your books, am I right?

KRAFT.- Yes, definitely. Unpredictable effects that go on and on: that is one of my motives for writing. In fact, I just remembered something that Cocteau

said: he was asked "why do you write?," and his response was, "I suppose it is so that I scatter my seed as far as I can."

QUESTION.- Then you put a little of everything in your novels: you take Einstein, Heisenberg, chaos theory, together with metafiction, and the result is paradoxical: there is insulation but also dispersal and fuzziness. In earlier novels we were guided by Peter Leroy, both narrator and protagonist of his own stories. Now in What a Piece of Work I Am we also have Ariane... Is there also a thread to escape this labyrinth?

KRAFT.- Yes, there is a thread that allows you to go from one world to the other. This thread is within my books all the time. One of the things I hope I've paid very close attention to is how well those separate characters and their separate roles are insulated, so that when Peter the narrator is moving small Peter –the one who is recalling one of his tales– the reader is aware of which is which. Talking to some students two weeks ago I wanted to know whether they could recognize the times when Peter had wrapped his older self in the skin of his younger self, deliberately trying to reexperience something in his head: I was referring to those occasions when there are the perceptions and interpretations of an adult in the child who is there. And the students could see that; they did understand what I was doing there, which was very comforting because I was afraid that for an adult who is now removed from his childhood, the separation between his older and his younger self would not be clear, the result might just seem precocious and impossible. So, I hope that each of my characters is just distinct from the others.

Now, the thread: enter Mark Dorset, the annotator of the books in the electronic version. When I was doing the annotations, I got the notion that Mark should be able to speak to me and to Peter, he should be an intermediary. In this way he's able to talk about or, at least, to consider my motives in the annotations, and also Peter's. And when he discusses our relationship he talks about us as collaborators.

QUESTION.- And we have an author, Peter the narrator, a character also called Peter Leroy, and now an editor who happens to talk to both fictional Peter and the real author... and you insist on talking about isolation? But let us move to a different topic now. You have mentioned the electronic version of your works. Even if they are going to be edited by fictional Mark Dorset,

how do you think this type of "interactive literature" is going to affect your writing and your readers?

KRAFT.- I think that the electronic version of my work is only an actualization of a way of thinking about my books that I've been exercising all along for at least a decade. I have always thought of the various interpreters of my work: Peter has his view, his story, but there are so many others who do, including myself. I have a slight fear that this electronic experience may make me to focus on reinterpreting what I've already done, rather than adding to it. At one point, Peter uses the image of overpainting on a canvas, and I don't want to start devoting myself to overpainting when there is still a lot to be added. The electronic book is an elegant game for me now, it is the equivalent of a computer game. However, what is boring about computer games is that you are only playing in the structure that somebody else has created. So, here I am, in effect, playing a game with my own work. I hope that I'm not just amusing myself and no one else by doing this. There are many other things for me to do.

QUESTION.- *We have already talked about this issue but still it seems to me that the impression the contemporary reader may have of experiencing reality is already very fragmented. In the case of the reader of the electronic version of your works, don't you think that your books may become further fragmented?*

KRAFT.- Right, that's true. The way in which a book is going to be read seems now so unpredictable to me after having the experience of readers responding to my books printed in paper: that was the first time that I really had my eyes open to the variety of ways in which people read. I was a little naive at the start; when I began writing my books I imagined that they would be read, in effect, as I had written them. As I wrote a book, I was also predicting the way in which it would be read, then I was astonished because they were almost never read that way! They were read in the ways readers chose to read them; often it has been said that "readers read their own book," not the writer's. So here comes the electronic book, a new way to read. I think that as a way of first reading a book, it does enormous violence to the structure of the book itself; it is so far removed from the way the writer intended the novel to be read that it does not do justice to the work you made to write the book.

Perhaps a new form of book comes along that deliberately caters to that kind of reading: I would imagine a collection of discreet texts from which the reader makes some sort of assembly. I'm not really interested in writing that kind of book; well, now that I've said that I realize that I'm interested in writing it! I have always wanted to write Mark Dorset's topical autobiography, which is going to be an encyclopedically arranged work, alphabetically ordered: it might just be a random access of topics about Mark's life; he would write discreet essays and reminiscences and the reader would wander among them as he chose.

However, what I'm doing now is an interactive book for the re-reader. I mean, the violence I'm now doing to my own books is addressed to the person who has already read my books in a manner close to the way I imagine they would be read. This type of person comes to the diskette version and says, "well, another way to read them." There might be only two dozen people interested in doing that, I expect to have a small audience for this work.

QUESTION.- I have recently attended the Second Oxford Conference for the Book (Oxford, Mississippi), and some booksellers there expressed their concern about how easy it becomes to illegally reproduce an electronic book. Are you also concerned about that possibility?

KRAFT.- No, not really. I think booksellers should be concerned more about the death of reading as a past-time among young people. That's certainly more important than how books are to be delivered. I can give you a firsthand example of it: recently I went to Harvard University and to a private secondary school nearby and at both institutions instructors told me that their students don't read books, it is not a pursuit of theirs, they don't talk about literature any more. When we were at this secondary school, every student there had read *Where Do You Stop?* because it was the Spring break book, and they had been assigned essays on my novel. One little fellow was handing in his essay, late. We were sitting in the Faculty room when he knocked at the door and asked one of the Faculty members to deposit his essay in his instructor's mail box. When the Faculty member saw that it was an essay on *Where Do You Stop?* he brought it over to me and said, "you might like to take a look at this." Well, this little student's thesis was that Peter Leroy was an unusual fellow, and one of the pieces of evidence that he used to prove that Peter was unusual was that he was always reading books! He said --I'm misquoting him, but not by much--, "Today a kid would have to

be out of his mind to read a book," but Peter is doing it all the time. So, I would be much more concerned about how to show kids that there is a lot of pleasure, beyond what they can get from watching TV, in books, than whether books are going to be delivered in paper or diskette. Something has been lost along the way and I think that here in the United States there is a real problem with the overteaching of a kind of subliterature at the elementary and secondary levels. I think that reading is turning to drudgery in the school. As a result, even if you point out to kids how much pleasure there is to be taken from reading, I think they will *suspect* your motives, they will think, "you are really trying to make my life miserable by giving me more of this drudgery!"

It does not happen so much in high school, because the literary selections there have improved over the years. In the anthologies they now use there has been a much greater attempt to really pick up works that satisfy two things: first, that they have real literary matter, and secondly that they appeal to young readers to a certain degree; schools do not introduce difficult works like *Hamlet* too soon, which used to be the kind of literature they had to read some years ago. My complaint is not so much with high school but with elementary school, when I think the child's attitude towards reading is formed, and there you find a lot of silly books with talking animals and things like that. I don't mean classic children's fantasy, mind you, but that sort of dribble that is made up for those anthologies that kids read. Even when they use something that is worthwhile, the teaching technique is not any good: kids will come in and read a little story one day, and for the next week or two they will be reading this same story again, and again, and again. You can imagine how sick they are of this by the time they've left this particular story, and how annoying the act of reading becomes. Very rarely do they have time when the teacher would simply sit and read them a story they could just enjoy. That is one of our main problems now, I think; I am worried about where the next generation of readers is coming from.

QUESTION.- Your comments remind me of some of your own stories within Peter Leroy's story, that also seem to be rooted in traditional story-telling. I am thinking of "The Fox and the Clam" and the reiterative notion of interpretation: each reader may have his or her interpretation and they may even modify your own views in the case of the electronic book. However, despite the textual insistence on interpretation and on scientific theories and technology that back your work, I have the impression that there is an

underpinning layer of myth and integration, that you are also looking for a superior kind of structure, whatever it is...

KRAFT.- Yes, *integration*; I would have said exactly that. I think that is what I seek and what my work is tending to. One of the reasons that I bring in other disciplines like science, mathematics, and other ways of looking at human experience and analyzing it, is that I am looking for a grand unifying theory, or a grand unifying understanding, and I think that writing is my way of doing it. There used to be a joke, a sexist joke about a fellow who, before going to a party, told his wife, "now, will you please think before you open your mouth"; she stopped for a moment and then replied, "But, how do I know what I think till I see what I say?" And, that's the way I work! I find that I think through my writing. I turn out to be a man made of words, as much as Peter is, and I'm looking for an understanding of *IT* all, and my way of finding that is through writing of all of this work: it's the ultimate purpose of what I'm doing. Peter will probably find out before I do, but just that much soon! [laughing]

QUESTION .- Looking backwards to your own literary sources one may have the impression that, contrary to what happens to some of the works written by Nabokov or Borges, you try to address your novels to a more ample audience: you may be using metafiction and advancing complex scientific and metaphysical theories in your writing, but still your novels can be read, enjoyed and understood by many readers...

KRAFT .- Yes, and I pride myself on that! When I began writing –even before I was writing full novels– I don't know how consciously I had in mind a readership that included people who would approach the books and appreciate them on different levels. But certainly at some point I knew that I had a diverse cluster of readers. Since then I have thought about it, because some of my actual readers were people I knew. In fact, I had first in mind a readership of people I knew. They were all people that I enjoyed talking with because they were clever and they were interested in very diverse things: some of them had more technical interests in computer programming, for example, others in social action... and what this diverse group of people shared would be my work.

QUESTION .- Following this trend: are your characters actually based on real people?

KRAFT .- I've been giving squirrely answers to this question many times but let's cut away all this nonsense. I'll give you the straight answer: many of the characters have *begun* with some elements of a person in my life. The most obvious cases of this device are Peter's grandparents, both the maternal and the paternal ones. That is where I started: but then the characters go elsewhere, they drift away. A certain insulation, a fuzz [laughing] grows somehow, and they begin to move away from their real models. That is a very satisfying shift for me. What remains, the aspects that make them still identifiable for me, turns out to be not details of their depiction, such as the way they look or the way they talk: it sometimes is just my attitude towards them, so that all the affection that Peter feels for his grandparents, for example, is identical to the affection that I felt for my grandparents, and here the resemblance ends.

And then there are other characters: the odd thing is that Peter's good friend, his imaginary friend Raskol, is not based on any of my close friends. However, he began with parts of several friends that I had as a boy. I had very good friends when I was a kid, so Peter would also have to have a good friend. I made Peter his imaginary friend so that I would have more freedom to develop him but also thinking that I didn't want any of my own friends to say, "Oh, you gave Peter this other real friend instead of me," and now they are all convinced that they are Raskol's real model!

QUESTION .- *And nobody is convinced that he is Matthew Barber's model, I guess...*

KRAFT .- No, no. That's not the role anyone wants. Matthew Barber is not derived from a friend; he came into the books with just a momentary flash of memory of one unhappy fat boy that I remembered from high school, and then I realized that I also took my younger fat unhappy self when I was in the sixth or seventh grade. For a while I was a fat lonely kid myself, and later in high school there was this other boy whom I did not really know, but even then I saw that he was what I might have become if I hadn't changed. So, those two people, what I could have been and somebody else, became the beginnings of Matthew Barber, but there again, he began moving off in some unexpected ways.

QUESTION .- *Finally, a question about forthcoming projects. What are your plans for the future?*

KRAFT .- Well, first of all, I have very specific plans for the Glynn twins; I am writing now about Peter's associations with the Glynn family. After that I have two projects that I've been working on but I don't know yet which of them is coming to the forth: one is "Captain Clam," the authorized biography of Porky White, the owner of the clam restaurant. This would take the form of one of those commissioned corporate biographies and Peter would be the hack paid to write it! Secondly, when the reader gets to the end of *What a Piece of Work I am* he finds out that Ariane also writes a book: it goes through several editions and many printings. Ariane's book is a transcendental work in the form of a cook book called *Making Your Self ... and an Easy, Nourishing One-Pot Meal*, where she gives a number of recipes for clam chowder – what else! Each of the recipes is accompanied by an essay on the philosophical and –if I may say it without making it sound religious– spiritual implications of the making of this dish, and each of them is coupled with attaching reminiscences of her mother, who taught Ariane to cook. So this would be a work of philosophy, story-telling, mythologizing... and cooking. All in one, this should be a best-seller [laughing].

Also, for a long time I've wanted Peter to write one of the children's books that he writes in my fiction, one of those Larry Peter's books. You may recall from "Call Me Larry" that what interested Peter most was not Larry Peter's *adventures* but what happened between the adventures, when the family gathered back at the island where they lived. I would like to have Peter write a book, the title of which I haven't decided yet, but the *subtitle* of which I already know: "An Interstitial Episode from the Adventures of Larry Peters," and this would appear over Peter's name [!!!], as a book written by Peter Leroy.

QUESTION .- So, here you are again, confusing the limits between fiction and reality: Peter is bound to appear in this world.

KRAFT .- Yes, in the *real* world. I'll tell you, there are holes in that insulation I was talking about earlier. I think these are the postulated wormholes that allow us to travel from one dimension to another, little wrinkles in the fabric of reality... a

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**THE WARRING VOICES
OF THE MOTHER:
MAXINE HONG KINGSTON'S TALE
OF THE MOTHER-DAUGHTER STORY**

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**ANGELES DE LA CONCHA
UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE
EDUCACION A DISTANCIA**

THE dialectic between feminism and postmodernism has led to a productive and enriching intellectual debate in which certain assumptions that perhaps had been all too readily accepted have undergone thorough scrutiny and reassessment. Particular scrutiny is given to any presumption that may ring of metanarrative overtones, though it might well be accorded that a phenomenon as universal and pervasive as male dominance must surely be allowed an origin at least as universal and pervasive, for all the undeniable historical and local differences that such a multifaceted phenomenon may show in its manifestations.

In this context, the recurrent dismissal of Nancy Chodorow's theory of mothering precisely on the grounds of its allegedly universalist metanarrative tones is not surprising. Her seminal work, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (Chodorow 1978), gave rise to a heated debate, partly covered in the volume *Mothering: Essays in Feminist Theory*, edited by Joyce Trebilcot in 1983. More recently, in 1991, Linda J. Nicholson, Nancy Fraser and some others

have taken up again the issue in the volume *Feminism/Postmodernism* edited by the former (Nicholson 1991). They offer no particularly new insights, insisting rather on the by now familiar charge that Chodorow ignores historical and cultural specificities. This seems to me, to say the least, the result of a narrow reading, as of course it is clear enough that her analysis lies within the frame of the nuclear family in a patriarchal social structure and as such it should be kept within the limits of patriarchal societies. To say, as Marion Iris Young did in her contribution to the volume *Mothering* (Trebilcot 1983: 138), that her theory aspires to offer an explanation of male domination in *all* societies (emphasis mine) that have hitherto existed, is simply a wilful exaggeration. On the other hand, Elizabeth Abel in her article "Race, Class and Psychoanalysis? Opening Questions" (Hirsch and Keller 1990: 184-204) explicitly demonstrates the applicability of object relations psychoanalysis to social configurations other than the middle-class white American nuclear family structure, referring to recent explorations of multiple mothering in extended African-American families, for example. And she quotes Jane Flax's assertion that "object relations theory is more compatible with postmodernism than Freudian or Lacanian analysis because it does not require a fixed essentialist view of 'human nature'."

Nicholson and Frazer's unqualified statement that the analysis of mothering developed by Chodorow "explains the internal, psychological dynamics which have led many women *willingly* (emphasis mine) to reproduce social divisions associated with female inferiority" (Nicholson 1991: 29) disregards the latter's account of girls' difficulties in establishing the feminine identity which will partly lead them to such reproduction. In "Feminism and Difference: Gender, Relation, and Difference in Psychoanalytic Perspective," Chodorow (1980: 14) explicitly mentioned the conflicts met by girls from "identification with a negatively valued gender category and with an ambivalent maternal figure, whose mothering and femininity are accessible but devalued, and often conflictual for the mother herself." "Such conflicts," she stressed, "are conflicts of power and cultural and social value" and "arise later in development," precisely due to their social and political grounds. For her part, in "Mother-Daughter Relationships: Psychodynamics, Politics, and Philosophy," Jane Flax (1980: 23) emphasized the problematic nature of the dynamics of identification with and differentiation from the mother, arguing that it was a far more central problematic in female development than Chodorow allowed, and that it might threaten and even obstruct a healthy development of women's core identity.

The debate dispels the charges brought against object relations analysis, and specifically against Chodorow, of ignoring concrete relations of domination and male power out of gender differences. It is indeed true that there is no one ultimate cause that would provide a satisfactory answer to a phenomenon of such transhistorical and crosscultural dimensions as female social oppression, and that the workings of ideology are extremely complex and permeate the whole social texture, but it is just as true that no other *institution* in patriarchal societies has been as ideologically laden as that of mothering. And I have deliberately chosen the word "institution" to emphasize its constructed nature, in the line of Adrienne Rich's differentiation between motherhood as female experience and as male construct (Rich 1976).

In this light, two aspects of the question should be underlined. First, the profoundly contradictory elements that integrate the concept of mothering. No human activity has been as sanctified, idealized and sentimentalized as motherhood while at the same time and with identical consistency it was being socially devalued. Second, the glaring fact of the collusion of mothering with the perpetuation of patriarchy. It is difficult not to agree to the evidence that women have been historically required to make children conform to gender roles according to biological sex, as well as expected to transmit the values of the dominant culture which with few exceptions, and most of them belonging to the misty realm of lost mythologies, has been consistently patriarchal.

It is important, then, to give careful consideration to the roots of this phenomenon, allowing for the fact that there is no one unique explanation to it and that its manifestations, though as multiple and diverse as the cultural multifariousness of the social groups in which it takes place, share, as Gayle Rubin has put it, a "monotonous similarity" (Rubin 1975: 60).

The theory of Chodorow and other feminist object-relations psychoanalysts offers a breakthrough in the rigid truly universalist and transhistorical Freudian and Lacanian theories of the constitution of human subjectivity, stressing the relational ego rather than the instincts and autonomous ego. The fact that her analysis is grounded on social and political practices opens it to social change. That this change might be difficult is undeniable, but at least it offers hopeful possibilities.

Chodorow argues that the process of childcare done by mothers produces daughters that in their turn wish to be mothers. Girls tend to grow up with a sense of oneness and identification with their mothers which provides them with a relational connection with the world. They emerge from this childhood

relationship with their mothers with a capacity for empathy and relationship built into their self definition in a way that boys do not. However, because of this same sense of identification which will make the girl's preoedipal period longer than that of the boy, if on the one hand the daughter will feel alike her mother in fundamental ways, on the other, conflicts are likely to come up later. Firstly, she may suffer a boundary confusion and a lack of adequate sense of separateness which can result in lack of autonomy and self-confidence. Secondly, the identification takes place in a socially constructed, heavily value-laden context, which means that "a girl identifies with her mother in their common feminine inferiority" (Chodorow 1978: 113).

This process also tends to produce men who, due to the primacy of the mother in early life and the simultaneous distance of the father, must learn their gender identity as being not-female, or not-mother. Consequently they will come to emphasize difference not commonalities between themselves and women, and eventually to deny those feelings in themselves they experience as feminine such as emotions or connectedness. Their sense of masculinity is thus constructed largely in negative terms in respect of the mother while, because of the absence or distance of the father as well as because of the social organization and ideology of male dominance, —he is representative of society and of culture itself— masculinity is "idealized or accorded superiority and, thereby becomes even more desirable" (1978: 181). In this way the system of interpersonal relationships which underlie the family structure is produced and reproduced. "Thus patriarchy reproduces itself" —argues Jane Flax (1988: 37)— "reinforced by "the fruits of civilization" —the knowledge and the political and economic systems which reflect and reinforce the splits between nurturance and autonomy, public and private, male and female." The way out, according to Chodorow, would be equal parenting (as distinguished from childbearing) by the father and the mother. In this way, children could establish an individuated sense of self in relation to both genders.

As the core of criticism Chodorow has received is laid against the fact that her evidence is drawn from clinical cases and that the sample used is reduced to present-day middle-class white American women I wish to offer a reading of Maxine Hong Kingston's *The Woman Warrior: Memoirs of a Girlhood among Ghosts* (1981), a novel that deals with a girl's search for personal identity out of the struggle of identification with and separation from the mother. The book was published in 1976, two years before Chodorow's *The Reproduction of Mothering*. Its author is American born of Chinese origin, her parents both born in China. And though gender, ethnicity

and class play their effects on one another in the dialectics between mother and child and the parallel process of constitution of the girl's subjectivity, it is the gender question, very particularly in the mother axis, that looms the largest along the process.

Kingston makes use of Chinese legend and tradition and of autobiographical material, and as such has been perceptively studied by Sidonie Smith, who writes:

For Kingston, then, as for the woman autobiographer generally, the hermeneutics of self-representation can never be divorced from cultural representations of woman that delimit the nature of her access to the world and the articulation of her own desire. Nor can interpretation be divorced from her orientation toward the mother, who, as her point of origin, commands the tenuous negotiation of identity and difference in a drama of filiality that reaches through the daughter's subjectivity to her textual self-authoring. (1987: 156)

The fact that Kingston used autobiographical matter, more reputedly "real" than the stuff of fiction, arose a heated controversy over the book among Chinese American critics, male of course, worried by the "misrepresentation" of Chinese culture and men as sexist (King-Kok Cheung 1990: 238). A case very similar, by the way, to the charge so often brought against African-American women writers by their male counterparts.

The novel indeed makes an interesting case of *microhistory* underlining the parallel narrative constructed nature of historical and fictional discourses and their equal authority for telling the truth. At the same time, and equally interestingly, the text shows the power of story-telling, an activity traditionally carried out by mothers and mother-figures, in shaping gender and social behaviour. "Whenever she had to warn us about life, my mother told stories that ran like this one, a story to grow up on" (*WW* 13), the narrator comments as she in turn tells us, through her remaking of her mother's stories, the story of how she became her own self, separate from her mother, and she herself also a "story-talker," that is, a novelist.

The novel is structured along five narratives, encompassing a large time span, vast geographic and cultural distances, and widely different literary genres. History, biography, autobiography, legend and myth mix, underlining the subjective construction of reality and the interplay of the social and the symbolic upon the constitution of human identity.

The first narrative, "No Name Woman," is the biographical story of a "no name" aunt, thus called because of her banishment from history and family memory as punishment for her sexual transgression of the patriarchal code. The narrative sets the tone of the dialectics between the mother and her daughter, who is the narrator. The former appears in the role of transmitter of the patriarchal order and, as such, as guardian of her daughter's sexual activity in order to ensure that the descent line will be faithfully kept. The mother, anchored in the traditions of the old culture, warns her daughter of the dangers of transgression by setting the example of her aunt's tragic destiny, not just dead in her prime, but her ghost forever restlessly wandering, condemned to family oblivion. The moral is explicit: "Now that you have started to menstruate, what happened to her could happen to you. Don't humiliate us. You wouldn't like to be forgotten as if you had never been born. The villagers are watchful" (WW 13). Traditional patriarchal elements in a peasant culture gather in the narrative: the economic basis of the family, in which sons are more highly valued because they ensure that parents will be fed in their turn in their old age; women and marriage used as a tie to the land, to ensure that the men forced to migrate will come back; social watching over individual behaviour which shows the connection between family ties and social structure to their mutual benefit.

The narrator's retelling of the story turns biography into autobiography by using the material as personal resistance against identification with her mother's values. In opposition to the mother's bare facts, she tries to provide her aunt with a full story, searching for alternative plots and testing their plausibility against the background of the peasant patriarchal society in which "to be a woman, to have a daughter in starvation time was a waste enough" (WW 14). She imagines her alternately as a helpless victim of rape and as a transgressive woman affected by the same "urge West" that had impelled her brothers to break away with traditional ways with impunity in foreign lands. The narrator's act of defiance, though, is laden with conflicting ambivalence. Only after many years is she able to break the pact of silence exacted by her mother, and by so doing, to break her own complicity with patriarchy. But her transgression is ridden with the fear fuelled by her mother's stories. Her aunt's ghost haunts her as, according to Chinese legend, drowned ghosts wait silently to pull down a substitute.

The second narrative tells another story told by the mother, the legend of Fa Mu Lan, a swordswoman, this time a positive female model impressed on the child's early memory while following the mother about in the house. The narrative voice interestingly differs from the previous one. There is no

distance set this time from the mother's tale nor from its morals. Rather, connectedness is emphasized with the flow of the mother's voice merging into the child's dreams: "I couldn't tell where the stories left off and the dreams began, her voice the voice of the heroines in my sleep" (*WW* 25). The mood suggests a fluidity, a sense of oneness and indifferentiation which recalls the seamless preoedipal bliss. Actually the content of the story was forgotten with the loss of that most irretrievable unity whose nature not even oppositions as irreconcilable as that between growing up a wife and [hence] slave and becoming a warrior woman could fissure. Only after "growing up" is the narrator, now a mature woman, able to discern the power of the maternal presence and voice infused into her innermost being by means of their joined chanting the feats of Fa Mu Lan, the woman warrior.

The swordswomen, powerful and invincible, were the alternative provided by myth to women's only path in real life, that of wives and slaves, both concepts interlocked in the Chinese word for the female 女. The legend of the swordswomen shares a certain similarity to the myth of the Amazons. The child reflects that women must once have been very dangerous, which connects with the similar fear of women at the source of the active antagonism to female desire, social power and language manifest in the founding texts of Western culture (see, f.i., Highwater 1990).

The narrative reproduces the conflicting ambivalence of the mother's role within patriarchy. She tells her little daughter she will grow to be but a wife and a slave, and simultaneously she shows her the way out in myth thus creating in the child deeply confusing expectations. The legend of Fa Mu Lan is itself full of ambivalence. The heroine's deeds and victories, for which she had to undergo years of hard training, are carried on out of filial duty. She takes her father's place in battle after he has inscribed in her back, cut deep in the flesh, the oaths and names she has to revenge in his name. Under a man's armour she leads a man's life in man's heroic style. She hides her pregnancy and when the fight is over, having reestablished justice and order, she goes back home and kneels at her parents-in-law's feet telling them she will stay with them, doing farmwork and housework, and giving them more sons (*WW*, 47). "The villagers would make a legend of my perfect filiality" are Fa Mu Lan's last words.

What lurks under the story of heroic deeds and personal achievement is the heroine's wish to be a son. She delights in the love shown by her parents on her arrival as woman warrior to release them and which is symbolized in their killing a chicken and steaming it whole as when welcoming a son. Being a *female avenger* means really to step out of the hated female identity

inscribed in the sayings labeled to girls—"girls are maggots in the rice," "it is more profitable to raise geese than daughters"—which so effectively excluded them not just from individual achievement or any pleasurable prospect, but even from family affection, due to their lack of value.

The mother's story is pregnant with contradictory feelings and values, glaringly revealed in the failure of the daughter's naive efforts to model her behaviour in real life on Fa Mu Lan's androcentric paradigm. The child perceives that, as daughter, she is utterly valueless. She fears that when they go back to China she will be sold unless she does "something big and fine" (*WW* 47), and feeling that the only possibility of growing in worth lies in being a son she adopts the masculine code of achievement—straight As at school—and of behaviour—refusal of female domestic tasks—to receive in reward scolding instead of approval.

The third narrative has the mother as protagonist, not only as "story talker." It is a biographical report of her own life back in China, a tale of courage and intellectual and professional accomplishments. There are elements that suggest a connection with the legend of Fa Mu Lan, such as the heroine's daring and boldness, her victory over a ghostly monster that terrorizes the medical college from which she eventually graduates as a doctor, her keeping her maiden name, Brave Orchid, against the general usage, or her freedom from husband and family. All of them belong to Chinese time and place, the land of stories, the mother's another bright legend of female worth. Interestingly, her legend also shares Fa Mu Lan's end in dutiful domesticity. The mother's life in America, the only reality accessible to the daughter, starts where Fa Mu Lan's story ends, with the return to husband and family life, once her husband who had migrated years before, calls back for her.

The American life entails for the mother a diminished social status as a laundry worker and farm labourer that undermines in her child's eyes the splendour of youthful triumphs. The girl has no objective standard against which her mother's "talk-story" can be tested. She cannot make a clear difference between history and stories, both narratives mixing, and both alluring and terrifying in their mixture of exotic achievement and lurking menace. Embedded both in the text of the mythical woman warrior and of her own mother wavers an underwritten story of worthless innocent girls and women whose sad fate haunts yet again the daughter's imagination. The selling of girls, a practice to which her mother had contributed by having bought one herself, or the offhand comment about girls given for free in hard times, or killed at birth, which her mother let slip was so easy, just a matter of

turning their little faces to clean ashes (*WW* 82), an affair carried on by the midwife, her mother's profession in China, or by a relative, have a profoundly disturbing effect on the daughter's mind. The fears are further reinforced and given a measure of actuality by the girl's own masculine relatives and the Chinatown immigrants who reduplicate the ancestral social representation of female lack of value in their popular sayings in which maggots and girls are synonyms, in theatrical performances in which daughters in law are customarily beaten up to the audience's uproarious laughter, or in the rejoicing in the birth of sons while mourning or offering make-believe comfort in the case of daughters.

In the fourth narrative, we are again given a biographical story which counteracts the opening text, the story of the suicidal No Name Aunt. The protagonist is Moon Orchid, another aunt, this time on the mother's side, and one of the many wives that waited patiently and faithfully in China for their husbands to call them back from America. The husband has become a successful doctor in San Francisco where he has a second wife, much younger and better accomplished than the first one, and never asks her back. By implicitly setting her story against that of the No Name Aunt, the narrative sadly mocks the reward to female faithfulness ironically exposing the painful outcome of the illusory nature of female rights and authority, even within the domestic sphere, which is her supposedly allotted domain. Confronted with a reality that shatters the expectations nourished through a whole life, Moon Orchid takes refuge in madness, that all too familiar female strategy against a reality too painful to endure, and dies in a mental asylum.

Kingston's mother appears now to the narrator/daughter as a pathetic fabricator of destructive fantasies of power, as it is she who has arranged for her sister's coming and who has encouraged her hopes with stories of empresses and of wives' rights within the family. The power the mother had over the child in the emotional realm is now not just undermined by the unwritten scraps in the fissures of the main text, but contradicted at every step by her social powerlessness and her compliance with the father's law. The conflicting process of the girl's identification with and individuation from the mother takes place against this pattern of story-telling in which the mother plays a prevailing role either as story-teller, protagonist or significant actant.

In her analysis of the novel, from the autobiographical viewpoint, Sidonie Smith (1987: 168) suggests that the mother "passes on a tale of female castration, a rite of passage analogous to a clitoridectomy, that wounding of the female body in service to the community, performed and

thereby perpetuated by the mother." In the text, the rite of passage may well be symbolized in the cutting of the daughter's tongue, slicing the fraenum. The child does not actually remember her mother doing it, only her telling her about it which sounds to her as ambivalent as her other stories. The girl is alternately proud and terrified at what she considers "a powerful act" (*WW* 148) but she is haunted by the real motives suggested in the misogynous Chinese sayings. For the first time in the novel the daughter overtly wonders whether her mother had lied to her. Her cracked voice adds misery to the immigrant's diffidence, to that uncertainty at what has to be silenced, suffered by misplaced people in a foreign culture with no clear signposts. Eventually the confusion between secrecy and "talk-story," the anxiety about her female status and the future awaiting her as such, sold as a slave or its equivalent, namely married off to the first available prospect, together with the frightening alliance she perceives between women and madness, and madness and silence, breaks up in a neurotic storm of impotence and rage. In her essay "Mother-Daughter Relationships," Jane Flax (1980: 35) suggests that one of the main ways women deal with anger is by repressing it and then turning it against themselves. The girl, driven by nightmares of guilt and fear, first contracts a mysterious illness and then makes herself "unsellable" through the adoption of affected physical disabilities and feigned dumbness.

The fact that mothers see daughters as an extension of themselves, as Chodorow argued, does not mean that they are able to provide them with a satisfactory nurturing experience, trapped as they may be, in their turn, in their own conflicting world of values and gender identity. In fact, as Jane Flax stresses,

the caretaker brings to the relationship... the whole range of social experience —work, friends, interaction with political and economic institutions, and so on. [Thus] the seemingly abstract and supranational relations of class, race and male dominance enter into the construction of 'individual' human development. (In Abel 1990: 185)

In *The Woman Warrior* the mother frequently mentions her falling down in status in America, not realizing that the economic conditions are of small significance compared with her contradictory sense of female and thus self value which she has driven into her daughter's subjectivity. While it is true that ethnic and cultural factors, such as the serious difficulty of mutual decoding of social signs, play an important part in the linguistic

misunderstanding between mother and child, it is the expectations of individual and social worth the mother raises through her "talking-story," altogether contradicted by her daily encouraging her daughter into patterns of self-esteem and behaviour utterly debasing and defined by men, that account for the girl's anxiety. "Throughout childhood —the narrator recalls— my younger sister said, 'When I grow up, I want to be a slave', and my parents laughed, encouraging her" (WW 78).

In her critical commentary on Chodorow's theory of mothering, Marion Iris Young (1983: 138) accused her of "ignoring the power of the father in accounting for gender personality," arguing that in her account, the father was "primarily an absence, not a power." Actually, what Chodorow deplored was precisely this absence of the father which left the whole of the responsibility for childcare in the mother's hands with its conflictive consequences, to which he contributed by providing an idealized father image which was effectively associated with the outward sphere of public and social prestige. This fact, she argued, may lead a girl to idealize her father and men or, conversely, to endow them with sadistic or punitive characteristics. *The Woman Warrior* is a "mother-daughter" story. It covers the preoedipal period of blissful symbiotic relationship with, and the difficult oedipal differentiation from, the mother. The father is only a presence dimly felt in the background. In *China Men* (1981b), Kingston's following novel and a companion volume to the former, it is the men's story that is narrated and consequently the father's role is explored. What is relevant to our study is the fact of his absence from the family and his distance from the children. The novel opens with memories of childhood in which first the father is mistaken by his own children who run to a stranger and greet him noisily as their *BaBa* until they are convinced that he is not their father. The anecdote is narrated in the first person, by the daughter, and whether it tells an actual or a fictional event it is equally significant. Later he is recalled as either muttering obscenities against women and particularly against his wife, the narrator's mother, or as imposing with his presence an unbearable silence which made the children feel punished and invisible. The father's inaccessibility and his way of behaving communicate to the child value-laden views about gender. "What I want from you is for you to tell me that those curses are only common Chinese sayings" —is the painful plea of the narrator, the now adult daughter— "That you did not mean to make me sicken at being female. 'Those were only sayings' I didn't mean you or your mother. I didn't mean your sisters or grandmothers or women in general!" (*China Men* 18)

What we have here is Chodorow's picture of the man that dominates and denigrates woman. In her article "The Woman Warrior versus The Chinaman Pacific: Must a Chinese American Critic Choose between Feminism and Heroism?" King-Kok Cheung suggested the correlation between "these men's umbrage at racism and their misogynist behaviour" (1990: 240). One can indeed accept the point and still wonder if it was a similar case of racism that accounted for the similar treatment women got back in China. There is always the irritant familiar acceptance of the fact that men will vent their frustrations, whatever their origins, on their weaker dependents, namely their children and wives without much questioning the cause of the latter's weakness and dependence.

In *The Woman Warrior* when the legendary heroine Fa Mu Lan had freed the village from the baron's tyranny she came upon a group of women locked in a room who could not escape on their little bound feet. "They blinked weakly at me like pheasants that have been raised in the dark for soft meat . . . These women would not be good for anything" (WW 46) is the cool remark the mother's mouthpiece is made to say before they are released and left to their luck on the road where "they wandered away like ghosts." Later they are reported to have turned into a band of swords women, female avengers, but the same narrator's voice disengages itself from the possibility of their actual existence, thus keeping them in the remote realm of legend. The brief anecdote shows how women are first weakened and rendered useless, and then dismissed as such. It shows too, sadly enough, the double-voiced maternal discourse and the mother's ambiguous stance in the patriarchal structure.

Chodorow's account of the mother-daughter story shows that it is problematic, full of tensions and strain, but that it has a predictable ending: the reproduction of the family as it is constituted in male-dominant societies. *The Woman Warrior*, a cross-cultural instance of the process, ends with the mother, now old, and the daughter, now adult, finally reconciled in the telling of a story. The mother provided the beginning and the daughter the end. But after all the strife and strain on gender issues, the daughter's ending disappointingly reproduces the fate of women in the hands of men. The story is a poetic tale of violence and abduction that ends happily with conciliatory marriage in the name of the father. It recounts the life of a poetess born in the year 175 AD who was captured by a barbarian, was kept prisoner, and bore him two children. Her songs full of sadness and anger soared high in the nights to the tune of the barbarians' reed pipes. After twelve years she was ransomed, returned to her native land and married within her kin "so that her

father would have Han descendants" (*WW* 186). She brought her songs back with her and eventually one was sung to Chinese instruments and thus remained alive until today. The last words of the story are "It translated well." The words are temptingly appropriate to end a paper on the transcultural, transhistorical role of women within patriarchy. It is a familiar story, evoking realities crossculturally easy to translate.

But this ending would be a lie to the possibilities of change enacted in the act of writing. In *Persuasion*, published in 1818, Jane Austen made her heroine Anne Elliot say: "Men have had every advantage of us in telling their own story...the pen has been in their hands" (1977: 237). Today the situation is quite other. Women hold the pen firmly and tell their own stories. And by telling and listening to them they are able to expose and resist imposed gendered role identities. That is what Maxine Hong Kingston in fact does. The narrator and protagonist of her novel, now a writer, tells her story, a meaningful one for large numbers of women as it so beautifully and perceptively deals with a crucial female predicament. In a sense, by recounting it, she helps the *id* to become *ego*, as Freud would put it. In *The Woman Warrior*, on the other hand, she explicitly presses the point. After learning the sad ending of Moon Orchid's story, the girls decided that they would never let men be unfaithful to them and, naively but shrewdly, "made up their minds to major in science or mathematics" (*WW* 144). Of course access to the public sphere, formerly the father's domain, has proved a first and important step, though by no means a definite one, as the lives of the women who have entered it are strewn with specific gender difficulties that add to the inevitable *thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to*. It is true that consideration of an equal share of childrearing activity with all the social changes it implies still borders on utopia, but history, legend and myth are full of stories that tell us of the power of utopia in altering the course of human lives. a

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**-FOREIGN LANGUAGE PERFORMANCE
AND LEARNERS' INTUITIONS ABOUT
VERBAL INTERACTION¹**

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1. INTRODUCTION

FOREIGN language performance has been traditionally assessed from the point of view of the subject's capacity to manipulate the linguistic code in a way as similar as possible to native speakers of the language. This may be the result of the fact that foreign language tests are in themselves an exercise of decontextualization, where the learner is not placed in the actual circumstance of use but rather forced to imagine it. Because of the gap existing between "imagined performance" and "actual performance", the examiner is often faced with no other choice but to restrict his/her assessment to the structural component of communication, leaving aside all the other factors that contribute to the success or failure of a communicative event.

One of the aspects where the gap between "imagined performance" and "actual performance" becomes most obvious is the assessment of oral abilities, which in some international standardized tests consists of an interview between examiner and examinee. The test in this case takes the form of a specific speech event involving two participants, one with the status of expert and another with the status of non-expert, each with his/her own expectations about what is appropriate behaviour in that context.

Furthermore, this speech event is expected to develop according to the cultural norms of the expert participant. Since the assessment is done from a holistic point of view at the end of the interview it seems logical to think that what is at stake is not only the structural characteristics of the subject's output but also his/her enactment of the role that he/she has been assigned in the interview. It is at this point where the examinee's definition of the encounter as well as his/her notion of the role that language plays in it becomes very crucial.

In spite of the relevance of the oral interview for the final assessment of the learner's abilities to communicate in a foreign language there has been little reflection upon its status in the respective cultures of the examiner and examinee. In the first place, an oral interview is an intercultural encounter which may be approached differently by its participants depending on their cultural assumptions. In the second place, we are dealing with a "gatekeeping" encounter in which one of the participants has been given the authority to make decisions on behalf of institutions that will affect the other participant's possibilities of social, economic and geographical mobility (Erickson 1976). It has been shown (Scollon and Scollon 1981, Gumperz et al. 1979) that the greater the number of culturally-based assumptions shared between gatekeeper and applicant the more positive the outcome of the encounter. The problem in the case of a foreign language oral interview is that explicit teaching of cultural assumptions and how they affect verbal interaction rarely form part of foreign language training, and that in many cases the examinee approaches the interview situation with a set of cultural assumptions different from those of the examiner.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship existing between the oral performance of a subject in a "gatekeeping" encounter such as an office appointment with a teacher and his/her definition of the situation and of the role that language plays in it. The experiment proposed touches upon two very important areas of linguistic research which have been little studied from the point of view of foreign language training. The first one is the ethnography of speaking, with its interest in studying situated oral performance, what is accomplished through it and how it relates to the speakers' assumptions, knowledge and beliefs about the world (Duranti 1988). The second area of linguistic research involved in the experiment is represented by the psychological and computational approaches to describing discourse understanding by means of structures of knowledge-of-the-world which have been defined as frames, scripts, scenarios or schemata (Brown and Yule 1983).

2. METHOD

The experiment involved 9 Catalan university students majoring in English, which were selected on the basis of the score they obtained in the TOEFL test. This is a test of English as a foreign language which is required of any non-native speaker of English intending to study for a degree in an American university. It consists of three parts: listening comprehension, reading comprehension and structure of English. The maximum score is 677, but most universities consider 550 as an acceptable score to follow a course of studies. All the subjects which took part in the experiment scored between 560 and 590.

The object of this first part of the experiment was to eliminate one potential variable which might affect oral performance: linguistic competence. In this way all the subjects were considered to have the same level of proficiency in manipulating the linguistic code in the decontextualized situation of the test.

Another variable that was eliminated was that of the sex of the subjects. It has been shown (Lakoff 1975) that women and men employ differently the linguistic resources of a language and that, in general, women's discourse shows more features of "powerless" language than that of men (O'Barr and Atkins 1980). It was for this reason that all the subjects selected for the experiment were women.

The second part of the experiment involved a role-play session in which the subjects were asked to visit separately one of their teachers during office hours. This is a task which was found quite realistic and therefore one with which the students would have no problems in defining the appropriate behaviour. The role-play sessions were always conducted with the same male teacher. The students were given the task of asking the teacher to change the date of an examination because for some reason of their choosing they could not sit for it on the previously scheduled day. All the subjects knew the teacher because they were either taking a course with him or they had taken it

during the previous academic year. The task was given to them five minutes before the role-play session was to take place. The reason for this was to avoid the possibility of the subjects coming to the session with their role rehearsed and, thereby, disguising a more "natural" performance. They were told that the whole encounter was being recorded and that it would be later transcribed. The average length of each encounter was 5 minutes.

The third and last part consisted of a third session in which the subjects were made to listen to a tape-recording and a transcription of the verbal interaction in which they had taken part. After this, they went through an ethnographic interview with the analyst which lasted between 15 and 30 minutes. This interview developed around the following questions:

1. What do you think of the conversation?
2. How would you define your relationship with the teacher?
3. In general, how do you feel when you go to visit a teacher during his office hours?
4. What do you think of the fact that teachers have certain office hours to help the students on an individual basis?
5. What is your opinion about the relationship between a teacher and a student?
6. How would you define your attitude and that of your teacher during the verbal interaction?
7. What was your objective during the interview? Did you think you would be able to attain your objective?
8. Do you think that it would have been very different if you had been able to talk in your native language?
9. Do you think the outcome would have been better?
10. Would you have added or taken out something?

Questions 1 to 6 were intended to force the student to reflect upon the social situation and the social roles that were being negotiated in it. Question 6 to 10 required the student to consider the role that language played in that situation as a means of negotiation of both the social/institutional roles of each participant and the specific goal of the encounter.

3. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

The analysis of the data is centered around 6 different strategies the subjects adopted in order to carry out the task they were assigned. The concept of "strategy" must be understood here from a functional point of view, i.e. as the speaker's systematic use of linguistic and general socio-cultural knowledge to achieve his/her intended goals in producing a message in a given context (Gumperz 1982).

The analysis will point out in the first place those strategies which are favoured by specific individuals and those which are rejected as effective means to accomplish their objective. In the second place it will be necessary to discover if there is any relationship between the subjects' choice of certain strategies and their response to the ethnographic interview.

The strategies which have been selected as analytical variables are the following:

1. Topic presentation: The object of analysis here is the way in which the subject states the purpose of the verbal encounter. Essentially, what we are after here is whether the issue is presented as a source of conflict or not.

2. Confrontation: In the verbal interaction studied, this strategy can be applied in two different ways: (i) a challenge or disagreement with the teacher's view of the problem, and (ii) a rejection of a suggestion by the teacher which does not conform with the original plans of the student.

3. Acknowledgement of responsibility: What we need to consider in this case is whether and to what extent the students acknowledge their responsibility in the appearance of a conflict between the teacher and themselves. The student has three different possibilities: (i) an explicit recognition of the problem, (ii) an expression of agreement with the teacher's view on the issue or (iii) a renunciation to pursue her original objective.

4. Conflict solution: The analysis of this variable consists of discovering whether the student finds it appropriate or necessary to propose a solution for the conflict and also whether this proposal is self-initiated or requested by the teacher.

5. Emotive function: This strategy involves, on the one hand, the expression of emotions or inner states of the student and, on the other hand, the action of appealing to the personal feelings of the teacher on the issue.

6. Justification: The interest of this variable is the degree to which the students deem it necessary to supply a series of details justifying their not being able to sit for the exam on the day it had been originally fixed. It is also interesting to consider whether this is a strategy that the students initiate on their own or is triggered by the request of the teacher.

It is necessary to bear in mind that each of these strategies cannot be studied separately for each individual, and that in order to obtain a thorough picture of the subject's verbal performance we must set them in relation to one another. Therefore, the comments about the student's preference for one strategy or another require the analyst to keep an eye constantly on the whole verbal encounter, not only on the rest of the strategies applied but also on the general taciturnity or volubility of the speaker.

For the analysis of the encounter I will concentrate on three aspects of the student's definition of the encounter that appeared in the course of the ethnographic interview: (i) the goal of the encounter, (ii) the relationship student-professor and (iii) the language used.

Attainable/unattainable goal:

The nine students who participated in the experiment can be divided into two groups in terms of their view of the goal as attainable or not. A first group includes the four students who clearly responded that their objective was attainable (S2, S4, S5, S8). The second group involves the two students who clearly described their objective as unattainable (S3, S6). Finally, in a third group we could classify the three students who adopted an ambiguous attitude in their response (S1, S7, S9): one of them stated that she found the objective in itself difficult to achieve but that she thought that the teacher could be convinced and the other two students considered their objective as attainable but expected a conflicting reaction from the teacher.

a) Topic presentation: Of the four students who considered that their objective was attainable, three omitted the preface expression "I have a problem" and went straight to the point by announcing that they would not be able to sit for the examination on the day it had been fixed. There is one exception in this group, a student (S5) who answered that she thought her goal attainable but nevertheless included the preface mentioned above. The explanation for this, after examining the whole of the encounter, is that the same lack of familiarity with the teacher (seen, for example, in the absence of inner feelings or emotions in her speech) is what made the student introduce the topic with a preface indicating caution. The two subjects who responded in the interview that they thought that their objective of making the teacher postpone the examination was unattainable introduced the preface

expressions "I have a problem". In the group of students showing an ambiguous attitude towards their goal, two students (S7, S9) introduced the preface and one did not.

In general we can say that the view of the goal as attainable promotes a greater degree of directness in the presentation of the goal at the beginning of the encounter.

b) Confrontation: Of the four students who clearly described their goal as attainable, three of them (S1, S2, S8) challenged the negative response of the teacher in rather direct ways (e.g. "why/why not?"). Furthermore, all of them introduced more than one disagreement. The two students who defined their objective as unattainable confronted the teacher on only one occasion and in both cases they introduced their disagreements preceded by softening devices (e.g. "yes but", "well"). The three students with an ambiguous attitude towards their goal show a slightly stronger tendency to confront the teacher than the latter group: one student (S1) confronted the teacher on only one occasion but she did it very directly ("why?" [do you need to change the whole exam in order to give me a special examination?]); the other two students (S7, S9) confronted the teacher once and twice respectively and in both cases their disagreements were introduced by means of softening devices.

The conclusion in this case is that confrontation increases in the case of those students who thought that their goal was attainable.

c) Acknowledgement of responsibility: None of the four students who saw their goal as attainable seems to be clearly giving in in her attempt to convince the teacher accepting the teacher's proposal. One of these students (S5) does not acknowledge her responsibility at any stage in the conversation and another (S8) only acknowledges it once. The high number of acknowledgements of responsibility that we find in the other two students that thought their objective attainable (S2: 4 and S4: 10) can be explained by looking at the nature of the turns in the first case: the student never shows a clear disposition to accept the teacher's negative response to her objective (e.g. "if you say/think so"). In the case of S4, the extremely high number of acknowledgements of responsibility is in itself a clear indication of the lack of "sincerity" with which they were uttered. In fact, the student recognized in the interview that this is a "strategy" that she uses very often and that it produces very good results. Of the two students who defined their goal as unattainable, one (S3) accepted the alternative proposed by the teacher and

the other (S6) does not introduce any expression acknowledging her responsibility for the conflict. In the group of students whose view of the goal was ambiguous, two (S1, S9) accepted the alternative proposed by the teacher and the other (S7) expressed her responsibility on two occasions.

In sum, we could say that the students who saw their goal as attainable are much stronger "negotiators." The more intense negotiation is precisely what explains the fact that these students need to introduce more expressions of "acknowledgement of responsibility" in order to save face. The only cases in which the teacher's view is accepted are students who either saw their goal as unattainable (S3) or were ambiguous about it (S1, S9).

d) Conflict solution: The four students who defined their goal as attainable coincided in self-initiating one or more possible solutions for the conflict originated by their inability to attend the examination on a specific day. Neither of the two students who thought that their goal was difficult to fulfill proposed a solution for the conflict. In the third group of students, whose position was ambiguous, one (S1) proposed a solution on three occasions and the other two only once.

In general there is a higher tendency to introduce a solution for the conflict created on the part of those students who saw that their goal was attainable.

Relationship teacher-student:

There were six students who defined their relationship with the teacher as one of familiarity (S2, S4, S6, S7, S8, S9), although three of those (S6, S7, S9) did not acknowledge it fully. The other three students (S1, S3, S5) recognized that there was some social distance between themselves and the teacher.

a) Emotive function: The most noticeable phenomenon in this area is the higher number of utterances invested in the expression of emotive function by those students who defined their relationship with the teacher as one of familiarity (S2: 12, S4: 8, S8: 2) compared with those who pointed out the social distance existing between themselves and the teacher (S1: 0, S3: 1, S5: 0). In between these two opposed poles we find three students (S6, S7, S9)

whose familiarity with the teacher is not fully acknowledged, even though they accept that their relationship with him is closer than with other teachers. These students devote only 1 utterance to expressing emotion.

The conclusion we can reach is that the presence of the emotive function increases if the subjects perceive a short social distance between them.

b) Confrontation: Those subjects who expressed more clearly their familiarity with the teacher confronted him on more than one occasion (S2: 10, S4: 2, S8: 3). However, one of the students who defined her relationship with the teacher as lacking in familiarity (S5) confronted the teacher on five occasions. The other two students who showed themselves as only slightly familiar with the teacher (S1, S3) confronted him only once. Of the three students (S6, S7, S9) who did not fully acknowledge their familiarity with the teacher, only one (S9) confronted him twice.

In general we could say that a close social distance seems to increase the possibilities of confrontation between the teacher and the student.

Language used:

When commenting about the difference using English or Catalan would have made in the students' behaviour during the encounter, three of them (S2, S4, S8) pointed out that their attitude would have been the same if they had been able to express themselves in Catalan. The other 6 students considered that the fact of using the English language as a means of expression was an obstacle for the full expression of their personality.

a) Emotive function: The three students for whom the fact of using English or Catalan did not make a difference (S2, S4, S8) included in their speech more than one utterance referring to their emotions. The presence of this strategy becomes specially relevant in S2 and S4 with 12 and 8 utterances respectively. On the other hand, those students for whom using English was not the same as using Catalan either do not express their emotions at all (S1, S5) or introduce only one utterance related to this meaning (S3, S6, S7, S9).

We can conclude here saying that the lack of comfort in using a language in a specific situation seems to preclude the presence of expressions related to the emotions or inner states of the individual.

b) Confrontation: The highest number of confrontations with the teacher appears in the speech of those students who thought that their attitude would not have changed if they had used Catalan instead of English (S2: 10, S4: 2, S8: 3). The four students who thought that using English was a problem (S1, S3, S6, S7) confronted the teacher only on one occasion and another student (S9) did it on two occasions. It is important to point out that, except in the case of S1, the confrontation from these five students is not as direct as that from the previous group. The exception in this tendency is S5, who, in spite of seeing English as an obstacle to her full expression, confronted the teacher on five occasions.

Again, in this case, we see that confrontation increases with the students' comfort in using the target language.

Taciturnity and volubility:

One indication of the taciturnity or volubility of the students is the number of justification details that they included as part of the self-initiated justification that they gave for their inability to attend the examination. It is interesting to see how those students who supplied more justification details (S1: 7, S2: 6, S4: 13) are the ones who apply the strategies of "acknowledging responsibility" and "self-initiated conflict solution" more frequently. Furthermore, in the case of S2 and S4 we also find the highest number of utterances with "emotive function." At the other extreme, we have students like S5 and S6 who either didn't apply at all the strategies of "acknowledging responsibility," "self-initiated conflict solution" and "emotive function" or they introduced them only once in their speech.

4. DISCUSSION

The present study has shown that linguistic competence as it is usually assessed in international standarized tests like the TOEFL cannot account for the foreign language learners' variation in oral performance. It has been demonstrated that, independently of their degree of knowledge of the linguistic system, certain aspects of the learners' definition of the encounter

can have a powerful impact on the conduct of conversation. The most relevant of these aspects seem to be goal feasibility, social distance and the speakers' reaction towards using the target language instead of their native language.

In order to explore the differences in oral performance I have proposed an approach based not on structural differences in handling the linguistic code but rather a functional approach based on the learners' application of certain strategies geared towards the fulfillment of their goal(s). The strategies I have found relevant for the analysis of this specific encounter are the following: (i) topic presentation, (ii) confrontation, (iii) acknowledgement of responsibility, (iv) conflict solution, (v) emotive function and (vi) justification. It should be pointed out that the kind of strategies deployed are strongly connected with the type of encounter studied as well as the object of negotiation, and that for other types of encounter different strategies may be found analytically relevant.

Through the analysis of their performance during the verbal interaction we have seen that those students who conceived the goal of the encounter as attainable introduce it more directly than those who thought it was less feasible. Also, they confront the teacher on more occasions and are not likely to yield in their attempt to fulfill their goal. The same students show a stronger tendency to propose a solution for the conflict. The existence of a close social distance between the students and the teacher is reflected in an increase in the number of emotive utterances and in the amount of confrontation. Finally, those students who thought that their performance had not been affected by the fact that they were using a foreign language show a tendency to include a higher number of utterances related to their inner feelings and emotions and they are also more likely to confront the teacher.

The deployment of strategies by the different students also shows that, in general, speakers' performance can also be approached from the point of view of what they conceive as the appropriate amount of participation in the verbal interaction. Thus, we can establish a difference between the more interactive or voluble speakers, showing a higher tendency to deploy any of the strategies analyzed, and less interactive or more taciturn speakers, much more reluctant to invest their personality in the interaction by applying any of the strategies studied.

It would also be very interesting to see to what extent the speaker's definition of one aspect of the encounter depends on his/her definition of another. Thus, we have that of the four students who clearly defined their goal as attainable (S2, S4, S5, S8) three also defined their relationship with

the teacher as relatively close and, furthermore, these very same students did not think that their interactive behaviour would have changed if they had spoken in their native language.

From the point of view of foreign language performance and assessment, it is necessary to point out that the presence or absence of the strategies studied in the speech of the learners have a direct effect on their presentation of self and, consequently, on the final outcomes of the interaction. In the context of an oral examination the outcome is the examiner's positive or negative assessment of the examinee's performance as appropriate or not according to his/her definition of what he/she thinks is appropriate verbal behaviour in the culture where the target language is spoken. In a real context of use, the outcome is connected with the speakers' fulfillment of the goal with which they approached the encounter. A fulfillment which, as we all know from personal experience, does not exclusively depend on the nature of the object being negotiated but also on how it is negotiated.

I would suggest that foreign language oral interviews should involve a first part in which the participants, examiner and examinee, clarify their definition of the encounter, either the interview itself or the situation they are asked to role-play. In this way, we would be able to not only avoid potential intercultural or interpersonal misunderstandings, which might have a drastic effect on the final assessment of the learner, but also evaluate the examinee's capacity of adapting to different patterns of behaviour. a

NOTE

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**APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLES OF THE VERBAL STRATEGIES
DEPLOYED BY ONE OF THE SUBJECTS (S4)**

A. Topic presentation

- I came to see you about the exam that we have the tenth
- I'm afraid I can't I won't be able to do the exam

B. Confrontation

- yeah or I'm not gonna see that until September
- yes but I knew the date of my appointment three days ago

C. Acknowledgement of responsibility

- I understand that it's not fair
- of course I understand
- I understand that it's not fair
- if you can't do it I'll understand. I'm just asking
- I realize it's not a common thing to happen
- If not — I'll do it in September
- I know and I realize that but I'm not doing it on purpose
- I would be happy to do it the tenth
- I (h) know (laughs)
- well just if you can do it tell me

D. Conflict solution

- could you please change it for me
- I could do it the day after and I won't have time to call anyone
- I could do it the day after, the eleventh
- why don't I do the whole subject in June?

- if I could do it in June it would be

E. Emotive function

- could you please change it for me?
- it would be really:
- I wouldn't ask anyone
- I'm just asking
- but if you could help me
- if I could do it in June it would be: —()
- I'm not doing it in purpose
- I would be happy to do it the tenth

F. Justification

- I have to go to Barcelona
- I have really severe headaches
- I have to go to the doctor to Barcelona
- I have to go the same day that I have the examination
- it was impossible because this doctor to get an appointment it's really hard
- I really have to go that day
- There's nothing I can do to change that
- I really tried to change the appointment but he couldn't
- it's really impossible for me
- I knew the date of my appointment three days ago
- I called the doctor and they said that they couldn't change the appointment
- the other appointment they give is —I don't know a month from now
- I really can't wait that long

**APPENDIX 2:
SUMMARY OF THE VARIABLES AND STRATEGIES ANALYZED**

STUDENT	ATTAINABLE GOAL	CLOSE SOCIAL DISTANCE	ENGLISH = CATALAN
S1	YES/NO	NO	NO
S2	YES	YES	YES
S3	NO	NO	NO
S4	YES	YES	YES
S5	YES	NO	NO
S6	NO	YES/NO	NO
S7	YES/NO	YES/NO	NO
S8	YES	YES	YES
S9	YES/NO	YES/NO	NO

STUDENT	TOPIC PRESENTATION	CON-FRONT	ACKNOW. OF RESPONSIBILITY	CONFLICT SOLUTION	EMOTIVE FUNCTION	JUSTIFIC. DETAILS
S1	1	4 (ACCEPT)	3	—	7	
S2	10	4	4	12	6	
S3 PROBLEM	1	2 (ACCEPT)	—	1	3	
S4	2	10	5	8	13	
S5 PROBLEM	5	—	1	—	1	
S6 PROBLEM	1	—	—	1	3	
S7	PROBLEM	1	2	1	1	2
S8	—	3	1	1	2	0
S9	PROBLEM	2	3 (ACCEPT)	1	1	0

a

IMAGINARY HOMELANDS REVISITED

IN THE NOVELS OF KAZUO ISHIGURO

— !

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THIS study will analyze the fiction of the Japanese-born English novelist Kazuo Ishiguro as an illustration of the views Salman Rushdie propounds in "Imaginary Homelands," an essay which may be considered a paradigm of the discourse of writers in the between-world condition. In this piece, Rushdie describes and defines the situation of those writers who are, in the words of Michael Ondaatje's English patient, "born in one place and choosing to live elsewhere. Fighting to get back or to get away from our homelands all our lives" (1992: 176). More specifically, Rushdie analyzes the theme and the presentation of the homeland in the works of this type of writer, pointing out that the attempt to portray one's land of origin is inevitably coupled with the inability to be faithful to any objective reality. Although he speaks principally about Indian writers, his observation of the situation clearly applies to most writers who share the multicultural experience.

It may be that writers in my position, exiles or emigrants or expatriates, are haunted by some sense of loss, some urge to reclaim, to look back, even at the risk of being mutated into pillars of salt. But

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if we do look back, we must also do so in the knowledge —which gives rise to profound uncertainties— that our physical alienation from India almost inevitably means that we will not be capable of reclaiming precisely the thing that was lost; that we will, in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary homelands, Indias of the mind. (Rushdie 1992: 10)

Taking as his point of departure the writing of *Midnight's Children*, Rushdie dwells on the complexity of fictionally re-creating the land he had left more than twenty years before in the saga of a child and of a nation. Recognizing that the distances of time and space distort facts, he revisioned his novel in order not to fall into the trap of having to validate his remembered experiences with objective realities. He centered his efforts on making the novel "as imaginatively true as I could," knowing that "what I was actually doing was a novel of memory and about memory, so that my India was just that: 'my' India, a version and no more than just one of all the hundreds of millions of possible versions" (1992: 10).

Any writer who writes about his homeland from the outside, Rushdie claims, must necessarily "deal in broken mirrors, some of whose fragments have been irretrievably lost" (1992: 11). Nonetheless, it is precisely the fragmentary nature of these memories, the incomplete truths they contain, the partial explanations they offer, that make them particularly evocative for the "transplanted" writer. For Rushdie, these "shards of memory acquired greater status, greater resonance because they were *remains*; fragmentation made trivial things seem like symbols, and the mundane acquired numinous qualities" (1992: 12).

The attempt to build a novel on the basis of memory has proven to be an attractive prospect for many exiled or immigrant writers, who may even feel that this is the only way to reconcile oneself to both one's past and present. This is the case with a great number of ethnic minority writers in the United States and Canada, as well as those in England. For instance, Sri-Lanka born Michael Ondaatje's fictionalized memoir, *Running in the Family*, is clearly the endeavour of a between-world writer to revision the history of his homeland and of his family. Rohinton Mistry's collection *Tales from Firozsha Baag* outlines the writer's process of introgression and assimilation into Western life and culture, as it shuttles back and forth from an Indian past to a Canadian present. This, perhaps, to prove Rushdie's claim that somehow, inescapably, "it's my present that is foreign, and that the past is home, albeit a lost home in a lost city in the mists of lost time" (1992: 9).

Kazuo Ishiguro conforms to and revitalizes the model of the between-world writer Rushdie refers to. His personal history is a vivid reflection of the particular development of the immigrant writer caught between two worlds. In 1960, when Ishiguro was six, his family moved from Nagasaki to England for a temporary stay related to his oceanographer father's job. The family believed for years they would return to Japan and, throughout his childhood, young Ishiguro could not forget Japan, principally because he had to prepare himself to return to it.

I grew up with a very strong image in my head of this other country, this very important other country to which I had a strong emotional tie... Of course, I didn't know Japan, because I didn't come here. But in England I was all the time building up this picture in my head of an imaginary Japan... [Later] I realized that this Japan, which was very precious to me, actually existed only in my own imagination, partly because the real Japan had changed greatly between 1960 and later on. I realized it was a place of my childhood and I could never return to that particular Japan. (Ishiguro 1991: 76)

There is a conscious effort on the part of the author to write about Japan; his need and his wish to "re-create this Japan —put together all these memories and all these imaginary ideas I had about this landscape that I called Japan... to make it safe, preserve it in a book before it faded away from memory altogether" being "one of the real reasons why I turned to writing novels" (Ishiguro 1991: 76). The result is three exquisitely elaborated novels: *A Pale View of the Hills* (1982), *An Artist of the Floating World* (1986) and *The Remains of the Day* (1989). In diverse ways, each of the novels projects a desire to come to terms with a past that is both personal and collective: Ishiguro's fiction will explore the Japanese character and history as a reflection of both his personal odyssey of displacement and his search for self. As an immigrant, "I had no obvious social role, because I wasn't a very English Englishman, and I wasn't a very Japanese Japanese either" (Ishiguro 1991: 82-83). This awareness of being what Bharati Mukherjee has called a "not-quite" made him consider himself a kind of homeless writer, as he had "no clear role, no society or country to speak for or write about. Nobody's history seemed to be my history" (Ishiguro 1991: 83). Not to have a role in history is to be denied the very basis of identity; hence the author's need to retain his memories and to recreate their panorama through fiction. The narrative itself, therefore, is converted into the pursuit of that which is now possessed only in fragments.

The search for lost bits of memory, which in the immigrant writer is almost equivalent to meaning, is an essential characteristic of his narrative. Rushdie has compared memory to a "shaky edifice we build out of scraps, dogmas, childhood injuries, newspaper articles, chance remarks, old films, small victories, people hated, people loved; perhaps it is because our sense of what is the case is constructed from such inadequate materials that we defend it so fiercely, even to the death" (Rushdie 1992: 12). There appears to be an underlying assumption that once the memories are given palpable shape, articulated in literature, they will provide the link to one's past and, consequently, to one's self. Nonetheless, oftentimes, the mere process of remembrance is sufficient. For Ishiguro, fashioning a Japan in his novels appears to be of utmost importance, though it will always be exclusively a personal and imaginary homeland; the impulse to document facts is not as compelling. His aim is so clearly to record and preserve the Japan that exists in his mind that to turn to research to validate experience and recollections will necessarily deter from the original purpose.

As a writer, therefore, Ishiguro draws fundamentally on a compound of his early childhood recollections, his family upbringing, textbook facts and the Japanese films of the fifties. His acknowledged dearth of first-hand information about Japan has forced him into a position of relying principally on his imagination and, rejecting a realist purpose in writing, to give vent to both originality and self: "I just invent a Japan which serves my needs. And I put that Japan together out of little scraps, out of memories, out of speculation, out of imagination" (In Mason 1989: 341). His novels are then a demonstration of what happens when the act of trying to remember and the act of creating begin to overlap.

The presence of Japan and all things Japanese as inspiration, theme and symbol in Ishiguro's novels is constant, overwhelming and deliberate. Pico Iyer has pointed out how the atmosphere of all his books is set by the title of the first, *A Pale View of the Hills*, and all three novels have "that same ink-washed elusiveness, an ellipticism almost violent in its reticence; all three, moreover, are exquisitely fashioned miniatures, miracles of workmanship and tact that suggest everything through absence and retreat" (Iyer 1991: 588). Ishiguro's narrative technique captivates the reader with its austerity, both in style and storyline, recalling the extreme suggestiveness of Japanese poetry that never loses its clarity and definiteness in spite of its simplicity of form. The novels are often full of melancholy and irony, and yet clearly constructed with immense care. Their simplicity is quite deceptive, disguising rare sensitivity, artistic sobriety, and well-ordered craft in order to achieve the

Japanese perfection in miniature which one has been led to believe is the essence of Eastern art.

The physical image of Japan portrayed in his first two novels is painstakingly constructed. Because "the visual images of Japan have a great poignancy for me" (Ishiguro, in Mason 1989: 336), Ishiguro sketches in detail for his readers the setting of his novels giving an emotive charge to the landscape itself, another characteristic of Japanese poetry. Etsuko (in *A Pale View of the Hills*) spends many moments gazing out at the view from her apartment window:

"On clearer days, I could see far beyond the trees on the opposite bank of the river, a pale outline of hills against the clouds. It was not an unpleasant view, and on occasions it brought me a rare sense of relief from the emptiness of those long afternoons I spent in that apartment" (*PVH* 99).

An Artist of the Floating World, which reads like the diary of the protagonist, the retired Japanese painter Masaji Ono, opens with this description:

"If on a sunny day you climb the steep path leading up from the little wooden bridge still referred to around here as 'the Bridge of Hesitation', you will not have to walk far before the roof of my house becomes visible between the tops of two gingko trees" (*AFW* 7).

The descriptions of these scenes, important to the protagonists, underscore the pervading emotional temperature of the dramas that will be enacted in the narratives. Throughout the novel, Ishiguro stresses the physicality of the setting with meticulous descriptions and frequent allusions to them as reflection of inner states of being.

There are continual references to Japanese customs as well as descriptions that conform to the recognized Western idea of Japan. Etsuko and Ono's world is a traditional Japan, where the light is filtered through translucent paper screens, tea is served on the verandah overlooking the garden, marriages are arranged by go-betweens and women wear kimonos and cover their mouths when they laugh. Masaji Ono lives according to strict codes of etiquette and order, the ethos of actively and passively knowing one's place and adhering to protocol and precedent. He was formed by the practice of giving and receiving deference of the kind due to "masters," both in the aesthetic and imperial hierarchy. Etsuko's husband, Jiro, is a typical

Japanese businessman, married to his company, expecting absolute loyalty and service from his subservient wife. Ono's daughters address him as "Father" in formal and respectful tones and only venture to disagree with or question him in oblique phrases, a behavior identical to the way Etsuko treats her father-in-law. Ishiguro even explains several customs: the *miai*, a dinner arranged by a marriage broker to bring the families together for the first time, and the *kujibiki*, similar to the games of toss-and-win played at fairgrounds.

A principal part of the novels' strength is a remarkable quality of style in which dialogue and narration are unemphasized yet strangely powerful. Similar to the way the Japanese prefer the image and its implication to the statement and its commentary, Ishiguro's is a kind of writing that fashions images that are suggested rather than stated. His rare virtue —typical of the *haiku* poets— is the ability to prompt a creative response in the reader, to arouse reactions which must be quite individual, so that the books take on as many forms as there are readers. His works show extraordinary control of voice, a Japanese quality emanating from his perfectly pitched English prose. One is aware that the dialogue in *A Pale View of the Hills*, for example, is not perfect English. Etsuko speaks in a Japanese way because she is Japanese, and it is made clear that English is a second language for her. She speaks carefully, particularly when she reproduces Japanese dialogue in English, achieving in this manner a certain foreignness to her discourse. With Masaji Ono, Ishiguro was aware he had to convey fluency in Japanese that the reader would receive in English.

In a way the language has to be almost like a pseudotranslation, which means I can't be too fluent and I can't use too many Western colloquialisms. It has to be almost like subtitles, to suggest that behind the English language there's a foreign language going on. (Ishiguro, in Mason 1989: 345).

But it is in *The Remains of the Day* that the writer reveals his own Japanese subtlety as he revisions Japan in a novel that is not even set in Japan but has as its theme six unexceptional days in the life of that most English of characters, a butler. Himself a between-world critic, Pico Iyer considers this novel, among the many books that purport to explain Japan to the West, "the most revealing one so far" (Iyer 1991: 585). *The Remains of the Day* is, as its title suggests, written in that favourite Japanese form, the elegy for vanished rites; it is a vespers novel. Through the recollections of the protagonist's, Stevens's, years of service at Darlington Hall, Ishiguro will reveal essential aspects of the Japanese character.

The author imbues his description of Stevens's world with an exquisite Japanese sensibility. The butler's attention to detail and pride in his work is comparable to that of an *origami* maker. His insistence on ritual, his stoicism in performing his duties, especially in the face of adversity, his unswerving loyalty to his master—all these are prominent aspects of the Japanese collective psyche. There is, moreover, an element of *buhsido* in Stevens's notions of honor and "dignity," which allow him to be dauntlessly unemotional in the face of even his father's death and the realization that he had lost the woman he loved. *Bushido*, the "way of the warrior," the ethical code of the *samurai*, resembled the code of the Knights in medieval Europe, demanding courage, honor, and loyalty to country and overlords. Once more, the novel is filled with descriptions of nature and when Stevens admires the English landscape for "the very lack of obvious drama or spectacle that sets the beauty of our land apart" or, while studying a travel book, ". . . the delights of Devon and Cornwall, complete with photographs and—to my mind even more evocative—a variety of artist's sketches of that region" (RD 11), he reflects the Japanese preference of subtlety and suggestion in art. The stilted and perfectly composed dialogue recalls the carefully elaborated "foreignness" of Ishiguro's earlier novels. Sometimes, when Stevens addresses his dying parent as "Father," never "you," or when Miss Kenton delivers sentences like "Is that so, Mr Stevens?" his narrative might almost be translated from the Japanese.

The simple yet suggestively complex dialogue, perhaps Ishiguro's main artistic triumph in his novels, is intimately linked with the three novels' principal theme: coming to terms with memories. In all three novels, we are presented with a character beyond middle age who is forced by circumstances to review, and, at times, almost relive, decisions made in the past in order to understand or cope with the demands of the present. This outline permits the author to examine under various lights what are to be the novels' recurring themes: dignity, self-deception, devalued ideals, repressed emotions and the high cost of displaced loyalty. The unadorned first-person narrations take place largely in the past but move freely and skilfully across time, capturing the ebb and flow of the old people's thoughts and their conflicting emotions.

The structure Ishiguro builds is rather like that of a murder mystery, in which fragments of crucial information are exposed gradually, piece by piece, often seemingly in passing, so that the reader collects clues and arrives at the truth by himself. And, in each of the books, the truth is revealed through the words of the narrators who are themselves, for the most part,

unaware of it. Ishiguro thus skilfully reveals each character's perceptions of the world at the same time he unveils, more importantly, how these perceptions blind them. *A Pale View of Hills* is the story of Etsuko trying to come to terms with the suicide of her eldest daughter Keiko. When a visit from her younger daughter prompts her to think about the events that led to this tragedy, Etsuko, unwilling and unprepared to confront harsh realities, decides to make a "sentimental journey" to her young adulthood and let another woman, her friend Sachiko, relive the turbulent experiences she witnessed and which later would be transposed to her own life. In this manner, Ishiguro very cleverly shows a person exploring the unhappiness of her own past by concentrating on the lives of other people. His narrative strategy in the book was to demonstrate "how someone ends up talking about things they cannot face directly through other people's stories. I was trying to explore that type of language, how people use the language of self-deception and self-protection" (Ishiguro, in Mason 1989: 339). Thus, Niki's visit and her references to her half-sister prompt Etsuko to remember the summer she bore Keiko —a fateful summer, for it was then, as she sees with hindsight, that the pattern of the future was set. Recounting Sachiko's story is Etsuko's manner of facing her own errors of the past, her oblique admission of how, out of a desire to fulfil her own emotional needs, she sacrificed her daughter's happiness.

Masaji Ono, in *An Artist of the Floating World*, faced with the investigation that forms part of the negotiations for his younger daughter's marriage, also looks back on the events that shaped his life. As a young man, he committed himself to a struggle that is no longer a cause for pride and he now attempts to resolve the conflict of his past with the reality of the present. This novel is thus the retrospective monologue of an elderly Japanese painter surveying his life and career from the perspective of defeated Japan: he tries to rationalize having used his talent in enthusiastic service of the cause of imperialism, and to avoid admitting the tragic consequences of his misplaced loyalty —the loss of his wife and son, the betrayal of his friends, the disintegration of the world as he knew it. Ishiguro uses the meanderings of memory to emphasize connections and reveal conflicts, as he unveils the real tension of the novel, where shameful incidents of Ono's past come back to threaten his daughter's future, his realization of how his dedication to the imperialist cause is no longer a matter for pride in post-war Japan.

At the center of the novel is Ono's pathetic struggle for self-affirmation in a society that measures worth with constantly shifting standards. He is forced to search his life for something to be proud of, revealing his ambition

to rise above the ordinary with his contribution through his art. The Japanese notion of honor and Ono's own desire to find something in his life to be proud of, compel him to seek that glory wherever it may be. Possessed of a great ability for admiration, and confident in his own success, he is capable of conceding honor even to those who have failed, subconsciously excusing what society now considers his own failures: "If one has failed where others have not had the courage or will to try, there is a consolation —indeed, a deep satisfaction— to be gained from this observation when looking back over one's life" (*AFW* 134).

Ono's need to rationalize is echoed by Stevens in *The Remains of the Day*. Stevens's journey, ostensibly to try and persuade Miss Kenton (now Mrs Benn), a former housekeeper, to return to Darlington Hall, sets in motion another journey —into the past, and the uncharted waters of his emotions. As he drives along, he begins to contemplate both the events he has lived through and the essence of his profession. But as the novel progresses, it becomes clear that Stevens is not merely contemplating the meaning of butlering: he is grappling with ways to justify his life, for once you take his professionalism, his dignity, out of the picture, not much is left. In proudly describing his service, he says that "a 'great' butler can only be, surely, one who can point to his years of service and say that he has applied his talents to serving a great gentleman —and, through the latter, to serving humanity" (*RD* 117). But the reverence he shows towards his master is slowly revealed to be devoid of foundation as it turns out that Lord Darlington, with his old-fashioned ideas of chivalry, was active in the cause of Munich and the appeasement of Nazi Germany, and even of domestic British fascism. Stevens's apology for his master loses its validity fast, and his own life loses all traces of "greatness" as he reveals how, in seeking meaning only in self-subordination, he sacrificed his own growth as a human being.

Piece by piece, Ishiguro unravels the disintegration of Stevens's world, where the ideal of unquestioned loyalty and service reigned. Stevens's deepest conviction is that he is only as great as the man he serves, and he can best serve king and country by literally waiting upon history, keeping the silver polished on behalf of the ministers and ambassadors who visit his house to change the world. He permits himself neither opinions nor curiosity, emotions, or even self. His insistence on self-control, "a butler of any quality must be seen to *inhabit* his role, utterly and fully" (*RD* 169) prevents him from admitting into his life anything that might deter him from the fulfillment of his duties. It prohibits close personal relationships. He is so out of touch with his own feelings that he does not recognize love when it comes, so

obsessed with personal perfection that his only recollection of a visit by George Bernard Shaw is of the writer's being impressed by a well-polished spoon. As Miss Kenton cries, "Why, Mr Stevens, why, why, why do you always have to *pretend?*" (RD 154). But, in the end, it is these virtues that he so sought to cultivate that leave him weary and forlorn.

Ishiguro's characters are defined precisely by the words and emotions they stifle, and all his novels are shadowed by the silence of these absences. It is clear from the beginning that Stevens, as Etsuko and Ono before him, is the sort of narrator that exists principally to be seen through. He is unbending, humorless, incapable of understanding anything outside his own limited experience, and tenacious in defending the beliefs and the prejudices of an era whose time has passed. Even his verbal style is elaborately inexpressive, or intends to be: but the language of rationalization is immediately perceived, as well as the deliberate neutrality of someone taking great pains to avoid telling the truth. There is in the novel, as in the other two, an observable pattern of simultaneous admission and denial, revelation and concealment, that emerges as the defining feature of the butler's personality (Graver 1989: 3). Behind the words of Etsuko, Ono, and Stevens lie the realities about their lives, the moral compromises they made, and the recognition of the price they have to pay in striving for their ideals or their misguided dreams.

The intricately suggestive nature of the novels implies that Ishiguro will disclose truths larger than the personal tragedies being recounted. Just as emotional dimension is added to Japanese poetry by the symbolic meaning that is attached to geographic sites and historic events, there are experiences hidden in the novels that add to the complexity of the discourse. Meena Tamaya has pointed out how historical events, elliptically alluded to but never directly mentioned, are the powerful absences which shape the characters and the narratives of all three of Ishiguro's novels (1992: 45). Crucial to the tone and texture of both novels, therefore, is the memory of imperialism and war. Both *A Pale View of the Hills* and *An Artist of the Floating World* begin after the bombing of Nagasaki, the event that lies at their emotional center. Barely touched upon, mentioned only by innuendo, the destruction of Nagasaki appears as a vacuum defined only by the fragmented lives and the disjointed modes of survival which derive from it (Yoshioka 1988: 73). In contrast to the simplicity of style and storyline, the plot of both narratives is overshadowed by the more elaborate settings of social and historical scope, which comprise World War II, the Atomic Bomb, the Korean War and the strenuous efforts of reconstruction in postwar Japan.

In *The Remains of the Day*, it is the dismantling of Britain's colonial empire, mentioned only as the date on which the narrative begins, that provides the determining historical context of the character's attitudes and aspirations. The destruction of Stevens's world of proud butlers and stately English manor houses coincides with the final curtain of Britain as the world's foremost imperial power. His reminiscences which are, in essence, a slow, reluctant slide downward to an end of the day realization that his scrupulous life has been entirely wasted, embody the denouement of his country's former omnipotence.

The historical allusions made by Ishiguro manifest on a larger scale the theme of dealing with a past rejected by a present; a subject which is, interestingly enough, among the principal concerns of immigrant writers. Temporal and spatial separation imply the need for a constant struggle to find a home and assert one's identity. On different scales, the novels are exercises in defining that identity for each of the protagonists. Etsuko must come to terms with the tragic consequences of the decisions she made years ago in another country. Her father-in-law, Ogata-san, a retired teacher who seems to be the epitome of bygone elegance and integrity, an educated and gentle man, has fought to imbue his students with imperialistic values and spur them on to die in a patriotic war, the ideals that Ono devoted his art to. Ono, as he gradually emerges from his reminiscences and encounters, is a former partisan and propagandist for Hirohito. With these two characters Ishiguro suggests that the honor of the past was itself more than a little tarnished. In postwar Japan, these ideas are discredited. Both old men are attacked by former pupils and witness the devaluation of their life's work just as Stevens will comprehend the pathetic end of his misguided years of service.

But the immigrant writer is further urged by his complex situation to go beyond external perceptions of differences and changes, to underlying similarities and motives. Rushdie believes that the consequences of the between-world experience permit, and even encourage, deeper insight into the nature of literature. The writer's discontinuity, his out-of-country and even out-of-language experience, is often the force that enables him to speak properly and concretely on a subject of universal significance and appeal (1992: 12). The loss of a past and a nation compel the writer to seek that necessarily self-made identity precisely in the gap between his past and his present, between where he used to be and where he now is. Rushdie asserts that

our identity is at once plural and partial. Sometimes we feel that we straddle two cultures; at other times, we fall between two stools. But however ambiguous and shifting this ground may be, it is not an infertile territory for a writer to occupy. If literature is in part the business of finding new angles at which to enter reality, then once again our distance, our long geographical perspective, may provide us with such angles. (1992: 15)

The principal effect of this temporal and spatial discontinuity is that the authenticity of Ishiguro's narrative springs from the validity of his voice, that of the expatriate, the exiled voice that is both marginal and central, clear and unequivocal in its commitment to struggle with undelineated identities. He has, according to Rushdie, access to a second tradition apart from his racial history: "the culture and political group of the phenomenon of migration, displacement, life in a minority group" (Rushdie 1992: 20). In *A Pale View of the Hills*, Ishiguro also treats, albeit obliquely, the occasionally tragic effects of displacement. The novel has a double structure of time and place. It moves back and forth, through surrealistic channels of reminiscence, daydream and fantasy, between the present and the past and also between England and Nagasaki (Yoshioka 1988: 75). Etsuko was born in Nagasaki and moved to England when she married for a second time, taking along her Japanese daughter. The lingering question of Keiko's suicide hovers over the whole tale, and the implication is that it is cultural displacement, resulting from Etsuko's search for happiness, that was at the root of her eldest daughter's misery. The future appears to belong to Etsuko's second daughter, Niki, from her very name a hybrid of East and West, loyal to nothing, attached to no one, ignorant and disorganized; she is also, however, honest and devoid of prejudices.

Ishiguro's perception of both Japan and England and the relations between the two is thus made profound and complex because it entails examining the past with what Rushdie has called "stereoscopic vision . . . a kind of double perspective: because they, we, are at one and the same time insiders and outsiders in this society" (1992: 19). This distinctive vision allows him to view impassively both countries separately and, more importantly, reveals how each sheds light on the other.

This dimension of Ishiguro's art is manifested in his short story "The Family Supper." The writer is aware of how certain events in national and literary history have helped shape the western vision of the East, as, for example, how the manner of novelist Yukio Mishima's death confirmed a specific attitude towards Japan.

The whole image of Mishima in the West hasn't helped people there from an intelligent approach to Japanese culture and Japanese people. He fits certain characteristics . . . committing *seppuku* is one of the clichés. It has always helped people to remain locked in certain prejudices and very superficial, stereotypical images of what Japanese people are like. (Ishiguro 1991: 80)

In this story, he creates a tension that plays precisely on the stereotypical belief described by Etsuko in *A Pale View of the Hills* as the "idea that our race has an instinct for suicide, as if further explanations are unnecessary" (PVH 10). As the narrative develops, Ishiguro plays on the Western reader's expectations that the Japanese characters must, and will, ultimately kill themselves. The story's end is almost anticlimactic, as the expected tragedy does not occur, as it was never meant to. The ability to understand both sides of the drama and unite them into a single tale is the territory of the between-world writer.

The true value of Ishiguro's discourse, then, lies not in what he tells us about Japan, but in what he tells us about England and, by extension, the rest of the world, through his portrayal of Japan. His stereoscopic vision, which focuses from different angles to create a unified image, merges the two realities and adds the dimension of depth. Ishiguro continually relates East and West, finding parallels in their history, their customs and rituals and unveiling their not-so-different-after-all personalities and perceptions of one another. In this manner, he makes the East seem less foreign, and more accessible to Western comprehension. England and Japan, both island nations, have an ingrained, antique response to caste, class and station. Moreover, both are former imperial powers who held dominion over populations that far outnumbered them. Ishiguro perceives and demonstrates

how one island of shopkeepers, bound by a rigid sense of class and an unbending sense of nationalism, can shed light on another; how one monarchy, bent on keeping up appearances, in part by polishing nuances, is not so different from another; and, in fact, how the staff of an English country house, with its stiff-backed sense of self-training, its precisely stratified hierarchy, its uniforms and rites and stress on self-negation, might almost belong to Sony or Toshiba. (Iyer 1991: 586)

In the Eastern hemisphere, Ono and Ogata-san have to deal with the ironies of Japan's recent history which condemn their own earlier, sincere convictions. In England, Stevens has to accept Harry Smith's declaration that "dignity's something every man and woman in this country can strive for and get... you can't have dignity if you're a slave" (*RD* 186). Ishiguro uses specific historical periods to point out another striking similarity. The first two novels are set in the aftermath of World War II and *The Remains of the Day* in July, 1956. These dates mark the epoch when each former empire came to accept the American dispensation: during occupation in the first instance and just after the nationalization of the Suez canal in the second. In all three novels, we see formerly imperialist countries adapting to post-war American "occupation," a time of great social and cultural change. Sachiko imitates her countrymen's rejection of their history in favor of the American dream of progress and sells herself to a pathetic illusion of the good life in the form of Frank the American. Ono finds the American style depositing the old Japanese tradition wherever he turns to look; even his young grandson admires and imitates the Lone Ranger and Popeye. Stevens, apart from being forced to adjust to his new American master's form of bantering, will take his memorable trip through the English countryside in Mr Farraday's vintage Ford.

The novels also underscore the closeness of temperament between the British and the Japanese —the suppressed emotions, the unwillingness to be explicit, the almost ritualistic politeness, and, at least where servants are concerned, the high personal and emotional cost of unstinting loyalty to one's employer. The adherence to the master that we see admired as a fundamental Japanese virtue in *An Artist of the Floating World* is again taken up in *The Remains of the Day*. Ono's blind subservience to his master is mirrored by Stevens's absolute trust in Lord Darlington. Ishiguro shows how the old Japanese virtue of veneration for the *sensei* (the teacher), or loyalty to the group, could be distorted and exploited. In this regard, he consciously uses Japan as "a sort of metaphor. I'm trying to suggest that this isn't something particular to Japan, the need to follow leaders and the need to exercise over subordinates, as a sort of motor by which society operates. I'm inviting Western readers to look at this not as a Japanese phenomenon but as a human phenomenon" (Ishiguro, in Mason 1989: 342). Stevens is another version of Matsuji Ono, who misjudged his loyalties in pre-war Japan and who finds that history will not forgive him. Ono, without knowing it, allowed himself to be made use of; Stevens, seduced into reverence for Lord Darlington, allowed himself to be blind to the direction in which history was going.

There are other, more external, parallels that can be drawn in the novels. For instance, Ono and Stevens have lost members of their family in the pursuit of military and national grandeur, in efforts that are now regarded ambiguously. Once again, the author points to how tragedies on one side of the globe can be simultaneously lived on another. In *An Artist of the Floating World*, this is made explicit in a dialogue between Ono and his son-in-law:

"There seems to be no end of courageous deaths," he said, eventually, "Half of my high school graduation year have died courageous deaths. They were all for stupid causes, though they never were to know that. Do you know, Father, what really makes me angry?"
 "What is that, Suichi?"
 "Those who sent the likes of Kenji out there to die those brave deaths, where are they today? They're carrying on with their lives, much the same as ever." (AFW 58)

Stevens has suffered the same tragedy:

I should explain here that I am one of two brothers —and that my eldest brother, Leonard, was killed during the Southern African War while I was still a boy. Naturally my father would have felt this loss keenly; but to make matters worse, the usual comfort of a father in these situations— that is, the notion that his son gave his life gloriously for king and country— was sullied by the fact that my brother has perished in a particularly infamous manoeuvre . . . so that the men who had died —my brother among them— had died quite needlessly . . . At the close of the Southern African Conflict, [his] general had been discreetly retired, and he had then entered business, dealing shipments from Southern Africa. (RD 40-41).

Ultimately, both Ono and Stevens must come to terms with the lives they see they have wasted on the wrong course and the wrong cause. Their respective conclusions to their lives stress the underlying similarity between the two cultures, and the fact that, Japanese or English, the characters are simply two old men looking forward peacefully to what remains of their days. Ono claims that "however one may come in later years to reassess one's achievement, it is always a consolation to know that one's life has contained a moment or two of real satisfaction such as I experienced that day up on that high mountain path" (AFW 204). Stevens, sitting alone on the pier at Weymouth, concludes:

What is the point of worrying oneself too much about what one could or could not have done to control the course one's life took? Surely it is enough that the likes of you and I at least *try* to make our small contribution count for something true and worthy. And if some of us are prepared to sacrifice much in life in order to pursue such aspirations, surely that is in itself, whatever the outcome, cause for pride and consolation. (RD 244)

To perceive parallels and articulate similarities in differences is perhaps the specific territory of the between-world writer. Kazuo Ishiguro's principal commitment in his novels is to observe the interaction of past and present, of East and West, and capture the evocative texture of memory. This, perhaps, in response to Rushdie's belief that one of the many possible strategies of the inescapably international writers is to protest, ultimately, against the limits of experience and, doing so, to cry "open the universe a little more!" (1992: 21). a

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**— FOCALISATION
IN ALFRED HITCHCOCK'S *THE BIRDS***

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1. INTRODUCTION

THIS essay is intended as an analysis of focalisation in Alfred Hitchcock's *The Birds* (1963) and, simultaneously, as an illustration of the workings of certain aspects of focalisation in film narratives. My aim is therefore not a theoretical discussion of the term.¹ However, a couple of theoretical points seem to be necessary at the outset. In spite of Mieke Bal's (1985: 100) extraordinary emphasis on perception and even on visual selection, the term focalisation as originally understood by Gérard Genette implies first and foremost selection of information effected by the narrative, whether perceptual or otherwise. Although visual pleasure, the look and other related terms have become central in film theory and criticism especially since the publication in 1975 of Christian Metz's "Le signifiant imaginaire" (1982) and Laura Mulvey's "Visual Pleasure in the Narrative Cinema" (1989a), concentration on the look of characters, camera and spectators has tended to underplay the importance of other equally important aspects of film narrative.² In the present essay, I will consider focalisation as both perception, following Bal, and manipulation of information, following Genette and, especially, Meir Sternberg's threefold analysis of narratorial intervention in terms of knowledgeability, self-consciousness and communicativeness (1978). Bal seems to imply that all selection of information in a narrative text is performed perceptually or conceptually by an agent of

the story, although not necessarily an agent inside the story, but I shall be arguing that the gap between perception and selection of information is, at least in film narratives, not so easy to bridge as she seems to imply. This problem has already been perceived by Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, who suggests the existence of different facets of focalisation, which she labels perceptual, psychological and ideological, the first two roughly corresponding, respectively, to Bal's concept of focalisation and to Sternberg's narratorial intervention (1983: 77-82).

Seymour Chatman has more recently proposed the terms *filter* and *slant* as a way of solving the main problem which, in his view, a term like "focalisation" still perpetuates, which is "the need to recognize *different* terms for the two different narrative agents, narrator and character" (1990: 139). "Slant," therefore, defines the narrator's attitude towards the reported material whereas "filter" refers to the characters' mental activity as far as it mediates the spectator's perception of the story. The obvious advantage of Chatman's terminology is that it foregrounds the ideological implications of narrative strategies. On the other hand, its realignment of narratological description along the axis narrator/character underplays the crucial similarities between the selection of information, perceptual or otherwise, carried out through a character or externally. That is, Chatman's model is based on a total separation between what Bal calls internal and external focalisation. As I have argued elsewhere, however, it is precisely the complex relationships between both modes as well as the theoretical differentiation between them that makes focalisation a particularly productive concept in the analysis of specific film narratives, especially those of the classical Hollywood cinema, whose narrative strategies are, to a great extent, based on the simultaneity of external and internal focalisation (see Deleyto 1991: 176, 1992: *passim*, and 1993: *passim*). The use of different terms for the two modes would obscure the relationship between them, most crucially in terms of the ideological manipulation of the text and the spectator's response.

I would, therefore, like to keep the terminology proposed by Bal but a further point seems necessary. For Rimmon-Kenan, external focalisation can occur through what Bal calls a "narrator-focaliser" or through a character in first person narratives, "either when the temporal and psychological distance between narrator and character is minimal . . . or when the perception through which the story is rendered is that of the narrating self rather than that of the experiencing self" (1983: 74). That is, for Rimmon-Kenan, a character in the story may become an external focaliser, especially, in films, in such cases as voice-over narration and flashbacks. I find this proposition

very problematic. On the one hand, it establishes a differentiation of narrative levels between narrating and narrated character, in cases in which both are the same person, a differentiation which is too drastic and difficult to hold in specific narratives. At what exact point does, for example, Walter Neff in *Double Indemnity* (Billy Wilder 1944) stop being an external focaliser on the narrated events and becomes an internal focaliser? On the other hand, in terms of the relationship between text and viewer, the usefulness of the differentiation between external and internal focalisation resides precisely in the possibility that a film may present as objective what is really the subjective view of one specific character, or, conversely, may externally manipulate the spectator's relationship with specific characters. In this essay, then, I will stick to what I find a simpler and more productive distinction: internal focalisation, when the focaliser is a character from the diegetic world, and external focalisation, when perception and/or selection of material does not appear to be mediated by any of the characters.³

Finally, my analysis of *The Birds* is only a formal analysis to the extent that it uses a concept from a narrative theoretical model, but the study of focalisation is not considered as an end in itself but only as an instrument that will provide a rigorous basis for what must always ultimately be an ideological interpretation of the different ways in which the film positions the spectator. While this model cannot include what Tania Modleski has called "ethnographic criticism" (1991: 37), the consideration of ways in which "real" viewers may be able to challenge and resist the dominant ideology proposed by the text, it is compatible with other current prestigious theories and approaches, such as psychoanalytic criticism, feminism or Marxism. Focalisation is the theoretical embodiment of a series of narrative strategies and provides a privileged vantage point from which to analyse the specific ways in which those strategies produce meaning, or, in Althusser's formulation, interpellate the spectator.

2. *THE BIRDS* I: SUBJECTIVITY AND OMNISCIENCE

From the beginning of the film, the narration seems very keen to establish a very specific attitude in the viewer towards the heroine, Melanie Daniels. Most of the material selected for presentation in the first section of the film is

closely related to her, and seems to have the general function of shaping her personality in order to cue the spectator to construct a specific kind of relationship with the character. She is presented as a wealthy, spoilt girl, who likes to play apparently childish games, which generally get her into trouble with a representative of the Law, be it the police, the legal system or, more playfully, Mitch, himself a lawyer. Her relationship with the Law is one whose importance and seriousness Melanie does not seem to be fully aware of at the start. In a more general sense, thematically and narratively, she is presented from the beginning as the natural antagonist of a male-ordered universe. "Male sexual anxiety in the face of an actual or potential autonomous female sexuality" is, according to Robin Wood (1989: 231), together with the identification with the woman's position, one of the major themes of Hitchcock's American films. We will see, however, that in *The Birds* the presentation of male sexual anxiety is given a rather secondary position. Tania Modleski's introductory account of Hitchcock's films in general comes closer to my argument: "[Hitchcock's] films are always in danger of being subverted by females whose power is both fascinating and seemingly limitless" (1988: 1). In any case, Melanie's behaviour and role in the film's society has won her the antipathy of Mitch and, presumably, of many other people with whom she has related in the past, but does not preclude an ambiguous response from the audience, one from which a certain degree of fascination is not absent. Notice in this respect how the film's stylistic system ironically prompts this ambiguous response by means of the use of the kind of diffusion shots associated with the glamorous heroines of melodrama and adventure films of the thirties and forties, in the unusual context of her conversation with the assistant at the pet shop. This tension is also apparent in the physical aspect of the heroine: the extreme tidiness of her clothes and hair style, which contrasts with the "untidiness" of her behaviour, apparently more similar to that of a "naughty child" than to what would have been expected from a grown-up sophisticated young lady.⁴ This manipulated response on the part of the audience carefully changes in the course of the narrative: her personality also changes and becomes more complex through her relationship with Mitch and the birds and, simultaneously, we receive more information about her capacity for love and about the absence of a mother figure in her life... until Lydia appears.

The presentation of Lydia (relatively late in the film for such an important character) is significant in the way the text controls our response towards Melanie. Notice that the story of Melanie's traumatic relationship

with her mother is left in the dark for much of the film and is only introduced as a non-visual retroversion after she has met Lydia, has learned about her attitude towards Mitch's previous girlfriends and has experienced her open hostility towards herself. In other words, the presence of Lydia in the narrative provokes the revelation of a completely new dimension to Melanie's character.

The narration, therefore, appears to be generally limited in range of knowledge, since it restricts itself to Melanie's knowledge, and highly subjective, with frequent close-ups of the heroine, probing her state of mind, and point of view shots and eyeline matches showing what she sees, approximately how she sees it. There are brief exceptions, as, for example, when Mitch goes into the shop and we momentarily share his point of view, or, shortly after, when his neighbour in San Francisco thoroughly appraises her with his sexualised gaze. These examples provide, from different registers, a certain ironic detachment from the protagonist. Later on, in the lake scene, her subjective point of view is broken at a moment of maximum intensity when Mitch comes out of the house with a pair of binoculars and tries to find out who is in the boat. A shot as from the binoculars shows Melanie from his point of view, unsuccessfully trying to start the engine of the boat. The film has therefore set itself certain norms that it seems to adhere to: general proximity to Melanie and her range of knowledge and occasional disruptions of this strategy for specific effects.

A more important disruption takes place shortly after: in the morning after Cathy's birthday party, the film temporarily leaves Melanie and follows Lydia, a tactic that allows the spectator to discover the horribly mutilated corpse of Dan Fawcett at the same time as her. This disruption of the self-imposed norm is more noticeable than on previous occasions and coincides with the growing importance that Lydia is beginning to acquire in the story and, interestingly, also with the parallels that the film has started to establish between the two women. Lydia's range of knowledge will from now on be adhered to several times and a similar strategy of frequent close-ups and medium close-ups of her face will help the viewer to establish connections between the two female characters, connections which obviously start with the uncanny physical resemblance between them (fig. 1). The fight for Mitch appears to be the name of the game from the very beginning, a fight which is stylistically paralleled by a struggle for control of the gaze, which in the second half of the film Melanie has to share with Lydia.

As in the case of Melanie, the close-ups of Lydia attempt, apart from issues of narrative dominance, to explore the workings of the character's

mind. The problem, however, both in the case of Lydia and of Melanie, is that this probing into the characters' minds does not seem to be all that effective. The narration flaunts its power to express character subjectivity and, at the same time, refuses—or maybe shows its inability—to go beyond.⁵

A perhaps more important disruption of the film's narrative norm has not yet been mentioned: the frequent extreme, usually long, high angle shots that punctuate the narrative. The first three occur during the pet shop scene, which will be analysed below. Melanie first and then Mitch are framed from the first floor (where the birds are) coming into the shop and then climbing the stairs (figs. 2 and 3). The shot is functional in both cases, since the camera has been placed at the best vantage point for narrative clarity and for an apparent economy of style: the camera position allows us to successively see the characters coming into the shop, going up to the bird section and visually relating to the person who happens to be upstairs. This economy is, however, denied by the third such shot, which occurs when Mitch leaves the shop and Melanie, after a few seconds' hesitation, rushes downstairs after him (fig. 4). This shot is narratively unnecessary—in terms of economy of style, the camera should have been placed downstairs, anticipating the direction of the movement of the characters—but it does continue the stylistic pattern established by the other two.⁶ This stylistic strategy may be interpreted as a sign of omniscience: a narration which flaunts its power to detach itself from Melanie and the other characters, even against its own set norms of restriction of knowledge. Typically, these shots may be interpreted as suggesting the existence of a mysterious external force, the film's version of Fate, controlling the characters' actions and threateningly watching over them. Notice that the third occurrence of the high angle shot takes place when Melanie has apparently decided to play another one of her little games, this time in retaliation for Mitch's humiliation of her. The stylistic device would suggest the impression that her action is being watched and judged from above. On the other hand, these shots, regularly spread out all through the film, set a pattern of disruption which shows, at the same time, the arbitrariness of narrative conventions and the narration's tactics of plot manipulation in order to control audience response.

A more complicated tissue of gazes occurs in the scene of Cathy's birthday party, as Melanie and Mitch return from a brief walk on a hill that is situated next to Mitch's house. During this walk, their relationship has been strengthened and Melanie has disclosed very relevant information about her

past, especially about her mother. Now they are walking down the hill in order to join the children and the rest of the people. The sequence starts with one more high-angle shot, with the two characters closer to the camera at medium distance, and the rest of the people at the bottom of the hill, in the background (fig. 7). This shot remains external but the sequence also includes two interesting cases of internal focalisation: first Annie and then Lydia look up at the two protagonists, with worried expressions on their faces, obviously concerned, for different reasons, about the growing attachment between Melanie and Mitch. After the establishing shot, there is a cut to a closer shot of the two climbing down and then a tracking shot to a close-up of Annie, looking at them, then looking down, with an expression which seems to convey the inevitability of her defeat in the unequal struggle for Mitch's love (figs. 8, 9 and 10); she then turns to look towards Lydia, who is coming out of the house and who slightly turns her head towards the position offscreen where Melanie and Mitch must be (fig. 11). A cut to a closer framing of the mother emphasises her reaction, which is just as worried as Annie's but more aggressive (fig. 12). Then there is a new cut to the same shot as the previous one with Annie now turning her gaze towards the sky, when a child shouts "look, look!" offscreen. An eyeline match shows a gull violently diving down and then the second attack of the film starts.

What is remarkable in this sequence is the complex pattern of gazes established by the film, and that, with the exception of the first and last shots described here, the way people look is more important than what they are looking at. At this point the relationship between Mitch and Melanie seems to be important not so much in itself but because of its consequences for the other two women. Furthermore, there is a very disturbing feeling that they are being constantly controlled in their movements, as if their attachment could not develop in any way without it being noticed and judged by all around them. They are being, then, strongly focalised, both internally and externally, but even Annie and Lydia's gazes are not all that important: they look but their visual control is not firmly established, since there is no eyeline match back to Melanie and Mitch, as we would have expected, after their gazes. Immediately after Lydia looks at the couple, the birds attack, occupying the position previously filled by the camera in the establishing shot. First external focalisation and then the birds share control over the situation. In the first case, we are again facing a clear example of omniscience on the part of the narration. What is not so easy to explain is the connection between this omniscience and the bird attack.

This pattern of disruption of point of view, itself another norm of the film, is again surprisingly broken in perhaps the most flauntedly omniscient long high-angle shot: the one of Bodega Bay after the petrol pump explosion (fig. 13). The shot, which the spectator expects, because of the norm and because of transtextual hypotheses, to be clearly external, turns out to present the point of view... of the birds! (fig. 14). The external force is then identified, the former similar shots acquire a different sense now —notice that those in the first scene could now be interpreted as also representing the point of view of the birds in the shop—and the film seems ready to answer several unanswered questions, as to the nature of the birds' attacks and perhaps even their relationship with Melanie. However, the questions remain unanswered. The film refuses to communicate and to fill the most important gaps. The explanation of the reasons for the birds' attacks fails to materialise, at the same time as the deepest recesses of Melanie's mind, that area of her personality access to which might have explained the mysterious events of the film, are forever left in the dark. After flaunting its capacity for subjective presentation and omniscience, the narration openly suppresses the most important information. On the other hand, if we compare this shot with the one previously discussed here, we can conclude that what was hinted at then is now confirmed: the position of the birds is becoming disturbingly close to that of the narration; their god-like supremacy is very similar to that of the omniscient narrator. This conclusion seems again confirmed and developed by the stylistic presentation of the final bird attack.

In this scene, when Melanie goes into the upstairs room, we see her looking up and an eyeline match shows the big hole full of birds in the exaggeratedly high ceiling (figs. 15 and 16). Because of the pattern previously established, we half expect now a reverse shot from the point of view of the birds, but this shot never occurs. High-angle shots are used in the scene but they are close-ups of Melanie as she is being attacked: these are close-ups which mysteriously again probe into her mind (figs. 17 and 18). It is as if the distance between subjectivity and omniscience—or bird subjectivity—is about to disappear, and the separation between Melanie's mind and the birds collapses into identity. Subjectivity has proved compatible with and, in this case, inseparable from omniscience. This ritualistic scene, in which the heroine faces the dark powerful forces outside and inside her, is resolved in an identification of narrative strategies which would also explain the very disturbing final shot of the film: the car leaving Bodega Bay, against a very artificial looking sunset, surrounded by the birds, who seem to have completely taken over (fig. 19). The flaunted omniscience

and self-consciousness of the narration cannot be separated from the perceptual control that the birds have gained: the shot is also intensely subjective, and this subjectivity can only metaphorically be interpreted as a transference of Melanie's or, for that matter, Lydia's final control over the rarefied world of the film. Margaret M. Horwitz has argued that the birds' attacks are a displacement for Lydia's maternal possessiveness and an extension of her hysterical fear of losing her son (1986: 279). While her interpretation of the film in terms of the Oedipal scenario is attractive, it does not seem equipped to explain the fact that Melanie and not Lydia is the real protagonist of the film and, especially, the rather obvious, although unexplained, link between Melanie and the birds. If, on the other hand, we acknowledge the identification rather than the competitiveness between the two female characters, there remains no obstacle to a tentative interpretation of the birds' presence as the film's hysterical construction of a threatening female power that constitutes an assault on the patriarchal order of Bodega Bay. The uncontrollable forces of nature or, metaphorically, the powerful unconscious of the two female characters, has finally reached the most important objective in any fictional story: narrative control.

3. *THE BIRDS* II: THE STRUGGLE FOR PERCEPTUAL CONTROL

In this section, I will concentrate on focalisation as perception and explore more specific ways in which perceptual point of view works in a film, both narratively and stylistically. In order to do this, I will analyse the first scene of *The Birds* and a short selection of fragments from later scenes. As has already been discussed, perception is inseparable from more general strategies of plot construction, but this film proves that it may also be singled out as a privileged channel for the construction of meaning in film.⁷

Classical patterns of focalisation

The opening scene of *The Birds* starts in a usual way for a classical film, with an establishing shot: it establishes the film space —the city of San

Francisco—and immediately introduces us to the main character, Melanie Daniels. The narrative presents, therefore, an external focaliser and a main internal focalised, Melanie, although the city itself and the other characters and objects that appear in this first sequence (including the part played by Hitchcock, a character taking two dogs out of the pet shop) are also focalised, but obviously not so intensely as Melanie. The omniscient external focaliser picks her out from the crowd and then follows her as she crosses the road and goes into the pet shop. This establishing shot gives the viewer important expository information about the character, even if it is only about her physical appearance, but in film, much more frequently than in novels, physical appearance is often an index of psychological insight (fig. 20).

When the boy whistles at Melanie, she looks back and then her perception is activated: she becomes an active internal focaliser. However, the effect of the shot is a composite of both the fact that she looks at him with an expression of satisfaction and playfulness, showing that she enjoys being looked at and of the fact that the spectator, thanks to the position of the external focaliser, "catches" her looking at him (fig. 21). This gives us additional information about her character, which we will be able to confirm and use shortly, during her first conversation with Mitch. On this occasion, her gaze is not so important as our gaze.

Immediately afterwards, the birds appear, not externally presented but through her eyes—the spectator sees what she sees. She also sees the boy in the previous sequence, but this is not underlined stylistically, for example, by means of a cut to him from her point of view. With the birds, there is a cut and an eyeline match and then a cut back to a medium shot of her—closer than the previous one—which explores her reaction (figs. 22, 23 and 24). We shall see that, throughout the whole of this first scene, her potentiality as focaliser is not particularly intensified by the narration, but this is a significant exception for our understanding of the action: from the very beginning, by using her momentarily as focaliser, the narration binds Melanie and the birds together. For the spectator, as well as for the inhabitants of Bodega Bay, the birds appear in the story the moment she appears. Later on, almost every time the birds appear in the narrative, her look plays an important role, constantly teasing the spectator with the possibility of a mysterious relationship between them but never actually going beyond this uncanny suggestion.

To go back to the first scene, as soon as she turns round, her subjectivity is not particularly emphasised any more. The narration seems relatively autonomous with respect to her, framing her in long shot as she goes into the

pet shop. This is, however, as far as perceptual focalisation goes, because, in terms of knowledge and selection of information, she is the main focaliser throughout the scene, and throughout the film —the spectator is restricted approximately to her range of knowledge: we go into the shop at the same time as she does, we get the information about the bird she has ordered at the same time, we are introduced to Mitch approximately at the same time and learn about his trick also at the same time. Expository material concerning her personality and her past is also presented to us mostly through her. Therefore there are two levels of focalisation which appear simultaneously but do not always coincide: one on her, constantly intensified by stylistic devices, and another one by her, presented by means of other tactics of plot construction. The spectator's construction of the character is influenced by the persistence of this double focalisation, a device used by many films, especially those in which women are the main protagonists. In this case, double focalisation results in a mixture of identification with and detachment from her or, to put it in other words, she is simultaneously, but separately, our guide through the world of the film and the main focus of spectatorial interest, both principal subject and object of the narrative.⁸

The dialogue between Melanie and the shop assistant is presented through a classical stylistic device: the shot/reverse shot. In this case, the situation in terms of focalisation is as follows: the external focaliser focalises on the two characters while they are talking but also alternately approximates the optical point of view of one of them, focalising on the other one: the spectator is simultaneously placed in a relatively close position to one of the characters and concentrates her/his look on the other one. The shot/reverse shot technique generally focuses the spectator's attention more on the focalised than on the focaliser. That is the case here too, but not in the same way with both characters. When Melanie is focalised and the shop assistant is a potential focaliser, exploration of Melanie's personality is more important than the other character's gaze. When the situation is the reverse, it is only the information that the other lady is giving that interests Melanie and the spectator, but not herself. This reverse situation, in any case, occurs much less frequently: the shots of Melanie are much longer and the attitude of the external focaliser different —Melanie is generally presented throughout this first scene through filters which both emphasise her "mystery" and ironically bring her close to the heroines of classical melodrama and adventure films. This greater concentration on Melanie makes the spectator, in theory, perceptually identify with the shop assistant but this potentiality for

identification is never realised. Unlike in novels, subjectivity in film is not only presented by means of internal focalisation by the character but through an alternation or simultaneity of both external and internal focalisation. In order to identify with a character we need to know what she is like and, very crucially, what she looks like. A character cannot express herself through what she sees; she must be seen looking. Identification with Melanie can only be achieved through an alternation between shots of Melanie as focaliser and focalised. In any case, spectator identification with Melanie is probably not a central effect of the text yet. What is at stake here is the possibility of understanding Melanie's personality and motivations, which, in narrative terms, results in a general emphasis on external focalisation on her.

The male gaze

When Mitch arrives at the shop, the situation changes: focalisation on Melanie is just as intense as before but the gaze is more internal. In this sense, the first cut after he is first framed is representative: he is seen going upstairs from a high-angle shot and then there is an eyeline match from a medium shot of him to a long shot of Melanie, from almost exactly his point of view (figs. 25, 26 and 27). Subjective shots like this one are relatively rare in films, especially in classical films, because they generally reveal too much about the presence of the camera. Most eyeline matches and shot/reverse shot sequences give approximately the same visual information as the internal focaliser would receive, but from a slightly different angle. Or else, shots are used in which both focaliser and focalised are framed together, with the internal focaliser typically, although not necessarily, closer to the position of the camera. Films which, like *The Birds*, use a completely subjective shot, do so for very specific reasons, either as a general textual strategy, maybe in order to subvert classical film language or, more locally, as in many other Hitchcock films, in order to emphasise a certain aspect of the dramatic content of the frame.

In this case, the general situation underlined by the stylistic device is that, as Mulvey has argued, the woman is identified as the object of the male gaze (1989a: 19-21 and *passim*). Now the spectator's interest in her is shared with Mitch and, for textual and extratextual reasons, we identify with him —

especially but not only, the male viewer. This pattern will remain firmly in place throughout most of the film, although it becomes more complex when Lydia appears. Mitch looks at Melanie and the film prompts the spectator to share his perspective: this is inevitably a gendered and sexually loaded perspective—the viewer as sadistic *voyeur* and fetishist finds his (rather than her) position in the film without difficulty and his gaze inscribed in the diegesis.⁹ Thus an interesting double perspective develops—narrative and visual desire are not exactly equivalent in the film, at least at this stage: the spectator is the external subject of both but inside the diegesis the situation is more complex. Melanie is the main—although not the only one—subject of narrative desire.¹⁰ Simultaneously, she is also the—sexual—object of visual desire, with Mitch as the main diegetic subject, but not the only one (think of Mitch's neighbour, that Melanie meets in the lift, or the post office clerk in Bodega Bay, for example). This tension shapes our complex process of identification with and detachment from Melanie and paves the way for the open ending of the narrative.

The ensuing dialogue between Melanie and Mitch is presented by means of the usual shot/reverse shot technique, with over-the-shoulder shots of the character nearest to the camera. As in the previous dialogue, concentration is mostly on Melanie, but now the fact that he is internal focaliser is more relevant: she is performing for him, just as she is metaphorically performing for the viewer. Melanie's relationship with Mitch and with the spectator is, therefore, based on performance. As in the case of the boy whistling, not only is she the object of the gaze: she also enjoys it or, at least, flaunts her objectification.¹¹ Mitch, like us, enjoys the game, although, in both cases, there is the explicit awareness that it *is* a game. The nature of the exchange is reinforced by the theme of their conversation: lovebirds, and overt references to mating, sexually overdemonstrative birds, etc. Visually, the dialogue is realised in the same way as the first one with the shop assistant and yet the situation has completely changed because the narration has activated the role of the internal focaliser. This is a very basic example of how the narrative context and our previous experience of other films can be appropriated by the narration in order to "fill with meaning" an apparently ideologically neutral stylistic strategy. Focalisation, like narration in general, is partly shaped by style, but is often more than that. In order to interpret a look correctly, we must take into account other considerations apart from a purely formal analysis of the look.

Again, when Melanie identifies the canaries as lovebirds (therefore giving herself away), the scene is presented from Mitch's point of view (over-the-shoulder shot) and his question, "Doesn't this make you feel awful?" momentarily strengthens the spectator's identification with him. Mitch, however, is, like the film, also playful, and he is not referring to her impersonation of the shop assistant but to something apparently irrelevant (although it will prove relevant later on¹²). Subtly, however, and even though we share with him the pleasure of her chastisement, the film initiates a crucial ironic detachment from his position, which will be confirmed when he reveals his own "trick." If we, with him, disapprove of Melanie because of her frivolity and playfulness, we must also disapprove of Mitch for the same reason. Identification with him is curtailed here by analogy with her, although there has been, as yet, no important interruption of his perceptual point of view. In a way which is typical of the Hitchcockian narration, delayed and distributed exposition subverts textually and structurally implemented identification with certain characters: through the information provided and the strategies used in the first few scenes, Hitchcock often articulates certain patterns of identification, which are later destroyed and replaced by new ones. With Hitchcock's films, the viewer's relationship with the text is an unusually shifting one, a relationship that the experienced viewer is obviously aware of and constitutes one of the most pleasurable aspects of the texts. On the other hand, by gradually disclosing Mitch's shortcomings, or the dubiousness of his designs, both of which can be directly or indirectly related to his maleness, the film intensifies its irony on the viewer in so far as a certain kind of identification with Mitch has been promoted by the text. When the spectator realises that s/he has been made to identify with a character who is not totally likeable, it is too late, and considerations of the cultural and psychological reasons why we have found such an identification possible should ensue.

The pattern used for the shot/reverse shot presentation of their last dialogue in this scene —over-the-shoulder shots of him and isolated shots of her— confirms the general pattern focaliser/focalised that has been established in their relationship. This pattern is metaphorically equivalent to that of the relationship between the spectator and Melanie, a pattern which will be crucial in our response to the rest of the film: the spectator, like Mitch, will try to get to the bottom of her personality and of her relationship with the birds, but, in spite of its apparent interest in communicativeness, the narration will frustrate our expectations.

On the provisional evidence provided by this scene, then, the film both presents the woman as object of male desire and the male's incapability to fully understand women, paralleled by the text's incapability, or refusal, to control its own creations. Finally, the spectator's psychic investment in the film's presentation of gender relationships is turned on us: Mitch, who has provided an easy subject position for the spectator and subsequently voiced our hostility towards Melanie's "childish" behaviour, is almost immediately involved by the text in the same kind of game. As a consequence, our position of moral superiority with respect to Melanie is exposed as hypocritical and destroyed.

Battles for focalisation: external vs. internal, Melanie vs. Lydia

As I have suggested, the patterns of focalisation offered by the film significantly change with Lydia's appearance. We first see her when she comes into the Tides Restaurant, just after the sudden attack of a gull on Melanie. She is first framed from the point of view of Melanie, who is facing the door through which Lydia comes in. The framing is significant in itself: a subjective shot as from the heroine's position, with Mitch in the foreground and Lydia in the background moving towards him (fig. 28). The sentimental relationship between the two protagonists which had shown obvious signs of progress —after Melanie's unexpected visit and Mitch's concern about the bird attack— is now narratively and visually interrupted by Lydia. Where the frame had only included the two younger characters, Lydia appears now, bringing in complications. Typically, the three characters are later framed together, with Lydia in the centre, visually separating the other two (fig. 1). This pattern will reappear in later scenes, for example when Melanie goes to Lydia and Mitch's house, thus providing a visual parallel for the development of the relationships between the three of them, which could be generally described as Lydia coming between the other two, not only, predictably, through her motherly possessiveness towards Mitch but, more unexpectedly, also through her increasingly intimate relationship with Melanie (fig. 29). As can be seen, external focalisation is privileged here, manipulating the spectator's response to the events, and contributing to the establishment of spatial relationships between the characters.

The remainder of the scene at the Tides Restaurant is presented in close-ups of the three characters, with a special emphasis on Lydia. The narration is mostly concerned with the exploration of the reactions of each character, particularly the two women, to what is being said. In fact, most of the time, it is Mitch who speaks, but his words are largely heard offscreen. When he explains about the birds that Melanie has brought for Cathy, for example, we do not see him but Lydia's rather mysterious face reacting to this news. Immediately afterwards, Mitch says that Melanie is staying for the weekend and that he has invited her to go to their house for dinner. The moment he gives this information, which is new to the spectator and even to Melanie herself, since he is actually inviting her now, is emphasised by a cut to him, then to Melanie and finally back to Lydia. But even before the cut to Mitch, the external focaliser remains with Lydia for a split second, so that the spectator can catch her reaction and attribute it to the fact that Melanie is staying the weekend in Bodega Bay. The spectator is, therefore, very precisely directed by the narration, and more specifically in this case, by the external focaliser, in the construction of the story.

The ways in which internal focalisation influences the attitude of the external focaliser is, however, less clear in this scene. Although the importance of character gazes is as great here as elsewhere in Hitchcock, it seems that in this succession of close-ups, with the occasional medium shot of Melanie alone, and of Mitch and Lydia standing together, the gaze is more important for what it expresses than for how it directs changes in subsequent framings (figs. 30, 31 and 32). The spectator learns that Mitch is still approaching his relationship with Melanie as an erotic game, and that Melanie is still reacting to this approach in the same way, putting on the all-too-obvious mask of the annoyed lady but inviting Mitch to disregard the superficial meaning of her words and to play on. Lydia, on the other hand, seems very conscious that the relationship between them is no game and strongly resents it. In a way, then, we see through the characters' eyes, but, rather than the world and the people around, we see inside them: their gazes seem to be turned inwards, looking at themselves. This happens especially in the case of Lydia. While she is being framed in close-up, she turns her eyes twice towards Mitch's position offscreen (fig. 30). We might have expected here an eyeline match and a cut to Mitch, but on both occasions, the cut only occurs once Lydia has turned her eyes back towards Melanie. The connections between the characters, on the other hand, seem to be firmly established through their gazes, but the editing patterns of the sequence are to

a very great extent independent of them. The omniscience of the narration overpowers any attempt by the characters to gain narrative control.

There is, however, more to the presentation of Lydia's character in this scene. As was pointed out before, she is first seen subjectively from Melanie's position. This is, of course, an establishing shot, and it can be argued that focalisation through Melanie is used here simply as the best way to establish the film space. Conversely, we may choose to pursue the subjectivity suggested by the framing. It seems clear that the selection of space in this scene is only very slightly affected by Lydia's gaze, at least in the first half, but the case of Melanie is less clear, and this can be seen, paradoxically, in the way Lydia appears to us. From the moment Lydia is first seen, there is a mysterious aura surrounding her. This is partly caused by her uncanny resemblance to Melanie, but the fact that she is strongly focalised also seems to affect her reactions, making her act in a less conventional way. In other words, rather like Melanie in the previously discussed scene, Lydia's behaviour is, to a large extent, dictated by the way other people, specifically Melanie, looks at her. In the first half of the scene, Melanie is mostly framed in medium shot and, consequently, our concentration on her is much less intense than on Lydia. If we also take into account that, among all the characters and in spite of the male gaze, so far we have identified mostly with Melanie, and add the fact that the first establishing shot was from her point of view, we may conclude that identification with Melanie is still strong and that at this point she is sharing perceptual control with the external focaliser. Lydia is seen through Melanie's eyes and hence the aura of mystery around the older woman and the uneasy feeling of threat: we are being made to share Melanie's perception of her. It could be said that, in this scene, internal focalisation through Melanie is selective: the film is interested in presenting Lydia (like the birds!) from her point of view, but not the rest of the action. Rather than granting Melanie narrative control, internal focalisation is used as a specific strategy of presentation of the new character and as an — unexplained — link between her and the birds, through Melanie's consciousness.

The link between Lydia and the birds is first suggested by the fact that, just before she appears, Melanie has told Mitch that she hates the gulls in Bodega Bay. Then Lydia comes into the restaurant, an obvious potential object of Melanie's hatred. Their subsequent conversation is mostly, like Melanie and Mitch's first dialogue, about the lovebirds. When at the end of the scene Melanie explains to Lydia that she has been attacked by a gull, the expression on Lydia's face is as mysterious as before and as mysterious as the

events that have begun to take place in Bodega Bay. I have previously argued that the connection between Melanie and the birds is never explicitly confirmed by the text. The same happens now with Lydia, but the connection is even more mysterious, more difficult to account for through the diegetic information given by the film.

In any case, Lydia's relationship with the birds underscores her incipient claim to narrative control. The second half of the scene seems to invert the pattern discussed above, and as the camera gets closer to Melanie, it seems to separate itself from Lydia, framing her now in medium shot, but the overall impression is that, symmetrically to what happened previously, it is her vision that the spectator is now asked to share. Once she has taken hold of the situation and understood what Melanie's visit to Bodega Bay really means, Lydia changes from main focalised into focaliser. When we find out more details about her personality and her past, our identification with her will be further strengthened.

Summing up, without denying the flaunted presence of the omniscient external focaliser, and the manipulative way in which it selects parts of the film space for us, internal focalisation is also crucial in this scene, and symbolic of the relationship between the characters: the narrative and perceptual control held by Melanie so far, only shared by Mitch in a rather secondary way at the pet shop and in the scene of the boat ride, seems to be won over by Lydia. From now on, the struggle for control between the two women will constitute, together with the bird attacks, the main part of the action. Notice also that the gradual reversal of focalisation patterns between Melanie and the birds—with Melanie as focaliser at the beginning and the birds progressively identified with the vantage point from which the high-angle shots are framed later, that is, the birds as internal/external (?) focalisers—is mirrored in a much more compressed way by her relationship with Lydia in this scene, also in terms of focalisation. This seems to point to a strong connection between Lydia and the birds, as Horwitz argues in the article referred to above, but, in my view, this connection can be more satisfactorily explained as a relationship between conscious and unconscious drives in Melanie's traumatic sexuality, or even as an expression of the tension between conscious and unconscious forces in the film, than as a more or less explicit unleashing of the dark forces of evil on Melanie on the part of the castrating mother. In spite of the initial impression, Lydia does not rise to complete protagonism in the rest of the film, and her most interesting dimension will not be as antagonist of Melanie but as mirror image of the

psychological disorders presented by the text through the character of the heroine.

A battle lost: Annie's function in the narrative

Annie, Melanie's other rival for Mitch's affection, is not even allowed the same share of narrative control as Lydia. She is displaced to the margins of the text and, unlike the other main characters, even denied survival after the bird attacks. Her death is cruel and unexpected but, at the same time, without the melodramatic excess that characterises the deaths of important characters in Hollywood films. Both the fact that this event does not take place near the end of the narrative and the lack of stylistic emphasis in the scene in which Melanie and Mitch find her body, point to Annie's lack of centrality.¹³ At the same time, Annie is hardly presented as internal focaliser. Only in her first appearance, when Melanie is enquiring about the name of Mitch's sister, does her gaze exert some control over the narrative. The close-up that shows her reaction to the fact that the birds Melanie is carrying are lovebirds (a reaction which is exactly repeated by Lydia in the Tides restaurant scene) is more a case of her gaze being used to focalise inwards, towards herself, rather than presenting the action from her point of view (fig. 33). Even though, when Melanie leaves, her gaze, again in close-up, seems to be more directed outside, with an element of threat in it (fig. 34), later developments in the film will confirm that this is little more than a stylistic red herring, a mirage of impossible narrative control.

There is one scene in which her marginality in the text is intensified through patterns of focalisation. After dinner at Mitch's, Melanie returns to Annie's house. Annie is still awake and they start talking. During this conversation Annie reveals to Melanie what already seemed obvious: her past involvement with Mitch, which is the reason why, without any hope, she is still in Bodega Bay. The dialogue is stylistically presented through shot/reverse shots. Since it is Annie that is giving relevant information, Melanie is the most active internal focaliser, with lengthier shots of Annie, from Melanie's approximate point of view.

However, when Mitch telephones in order to invite Melanie to Cathy's birthday party, the situation changes abruptly and the style becomes less transparent, more self-conscious. Let us remember that this situation is parallel to the one at the Tides Restaurant discussed above, except that the

intruder is now Annie instead of Lydia, and Mitch is visually absent. The first part of the conversation is presented by means of a very self-conscious framing: Annie in close-up in the foreground, on the right of the frame, and Melanie on the left, in three-quarter shot (fig. 35). What is interesting here is that both realistic and stylistic expectations, brought to bear by the viewer through her/his experience of classical cinema, would have Annie, who is politely turned away from Melanie, look towards her and at some point and, consequently, be turned into internal focaliser. In a sense, of course, she is an active internal focaliser, since she is *listening* to the conversation and the way in which she reacts to it contributes to our construction of the story. Visually, however, she denies herself any narrative predominance by not looking. The film, in a sense, frustrates our expectations by framing her in a position which would privilege her as focaliser, and then emphasising her predicament when we realise that she has to relinquish that possibility of control.

The second part of the telephone conversation is presented by means of shot/reverse shots. This is the usual device to convey dialogues in classical films. In this case, there is a dialogue —on the telephone— but the text relates not the two people who are talking but the two who are felt to be the most important. In other words, the omniscient external focaliser subverts the fabula by attracting the spectator's attention away from its apparently most obvious centre of interest. In any case, we would expect the two female characters to be connected by their gazes. Melanie, as a matter of fact, does look at Annie, but once again, Annie chooses to look away, making us concentrate on her as overpowered by Melanie, rather than on her gaze. She is framed in complete isolation, in a state of solipsistic reflection, her gaze only directed internally at herself (fig. 36), powerless to forget Mitch or to do anything to regain his affection. When Melanie arrives in Bodega Bay, Annie can do nothing but look on from the outside, but she, unlike the external focaliser and unlike Lydia, is not even allowed to make us identify with her gaze, and it is understandable that it should not be so: the moment a character in a film holds visual control, her/his position in the narrative becomes more central, more powerful than Annie could ever be allowed.

**Patterns reversed:
Melanie's strength vs. Lydia's displacement**

In the previous section, I mentioned the structurally important scene in which our range of knowledge significantly transcends Melanie's: on Monday morning, Lydia leaves her house and the narration accompanies her, leaving Melanie behind. The structural change is important in itself, since it explicitly acknowledges Lydia's growing narrative centrality. This process, however, goes through different stages in the course of which the relationship between the two women is developed. One significant scene in this respect is the previous one, which takes place the night before in Lydia's house, just after the sparrow attack, when the sheriff has just arrived to find out what has happened.

The scene starts with a framing which reminds us of the telephone conversation just discussed: Mitch, Lydia and the sheriff are framed in three-quarter shot discussing the attack, in the centre of the frame, and Melanie is closest to the camera in medium shot, looking at them (fig. 37). Unlike the case of Annie, we are made to share our vision with Melanie. In spite of her separation from the others, we do not for a second doubt her centrality, whereas with Annie our impression was one of displacement and detachment from her. Melanie's internal focalisation is then further intensified by a cut to a reverse shot of her now concentrating on Lydia's nervous movements as she tries to tidy up, and a subsequent eyeline match to Lydia moving around the room (figs. 38 and 39).

The manipulation of space is again obvious here: although it is the two men who are talking, with occasional brief interventions from Lydia, the narration makes us concentrate on the character of the mother through Melanie's internal focalisation: as in the scene at the Tides Restaurant, we are made to look at Lydia through Melanie's eyes. However, there is a crucial difference: in the previous scene, we felt, with Melanie, the mysterious aura and the threatening attitude of the other character; now we realise her weaknesses, her sense of loss, of not being able to cope any more. Melanie's gaze loses part of its fear and becomes more sympathetic towards a character who, probably for the first time, is made to look like a "normal" human being. The impression of a direct connection between Lydia and the birds loses strength here, as she seems to be totally overpowered and helpless after the sparrow attack. The order that she represented has been shattered both by the bird attack, and in another sense, by Melanie's arrival. At one point, after an unusually long concentration on Lydia's movements with occasional close-ups of Melanie looking at her, Melanie decides to act: she states her intention to stay the night and leaves the room accompanied by Cathy, who seems closer to her than to her own mother. The framing is now parallel to the one

that opened the scene: if before Melanie was standing on the right of the frame in medium shot, Lydia is now standing closest to us, on the left hand side, looking at Melanie and Cathy as they disappear offscreen right (fig. 40). The pattern of internal focalisation has evolved in the same way as at the Tides Restaurant: Melanie starts off as the internal focaliser but Lydia gradually replaces her. It is her gaze turned towards the viewer that once again closes the scene (fig. 41). Here, however, the nature of the gaze is different: this is very clearly the face of a woman who is afraid of losing both her children at the hands of an intruder, a woman who looks remarkably like her but who is much younger, and, contrary to our expectations, much stronger than her. The culmination of this process will take place on the following morning when she is in bed and Melanie brings her tea and offers to go to the school and collect Cathy. Lydia tells Melanie about her dead husband and acknowledges the inevitability of her displacement from the centre of things, but our sympathy for the character has grown remarkably since the first time we saw her. The narration is now ready to follow Lydia and it is through her and not Melanie that we are going to experience the horror of violent death.¹⁴ While at the beginning the spectator might have considered Lydia's main function in the narrative to be that of obstacle and threat to Melanie and Mitch's relationship, the film contradicts our expectations by gradually revealing her humanity, her weaknesses and her fear of relegation. She appears, in this sense, close to Annie, but the difference is also clear: whereas Annie is denied focalisation or any sort of narrative prominence, Lydia grows more and more central, and her gaze becomes the only important rival for internal focalisation found by Melanie until the end of the film.

The triumph of the female gaze

The episode discussed above presents interesting contrasts with both the scene at the Tides Restaurant and that of the telephone call at Annie's house, in terms of the manipulation by the external focaliser and the thematic connotations of the patterns of internal focalisation. It also contrasts, in a different sense, with the opening scene, at the pet shop, in that it dramatises the complete disappearance of the male gaze.

The two men present in the room —Mitch and the sheriff— are denied any centrality by the text,¹⁵ and are consistently ignored except when Lydia

happens to be near them, the contents of their dialogue becoming practically irrelevant. After the bird attacks, the world of the film seems to be almost completely dominated by the women: Melanie is now joined by Lydia as protagonist of the action. Mitch's gaze had been used in the film's first scene, in a classical way, in order to present Melanie as willing and playful sexual object, but as the film grows in depth and Melanie's personality is developed and enriched by the events, Mitch's gaze is made to disappear and is replaced by both Melanie's and Lydia's. Laura Mulvey's contention that the gaze in narrative films is always male, based precisely, among others, on a study of Hitchcock's films (1989: 23), is disqualified by *The Birds*.¹⁶ After this scene, Mitch's position as the leader of the group becomes more and more precarious and, apart from being the one who saves Melanie from the final bird attack, his narrative relevance gradually dwindles into almost nothingness.¹⁷ It is clearly Melanie and Lydia who attract all of the spectator's attention from now on.

Moreover, in this scene there is another man present in the room: Mitch's dead father, whose portrait hangs on the wall above the piano. Under Melanie's scrutiny, Lydia tries to straighten the picture, bringing it back to its original position of dominance but a dead bird frightens her and the portrait remains askew (figs. 42 and 43). Later on, Lydia will confess her total dependence on her husband in the past and her inability to adapt to life without him. In the course of the scene, the father metaphorically loses his position of authority in the house and his male gaze is also brutally disavowed, both by the bird attacks and by Melanie's gaze. The father is not replaced by Mitch as the figure of authority in the family but, rather, by both Lydia and Melanie.

In a wider sense the birds have upset and subverted the patriarchal order in Bodega Bay, replacing it by a profound, mysterious, threatening and chaotic alternative, one which is related, although never logically explained, to the two female characters. In many senses, of course, the narration remains male, for example in its confessed impossibility to understand Melanie (and the nature of the bird attacks), but the male narration is also ultimately overpowered by the female world: not only is the visual control of the father and Mitch won over by Melanie and Lydia, but also the apparently totalising omniscience of the narration has been revealed to be the omniscience of bird subjectivity, which produces the final image of complete bird control over the society of Bodega Bay. By going against what Mulvey and others would see as the natural inclination of visual representation in Hollywood films and

substituting female for male both at the levels of internal and external focalisation, *The Birds* effectively overturns the patriarchal order, replacing it by an admittedly more threatening but also more interesting *Weltanschauung*. It is as if, while still refusing and proving incapable to understand female difference, still unprepared to reject the centrality of castration, the patriarchal text accepts defeat, just as Bodega Bay and the principal characters acknowledge their own defeat to the birds, and surrenders narrative control to the female characters, the victory of the birds being, in Julia Kristeva's terminology, the victory of the abject, of the phobic's substitute for sexual difference.

4. CONCLUSION

My study of focalisation in *The Birds* has disclosed a transference of power and narrative control from male to female in the course of the film. It can be argued that, even granting that the female vision acquires a certain predominance at the end, the text remains male (Hitchcock's?) in ultimately witnessing the final events from the outside, as the triumph of chaos and hysteria. The birds become an unconscious objective correlative of female hysteria, and, as a symbol, a little hysterical themselves. But this reading is based on the premise that the text is the product of a single consciousness (the author), which, even against textual evidence, must hold ultimate power over the narration, or, to put it in other terms, an agent who holds the final voice over all the rest. My theoretical discussion of focalisation in film narrative, however, rejects this approach and substitutes the existence of a poliphony, a multiplicity of "visions" in a filmic text, and therefore, also a multiplicity of subjects, often struggling for narrative or perceptual control, and, in many cases, with high degrees of independence from one another. In *The Birds*, I have suggested, narratorial male omniscience is gradually replaced by, or disclosed as, bird and female subjectivity.¹⁸ Two powerful narrative forces have fought for control of the universe of the film, even for control of the mechanisms of audience identification and the outcome, from the evidence of the final shot, seems clear enough, even though the ending itself is anything but clear. Different interpretations of this ending have tried

to make sense of its mystifying nature. From the evidence presented here, it seems that Horwitz's is least tenable:

it is clear that Lydia and Mitch are 'reunited'; now they have two 'children.' It is as if Mother is in the back seat with the younger child who is sick, while Father, in the front seat, drives with the older child next to him The last shot of the car driving away can be considered a point-of-view shot from the perspective of the birds, underlining the impression that they have (Lydia has) achieved dominance" (1986: 286).

One may agree that the birds' final focalising power represent Lydia's dominance, but not as opposed to Melanie, certainly not as an outcome of Lydia's struggle to keep the Mother position in her family. One only needs to look closely at the final shot, but also at what has happened immediately before, to see how little this interpretation clarifies the film. Cameron and Jeffery interpret the film ultimately as an allegory of Hitchcock's attack on the audience (1986: 268-70). The birds would not be a feminine symbol at all, but a symbol of Hitchcock himself, launching an assault on audience complacency and insincerity. The metafictional dimension, which these critics exploit, is present in many Hitchcockian texts, but to argue that this is the only possible reading of such an ambiguous and open ending is to deny the power of the film to signify at different narrative levels. Robin Wood, after perceptively interpreting the birds as representative of everything that is unpredictable, precarious and uncontrollable in our lives, summarises the effect of the final shot in the following line: "the birds are letting them through; the birds are massing for the next assault" (1989: 172). A similar conclusion is reached by Spoto, who argues that the birds do not stand for any "thing," but immediately adds, "rather they represent all the unacknowledged, invisible forces of destruction and disorder which inhabit every psyche and which subordinate human life to a capricious universe" (1976: 388).¹⁹ These last two readings attempt to preserve the ambiguity of the final scene, a scene which rejects interpretation, and seeks to signify randomness, non-meaning. Rosemary Jackson explains, referring to modern fantasy: "Without a cosmology of heaven and hell, the mind faces mere redundancy: the cosmos becomes a space full of menace, increasingly apprehended and internalized as an area of non-meaning" (1981: 18). By displacing my interpretation of the film to the fantastic I am not only acknowledging its obvious generic allegiance but also occupying the only

space of representation that our culture has allowed for female subjectivity and sexuality: the realm of fantasy. In this *mise en scène* of desire, Melanie is left, in Jackson's words, "disatisfied, endlessly desiring" (9). *The Birds* can be considered a modern fantastic text in that, without apparently abandoning the world of the real, it disavows a realistically explained patriarchal universe. Against the dominant male conscious of omniscience and the sadistic gaze, it posits a subjective female unconscious which, however mysterious, chaotic and hysterical in its representation, seems to finally take over the control of the paraxial space in which this fantasy takes place. a

NOTES

1. For a theoretical framework to the concept of focalisation in film see my "Focalisation in Film Narrative" (1991) and the other theoretical works referred to in this introduction.

2. Stam, Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis make a similar point in the course of their discussion of Seymour Chatman's concept of *filter*, to which I will return below: "The concept of filtration may disclose a different hierarchy, . . . wherein the optical point-of-view can be shown to be subordinate to the role of the psychological filter. The character functioning as the filter may not command a literal point-of-view shot, but can nevertheless serve as the delegate of the narrator, the principal screen or medium through whom events are channeled" (1992: 95). These authors, incidentally, argue, inaccurately in my opinion, that Genette's concept of focalisation is perceptual (1992: 88,94). Consider Genette's definition of focalisation: "une restriction de 'champ', c'est-à-dire en fait une sélection de l'information narrative par rapport à ce que la tradition nommait l'*omniscience*" (1982: 49).

3. This distinction between external and internal focaliser does not correspond to the one proposed by Edward Branigan in his recent cognitive theory of focalisation (1992: 100-07).

4. In this sense, Melanie is very similar to other Hitchcockian heroines, particularly the character played by Tippi Hedren in his next film, *Marnie* (1964), and those played by Grace Kelly in *Rear Window* (1954) and *To Catch a Thief* (1955) and by Eva Marie Saint in *North by Northwest* (1959). According to Wood, the two main human shortcomings that are attacked in the film are insincerity and complacency. About our first impression of Melanie, he says: "Melanie is imprisoned in a gilded cage of sophisticated triviality, an inability to be sincere which is an inability to live" (1989: 155). About Melanie's hair, Donald Spoto argues: "We first

see her . . . , her blond hair impeccably coiffed. That hair will become gradually more disheveled as the story progresses; at the end it is tightly wrapped in bandages, and provides a visual paradigm for the undoing of Melanie's unreflective self-confidence" (1976: 388).

5. We must remember that films, unlike novels, have obvious difficulties to enter characters' minds. In this sense, *The Birds* seems to be playing against the nature of film as a narrative language and, at the same time, expressing—and maybe parodying—the medium's limitations. Possible lack of communicativeness is therefore related here not to omniscience but to subjectivity.

6. Notice also that the following shot/reverse shot dialogue between Melanie and the shop assistant, who has remained upstairs, reinforces the idea that the high angle shot was not carrying out any specific narrative function: this dialogue presents low angle point of view shots of the assistant as from Melanie's position (fig. 5), but the reverse shots of Melanie, instead of being high angle, are straight angle shots (fig. 6)—the high angle strategy is used when it is not necessary and not used when it would have seemed more appropriate.

7. Identification is a central issue in the construction of meaning through focalisation. Therefore, mechanisms and processes of spectator identification or, to use the most widely accepted phrase in film theory, subject positioning, will be frequently mentioned. I generally agree with Robin Wood's contention that "the construction of identification in a film cannot be reduced to an analysis of 'the look'" (305). While early French structuralist and later feminist criticism privileges the centrality of the look in the cinematic apparatus and in the construction of gendered subjectivity, it is clearly not the only mechanism of subject positioning in film narratives. There are extratextual and pretextual considerations, as well as such strategies of film construction as have been analysed in the previous section, that influence matters of identification. Wood lists six factors that are relevant in the construction of identification: identification with the male gaze, identification with the threatened or victimised, degrees of sympathy, the sharing of a consciousness, the use of cinematic devices and identification with the star (305-10). I would like to suggest, on the other hand, that the concept of focalisation in the way it has been defined here, provides a rigorous formal starting point in the sense that it covers within the different strategies of plot and textual construction, all the narrative mechanisms through which subject positioning may occur in a film. Likewise the concept of focalisation is productive in that it allows scope for the occurrence of apparently contradictory patterns of identification within single scenes or even shots, through its positing of a gap between perceptual and conceptual or ideological focalisation and the possibility of a simultaneity of occurrence of external and internal focalisation in film narratives.

8. Stephen Heath has suggested, in a different context, that the relationship between the spectator and the events taking place on the screen can be defined through the phrase "separation in identification" (see Johnston 1985: 247).

9. While Mulvey's theory has been enormously influential in the whole of contemporary film theory and criticism, she has also been criticised on many fronts, for example, in her deterministic theorisation of the spectator as male or "masculinised." Recent theories such as those proposed by Cowie (1984), Studlar (1988), Rodowick (1991) and others take issue with Mulvey through different re-readings of Freud's writings on the subject's capacity for gender fluidity and transformation in fantasy. These theories, however, are compatible with the present

analysis of focalisation. Focalisation cannot say anything about the real spectator's psychic processes and affects: it can only analyse the way in which culturally formed patterns of "vision" have found their way into film language and into the construction of specific films and evaluate the ideological strategies at work in such appropriations or, to use the term proposed, in different contexts, by Stephen Greenblatt (1988) and Christine Gledhill (1988), negotiations. In this scene, an analysis of focalisation can conclude a change in the patterns of "looking" brought about by Mitch's appearance, but it can say very little about the spectator's psychic investment in the character's gaze.

10. Peter Brooks has defined this desire as the desire for solutions and endings (1984). The emphasis on the inevitability of endings and the containment of subversion through closure has been a "given" of Althusserian-based film theory and, more generally, of ideological criticism of narrative both in film and literature. However, Cowie, among others, has argued that spectatorial pleasure in narrative is not in the consummation but in the process of reaching that consummation (1984: 80). An interesting, alternative definition of narrativity is proposed by Teresa de Lauretis: "the inscription of the movement and positionalities of desire" (1984: 79).

11. Mary Ann Doane, following Luce Irigaray, has proposed the concept of "masquerade," or conscious intensification of female self-objectification as a possibility of subversion of the patriarchal construction of femininity (1991: 25-26 and *passim*). In a later work, she proposes a new term, "double mimesis," through which the female spectator of classical films renders the gestures and poses of traditional definitions of femininity "fantastic" and "literally incredible," in order to demonstrate "that these are poses, postures, tropes—in short, that we are being subjected to a discourse on femininity" (1987: 181).

12. He is now explicitly referring to the birds being caged. Later on in the same scene, when a bird escapes from the cage, and it is significantly Mitch that catches it and returns it to its confinement, he says, "Back to your gilded cage, Melanie Daniels," thus giving his own game away. The explicit connection made by him between Melanie and the birds reinforces the mysterious relationship which links her with them, but it is also interestingly reversed later on in the film, when, during a bird attack, Melanie goes into a telephone box in order to protect herself, and the framing suggests that *she* is caged, with the birds outside, savagely crashing into the glass windows. About the identification the film establishes between Melanie and the birds, Spoto remarks that the first three letters in Melanie's car's number plates are RUJ ("Are you jay?") (1976: 388).

13. The teacher's sacrificial death is described by Spoto as an "affecting scene" but even his description places more emphasis on the other characters than on Annie herself (1976: 393).

14. Notice that Annie's death was presented, to a certain extent, through Melanie's internal focalisation but whereas identification was played down in that scene, the farmer's death is presented to us very emphatically through Lydia's gaze and reaction.

15. Wood argues: "Officials of the law are always ineffectual in Hitchcock: as representative of a superficial, unnaturally imposed order they are unable, or refuse, to see the abysses" (1989: 163).

16. Laura Mulvey's later account of the position of the female spectator, in which she defends a kind of transvestism whereby women would adopt masculinised positions when seeing a film does not seem very useful to explain Melanie's and Lydia's narrative and visual control in *The Birds* (Mulvey 1989b: 37 and *passim*). On the other hand, Mary Ann Doane's analysis of the woman's film in the 1940s (Doane 1987) seems more appropriate. In this book, Doane argues that while it is true that women hold a great degree of control in these films, the nature of their look is different from that of male characters in other Hollywood genres: fetishism, voyeurism and Oedipal identification are replaced in the woman's film by masochism, narcissism and passivity. Although she tends to conclude that these psychic mechanisms are activated in these films with the ultimate purpose of denying female subjectivity (1987: 174), and this conclusion would probably not hold for a film like *The Birds*, the identity established in the film between Melanie, the birds and, later on, Lydia, the two women's highly ambiguous response to the bird attacks and Melanie's victimisation by the birds all point to the feasibility of an interpretation along the lines proposed by Doane.

17. I disagree with Slavoj Zizek, who elaborates a chronological classification of Hitchcock's films and places *The Birds* in a group "thematically centred on the perspective of the male hero to whom the maternal superego blocks access to a 'normal' sexual relation" (1992: 5). While this model may accurately explain Mitch's relationship with Melanie and Lydia, his perspective can in no way be considered the central point of interest in the film.

18. Tania Modleski argues something very similar when she says: "Not only is it possible to argue that feminist consciousness is the mirror of patriarchal consciousness, but one might argue as well that the patriarchal unconscious lies in femininity" (1988: 4).

19. Spoto also mentions that Hitchcock had considered alternative endings: the Brenners and Mitch arriving in San Francisco but finding the Golden Gate Bridge swarming with birds, or even a further journey through towns that had been attacked by the malevolent animals, but the mixture of menace and a glimmer of hope in the version finally used is found by the critic preferable to the others (1976: 394).

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METHODOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A FUNCTIONAL LEXICOLOGICAL MODEL¹

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0. INTRODUCTION

IN contrast with previous years in which syntax held the dominant role in linguistic theory, the period 1975-1985 can be considered the decade of the lexicon (Nowakowsky 1990: 3). Within linguistic theory, the lexicon is now known to be more than an accessory list, providing auxiliary information in order to make grammatical rules work. It can rather be conceptualized as an intricate network of elements interconnected by cohesive, associative, lexical and encyclopedic functions.

In fact, this resurgence of interest in the lexicon and its organization is evident even in those linguists (e.g. Chomsky 1981a, b; 1986a, b) who had first advocated precisely the opposite. This rediscovery of the lexicon can be attributed to a number of factors, some of which were brought about by improvements in linguistic research and others which were prompted by the recent developments in disciplines such as psychology, philosophy, categorization, etc.²

Following this revival of interest in lexical items, in this paper we explain the theoretical foundations of our Lexicon/Dictionary. This Lexicon/Dictionary is the result of the pioneering work and research of Martín Mingorance (1984; 1985a,b; 1987a,b,c; 1990) in lexicology and lexicography.

The first part of this paper is an analysis of various features relevant to the different proposals of semantic theories for the lexicon. This introductory survey serves as a backdrop for the second part which is an explanation of our functional lexicological model.

1. SETTING THE SCENE

Rather than give a summary of the different proposals of semantic theories for the Lexicon, we believe it will be more enlightening to examine these theories in terms of certain points relevant to them all:

(i) In accordance with this lexical resurgence, linguistic models might now be regarded as "panlexicalist" (Starosta 1988: 1). In other words, the word has become the central unit in language description and thus the lexicon has become the informational domain *par excellence*:

[A] lexicon by itself generates the set of grammatically well-formed sentences in a language: each word is marked with contextual features which can be seen as well-formed conditions on trees, and a well-formed sentence is any configuration of words for which all these well-formedness conditions are satisfied. . . . Consequently *a fully specified lexicon is itself a grammar*, even if it is not associated with a single grammatical rule. (Starosta 1988: 1; our own emphasis).

We also share the view that the lexicon of a language should be seen as a type of grammar, capable of accounting for human lexical abilities (cf. below). Yet, despite the panlexicalist orientation of linguistic theories, the internal make-up of the lexicon component is still too deeply-seated in theory internal qualifications.³ Somehow, the erroneous maxim "let the theory decide" instead of "let the data decide" has served as the guideline for the

construction of the Lexicon Component. This can yield dangerous results. Although we agree that the configuration of a lexicon should be in accordance with the methodological postulates adopted for its description, the Lexicon should also be sensitive to what speakers really know about the words in their language. In this respect, we believe that there is a discrepancy between the frozen notion of the lexicon (as envisaged in most linguistic models) and the speakers' actual lexical knowledge (e.g. metaphorical processes, lexical presuppositions, lexical intensional properties, semantic domains, axiological distinctions, pragmatic features, double-field membership etc.). This discrepancy leads to the concept of the lexicon as a fixed data base, innocent of all dynamic operations. In our opinion, this account of the lexicon is still insufficient since this component should be able to account for all type of active lexical operations noted above.

Within Cognitive Linguistics two relevant approaches which try to formulate active semantic theories for the lexicon are those of Jackendoff (1983, 1987) and Lakoff (1982) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980). These linguists, departing from the formal models of logical semantics (cf. Jackendoff 1983: 23-37; Lakoff and Johnson's (1980: 156-ff) critique of "the myth of objectivism"), agree that categorization is an essential aspect of human cognition and that grasping a meaning is an *event* of understanding, in which human perceptual experience plays a vital role (cf. Johnson 1987: chapter 2). Each approach emphasizes a different aspect of language and cognition: Jackendoff gives prominence to perception and individuation while Lakoff places greater emphasis on experiential aspects of categorization and metaphorical processes. Although both make valid assertions, neither of these approaches can be said to give an adequate account of the speaker's actual lexical knowledge.

Firstly, they fail to recognize strictly lexical issues, and consequently they cannot account for their specificity.⁴ In our opinion, these models lack a theoretical linguistic framework which can systematically account for the nature and origin of prototypical features, types of metaphor, image schemata, semantic interrelationships, etc. In contrast, we will show that the structure of our lexicon/dictionary can bridge the gap between structural semantics and prototype theory, giving proof that a semantic dimension reflects the structure of a conceptual schema (Faber and Mairal, forthcoming).

Secondly, there is no reason to postulate a different treatment for those lexical operations that touch upon the formal aspects of lexical units (namely,

syntactic, morphological and phonological) and those related to their semantic aspects. We have found that both types of operations are diagrammatically motivated, and thus we have formulated a number of iconic principles which have been derived from the semantic architecture of our Lexicon/Dictionary.

Thirdly, in Lakoff's model, there is an excessive tendency to treat any linguistic expression as a type or subtype of metaphor. A better solution would be to determine criteria for literalness and also pin down the nature of these metaphorical expressions within what Givón (1989, 1990) calls the "communicative contract." In doing so we claim that evidence can be obtained of the links and relations between semantic domains from meaning structure itself. That is, we believe that one can arrive at an inventory of conceptual categories and their interrelationships through the structure of language itself, as a reflection of our understanding of reality, or our way of having a world.

Fourthly, what is undeniably true is that generally the examples given to justify prototype theory fall in those areas of vocabulary which appear to be the best examples of that particular theory, e.g. prototype theory tends to use birds and artifacts. Considerably less has been said about those "messy," but very important areas which, because of their abstractness, are more difficult to handle such as "perception," "speech," "mental processes," "change," "existence," "feeling"⁵ etc. In our opinion, any theory of category membership must be prepared to deal with all types of categories, and not only those which are the best examples of the particular theory in question⁶ (cf. Faber 1994).

In essence, it seems that in most linguistic models priority is given to storage and therefore the lexical unit is still "an immobile Saussurean sound-sense type of sign." Other models such as Lakoff's and Jackendoff's present a more promising account though insufficient account of the lexicon. In our model, the lexical item itself is a process and consequently the lexicon is conceived as a dynamic storage of words.

(ii) Cognitive sciences share the view that it is necessary and legitimate to postulate systems of rules and mental and computational representations to explicate human behaviour and the working of a machine. It is assumed that the study of the lexicon is of great interest for two types of cognizers: (1) human beings and (2) computational systems. In this respect, a number of

linguists have tried to partially simulate the working of the mental lexicon on the computer.

This analogy is based on the fact that human mental behaviour can be explained in terms of representations, namely lexical and computational representations (Pylyshyn, in Paprotté 1990: 1). Both lexical and computational representations, conceived as physically immediate cognitive codes, are used as operation triggers yielding linguistic observable acts or internal computational representations. In the same way, some linguists think that the computational lexicon can imitate the mental lexicon. Although both types of lexicon differ in their physical architecture, it is assumed that they show an identity insofar as the characteristics of the operations and procedures they perform, viz. mental processes and capacity for lexical representation.

Even though this explanation is very attractive, the analogy between the mental lexicon and the computer is not exact. Among the most obvious differences is the fact that the computer can quickly sort huge amounts of data, whereas the mind does not have this capacity. In contrast, the sophisticated semantic networks within the mental lexicon which permit the instant disambiguation of lexical items in context have until now escaped computational representation.

(iii) The lexical component within contemporary linguistic theories has been furnished with a number of operations primarily designed to reduce or minimise redundant information in the lexicon. Since Jackendoff's (1975) hypothesis of "full entry," the concept of a lexicon as a set of "fully specified word types" has gained currency. The lexicon should achieve an equilibrium between idiosyncratic information and generalized or predictable information. In order to avoid redundancy and reduce storage requirements, the lexicon of a language should contain a huge amount of generalized information and a minimal amount of idiosyncratic information.

These lexical operations have received different names depending on the model: "Lexical Templates" and "Lexical Redundancy Rules" (LFG); "Simple inheritance" and "Default Inheritance" (HPSG). The purpose of these mechanisms is to simplify the vast amount of information that lexical entries carry, thus making the theory more explanatory.

It is important to note that lexical redundancy rules were not meant to account for active processes but rather to show lexical-internal relations or quasitransformations. In fact, these mechanisms embody some processes that

in earlier models were conceived as syntactic. Although the formulation of these rules is basically correct, some of them are problematic to the extent that they remain essentially intuitive notions whose precise description has to be formulated (e.g. the rule that postulates that cognitive and assertive predicates take declarative complements).

As a solution to this problem, we postulate a different version of redundancy rules. In line with Dik's (1989) Functional Grammar, we use the notion of expression rules in such a way that each field, and more particularly each dimension, contains a number of these expression rules, which ultimately form the body of the grammar of each field. This is an immensely attractive idea since these rules are based on a precise lexical analysis of the items that are subsumed under a given dimension and in turn within a given field. Again, our insights come from the structure of the language itself.

(iv) It can be observed that most linguistic theories have eschewed the treatment and codification of emotive, axiological, or as some people prefer to call them, subjective factors. In this light, Krzeszowski claims:

The Saussurean and Chomskyan traditions of linguistics are usually silent about other aspects, which may also be relevant in semantics of natural languages, such as various axiological distinctions between "good" and "bad" or "ugly" and "beautiful." (1990: 135)

In other words, semantic theories have focused their attention on the description and research of "descriptive or cognitive meaning" to the detriment of "emotive meaning." Yet, most lexemes have both a descriptive and an emotive meaning (cf. Lyons 1981: 54-55). Why have emotive aspects of meaning been ignored? This state of affairs might be due to the fact that linguists have hitherto concentrated their attention only on the ideational function of language (cf. Halliday 1985).

Evidence supporting this hypothesis can also be observed in dictionaries. Lexicographers have similarly concentrated their attention on what one might call "descriptive or referential lexemes." In this light, Snell-Hornby (1990: 210) distinguishes the following five prototypes:

1. Terminology and Nomenclature
2. Internationally Known items and sets
3. Concrete objects, basic activities, stative adjectives

4. Words expressing perception and evaluation, often linked to sociocultural norms.⁷
5. Culture-bound elements.

Interestingly enough, she observes that bilingual lexicography restricts itself to groups 1, 2, and 3. However, groups 4 and 5, conditioned by "dynamic factors"⁸ of sociocultural norm, perception and evaluation, with varying stages of gradation in between, are poorly treated.

In much the same way, Tomaszczyk notes that bilingual dictionaries present many inconsistencies for the translator since

lexicographers have not paid sufficient attention to the socio-cultural layer of word meaning. As a result, the English equivalents of the culture bound items in Polish-English dictionaries are of little use to Polish-English speakers, writers and translators. (1984: 289)

Thus, the major goal of the lexicographer today is to codify these meanings, or put it differently, to compile a dictionary of the Natural Language User. To summarize, the lexicon as well as dictionaries have concentrated on issues that would pertain to Halliday's ideational or textual metafunctions, largely ignoring those that pertain to the interpersonal metafunction. In other words, lexicographers and semanticians have described and analyzed how speakers of a language describe people, things, events and actions that are going on in the world, and have paid no attention to how speakers control, modify, evaluate, perceive those people, things, events or actions. Therefore it is the task of the lexicographer to explore new ways, new concepts, and new methods of description and presentation.

(v) There has been a clear-cut tendency to identify the lexicon as a subcomponent of a linguistic theory with the dictionary as a lexicographical artifact. This set of beliefs and assumptions that validate this analogy are what Nowakowski (1990: 10) calls "the metaphysics of the dictionary."

However, we must ask ourselves if it is possible to identify the type of lexical component as envisaged in most linguistic theories with the dictionary, and if this widely accepted analogy is valid. As has been previously mentioned in (i), we believe that this analogy will be valid if and only if we succeed in compiling a dynamic type of lexicon that can account for all types of lexical human abilities.⁹

2. FUNCTIONAL LEXICOLOGY

Within Functional Lexicology, however, the lexicon is conceived as much more than a mere storage place for words. When we speak of the lexicon, we mean a dynamic, textually-oriented repository of information about words and their contexts. The lexicon manifests itself as (i) the mental lexicon of a speaker; (ii) as a component of a language model; (iii) as a module of systems for the processing of natural languages and (iv) as a dictionary. Although our proposal is sensitive to the four manifestations, just (ii) and (iv) will be covered in depth.

Given the fact that the lexicon is also regarded as a dictionary, the proposal of a functional model impinges both on the internal make-up of the lexicon component as envisaged in Functional Grammar as well as on the construction of a dictionary of the Natural Language User.

The following hypotheses form the basis of Functional Lexicology. Firstly, it might be noted that lexicological studies were an anachronism for many years. It has been postulated that this incongruent state of affairs was due to the lack in adequacy between lexicography and advances made in certain other branches of linguistics (cf. Martín Mingorance 1990: 227). For many years, lexicographers went about their work with little recourse to any theoretical framework. The result has been the organization of dictionaries in accordance with the principles of system and norm to the detriment of pragmatically and textually oriented dictionaries.

Secondly, linguists took the view that lexical entries could be established and formalized without making any appeal to pragmatics, glossed by Morris (1971: 6) as "the study of the relation of signs to interpreters." This type of information, stigmatised as "extralinguistic," has been the weak point in linguistics, and more particularly in lexical semantics. Therefore, linguistic theory of the time conceived the lexicon/dictionary as a set of formal rules, and surprisingly enough, the relation of a linguistic sign to the use that the speaker and hearer make of it in a given communicative context was deliberately overlooked.

Aware of the lack of theoretical basis, on the one hand, and of this neglect in the functional dimension of language, on the other, we wish to underline the validity of Martín Mingorance's (1990) concept of the lexicon

as "lying at the interface of linguistic and extralinguistic worlds, at the crossroads of phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, stylistics, pragmatics etc." In this respect, the "functional-lexematic model" (Martín Mingorance 1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1990)) entails the integration of Dik's Functional Grammar, Coseriu's Lexematics and more peripherally some basic assumptions of cognitive grammar. This is an instantiation of a more theoretical model termed Functional Lexicology.

3. METHODOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF A FUNCTIONAL LEXICOLOGICAL MODEL

Functional Lexicology, and in turn the functional-lexematic approach, is characterized by the following features:

(i) The functional-lexematic approach postulates a fully-specified lexicon / dictionary which is in itself a grammar. The word, being the central unit of our description, will be furnished with all the syntactic, morphological, semantic and pragmatic properties that it embodies. Martín Mingorance states the aims of this model:

- (a) criteria of vocabulary delimitation and selection.
- (b) types of meaning which can be considered necessary for the complete description of lexical units.
- (c) organization of the different types of meaning in a hierarchically-structured manner.
- (d) criteria to achieve the maximum degree of information with the maximum degree of economy in definitions. (1990: 228)

(ii) The term functional suggests that the lexicon should be viewed as a repository of information for the speaker and hearer during the act of communication. In this light, it does not suffice to postulate a lexicon filled with a set of formal rules that fail to explain the ultimate goal of language, communication. Alternatively, the new structure advanced by us in this paper is rooted in a pragmatic theory of verbal interaction. Consequently, pragmatics will play an all-powerful role. This means that syntax and semantics will no longer be regarded as an end in themselves, but as

instruments that maintain a diagrammatic and iconic relationship with pragmatics.

(iii) The structure of the lexicon/dictionary which we are in the process of elaborating consists of two axes, viz. the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic axis. In the paradigmatic axis lexemes are arranged onomasiologically within semantic fields following the dictates of Coseriu's Lexematics. The structuring of these semantic fields entails three important types of analysis: (1) analysis of dimensions; (2) semic analysis and (3) classemic analysis.

The problem with semantic fields in contemporary linguistic theory seems to be that though there is a general consensus of opinion that they do exist, there is somewhat less agreement as to:

(1) their internal configuration

(2) the basis for determining the field/domain membership of a lexical item.

We believe that these two problems can be resolved by deriving the criteria for membership within a given lexical field from the definitional structure of lexemes themselves. Using dictionaries as texts that embody our general shared knowledge about words, we have extracted the meaning of components from the definitions of the words analyzed, and used them to elaborate hierarchies of meaning within lexical fields.

According to S. C. Dik's method of *Stepwise Lexical Decomposition* (1978b), each hierarchy has one archilexeme in terms of which all the members of the field are defined. To justify the inclusion of a verb in the field in question, it is lexically decomposed, so that its definition consists of a nuclear word (or a previously defined non-nuclear one) and one or more features which differentiate it from the preceding members of the hierarchy. The nuclear word is the *definiens* which labels the lexical dimension, and this word in turn contains a *definiens* which labels the lexical field in question.

Lexical dimensions in each field are established in terms of oppositions formulated from the definitional structure of the lexical units. These oppositions characterize both the internal structure of the domain in question as well as the lexical structure of the items it contains. Lexical dimensions are thus directly derived from the definitional structure of lexical units (cf. Coseriu 1977). In this way we have obtained the criteria to assign units to a specific domain, as well as determine and classify their relevant interrelationships both on a micro- and macro-structural level.

Examples of this can be seen below in the following.

Example 1: *Lexical dimensions established for the semantic field of "feeling"*

Feeling (to become aware of sth other than sight, having a sensation)

- 1.1. To feel sth bad / cause
- 1.2. To feel sth good / cause
- 1.3. To feel sadness / cause
- 1.4. To feel happiness / cause
- 1.5. To feel aversion / cause producing:
 - 1.5.1. disgust
 - 1.5.2. anger
- 1.6. To feel attraction / cause
 - 1.6.1. To feel a loss of attraction / cause
- 1.7. To feel sth bad in your body / cause
 - 1.7.1. To cause sb to feel less physical / mental suffering / pain
- 1.8. To feel fear / anxiety (fear about bad things happening in the future) / cause
 - 1.8.1. To feel less fear / worry / anger / cause
- 1.9. To feel surprise / cause
- 1.10. To feel shame / cause
- 1.11. To feel a need to do sth or to have / get sth
- 1.12. To cause sb to feel hope / courage
- 1.13. To cause sb to lose (not to feel) hope / courage / confidence

Example 2: *Lexical structure within the subdimension of the field of "sound," "to make a sound indicating an emotion"*

"To make a sound indicating happiness"

- 1. **laugh:** to make *the* sound expressing happiness, amusement.
 - 1.1. **chuckle:** to laugh quietly (usu. to oneself)
 - 1.2. **giggle:** to make quiet, repeated laughing noises
 - 1.2.1. **titter:** to giggle nervously (+embarrassment)
 - 1.3. **snigger:** to laugh quietly in a secret way (+disrespectful)
 - 1.3.1. **snicker:** to snigger (higher-pitched)

- 1.4. **cackle**: to laugh loudly, unpleasantly
- 1.5. **guffaw**: to laugh loudly, heartily
- 1.6. **howl**: to laugh loudly (+ duration)
- 1.7. **roar**: to laugh loudly, noisily

In the elaboration of the syntagmatic axis we specify the complementation patterns of a given predicate. In doing so, we have advanced what we have provisionally termed "Functional Lexical Syntax."¹⁰ This is concerned with the form and meaning of the different complementation patterns of each predicate (cf. Mairal 1994). The following examples illustrate the construction of this axis:

Example 3: Semantic field of CHANGE

Dimension: "To become different by increasing"

deepen: to become deeper (greater in measurement from surface to bottom)

SV (Unaccusative / ergative verb)
 (a) S = prototyp. a river, sea, well, etc. (Proc)

e.g. The sea deepens gradually (C.C.)

SV
 (a) S = prototyp. -concrete negative situation (usu. negatively axiologically loaded) (Proc)

e.g. The crisis deepened (LDCE)

SV
 (a) S = -concrete feeling (Proc)

e.g. His love for her deepened over the years (PF)

SV
 (a) S = prototyp. knowledge (Proc)

e.g. Man's understanding of the universe has deepened in the last few years

SV Adjunct (PO, *into* / *to*)
 (a) S = prototyp. light (Proc)

e.g. The dusk deepened into the night (C.C.)

SV

(a) S = prototyp. sound (Proc)

e.g. The engine sound deepened from a steady whine to a thunderous roar
(C.C.)

We claim that there exists an iconic diagrammatic relationship between the two axes, and it is precisely this relationship which gives rise to the derivation of cognitive conceptual schemas within the lexicon (cf. Faber and Mairal, forthcoming).

(iv) If we assume the validity of the lexicon/dictionary as a grammar, this grammar will be subjected to a number of standards of adequacy: typological, psychological and textual adequacy.

Regarding typological adequacy, the question of universals has been hotly debated from different theoretical angles in the last three decades. Some linguists have rejected¹¹ the possible universality of particular linguistic phenomena whereas others have favoured such a view.

Today, there seems to be a general tendency to furnish a linguistic theory with several standards of adequacy (cf. Chomsky 1965; Dik 1989). Among these standards, linguists include what has come to be called "typological adequacy." By "typological adequacy," Dik means that any theory of language

should be typologically adequate, i.e. that it should be capable of providing grammars for languages of any type, while at the same time accounting in a systematic way for the similarities and differences among languages. (1989: 14)

We believe that from our lexicon it will be interesting to investigate the universal potentiality of a set of lexical rules and principles, as well as the isosemic and anisosemic features between various languages. Following this spirit, Kittay and Lehrer write:

The concept of an organized lexicon provides a way of looking at the possibility of lexical universals by grouping together conceptually related words that may not have an exact translation (or at least an exact lexicalized counterpart) in another language. Whereas word-for-word translations may not be available, cross-

linguistic comparisons can be made given a common conceptual space. (1992: 14)

Thus, if we assume that both axes form a cognitive conceptual schema, we can ask ourselves if the rules and principles stipulated in our lexical underlying predication have potential cross-linguistic applicability, and also if the underlying lexical predication can be regarded as universal. The question also arises as to whether semes and classemes have universal potentiality, and if cognitive conceptual schemas have intralinguistic connections.

In our opinion, it is possible to undertake the study of lexical universals if and only if the semantic principles and features stem from the definitional structure of lexemes. More specifically, these are conceptualized as "aquellas propiedades ('sustantivas' o 'relacionales') de las 'cosas' designadas que corresponden, en lo mental, a rasgos funcionales (distintivos) en la lengua, es decir, *a rasgos constitutivos de un significado de lengua*" (Coseriu 1990: 14; our own emphasis).¹²

Secondly, our lexicon/dictionary should aim at psychological adequacy. Accordingly, the lexicon of a language should serve as the basis for both productive and interpretive processes. In other words, the speaker will be able to construct messages from the information stored in the lexicon and the hearer will be able to decode these messages from the lexicon too. Thus, our lexicon/dictionary will have a bottom-up orientation and a top-down perspective. This type of structure enables the lexicon/dictionary to carry information relevant not only to the structure of the clause but also to discursive scenarios.

Finally, we should like our lexicon/dictionary to have a macrotextual orientation. Departing from the view of a lexicon as a set of abstract entries, our model presents lexical units within a coherent structure. This means that the lexicon is conceptualized as an intricate network of elements interconnected by cohesive, associative, lexical and encyclopedic functions. The existence of such semantic connections has been confirmed by experiments in cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics which show that they are the reason for our ability to rapidly access different lexical items mentally (Aitchison 1987). This in itself justifies the incorporation of more extensive information regarding semantic links. According to Emmorey and Fromkin (1988), semantic relations between words must be accounted for in a viable model of the lexicon. These could most clearly be represented by

links between words in a network of cross-references within a relational mode of the lexicon.

In our lexicon/dictionary we show that it is possible to obtain criteria through which one can assign units to a specific domain, as well as determine and classify their relevant interrelationships both on a micro- and macro-structural level (Martín Mingorance 1984, 1987, 1990). It cannot be overstressed that our inventory of conceptual categories and their interrelationships have been elaborated through the analysis of language structure itself,¹³ as a reflection of our understanding of reality (cf. knowledge representation, below). By working upwards from the definitional structure of primary lexemes to structure semantic space, we have found certain basic domains such as Perception, Speech, Movement, Change, Existence, Possession, Position and Feeling which are in turn structured in terms of dimensions established through the formulation of immediate oppositions of the lexical items belonging to the domain in question. These oppositions thus characterize both the domain as well as the internal semantic structure of the lexical items it contains.

The results obtained in the paradigmatic axis are validated in the syntagmatic axis since we sustain the claim that together both form a cognitive conceptual schema. The interrelationships and connections of a given cognitive-conceptual schema with other schemas or domains are also analyzed, and finally we formalize these connections in terms of a semantic macronet.

The example below reflects how the field of cognition extends to other semantic domains:

Example 4: SEMANTIC NET: FIELD OF COGNITION. Interrelations with other domains

Related Field	Examples of verbs of COGNITION with semantic connections to other fields
EXISTENCE	foresee: to know sth will happen
VISUAL PERCEPTION	view: to believe that sb/sth is a certain way (looking at them in your mind)

LIGHT	enlighten: to cause sb to understand better
ACTION	plan: to think out sth (esp. a method or a way of doing sth carefully and deliberately)
FEELING	perplex: to confuse sb making them feel slightly worried because they do not understand
SPEECH	reason: to think about all the facts in a logical manner and then arrive at a final opinion or judgement
POSSESSION	swindle: to deceive sb in order to obtain sth valuable from them

(v) The lexicon is conceived as a base for knowledge representation. The central point we pursue in this section is how language users relate the content of linguistic expressions to their non-linguistic knowledge (Dik 1989: xiv). For this purpose, we claim that cognitive conceptual schemas as specified in our lexicon/dictionary seem to be good candidates for the representation of the non-perceptual part of this non-linguistic knowledge.

This feature revolves around the shaky issue of knowledge representation. Dik writes the following:

Any system which is to be able to process natural language data in a communicatively adequate way will need a vast data base containing sources of different types of knowledge. (1986: 1)

We believe that some of these sources are "linguistically motivated" (Dik 1986: 2). In his search for knowledge representation, Dik poses three questions that involve the following three areas:

1. Knowledge typology
2. Knowledge representation
3. Knowledge utilization

To these three, we should like to add a fourth, provisionally termed "knowledge establishment / residence."

We think that the physical *locus* for knowledge representation should be the lexicon. For us, the lexicon should be conceived as a repository of knowledge, or as a knowledge component, since information sources of different kinds (syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, stylistic, cultural, sociological, etc) converge in the lexicon. It is thus the complete dictionary of a language that constitutes the *Weltanschauung* of the cultural community which has created it (cf Martín Mingorance 1990: 227-228). Accordingly, in the lexicon, we will agglutinate both the linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge or, according to Dik (1986: 14-17), the "short-term" and the "long-term" knowledge.

With regard to knowledge representation, we believe that if we use language as a kind of map in order to ascertain how concepts are categorized in our brain, much of value can be learned, since semantic structure (as codified in the lexicon) can be said to reflect conceptual structure. In fact, according to Langacker (1987: 98) lexical structure is conceptual structure shaped for symbolic purposes according to the dictates of linguistic convention.

Thus, the establishment of a semantic macronet will not only reflect the internal structure of our lexicon/dictionary, but will also tell us a great deal about ourselves and the way we interact with the world. For example, as indicated in Faber (1992), the negative/negatively-valued dimensions in the lexicon are considerably more complex than those with a positive axiological value. We believe that it would be a mistake, however, to interpret this as general tendency on the part of men to dwell on what is painful, ugly, sad, or otherwise unpleasant. On the contrary, this disposition to highly lexicalize what is negative is direct confirmation of the fact that man views himself as being basically good, and expects the same of the world surrounding him. When his expectations are not confirmed, this creates a strong impact on his perceptual horizon. Then the complexity of each domain (in other words, the degree to which it is lexicalized) can be said to be directly propositional to its psychological saliency in human perception.

(vi) Priority will be given to processes rather than storage. That is, in each lexical entry we will have to account for all those active lexical operations that particular lexical items are sensitive to. Among the most important ones, one could include the following: metaphorical processes,

lexical presuppositions and cancellations of these presuppositions, lexical intensional properties, lexical iconicity, lexical logical properties and categorial error.

(vii) In the delineation of complement meanings, we have resorted to values that would fall within the province of "Logical Semantics." In this light, we would briefly like to state the weight logical values acquire in this type of Lexicon/Dictionary.

As is well-known, there has been a mistaken tendency to associate complement meanings with logic. Semantics was deeply-seated in logic and therefore meanings were described in relation to objective reality in the world at large¹⁴ through a set of sufficient and necessary conditions (e.g. *the grass is yellow* is true in the case that *the grass is yellow*). This state of affairs led to the overuse of notions such as "logical entailments," based on systems of truth-falsehood. This myopic view did not capture emotive or connotative meanings (see. Krzeszowski 1990), degrees of necessity and probability, metaphor, speech acts etc., which obviously could not enter the hermetically-sealed vacuum of Logical Semantics.

Thus, in order to account for these factors, we resorted to the more flexible character of fuzzy logic. However, in answer to the question as to how these values are to be interpreted, we think that logic should be strongly tied to natural language. More precisely, we need a type of logic that can account for the structure and principles of human reasoning. Consequently, all those logical values are supposed to be understood as human inferences on a given norm. This norm will vary from one type of evaluation to another.

In order to illustrate this point, it is useful to resort to Grice's maxims and study the implications of presenting a predication as "certain," and not "probable." To put it differently, logical values will be ordered on a scale that will simulate the degrees of inferences in human reasoning. Compare the intensional operators "certain" and "probable":

Example 5:

"Cert X₁" blocks the occurrence of:

- * though in fact it is not the case that X
- * but it is not possible / the case that X
- * but it is not expected that X
- * but it may not be the case / * or not.

Example 6:

"Prob X₁" blocks and allows the occurrence of:

- though in fact it is not the case that X
- * but it is not possible / the case that X
- * but it is not expected that X
- but it may not be the case / * or not.

Note that the codification of these operators should have to be compatible with all the members of a given semantic dimension as well as with the conceptual notion defining the semantic dimension.

In sum, this type of logic that simulates human reasoning is called "Functional Logic." This notion is still in a primitive state and much research in this area still needs to be done.

(viii) We claim that syntax is not semantically arbitrary. In other words, our lexicon component is furnished with a number of iconic and diagrammatic principles. As a result, we propose to show that there is a non-arbitrary correlation between function and form.

Given this state of affairs, we should like to introduce what we have provisionally termed as "Lexical Iconicity." In our model, the grammatical meaning of lexical items will be said to have an isomorphic relationship with its semantic weight.¹⁵

Lexical Iconicity will enable us to account for the fact that language is not randomly organized and that speakers of a given language make a consistent and specific use of words. Although the users of a language are perhaps not aware of the distinctions that underlie the different words they use, we sustain the claim there are motivating factors that prompt the selection of one word over another. In this respect, Bolinger states the following:

There are situations where the speaker is constrained by a grammatical rule, and there are situations where he chooses according to his meaning . . . ; but there are no situations in the system where 'it makes no difference' which way you go. . . . This is just another way of saying that every contrast a language permits to survive is relevant, some time or other. (1972: 71)

Lexical Iconicity subsumes a number of iconic principles within our lexicon/dictionary. By way of example, in each dimension we observe that the archilexeme (prototype) tends to take a greater number of complementation patterns than the rest of the members. In fact, one could claim that as long as we move down the scale (that is, from the most general to the more specific term, semantically speaking), the number of syntactic patterns decreases. We have formulated this idea in terms of the following iconic principle:

The greater the semantic coverage of a lexeme, the greater its syntactic variations.

This can also be rephrased in the following way:

The more prototypical a term is, the more prototypical effects it will show.

(ix) In structuring a semantic domain we observe that there is a nuclear meaning common to all words and there are different non-nuclear parameters of semantic differentiation such as Manner, Duration, Scope, Result, Number, Agent, Time, Length, Space, Emotional Evaluation etc. which can be said to mark the distance of the hyponym from the more general prototypical action. This structure has led us to implement pragmatic functions in the Lexicon, because in our opinion, the nuclear meaning in a dimension performs the function of *Topic* in that this presents the entity about which the predication predicates something in a given setting (cf. Dik 1978a: 130-ff).

Moreover, those parameters of semantic differentiation are meant to bring into the foreground a number of meaning components. More precisely, these parameters *focalize* the most important or salient information which is maximally significant since this is the means through which lexemes in the same field are differentiated from each other. Accordingly, these parameters perform a function close to the pragmatic function of *Focus*.¹⁶

Furthermore, Topic and Focus functions in the paradigmatic axis have an immediate correlate in the syntagmatic axis. This is in consonance with our idea that both axes form a cognitive-conceptual schema (cf. Faber and Mairal, forthcoming).

(x) Finally, we claim that our lexicon should be sensitive to the three metafunctions as proposed by Halliday (1985), namely the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual. We believe that so far the internal make-up of

the Lexicon component and also dictionaries have concentrated on issues that would pertain to Halliday's ideational metafunction (cf. above), neglecting those that pertain to the interpersonal metafunction.

It has been increasingly evident, however, that affective meaning permeated with axiological values is much more important and vital to definitional structure than has hitherto been supposed. Following this spirit Krzeszowski (1990) has pointed out the dominant function that "values" perform in the structure of concepts, and underlies that emotions are among the major factors determining information processing rather than merely modifying it. In fact he has gone so far as to affirm that *all* lexical items are assessable on an axiological scale. Although such a broad generalization may be difficult to prove, it is certainly true that many lexical items carry heavy axiological weight, and that that weight is semantically relevant.

As a way of example, we have observed in our research on the lexical semantic structure of English verbs that the opposition *good* and *bad* appears as structuring device within the semantic domains studied (cf. Faber 1992).¹⁷

Therefore, we have proposed a type of lexicon that can explain not only how speakers describe what is going on in the world, but also how speakers transmit their feelings, emotions, etc. For this reason, we suggest that the notion of predicate frame should be expanded in such a way that interpersonal factors have a place in the lexicon/dictionary of a language.

3. CONCLUSION

Although the lexicon is a central component of many linguistic theories, its present description is insufficient to account for speakers' actual lexical knowledge. Even Cognitive Linguistics has failed to come up with an adequate descriptive model.

We believe that the answer to this problem lies in a functional lexicological approach which conceives the lexicon as a dynamic, textually-oriented repository of information about words and their contexts. The lexicon is thus a grammar in itself in which pragmatics plays an important role, given that syntax and semantics are viewed as instruments that maintain a diagrammatic and iconic relationship with pragmatics.

Along the paradigmatic axis of the lexicon, lexical items are arranged onomasiologically in semantic fields, while the syntagmatic axis specifies all

the complementation patterns of a given predicate. There is a definite correlation between paradigmatic and syntagmatic structure (function and form) as can be seen in the formulation of the Lexical Iconicity Principle.

The relationship between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes gives rise to a series of cognitive conceptual schemas, which come together to form a semantic macronet. The lexicon is thus a base for knowledge representation, the exploration of which will undoubtedly reveal the answers to many of our questions about ourselves and how we perceive the world around us. a

NOTES

1. This paper is part of the research carried out in the project "Una base de datos léxica multifuncional y reutilizable inglés, alemán y español" directed by Professor Leocadio Martín Mingorance and funded by DGICYT, code number PB 90/0222.

2. Cf. Nowakowsky (1990: 3-4) for those factors that justify this lexical revival.

3. Generative Grammar, in its version of principles and parameters, is a good exponent of this assumption.

4. This is one of the reasons why we still believe that lexematics provides a sound basis for the delimitation and delineation of lexical issues. One of the problems in cognitive semantics is that "los prototipos no son prototipos de significados . . . ; son prototipos de "cosas," que corresponden a ámbitos culturales y de experiencia extralingüística" (Coseriu 1990: 39). As will be expounded below, lexematics is one of the building theoretical blocks in our model.

5. In this regard Coseriu affirms that "al léxico estructurado se ha aplicado [la teoría de los prototipos, PF,RM] sólo saltuariamente, como en incursiones de ensayo, y con un éxito más que dudoso . . . y desde luego no se ha aplicado a las estructuras semánticas consideradas por la semántica estructural" (1990: 28).

6. Langacker (1987, 1991) has posited the existence of certain basic domains as well, which he defines as "cognitively irreducible representational spaces or fields of conceptual potential" (Langacker 1991: 4). As specific examples of these domains, he mentions TIME, COLOR, and MOTION, but is rather vague as to how a more complete inventory can be arrived at. In contrast, our model provides a sound theoretical basis for the elaboration of such domains,

and as a result, we believe that we have managed to arrive at a more complete inventory of semantic space.

7. Felices (1991) and Krzeszowski (1990) explore how this prototype four is codified in the English language, presenting abundant exemplification.

8. Remember that one of our goals is to codify this dynamic load of meaning. In this line, we hypothesize that priority will be given to processes and not to storage (cf. above).

9. For an opposite view, see. Nowakowski (1990: 10-ff). This linguist believes that the inclusion of dynamics in the lexicon means the fall of the lexicon-dictionary analogy. This is fairly debatable, since we are convinced that we can furnish a grammatical theory (in this case FG) with a dynamic lexicon that will also prove useful for lexicographic research.

10. It is important to note that Functional Lexical Syntax implies the extension of the notion of predicate frame in such a way that the argument structure of a predicate is sensitive to the "layers" advanced within the framework of the "Layered Hypothesis" (cf. Dik 1989).

11. In this respect, L. Bloomfield (1933) and the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis are the best exponents of this view. These linguists, deeply rooted in a radical empiricism, excluded the study of universals as methodologically untenable. Bloomfield (1933: 20) claimed that the relationship between corpus and theoretical postulates had to be direct, and thus the only possible generalizations about language are inductive. Remember that structuralists even refuted those pioneering analysis of the Prague School on distinctive features.

12. This view differs radically from the idea advanced within the framework of Generative Semantics. Remember that features ("markers," "distinguishers" and "selection restrictions") were said to constitute an independent abstract metalanguage.

13. Remember that this was one of the problems that we found within the realms of cognitive semantics.

14. In connection with this, see. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 195-220) and Lakoff (1982: 4-40) and their critique of the "myth of objectivism." In much the same vein, Jackendoff (1983: 23-27) claims that it is erroneous to propose a theory of language based on necessary and sufficient conditions since for this linguist this view is grounded in the mistaken assumption that "the information language conveys is about the real world."

15. This isomorphic position contrasts with the Chomskian version of the interface syntax/semantics. Remember that Chomsky proclaims the "autonomy of syntax." In the same light, Montague Grammar postulates the isomorphic nature of syntax and semantics. However, the major difference lies in the fact that for Montague this relationship stems from the pure formalism imposed on the theory. Conversely, we believe that isomorphism should reflect somehow the underlying iconic motivating factors that comprise the communicative contract.

16. We are planning to write an extensive article on the codification of pragmatic functions in the lexicon providing enough justificatory evidence to support our thesis.

17. In this connection, see, Felices's (1991) outstanding research of the classeme "evaluation" in the English language.

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TAKING RISKS:
A READING OF OSCAR WILDE'S
THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY

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All art is at once surface and symbol.
 Those who go beneath the surface do so at their peril.
 Those who read the symbol do so at their peril.

(Preface to *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, 1989: 48)

AS an Irishman, Oscar Wilde had, according to those who met him, the gift of the gab. His brilliant, witty conversation, was enriched by his wonderful ability as a story-teller: everything became, in Wilde's mouth, a tale with which he could entertain his admiring audience. As André Gide remarked, "Wilde did not converse: he narrated" (1969: 26). Wilde himself claimed: "They don't understand that I cannot think otherwise than in stories" (qtd. in Gide 1969: 31). His prose fiction has, like his conversation, the fine quality of a perfectly finished object, polished by the thoughtful care of the aesthete: after reaching the words "The End" in *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, the reader may have the impression that Wilde must have written them (with the same attitude as one of the characters in the novel) , "with a self-conscious and satisfied air, as if he had summed up the world in a phrase" (DG 57). It seems that, as a reader, one can do very little but remain in silent admiration of the beauty of the work, in such a way that Wilde's sentence, "There was nothing I said or did that did not make people wonder" (1989b: xii), would come true again. Is the reader, then, allotted in *Dorian Gray* the place of "the ugly and the stupid," who "can sit at their ease and gape at the play" (DG 51)? I would like to argue that, far from being so, the novel is very much concerned with the place of the reader, and that it can in fact be interpreted as a study of the

relationships between the art of narrative and the reader, and of the dialectic which emerges from the dialogue between the author, the reader, and the text.

For, in fact, the work of art which occupies the centre of the novel and which gives it a title can be considered to be a narration, a story, as much as a picture. It has already been remarked by several critics (Bal 1985: 102; Barthes 1977: 79) that narrativity is not altogether absent from painting, since its contents include a succession in time as well as a chain of causes and effects that the viewer of the picture must reconstruct in her/his mind. In the case of this particular picture, the narrative quality which surrounds it is even clearer: by means of the transformations it undergoes, it becomes the diary Dorian keeps of his life (*DG* 162). If Dorian was at first afraid that the picture would some day tell him the story of his own past, that it would be, in his old age, the continual reminder of his youth, he soon comes to discover that it is also capable of telling him the story of his present: this portrait "holds the secret of his life and tells his story" (*DG* 116). It is precisely what E.M. Forster (1972: 85) has called (in a very clear reflection of the Victorian division between the public and the private life, a division which was also a central concern of Oscar Wilde) "the secret life" that will constitute the plot of this picture which, refusing to keep its static quality, makes itself into a narrative. It is not difficult, then, to admit that Dorian has become the signified of the portrait, that the story of his life is the content that can be gathered from the picture, and that he is being narrated, told, by Basil's masterpiece. If Wilde felt, as Featherstone (1992: 269) has argued, the need to "aestheticize everyday life" by "turning (it) into a work of art," he made this feeling crystallize in this novel in which the protagonist's life becomes the story told by his own portrait. Early in the novel, Dorian, confused by the chaos of his existence, tries "to gather up the scarlet threads of his life, and to weave them into a pattern" (*DG* 119). A few lines later, he succeeds in his attempt in this rather unexpected way: the course of his life will be hence inseparable from the pattern of the work of art.

It is not so easy to determine whether the picture is simply mimetic, and limits itself to reproducing and representing as accurately as possible the processes which go on in Dorian's mind, in which case he would be unconsciously using it "to symbolize and finally to replicate" himself, as a reader does with a literary work according to Norman Holland (quoted in Selden 1988: 190), or whether, under the powerful spell of the picture, he is being constructed by it, as he seems to believe on the many occasions on which he accuses the picture of having destroyed him and completely changed

the course of his life. No matter how much Lord Henry repeats that "Art has no influence upon action," Dorian knows very well that it can powerfully act upon him and recreate him. Literature, painting, even the art of conversation, have the power to transform him. In watching a Shakespearean play, he forgets "that I was in London and in the nineteenth century. I was away with my love in a forest that no man had ever seen" (*DG* 104). He is also radically transformed by Lord Henry's conversational art, to such an extent that the latter can conclude, much to his satisfaction, that "to a large extent, the lad was his own creation" (*DG* 91); in fact, as Sánchez-Pardo (1991: 234) has noticed, "the picture can only be completed (through) Dorian's response to Wotton's rhetorical power." Dorian himself views Lord Henry's aphorisms as norms of life one should put into practice (*DG* 83). He can be transformed by the power of literature, and "poisoned by a book" (*DG* 156) which, not unlike the picture, seemed to him "to contain the story of his life, written before he had lived it" (*DG* 142). Art's action upon Dorian, then, is not something ephemeral, but rather what I. A. Richards would call "the after-effects, the permanent modifications in the structure of the mind, which works of art can produce" (1988: 196). The remark of this critic that "no one is ever quite the same again after any experience; his possibilities have altered in some degree," is perfectly applicable to Dorian, who is never the same after he first faces his portrait.

This initial encounter between Dorian and the picture deserves some comment. The first reaction of Dorian on seeing his portrait is one of fascination: he stands "gazing at the shadow of his own loveliness" (*DG* 67). The fascination, similar to the one he feels when reading the enigmatic book (*DG* 142), is produced by what Aristotle already classified as one of the effects of the work of art, the "pleasure of recognition," or what Laura Mulvey (1989: 17) has recently called "a fascination with likeness and recognition," since the portrait is "a wonderful work of art, and a wonderful likeness as well" (*DG* 66). The newly-discovered pleasure Dorian experiences when looking at this mirror-like picture can be explained by means of Mulvey's theories (1989: 17) about "scopophilia in its narcissistic aspect." Some critics, such as Sánchez-Pardo (1991: 233), have usefully analysed the ways in which Dorian's narcissism, his love for identification and sameness, can be regarded as a hint of his homosexual identity, and therefore a clue to a better understanding of the relationships between Dorian, Basil, and Henry. Here I would like to concentrate on Dorian's narcissism as related to his

personal evolution rather than to his potentially sexual relationships with the other male characters in the novel.

Narcissism, in fact, an attitude which would have been up to this moment unthinkable in Dorian, will now take its place in his life, as highlighted by the text itself when Dorian is presented kissing, "in boyish mockery of Narcissus," the "painted lips" of his own image (*DG* 126). Dorian has, then, discovered his own beauty, but, moreover, he can be said to have discovered, or rather, to have constructed, his own identity. This stage in Dorian's development can be best analysed by resorting to the Lacanian concept of "the Imaginary" (as analysed by Sarup, 1992: 101), which "grows from the infant's experience of its 'specular ego,'" that is, the moment at which the child "demonstrably 'recognises' his or her image in the mirror" (Sarup, 1992: 110). Dorian is, at this point of his evolution, inaugurating the field of the Imaginary: "A look of joy came into his eyes, as if he had recognized himself for the first time" (*DG* 66). Lord Henry makes the point even more evident by remarking: "The moment I met you I saw that you were quite unconscious of what you really are, of what you might really be" (*DG* 65). But Dorian's recognition of his own image is not only charged with joy and celebration; it is true that he is "in love" with the picture (*DG* 68) and that he knows that "it is a part of himself" (*DG* 68), but, even as he enjoys his identification with his own lovely image, he will also feel aggressive towards the author of the picture and toward the picture itself: "I am jealous of the portrait you have painted of me. . . . Why did you paint it? It will mock me some day—mock me horribly!" (*DG* 68). Again, these conflicting reactions on the part of Dorian can be explained by means of Lacanian theory: when the child recognizes for the first time her/his own image in a mirror, her/ his look is not only one of recognition, but also one of misrecognition, since the basic relationship between the subject and her/his specular image is one "between a fragmented or incoordinate subject and its totalizing image" (Sarup 1992: 102). As a consequence, the subject experiences, according to Cohan and Shires' reading or Lacan, "the pleasure of being signified as a coherent subject" (1988: 156), but s/he is, at the same time, alienated from her/himself: the result of the mirror stage is "the paradox that the subject finds or recognises itself through an image which simultaneously alienates it, and hence, potentially confronts it" (Sarup 1992: 102). In this light, Dorian's reaction can be easily accounted for: he has been violently pulled to pieces, he has unconsciously discovered, in the midst of his narcissistic joy, that "identification amounts to self-alienation" (Cohan and Shires, 1988: 158). He

has constructed his own image only to feel immediately alienated from it and from himself. This alienation has one more effect upon him: he is "filled with a wild desire to know everything about life" (*DG* 85), since "a subject can desire only in terms of the division that occurs through a symbolic representation of the desired object": Dorian had never known desire till this moment, since he had not been alienated from himself yet; from now on, though, and since "desire admits of no full satisfaction or it is not desire" (Cohan and Shires, 1988: 161), desire will "come to meet [him] on the way" (*DG* 89).

To return to the argument that the picture can be viewed as a narrative which constructs Dorian rather than simply represent him, it can be suggested that this narcissistic identification is made possible precisely by his unmistakable feeling that it is him that the picture "talks" about, that, if there is a story to be told, Dorian himself will be its protagonist: he is constructed as "the subject of the narrative." Now, as Cohan and Shires (1988: 150) would express it, "because this text addresses you explicitly as the subject of narration, it foregrounds, as conventional narratives do not, the extent to which your subjectivity as a reader depends upon identification with the signifier *you*," a signifier which is to be equated, in the case of this novel, with Dorian's portrait. From this moment, Dorian will passionately identify with "the pronoun *you*," with the protagonist of the story told by the picture, in order to be "signified as a coherent subject" (Cohan and Shires 1988: 156), but will, at the same time, "lose autonomy from the discourse in which that pronoun appears." As any reader who is directly addressed as "*you*," therefore, Dorian has to renounce a part of himself, and let the text construct him. In doing so, he tries to cling to his ideal ego, that "essentially narcissistic formation," which corresponds to "what he himself was" (according to Sarup, 1992: 102) and from which he feels he has already been forever alienated, as he reveals when he says, for example, that he is jealous of the portrait because it is already "a whole month younger than I am" (*DG* 89).

As opposed to Dorian's construction of his portrait as his ideal ego, Basil will offer a different interpretation. Far from seeing in it, as Dorian does, an invitation to pleasure, an intimation that the youth should not cease in his attempt (forever frustrated) to fulfil desire, Basil regards the picture as "the visible incarnation of that unseen ideal whose memory haunts us artists" (*DG* 132); it is the representation of Dorian's unspoilt youth, of his innocence and purity. Rather than interpreting the picture as the imaginary instance of the ideal ego, he chooses to see it as the symbolic formation of the ego ideal

(Sarup 1992: 102), concerned, not with the unconscious, not with the desires of the narcissistic ego, but with a moral ideal. The painting comes to represent for him a morally perfect Dorian, whose physical beauty is but a reflection of his inner beauty. His reading of the picture is influenced by his own moral standards, by what Dorian calls his "Philistinism." He is projecting his own ideals on his work, as he himself notices at several points:

The reason I will not exhibit this picture is that I am afraid that I have shown in it the secret of my soul . . .

I will not bare my soul to their shallow, prying eyes. My heart shall never be put under their microscope. There is too much of myself in the thing, Harry- too much of myself! (*DG* 52, 56).

Basil, therefore, interprets this pictorial text according to the critical stance that Stonehill (1988: 4) has called "autobiographical criticism." In the opinion of this type of critics, a text is seen as a "revealing expression of its author's subconscious." He cannot abandon his authorial (and authoritarian) position in the interpretation of his work, precisely because he will always regard the painting as a "Work" and never as a "text" (for a critical discussion of both terms, see Scholes 1970: 170f.). For him, there is only a point of view from which the work can be regarded, that of the author, and never that of the reader, which would give rise to a different critical stance, that of rhetorical criticism (Stonehill 1988: 4), which regards the texts as "a verbal machine constructed so as to create a specific effect upon its reader," and which will be the attitude adopted by Dorian, as will be shown later on. (Although, of course, "the specific effect" it will produce on Dorian will be very different from that intended by the author, very distant from the purpose for which it was constructed.) Even though Basil himself denounces the current practice of autobiographical criticism (as when he says angrily that "We live in an age when men treat art as if it were meant to be a form of autobiography," *DG* 57), he, nevertheless projects his own life, his own dreams, on the picture: for him, it is a work about the ideal Dorian he has constructed in his mind. That he considers any other interpretation impossible is made clear by the feeling of possession of his work he shows at many points: the satisfaction with which he contemplates his newly-finished masterpiece and writes his name "in long vermilion letters on the left-hand corner of the canvas" (*DG* 66), the "most wonderful frame, specially designed by himself" (*DG* 89) with which he accompanies his gift to Dorian (as if indicating by framing the portrait in such a markedly personal way, that there is only one point of view, one

perspective, one "frame" from which to look at it), the surprise with which he asks Dorian: "Not look at my own work! You are not serious!" (*DG* 131), are all revealing in this sense. As he has admitted, however, it is not his property, but Dorian's (*DG* 67). Soon, he comes to suspect that there may be more to the picture than he had intended to put into it, and will anxiously ask Dorian: "You didn't see anything else in the picture, did you? There was nothing else to see?" (*DG* 134). He will be reassured, on that occasion, that the "something curious," that "something that probably at first did not strike you, but that has revealed itself to you suddenly" (*DG* 132), is nothing but the projection of his own feelings, of his own soul which he has, he believes, poured out on the painting. With the passing of time, however, he will realise that someone (Dorian) has, in a rather mysterious way, contributed his own share of the painting: Basil can hardly identify it as his own when he is finally allowed to contemplate it again:

An exclamation of horror broke from the painter's lips as he saw in the dim light the hideous face on the canvas grinning at him. . . . Yes, it was Dorian himself. But who had done it? He seemed to recognize his own brushwork, and the frame was his own design. . . . He seized the lighted candle, and held it to the picture. In the left-hand corner was his own name, traced in long letters of bright vermillion. (*DG* 163)

In spite of its bearing all the marks of Basil's authorship, this image of Dorian does not correspond any longer to the old ideal cherished by the painter: the story it tells Basil does not admit the reading of Dorian as a morally perfect being; it is no longer the ideal beauty which can be looked at as an expression of inner light and purity. Basil's reading does not apply to the pictorial text any more. His efforts to make the picture conform to his own moral standards will all be to no avail, since, as Menand (1987: 86) has noticed, although the artist can, from the Wildean perspective, "say what he likes," "he has effectively relinquished control over what he means." His attempt at moral interpretation is typical of his Victorian ideology. But *Dorian Gray*, which has adequately been labelled by Moya (1991) "an epitaph for Victorian civilization," and which combines in a surprising way the Victorian and the postmodern (Menand 1987: 79), cannot easily endorse Basil's views. It is rather Dorian's reading which can now throw some light on the picture. For Dorian is to be seen not only as the signified of the text, as the one who is being narrated, told by the picture, as the "you" addressed by the

text: he has also become an interested reader of his own story as written by the picture. Dorian has lived that magic moment at which, as Lord Henry says,

Suddenly we find that we are no longer the actors but the spectators of the play. Or rather we are both. We watch ourselves, and the mere wonder of the spectacle entralls us. (*DG* 123).

Since he has learnt that "To become the spectator of one's own life, as Harry says, is to escape the suffering of life" (*DG* 130), he will live the transformations of the picture, not so much with the passionate involvement of the one who contemplates the dramatic changes his own life is going through, but rather with the mixture of passion and detachment of the spectator, of the reader, of the one who, even as he enjoys the spectacle, knows perfectly well that he is "willingly suspending his disbelief." He can, therefore, "gaze at the portrait with a feeling of almost scientific interest" (*DG* 118), and grow "more and more interested" in the story it tells him, the story of "the corruption of his own soul" (*DG* 143). Dorian has become, therefore, a reader of himself, and his own reading will be, of course, very different from Basil's. It is true that, in its original state, the picture was a reflection of Dorian's unstained purity: it corresponded closely to the intentions of the author. But Dorian's ulterior behaviour will show that he has got to feel hostile towards that interpretation, that he refuses to look at the picture through Basil's eyes. He refuses to keep the position of what Tomashevski has called "the innocent reader": "To read," Tomashevski says, "one must be innocent, must catch the signs the author gives. . . . Because literature is so persuasive, we naturally assume that it should perform the duties of a teacher and have the authority of a preacher" (1965: 90). This is indeed the position favoured by Basil, who (as a Victorian author and critic) firmly believes in the moral authority, not only of literature, but of any art. As opposed to this conception of "the innocent reader," however, Dorian will be what J. Fetterley calls "the resisting reader," the one who refuses to accept the impositions of the text, the subversive reader who reads against the grain. Dorian can also be equated to Barthes's conception of the "perverse reader," a revolutionary notion which inevitably leads, according to this critic, to the "death of the author" (1968). This theoretical concept of the death of the author is dramatically enacted by the novel at the point in which Dorian, the original reader, murders Basil. Once again, the death of the author (at least, of this specific author), can be more clearly seen by applying Lacanian theory. The

author has tried, as has been shown, to make his conception of the ego ideal triumph over Dorian's opposing ideal ego. Now, according to Sarup's reading of Lacan, "The ego ideal is also, according to Hegel's formula which says that coexistence is impossible, the one you have to kill" (1992: 166). By killing Basil, therefore, Dorian has also killed his ego ideal, which leaves him free to interpret the pictorial text the way he likes best. Having got rid of the authoritarian voice of the author, Dorian privileges the concept of the text over that of the work, and the approach of the reader over that of the author. He refuses to accept the idea that the "soul" of a text is necessarily one with that of its author in order to identify it with the soul of the reader.

But can it be argued that it is Dorian who imposes now his own "soul," his own interpretation, on the picture? The question which has already been posited should be asked again: is the picture a merely mimetic phenomenon which reflects Dorian's life? Does it simply admit the structure Dorian tries to impose on it, or is it rather the picture that influences him, that constructs him? Does this perverse reader read and interpret the text according to his own wishes, or is he constructed by the text as the subject of its narrative by its addressing him explicitly as the subject of the narration, as has already been suggested? As Selden would express it (1988: 187), "Does the text or the reader determine the process of interpretation?" To answer these questions is no easy task, since the analysis of Dorian's position as a reader reveals extraordinary complexities: it is not as simple as claiming that the picture as a text has the only function of providing him with the opportunity to liberate himself from all his negative passions, in a cathartic experience, by projecting them on his mirror-like image. On the one hand, his relationship to the text is an active one since, as has been shown, he puts forward an original interpretation of his own. But, at the same time, he is also constructed by the text, for, as Wilde himself thought (according to Alice Wood, 1970: 351), "every reader or beholder is a creator even as it is a creation." I will try and analyse both contradictory aspects more in depth.

As has been said, Dorian is a creative, participative reader, in that he refuses to accept the authorial interpretation of the text and is able to find alternative meanings. In this sense, he enacts Wilde's own ideas about reading and about literary criticism. We may recall at this point Wilde's opinion (qtd. in Wood, 1970: 349): "That is what the highest criticism really is, the record of one's own soul," for it "is in its essence purely subjective, and seeks to reveal its own secret and not the secret of another." Similarly, Anatole France remarks:

To be frank, the critic ought to say: 'Gentlemen, I am going to talk about myself on the subject of Shakespeare, or Racine, or Pascal, or Goethe- subjects that offer me a beautiful opportunity" (1971: 671).

Dorian will eagerly agree with such opinions: by refusing to accept Basil's view of the picture, by regarding it in a new light, by making it indeed into "the record of his own soul," he acts according to the standards which define, according to Wilde, the work of the aesthetic critic, who

rejects those obvious modes of art that have but one message to deliver, and having delivered it become dumb and sterile, and seeks rather for such modes as suggest reverie and mood, and by their imaginative beauty make all interpretation true, and no interpretation final. (qtd. in Wood, 1970: 351)

Basil's picture indeed belongs to the latter category, and, although, due to his strict moralising attitude, the painter sought to turn it into a work belonging to the former, Dorian manages, by doing away with the myth of authorial interpretation, to multiply the imaginative messages which can spring from the text. He is, therefore, enacting the creative function of the reader in which Wilde so firmly believed (Wood 1970: 352).

Dorian's reading of the text is indeed a violent one, from the point of view of the author: the resulting modifications which take place in the narrative picture are such that the painter considers them to be an attack against his work, and he will try to reason away the transformation it has gone through: "The room is damp. Mildew has got into the canvas. The paints I used had some wretched mineral poison in them" (*DG* 164). He even refuses to admit that it is his own picture that he is looking at; it is, instead, "some foul parody, some infamous, ignoble satire" (*DG* 163). This identification of Dorian's new interpretation of the text with an attack can be related to the Kristevan conception of reading as "aggressive participation" (in Worton and Still 1990: 11): the reader should refuse, according to her, to compromise with the interpretation that, by means of the text itself, the author calls for. It can also be viewed as an attempt on the part of Dorian to free himself from what Bloom has called "the anxiety of influence" (in Worton and Still 1990: 8): an attempt which has led literary critics and readers of all times to produce readings "grounded in an almost boastful forgetfulness" of the author and of the intentions the author may have entertained in creating her/his work (Worton and Still, 1990: 8). It is not surprising that Dorian should often feel this anxiety of influence, since the concern with alien influences operating on

a subject is very much at home all through *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, and is perhaps best summarized by the following words pronounced by Lord Henry early in the novel:

All influence is immoral . . . because to influence a person is to give him one's own soul. He does not think his natural thoughts, or burn with his natural passions. His virtues are not real to him. His sins, if there are such things as sins, are borrowed. He becomes an echo of some one else's music, an actor of a part that has not been written for him. (*DG* 61)

Dorian will therefore try to liberate himself from such dangerous influences in order to preserve his own individuality. He cannot avoid the knowledge that the text was originally Basil's, that the picture was his own creation, but, by re-interpreting it, by reducing it to his own terms and translating it into his own language, he acts as an innovative reader. His reading, or rewriting, of Basil's text, is not a mere repetition of the purposes with which the author originally created it, but, as "original imitators" of all times, such as Cicero and Quintilian, have always done, according to Worton and Still (1990: 7), he establishes a relationship with the text which is not one of dependence (not, at least, one of dependence on its author), but one which at the same time liberates him from "over-investment in admiration for past masters" (in this specific case, Basil), and "reveals and actualises the inner principle of proliferation," by revealing some further possibilities of interpretation of the text.

Even though Dorian has managed to declare his independence from the author, even though he can in some ways show his mastery over the text itself by providing it with fresh interpretations, it is not so easy to affirm on this basis that it is he who constructs the text, and not the other way round, since, in his own words, "there is something fatal about a portrait. It has a life of its own." (*DG* 135). The portrait is indeed so powerful that it can seemingly act with a certain degree of independence from Dorian's mental processes: it gets to know about Sibyl's death, for example, earlier than Dorian himself (*DG* 125), in such a way that it seems to be challenging Stevenson's conviction that "no art . . . can successfully compete with life. Life goes before us, infinite in complication..." (1985: 216). Dorian is often afraid that it is in fact the picture that makes his decisions for him. Under the influence of the picture, Dorian will actually change: "He would often adopt certain modes of thought that he knew to be really alien to his nature" (*DG* 146). The experience Dorian goes

through at this point is one which is common enough for any reader. G. Poulet expresses it in the following way:

Now what happens when I read a book? . . . Whatever I think is a part of my mental world. And yet here I am thinking a thought which manifestly belongs to another mental world, which is being thought in me just as though I did not exist. . . . This thought which is alien to me, and yet in me, must also have in me a subject which is alien to me. . . . This I who 'thinks in me' when I read a book, is the I of the one who writes the book. (1988: 201-2)

This is, except for one thing, a perfect description of Dorian's relationship with the picture; it should be noticed, however, that the "I" who thinks in Dorian is not, as Poulet would have it, that of the one who "writes the book," or, in this case, of the one who "painted the portrait": it is not, obviously, Basil's spirit, that, thinking through Dorian, thinking "in him," leads him to attitudes and deeds that Basil would most probably consider "wicked." The "I" who thinks in Dorian and who is alien to himself is to be identified with what Gibson (1980: 1) would call his "mock reader personality." In any reading experience, Gibson says,

we become a new person —controlled and definable and remote from the chaotic self of daily life. . . . We are recreated by language. We assume that set of attitudes and qualities which the language asks us to assume.

This is the reason why Dorian, when he becomes a reader of his own story, radically abandons his former self, his "real reader" personality, and lets himself be recreated by the changing language of the portrait. As he now spends the whole of his life reading himself, he discovers "the terrible pleasure of a double life" (*DG* 178) and finds out that "perhaps one never seems so much at one's ease as when one has to play a part" (*DG* 177). The many different personalities he adopts, the disguises he frequently uses, his changeable poses can all be seen as a product of his realization that, as Gibson has said, "he is many people as he reads many books and responds to their language worlds" (1980: 5). One book, the never-fixed text of the book of his life as presented by the many different appearances the portrait adopts with the passing of time, is enough for Dorian to continually enlarge, as experienced readers do, according to Gibson (1980: 5), his "mock possibilities." He has learnt from Lord Henry that, to the question "What are

you?" one should never answer anything but "to define is to limit" (*DG* 193). He has come to agree with the view that the ideal aesthete should "realize himself in many forms, and by a thousand different ways, and . . . be curious of new sensations" (Shusterman 1988: 2-3). He has also found out that "Insincerity (and it should be remembered here that, significantly enough, insincerity was for Wilde a quality which was never very distant from artistic creation) is merely a method by which we can multiply our personalities. He used to wonder at the shallow psychology of those who conceive the Ego in man as a thing permanent, simple, reliable, and of one essence" (*DG* 154).

When reading, therefore, everything is all right as long as one agrees to adopt the different mock reader personalities required by the text. Otherwise, the balance, the perfect understanding between the reader and the text, is broken. As Gibson expresses it, "a bad book is a book in whose mock reader we discover a person we refuse to become" (1980: 5). A good example of a subject abandoning her mock reader personality in favour of her real reader views is Sibyl, who transforms *Romeo and Juliet*, by means of her dreadful acting, into a boring, altogether unconvincing play. The excuse she offers Dorian when trying to make up for the artificiality with which she has played her part is the following: she has suddenly found out that

the words I had to speak were unreal, were not my words, were not what I wanted to say. . . . I have grown sick of shadows. . . . What have I to do with the puppets of a play?" (*DG* 112)

And, with the passing of time, the same feeling will get hold of Dorian, although, throughout his life, he has accepted without much resistance any mock reader personality put forward by the pictorial text he so assiduously reads. One day, towards the end of the novel, he asks himself the question which, according to Gibson (1980: 3), is the necessary step before one abandons her/his real reader personality in favour of a different, mock personality, "Who do I want to become today?" On any other occasion, Dorian would have unhesitatingly replied that he wanted to become absolutely anything: any new mock reader position dictated to him would have done well enough. This time, however, he seems to have got tired of the game: he does not show any desire to adopt one more of the "corrupted," "wicked" personalities he used to be so eager to take up. He is seized instead by a desire to forget all about the picture and be able to lead a normal, real reader experience; he cannot bear any longer the impositions of the picture, and, moved by his willingness to free himself from its influence once and for

all, he exclaims: "There is no one with whom I would not change places" (*DG* 199). He prefers to be anything except to become again the mock reader of a text whose reading has already tired him out, and decides to declare his independence from the demanding portrait: "I am going to alter. I think I have altered" (*DG* 201). The cruel picture will show him, however, that it is no longer in his hand to do so. When he tries to liberate himself once and for all from the influence of the portrait by destroying it, the result will turn out to be, contrarily to all his expectations, his own death: the fictional Dorian Gray turns against the real one, and the latter's destruction can actually be regarded as "a consequence of the contradiction between the portrait and himself" (Moya 1991: 110). There is something threatening in this victory of fiction over the purely human; the rebellion of the picture against Dorian has some of the quality of Augusto Pérez's words to Unamuno:

¡Conque no, eh? ¡Conque no? No quiere usted dejarme ser yo, salir de la niebla, vivir, vivir, vivir, verme, oírme, tocarme, sentirme, dolerme, serme. ¡Conque no lo quiere? ¡Conque he de morir, ente de ficción? Pues bien, mi señor creador don Miguel, también usted se morirá, también usted, y se volverá a la nada de la que salió... ¡Dios dejará de soñarle! (Unamuno 1978: 153-4).

Augusto, already doomed, will die a few pages after this speech, but the portrait of Dorian Gray will refuse to be killed by Dorian's own knife: it is Dorian himself who dies in trying to get rid of the picture. After Dorian's death, it is only the picture that survives in all the magnificence of its old splendour, and it is, therefore, revealed to be more enduring, more real than the real Dorian. In this way, *The Picture of Dorian Gray* explores, as typical of metafictional texts, (according to Patricia Waugh, 1990: 2) , "the possible fictionality of the world outside the literary fictional text." This is in no way a surprising conclusion for a novel by an author who, like Wilde, boasted of having "treated Art as the supreme reality, and life as a mere mode of fiction" (1989: xii). This conclusion, however, may be seen as reassuring as well as threatening; it heals even as it hurts. It is a reflection on the permanence of art through time, as when, in *Twelfth Night*, after a song about the destructive power of time, Feste the fool closes both the song and the play with the following words: "But that's all one, our play is done,/ and we'll strive to please you every day" (1975: 156). The implication is that, in spite of the transience of human life, the spirit of the human will live on by means of art, that supreme human creation...

As a conclusion, the story of the portrait of Dorian Gray may be regarded as a study of both the advantages, the privileges, and the risks, which any reader of fiction is granted. It is not only Dorian who is allowed to hold this creative position: any reader of *The Portrait of Dorian Gray* is granted the same possibility since, according to Wilde, "Each man sees his own sin in Dorian Gray. What Dorian Gray's sins are no one knows. He who finds them has brought them" (qtd. in Roditi, 1969: 59). The reader is, therefore, to enter the same game of identification, of development of mock possibilities, that Dorian has played. Wilde, of course, as a reader of his own work, grants himself privileged possibilities of entering the game of identifications: if we are to believe his biographers and the people who met him, Wilde seems to have identified alternatively with different characters in the novel. Like Lord Henry, Wilde "charmed his listeners out of themselves" (DG 79); like Dorian, he "dreamt of evolving into a master of sensation, a harp responding luxuriously to every impression" (Jackson 1970: 336), and, to be brief, *The Picture of Dorian Gray* is, according to Jackson, a "full portrait of himself," since "Lord Henry Wotton and Dorian Gray represent two sides of Oscar Wilde; they are both experimenters in life, both epicureans and both seeking salvation by testing life to destruction" (1970: 338). Maybe Wilde is, after all, experimenting in reading himself through his works. Maybe he discovered that, as Lord Henry says, we can become the spectators, rather than the actors, of our own lives. To quote Henry once again, "We watch ourselves, and the mere wonder of the spectacle entrails us" (DG 123). Or maybe we can even think of Oscar Wilde, engaged in the writing of his *Dorian Gray*, as Jackson imagines him: a "remarkable man for ever telling himself an eternal tale in which he himself is hero" (1970: 339). a

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THE BATTLE OF MALDON Y ST. EDMUND:
UNA APROXIMACION PRAGMATICA
DESDE LA TEORIA DE LA CORTESIA LINGUISTICA

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INTRODUCCION

ESTE estudio se propone analizar, desde la pragmática literaria, más concretamente desde los parámetros de la teoría de la cortesía lingüística, dos textos anglosajones: el poema heroico *The Battle of Maldon* y la narración en prosa de Ælfric sobre la vida del rey Edmund. Nuestros objetivos fundamentales son dos. En primer lugar, mostrar que este tipo de análisis lingüístico permite acometer el estudio no sólo de las variedades de lengua actuales sino también llegar a una mejor comprensión de los textos de períodos históricos distintos, puesto que el enfoque pragmático desde el que se aborda le dota de una nueva dimensión interpretativa y evaluativa. En segundo, validar la aplicabilidad de la teoría de la cortesía como marco analítico en textos y contextos en los que no ha sido generalmente empleada.

Los dos textos mencionados, aunque pertenecientes a géneros distintos, fueron escritos en la misma época. *Maldon* tuvo que componerse, lógicamente, después de que la batalla tuviera lugar, en el año 991, tal y como aparece en la entrada de la Crónica de ese año, y quizá no mucho

después del suceso, a juzgar por la evidencia interna del texto, aunque no existe una opinión unánime entre la crítica especializada sobre este punto.¹

Existe también una notable discrepancia sobre el carácter heroico del poema y sobre la figura del protagonista, *Byrhtnoth*. Algunos autores defienden que el poema está escrito en la tradición de *Beowulf*, *The Battle of Brunanburh*, o *The Battle of Finnsburh*, mientras que otros señalan las diferencias entre este poema tardío y los más claramente pertenecientes a la tradición heroica germánica, haciendo notar que quizás no tenga como finalidad la exaltación de la figura del héroe, sino, muy al contrario, su denuesto. Entre los que defienden el valor heroico del poema desde el poema mismo (interpretación literaria) están G. Clark (1979), Blake (1965), Swanton (1968), Shippey (1985) y Parks (1986). Entre los partidarios de una visión historicista de *Maldon*, y que siguiendo a Tolkien encuentran que el poeta critica la figura y la actuación de *Byrhtnoth* en el poema, al que en ningún momento pretende presentar como héroe, figuran, además del propio Tolkien (1953), otros muchos anglosajonistas de indudable prestigio, como Cross (1974) y Gneuss (1976). Merece la pena reseñar, por lo extremo de su planteamiento desde esta última perspectiva, el artículo que Stuart publicó en 1982.

La vida del rey Edmund es, como las demás homilías sobre vidas de santos de *Ælfric*, un sermón escrito para ser leído en la iglesia en el día de la fiesta del santo, y se encuadra dentro de la tradición apologética de la prosa anglosajona con una finalidad claramente didáctica. La fuente más conocida de esta obra de *Ælfric* es *Passio Sancti Edmundi*, de Abbo de Fleury, un monje benedictino que alcanzó un gran renombre en la Europa de su tiempo por su sabiduría. *Ælfric* adapta con gran acierto la narración de Abbo a la lengua vernácula, en la que puede considerarse como una de sus mejores traducciones.

A primera vista, ambos textos presentan claros paralelismos. Desde el punto de vista del contenido, los dos tratan una situación similar: las invasiones vikingas con sus terribles consecuencias para el pueblo anglosajón. La Crónica Anglosajona relata lacónicamente que fue precisamente a partir de la batalla de Maldon cuando se comenzó a pagar tributo (el famoso "Danegeld") a los invasores escandinavos. De hecho, en los dos textos, la crisis se desencadena cuando, ante la propuesta del enemigo, la petición de tributo a cambio de paz, se hace necesario tomar una determinación.

Desde el punto de vista formal, existen también paralelismos entre ambas obras. *St. Edmund* está escrita en prosa aliterativa, dentro de la tradición

germánica a la que pertenece *Maldon*. Además, el elemento germánico aparece en la narración de Ælfric claramente desde el comienzo de la obra cuando se nos relata cómo llegó a oídos del narrador la historia del rey santo. Este fragmento inicial se hace eco de las genealogías que aparecen en la poesía heroica. Por otro lado, los lazos de lealtad y de fidelidad que unen a Edmund con su pueblo son similares a los que se existen en *Maldon* entre el señor y sus guerreros (dentro de la tradición de la "comitatus" en la poesía heroica), si bien en *St. Edmund* se invierten los términos, y no es, en este caso, el servidor quien debe morir por su señor sino el señor el que ha de entregar su vida por sus súbditos, dentro de la tradición cristiana más ortodoxa.

Se podría concluir esta introducción afirmando de modo general que, pese a las diferencias de opinión sobre la interpretación de *Maldon* por parte de la crítica, ambos textos presentan una serie de características formales comunes, y contienen una temática similar.

1. PRESUPUESTOS TEORICOS

Nuestro análisis de los textos desde la pragmática literaria y los dos niveles o contextos de análisis textual se ha basado, fundamentalmente, en los presupuestos de Sell (1985, 1986, 1989). Respecto a la codificación lingüística de la cortesía, hemos seguido para su aplicación al estudio de los textos el marco teórico descrito por Brown y Levison (1978, 1987).

Consideramos que el texto literario es un mensaje que tiene, al igual que el lenguaje coloquial, un *emisor* (el autor de la obra) y un *receptor* (el público al que esa obra va dirigida). La interpretación de un determinado mensaje, ya sea literario o coloquial, viene dada por el contexto del mismo, entendiendo por contexto el conocimiento que el receptor del mensaje tiene de su interlocutor, de la situación en sí, y del mundo en general. Este contexto es el que le permite, por deducción, extraer una serie de conclusiones sobre la intención comunicativa del hablante más allá de su contenido literal.²

La diferencia entre el lenguaje coloquial y el lenguaje literario, desde este punto de vista, estriba en el hecho de que en el lenguaje literario se puede hablar de dos contextos, uno externo (*nivel extradiegético*), que incluiría las relaciones entre autor y lector, y un segundo contexto interno

(*nivel intradiegético*), que se refiere a todo lo que sucede dentro de la obra,³ i.e. las relaciones entre los personajes de la obra y sus diálogos.

Por su parte, Sell (1985, 1986), en la línea de Genette, propone los términos alternativos de *cortesía en los textos* y *cortesía de los textos* para designar conceptos similares. Sell entiende la cortesía lingüística no como una simple serie de recursos léxicos encaminados a facilitar las relaciones sociales, mitigando el contenido proposicional amenazante de los actos contra la imagen, una especie de lubricante social (Sell 1989: 8), sino como estrategias lingüísticas presentes en todo proceso de comunicación:

I do not see politeness as a principle in isolation from others, and I do not see it as coming into operation only when people face-threateningly address each other, talk about other people, or make commands, requests or enquiries. I see all interaction, and all language, as operating within politeness parameters. Politeness, one might say, or a sensitivity to politeness considerations, is mankind's patient, sleepless superego. (Sell 1989: 9)

Pese a la importancia que Sell otorga a las manifestaciones de la cortesía en los textos, es, sin embargo, el estudio de la cortesía *del texto* el nivel que, según el autor, reviste una importancia fundamental desde el punto de vista de la pragmática literaria. Es el contexto social compartido por autor y público y la intención comunicativa del primero lo que dota a las manifestaciones textuales de una funcionalidad y relevancia concretas.

2. ESTUDIO DE LA CORTESIA EN LOS TEXTOS

El primer paso de nuestro estudio lo constituye un análisis detallado de las manifestaciones de la cortesía *en los textos*, con el fin de relacionarlas posteriormente con la cortesía de los textos e intentar dilucidar, en función de ésta, cuáles son las diferencias substanciales que hacen que dos textos muy similares se perciban o interpreten de forma muy distinta pese a los intentos por parte de la crítica de señalar, sobre todo, sus similitudes.

Puesto que un análisis de las manifestaciones de la cortesía en los textos completos rebasaría los límites adecuados de este trabajo, hemos

seleccionado para la comparación y estudio pormenorizado dos extractos que contienen sendos episodios de lo que Parks (1986) denomina *flyting* o intercambio de provocaciones entre interlocutores hostiles en un contexto predecible. Las ostentaciones y los insultos son tradicionales y recurrentes en la literatura heroica, y presentan una forma lingüística muy estilizada. A nuestro parecer, otro de los intereses de los extractos seleccionados radica en ofrecer un análisis detallado de cada una de las dos formas más peculiares de *flyting*, ya que según Parks: "Regularly *flyting* occurs in one of two such social environments: amid warring armies relations, and amid guest-host relations" (1986: 297). *Maldon* constituiría el primero de los casos y *Edmund* el segundo.

Lo relevante para nuestro análisis es el hecho de que este carácter tradicional y estilizado de los extractos les confiere un significado fundamentalmente simbólico. Pese a que la naturaleza del intercambio es hostil, éste presupone un alto grado de cooperación entre los participantes y los grupos sociales que éstos representan, constituyendo el fin último de los mismos mantener o aumentar la buena reputación del protagonista o héroe.

Estas características —cooperación, intercambio lingüístico relacionado con un determinado grupo social y el mantenimiento de la *imagen* de los interlocutores— relacionan el contenido de los episodios de manera directa con los presuestos básicos de la teoría de la cortesía lingüística desarrollada por Brown y Levinson (1978, 1987), los cuales, a nuestro juicio, constituyen el marco adecuado desde el que acometer el estudio e interpretación de los mencionados episodios y su relevancia en el conjunto global de la obra. Los postulados esenciales de la teoría de la cortesía lingüística se hallan recogidos en estas palabras de Parks, cuando concluye sobre la importancia y funcionalidad fundamentales de los episodios de *flyting*:

Despite appearances to the contrary, *flyting* is a highly socialized act. For its aim, the winning of *kléos* and the reaffirmation of selfhood, requires the presence of witnesses. Regularly, therefore, epic contests in both their verbal and martial aspects occur in public places in full view of the contestants' peer communities. . . . Why does community play such a major part? . . . the purpose of *flyting* is largely ceremonial and symbolic in the first place. Of course the perils are quite real. . . . Yet what drives them to run such risks is the insistent need . . . to prove self-worth and manhood. The final witness and ratifier for such demonstrations remains the social unit. Thus the *flyting-fighting* sequence provides a socially legitimated format for the expression of adversativeness. Through this activity heroes are

enabled to articulate verbally the stakes of honor that compose the very foundation for individual identity in heroic culture... The resulting proof and establishment of selfhood is a public event which reaffirms the individual's role within the community . . . The flying-fighting phenomenon constitutes in many ways the best paradigm for the realization of selfhood in community in a heroic world. (1986: 297-303)

2.1. PREMISAS FUNDAMENTALES DEL MODELO TEORICO DE BROWN Y LEVINSON


Antes de proceder a su aplicación, creemos que sería de utilidad presentar un breve resumen de los presupuestos básicos del marco teórico mencionado.

Un concepto clave para el correcto entendimiento del modelo de Brown y Levinson es el de *face* (imagen). Los autores distinguen entre la *imagen negativa* —la necesidad que siente todo individuo adulto de una sociedad de que sus acciones no se vean impedidas o entorpecidas por los demás— y la *imagen positiva* —la necesidad que siente cualquier miembro adulto y competente de una determinada sociedad de que su propias necesidades sean compartidas por otros—. El salvaguardar la imagen ajena o propia en todos los casos y circunstancias resulta tarea imposible. Prácticamente, cualquier interacción humana está compuesta por actos cuyo contenido proposicional merma la imagen. Brown y Levinson los denominan *Face Threatening Acts FTA* (Actos contra la Imagen, *ACI*⁴) y presentan una detallada clasificación de los mismos.

Una vez establecida la clasificación de los ACIs, Brown y Levinson se centran en la parte más interesante e importante de su estudio: establecer una tipología de las estrategias lingüísticas que un Hablante utiliza cuando tiene que llevar a cabo un ACI pero al mismo tiempo se ve obligado, por consideraciones sociales, a mantener o tener en cuenta la imagen positiva y negativa de su interlocutor.

Los autores afirman que cuando el Hablante se encuentra en esta coyuntura valora las siguientes necesidades: "...(a) the want to communicate the content of the FTA x (b) the want to be efficient or urgent and (c) the want to maintain H's [hearer's] face to any degree" (Brown y Levinson 1978: 73). Despues de valoradas, y siempre que (b) no sea más importante que (c),

el Hablante decide, en todos los casos, mitigar la amenaza al Oyente que su ACI lleva implícita. Para ello, puede hacer uso de las cinco estrategias lingüísticas que los autores presentan de forma esquematizada en el siguiente diagrama arbóreo:



Cuando el Hablante decide llevar a cabo un acto A que es intrínsecamente un ACI de modo que éste conste, *on record*, según la terminología de Brown y Levinson, los participantes en el intercambio conversacional no tienen duda sobre cuál ha sido la intención comunicativa que ha llevado al Hablante a realizar el acto A. Por ejemplo, si el Hablante dice: "Prometo venir mañana" no hay duda posible de que se ha comprometido a realizar un acto en el futuro y ese acto consta, *on record*, como una promesa.

Sin embargo, un Hablante puede decidir realizar un ACI sin constancia, *off record*, en cuyo caso se puede asignar más de una posible intención comunicativa al acto A y el Hablante no puede ser responsabilizado de haber querido realmente expresar el contenido X y haber cometido de este modo el ACI correspondiente. Al decir: "Se me ha estropeado el coche justo cuando tenía que viajar a Madrid", el Hablante puede estar implicando el ACI: "Préstame tu coche", pero si el Oyente le dice "No pienso dejarte el coche porque la última vez me lo estropeaste", el Hablante puede muy bien defenderse diciendo que él nunca ha pretendido pedírselo, porque no hay constancia explícita de que así lo haya hecho. Las realizaciones lingüísticas resultado de la estrategia número 4, (es decir, lleve a cabo el ACI sin constancia), son relacionadas por los autores, en todos los casos, con la violación de las máximas del Principio de Cooperación de Grice (1975):

Linguistic realizations of off-record strategies include metaphor and irony, rhetorical questions, understatement, tautologies of all kinds, of hints as to what a speaker wants or means to communicate without doing so directly, so that the meaning is to some degree negotiable. (Brown y Levinson 1978: 78)

Ejecutar un ACI *sin compensación* implica hacerlo de la forma más directa, clara, concisa y menos ambigua posible, es decir, siguiendo todos los requisitos de las máximas del Principio de Cooperación de Grice. Un ejemplo perfecto de esta estrategia lo constituye el imperativo. Normalmente, el Hablante utilizará la estrategia número 1 cuando no tema represalias por parte del destinatario del ACI y en circunstancias en las que ambas partes estén de acuerdo en que la imagen no es tan importante como la urgencia o la eficacia en la comunicación ("Apártate" dicho a alguien a quien ha estado a punto de atropellar un coche). También se utilizará esta estrategia cuando el peligro de mermar la imagen del Oyente sea mínimo, como en los ofrecimientos, peticiones o sugerencias que están hechas claramente para el interés del Oyente y que no requieren un gran esfuerzo por su parte ("Síéntate", "Entre"). Un tercer supuesto en el que se utilizaría la estrategia que discutimos es aquel en el que el Hablante tuviera tanto poder sobre el Oyente que no le preocupara en absoluto mantener su imagen (un amo dando órdenes a su criado) o el apoyo necesario por parte de la audiencia para destruir la imagen del Oyente sin mermar la propia (el fiscal acusando a un criminal).

Llevar a cabo un ACI *con acción compensatoria* quiere decir que el Hablante intenta mantener la imagen de su interlocutor suavizando, en la medida de lo posible, la amenaza potencial que el contenido del ACI lleva implícita. Para ello, realiza las adiciones y modificaciones necesarias que indiquen que el Hablante no pretende o no desea mancillar la imagen del Oyente y que, en general, reconoce las necesidades del Oyente como válidas y espera que éstas se vean satisfechas. Esta acción compensatoria tiene dos formas posibles, dependiendo de qué tipo de imagen, la positiva o la negativa, esté siendo amenazada. La *cortesía negativa* se relaciona con el fin social del individuo de no resultar una carga para los demás o entorpecer sus acciones y se manifiesta en esas determinadas formas con las que el concepto cortesía ha sido tradicionalmente asociado. La *cortesía positiva* es, quizá, menos obvia y se relaciona con la característica más importante de la personalidad de un individuo en su interacción con otros que es, precisamente, lo que esa persona espera o requiere de los demás e incluye el deseo de ser admirado, comprendido, de que se esté de acuerdo con él, de que su conducta —presente o pasada—, creencias etc. merezcan aprobación. De lo anterior, se deduce que los valores de la cortesía positiva están fundamentalmente determinados por la cultura, por el grupo social al que se pertenece y son, en última instancia, idiosincráticos.

Brown y Levinson afirman que cuanto más alto sea el riesgo potencial de un ACI a juicio del Hablante, éste codificará su mensaje utilizando progresivamente estrategias con una numeración más alta. De este modo, ACIs con un riesgo potencial bajo deberían ser codificados mediante la estrategia 1 (con constancia y sin compensación) y los más peligrosos, socialmente hablando, deberían o no ser llevados a cabo por el Hablante o no existir una constancia explícita del hecho. Esta postura implica la defensa del uso jerárquico y excluyente de las estrategias propugnadas.

Según los autores, la valoración del riesgo potencial de un determinado ACI —al que los autores denominan **W** (weight) y al que llamaremos **S** (seriedad)— depende de los siguientes factores:

- (i) la distancia social (**D**) entre el Hablante y el Oyente (relación de carácter simétrico).
- (ii) el poder relativo (**P**) del Hablante sobre el Oyente o viceversa (relación de carácter asimétrico).
- (iii) el grado de imposición absoluta (**I**) que el ACI implica y que es determinado por factores socio-culturales.

2.2. ANALISIS DE ST. EDMUND

Debido a la poca información respecto a la figura del mensajero, no se puede llevar a cabo un estudio completo de variables, ya que no se sabe si éste es tan sólo un soldado o, por el contrario, tiene un rango más elevado. Tampoco sabemos si es noble o plebeyo. De cualquier manera, el hecho de que Edmund sea un rey le coloca en el pináculo de la jerarquía. Por ello, la variable **P** tendría valores muy elevados. Respecto a **D**, la distancia, ocurriría lo mismo, porque los interlocutores no se conocían antes. Por su parte **I**, el grado de imposición, sería el máximo, porque a Edmund se le pide que renuncie a sus derechos como rey, a su fortuna y se le amenaza con la muerte.

A. Diálogo entre el mensajero de Ivar y Edmund:

1.
 Hinguar ure cyning cene and sigefæst.
 on sæ and on lande. hæfd fela yeoda gewyld.
 and com nu mid fyrde færlice her to lande
 yæt he her winter-setl mid his werode hæbbe. (48-51)

Ivar nuestro rey, valiente y victorioso

en tierra y mar, ha sometido muchas naciones
 y ha atracado aquí repentinamente con su ejército
 de manera que puedan él y sus huestes pasar aquí el invierno

Desde el punto de vista del contenido proposicional, éste es un ACI que encontramos definido en la clasificación de Brown y Levinson (1978) como *expresión de malas noticias* y forma parte del grupo de ACIs que amenazan la imagen positiva del Oyente, ya que el Hablante indica que no le importa causar desasosiego al Oyente. En lo que concierne a la presencia de recursos mitigadores de cortesía, hay que señalar que la amenaza que estas noticias implican no ha sido todavía formalmente explicitada, sino que *se da por supuesto* que el interlocutor, conocedor de la fuerza destructiva de Ivar, entenderá su sola presencia como una declaración de intenciones. Al dar por supuesta esta información, el hablante viola la máxima de relevancia y lleva a cabo el ACI sin constancia. El uso del presente de subjuntivo de *habban* es también un recurso de cortesía negativa que Brown y Levinson denominan *distanciamiento del punto de vista*; con ello el hablante intenta disociarse a sí mismo y al Oyente del ACI.

El uso de esos recursos de cortesía negativa está en franco desacuerdo con el contenido del mensaje y el desarrollo posterior de los acontecimientos. Al utilizar una partícula mitigadora, el Hablante da a entender que no da por supuesto nada en lo que se refiere a las necesidades del Oyente o a lo que le es relevante. Además mediante la estrategia de distanciamiento del punto de vista, el Hablante comunica su intención de no entorpecer las acciones del Oyente, lo que, en principio, haría suponer que éste no procederá a imponer un curso de acción al Oyente de modo inmediato. Sin embargo, esto es lo que precisamente ocurre en el siguiente ACI. Por otra parte, el codificar parte del ACI mediante la estrategia *off-record* podría tener como fin el que al Oyente no se pudiera imputar haber realizado el acto A, una amenaza. Pero, una vez más, el siguiente ACI no deja lugar a dudas sobre la intención comunicativa del mensajero y, por ello, resta toda eficacia a los recursos mitigadores empleados en este ACI.

2.

Nu het he dælan yine digelan gold-hordas.
 and yinra yldrena gestreon radlice wid hine.
 and yu beo his underkyning. gif yu cucu beon wylt.
 for-dan-ye du næfst pa mihte yæt yu mage him wid-standan. (52-55)

Ahora te ordena que repartas

inmediatamente tus secretos tesoros de tus antepasados con él
y que, si quieres vivir, te hagas su vasallo,
ya que no cuentas con las fuerzas necesarias para poder hacerle frente.

En este MACI, encontamos una *orden*, una *oferta* y una *amenaza*. Los tres ACIs merman la imagen negativa del Oyente, y ostentan un valor **S** muy elevado. Una posible compensación la constituye el hecho de que el mensajero no es responsable último del contenido de los ACIs, sino que se limita a trasmitir las palabras de su rey. En este caso, el mensajero no deja lugar a dudas sobre la fuerza ilocutiva de sus enunciaciones, ya que utiliza el verbo performativo *hatan* (ordenar) en la orden y la frase "gif du cucu beon wylt" ("si quieres vivir") en la amenaza.

A los contenidos proposicionalmente negativos que hemos discutido anteriormente, hay que sumar la presencia de la estrategia de cortesía positiva: *Dé a entender que da por supuesta la cooperación con el Oyente*, (Declare la existencia de una reflexividad entre el Hablante y el Oyente. Haga ofertas o promesas al Oyente) en la claúsula "for-dan-ye du næfst ya mihte yæt yu mæge him wid-standan" ("puesto que no cuentas con la fuerzas necesarias para poder hacerle frente"). El interpretar que una estrategia de cortesía concreta, lejos de ser una compensación, represente una mayor merma a la imagen del Oyente se debe al hecho de que el uso de las estrategias es contextual, siendo su adecuación al contexto lo que determina que su finalidad compensatoria se cumpla o no. Para que las estrategias de cortesía positiva cumplan su función, se presupone una relación de intimidad o proximidad entre los interlocutores que facilite la cooperación. Es evidente que éste no es el caso, por lo cual el que el mensajero dé por supuesto que Edmund se rendirá porque está de acuerdo con respecto a la relativa debilidad de su ejército y, por ello, aceptará la oferta de convertirse en vasallo de Ivar, pone de manifiesto la falta de respeto hacia su adversario y la posición de superioridad en la que creen encontrarse los invasores.

B. Diálogo entre Edmund y el mensajero de Ivar

1.
Æfter yysum wordum he gewende to yam ærendracan
ye hinguar him to sende and sæde him unforht.
Witodlice yu wære wyrde sleges nu.
ac ic nelle afylan on yinum fulum blode
mine clænan handa. fordan-ye ic criste folgie

ye us swa ge-bysnode. and ic blidelice wille beon
 ofslagen yurh eow gif hit swa god fore-sceawad
 Far nu swipe hrade and sage yinum repan hlaforde
 ne abihd næfre eadmund hingware on life
 hæyenum here-togan buton he to hælende criste
 ærest mid ge-leafan on yysum lande gebuge. (83-93)

Después de estas palabras, se volvió hacia el mensajero que Ivar le había enviado y le respondió sin miedo:
 Ciertamente merecerías la muerte
 pero no deseo ensuciar con tu sangre impura
 mis manos limpias puesto que sigo a Cristo
 que así nos lo enseñó y antes recibiría con alegría
 la muerte a manos vuestras si Dios así lo dispone.
 Regresa ahora con mucha rapidez y dile a tu cruel señor:
 "Nunca se someterá Edmund en vida a Ivar
 caudillo pagano, a menos que éste a la fe de Cristo Salvador
 se convierta antes en esta tierra".

En el primer MACI, encontramos una expresión de sentimientos negativos muy fuertes hacia el Oyente: "Witodlice yu wære wyrde sleges nu" ("Ciertamente merecería la muerte") y el insulto "yinum fulum blode" ("tu sangre impura") que merman la imagen positiva del Oyente. A continuación, una excusa, el Hablante expone las razones por las que no ha realizado un acto —quitarle la vida al mensajero— y una promesa, por la que Edmund se compromete a tomar un determinado curso de acción —morir por sus súbditos. Tanto la excusa como la promesa son actos que amenazan la imagen negativa del Hablante. El siguiente ACI es una orden, acto contra la imagen negativa del interlocutor —el mensajero de Ivar— que lleva incluidas la expresión de malas noticias lo cual supone una carga mayor —merma a la imagen positiva del Oyente— porque éste se ve obligado a ser el portador del desacuerdo con los deseos de su señor que implican las palabras de Edmund.

Con respecto a los recursos léxicos utilizados para mitigar los contenidos proposicionales amenazantes, hay que destacar los siguientes: *wære* ("serías") lleva a cabo la función, dentro de la cortesía negativa, de distanciar al Hablante y al Oyente del ACI. *Witodlice* ("ciertamente") es una partícula mitigadora de la fuerza ilocutiva del acto y, por lo tanto, también se incluye entre los recursos de cortesía negativa .

Por otra parte, encontramos el uso de una estrategia de cortesía positiva "for-dan-ye ic criste folgie ye us swa ge-bysnode" ("puesto que sigo a Cristo

que así nos lo enseñó") con la que el Hablante justifica, da razones, para no haber realizado un acto, matar al mensajero. Con esta subestrategia el Hablante presupone la cooperación de su interlocutor, ya que da por su supuesto que éste está familiarizado con los valores cristianos y, por ello, entenderá cuáles han sido los motivos que le han impulsado a obrar como lo ha hecho. A esta justificación, le sigue una promesa "and ic blidelice wille beon ofslagen yurh eow gif swa god for-sceawad" ("y antes recibiría con alegría la muerte a manos vuestras si Dios así lo dispone"), que además de constituir, a nivel de contenido proposicional, un ACI contra la imagen negativa del Hablante, tiene una función de subestrategia de cortesía positiva ya que el Hablante declara que existe una cierta reflexividad entre él y el Oyente y que se someterá gustoso a la muerte pero no porque esto sea la voluntad de Ivar sino la de Dios "gif swa god for-sceawad" ("si Dios así lo dispone"). En el siguiente ACI encontramos "hlaforde" (90) ("señor") que utiliza Edmund para referirse a Ivar con lo cual ofrece deferencia, es decir cortesía negativa, como compensación ya que sigue reconociendo el status de su enemigo y refiriéndose a él con un título ennoblecedor. Este mismo recurso es empleado en el siguiente ACI, en el que Edmund se refiere a Ivar como "here-toga" (92) ("caudillo"). Asimismo, en este ACI, encontramos la utilización del nombre propio *Ivar* lo que constituye una subestrategia de cortesía positiva. Edmund también hace uso de una subestrategia de cortesía negativa en este último ACI de su diálogo con el mensajero, la impersonalización, ya que evita utilizar los pronombres tú y yo. Utiliza su nombre propio, Edmund, para referirse a sí mismo.

Al igual que en el primero de los extractos analizados, Edmund mitiga prácticamente todos los ACIs con cortesía negativa e incluso positiva, lo cual es bastante extraño, según las previsiones de la teoría de la cortesía lingüística de Brown y Levinson (1978, 1987), ya que para que ésta sea funcional se tienen que dar una serie de circunstancias, entre ellas la fundamental es la cooperación entre los interlocutores, que evidentemente no se presupondría entre Edmund y el mensajero de Ivar.

Sin embargo, para la correcta interpretación de este mensaje, debemos recurrir a la explicación de Parks, quien enfatiza el hecho de que los episodios de *flyting* se caracterizan por la cooperación entre las partes implicadas y las comunidades a las que éstas pertenecen —como en el caso de *sounding*, descrito por Labov (1972)— ya que se trata de episodios altamente ritualizados y tradicionales. En el caso de Edmund, hay que recordar que estamos en el marco de una relación anfitrión-huesped y que, en este marco concreto, ciertas reglas deben ser observadas:

In those two instances of flying-on-the-battle-field, the contestants in the verbal contents become mortal foes in the subsequent martial exchange. Yet contest sequences within guest-host environments follow quite a different pathway. In such situations, the chief imperative is that the contest not endanger the process of guest-host binding. (Parks 1986: 299)

El código heroico prohíbe tácitamente la conducta violenta entre el huésped y el anfitrión y Edmund, fiel a éste, no quita la vida al mensajero.

2.3. ANALISIS DE *THE BATTLE OF MALDON*

Al igual que ocurría en el caso de *Edmund*, se hace imposible llevar a cabo un cómputo de variables completo, puesto que desconocemos la identidad y el rango del mensajero de los vikingos y, por tanto, no sabemos como evaluar su posición con respecto a la de *Byrhtnoth*, noble al servicio de *Ethelred* y capitán de la tropa. Por su parte, la variable **D** tendría un valor alto, puesto que los interlocutores son perfectos desconocidos, al igual que la **I** ya que la petición de tributo del vikingo implica renunciar a los valores y compromisos de *Byrhtnoth* con su rey y el no satisfacer las demandas de los invasores implica la batalla y, tal vez, la muerte propia y de sus partidarios.

A. Diálogo: El mensajero de los vikingos se dirige a Byrhtnoth

1.

Ya stod on stæde, stidlice clypode
wicinga ar, wordum malde,
se on beot abead brim liyendra
ærænde to yam eorle yær he on ofre stod:

'Me sendon to ye sãmen snelle,
heton de secgan yæt pu most sendan rade
begas wid gebeorge. (25-31)

Entonces apareció en la orilla opuesta y gritó con fiereza,
un mensajero de los vikingos dijo estas palabras
anunció con amenazas, de los vikingos
un mensaje al señor que estaba en la otra orilla:

Me envían a ti valientes marinos,
me ordenan que te diga que debes enviar inmediatamente
riquezas a cambio de protección.

En este MACI, encontramos, en primer lugar, la *expresión de malas noticias*, que es un ACI que Brown y Levinson (1978, 1987) clasifican como merma a la imagen positiva del Oyente, ya que el Hablante no duda en causar desasosiego, miedo etc. a su interlocutor haciéndole partícipe de cierta información nueva. El siguiente ACI contiene una *oferta*, ACI cuyo contenido proposicional amenaza la imagen negativa del Oyente, ya que el Hablante indica que desea que éste decida si quiere o no que el Hablante realice el acto A por o para el Oyente. De este modo, si el Oyente acepta, se puede ver obligado a compensar al Hablante.

2.

And eow betere is
yæt ge yisne garræs mid gafole forgyldon
yonne we swa hearde hilde dælon. (31-33)

Y es mejor para todos vosotros
que esta batalla compréis con tributo
antes que en tan duro combate nos enzarcemos

En este segundo MACI del diálogo entre el pirata y Byrhtnoth, encontramos un acto cuyo contenido proposicional debe interpretarse como una *amenaza*, acto que implica una merma a la imagen negativa del Oyente, ya que el Hablante indica que él —alguien o algo— instigará sanciones contra el Oyente: "we swa hearde hilde dælon" (33) ("que en tan duro combate nos enzarcemos"), a menos que éste realice el acto A "mid gafole forgyldon" (32) ("compréis con tributo"). La estregia de cortesía negativa que encontramos en este ACI es la disociación del Hablante y el Oyente del ACI por medio de la utilización de tiempos verbales que sitúen la acción en unas coordenadas distintas del aquí y ahora, en este caso el tiempo utilizado es el pasado en lugar del presente "swa hearde hilde dælon" (33).

3.

Ne yurfe we us spillan gif ge speday to yam
we willad wid yam golde grid fæstnian. (34-35)

No tenemos necesidad de destruirnos unos a otros si os lo podéis
 permitir
 Estamos dispuestos a cambio de oro a establecer una tregua

El mensajero realiza otra *oferta* de paz a Byrhtnoth, mermando de nuevo su imagen negativa. Asimismo, el Hablante se compromete —por medio de una *promesa*, acto que amenaza su imagen negativa— a tomar un curso determinado de acción en el futuro, no entrar en combate a cambio de la entrega de un tributo.

4.
 Gyf yu yæt gerædest ye her ricost eart,
 yæt yu yine leoda lysan wille,
 syllan sæmannum, on hyra sylfra dom,
 feoh wid freode, and niman frid æt us,
 we willay mid yam sceattum us to scipe gangan,
 on flot feran, and eow friyes healdan. (36-41)

Si tú así lo decides como el hombre más poderoso aquí
 que estás dispuesto a redimir a tu gente
 mediante el pago a los vikingos de una cantidad estipulada por
 ellos,
 dinero a cambio de paz, y a aceptar nuestra oferta de paz
 estaríamos dispuestos con estas riquezas a embarcarnos de nuevo
 surcar el mar y mantener la paz con vosotros.

En este MACI, encontramos una repetición del esquema del ACI (3) el Hablante amenaza la imagen negativa de su interlocutor, efectuando una *oferta* —mediante la cual reitera su ofrecimiento de aceptar dinero a cambio de paz— y una *promesa*, acto que amenaza la imagen negativa del Hablante, y que le compromete a llevar a cabo un determinado acto en el futuro —("we willay mid yam sceattum us to scipe gangan, on flot feran, and eow friyes healdan" (36-41); "estaríamos dispuestos con estas riquezas a embarcarnos de nuevo surcar el mar y mantener la paz con vosotros"). La merma a la imagen negativa del Oyente está compensada con cortesía negativa, ya que el mensajero hace explícito el valor **P** reconociendo a Byrhtnoth como la más alta jerarquía presente y, por lo tanto, con "Gyf yu yæt gerædest ye her ricost eart . . ." (36), "Si tú así lo decides como el hombre más poderoso aquí", le ofrece deferencia.

Nos gustaría ofrecer una valoración global respecto a las estrategias de compensación que encontramos en este primer diálogo, cabe destacar que hay una que subyace al resto que hemos detallado en cada caso y que es la estrategia de cortesía positiva con la cuál el Hablante pone de manifiesto que *da por supuesta la cooperación del Oyente*, declarando que existe una reflexividad entre el Hablante y el Oyente [si el Hablante quiere X, entonces el Oyente quiere X] y, por ello, se permite hacer ofertas o promesas al Oyente. Como hemos visto, la codificación de ofertas y promesas ha sido continua en esta primera parte del diálogo. Sin embargo, es precisamente la compensación de cortesía positiva la que dota de una mayor carga de merma a la imagen positiva del Oyente a este MACI, ya que el Hablante da por supuesto que Byrhtnoth estará de acuerdo en pagar el tributo porque es evidente para él que sus tropas son menos diestras que las de sus adversarios. Es desde esa postura de superioridad asumida que el pirata se dirige a Byrhtnoth, y por lo cual éste se siente doblemente insultado. Una vez más, vemos como el uso de las estrategias de cortesía para ser funcional tiene que adecuarse al contexto y a la relación concreta que mantienen entre sí los interlocutores, puesto que los diferentes recursos de compensación cortés tienen asociado un determinado significado social, de modo que, a partir de ellos, se puede abstraer el tipo de relación entre las partes. Por ello, dicho significado se puede manipular para crear implicaturas, como en este caso, que podrían interpretarse como ironía o displicencia y hacer vacíos de significado todos los demás recursos compensadores utilizados.

B. Diálogo: Byrhtnoth se dirige al mensajero de los vikingos.

1.
 Byrhtnod mayelode, bord hafenode,
 wand wacne æsc, wordum malde,
 yrre and anræd ageaf him andsware:
 Gehyrst yu sælida, hwæt yis folc seged? (42-45)

Byrthnoth habló levantó su escudo,
 blandió su ligera lanza dijo estas palabras
 enojado y resuelto le dió esta respuesta
 Marino, ¿oyes tú lo que dice esta gente?

Byrhtnoth comienza su intervención con una *peticIÓN de informaciÓN* que supone proposicionalmente un ACI contra la imagen negativa del Oyente. Esta petición está compensada con cortesía negativa al estar codificada en forma de pregunta. Este es un recurso mitigador mediante el cual el Hablante da a entender que no da por supuesto o no asume nada respecto al Oyente.

2.

Hi willad eow to gafole garras syllan,
 ættrynne ord and ealde swurd,
 ya heregatu ye eow æt hilde ne deah. (46-48)

Como tributo desean ofrecerte espadas
 la lanza envenenada y las expertas espadas
 los arreos del guerrero que de poco te servirán en la batalla.

En este segundo MACI, tenemos, por un lado, un *desacuerdo* con las palabras del mensajero y su asunción de que Byrhtnoth y sus hombres aceptarían su inferioridad y pagar el tributo, lo cual supone una amenaza para la imagen positiva de éste. Por otro, las palabras de Byrhtnoth contienen un *reto* —acto que amenaza la imagen negativa del Oyente—, una clara invitación al enfrentamiento físico que ha de seguir a este enfrentamiento verbal. El desacuerdo y reto han sido compensados con recursos de cortesía negativa, ya que la simple respuesta *no* ha sido elaborada profusamente, como es de esperar en un registro poético, de modo que es más difícil descodificar su contenido proposicional básico.

3.

Brimmanna boda, abeod eft ongean!
 Sege yinum leodum miccle layre spell,
 yæt her stynt unforcud eorl mid his werode,
 ye wile gealgean eyel yisne,
 æyelredas eard, ealdres mines,
 folc ond foldan. Feallan sceolon
 hæyene æt hilde. To heanlic me yinced
 yæt ge mid urum sceattum to scipe gangon
 unbefohtene, nu ge yus feor hider
 on urne eard in becomon. (49-58)

Mensajero de los vikingos, vuelve con este recado
 Comunica a tu gente unas nuevas mucho mas desagradables

que aquí permanecen impertérritos un caudillo con su gente
 que defenderá esta tierra,
 la tierra de Ethelred, mi señor
 la gente y la tierra caerán
 los paganos en el combate. Me parece demasiado vergonzoso
 que vosotros con nuestras riquezas retornéis a vuestros barcos
 sin haber encontrado oposición ahora que así tan adentro
 en nuestra tierra habéis penetrado.

En este MACI, encontramos, en primer lugar una *orden*, acto contra la imagen negativa del Oyente, que ha sido codificado sin compensación alguna, mediante la estrategia *bald on record*, para lo que se ha utilizado el imperativo. La segunda parte del MACI implica un *desacuerdo* y la *expresión de malas noticias*, ambos ACIs merman la imagen positiva del interlocutor. La estrategia de cortesía negativa que ha sido utilizada para compensar estos dos contenidos proposicionales es la de la *impersonalización*. Con ella el hablante se disocia del ACI, evitando utilizar el pronombre personal *Ic* o *we* "...eorl mid his werode..." (51), "un caudillo con su gente", "ye wille gealgean eyel yysne" (52), "que pretende defender esta tierra).

4.

Feallan sceolon
 hæyene æt hilde. (54-55)

Caerán
 los paganos en el combate

Este ACI es, a nivel de contenido proposicional, una *amenaza*, acto que merma la imagen negativa del Oyente. De nuevo, para compensarlo el hablante ha recurrido a la impersonalización, cortesía negativa, al evitar el pronombre *yu* o el adjetivo *yin* y referirse en tercera persona a su interlocutor, con lo cual lo ha disociado del ACI.

5

To heanlic me yinced
 yæt ge mid urum sceattum to scipe gangon
 unbefohtene, nu ge yus feor hider
 on urne eard in becomon
 Ne sceole ge swa softe sine gegangan (55-59)

Me parece demasiado vergonzoso
 que vosotros con nuestras riquezas retornéis a vuestros barcos
 sin haber encontrado oposición ahora que así tan adentro
 en nuestra tierra habéis penetrado
 No conseguiréis tan fácilmente el tesoro.

Byrhtnoth vuelve a rechazar la oferta hecha por el mensajero y sus palabras expresan un MACI contra la imagen positiva de éste al codificar un *desacuerdo*, la compensación ofrecida de cortesía positiva es la subestrategia *Dé o pida razones*. Byrhtnoth explica por qué la rendición sin lucha no es posible: ésta sería terriblemente vergonzosa para unos hombres que han jurado defender con su vida las tierras de su señor. La presencia de "...swa softe" (59), "tan fácilmente", en el último ACI es también un recurso de cortesía negativa: la utilización de partículas o expresiones mitigadoras de la fuerza ilocutiva del acto.

6

Us sceal ord and ecg ær geseman,
 grim gudplega, ær we gofol syllon. (60-61)

La lanza y la espada deben decidir primero
 la terrible batalla antes de que os paguemos tributo.

Las palabras finales de Byrhtnoth constituyen un *reto*, una clara invitación a la lucha y son, por ello, un ACI contra la imagen negativa del Oyente. En la codificación de este ACI, Byrhtnoth ha violado la máxima de calidad ya que ha utilizado una metáfora. Por tanto, el ACI se ha realizado sin constancia, *off record*.

Es evidente, que el contenido de ambos diálogos en otro contexto sería exponente de un tipo de discurso en el que no se presupondría que los interlocutores respetaran las reglas de cortesía, ya que si éstas están dirigidas a compensar la posible pérdida de imagen del interlocutor o la propia, o a re establecer el equilibrio interactivo entre ambos, se deberían relacionar con un cierto grado de cooperación social que está ausente en este caso por obvios motivos. Por ello, nuestra hipótesis de trabajo es que la presencia de recursos léxicos de cortesía *en* los textos debe ser entendida tan sólo en relación a la cortesía *de* los textos, es decir la intencionalidad comunicativa del autor respecto al público concreto a quién iban destinadas las obras. Este público no podría aceptar un héroe que no respetara las normas de cortesía impuestas por el código heroico. Por ello, el autor hace por preservar, en

todo momento, la imagen de los héroes, la cual quedaría totalmente desvirtuada si éstos insultaran a sus enemigos o utilizaran un tipo de vocabulario que no contribuyera a engrandecer sus proezas a los ojos de los lectores, sobre todo en los episodios de *flyting* que, como señalaba Parks (1986), constituyen el máximo exponente de la autoafirmación heroica.

3. ESTUDIO DE LA CORTESIA DE LOS TEXTOS

A continuación, llevamos a cabo el análisis de la cortesía del texto (nivel extradiegético) en los dos textos que nos proponemos estudiar, con la finalidad de comprobar en qué difieren y en qué se asemejan en este nivel de análisis contextual. El estudio de la cortesía del texto es el que reviste mayor interés desde el punto de vista de la pragmática literaria, puesto que estudia las relaciones entre el autor y el público al que va dirigida la obra, y de cuyo análisis se deriva la interpretación de ésta.

El estudio de la cortesía de los textos pretende descubrir la relación establecida entre los autores de las obras y el público al cual, en principio, éstas iban dirigidas. Si este análisis es correcto, nos permitirá descubrir la intención comunicativa de los autores, y la finalidad de las obras.

Sell (1985: 175) divide la cortesía de los textos en *cortesía de selección* y *cortesía de presentación*. La cortesía de selección se refiere a lo que el autor elige contar en su obra, y la cortesía de presentación a cómo lo cuenta. Según la teoría de Sell (1989: 11), un autor que quisiera mantener la cortesía de selección de modo absoluto no escribiría nada que fuera en contra de las convenciones morales o sociales de su época; por otro lado, el pretender observar a toda costa la cortesía de presentación implicaría respetar en todo momento el Principio de Cooperación (PC), manteniendo a los lectores informados de todo cuanto ocurre dentro de la obra con absoluta claridad, de un modo diáfano.

Por razones obvias, esto no suele ocurrir en la obra literaria. Los autores no se adhieren de modo absoluto a los dos tipos de cortesía (de selección y de presentación), puesto que el hacerlo significaría la creación de obras pesadas, aburridas y demasiado obsequiosas para el público. Sell escribe:

Obsequious overselection would rule out much of the pleasure of literary texts, much irony and satire, much gentle goading of the

reader by the writer. Dull overpresentation, again, would rule out certain elements of surprise, suspense or intellectual and moral stimulus, generally leaving the reader with too little work to do for himself, and with much less opportunity for real engagement with the text. (1989: 12)

Efectivamente, en el caso de la literatura, aunque ello no es exclusivo del lenguaje literario, el autor viola en muchas ocasiones deliberadamente alguna/s las máxima/s del PC de modo que el mensaje no sea absolutamente explícito para el receptor, y éste deba, mediante implicaturas derivadas del contexto en que se produce dicho mensaje, extraer finalmente el sentido del mismo. El texto literario requiere especialmente cierta opacidad para que resulte interesante, para que pueda establecerse una cierta complicidad entre el escritor y su público al sentir el destinatario de la obra que el autor de ella ha dejado algo a su interpretación, en lugar de presentar todo su mensaje de forma explícita; de ahí se deriva precisamente el disfrute que produce la literatura. En este sentido, Garcés afirma:

Al asumir esta hiperprotección del PC como rasgo esencial de la situación comunicativa literaria, el lector está dispuesto a hacer el esfuerzo necesario de interpretación, incluso cuando la violación de las máximas haga esta tarea ardua. No obstante, el lector se somete a ella gustoso porque sabe que en la literatura, más que en otros casos, lo que se implica es más importante que lo que se expone abiertamente. (1991: 363)

Es necesario, por otro lado, tener en cuenta que si el autor no mantiene siempre la cortesía de presentación mediante la violación de alguna de las máximas del PC, el lector deberá siempre poder extraer, por el contexto compartido por ambos, lector y autor, y mediante implicaturas, el sentido de la obra, de modo que la comprensión de ésta sea posible.

Una vez establecidos estos presupuestos con respecto al análisis de la cortesía del texto (nivel extradiegético), se procederá al estudio de este nivel en las dos obras que nos ocupan. En el caso de *Maldon* y *St. Edmund* es precisamente el análisis de este nivel el que nos permite dar cuenta de ciertas diferencias entre los dos textos que no han sido señaladas por la crítica que, sin embargo, ha recalcado los paralelismos entre ambas. Estas diferencias residirían principalmente en el modo en que los autores observan la *cortesía de presentación* (el modo en que cuentan su historia), ya que el contenido

(cortesía de selección), si no exactamente igual, es verdaderamente muy parecido.

Desde la crítica literaria tradicional se ha interpretado la figura de Byrhtnoth en el poema de muy diferente modo. Algunos consideran la obra como una exaltación de la figura del héroe que encarna el protagonista, y un canto épico de los antiguos valores germanos (lealtad, valor, obediencia), escrito en una época de clara decadencia de éstos. Otros estudiosos del poema han querido ver en *Maldon*, por el contrario, un alegato antimilitarista, y en la figura de Byrhtnoth la historia de un hombre que, debido a su orgullo exagerado (*ofermod*) conduce innecesariamente a la muerte a un grupo de nobles guerreros y de fieles soldados; esta interpretación tiene uno de sus exponentes más extremos en el artículo publicado por Stuart en 1982. Basándose en la supuesta crítica del poeta a las acciones de Byrhtnoth, y en el alto contenido de violencia de la obra, la autora concluye:

Even though it utilises concepts and language directly associated with the heroic code, *The Battle of Maldon* does not have a heroic meaning. Since the poem as a whole advocates careful thought and moderate action rather than marvellous feats performed in impetuous haste, and since it places great emphasis on the destruction of war, one may interpret it as antiheroic. (1982: 137)

Estos argumentos, sin embargo, no resultan en absoluto convincentes a poco que se estudien más de cerca. Los poemas heroicos, como *Beowulf*, también contienen episodios sangrientos y de una gran violencia, y a nadie se le ocurriría cuestionar su carácter heroico. Por otro lado, las críticas del poeta a Byrhtnoth (la supuesta acusación de *ofermod*), si bien apoyada por parte de la crítica, no ha encontrado, hasta ahora argumentos definitivos. Las conclusiones a las que llega Stuart (1982) sobre el carácter antiheroico de Byrhtnoth están basadas en meras intuiciones literarias e interpretaciones personales que, si bien tienen cierto valor, no pueden presentarse en ningún caso como definitivas o como "la verdad" sobre el poema. La mayoría de los lectores sigue interpretando la obra como una clara apología del código heroico, aunque la figura de Byrhtnoth presente ciertas contradicciones.

Por otro lado, nadie ha cuestionado (ni probablemente se cuestionará nunca) el carácter moralizante y apológetico de *Edmund*. Para cualquier lector resulta indudable la defensa que Ælfric hace en su narración de los valores cristianos —o germánicos cristianizados— en un tiempo de crisis, y la figura del rey que rehusa pagar tributo (al igual que el general de *Maldon*)

y que prefiere morir a manos enemigas antes que renunciar a sus principios morales siempre se ha considerado exaltada por el autor, que parece identificarse totalmente con la noble naturaleza del santo. Ambos textos parecen tener, pues, una intención propagandística y de defensa de una serie de valores, si bien, la intencionalidad del autor es mucho más oscura en *Maldon*. Es nuestro propósito demostrar, desde el análisis de la cortesía de los textos, por qué el carácter apologético de la obra de Ælfric no ha sido cuestionado y el *Maldon* tan discutido.

La codificación lingüística de un mensaje (tanto en el lenguaje coloquial como en el literario) depende de una serie de factores que el autor tiene que tener en cuenta; quizá el más determinante sea el público al que ese mensaje va destinado. Por esta razón, en contra de lo que afirma Stuart (1982: 138), el contexto de una obra literaria sí es relevante a la hora de establecer la validez de su interpretación. El público al que iba dirigido *Edmund* estaba constituido principalmente por los fieles que asistían a la iglesia el día del mártir. El mensaje de Ælfric es un sermón, y, por lo tanto, resulta lógico que sea lo más directo y comprensible posible. Debido al carácter homilético de su mensaje, el autor respeta en todo momento la cortesía de presentación, evitando violar las máximas del PC. Ælfric narra su historia con claridad, delimitando quiénes están de parte de Dios y quiénes del diablo, y de qué lado está el autor. Si se compara su relato con el original latino de Abbo, se comprueba que, si bien Ælfric omitió fragmentos de la fuente latina en su versión, de ningún modo eludió aquellos que son indispensables para que el lector extraiga el sentido moral de la obra; Ælfric elige (cortesía de selección) presentar algunos aspectos de la obra de Abbo u obviar otros; por ejemplo, el autor no describe explícitamente las atrocidades cometidas por los vikingos (violaciones, matanza de niños, etc.) y que sí aparecen en el texto de Abbo, sino que se limita a mencionarlas en sentido general. De este modo, el autor dice lo suficiente para no violar la máxima de cantidad del PC, y al mismo tiempo respeta la de modo evitando exagerar los detalles desagradables que causarían repugnancia en el oyente, y que, desde el punto de vista de la comprensión del mensaje final, son innecesarios porque no añaden nada.

Por lo demás, Ælfric mantiene la cortesía de presentación a lo largo del todo el texto. La única parte de la narración que podría presentar un problema de interpretación es el fragmento en que el obispo aconseja a Edmund la huida y éste se niega.⁵ Ælfric no hace ningún comentario explícito sobre este hecho, pero el público tiene las claves suficientes, dentro y fuera de la obra, para descubrir el significado del gesto del rey: Edmund es un

mártir, un santo, y, por lo tanto, no puede someterse a los dictados de los caudillos paganos, ni abandonar a su pueblo. Existen en el nivel contextual compartido por autor y lector numerosos paralelismos que así lo indican (martirio de San Edmundo como una *imitatio Christi*). Incluso al final de la obra, por si quedara alguna duda, después del relato de los milagros del santo, se nos presenta la figura de un obispo indigno que nos recuerda al primero que aconseja a Edmund la huida. Este respeto de las máximas del PC tiene su razón de ser en la obra de Ælfric: *Edmund* es una homilía, y, como tal, debe presentar un carácter explícito y dejar poco lugar al juego interpretativo del lector puesto que la finalidad es que la intención comunicativa del autor quede muy clara; por eso es muy difícil que un sermón sea *artístico*.

El caso de *Maldon* es diferente. *Maldon* defiende los valores heroicos (lealtad, valentía, etc.), y esto es algo que se percibe tras la lectura del poema de modo intuitivo; Sell (1985:12) se refiere a esta primera interpretación intuitiva como *gut feelings*. Sin embargo, es interesante que, a pesar de ello, la lectura del poema haya provocado reacciones contrapuestas. Desde la pragmática literaria, esto tiene una clara explicación. *Maldon* es uno de los poemas más bellos e interesantes de la literatura anglosajona; es una obra de arte y no un panfleto; desde el punto de vista estilístico, por lo tanto, no puede ser tan explícito como un sermón al uso, debe dejar un papel más activo al lector en la recepción del poema. Aunque el poeta de *Maldon* defiende los valores heroicos (como demuestran las arengas de los soldados y otros elementos del poema), su postura no se hace nunca completamente explícita a lo largo de éste. El autor anónimo de *Maldon* no mantiene siempre la cortesía de presentación del texto; en algunos fragmentos del poema, ya analizados en el nivel intradiegético (estudio de cortesía en el texto), mediante la litotes y la ambigüedad, el poeta de viola las máximas de modo y cantidad del PC.

Esta ha sido precisamente una de quejas más frecuentes de la crítica especializada: si el poeta reprende el comportamiento de Byrhtnoth (*ofermod*), ¿por qué lo hace de modo tan ambiguo? ¿por qué no se extiende más sobre este hecho a lo largo del poema? Desde nuestro punto de vista, es en esta ambigüedad en la que reside la calidad estética del poema y su valor literario (muy superior al de *Edmund*). El poeta no siempre respeta la cortesía de presentación, pero el lector de entonces (y el de ahora, si está debidamente informado) cuenta con las claves contextuales suficientes para captar el mensaje que se le pretende transmitir. Estas claves contextuales son las siguientes:

1. El destinatario del poema es un lector culto, o al menos conoce (está familiarizado con) la épica y sabe que Byrhtnoth no tenía otra alternativa de actuación. El general no conduce a sus hombres a la muerte y debe ser, por ello, condenado, como afirma Stuart (1982: 129). En primer lugar, Byrhtnoth es el jefe de un ejército, pero a su vez está unido por lazos de lealtad al rey, cuya tierra debe proteger. Su primer deber es el de defenderla, y el de sus hombres, según la esencia del código heroico, es el de apoyarlo a él.

2. Por otro lado, cuando el general desafía al enemigo vikingo se compromete a luchar, no puede volverse atrás; el no permitir a los vikingos el paso haría imposible esa lucha prometida.

3. Por último, uno de los rasgos característicos del héroe es su precipitación. Este defecto, lejos de ser marcadamente negativo, es uno de los rasgos que le hacen distinto del resto de los mortales.

Como consecuencia, a pesar de que el autor no observa una cortesía de presentación de modo tan escrupuloso como lo hace *Ælfric*, el público de la época, conocedor de las claves del poeta, comparte su visión del mundo y es capaz de entender el significado del mensaje: seamos fieles a nuestros ideales en una época de desmoralización y fracaso nacional. La ambigüedad que ocasiona este desafío a las normas de la cortesía de presentación hace de *Maldon* mejor literatura.

CONCLUSION

Los intercambios comunicativos analizados, tanto en *Maldon* como en *Saint Edmund*, presentan, en un primer nivel de análisis (cortesía *en* el texto), varios paralelismos fundamentales:

1. En los dos textos, los diálogos entre los personajes están altamente estilizados y aparecen en ellos frecuentes recursos de cortesía negativa y positiva encaminados a compensar el carácter potencialmente amenazante que los ACIs suponen contra la imagen del Hablante y del Oyente.

2. Precisamente, por el alto grado de agresividad del contenido proposicional de los ACIs y el contexto en el que se producen, no se esperaría —según los presupuestos del marco teórico de Brown y Levinson (1978, 1987)—, encontrar un número tan elevado de estrategias mitigadoras. La causa de su presencia en los textos hay que buscarla, siguiendo a Parks (1986) en que ambos fragmentos pertenecen a determinados géneros

literarios: literatura heroica y hagiografía, en los que, por su naturaleza propagandística, es necesario salvar a toda costa la imagen del Oyente y del Hablante, independientemente de cuál sea el grado de agresividad potencial o real de los contenidos de sus intercambios comunicativos.

Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista de la cortesía de los textos, que es precisamente el nivel que nos ofrece la clave para la comprensión de los mismos, *Maldon* y *Saint Edmund*, a pesar de no contener distinciones significativas en el nivel de la *cortesía de selección* (intercambios comunicativos similares: ostentaciones, insultos, amenazas, mitigadas por recursos semejantes en los dos casos), presentan, sin embargo, una serie de diferencias en el nivel de la cortesía de presentación, que están derivadas, en última instancia, de la naturaleza de los géneros a que pertenecen ambas obras. En el caso de *Saint Edmund* (hagiografía), el autor respeta, en todo momento, la *cortesía de presentación* puesto que le interesa primordialmente que su mensaje sea claro para el Oyente, y no haya lugar a dudas sobre la intencionalidad del mismo. En el caso de *Maldon*, sin embargo, y puesto que se trata de una obra literaria de gran calidad que tiene como finalidad el entretenimiento y no la indoctrinación, el autor viola, en determinados momentos de la narración, algunas de las máximas del PC, esto es, no respeta a ultranza la *cortesía de presentación* posibilitando así que el autor infiera, mediante implicaturas, la intencionalidad del mensaje, de modo que su interpretación final dependerá, en gran parte, de las inferencias que el lector efectue teniendo en cuenta el conocimiento compartido por ambos, autor y lector. a

NOTAS

1. Tradicionalmente, la crítica ha convenido en situar la fecha de composición del poema en la última década del siglo X (cf. C. Clark 1983). Sin embargo, hay que ha propuesto también una fecha más tardía: McKinnell (1975), Blake (1978), G. Clark (1979), entre otros.

2. Cf. Sperber y Wilson (1986).

3. Para una exposición más detallada de estos conceptos, cf. Genette (1980).

4. Brown y Levinson tan sólo analizaron las manifestaciones de la cortesía en el acto de habla individual. En nuestro análisis, hemos extendido el estudio del uso de los recursos léxicos

de mitigación cortés al ámbito del macro-acto de habla. Por lo tanto, además de la abreviatura ACI, acto contra la imagen, se encontrará en el texto otra MACI que corresponde a macro-acto contra la imagen.

5. En nuestro análisis, hemos excluido la parte concerniente al diálogo del obispo con Edmund puesto que estabamos interesadas en comparar lo que de similar tenían ambos episodios de *flyting*, es decir la interacción mensajero de los vikingos-héroe.

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— ENUNCIACION, FICCION
Y NIVELES SEMIOTICOS EN EL
TEXTO NARRATIVO



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EN este trabajo estableceremos algunos paralelismos entre conceptos narratológicos y otros derivados de la pragmalingüística, con la esperanza de que esta comparación contribuya a clarificar las relaciones entre dos disciplinas tan próximas y que a la vez han trabajado tan aisladas.¹ Dado que el tema desborda con mucho el tratamiento que aquí podemos darle, nos centraremos ante todo en las peculiaridades enunciativas de la ficción. No trataremos directamente otros temas de indudable relevancia para una pragmática literaria, como son por ejemplo las peculiaridades comunicativas del lenguaje escrito, la interacción comunicativa, el concepto de literatura, la narración como acto de habla conversacional, etc. Examinaremos algunas definiciones clásicas de la ficción en el campo de la teoría literaria y la teoría de los actos de habla. Partiendo de ellas, estableceremos pautas de descripción estructural que tengan en cuenta la naturaleza compleja y estratificada de la ficción narrativa, teniendo en cuenta los casos fronterizos o problemáticos. Terminaremos con unas consideraciones sobre las relaciones entre la lingüística ampliada (pragmalingüística) y la teoría literaria.

1. BREVE HISTORIA DEL CONCEPTO DE FICCION

Desde la antigüedad griega, la reflexión sobre la literatura (o la poesía) va unida a una reflexión simultánea sobre el sentido de la ficcionalidad, y sus relaciones con otros conceptos como imitación, realismo o verosimilitud. De hecho, podríamos decir que más que unida va mezclada.

Así, Platón distingue en el *Sofista* entre imitación icástica e imitación fantástica, y condena a esta última por ser creadora de falsedades. La ficción no tiene cabida exacta en estas categorías, pero nada bueno parece augurarse para ella. En la *República* Platón pronuncia su célebre condena contra los poetas: "los poetas . . . no son más que imitadores de fantasmas, sin llegar jamás a la realidad" (X, 283). Está claro que para Platón la ficción es algo muy cercano a la mentira. Lo mismo declara Solón (cit. por Aristóteles, *Metafísica* I. ii, 983 a). Para Gorgias, la ficción (poesía) es una forma de mentira en la cual el engañado es más sabio que el que no se deja engañar.

La tradición crítica posterior, comenzando por Aristóteles, pugnará por diferenciar los conceptos de ficción y mentira: hay una correspondencia subyacente entre la realidad y la ficción que no se da en el caso de la mentira. Aristóteles opone la poesía a la historia, pero no se trata de la oposición entre mentira y verdad. Para Aristóteles la ficción es fiel a la verdad en un sentido que va más allá de la mera literalidad de la historia :

resulta claro no ser oficio del poeta el contar las cosas como sucedieron sino cual deseáramos hubieran sucedido, y tratar lo posible según verosimilitud o necesidad. Que, en efecto, no está la diferencia entre poeta e historiador en que el uno escriba con métrica y el otro sin ella . . . , empero diferéncianse en que el uno dice las cosas tal como pasaron y el otro cual ójala hubieran pasado. Y por este motivo *la poesía es más filosófica y esforzada empresa que la historia* , ya que la poesía trata sobre todo de lo universal, y la historia, por el contrario, de lo singular. (*Poética* IX, 1451 b)

Es decir, el objeto de la *mimesis* no tiene por que ser real: puede ser ideal, puede incluso manifestar de una forma más perfecta que los objetos reales la esencia y potencialidades de la naturaleza.

En otro pasaje igualmente famoso, Aristóteles pide a los poetas que sean lo más "miméticos" posible, "que el poeta mismo ha de hablar lo menos posible por cuenta propia, pues así no sería imitador" (*Poética* XXIV, 1460 a). Es decir: no sería artista. Son frecuentes en la crítica posterior las condenaciones aristotélicas a la voz directa del autor, que se considera un elemento necesariamente extra-artístico.² Parece difícil no ver en este pasaje

aristotélico una contradicción con la anterior definición de los modos de la *mimesis*, cuando Aristóteles dice que "se puede imitar y representar las mismas cosas con los mismos medios, sólo que unas veces en forma narrativa—como lo hace Homero, o conservando el mismo sin cambiarlo" (*Poética* III, 1448 a). Habrá que admitir que Aristóteles entiende por *mimesis* dos cosas diferentes en uno y otro contexto. Se trata de una molesta confusión entre ficción y literatura, que comprensiblemente será muy frecuente en los teorizadores más variopintos.

Durante numerosos siglos, la teoría literaria no va mucho más allá de las teorías platónica y aristotélica en cuanto al problema de la ficcionalidad. San Agustín reconoce que las obras de arte tienen verdad a su manera, precisamente por el hecho de ser una especie de falsedad, pues es el papel del artista ser en cierto modo un fabricante de mentiras.³ Boccaccio añade algunas ideas interesantes. Identifica deliberadamente los conceptos de poesía y ficción; lo que se nos presenta "compuesto bajo un velo", con la verdad oculta bajo apariencia de falsedad, es poesía y no retórica.⁴ La poesía no es en absoluto "mentira", debido a este significado oculto que se interpreta a partir del aparente y superficial. El poeta ya trabaja dentro de una convención y debe ser leido de acuerdo con ella: "Poetic fiction has nothing in common with any variety of falsehood, for it is not a poet's purpose to deceive anybody with his inventions".⁵

Este mismo razonamiento subyace a los planteamientos posteriores del problema del valor de verdad de la ficción en la teoría literaria del Renacimiento. Es conocido el argumento de Sir Philip Sidney en defensa de la poesía:

the poet, he nothing affirms, and therefore never lieth. For, as I take it, to lie is to affirm that to be true which is false. . . . But the poet (as I said before) never affirmeth. The poet never maketh any circles about your imagination, to conjure you to believe for true what he writes. . . . And therefore, though he recount things not true, yet because he telleth them not for true, he lieth not (1973: 124).

Esta solución es básica, y tiene sus equivalentes modernos. Sin embargo, es muy parcial e incompleta. Sólo resuelve el problema relativo al aspecto superficial del discurso: superficialmente, la ficción no es una afirmación, por tanto no puede ser una mentira. Sin embargo, las teorías renacentistas, incluida la del propio Sidney, suponen que la ficción *sí afirma* de una manera subyacente, puesto que mantiene con la realidad una relación de

inteligibilidad semejante a la descrita por Aristóteles. Y Sidney distingue, inspirándose en Platón, una poesía fantástica, que se ocupa de objetos triviales o indignos, de una poesía icástica, "figuring forth good things" (1973: 125).

En suma, la ficción no es en absoluto una mentira: más bien, tiene posibilidades de ser una afirmación verdadera sobre la realidad. Esta visión aristotélica pervive esencialmente durante los siglos XVII y XVIII. Para Samuel Johnson, "the Muses wove, in the loom of *Pallas*, a loose and changeable robe, like that in which *Falsehood* captivated her admirers; with this they invested *Truth*, and named her *Fiction*".⁶ En líneas generales es la postura que sigue vigente hoy mismo, ya se formule en términos lingüísticos, marxistas o psicoanalíticos.

Por supuesto, el problema de la relación entre literatura y realidad es mucho más complejo que el de la mera distinción entre ficción y mentira. Algunos románticos afirman de nuevo una postura semejante a la platónica, pero invertida: lo que hace importante a la ficción no es que haya una realidad previa a la ficción con la cual ésta se corresponde secretamente, sino precisamente una no-coincidencia fundamental: los artistas nos presentan cosas que no son, y precisamente por ello son creadores de ideales, de modelos. Así, por ejemplo Oscar Wilde en "The Decay of Lying". Todavía hoy John Fowles piensa que el novelista tiene mucho de mentiroso en su constitución (in Onega 1988: 76). En este sentido podríamos discutir la función *realizativa* del discurso de ficción: no es una mera descripción de la realidad, sino un acto que transforma la realidad y da lugar a elementos nuevos que no se encontraban antes allí.⁷ Pero estas observaciones se colocan a un nivel mucho más complejo, que desborda el nivel de comprensión lingüística básica que ahora continuaremos examinando.

Tanto Dryden (1970c: 89) como Johnson o Coleridge observan que nunca hay una confusión por parte del receptor entre la ficción y la realidad. De haberla, se debería a un error. La actitud que el receptor adopta ante la ficción no consiste en creerla, sino más bien en colaborar con la ficción, entrar en el juego, "to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith" (Coleridge 1956: 168). El concepto *dewilling suspension of disbelief* sigue en la base de las teorías contemporáneas. En él se encuentra implícito un principio básico de la descripción pragmática de la ficción: "fiction is

defined by its pragmatic structure, and, in turn, this structure is a necessary part of the interpretation of fiction " (Jon-K. Adams 1985: 2).

Ingarden (1973: 342) formula un principio comparable: no hemos de ser absolutamente conscientes de la ficcionalidad, y tampoco confundir la ficción con la realidad. Si se da cualquiera de estos dos extremos la obra fracasa.⁸ Esto no impide, continúa Ingarden, que reaccionemos emocionalmente ante la ficción como ante la realidad. Según Bullough (1971: 757), el hecho de que un personaje de una narración sea o no ficticio no altera nuestros sentimientos hacia él. Las teorías estéticas de finales del siglo pasado y principios del presente expresan el status peculiar de la poesía refiriéndose a su valor intrínseco o autónomo (cf Bradley 1971: 738), un concepto que con frecuencia se ha prestado a exageraciones o malinterpretaciones. El psicoanálisis explicaría esta autonomía en otros términos, diciendo que el contenido de la narración es siempre fantástico (Castilla del Pino 1983: 302). Tanto en la narración literaria real como en la ficticia la intervención del lector consiste en una proyección de deseos propios sobre el mundo narrado. Por ello, como veremos, en literatura no es crucial la diferencia entre ficción y no ficción: lo importante es que tanto la ficción "realista" como la ficción "fantástica" siguen unas pautas de organización semejantes.

2. FICCION Y ACTOS DE HABLA

El estudio de la diferencia entre ficción y realidad ha sido tradicionalmente objeto de la teoría de la literatura y de la filosofía, más bien que de la lingüística. Esta carecía hasta una época relativamente reciente de categorías conceptuales que le permitieran tratar el asunto de la ficcionalidad en sus propios términos analíticos.

Sin embargo la lingüística ya poseía, incluso al nivel del análisis formal de sistemas, un embrión de estas categorías en la medida en que era capaz de enfrentarse al fenómeno de la enunciación. El estudio de los deicticos o de los tiempos del verbo se ha aplicado así al estudio de la enunciación literaria, con mayor o menor fortuna.⁹ Un concepto como el de *modalidad verbal* también era un terreno apto para iniciar la discusión: toda modalidad debe ser considerada en relación con el acto de palabra; es una marca puesta por el sujeto sobre el enunciado para darle una categoría u otra, para *modalizarlo*

con respecto a la realidad o a sus intenciones (cf. Lozano, Peña-Marín y Abril 1982: 64 ss). Podríamos pensar, en base a ello, que un discurso de ficción sufre algún tipo de modalización para diferenciarlo de los discursos sobre hechos reales. Más adelante veremos ciertos desarrollos de estas categorías a nivel de gramática textual.

Deslindaremos primero desde un punto de vista pragmático los conceptos de ficción y mentira, para concentrarnos seguidamente en el análisis de la ficción. La caracterización dada por Frege al fenómeno de la ficción (literaria) enlaza directamente con la formulación de Sidney antes citada. La ficción no es lógicamente igual a la mentira: es más bien aquéllo que no se somete a la prueba de la verdad.¹⁰ I. A. Richards también investiga la naturaleza del lenguaje poético, y llega a conclusiones comparables a las de Frege o Ingarden. Para Richards (1970, 1973), la poesía está compuesta de pseudo-afirmaciones (*pseudo-statements*) que no se deben juzgar de acuerdo con su valor de verdad. Richards distingue cuatro componentes en la noción de significado, o cuatro tipos de significado posibles:

- *Sense*: es el significado referencial, que consiste en dirigir la atención del oyente hacia un estado de cosas externo.
- *Feeling*: la actitud subjetiva hacia el estado de cosas, que también se transmite en el mensaje.
- *Tone*: la actitud hacia el oyente por parte del hablante, la relación entre ambos asumida por el hablante.
- *Intention*: el objetivo que busca el hablante (cf. la *intención perlocucionaria*). Richards no distingue entre ilocución y perlocución.

En el lenguaje "científico" o "no poético" en general, predominaría el sentido referencial, mientras que en la literatura este valor queda convencionalmente anulado, y lo significativo son las emociones excitadas:

When this happens, the statements which appear in the poetry are there for the sake of their effects upon feelings, and not for their own sake. Hence to challenge their truth or to question whether they deserve serious attention as *statements claiming truth*, is to mistake their function. (Richards 1973: 186).

Las creencias e ideas de la obra no chocan al lector por su discordancia con las suyas propias, afirma Richards: se asumen como ficciones poéticas, y no se interpretan referencialmente. "The absence of intellectual belief need not cripple emotional belief, though evidently enough in some persons it may" (1973: 278). Sin embargo, Richards comenta que esto no es precisamente una

willing suspension of disbelief, según había afirmado Coleridge: ni sentimos incredulidad ni la suspendemos voluntariamente.¹¹

En nuestra opinión, la teoría de Richards es anti-intelectualista en exceso. Postula una diferencia radical entre la ficción y la no ficción, y por lo tanto subestima el papel que los conocimientos enciclopédicos que el lector aporta a su actividad real le sirven igualmente en la actividad simbólica de la literatura.¹² En la ficción no cambia radicalmente la naturaleza de nuestra comprensión, sino la interpretación que le damos a lo comprendido, la clasificación que damos al acto discursivo en nuestra ordenación de la realidad.

Van Dijk (1972: 152) propone en su modelo generativo una fase de descripción textual que introduce operadores modales a nivel ya sea de todo el texto o de alguna sección, operadores que identifiquen los textos *contrafactuales*. En este concepto, al parecer, se deberían incluir tanto las mentiras como los relatos de sueños o la ficción. En un sentido puede resultar útil y económico englobar estos fenómenos en un signo común para la descripción textual, pues tienen algunos rasgos comunes, pero nunca identificarlos. Creemos que en la utilización discursiva real de un texto la modalidad entendida en este sentido está más especificada. En el caso de la mentira, la contrafactualidad sólo existe (en principio) como operador macroestructural en la representación del hablante; la ficción, para ser tal, debe existir también en la del oyente (cf. Van Dijk 1972: 290). Más adelante (1972: 300) Van Dijk introduce un operador modal *Fict* exclusivo para los textos de ficción, pero sin distinguirlo claramente de otros contrafactuales (cf. 1972: 336). Son comparables a los textos contrafactuales de Van Dijk los modos "virtuales" de Bonheim: "[t]he virtual form . . . consists of imagined speech, of report conceivable rather than actual, or of imaginary description" (Bonheim 1982: 34). Como observa Bonheim, la importancia de estos fenómenos en literatura va en aumento.

Podemos admitir que se engloben ficción y mentira bajo el término general de contrafactualidad, junto con algún otro tipo de fenómenos, como el lenguaje figurativo. Pero esta categoría modal es demasiado inclusiva, y requiere un análisis que dé cuenta de las diferencias reales que se perciben entre estas acciones discursivas.

En términos de la teoría de los actos de habla de Austin, podríamos decir que la ficción tiene la categoría de un acto ilocucionario: su existencia como tal exige su reconocimiento por parte del oyente. Por el contrario, la mentira es el ejemplo perfecto de acto no definible en términos de ilocución, sino

solamente de *intención perlocucionaria*. Para que la mentira se produzca, debemos tener la intención de que el interlocutor no reconozca nuestra intención de mentir: y así volvemos a recordar la defensa de Sir Philip Sidney contra los que identifican mentira y poesía. Coincide en lo esencial con esta visión la teoría del "presupuesto de ficción" de Castilla del Pino (1983: 321). Como señala Castilla del Pino, el oyente debe *inferir* lo que el hablante *presupone*; la cualidad de ficcionalidad podrá así describirse como una presuposición del hablante que es inferida por el oyente.

Que sepamos, el primer análisis filosófico detenido del concepto de ficcionalidad, delimitándolo frente a realidad, idealidad, potencialidad, etc., es el de Ingarden.¹³ Como muchos otros estudiosos, Ingarden no define con suficiente claridad su concepto de literariedad, con lo que éste queda confundido con el de ficcionalidad. Pero de su análisis queda bien claro qué parte de su estudio se refiere a la literatura *en cuanto ficción*. Por tanto, hablaremos de "ficción" donde Ingarden dice "literatura" mientras exponemos sus ideas.

Para Ingarden, los objetos ficticios son "puramente intencionales". En general, el "estrato de los significados" (*meaning stratum*) tiene una existencia *puramente intencional*, como todo correlato de una forma lingüística. Este objeto puramente intencional

has no autonomous ideal existence but is relative, in both its origin and its existence, to entirely determinate subjective conscious operations. On the other hand, however, it should not be identified with any concretely experienced "psychic" content or with any real existence (1973: 104).

El objeto puramente intencional, ya sea el significado de una sola palabra o el nivel de la *acción* de un *discurso narrativo*, puede según Ingarden *corresponder* (no óntica, sino significativamente) a una realidad externa, con una limitación: "Objective states of affairs can directly correspond . . . only to assertive propositions".¹⁴ Esta correspondencia, sin embargo, no tiene nada de necesaria; puede no darse:

sentences which have the form of assertive propositions can be modified in such a way that, in contrast to genuine "judgments", they make no claim of "striking" an objective state of affairs. (1973: 131)

La naturaleza óntica de la proposición (universalidad, necesidad, factualidad, etc.) es independiente de esta correspondencia, señala Ingarden. En otros términos (diríamos hoy): la ficcionalidad no afecta a la semántica de la forma lingüística, sino solamente a su caracterización pragmática.¹⁵ Rasgos semánticos que son contradictorios, mutuamente excluyentes, en las referencias a la realidad, pueden coexistir sin ningún problema en las frases que no aspiran a esa conexión pragmática: es lo que Platón llamó despectivamente la fantasía. También se hace posible la multiplicidad de sentidos, si el bloque semántico fundamental no está claramente determinado sino que es "opalescente", es decir, que se presta a diversos tipos alternativos de asociaciones semánticas (Ingarden 1973: 143).

Pero aún hay más. Los actos de habla de una obra de ficción no sólo coinciden con las proposiciones de la no ficción en su caracterización semántica, sino también en lo que Ingarden denomina el *habitus*. Para Ingarden, la relación entre una proposición y la realidad sería una no-relación: la proposición que afirma el objeto ficticio se contenta con tener la forma de una proposición afirmativa (es decir, a tener una estructura semántica) sin dar el paso de constituirse en una proposición judicativa, en un juicio (es decir, sin establecer una relación de referencialidad con la realidad).¹⁶ Con ello, la esfera óntica del estado de cosas no se constituye independientemente de la proposición misma, al superponerse a la esfera óntica de un posible correlato exterior, sino que queda ligada a la proposición en cuestión.

Ingarden opone la *afirmación* a la *aserción*. Una proposición afirmativa puede referirse a un estado de cosas en la realidad: pasa entonces a ser un juicio.¹⁷ De *proposición afirmativa* deviene *juicio asertivo*. En un juicio propiamente dicho, el estado de cosas significado por la proposición se hace transparente y nos remite al estado de cosas coincidente con él que existe en la realidad objetiva. "Between the two extremes —of the pure affirmative proposition and the genuine judicative proposition— lies the kind of sentences that we find in the (modified) assertive propositions in literary works" (1973: 167).

En efecto, no son frases meramente afirmativas: hoy diríamos que no pertenecen a la lengua, sino al habla; en tanto que son usadas en un contexto, devienen asertivas. Pero no por ello se actualiza en ellas lo que Ingarden denomina el *habitus* intencional de proyección hacia la realidad: "the assertive propositions in a literary work have the external *habitus* of judicative propositions, though they neither are nor are meant to be genuine

"judicative propositions" (1973: 167). Tienen el *habitus* que las actualiza como juicios, pero en cambio no poseen un valor de verdad: como si no fuesen proposiciones asertivas siquiera.¹⁸ Son lo que Ingarden denomina *pseudo-juicios (quasi-judgments)*. El principal inconveniente que presenta esta formulación es que la frase literaria se presenta así como si le faltase algo que sí tienen las frases "ordinarias", cuando es más conveniente describirla como el resultado de una codificación ulterior: la frase "ordinaria" más unas reglas de interpretación adicionales.

Algunos de los pseudo-juicios se acercan más al polo asertivo, otros al judicativo. Pero todos tienen un rasgo en común: el estado de cosas significado por la proposición es proyectado intencionalmente hacia una actualización, es desligado de la proposición, y deviene transparente con relación a estados de cosas existentes al margen de la frase. Pero esos estados de cosas no se corresponden con estados de cosas identificables en el mundo real. No hay referencialidad al mundo real, sino a un mundo ficticio.¹⁹ Somos conscientes durante la lectura de que el contenido intencional de los pseudo-juicios tiene su origen en la frase:

For this reason the corresponding purely intentional states of affairs are *only regarded as really existing*, without, figuratively speaking, being saturated with the character of reality. That is why, despite the transposition into reality, the intentionally projected states of affairs form their own world. (1973: 118)

Un mundo propio que, como reconoce Ingarden, está anclado hasta cierto punto en el mundo objetivo.

En principio, la distinción de Ingarden entre la presencia de un *habitus* determinado y su "saturación" parece corresponder a la diferencia antes mencionada entre los niveles locucionario e ilocucionario. Es decir, además de ser proposiciones con valor semántico, el *discurso* de ficción adopta la forma de un acto de habla (ilocucionario) sin por ello adquirir una referencialidad real. Sin embargo, los conceptos de Ingarden no son completamente coincidentes con los de la teoría de los actos de habla tal como la entendemos aquí, y habría que guardarse de hacer identificaciones precipitadas.²⁰ Nosotros diríamos que un *discurso de ficción* sí es un tipo particular de acto de habla (ilocucionario), un acto de habla particular cuya descripción presupone lógicamente la descripción de un acto de habla comparable formalmente pero que tenga referencia real.

Martínez Bonati caracteriza la naturaleza lingüística básica de la obra de ficción a partir de dos rasgos fundamentales. El primero es la presencia en ella de *lenguaje mimético*. Se refiere Martínez Bonati a la vez a la *mimesis* aristotélica y a la creación de un mundo a partir del texto según acabamos de ver en la teoría de Ingarden. Para Martínez Bonati, el lenguaje mimético es transparente: no atrae la atención sobre sí mismo en tanto que lenguaje, sino que nos remite al mundo ficticio en el acto mismo de nombrarlo.

Al estrato mimético no lo vemos como estrato *lingüístico*. Sólo lo vemos como mundo. Su representación del mundo es una "imitación" de éste, que lo lleva a confundirse, a identificarse con él. El discurso mimético se mimetiza como mundo. Se enajena en su objeto. (Martínez Bonati 1972: 72)

El lenguaje mimético será para nosotros el *discurso* en tanto que transmite el *relato*. Esto no se debe entender en términos de párrafos concretos o fragmentos textuales: el lenguaje mimético es un *aspecto* presente en mayor o menor grado en el conjunto del texto. Martínez Bonati ve en la *mimesis* una abstracción realizada a partir del discurso del narrador (que incluye los de los personajes), una abstracción que se realiza de manera natural y espontánea, al leer u oír el texto. En cada frase se divide "el contenido mimético, que se enajena y desaparece del marco lingüístico, y el resto de forma idiomática y subjetividad expresa, que queda como expresión, como lenguaje" (1972: 75). De manera similar, Ohmann ve la *mimesis* como una inversión de la dirección usual de inferencia. En lugar de intentar fijar el sentido del acto de habla a partir de las circunstancias de la enunciación, se da por supuesto el sentido y se reconstruye a partir de él el contexto (ficticio) de enunciación y el mundo significado (1987b: 47). Esto se hace en gran medida a través de la topicalización, la presuposición y la deixis en fantasma.

La otra característica de la ficción literaria según Martínez Bonati es que no utiliza frases auténticas, sino pseudo-frases.²¹ La obra no se enuncia con intención de verdad: simplemente se hace presente, se cita: la enunciación del narrador es para Martínez Bonati una enunciación citada, es decir, presentada "íconicamente", no lingüísticamente. La literatura es lenguaje imaginario (Martínez Bonati 1972: 133). Nos parece que esta solución no hace sino remitir a una enunciación ajena (que, por cierto, habrá de ser ficticia, inexistente) el problema de la enunciación del texto de ficción, sin resolverlo realmente. Además plantea problemas a la hora de relacionar al autor con su obra.

Robert Champigny²² añade una puntuación interesante sobre la diferencia entre el discurso de ficción y el lenguaje figurativo. Según Champigny, la ficción no se opone lógicamente al lenguaje literal, sino al lenguaje referencial. En efecto, la ficción contiene tanto lenguaje literal como lenguaje figurativo (cf. Searle 1975: 320 ss). Partimos de su teoría para diferenciar de la siguiente manera el lenguaje en su uso histórico, literal, referencial, figurativo, y de ficción:

	Literalidad	Referencialidad
Histórico	+	+
Literal	+	□
Referencial	□	+
Figurativo	—	□
Ficción	□	—
Tropos ficticios	—	—

Es importante que no nos lleve a confusión el concepto de referencialidad que acabamos de introducir: se trata de una referencialidad extratextual, que conecte el mundo semántico del texto con el mundo real, es decir, se trataría del concepto tradicional de referencialidad. Searle (1975: 329 ss) propone el "axioma de la existencia" para delimitar qué es referencia: sólo nos podemos referir a cosas que consideramos realmente existentes. En el caso de la ficción tendríamos una referencia fingida en tanto en cuanto participamos en la ficción. Esta posición es contestada por Ziff (1979), quien opina que no es la existencia de un referente, sino la coherencia en la referencia lo realmente determinante. Por otra parte, Searle (1975) y Van Inwagen (1983) señalan que podemos considerar a las entidades ficticias existentes en tanto que "entidades teóricas", y por tanto hacer referencia (literal) a ellas en tanto que tales.²³ Con lo cual ya tenemos dos conceptos de referencialidad distintos, o un mismo concepto aplicado en dos niveles que es preciso distinguir. Ohmann señala además que la ausencia de referencialidad no está necesariamente unida a la literatura, ni siquiera al lenguaje no literal, sino que se da en frecuentes construcciones del lenguaje corriente (1987a: 16).

Jon-K. Adams observa que en el tratamiento de la referencia habría que distinguir un aspecto epistemológico y un aspecto pragmático: "claims about the epistemological aspects of referring to fictional entities are incoherent

when placed next to the pragmatic aspects of how those fictional entities are actually used in discourse".²⁴ Lo que nos interesa de la teoría de Adams es la manera en que resalta que existe una referencialidad intradiscursiva que opera en la ficción como en cualquier otro tipo de discurso:

There are two overlapping distinctions that we need to have a firm grasp of: fiction and nonfiction on one hand, and discourse and nondiscourse on the other. Fiction and nonfiction are both modes of discourse; so when we talk about either one we are talking about entities, properties, or states of affairs of discourse. The difference between them is that when we talk about fiction we assume as a matter of convention that what we are talking about has only discourse properties. And when we talk about nonfiction we assume as a matter of convention that what we are talking about has both discourse and nondiscourse properties. (J. K. Adams 1985: 7)

Pero parece inexacto negar al discurso de ficción la posibilidad de una referencia al mundo real. Aparte de la posibilidad de una referencialidad parcial de sus elementos, deberemos reconocer una cierta congruencia entre el mundo de ficción y la realidad si queremos sostener que la literatura de ficción es (o puede ser) un comentario válido sobre la realidad. Deberemos admitir que el mundo ficticio guarda una relación de *analogía* con la realidad.²⁵ Para Jeanne Martinet la obra de ficción es un *ícono* de la realidad, pero que no opera por semejanza, como los demás iconos, sino analógicamente:

Le récepteur (spectateur) se laisse toucher par ce qui lui est présenté, parce que les ressemblances partielles avec ce qu'il connaît lui font accepter la possibilité d'une ressemblance avec quelque chose qui lui était jusqu'alors inconnu et qu'on lui dévoile. (1975: 63)

Puntualizaríamos únicamente que esta analogía no es algo meramente comunicado al lector, sino una relación establecida conjuntamente entre autor y lector, con atención al contexto de relevancia dependiente de las circunstancias del receptor. Pero volvamos al problema del status lingüístico de esa ficción.

Abundan los conceptos de ficcionalidad más o menos derivados o análogos al de Ingarden. Ohmann propone describir la ficción basándose en el concepto de "acto de habla hipotético":

literature can be accurately defined as discourse in which the seeming acts are hypothetical. Around them, the reader, using the elaborate knowledge of the rules for illocutionary acts, constructs the hypothetical speakers and circumstances — the fictional world — that will make sense of the given acts. This performance is what we know as mimesis.²⁶

Searle (1975: 324 ss) sostiene una teoría semejante a la de Ohmann: afirma que el autor *finge* realizar actos de habla, amparado por las convenciones de la ficción, que suspenden las reglas ilocucionarias que normalmente ligarían a la realidad los actos de habla que el autor finge realizar. El caso de la narración en primera persona es algo diferente. Searle diría entonces que el autor finge ser un personaje que realiza actos de habla ilocucionarios (auténticos).²⁷ Según Searle (1975: 325) no hay huellas formales de esta ficcionalidad: sería un puro problema de intencionalidad. Cómo hace, pues, el autor, para fingir que realiza un acto ilocucionario? Searle no responde, o más bien propone un absurdo: la pretensión se hace realizando un acto de habla locucionario. Pero ello no supondría ninguna diferencia respecto de los actos de habla ilocucionarios "auténticos": también en la conversación "sería" el hablante realiza un acto de habla locucionario para realizar el acto ilocucionario no fingido. Por otra parte, para Searle el autor no está realizando ningún acto de habla real específico: sólo actos ficticios, y a través de ellos actos de habla reales no específicos del discurso literario.

Pero se hace evidente la insuficiencia del concepto del acto de habla ficticio. Imaginemos una novela epistolar. ¿Qué acto de habla, o de discurso, es ficticio en ella? No el del personaje que escribe la carta, porque no es ficticio en su propio nivel; en la *acción*, el personaje escribe efectivamente una carta sin la menor intención de ficcionalidad (cf. Ingarden 1973: 172; Harris 1988: 100ss). En la realidad extraficcional, el autor escribe algo en forma de carta. Aquí está la ficcionalidad: la carta no es tal carta en realidad. Ello no quiere decir, sin embargo, que *todos* los actos de habla del autor sean ficticios. Porque el autor ha escrito una carta ficticia, pero una novela auténtica; la escritura de la novela es un acto de habla, de discurso, de la misma manera que lo es la escritura de la carta en el nivel de la *acción*. Es más, la carta está al servicio de la novela; en los términos de los formalistas rusos, la carta es un artificio de *motivación* de la novela. Y esta servidumbre siempre deja huellas formales harto evidentes, en contra de lo que afirma Searle (cf. Eco 1981: 109). Por tanto, concluimos que puede decirse que el

autor esté realizando actos de habla ficticios, pero solamente como medios para realizar un acto de habla auténtico, que ha de definirse como la creación de un discurso de ficción. Searle admite la posibilidad de que el autor realice actos de habla auténticos que no se encuentran en el texto, pero parece entender esos actos de habla como tomas de postura del autor ante la realidad, y no como actos ilocucionarios pragmáticamente definibles. No acepta que pueda haber actos de habla como "escribir una novela" o "contar una historia".²⁸

Esto es comprensible si se entiende en el sentido de que "escribir una novela" o "contar una historia" no son ilocuciones primitivas. Pero Searle no hace esta distinción, y así, según su propuesta, la ficción no es en sí ningún acto de habla definido: sólo actos ficticios. Ya puede adivinarse cuál es nuestra postura sobre si tales actos existen: "escribir ficción" no es un acto de habla ilocucionario primitivo, y resultaría absurdo colocarlo a ese nivel, como bien dice Searle (1975: 323). Sin embargo, sí que es una actividad literaria bien definida, y por tanto un acto de discurso (complejo y derivado). Pero nos interesa más insistir en que Searle tampoco acepta un nivel intermedio de análisis: los actos de discurso *primitivos*, como son en distintos órdenes "contar una historia" o "componer discurso de ficción". Aquí sí es relevante distinguir actos ilocucionarios específicos de una manera que Searle no termina de hacer con su insistencia exclusiva en el acto de habla fingido.

J. K. Adams también se opone a una teoría de la ficción basada en el concepto de acto de habla ficticio, pero propone una solución distinta de la que acabamos de esbozar:

as an alternative to the pretended speech act analysis, I will propose a pragmatic description of fiction that is based on an act the writer performs but which is not a speech act. The writer creates a fiction when he attributes what he writes to another speaker, which means, the writer attributes the performance of his speech acts to a speaker he creates. From this act of creation and attribution, it follows that every fictional text is embedded in a fictional context that includes a fictional speaker and hearer. The real writer and reader, on the other hand, are not part of this context and therefore do not interact with each other on the communicative level. (J. K. Adams 1985: 10)

Quizá esto sea mucho decir. Adams está negando que la ficción literaria sea una forma de comunicación, lo cual es cuanto menos discutible.²⁹

También está suponiendo una estanqueidad entre los niveles narrativos que no se da en la práctica: existen el *personaje-autor* y el *autor-narrador*.. En la narración no intrusiva, las figuras del autor y del narrador están más claramente separadas. Es este tipo de discurso de ficción el que suelen estudiar los pragmatólogos. Aun así, sus definiciones no llegan a ser satisfactorias.

Según Lanser, "fiction instructs us to disbelieve in order to believe" (1981: 291). Recordemos que Coleridge definía al revés la actitud del receptor: "a willing suspension of disbelief". La teoría de la literatura ha de mostrar la identidad fundamental de estas afirmaciones en apariencia contradictorias: creemos que son compatibles debido a la fragmentación de las actitudes del lector y a que corresponden a fases (lógicas, no cronológicas) diferentes de la toma de contacto con la ficción:

- por una parte, se orienta el lector hacia la situación comunicativa real
- por otra, hacia los espacios que el texto le reserva en su interior.

"Readers of such literary works", observa Pratt, "are in theory attending to at least two utterances at once—the author's display text and the fictional speaker's discourse, whatever it is" (1977: 173). Consideramos que los análisis pragmáticos de la ficción que hemos venido citando son incompletos porque no llegan a tener en cuenta la totalidad de los actos de habla simultáneos que se realizan en la obra de ficción, insertos unos dentro de otros jerárquicamente.³⁰ En este sentido, las teorías de Searle y de J. K. Adams no son tan diferentes. Por ejemplo, J. K. Adams opina que el autor no realiza actos de habla, y que no tiene "autoridad retórica" sobre el texto:

The speaker [= el narrador], by the act of speaking, has rhetorical authority over what he says, but when the writer [= el autor] writes fiction, it is this very rhetorical authority that he gives up, for in creating a fictional speaker, the writer becomes a non-speaker, and as a non-speaker he can have no rhetorical authority over a speaker. Unlike the speaker, the writer does not report what anyone says. Whatever authority the writer has over the speaker derives from writing and not from speaking; that is, it is creative authority rather than rhetorical authority. (1985: 60)

Esta visión del asunto ignora la estratificación del texto de ficción, que supone el cumplimiento de unos actos de habla internos a él como medio para el cumplimiento del propio texto como acto de habla. Van Dijk muestra


que las conexiones entre actos de habla simples forman actos de habla complejos, o macro-actos de habla:

En general . . . los criterios de conexión corresponden a relaciones *condicionales* entre actos de habla : un acto de habla puede servir como una condición (posible, probable o necesaria), como un componente o una consecuencia de otro acto de habla. (1987: 174)

El texto de ficción es, en cierto modo, un gigantesco acto de habla indirecto. El autor no deja en modo alguno de ser un hablante (cf. Pratt 1977: 88). Podríamos argüir que el autor sólo deja de hablar según las leyes (convenciones) de la retórica para hablar según las leyes (convenciones) de la poética. Y espera, de una manera social y genéricamente convencionalizada, que se le interprete según ellas: no se desentiende de su creación. ¿Acaso no es la literatura un uso del lenguaje, un tipo de discurso? La conclusión lógica del razonamiento de Adams (1985: 12) cuando niega que el autor realice acto de habla alguno, fingido o auténtico, debería ser que la literatura no es un tipo de discurso, lo cual es manifiestamente absurdo. Observa, sí, que el autor atribuye a otro las palabras que escribe, y en ese sentido no es el enunciador de esas palabras: pero no ve que lo que atribuye es la *narración* , no la *obra*.³¹ Si el nombre del autor aparece en la portada del libro, difícilmente podremos sostener que se le atribuye a otro. Quizá *Great Expectations* esté escrito (ficticiamente) por Pip, pero está escrito (realmente), *firmado* y *publicado* por Dickens. Con frecuencia, las caracterizaciones pragmáticas del fenómeno literario suelen dejar de lado el nivel de análisis correspondiente a la *narración* para confundirlo en la totalidad de la *obra* ; es decir, pretenden basarse únicamente en un análisis de los actos de habla efectuados por el autor. Pero la literatura es un juego continuo con la enunciación: "fictional discourse is particularly free to create structures that reflect and manipulate the images of status, contact and stance which the reader will construct in decoding the text" (Lanser 1981: 98). La ficción no es sólo un acto de habla determinado, sino una manipulación de otros tipos de actos de habla y de discurso que quedan subordinados al acto de discurso global, a la escritura. Inversamente: no es sólo una manipulación de discursos. También es un acto discursivo determinado.

Teniendo en cuenta lo dicho, podemos establecer la estructura *ontológico-semiótica* de la narración ficticia literaria. Esquematizamos esta estructura en el cuadro nº 1.

(nº 1)




Para aclarar la interpretación que queremos dar a la posición de cada elemento en esta figura, deberemos justificar nuestro esquema frente a otros al uso.³²

Jon-K. Adams (1985: 12) presenta un esquema más reducido de la estructura pragmática del discurso ficticio:

W (S (*text*) H) R
 W= writer, S= speaker, text = text, H= hearer, R= reader
 The underline [sic] marks the communication context,
 which is fictional.

Este esquema es comparable a otro propuesto por Lanser (1981: 118). Es necesario incluir al autor y lector textuales y reales en el esquema: Bal (1977, 1985) también los suprime precipitadamente en su formulación. En Adams encontramos una versión más moderada, pero también insuficiente. Las denominaciones *speaker* y *hearer* se refieren a las instancias que nosotros llamamos narrador y narratario. En contra de lo que parece suponer Adams, el narrador puede ser además el autor (ficticio) de la versión escrita del texto. Se observará que a pesar de marcar la diferencia ontológica entre la acepción real y la acepción ficticia del texto (con los dobles paréntesis) Adams no tiene nombre para el objeto transmitido por el autor al lector; ello va unido al hecho de que no reconoce que exista una comunicación entre ellos; el único contexto comunicativo que reconoce es el ficticio. Pero esto es absurdo: hay una comunicación entre el autor y el lector que es la participación de ambos en la actividad literaria; el contexto comunicativo real está desdoblado en escritura, publicación y lectura, y el objeto transmitido es el libro. No hay, por tanto, un "desplazamiento" del autor y lector fuera del contexto comunicativo, para dejar sitio al narrador y narratario, como pretende Adams (1985: 14); lo que hay es una superposición lógica de los dos contextos comunicativos. La enunciación ficticia, de haberla, es solamente el paso obligado para llegar a la enunciación real. Puede no haber narrador ficticio, con lo que la narración está a cargo directamente de la voz textual del autor (que es también, por supuesto, una construcción retórica). Observemos de paso que a pesar de que la actividad del narrador sea un elemento ficticio, no por ello deja de ser necesaria su descripción para la caracterización óntica del texto (en contra de lo que afirma Martínez Bonati, 1972: 41-42): en los objetos semiológicos no tiene sentido separar *a priori* lo real de lo ficticio sin tener en cuenta su papel estructural. En cuanto a la doble flecha entre el lector y la obra literaria, quiere indicar que la estructura de la obra no está cerrada, sino que es en mayor o menor grado el resultado de una dialéctica comunicativa.


(nº 2)



Los niveles que hemos señalado en el esquema nº 1 no deben ser confundidos con los niveles de inserción narrativa ni con los niveles puramente ontológicos de ficcionalidad (una vez hecha abstracción de la codificación semiótica). Los niveles de ficcionalidad serían representables según el esquema del cuadro nº 2. La diferencia fenomenológica existente entre algunos niveles es una simple diferencia de rango semiótico: un nivel es significado por otro; o, siendo codificado por medio de signos, constituye el nivel siguiente. Es lo que sucede con las relaciones entre *acción*, *relato* y *texto*. Pero esta diferencia está implícita en la noción misma de significación: el significante está presente ante nosotros, existe para nosotros, de distinta manera que el significado. Ello no significa que estos distintos niveles fenomenológicos no puedan pertenecer a un mismo *mando posible* (Leibniz, *Monadologie* § 53; Eco 1981: 172 ss). La diferencia entre lo real y lo ficticio, sin embargo, es ontológica. La distancia entre el texto ficticio o el

real, o entre el narrador ficticio y el autor textual, no es una simple diferencia de codificación: se trata de instancias pertenecientes a diversos mundos posibles: el mundo real y el mundo de ficción.

Por otra parte, hay que diferenciar estos dos cuadros de un tercero que presentamos a continuación (nº 3), y que nos indicará la simple inserción narrativa del discurso directo de los personajes.



Esta inserción enunciativa da lugar a lo que Genette (1972) denomina relatos intradiegéticos, aunque su formulación oscurece el hecho de que puede haber inserciones semióticas narrativamente autónomas (es decir, no enunciativas) que no adoptan la forma de estos relatos. Además, un relato intradiegético puede ser una simple analepsis donde se relatan sucesos anteriores de la misma historia, o puede suponer una inmersión en un universo ficcional distinto (en cuyo caso se superponen los cuadros 2 y 3). Observemos que en

el cuadro nº 2 son *mundos ficticios* construidos por los sucesivos personajes lo que se multiplica hacia el interior. Esos mundos son constructos semióticos que pueden recibir cualquier soporte: un relato verbal, aí, pero también, por ejemplo, un cuadro descrito en el relato o un sueño: soportes pictóricos u oníricos *virtuales*, que suponen un segundo nivel de ficcionalidad pero no necesariamente una inserción enunciativa diferente, y son presentados en forma lingüística por el mismo narrador que los enmarca. En el cuadro nº 3, cada nivel semiolingüístico puede referirse al mundo del nivel anterior o a un mundo diferente: es decir, no hay marcas de nivel ontológico. Además, se refiere a un fenómeno específicamente lingüístico.

Podríamos contemplar al cuadro nº 1 como una derivación compleja de los cuadros 2 y 3, que por lo demás se pueden combinar entre sí de formas muy variadas, como veremos más adelante. Algunos de los niveles del cuadro nº 1 son, por tanto, un grupo posible de niveles. Esto nos da una primera posibilidad de complicación de la estructura básica que hemos presentado. Hay dos posibilidades de multiplicación básicas:

- Mediante esta primera multiplicación *vertical* algunas figuras del cuadro 1º pueden multiplicarse dentro de su propio nivel: un narrador ficticio puede introducir a otro narrador ficticio, un focalizador a otro focalizador, y así sucesivamente. Esta propiedad deriva de la capacidad que tienen los cuadros 2 y 3 de multiplicarse al infinito *en profundidad*.
- Por otra parte, también se pueden multiplicar las figuras del cuadro 1 *horizontalmente*: es lo que sucede, por ejemplo, cuando tenemos una alternancia de distintos narradores ficticios en el mismo nivel. En este caso no es un narrador quien introduce al otro: es la figura jerárquicamente superior quien lo hace. El autor textual introduce sucesivamente a varios narradores ficticios, el narrador a varios focalizadores alternativamente, etc.

Con respecto a la caracterización de lo ficticio, se desprende de nuestro esquema que la diferencia entre el *discurso de ficción* del autor (la obra) y el *discurso ficticio* del narrador (la *narración*) no es reducible a una inserción narrativa de uno en otro: no estamos tratando aquí el rango narrativo de los textos, sino su rango ontológico, que se determina gracias a las convenciones del género. El texto ficticio coincide físicamente con el texto real salvo en ciertas marcas que señalan la primacía ontológica del último: el nombre del autor, y quizás una indicación del género literario al que pertenece el libro. Estos elementos tienen un carácter metatextual, sin por ello transformar al texto ficticio en un discurso intradiegético respecto del texto real. En última instancia, son prescindibles. Lo realmente determinante es el conjunto de

contextos, convenciones genéricas y prácticas sociales (la institución literaria) que nos hacen leer una novela como una novela. Es decir: un mismo texto, materialmente entendido, contiene al narrador y al autor textual; ambos son los enunciadores de ese texto. Pero lo son en sentidos distintos, los que hemos señalado anteriormente; de ahí el desdoblamiento en texto real y texto ficticio.

Podemos relacionar la ficcionalidad a la distinción mucho más básica entre actos de habla directos e indirectos. Como hemos señalado más arriba, un acto de habla indirecto es "an illocutionary act that is performed subordinately to another (usually literal) illocutionary act. It is indirect in the sense that success is tied to the success of the first act" (Bach y Harnish 1979: 70). En el discurso de ficción, la identificación del contexto ficticio es un paso necesario en la comprensión correcta. De ahí la analogía que hemos señalado entre la ficción y los actos de habla indirectos. Por supuesto, no sólo puede existir una duplicación o una triplicación de contextos y fuerzas ilocucionarias: es posible toda una jerarquización múltiple, tanto en la ficción como en el discurso ordinario.³³

Aún hay un tercer tipo de actos de habla en el discurso de ficción: los de los personajes. Pero la definición general de estos en el discurso narrativo de ficción es común a la del discurso narrativo ordinario. Como ya señaló Ingarden para el caso del drama, "words spoken by a represented person in a situation signify an *act* and hence constitute a part of the action, in particular in the confrontations between represented persons" (1973: 386). Así, estos actos de habla contribuyen al progreso de la *acción* como cualquier otro acto realizado. Pero además pueden desempeñar otras funciones en el nivel del *discurso*.

- En tanto que actos realizados por los personajes, contribuyen a su caracterización desde el punto de vista del lector e incluso pueden ser determinantes en su constitución como tales personajes.³⁴
- Entre los posibles tipos de *discurso* que pueden utilizar los personajes está, por supuesto, el *discurso de ficción*, con lo cual se duplica o se multiplica la estructura ontológica que hemos descrito anteriormente (cf. Ingarden 1973: 182).
- Un acto de habla interno a la *acción* tiene varios sentidos superpuestos, es descifrado simultáneamente de acuerdo con distintos tipos de reglas interpretativas: las del contexto (ficticio) interno a la *acción*, las del *discurso* de ficción y las del *discurso* real; es un caso particular de la *perspectiva pragmática* descrita por Van Dijk (1980: 322). La fuerza ilocucionaria del

acto de habla es distinta en cada uno de esos contextos enunciativos, a veces sorprendentemente distinta. Su mismo rango ontológico es distinto: real para el personaje, ficticio para el espectador. El espectador no está viendo lo mismo que los personajes de ficción;³⁵ de ahí la posibilidad de la ironía, el patetismo, el suspense, etc. Esta superposición de distintas enunciaciones puede alcanzar una gran complejidad. Nos encontramos tanto con el caso de un mismo tipo de superposición que se multiplica por recursividad (la superposición de relatos intradiegéticos) como con la superposición de distintos tipos de enunciación muy distintos. Por ejemplo, si seguimos la argumentación de W. Bronzwaer ("Implied author" 11 ss), encontramos que en una lectura pública como las que solía dar Dickens, en la actuación del novelista podían superponerse no menos de cuatro tipos de enunciación diferentes: su enunciación real, su enunciación en tanto que encarnación del autor implícito, la enunciación del yo-narrador de la novela y la enunciación indirecta libre del yo-personaje. Y aun en el caso en que consideremos el valor del acto de habla en el nivel de la ficción, la existencia del receptor en tanto que intérprete en este nivel posibilita la explotación de una diferente fuerza ilocucionaria. Roventa observa cómo Samuel Beckett ha explotado esto en su obra dramática como fuente de absurdo y comicidad:

Pour le dialogue beckettien il est à remarquer *un clivage* dans l'interprétation des phrases prononcées sur la scène: tandis que *les personnages* perçoivent les répliques comme des *actes de langage directs*, *le destinataire* (lecteur / spectateur) les interprète comme des *actes de langage indirects* . (1979: 81)

De hecho, la variedad de situaciones posibles es enorme. Este es uno más de los muchos juegos de lenguaje que nos propone la literatura, uno que con frecuencia pasa desapercibido pero que no por ello es menos activo o deja de tener sus propias normas estéticas, sus propias "reglas del juego".³⁶ Por supuesto, la literatura se basa en las reglas del lenguaje normal, pero también añade algunas nuevas. Es un sistema que *engloba* al del lenguaje no literario, o lo presupone.³⁷

3. CUANDO ES FICTICIO UN TEXTO

Creemos que sería conveniente distinguir la actitud que ante la ficción adoptan el narrador de una novela, el autor implícito y el autor real, así como sus interlocutores. Estas actitudes no son independientes entre sí, sino que están lógicamente subordinadas; son, además, uno de los criterios a tener en cuenta para determinar la relevancia de la separación entre estas tres instancias o, inversamente, la anulación de su oposición. Las interiores al texto narrativo, así como la intencionalidad del autor, son tenidas en cuenta por el lector, el último depositario de la significación, para su propia comprensión del texto. Es el lector, o el crítico, quien decide en última instancia la relación entre ficcionalidad y no ficcionalidad que se da en una obra determinada, aunque esa decisión no es arbitraria ni caótica.

Es frecuente encontrar, sin embargo, la teoría opuesta: sería el autor quien concedería el status de ficción o de realidad a su creación. Hemos visto que para Searle una obra no contiene marcas expresas, semánticas, formales, de su ficcionalidad. Es sólo la intención ilocucionaria del autor la que determina el status de la obra: "whether or not it is fiction is for the author to decide".³⁸ Un problema no resuelto por Searle es el reconocimiento de esa intención ilocucionaria. ¿Cómo íbamos a saber que un texto es ficticio sin preguntarle al autor sobre sus intenciones? Recordemos que Searle no admite ninguna diferencia formal entre textos de ficción y de no ficción.

También para Jon-K. Adams, el rasgo básico que caracteriza a un discurso de ficción es la no coincidencia entre autor (*writer*) y narrador (*speaker*): "the writer is always the speaker in nonfiction, but the reader may or may not be the hearer" (1985: 70). Es lo que sucede, por ejemplo, cuando leemos correspondencia ajena. ¿Es, pues, en el polo de los emisores donde hemos de buscar la frontera entre el discurso ficticio y el no ficticio? La respuesta afirmativa parece pecar de precipitación: estaríamos identificando la intencionalidad del autor con la interpretación del lector. A veces pueden estar muy lejanas. Pero esto parecen sugerir algunas de estas teorías, quizá influidas por la noción de intencionalidad tan ligada a la definición de los actos ilocucionarios. El concepto de *ficción* es definible, afirma Adams, en la estructura pragmática interna al texto, aunque no es esta estructura pragmática interna lo único a tener en cuenta. Adams acepta la posición básica de Searle: "fiction is defined from the writer's point of view rather than the reader's. . . . The writer decides whether or not a text he is writing is fiction, and when he decides that it is to be fiction, he creates a disctinct pragmatic structure" (Jon-K. Adams 1985: 9). Puesto así, resulta algo vago. Es más exacto decir que el género está sometido a un grado de variabilidad

contextual e histórica. Un autor puede escribir un libro con la intención de hacer una crónica, un libro científico o una revelación, y sus lectores pueden en principio aceptar esta proposición del autor, leyendo el libro con la intención deseada por el autor. Los criterios de verdad asumidos por el autor (o, más ampliamente, los de su época) pueden ponerse en duda más adelante, y el texto pasa a leerse como ficción, mito o alegoría. Pensemos, por ejemplo, en la controversia entre creacionistas y evolucionistas sobre el relato bíblico del Génesis.

Este ejemplo que acabamos de citar *no corresponde* al análisis que hemos realizado, aunque en cierto modo está emparentado con él. No corresponde, pues los autores de esos textos "verdaderos" reinterpretados más tarde como textos "de ficción" no habían invocado las convenciones del discurso ficticio. Con este ejemplo modificaríamos hasta cierto punto la proposición de Searle, que quedaría así: *el autor puede decidir de entrada sobre la ficcionalidad de un texto (el tipo de acto ilocucionario que propone): ahora bien, si el texto no respeta los criterios genéricos reconocidos, el autor se expone a que el lector no acepte el valor de verdad propuesto para el texto, que quedará asimilado por analogía a otro género a pesar de la intención contraria de su autor.* En cualquier caso, hay que tener en cuenta los requerimientos distintos de los diferentes contextos de lectura. Nosotros leemos *Moll Flanders* como una novela, pero un estudio histórico requiere que nos pongamos en la perspectiva de un lector del siglo XVIII, cuando no estaban en absoluto clara la frontera entre el género "novela" y el género "memorias", y Defoe podía publicar la obra como unas auténticas memorias, y su público leerlas como tales, sin que se pueda decir en justicia que hubiese engaño alguno. Es decir, no era esencial para los fines de la mayoría de los lectores de Defoe el identificar tajantemente esta obra como unas memorias o como una novela.

También puede darse el caso inverso al expuesto, que es el que hace más problemática la tesis de Searle o Adams. Otra vez Defoe nos servirá de ejemplo, en este caso por lo sucedido con sus panfletos en apoyo a los Whigs:

Defoe ventured on irony, attacking the Jacobites in 1712 with his *Reasons against the succession of the House of Hanover*. But the literal Whigs prosecuted him for issuing a treasonable publication, and once more he was imprisoned.³⁹

En este caso vemos cómo el autor ha realizado actos de habla ficticios, y sin embargo se le hace responsable de su literalidad, pues no se ha identificado su intención. Vemos, por tanto, que no sólo el punto de vista del autor es el relevante: en ciertos géneros el autor deberá cuidar de marcar su texto como tal texto ficticio, de modo que se pueda reconocer o suponer la intención con la que él está escribiendo, que es la intención de invocar las convenciones del discurso de ficción.⁴⁰ Aunque el autor pueda invocar esas convenciones, es el *lector* quien las reconoce y las aplica, si procede. Los indicios de que se sirve el lector para juzgar que el autor invoca las convenciones de la ficción son de diversos tipos. En el caso de la literatura, ya hemos señalado las marcas externas de edición, aun reconociendo su carácter contingente. Más fundamentales parecen las convenciones formales inherentes a la literatura en cada época histórica: sólo en raros casos es necesario verificar por otros medios si un escrito pretende o no ser ficticio. Lo que nos interesa ahora, empero, no es lo que pueda llevar al lector a atribuir esa intención, sino el hecho mismo de que *deba* atribuirla.

Desde un punto de vista cronológico, es el lector quien tiene la última palabra sobre el asunto (cf. Petrey 1990: 68). Por otra parte, el análisis del discurso ya prevé este problema a nivel de los actos de habla microestructurales, y así introduce conceptos como *uptake* o *negotiation* para determinar el cumplimiento de los actos de habla. *Uptake* se refiere al pacto convencional de la ilocución: el cumplimiento del acto ilocucionario requiere la identificación de la intención de realizarlo (Austin 1980). El concepto de negociación supone una matización crucial para la teoría de la literatura: la fuerza ilocucionaria puede no estar absolutamente prefijada, sino que puede dejarse indeterminada para que la interacción ulterior entre emisor y receptor la determine (Leech 1983: 155). En el caso de la literatura, esta subsiguiente interacción es la recepción históricamente variable y el trabajo de interpretación. Las teorías contemporáneas insisten en el papel decisivo del receptor:

Al dar mayor importancia a la intervención del «polo receptor» que en la teoría clásica, prevemos la definición retrospectiva de los actos y postulamos que el locutor anticipa estratégicamente las respuestas al acto que propone; correlativamente, sólo la *sanción* implícita en la respuesta del interlocutor autoriza a considerar que el acto se ha cumplido o no. (Lozano, Peña-Marín y Abril 1982: 206).

Como cualquier otro tipo de acto ilocucionario, el *discurso de ficción* requiere una ratificación por parte del oyente. Por supuesto, una vez reconocida la pretensión de ficcionalidad o de factualidad, el lector puede rechazarla. Sin embargo, ello no afecta a nuestro análisis. Si un lector no acepta como auténtica una obra con pretensiones de factualidad, no diremos por ello que la obra se transforma en una obra de ficción: el intercambio discursivo en el que ha participado es diferente, y no se confunde con el de la obra cuya pretensión es aceptada por el lector. En este sentido, cada lectura y cada escritura están históricamente marcadas.

Debe quedar claro, además, que una obra es ficticia si así queda determinado en el nivel de la comunicación real. El nivel comunicativo ficticio puede presentarse como productor de un texto real o de un texto de ficción. Esto es una técnica de motivación que complica la descripción del texto, pero que de por sí no determina en modo alguno la interpretación última que se dé al texto narrativo. La ficcionalidad de una obra no es establecida por el texto del narrador⁴¹ sino por la interpretación que el lector hace del texto del autor.

4. GRADOS DE FICCIONALIDAD

La ficción no surge a partir de la nada. Es una construcción con elementos tomados de la realidad, y siguiendo principios también tomados de la realidad. Por tanto, no hay actor, situación o ambiente puramente ficticio: todos se sitúan en algún punto de la línea que une la realidad con la ficción, sin alcanzar nunca este segundo polo, que es más una virtualidad que una posibilidad: una ficción útil.

Lo mismo sucede con los narradores, como veremos adelante. No siempre es preciso diferenciar un hablante ficticio, el narrador, de un hablante real, el actor. Una característica, sin embargo, se aduce para separar los enunciados narrativos de ficción, aun los más "impersonales", de los del autor: "speakers who use fictional language cannot use nonfictional language".⁴² Una característica que, según Adams, une a estos narradores anónimos con sus equivalentes más locuaces. Ambos tipos de narradores mantendrían la misma relación con los personajes cuyas aventuras relatan. La no-ficción no podría estar insertada (*embedded*) en medio de la ficción: un

personaje ficticio sólo podría pasearse por una calle ficticia, no por una calle real.⁴³

Este argumento no nos parece coherente. El Londres de los relatos de Sherlock Holmes no es tan ficticio como el Londres de *1984*, y éste es menos ficticio que la Utopía de More. Sabemos que el Londres de Sherlock Holmes es un Londres con Oxford Street, con Westminster Abbey y con Trafalgar Square. Quizá no nos atreveríamos a decir tanto del Londres de Orwell; sin embargo, sabemos que está en Inglaterra y podemos suponer razonablemente que por él pasa el Támesis. Los rasgos peculiares de Utopía, en cambio, no se construyen por proyección, sustracción y alteración de un todo ya conocido: todo ha de hacerse por adición a partir de prácticamente nada. Las calles de Londres son ficticias sólo en tanto en cuanto se pasea por ellas Sherlock Holmes; las de Utopía son casi totalmente ficticias. Pero un mundo radicalmente ficticio sería incomprensible, inanalizable e incluso imperceptible para nosotros. El material que constituye la ficción es siempre la realidad. Simplemente, la ficción hace un uso limitado de objetos o situaciones individuales y se basa sobre todo en los rasgos semánticos y conceptos básicos de la enciclopedia que el autor postula en un lector medio muy abstracto. "The author", dice Searle, "will establish with the reader a set of understandings about how far the horizontal conventions of fiction break the vertical connections of serious speech".⁴⁴

Otra cuestión muy relacionada con ésta es si el *discurso* de ficción puede incluir actos de habla o de discurso que no son leídos como ficción. Es la opinión de Searle y otros muchos (1975: 331). Según Lanser, "the fictional text may contain a good deal of nonfictional discourse" (1981: 285). Esta característica del discurso de ficción se debe en gran medida al hecho de que en su misma esencia deriva del discurso real; su definición lo presupone. La misma noción de acto de habla ficticio responde a esta descripción. Lanser (1981: 290) propone que sus "hypothetical speech acts" se basen parcialmente en elementos de las otras categorías de actos de habla definidos por Searle: así, tomarían de los declarativos su compromiso de coherencia, etc. El mismo Searle indica el camino para derivar los actos de habla básicos para constituir el mundo ficticio a partir de los actos de habla representativos (1975: 324).

5. LA INSUFICIENCIA DE LA PRAGMATICA LINGÜISTICA

Una pragmática lingüística está centrada en torno al fenómeno de la palabra, de la verbalización. Pero la literatura está interesada en la totalidad de la acción humana, no sólo en los actos de habla. La palabra tal como aparece en el discurso de ficción es a veces una transcripción convencional de fenómenos mucho más oscuros, que pueden consistir desde una vaga intencionalidad preconceptual hasta imágenes, percepciones, recuerdos, sueños, deseos. Todo es verbalizado en literatura, y todo ha de ser analizado verbalmente; pero no debemos caer en la ilusión de creer que nuestra mente está hecha de lenguaje y nada más; del mismo modo, habrá que determinar qué partes de ese lenguaje del cual está hecha la literatura han de interpretarse literalmente como tal lenguaje y en cuáles el lenguaje es meramente instrumental.

Por otra parte, es obvio que el concepto de ficción no se limita a la literatura, y que no es estrictamente lingüístico, sino semiótico. Puede haber imágenes ficticias, gestos ficticios, etc. en medios como la pintura, el teatro o el cine (cf. Ingarden 1973: 327). Lozano, Peña-Marín y Abril (1982) señalan la posibilidad de desarrollar un análisis de la comunicación paralelo a la teoría de los actos de habla, extrapolando el análisis en la medida de lo posible. El resultado de semejante análisis para la teoría del arte no estaría demasiado alejado de los estudios estéticos de Ingarden u otros teorizadores formalistas-ontologistas. El camino para este tipo de análisis ya ha sido allanado por la estética tradicional; a este respecto podríamos remontarnos al capítulo primero de la *Poética* de Aristóteles.

La pragmática lingüística, en suma, es un estudio especializado de especial importancia para la literatura en tanto que ésta utiliza el lenguaje como vehículo. Pero ese vehículo comunica una realidad mucho más compleja, la actividad semiótica de las culturas humanas, donde todo significa aunque no todo sea lenguaje verbal. Una muestra de ello es la importancia de diversos estratos semióticos del texto narrativo, que no se pueden reducir a la inserción de unas enunciaciones en otras. La lingüística no es un instrumento autosuficiente para el estudio de la literatura por lo mismo que no es un instrumento suficiente para la comprensión efectiva del lenguaje en general. Su misión es dar pautas de organización, formular teorías y modelos sobre la estructura y uso del lenguaje. El proceso efectivo de la comprensión o la interpretación lingüística conlleva inevitablemente mucho más: la activación de todos los códigos culturales que conocemos y gracias a los cuales conocemos. a

NOTAS

1. Son interesantes en este sentido las propuestas de una ciencia general del discurso literario, una pragmalingüística literaria que asimile la tradición retórica y formalista, desarrolladas por autores como García Berrio (1989) o Chico Rico (1988).

2. Ingarden 1973: 173 n. 157; Lubbock 1921: 123; Mark Schorer (1962); Friedman (1955), etc.

3. *Soliloquia* II, x ; cit. en Wimsatt y Brooks 1970: 125.

4. *Genealogy of the Gentile Gods* (XIV. ix , 1971: 428). Es decir, la ficción consiste en la "creación", mediante la palabra, de una realidad al margen de la referencia objetiva. Cf. las ideas de Escaligero (*Poetica*, 1971: 139) o Sidney (*An Apology for Poetry*, 1973: 100). Para algunos, la ficcionalidad sería necesaria para distinguir la literatura de la historia (Castelvetro, *Aristotle's Poetics* I, 1971: 145; Dryden, "An Account of the Ensuing Poem [*Annus Mirabilis*] in a Letter to the Honourable Sir Robert Howard", 1970a: 8). En el Renacimiento se discutía en este sentido la *Farsalia* de Lucano; hace unos años, el status literario de *In Cold Blood* .

5. *Genealogiis* XIV. xiii, 1971: 131. Argumentos parecidos aparecen ya, según Shepherd (Sidney 1973: 199), en la *Rhetorica ad Herennium* y en las *Etimologías* de San Isidoro.

6. Johnson, *Rambler* 96. Cf. también Hegel, *Introducción a la Estética* II, 1985: 49; John Stuart Mill, "What is Poetry?" 1971: 538; Paul de Man 1983: 18.

7. Hillis Miller ha venido reflexionado en este sentido sobre la ficción en sus obras recientes (1990, 1991, 1992).

8. Cf. también Bullough 1971: 760; Richards 1973: 277.

9. Por ej. Benveniste 1966, Weinrich 1973...

10. Frege 1984 [1892]: 59; cf. Todorov 1975: 41; Searle 1975: 324.

11. Richards 1973: 277. Sin embargo, nos parece que Richards está de acuerdo con Coleridge en cuanto al sentido que éste quería expresar, aunque discuta lo afortunado de los términos.

12. Cf. la crítica que en este sentido hace a Richards Stanley Fish (1980a: 89-92).

13. Ingarden 1973: 60, 103 ss, 129 ss, 221.

14. Ingarden 1973: 129. Desde nuestra perspectiva, consideraremos que este asunto sólo puede tratarse a nivel de *discurso*: es decir, no hablaremos de los *states of affairs* de una oración asertiva sin tener en cuenta el *mundo* (ficticio o real) al que el texto en su conjunto nos remite, mundo en el cual tiene lugar la *acción*.

15. También basan su definición de la ficción en una contraposición a la frase asertiva Martínez Bonati (1972: 55 ss) y Searle. Este último muestra cómo la regla fundamental a la que obedece la aserción, el compromiso del hablante con la factualidad de lo que afirma, no se da en el lenguaje ficticio, y cómo todas las demás reglas constitutivas del acto ilocucionario se desprenden lógicamente de este primer paso (1975: 322 ss).

16. Según Frege, "por juicio entendemos el paso de un pensamiento a su valor veritativo" (1984: 83).

17. Hay una complicación posterior del concepto de proposición. Según J. Lyons: "a proposition is what is expressed by a declarative sentence when that sentence is uttered to make a statement" (1977: 141-142). Searle diría que la realización efectiva de un acto de habla asertivo (juicio) sólo se puede determinar a partir de las intenciones ilocucionarias del hablante (1975: 325; cf. 1980: 38). Como vemos, a la descripción de Frege se superpone en Searle y Lyons el problema de la diferenciación entre actos locucionarios e ilocucionarios (primitivos); a ello habrá que superponer, además, la posibilidad de que esos actos ilocucionarios sean *imitados* por otros actos (derivados) distintos a ellos en naturaleza. De la proposición deriva el juicio según Frege; del juicio derivará de modo parecido el acto ilocucionario efectivamente realizado.

18. Cf. la diferencia establecida por R. M. Hare (1971) entre el elemento *trópico* y el *néustico* de un acto de habla (ilocucionario). Esta analogía nos podría llevar a precisar más lo que hay de común entre un *discurso de ficción* y una cita (imaginaria): "when we embed a declarative sentence as the object of a verb of saying in indirect discourse, we associate the it-is-so [tropic] component, but not the I-say-so [neustic] component, with the proposition that is expressed by the embedded sentence" (Lyons 1977: 750).

19. Searle, en cambio, propone hablar de referencia ficticia o fingida, y no de referencia a un mundo ficticio (1975: 330). El sentido es, sin embargo, equivalente: Ingarden entiende aquí "referencia a un mundo ficticio como si se tratase de un mundo real"; Searle distingue este caso de la referencia a un mundo ficticio como tal mundo ficticio.

20. Por ejemplo, no queda claro en la teoría de Ingarden qué lugar podría corresponder a las frases de una obra de ficción. No son propiamente hablando ni proposiciones ni juicios. La teoría de Ingarden parece requerir esta categoría intermedia, que sólo es definida vagamente por Ingarden, en lugar de una progresiva instrumentalización e hipercodificación, según proponemos nosotros. Además, a pesar de su mérito histórico, la noción de textualidad de Ingarden está insuficientemente desarrollada, y es infráutilizada en su discusión de la ficcionalidad. La peculiaridad óntica del *discurso de ficción* no debería describirse en base al "quasi-judgemental character of its assertive propositions" (1973: 172) sino en base a una

peculiaridad pragmática del texto entero. En la edición de 1965 de *Das Literarische Kunstwerk*, Ingarden hace extensivo su análisis al resto de las frases de la obra: así, habrá *pseudo-preguntas*, *pseudo-evaluaciones*, etc. (1973: 182 ss). Lamentablemente, no podemos extendernos aquí más en la comparación con la teoría de Ingarden.

21. En un sentido algo distinto al de Richards, pero que según creemos coincide fundamentalmente con el de Ingarden. "Las frases literarias", aclara Martínez Bonati, "son juicios auténticos, pero imaginarios, no cuasi-juicios reales, como sostiene Ingarden" (1972: 216). De la descripción de Ingarden se desprende que las diferencias son sólo terminológicas.

22. Champigny 1972; cit. en Lanser 1981: 285.

23. Searle 1980: 86; 1975: 330. Cf. también Castilla del Pino 1983: 319 ss.

24. Jon-K. 1985: 2. Adams (1985: 5) pretende que algunos de los ejemplos de Searle o Quine están viciados por no tener en cuenta este doble sentido de la referencialidad: ignoran que sus ejemplos también están sujetos a condicionantes discursivos, a saber, los del propio discurso filosófico que los introduce. Cf. por ejemplo la afirmación de Searle sobre la carencia absoluta de referencialidad, incluso ficticia, de la expresión "la señora de Sherlock Holmes" (1980: 86; 1975: 329). Pero creemos que Searle está haciendo abstracción de su propio discurso, está utilizando metalenguaje, y que sus conclusiones son perfectamente aceptables en este punto.

25. "El conocimiento *según la analogía* . . . no significa, como se entiende generalmente la palabra, una semejanza incompleta de dos cosas, sino una semejanza completa de dos relaciones entre cosas completamente desemejantes" (Kant, *Prolegómenos* § 58, 1984: 180).

26. Ohmann 1971: 254. Cf. Frye 1957: 79, 84-85; Pratt 1977: 173; Ruthrof 1981: 53. Es obvio que estos autores se están refiriendo a la literatura en cuanto ficción. Lanser propone definir la ficción como un conglomerado de actos de habla hipotéticos, "'hypothetical' illocutionary acts, acts of pretending" (1981: 280). Sobre la idea de Ohmann de que el contexto va incluido en cierto modo en el texto, cf. Greimas 1976: 28 ss; Ducrot 1980: 534). Es una idea ampliamente difundida: cf. Gullón 1980: 83 ss; Lanser 1981: 118, 243; Lázaro Carreter 1987: 160.

27. Searle 1975: 326. Según Lanser (1981: 284) tanto Searle como Ohmann e Iser comparten el concepto del texto literario como conjunto de actos de habla "fingidos", "imitados", "hipotéticos". La postura original Ohmann no está a veces nada clara: tan pronto niega que los actos literarios tengan fuerza ilocucionaria como afirma que se realiza el acto de "fingir" (cf. Searle 1980: 27-29); una vacilación semejante vemos en Oomen (1987: 139, 147). Posteriormente Ohmann reconoce una fuerza ilocucionaria específica de la ficción (o "literatura"; 1987b: 47 *passim*).

28. Cf. una concepción semejante a la de Searle en Hough (1976: 226), Close (1976), Skinner (1976), Domínguez Caparrós (1987: 115) o Harris (1988: 47ss).

29. Un discurso de ficción puede ser comunicativo en dos sentidos: en el sentido de que nos es comunicado y en el sentido de que se nos comunica algo a través de él. La idea de que la

ficción literaria puede ser una forma de comunicación no es en absoluto novedosa o infrecuente. Cf. por ej. Booth 1961: 397; Posner 1987: 125 ss; Oomen 1987: 139; Pratt 1977: 86; Chatman 1978: 31; Lanser 1981: 4; Lázaro Carreter 1987: 169; Van Dijk 1987: 175.

30. La teoría de los actos de habla de Récanati (1979, 1980) es más flexible que la de Searle a la hora de explicar los escalonamientos, instrumentalizaciones y desdoblamientos de los actos de habla. Tzvetan Todorov (1987) y Oomen (1987: 148) también presentan una descripción semejante de la superposición de enunciaciones.

31. La postura de Adams recuerda la distinción establecida por Ducrot entre enunciador y locutor (1980: 518). Según Ducrot, en el caso de ironía, el locutor es meramente el productor del enunciado, y no su enunciador. Pero, como señalan Lozano, Peña-Marín y Abril (1982: 115) el locutor sí es responsable de la ironía en tanto que ironía, y debemos suponer un desdoblamiento de su actividad.

32. Cf. Bal 1977: 33; Chatman 1978: 151; Lintvelt 1981: 16, 32; Chico Rico 1988: 59. El modelo más semejante al que proponemos es el de Lanser (1981: 144).

33. Cf. por ejemplo el análisis del sobreentendido presentado por Lozano, Peña-Marín y Abril (1982: 224 ss, 242.).

34. Cf. Ingarden 1973: 60, 183 ss; Friedman 1955: 123; Fowler 1977: 37; Lanser 1981: 80; Ohmann 1973: 99.

35. Cf. Ingarden (1973: 383, 393). Ingarden señala que este estudio ya fue iniciado por Waldemar Conrad a principios de siglo.

36. Cf. por ejemplo la opinión de T.S. Eliot sobre la retórica teatral: "A speech in a play should never appear to be intended to move us as it might conceivably move other characters in the play, for it is essential that we should perceive our position of spectators, and observe always from the outside though with complete understanding" (1951: 40). Por supuesto, nosotros vemos esta afirmación no como una ley universal, sino como una ley de un lenguaje dramático concreto que está definiendo Eliot; otros estilos dramáticos pueden recrearse en el involucramiento y la ignorancia del espectador. Situaciones comparables se producen en la narración. Así, por ejemplo, se puede motivar la exposición de un acontecimiento al lector por medio de una conversación entre los personajes.

37. Ohmann afirma que no existe sistema literario distinto del sistema del lenguaje corriente, sino sólo un uso distinto: "the writer is using the system of language and language acts describable by the ordinary rules, but using it in a special way" (1971: 257). Pero en el análisis del discurso un uso distinto, si obedece a regularidades, es un sistema distinto.

38. Cf. Jon-K. Adams: "It should be emphasized that the pragmatic structure is not a device for determining whether or not a text is fictional. That is ultimately the responsibility of the writer, who can use external conventions, such as having "a novel" printed on the title page, or internal conventions, such as writing in a language that is overtly marked as fictional. The pragmatic structure is a description of what is generally implied once the conventions of fiction are invoked" (1985: 23). Esto no parece suficiente para cubrir todos los casos. El que los libros

de Carlos Castaneda sean considerados "reportajes" o novelas no depende de las indicaciones de Castaneda, sino de las creencias de su lector y la manera en que interprete la actitud de Castaneda hacia su obra. Cf. la crítica de Petrey (1990: 59-69) a la postura de Searle.

39. Sampson (1979: 379). Defoe no escarmentaba: ya diez años antes había sido encarcelado por otro panfleto (*The Shortest Way to Deal with the Dissenters*) cuya ironía no se captó en un principio.

40. Cf. Ohmann 1987a: 28; Fish 1980b; Harris 1988: 95 ss; Petrey 1990: 70ss.

41. Así lo sostiene S.-Y. Kuroda (1976; cit. en Albadalejo Mayordomo 1983: 195).

42. Jon-K. Adams 1985: 19. Cf. Van Dijk 1972: 300.

43. Jon-K. Adams (1985: 21); cf. Ingarden (1973: 224). Sobre la posición de Ingarden, cf. sin embargo 1973: 170 ss.

44. Searle 1975: 331. Cf. también Ruthrof 1981: 81; Toolan 1988: 97.

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
**COMPLEX EVENT NOMINALS
IN ENGLISH AND SPANISH:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH**

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0. INTRODUCTION

ARGUMENT structure (henceforth, a-structure) has been studied extensively during the last ten years due to the importance that the concept has developed within the Government and Binding framework. The a-structure of a lexical item contains a complex of information critical to its syntactic behavior. Grimshaw (1990) claims that the a-structure of a predicate should be derivable from key characteristics of its meaning. As a consequence, a-structure cannot be freely altered by syntactic rules.

The fundamental goal of Grimshaw's proposal is to project a-structure from lexical semantic structure and d-structure from a-structure and principles of X' theory. This could be represented as in (1):



Grimshaw claims that "in the strongest possible theory, the a-structure of a lexical item is predictable from its meaning and the d-structure the item appears in is predictable from its a-structure in interaction with independent parametric characteristics of the language" (1990: 1-2). She also proposes to study a-structure as a "structured representation over which relations of prominence are defined" (1990: 3). The prominence theory of a-structure assumes that the a-structure of a predicate has its own internal structure, which affects the behavior of the predicate in many ways. A-structure is now defined as a representation which shows prominence relations among arguments. The prominence relations are determined by the thematic and the aspectual properties of the predicate. Grimshaw provides the structure for a verb like *announce* with an external Agent and an internal Theme and Goal. The a-structure prominence relations are those indicated in (2):

(2) *announce* (Agent (Goal (Theme)))

The Agent is more prominent than the other arguments which are more embedded in the representation. Other arguments also bear relations of relative prominence to each other; the Goal is more prominent than the Theme, for example. In the prominence theory, "the internal organization of a-structure results from the thematic hierarchy, so the prominence relations reflect thematic information of a very limited kind, namely, whether a given argument is higher or lower on the thematic hierarchy than another" (1990: 5).

1. NOUNS, VERBS AND A-STRUCTURE

1.1. Complex Event Nouns vs. Simple Events and Result Nominals

Grimshaw analyzes the question of the relationship between nouns and verbs. Although it has been asserted that nouns take arguments only optionally, she argues that this is not correct. Her claim is that only nouns that refer to what she calls **complex events** —nouns that have an internal aspectual analysis— have obligatory grammatical arguments of the kind that verbs have. The a-structure of such nouns must be satisfied, hence the obligatory character of their arguments. Other nouns, **simple events** and **result** nominals, have no a-structure.¹ Grimshaw uses various techniques of disambiguation to distinguish between complex event nominals and other NPs:

(i) certain modifiers occur only with the event interpretation of particular nouns. For example, *constant* and *frequent*, when modifying singular count nouns must be licensed by event structure:²

- (3) a. The expression is desirable.
- b. *The frequent expression is desirable.
- c. The frequent expression of one's feelings is desirable.³

The addition of *frequent* in (3b) rules out the result reading since *frequent* cannot be construed as a modifier of *expression* on its result reading and forces the complex event reading of the noun. Hence, its a-structure must be satisfied as in (3c).

(ii) the presence of the subject argument, particularly with agent-oriented adjectives (*intentional*, *deliberate* ...):

- (4) a. The instructor's deliberate examination of the papers took a long time.
- b. *The instructor's deliberate examination took a long time.

The presence of the modifier *frequent* in (3) and the subject argument *the instructor* in (4) entails that the a-structure of the noun is projected to the syntax. Therefore, (3b) and (4b) are theta-criterion violations (the theta-role

corresponding to the complement cannot be assigned because there is no complement present).

(iii) when a nominal is associated with an a-structure, as in (5b, c), it admits only the definite determiner:

(5) a. They observed the/*an/*one/*that assignment of the problem.
 b. They studied the/an/one/that assignment.

In (5a) only *the* is possible as a specifier, since the noun projects an a-structure. In (5b), however, *assignment* is a resultative, projecting no a-structure and the entire range of pronominal specifiers is allowed.

(iv) complex event nominals never pluralize:

(6) *The assignments of the problem took a long time.

(v) complex event nominals show a failure in predication:

(7) a. That was the /an assignment.
 b. *That was the / an assignment of the problem.

What all these disambiguation techniques show is that nominals with an event structure have an obligatory a-structure. The hypothesis argued for by Grimshaw is that result nominals have no a-structure at all (versus the usually assumed idea of having an optional a-structure).

1. 2. Nouns as Defective Theta-Assigners

Grimshaw also proposes (following Emonds (1985)) that nouns have no direct theta marking capacity. Therefore, argument-taking nouns cannot directly accept arguments because they are defective theta markers. They will only take arguments when they combine with prepositions. However, this property that both Grimshaw and Emonds attribute to the lack of theta marking capacity of nouns, can also be explained from a Case theory perspective. Following Aoun (1982) let us assume that an element is visible for theta-marking only if it is assigned Case. According to this Visibility Condition, stated in (8), a noun phrase or a clausal complement can receive a

theta-role only if it is in a position to which Case is assigned or is linked to such a position.

(8) Theta-roles can only be assigned to A-chains that are headed by a position occupied by Pro or Case. (In Stowell 1981: 34)

That is, if a noun cannot assign Case or if the inherent Case assigned by the noun is 'realized' with a preposition, this prevents it from assigning a theta-role to a clausal complement.

In English, when a noun occurs with a complement that is not introduced by a preposition, the complement cannot be a syntactic argument and the NP cannot be a complex event nominal. The fact that in English a configuration such as P CP is not possible leads to the conclusion that if a CP appears within an NP then the CP cannot be a true complement, i.e. a syntactic argument, and so the NP cannot be a complex event nominal. NPs with CPs in the absence of a preposition never behave like arguments; they act as result nominals or simple event nominals. This is shown in (9) - (12):

(i) CPs within NPs are always *optional* even when the corresponding verb takes an obligatory complement:

(9) a. The announcement/conclusion (that an investigation has been initiated) was inaccurate.
 b. *They announced/*They concluded

(ii) Nouns with sentential complements do not have the meaning of process nouns, as pointed out by Stowell (1981):

(10) The/their observation that the position had been filled surprised everyone.

The noun *observation* refers not to the fact/event of observing but to the content of the observation. According to Stowell (1981: 199-200), this can be unambiguously shown by looking at the relation between a derived nominal and its 'complement'. This relation is actually one of apposition rather than of theta-role assignment. This intuition is confirmed by the fact that the identity relation holds between the pair (derived nominal/tensed clause complement) as shown in (11):

(11) a. Andrea's guess that Bill was lying.
 b. Andrea's guess was that Bill was lying.

(iii) A CP within NP cannot co-occur with the modifiers *frequent* and *constant* (cf. (12a)) or with a subject argument (cf. (12b)); it may appear, however, within a NP headed by the full range of prenominal specifiers (cf. (12c)):

(12) a.*The frequent/constant statement that he was about to resign was intended to mislead.
 b.*I listened in awe to their constant announcement that the game had been cancelled.
 c. She did not want to listen to the/an/that announcement that she could not park her car there.

In summary, English sentential complements to nouns are never arguments. The evidence is that they are never obligatory, which suggests that they are not related to a-structure positions and that the nouns they are associated with do not behave as complex event nominals.

2. COMPLEX EVENT NOMINALS IN SPANISH

Once all the differences between complex event nominals and other types of nominals, and the non-argumental nature of complements to NP without a preposition have been spelled out for English, one should ask whether the same facts hold for a language like Spanish. Some of the tests used for English can be applied to Spanish to see whether there are syntactic differences between complex event nominals and simple event and result nominals.

2.1. Complex Event Nominals vs. Result Nominals

As in English, the aspectual modifier *constante* and, with some variation, *frecuente* have the effect of forcing the argument structure of the noun.⁴

(13) a. Su explicación empezaba a aburrir a la gente.
 Her explanation started to make people bored.
 b. Su frecuente explicación *(del problema) empezaba a aburrir a la gente.
 Her frequent explanation *(of the problem) started to make people bored.
 c. Explicamos *(los problemas).
 We explained *(the problems).

The presence of a subject argument co-occurring with an adjective such as *deliberate* also has the effect of forcing a-structure to be present:

(14) a. Su insistencia (en una casa a la orilla del mar) vuelve loco a cualquiera.
 Her insistence on a house by the seaside makes anyone crazy.
 b. Su deliberada insistencia *(en una casa a la orilla del mar) aburre a cualquiera.
 Her deliberate insistence *(on a house by the seaside) makes anyone angry.

Similarly, NPs which appear as complements to verbs such as *presenciar* 'to witness', *escuchar* 'to listen', particularly when they are in an imperfective tense, are interpreted as complex event nominals:

(15) El público pudo presenciar la destrucción *(del edificio) en la televisión.

2. 2. Nouns with CPs Introduced by Prepositions

In Spanish we know independently that a preposition can take a CP complement (Contreras (1984), Plann (1986)). The 'a' examples in (16) and (17) show that the same preposition appears when there is an NP complement. This indicates that the preposition is part of the lexical entry of the verb:

(16) a. Ayer soñé **con** mi pueblo.
 Yesterday I dreamed of my village.
 b. Ayer soñé **con** regresar a mi pueblo.
 Yesterday I dreamed of going back to my village.

(17) c. Ayer soñé **con** que mi hermana Ana venía a visitarme.
 Yesterday I dreamed that my sister Anne came to visit me.

a. La fiesta consistió **en** un baile.
 The party consisted of a dance.

b. El concurso consistía **en** saltar charcos.
 The contest consisted of jumping puddles.

c. La actividad consistía **en** que cada alumno visitara un museo.
 The activity was that each student should visit a museum.

We should investigate whether CP complements are acting like arguments and whether NPs have an event reading in these cases. As we have seen (cf. (13)) the use of aspectual modifiers like *frecuente* and *constante* forces an a-structure reading in Spanish as was the case in English. (18) - (19) show how the a-structure of the nominal is satisfied with a CP:

(18) a. Su insistencia enfada a toda la familia.
 Her insistence makes the whole family angry.

b. *Su frecuente insistencia enfada a la familia.
 *Her frequent insistence makes the family angry.

c. Su frecuente insistencia *(en que los nietos la visiten) enfada a toda la familia.
 Her frequent insistence on her grandchildren coming to visit her makes the whole family angry.

(19) a. El anuncio llega a ser fastidioso.
 The announcement becomes annoying.

b. *El constante anuncio llega a ser fastidioso.
 *The constant announcement becomes annoying.

c. El constante anuncio *(de que no se puede aparcar allí) llega a ser fastidioso.
 The constant announcement that one cannot park there becomes annoying.

The use of subject arguments together with agent-oriented adjectives (cf. (14b)) forces the a-structure of the nominal. (20) - (21) show how the addition of *deliberate* rules out the result reading and forces the complex event reading of the nouns *anuncio* e *insistencia*. Hence their a-structures have to be satisfied. As in (18) - (19), the a-structure is satisfied with a CP:

(20) a. Su anuncio enfadó a los ayudantes de cátedra.
 Her announcement made the TAs angry.

b. *Su deliberado anuncio enfadó a los ayudantes de cátedra.

*Her deliberate announcement made the TAs angry.

c. Su deliberado anuncio *(de que los sueldos iban a ser reducidos) enfadó mucho a los ayudantes de cátedra.
Her deliberate announcement that salaries would be reduced made the TAs angry.

(21) a. Mi insistencia causó un gran descontento.
My insistence caused much irritation.

b. *Mi deliberada insistencia causó un gran enfado.
*My deliberate insistence caused much irritation.

c. Mi deliberada insistencia *(en terminar el trabajo pronto) causó un gran enfado.
My deliberate insistence on finishing the paper soon caused much irritation.

(18) - (21) show that in Spanish sentential complements (CPs) to nouns with a complex event reading are arguments. The evidence is that they are obligatory, which suggests that they are related to a-structure positions.

As we have seen, if the nominal we are dealing with has an a-structure, only the definite determiner occurs with it. This is what (22) and (23) show:

(22) a. La constante advertencia de que esa medicina era peligrosa llegó demasiado tarde.
*The constant warning that that medicine was dangerous arrived too late. (vs. The constant warning of the dangers of the medicine arrived too late.)

b.*Una/*Alguna constante advertencia de que esa medicina era peligrosa llegó demasiado tarde.
*A/*Some constant warning that that medicine was dangerous arrived too late.⁵

(23) a. El frecuente anuncio de que la gasolina subiría no influyó en el número de personas que se fueron de vacaciones.
*The frequent announcement that gas prices would go up did not affect the number of people that went on vacation.

b.*Un/Algún frecuente anuncio de que la gasolina subiría no influyó en el número de personas que se fueron de vacaciones.
*A/*Some frequent announcement that gas prices would go up did not affect the number of people that went on vacation.

When a nominal is associated with a complex event reading it never pluralizes:

(24) a. El anuncio de que la sequía iba a continuar causó pánico entre los habitantes de California.
 The announcement that the drought would continue caused panic among California residents.

b. *Los anuncios de que la sequía iba a continuar causaron pánico entre los habitantes de California.
 *The announcements that the drought would continue caused panic among California residents.

c. Los anuncios de que la sequía iba a continuar y que el terremoto estaba cerca causaron pánico entre los habitantes de California.
 The announcements that the drought would continue and the earthquake was near caused panic among California residents.

Whereas (24a) can have both an event and a complement reading (i.e. announcement of which the CP specifies the content) if the nominal is pluralized (24b) the event reading is lost. (24c) shows that pluralization is grammatical with an appositive reading.

From the data in (18) - (24), it can be concluded that in Spanish nouns with sentential complements introduced by a preposition show the following characteristics:

(25) (i) They can have an event reading.
 (ii) They have the possibility of appearing with aspectual modifiers or with agent-oriented adjectives that have the effect of forcing the a-structure of the nominals.
 (iii) When the nominals have an event reading, the CPs are not optional. Rather, they behave like arguments.

2. 3. Event Control into Purpose Clauses

Grimshaw argues, following work by Williams (1985) and Lasnik (1988), that complex event nominals allow control into an infinitival purpose clause (cf. (26a)) because the controller in such cases is the 'event' denoted by the clause or the nominal rather than an implicit argument, as proposed in Roeper (1987). No event or implicit argument control is possible with result nominals (cf. (26b)):

(26) a. [The translation of the book]_i (in order) PRO_i to make it available to a wider readership was a success.

b. [Their statement that the president_j intends to retire]_i in order PRO_{ij} to mislead the public was absurd.

When arguing against the NP PRO analysis (the idea that an NP has a 'controllable' PRO subject in specifier position), Williams (1985) offers an account of result clause control in which he proposes that the matrix S itself is available as a controller of the result clause:

(27) a. [John_i went to New York] [PRO_i to annoy Mary]
 b. [John went to New York]_j [PRO_{ij} to annoy Mary]

(27) has two possible interpretations: (27a) offers the intentional purposive interpretation by means of the index on *John*, the agent that controls PRO. (27b) shows the reading in which it is the event itself of John's going to New York that annoys Mary. This is shown by placing the index on the whole S (IP). This kind of control is called S-control by Williams. He extends S-control to N' control. Thus, he does not need to posit NP PRO or implicit argument control to account for (28):

(28) The destruction of the city to impress the general.

Williams argues that in (28) the result clause is controlled by the N' *destruction of the city* in the sense that it is the destruction of the city that will impress the general, not the destroyer. The same explanation will apply to (29) where the result clause is controlled by the S *the ship was sunk* in the sense again that it is the fact that the ship was sunk that will impress the general:

(29) The ship was sunk to impress the general.

In both the English and the Spanish sentences that follow, the purpose clause can be associated with both the higher and the lower clauses:

(30) a. They_i stated that the president_j intends to retire in order PRO_{ij} to mislead the public.
 b. [They stated that the president_j intends to retire]_i in order PRO_{ij} to mislead the public.

(Grimshaw 1990: 76 (68b))

(31) a. Los generales_j anunciaron que las tropas_j se habían retirado para PRO_{i/j} confundir al enemigo.
 The generals_j announced that the troops_j had withdrawn in order to PRO_{i/j} to confuse the enemy.
 b. [Los generales anunciaron que las tropas_j se habían retirado]_j para PRO_{i/j} confundir al enemigo.
 [The generals announced that the troops_j had withdrawn]_j in order PRO_{i/j} to confuse the enemy.

An event control reading is neither possible in the corresponding English sentence with a result nominal (cf. (32)) nor in the corresponding Spanish sentence with a complex event nominal (cf. (33)):

(32) [Their statement that the president_j intends to retire]_j in order PRO*_{i/j} to mislead the public was absurd.
 (33) [Su anuncio de que las tropas_j se habían retirado]_j para PRO*_{i/j} confundir al enemigo se transmitió en la radio.
 Their announcement that the troops had withdrawn to confuse the enemy was transmitted on the radio.

The event control in (33) does not hold and the purpose clause can only be understood to refer to *las tropas* not to the *anuncio*. Similar examples are those in (34) and (35):

(34) [Los generales anunciaron [que el edificio se había bombardeado]_j]_j para PRO_{i/j} confundir al enemigo.
 [The generals announced [that the building had been bombed]_j]_j in order PRO_{i/j} to confuse the enemy.
 (35) [El anuncio de los generales de [que el edificio se había bombardeado]_j]_j para PRO*_{i/j} confundir al enemigo se transmitió por la radio.
 [The generals' announcement [that the building had been bombed]_j]_j in order PRO*_{i/j} to confuse the enemy was transmitted on the radio.

Again, (34) shows that the sentence can be interpreted as meaning that the generals made the announcement in order to confuse the enemies or that the building was bombed in order to confuse the enemy. However, (35) can only have the second interpretation.

As we have already mentioned, complex event nominals in English allow event control into an infinitival purpose clause (cf. (26a)). From the examples in Spanish given above (cf. (33), (35)) one could conclude that complex event nominals in this language do not allow this type of control. Actually, that will be a test for argument structure which Spanish NPs with clausal complements fail to meet (assuming, with Grimshaw, that 'N' control = event control). However, this is not exactly what happens in Spanish. As the data show, event control is possible when the complex event nominal has an NP complement (cf. (36a)), as in English, or when the NP has a CP complement with an inchoative type of verb, in contrast with English (cf. (38) where control is not ambiguous in S). No event control is possible with NPs with sentential complements (cf. (35b)).

(36) a. [El anuncio [del bombardeo del edificio]_j]_i para PRO_i_j confundir al enemigo se transmitió por la radio.
 The announcement of the bombardment of the building in order PRO to confuse the enemy was transmitted on the radio.

b. *[El anuncio de los generales de [que el edificio se había bombardeado]_j]_i para PRO*_i_j confundir al enemigo se transmitió por la radio.
 The generals' announcement that the building had been bombed in order to confuse the enemy was transmitted on the radio.

If the verb in the lower clause is an inchoative that cannot participate in event control the version with an NP and a sentential complement is ungrammatical in English:

(37) a. They_i stated that the gun misfired in order PRO_i to mislead the public.
 b. *Their statement that the gun misfired in order to mislead the public was absurd.

(Grimshaw 1990: 77 (70a, b))

In Spanish when an inchoative type verb appears in the lower clause, there is still control into an infinitival purpose clause by the Agent of the main clause:

(38) a. [La insistencia del abogado_i en las pruebas balísticas]_j para PRO_i_j demostrar la inocencia de su cliente fue en vano.

The lawyer's insistence on ballistic evidence in order to prove his client's innocence was in vain.

- b. [Su_i insistencia en que la pistola había fallado]_j para PRO_{i,j} convencer al jurado fue absurda.
*His insistence that the gun had misfired in order to convince the jury was absurd.
- c. El abogado_i insistía en que la pistola había fallado para PRO_i convencer al jurado.
The lawyer insisted that the gun had misfired in order to convince the jury.

In (38b) *su* controls PRO in the infinitival purpose clause; in that sentence, there is agent control when *su* = PRO and event control when PRO = *j*. (38b) should be contrasted with (36b). There, it was shown that event control into the infinitival purpose clause was not possible. The same examples can be used to show that Agent control is not possible either. Here, we will just repeat (36b) with an Agent control interpretation:

(39) *[El anuncio de los generales_i / Su_i anuncio de [que el edificio se había bombardeado]_j para PRO*_{i,j} confundir al enemigo se transmitió en la radio.
The generals' announcement / Their announcement that the building had been bombed in order to confuse the enemy was transmitted on the radio.

A question that could be raised is whether what we find in (36a) is event control of control by an implicit argument. Roper (1983) cites the following examples as support for the control-by-implicit argument view:

(40) a. *The boat sank to impress the king.
b. The boat was sunk to impress the king.

His idea is that it is the availability of an implicit agent in the passive construction in (40b) which is responsible for the difference; such an implicit argument is lacking in the 'ergative' construction of (40a). Williams (1985: 310), on the other hand, considers that it is wrong to say that when the S is the controller, the S must denote an event which involves an Agent. He claims that there is evidence that agenthood has nothing to do with the difference between the two examples mentioned above or with control of

result clauses in general. The example he provides to support his claim is given in (41):

(41) Grass is green to promote photosynthesis.

In this example it cannot be said that *is* or *green* has an implicit agent argument. "We must simply suppose that there is some purposeful agent (evolution, God) under whose control is the circumstance 'grass is green'. This is quite different from saying that God or evolution is an Agent in the theta-theoretic sense" (1985: 311). For Williams, where the implicit argument can control, the controlled clause is an argument and where it cannot control, the controlled clause is an adjunct, as (42) shows:

(42) a. the desire to leave
(implicit argument is controller)
b. the destruction of the city to prove a point
(implicit argument is not controller, N' is)

According to Williams, we have to assume that adjuncts are always generated outside of VP or outside of the first projection of V, as in Jackendoff (1977), while arguments (subjects being an exception) are always generated within the first projection. Besides, we need to assume that implicit arguments are only 'visible' to rules applying within the first projection of V. Thus, it follows that implicit arguments will be visible as antecedents only for control of complements, never for control of adjuncts. Therefore, for Williams, (36a) will have event control, not implicit argument control. However, that type of example can also be understood as having an implicit argument behaving as an Agent. In the end the distinction between event control or implicit argument control is not going to be of much help in trying to figure out why control is not possible in (36b). Complex event nominals in Spanish theta-mark their sentential complements and project an a-structure. However, when it comes to control into infinitival purpose clauses, complex event nominals with CP complements behave as if they were not theta-marking their complements (if Grimshaw is correct in assuming that event control is a diagnostic of a-structure).

3. CONCLUSION

This paper has analyzed the behavior of complex event nominals in Spanish. The techniques of disambiguation that Grimshaw uses to distinguish complex event nominals from simple events and result nominals in English were applied to Spanish and the conclusions arrived at were similar to the ones obtained for English. The use of certain aspectual modifiers and the presence of a subject argument co-occurring with adjectives such as *deliberate* have the effect of forcing the a-structure of the noun and, hence, its arguments must be projected.

However, the results varied when the behavior of CPs within NPs was analyzed. In English if a CP appears within an NP then the CP cannot be a true complement (cf. 1.2.). In Spanish sentential complements to nouns are introduced by prepositions and when the nominal has an event reading its a-structure is satisfied with a CP that behaves as a true argument.

Event control into infinitival purpose clauses was also analyzed. Grimshaw shows that complex event nominals in English allow this type of control (cf. (26a)). At first blush, it seemed that complex event nominals in Spanish did not behave in a similar way (cf. (33), (35)). However, the data showed that control (event or implicit argument) is possible when the complex event nominal has an NP complement (cf. (36a)) or when the NP has a CP complement with an inchoative verb (cf. (38b)). No control is possible with NPs with non-inchoative sentential complements. The reason why this lack of control exists in the latter case is not clear. It seems that it has to do with the 'complexity' of the NP structure but at this point no answer is provided.

The analysis of complex event nominals and control into infinitival purpose clauses proves, however, that the relationship between event control and a-structure is not as simple as one could infer from Grimshaw's account of the phenomenon. The concept of 'event control' itself needs to be further refined. We leave this topic for future research. a

NOTES

1. It is not clear if this means that elements which appear with these nouns are all modifiers of some type even when they 'look like' objects.
2. Ungrammatical sentences and interpretations are indicated by the use of an asterisk.
3. If the addition of *frequent* forces the a-structure of the noun to be projected one could ask whether a subject would not be necessary here.
4. *() is used to indicate that the sentence is ungrammatical if the material within the parenthesis is not used.
(*) is used to indicate that the sentence is ungrammatical if the material within the parenthesis is used.
5. Sentence (22b) is grammatical without *constant*, as is to be expected.

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**I DON'T CARE WHAT YOU
MEANT:
I HEARD WHAT YOU SAID**

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1. INTRODUCTION

MUCH of the work done on interpersonal communication in the last twenty years, whether under the heading of Discourse Analysis (for example, Coulthard 1985) or within the area of post-Gricean pragmatic treatment of cooperation in any of its aspects, (for instance, Sperber and Wilson 1986), proceeds on the assumption that there is a sincere Hearer (or Reader) who genuinely tries to interpret what an equally sincere Speaker (or Writer) means when he or she says (or writes) something in a specific context. Some authorities in the field (such as Tannen 1981) seem to assume that this approach to an understanding of how communication functions corresponds fairly closely to what actually happens in real life, whereas others (perhaps Grice 1975) simply use the assumption as a hypothesis, basis or norm on, or

around, which to construct a theory to explain both genuine, innocent, cooperation and its opposite.

The present paper sets out to discuss one way in which Hearers, when it suits their purposes, take advantage of what Speakers say and deliberately ignore what they mean, in order to gain some personal advantage. It aims to provide an additional sidelight on indirect speech acts as carriers or intensifiers of pragmatic ambiguity, showing how misunderstandings may sometimes be exactly what Hearers want to achieve. It relates also to what Carmen Olivares (1991: 151), having mentioned half lies and half truths, describes as a "disturbing effect" caused by verbalism, which pays too much attention to "form" at the expense of "content," since if Hearers respond to the form and seek a content —semantic or pragmatic— that will best accord with their own aims, such misunderstandings are bound to occur.

2. PRAGMATIC AMBIGUITY

Grice's Cooperative Principle (see Grice 1975) is so well known that there is no need to reiterate it here. The aspect of its application which is directly relevant to this paper is that it provides an explanation of how a cooperative Hearer manages to understand what the Speaker means —in the sense of wanting to achieve— even when this is not directly related to what he says. The four maxims into which Grice divides his Cooperative Principle provide a framework within which indirect speech acts (like the use of a request for information on the literal level —"Can you pass the salt?"— which is easily and immediately understood as a request for action —passing the salt) are explained as not causing a communicative problem in ordinary, sincere, conversation. Yet, of course, indirect speech acts never totally lose their literal, or direct, meaning or force. Thus the question "Can you pass me the salt?" may realistically be treated as a literal request for information about the Hearer's salt-passing ability in a particular situation, evoking a straightforward answer like "Yes" or "Sure," at the same time as it functions as a request for action, stimulating both the act of passing the salt and a commentary on the act like "Here it is" or "There you are." "Sure, there you are," then, acknowledges both the direct and the indirect meaning of the utterance "Can you pass the salt?"

Grice made at least three provisions for non-cooperative conversation; by this I mean that he does not claim that talk exchanges are always sincere and innocent. Firstly, he gives rather full treatment (1975: 49-50) to various ways in which a participant in an exchange may fail to fulfil the Cooperative Principle, simply by violating it, by opting out of it, by flouting one of its maxims or by choosing to respect one maxim which clashes with another. Secondly, he mentions quarrelling (1975: 48) as a type of exchange in which a Speaker may fail to be cooperative. Thirdly, he explains that "any one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation . . . must be expected to have an interest . . . in participating in talk exchanges that will be profitable . . ." (1975: 49), thus implying that others may not care about the goals of the conversation itself or may not have an interest in talk exchanges that will be "profitable," in the sense of mutually profitable.

From this brief outline of the Cooperative Principle it is clear that Grice envisaged situations in which a Speaker might not be interested in cooperating with the Hearer and might take deliberate steps to be uncooperative. What I want to suggest here is that the Hearer is just as likely as the Speaker not to cooperate and that he too has means of violating the Cooperative Principle at his disposal.

Other authorities have treated a different type of pragmatic ambiguity, which can be seen as analogical with semantic or lexical ambiguity, in the sense that an utterance spoken by one person to another in a given situation may be capable of being interpreted as performing more than one single, univocal, act. In a particularly clear exposition of the pragmatic ambiguity, Haldur Óim (1977: 251-268) shows how a sentence like "The man is cutting a tree" (the non-standard English is irrelevant to the point being made) "which has one definite syntactic form and designates one definite objective fact . . . can be analyzed as a message in several different ways. What this means is that (the sentence) is pragmatically ambiguous . . . it cannot be given one definite pragmatic description" (1977: 254- 255). In other words, such a sentence may be telling the Hearer different things.

What is of specific interest to my purposes is that it is the Hearer, and not the Speaker, who is in the better position to decide what information is being conveyed. For example, the new information which is here being added to what the Hearer already knows may be either a) that what the man is cutting is the tree (and not something else), b) what the man is doing to the tree is that he is cutting it (and not climbing it), or c) that the person who is cutting the tree is the man (and not the woman), knowing as he does already that the

man is cutting something, that he is doing something to a tree or that someone is cutting a tree, respectively.

We have seen, then, two types of pragmatic ambiguity: one deriving from indirect speech acts and the other from the distinction between what the Hearer already knows and what information is new to him. Once the possibility, and indeed the everyday "normality" of pragmatic ambiguity is established, it will be easy to see that it can be exploited by a Hearer for his own purposes. I suggest that Hearers often use such ambiguity to achieve objectives that may be hostile to the Speaker personally or may at the very least run counter to his intentions.

3. THE HEARER AS LIAR

Most face-to-face conversations are structured around some system of turn-taking on the part of the interlocutors, with propositions being put forward and questioned, challenged and rejected or, on the other hand, accepted and incorporated into the ongoing exchange. In many cases, the final version of the proposition as accepted will have been negotiated and re-negotiated in several turns and perhaps out of all recognition. Having focused briefly on pragmatic ambiguity, I now wish to add another element which frequently manifests itself in such to-and-fro exchanges, namely semantic meaning. Since the term "meaning" is used both in the pragmatic and in the semantic sense, there may be a danger of thinking that they are, in fact, the same thing. However, what a Speaker or an utterance means semantically is the information they convey or express, whereas to mean pragmatically refers to attempting to bring about some change in the Hearer's state or actions. Therefore a Hearer may ask for clarification of a Speaker's semantic or pragmatic meaning with a question like "What do you mean?" or "What does that mean?." In answer to these questions, the Speaker may reply: "I don't mean x, I mean y" or "I don't mean to Verb (1) you, I mean to Verb (2) you," as in "I don't mean a ball to play with, I mean a ball where you dance" or "I don't mean to insult you, I only mean to give you advice."

Just as a word like "ball" may refer to a toy or to a dance unless further clarified, so also very often one and the same (group of) words may be used to perform the act of advising, congratulating, accusing, warning, etc. Just as there is no infallible method of ensuring that what a Speaker means

semantically will be, or has been in a given case, understood by the Hearer in the sense intended by the Speaker, neither is there any foolproof way of ensuring that a Hearer will take, or has taken, the pragmatic meaning or force of an utterance in the sense intended.

The point I wish to make here is that, as a Speaker may mistakenly or deliberately say something that is untrue, so also the Hearer may mistakenly or deliberately "take up" (see Austin 1962: ch. IX) and react to some meaning or force that was not intended; he may be misled by the words into genuinely misinterpreting the semantic or the pragmatic meaning, or both, or he may feel tempted to accept one type of meaning and reject the other, since there is a fairly broad dichotomy between what is said and what is meant. If what is said stimulates or influences a certain type of reaction —positive or negative—, that reaction is likely in turn to condition at least to some extent the uptake (see Austin 1962: ch. IX) of the pragmatic force.

4. HOSTILE AND MISTAKEN INTERPRETATIONS

The types of situation in which a deliberately hostile uptake is likely are usually conflictual or adversarial before the utterance itself is spoken. Take the following, authentic, exchange, for which the setting was a dinner table:

Father to Son: "If you ate more green vegetables, your spots would soon clear up."

Angry Mother to Father: "Well, you can cook dinner tomorrow, then."

The pragmatic vagueness of the father's utterance allows the hostile mother deliberately to interpret the "advice to son" act as a "criticism of mother" act, for the benefit of the latter. The hostile response relies on the knowledge shared by all participants in the situation that Mother usually makes the meals, that it is therefore plausible that Son's eating green vegetables or not may depend on being given or not being given them at meal-times; if the latter "meaning" were the intended one, then the utterance could genuinely be seen as a criticism of Mother's cooking or choice of menus for the family.

I now wish to attempt an analysis of this kind of hostile reaction or perlocutionary effect with the aid of Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Wilson 1993). These authors ask how a Hearer

selects one from a number of possible resolutions to an ambiguity (for example in interpreting an implicature or in selecting the antecedent of reference). They suggest that the Hearer evaluates the "candidate solutions" according to their accessibility. This implies, in general terms, that the Hearer looks for an interpretation that is "optimally relevant," in the sense of yielding the greatest possible return in terms of contextual effects for the smallest processing effort on his own part. By "contextual effect" they mean that some existing assumption of the Hearer's is reinforced or else contradicted and eliminated, or that the new input combines with some such existing assumption to give a contextual implication. This is achieved with the least effort necessary to overcome any linguistic or psychological complexity found in the utterance, the accessibility of possible referents, disambiguations etc. and the accessibility of the contextual assumptions themselves. Sperber and Wilson also mention that, according to other, non-relevance, criteria, the Hearer may look for an interpretation that is merely true, informative and evidenced, consistent with the context or coherent with some prior discourse.

My purpose in alluding to these theories, or criteria, which purport to explain how a Hearer decides which interpretation to put on some utterance when more than one interpretation is available, is to show that they seem to presuppose that the Hearer is sincerely seeking the interpretation of the Speaker's utterance that will optimally accord semantically and pragmatically with the latter's intentions: at least that is how I understand them. An insincere Hearer, however, does not look for a) the particular interpretation that is "optimally relevant" in the straightforward sense of fitting in with the Speaker's intentions, b) an interpretation that is true, informative and evidenced, in any "normal" sense, or c) an interpretation that is coherent with prior discourse in the sense of what has taken place earlier in the same, or recent, communication between the same interlocutors. What such a Hearer seeks is any interpretation, however indirect, that is not totally inconsistent with the semantic meaning of the utterance and which allows the utterance to be interpreted in a way that is either hostile to the Speaker or to someone else, or favourable to the Hearer himself.

Let us take this initial explanation a little further. Sperber and Wilson argue that a Hearer interprets an utterance in an optimally relevant way, understanding "optimal relevance" as meaning that sufficient contextual effects to be worth the Hearer's attention are achieved and that it puts the Hearer to no gratuitous or unnecessary processing effort in achieving these effects. A conclusion to be drawn from this relevance-based criterion is,

according to Sperber and Wilson, that the first satisfactory interpretation is the only satisfactory one and is the one the Hearer "should" choose.

I believe that we can remain within the framework of Relevance Theory if we posit that what happens when a hostile interpretation is sought is this: the Hearer judges that he cannot make use for his own benefit or to the Speaker's detriment of the first legitimate interpretation, and therefore decides to go on to find a second or third interpretation that will fit in more fully with his own objectives, ignoring the Speaker's intentions even if they are perfectly clear to him. In other words, once the Speaker has placed an utterance at the disposal of the Hearer, it can be used by the latter in any way and for any purpose he chooses (within very broad limits of semantic and pragmatic meaning), irrespective of the purpose for which it was first intended. The fact that the processing effort is greater for a second or third interpretation than for the first "satisfactory" one is compensated for by achieving sufficient contextual effects to make it worth while, and this is provided for by Sperber and Wilson's theory (1986: 151-153), even though they do not say so explicitly. After all, their "first satisfactory interpretation" is not necessarily the "first chronological interpretation."

The Hearer may either take this course of action to attain some objectives of his own in a particular exchange or he may be induced to do so by recall of his experience of previous exchanges with the Speaker. In other words, a Hearer may sincerely believe that the Speaker has some indirect intentions and that the first relevant meaning that comes to his mind is probably not the correct one, or else he may simply realise that an overt reaction on his part to the first relevant interpretation will not help him to achieve his egotistic or hostile objectives. Tannen (1981: 222-229) reports that "misunderstandings," as she calls them, about what the Speaker meant are in fact often reinforced by repeated interaction between the same interlocutors. She states that interaction between married partners reveals the effects of different uses of indirectness over a period of time, which may strengthen mistaken judgements of each other's intentions or increase expectations that the other will behave in a certain way, perhaps a way that is experienced as stubborn, irrational or uncooperative, so that misjudgements are "calcified by the conviction of repeated experience" (1981: 225). Tannen suggests that such misunderstandings occur because the Hearer does not, despite past experience, expect to receive a message in a particular way, but continues to assume that it should or will come in a different way.

I have no reason to question Tannen's fascinating findings. I can only suggest that such reinforcements of genuine misunderstandings may be due,

not only to sincere mistakes regarding the Speaker's intentions and the ways in which he "should" formulate them, but to annoyance that has built up over time at the way the Speaker repeatedly conveys messages (just as annoyance can build up over the way a married partner squeezes a tube of toothpaste), or to ill will that has accumulated in relation to unrelated factors and which finds a vocal outlet in deliberate misinterpretation of utterances. It would be interesting to know whether such misinterpretations occur regularly in cases where it would serve the Hearer's immediate purpose not to misinterpret the Speaker, but I am not aware of any empirical work having been carried out on this point.

5. THE HEARER HEARD

J. L. Austin (1962) divided speech into locutionary acts, illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts, the first being the raw speech which composes the linguistic surface of an utterance ("what the Speaker said"), the second being what the Speaker does, or the act he performs in speaking ("what he meant by what he said"), and the third being what the Speaker achieves by, or as a result of, speaking, such as the change brought about in the mind or the behaviour of the Hearer ("what he did to the Hearer"). Unlike the locutionary and the illocutionary acts, then, the perlocutionary act, force, or effect is at least to some extent within the control of the Hearer, since it depends, not merely on what the Speaker says or intends to do, but on how it is received, processed, assimilated and reacted to by the Hearer. Austin further distinguished the perlocutionary object from the perlocutionary sequel, the former being the direct or intended result of the illocutionary act, the latter being some more secondary consequence. Although this summary is quite crude, it will suffice to allow us to distinguish the Speaker's exclusive area of influence from the Hearer's sole or partial domain, which is what is of interest here. In his introduction to Discourse Analysis, Coulthard (1985: 9-20) brings together a Hearer-knows-best principle (see Edmondson 1981: 50) according to which linguistic analysts need not concern themselves with the Speaker's intention, because it is the Hearer's interpretation of the force of an utterance that determines how an interaction proceeds, and Labov's (1972) distinction between A-events, about which one interlocutor alone knows, B-events, about which the other interlocutor alone knows, and AB-events,

which are known to both. Labov explains that if interlocutor A makes a statement about a B-event, interlocutor B will hear it as a request for confirmation, rather than as a statement. However, if A's assumption about B's knowledge is inaccurate, in other words if A thinks B knows something which B does not in fact know, then A's intended request for confirmation will be heard by B as a statement of new information.

By loose analogy with the Labovian distinction, I wish to posit B-feelings, B-thoughts, B-values etc., which will act in conjunction with an incoming utterance to affect its intended force and bring it into line, so to speak, with the Hearer's own perception of what will be useful, in some sense, to him. Let me explain this. Labov suggests that a Speaker's intended request for confirmation is sincerely perceived, not as a request, but as a statement of fact by the Hearer when his information status is not what the Speaker assumed it to be; I am suggesting that the Hearer's feelings, thoughts, emotions, values, etc. (for example, annoyance, irritation, antagonism towards the Speaker, the subject under discussion or the world in general) may influence him not to accept the first relevant interpretation that can be used for his own benefit or against the Speaker's interest. The case of the mother's reaction to the suggestion that her son should eat more green vegetables exemplifies this antagonistic or hostile activity.

Let us now take this suggestion a little further. Just as the Hearer's feelings towards the Speaker, the subject of discussion or the world in general may influence his reaction to the utterance, other factors of a rather different nature may also play a part in this process. The Hearer may dislike certain forms of speech and may react directly to the language or to its connotations, rather than to its semantic or pragmatic import. An authentic example is the following: Wife uses a tag question after statements, not to request confirmation (which is the "standard" function of tag questions) but to indicate that the statement is an explanation of something that has gone before (see Rockwell 1974: 12), as in:

"She drank too much, didn't she?"

Husband dislikes this use of tag questions, because he is not sympathetic to his wife's wish to appear working class, of which this use of tag questions is indicative when they follow statements of events fully known to the Speaker herself; he therefore consistently reacts to them on their literal level, as if they were genuine requests for confirmation, saying something like:

"I don't know whether she did or not."

Lawyers frequently take up utterances at their literal value, in order to advance their client's case. For example, when asked if he hit the plaintiff, a defendant may answer:

"Why should I hit him?"

Although he is aware that this is a rhetorical question meaning "I had no reason to hit him and therefore I did not hit him," the Lawyer may retort:

"That's for you to tell me."

It is clear from this last example that the deliberate misinterpretation of semantic or pragmatic meaning is not always negatively or maliciously motivated. Indeed, it is sometimes the basic factor in jokes, whether intended or accidental. Let us see a few positive examples. A notice in a British airport duty-free shop reads:

"Boarding cards are required to make a purchase."

The pragmatic ambiguity of this authentic notice has certainly amused many passengers as they queue up to pay for their duty-free goods since, apart from indicating that they must show their boarding cards when paying, it can also be interpreted, with a little more effort, as making it obligatory for every boarding card to go to the till and buy something, thus providing an image that is truly outlandish. Similarly a packet of Tesco Apricot Crunchies carries on it the words:

"Made with 80% Recycled Board,"

where the ambiguity refers to the indeterminacy of the reference between the (inedible) packet itself and its (edible) contents. Finally, on this positive note, the leader of the British Liberal Democratic Party recently claimed in a television interview that

"Everyone has a right to clean streets,"

which allows a Hearer unsympathetic to the Speaker to understand that the latter is claiming, or perhaps planning, that everyone should be allowed to clean the streets.

6. CONCLUSION

When discussing the intent to deceive, philosophers (see for example Chisholm and Feehan 1977) sometimes classify the ways in which one person may deceive another into positive and negative, that is, deceit by commission or by omission. I have not yet seen any claim that a Hearer's deceit can be

just as definite, and just as devastating, as a Speaker's, and yet it seems clear that the arguments put forward in this paper tend to show that deceit can indeed work both ways. a

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**'SALEEM'S HISTORICAL DISCOURSE
IN *MIDNIGHT'S CHILDREN* -'**

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BEING structured around a central date for the state of India, 1947, Salman Rushdie's novel *Midnight's Children* may be said to aspire to an epic status. Thus, from the very nature of the novel, the concept of history, as well as its writing, becomes one of its main concerns. Therefore, the relation between history and fiction may be considered a keypoint for a better understanding of it.

When tackling the subject of history, and especially its relation to literature, one ought to bear in mind the radical change undergone by the concept both in the nineteenth and in the twentieth century. Fundamentally, this new era puts an end to a long period where history stresses its literary qualities, "se esmera en la forma. Como un género más dentro de la Literatura, presenta de un modo hermoso, en ocasiones eterno, la crónica de sucesos pasados" (Rama 1970: 14). The turn of the eighteenth century signals a critical point: it is in the nineteenth century that "history was invented, which is to say that it left the realm of the contingent to become a fundamental mode of intelligibility" (Thiher 1990: 10). This new attitude implies the rising of history as a novel and independent discipline, reaching for a scientific status.

During the nineteenth and two thirds of the twentieth century, the study of history has been understood as an independent discipline, which was carried out by a recording of the events of the past with a view to abstracting

general "truths" by what was considered to be a scientific method, and by extracting the "logical" deductions that such a knowledge implied. The nature of the events, of language, of the point of view, and the inevitable process of selection and ordering of these events were never thought to interfere with the final product. To a certain degree, nineteenth-century history writing can be defined as a combination of the two genres it gave birth to, the realist novel and the historical novel: the former characterized by the realist demands for unobtrusive objectivity, abundance of detail and factual documentation; from the latter it seems "to borrow" the concept of history "as a group of facts which exists extra-textually and which can be represented as it "really was," [and which] is never in question" (Lee 1990: 35). Thus, assumptions such as the neutrality of language and the absence of a domineering, ideologized narrating voice are features taken for granted.

This attitude is contested by the "New Historicism," which "takes the present powers and limitations of the writing of that past into account" (Hutcheon 1989: 90). Accordingly, Paul Veyne states that "*en aucun cas ce que les historiens appellent un événement n'est saisi directement et entièrement; il l'est toujours incomplètement et latéralement, à travers des documents ou des témoignages*" (1971: 14). The impossibility of an all-embracing and totalizing account, and the textual nature of the referents seem fundamental issues. Similarly, Hayden White, in his study on the historical imagination in nineteenth-century Europe, openly states the relativity of such a task: "I treat the historical work as what it most manifestly is: a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse" (1987: ix). Thus, White stresses the linguistic nature of the historical discourse, and brings forward the ideological implications that arise when preferring one linguistic mode to another.

Stemming from Benveniste's distinction between language and discourse (1971: 179), contemporary literary theorists have developed the opposition fabula/story, where the figure of the narrator has revealed itself as central for an analysis of fiction writing. Thus, Bal's distinction (1988: 5), where the concept of fabula is defined as "a series of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or experienced by actors," seems to lack the linguistic component, and thereby ideological trait, which White confers to it (1978: 90): White, who refers to "chronicle" instead of fabula, denies the possibility of resorting to a neutral account of events because there is no such a thing: the chronological order which Bal mentions should not be understood as devoid of ideology.

It is in the light of this New Historicist approach that the present study has been carried out. Among many distinctive traits, the postmodernist novel can be said to hold similar standpoints to those just mentioned: the neutrality of language and the absence of an ideologized narrating voice are looked at as old humanist assumptions which have become fundamental issues to be questioned and subverted in most contemporary fiction. It is the aim of this paper to analyze how these topics are discussed and problematized in Rushdie's *Midnight's Children*.

I

One of the common traits by which a bulk of postmodernist fiction is characterised is the presence of a self-conscious narrator. Accordingly, *Midnight's Children* underlines this metafictional trait inherent in any piece of fiction writing, and it is Saleem's position, midway between historian and fiction writer, that makes the present approach worthwhile: as I will try to make clear, the ambiguity between both concepts is never solved in favour of either, what is important is the process undergone by the narrator.

Saleem seems to begin by accepting White's initial premise about the discursive nature of history, albeit for very different reasons. To sum up his evolution, Saleem begins by declaring that "no sane human being ever trusts someone else's version more than his own" (MC 211). This initial motive, which could be termed as rather banal and even capricious, will gradually give way to a more conscious attitude, one where Saleem becomes aware of the narrator's subjectivity, of its mistakes and errors, of its inaccuracy, of its "forgetfulness." Thus, the evolution that Saleem undergoes immediately after beginning his account is quite revealing: after writing his first twelve words he comes across his first obstacle ("no, that won't do"), and therefore rectifies. After four paragraphs, he totally abandons his first plan, and a thirty-two year long analepsis¹ begins. Saleem's initial plan has been entirely changed in a matter of seconds: his fairy-tale-like beginning gives way to a based-on-fact narration, which very soon proves to be unfit for the narrator's purposes, and then goes a long way back in time, in order to replace it with a flash-back. This beginning is clearly indicative of the type of discourse we will later encounter: it starts by acknowledging the individual and subjective

nature of writing, whether history or fiction, and continues by implying that the position held by the narrator is in no way neutral, but, on the contrary, answers to very specific and personal purposes.

Saleem's position as a character-bound narrator (Bal 1988: 122) deserves further analysis when taking into account the different degrees in which his presence is felt. This is especially so in Book One, where he seems to place himself in a completely new position. After Saleem places himself at the centre of the narrative, he acknowledges that "[m]ost of what matters in our lives takes place in our absence" (*MC* 19). The analepsis which begins on page two answers, partly, to this last statement. By means of this backward jump in time, Saleem gains a certain distance which allows him a new standpoint from which to narrate, a different perspective, a sort of distant point of view. Leaving aside the verisimilitude of this temporal jump, we cannot forget the implications that this entails: it is somewhat paradoxical that the events that took place after his birth present more difficulty when it comes to narrating them, whereas those that belong to the far-distant past hardly pose any problems. The mode of narration in which each of these pasts is carried out is a clear and direct reflection of this very same fact: the events recounted within the initial analepsis remind us of the traditional realist novel, a fact which Saleem himself seems to corroborate when he, initially, sets no limits to his knowledge:

but I seem to have found somewhere the trick of filling in the gaps in my knowledge, so that everything is in my head, down to the last detail, such as the way the mist seemed to slant across the early morning air ... everything, and not just a few clues one stumbles across. (*MC* 19)

And this is no joke; he has just explained what his main objective is: by becoming a narrator who is fully in control, and master of his narration, with no apparent doubts, and always willing to give the utmost exactitude and the smallest detail, Saleem strives to become—and at times believes himself to be—an omniscient narrator. In other words, Saleem, by endowing himself with absolute power, acquires the status of a traditional historian, whose omniscience seems to be a taken-for-granted gift. However, the reader, as well as Saleem, will gradually realise that this is only a mask under which he pretends to cover his inefficiency, a mask which will continue to fall apart when confronting harsh reality. But meanwhile he will keep up his pretence:

thus, he has no trouble in being the only one who is able to recall what happened a certain day, on April 13th:

As the fifty-one men march down the alleyway a tickle replaces the itch in my grandfather's nose. The fifty-one men enter the compound and take up positions, twenty-five to Dyer's right and twenty-five to his left. (MC 36)

A precision that has no limits, as the reader finds out only a few sentences below:

Brigadier Dyer's fifty men put down their machine-guns and go away. They have fired a total of one thousand six hundred and fifty rounds into the unarmed crowd. Of these, one thousand five hundred and sixteen have found their mark, killing or wounding some person. (MC 36)

I believe that the reasons for acting/posing as an external narrator are clear by now: following Rimmon-Kenan (1990: 95), the idea of a heterodiegetic narrator is implicitly associated with omniscience. But I believe that the use of this type of narrator in *Midnight's Children* is tainted by its parodic nature: on the one hand it uses this absolute power to its own benefit, but on the other hand, it shows the fragility and artificiality of such power, for a fanciful memory, imagination and inventiveness are the main assets on which it is based.

It is at the moment of Saleem's birth that the narrator, confronted with the present, cannot maintain his false attitude. When his narration catches up with his present, Saleem cannot hide any longer behind the role and attitude of a traditional realist historian/narrator. The narrator can no longer rely on hiding behind masks to do his job. The fact that now Saleem is narrating his present does not mean that things are any easier; much to his surprise it is in Books Two and Three that he faces the difficulties of becoming a historian—and thereby, a writer of fiction as well. His being close to the events does not help at all, and in spite of the different magical powers that he enjoys, he feels unable to be as precise and accurate as he would wish to. Book Two has hardly begun, and Saleem discovers the dangers of subjectivity, he realizes that his narration is being openly fictionalized by his own attempt to fill in the gaps in knowledge that he encounters:

Perhaps the fisherman's finger was not pointing at the letter in the frame . . . Or maybe . . . it was a finger of warning, its purpose to draw attention to itself. (*MC* 123)

Saleem continually shows that, in spite of his efforts, he is no longer master of his narrative —and perhaps discovers that he had never held such a control:

It was reported that flowers had been seen bleeding real blood. . . . The rumour spread that a mad Bengali snake-charmer, a Tubriwallah, was travelling the country. . . . After a while the rumours added that the Tubriwallah was seven feet tall. (*MC* 136)

This incapacity to recount certain events contrasts with his "ability" to quote everybody's words when he was only a couple of months old. This right to fictionalize is nothing more than a desperate attempt to overcome his difficulties; at the same time, it implies a harsh criticism of the historian's role, as well as commenting on his own unreliability, the previous step before accepting the possibility of his lying. As the narration develops the narrator enjoys further magical powers, which always turn out to be insufficient for his purposes. In fact, against all expectations, the more insight the narrator has, the more indefinite his narration becomes:

And there was worse to come; because now (although a chick-blind divided the scene into narrow slits) did I not see the expression on Evie's face begin to soften and change? —did Evie's hand (sliced lenghtways by the chick) not reach out towards my electoral agent? (*MC* 185-6)

The fact that these are only rhetorical questions, to which he immediately offers a definite answer ("She did") does not dispel a sense of doubt and ambiguity that assails the reader. Thus, his questions appear less rhetorical, and more real, as we go on reading:

Did he? Didn't he? If it was him, why did he not enter the Mosque, stick in hand, to belabour the faithful as he had become accustomed to doing? If not him, then why? There were rumours . . . did they? Or not? Was this bizarre incident truly political, or was it the penultimate attempt . . . (*MC* 277)

And this time the questions are more than rhetorical ("but I can't answer the questions that I have asked" [MC 278]); they simply express the narrator's unfitness to produce the narrative he had hoped to carry out at the beginning of his story-telling. Saleem-narrator himself will become aware of the process he has been undergoing:

Reality is a question of perspective; the further you get from the past, the more concrete and plausible it seems —but as you approach the present, it inevitably seems more and more incredible. (MC 165)

Saleem finds it almost impossible to narrate about the present: so, as he progressively realises this, he confines himself to a mere chronological narration, a sort of diary. In this struggle towards objectivity and reliability, Saleem tries to avoid the doubts and indecisions that haunt his narration from the very beginning ("But I shall concentrate on facts" [MC 336]). The following quotations from Book One,

On April 6th, 1919, the holy city of Amristar smelled (gloriously, Padma, celestially!) of excrement. (MC 32)

On April 13th, many thousands of Indians are crowding through this alleyway. (MC 35)

are only the beginning of a tendency that increases as the narration reaches either its least verifiable events:

On Friday, December 27th, a man answering to my grandfather's description was seen . . . At four forty-five on Saturday Morning . . . (MC 277)

Or its most critical moments:

On the stroke of Midnight, as a matter of fact. Clock-hands joined palms . . . at the precise instant of India's arrival at Emergency, he emerged. (MC 419)

because, as Saleem Sinai says

That much is fact; but everything else lies concealed beneath the doubly hazy air of unreality and make-belief which affected all goings-on in those days. (MC 335)

Facts that, as he finds out through his narration, are not as solid as they might seem: dates, the exact time of the events, numbers that reach towards precision ... all these "truths" that were meant to be the signposts along his journey seem to fail him sooner or later. At this point, Saleem —together with Rushdie— seems to be going one step beyond White's reasoning on the existence of certain "elements" which are the basis of a historical discourse. According to White,

The reality of these events does not consist in the fact that they occurred but that, first of all, they were remembered and, second, that they are capable of finding a place in a chronologically ordered sequence. (1981: 19)

The distance between "what is" and "what is written" is the central point, and is totally dependent on the subject which produces the discourse. White believes in the existence of a "historical field," of which only part becomes known —that is, selected; that is, written. But Saleem's point, tackling this same issue, is more radical: what happens when imaginary events find a place in that same sequence? Are they validated by the context in which they are inserted, or do they invalidate the rest of the narrative? The question remains open, although Saleem answers clearly:

Re-reading my work, I have discovered an error in chronology. The assassination of Mahatma Gandhi occurs, in these pages, on the wrong date. (MC 166)

However, Saleem refuses to change the wrong date, thereby further underlining the active role of the narrator —of the historian. The effect thus produced is twofold: once again it underlines the position of the narrator as vital for an understanding of the discourse, whether historical or fictive; but what is more important is that, by problematizing the relation of language to reality, it stresses his importance as producer and not only as receiver of meaning.

II

The narrator's ambivalent attitude on the diegetic level is mirrored by Saleem's position as character in his own account. The effect produced by Saleem's extreme mobility leads the reader to a degree of uncertainty as to the type of account he is facing, and an overall feeling of ambiguity is produced in the reader: what is it that s/he is reading, an autobiographical account of Saleem's life, or a historical account of India's process towards independence? This may be caused by the fact that Saleem-narrator refuses to fix his position as historian. Paul Veyne (1971: 26-7) distinguishes between two types of historians according to the type of narration they carry out, the difference lying on the amount of information and explanation which is given: thus, a *strong* history will be that which offers a high degree of explanation and little information, whereas a *weak* history will do the opposite. Saleem's story seems to seek a balance between these two poles: either he leans towards an autobiographical novel —by placing himself at the centre of his narrative— or comes close to a historian —by adopting a heterodiegetic position and distancing himself from the story. This longed for balance is never reached and the reader feels there is never enough time to decide on what we are actually reading. We are denied a passive role and are forced to get involved while reading, to take part, and to construe and misconstrue meaning: "the novel no longer seeks just to provide an order and meaning to be recognized by the reader. It now demands that he be conscious of the work, the actual construction (Hutcheon 1984: 39)

Leaving aside the narration act itself, I would here like to discuss how the narrator's changing attitude is reflected on Saleem-as-character. The initial question appears to be whether Saleem succeeds in maintaining himself at the centre, as he longs for, or whether he is denied such a position. It is this unstable position he is subjected to that becomes a main motive. Saleem departs from what seems a rather solid stand: his centrality has been offered by Nehru himself, and Saleem attempts to follow it to the letter. But in spite of this initial position, his life —that is, his writing— is an endless striving to remain at the centre of the narrative, one that he understands very well when commenting on his sister, who was "[o]bliged to fight for attention, possessed by her need to place herself at the centre of events, even of unpleasant ones" (MC 150).

As has just been mentioned, the continuous fluctuation undergone by the narrator is mirrored by his endless shifting from one place to another all over and outside India. His journey begins before he is born, when his pregnant mother travels to Bombay (MC 91), allowing our hero to come into the world at the centre of India. But even while living in Bombay the reader realises

that the narrator is always in weird places which enable him to get a better view of what is going on: these allow for new angles, points of view, and perspectives which offer the unknown sides of reality; this is the reason for his being in a washing-chest, a car boot, a clock-tower, and on the hill. Even on this anecdotal level, we should be aware of the metaphorical trait of these places: on every of these occasions Saleem acquires the right amount of information he needs to interpret certain events. Similarly, the same trait can be realised on a more *historical* level: as he grows older, he is pushed to further marginal positions: his first exile takes him to uncle Hanif's home (*MC* 240); in his second exile he visits Pakistan (*MC* 282) before Karachi (*MC* 306); finally, he is dropped in newly-born Bangladesh (*MC* 354), where he retires into the jungle. After this critical experience, he returns to India with the magicians, a journey he carries out in a basket (*MC* 381), only to stay in their ghetto until he is sent to prison. After being released, he accompanies captain Picture Singh to the highly-symbolic Midnite-confidential Club (*MC* 453) in what is his final step before reaching north and secluding himself inside Braganza Pickles Ltd. Factory (back in Bombay, that is). Saleem's journey can be said to run parallel to some of the most conflictive moments of history, and his discourse should be understood as an attempt to shed new light to these "dark areas of history" (McHale 1987: 90). It should also be noticed that Saleem almost always pertains to the defeated side, and it is to this side that his discourse must be ascribed. Once again, Saleem's words are used to give voice to a traditionally unrepresented —or even worse, misrepresented— group of human beings.

Saleem's journey is also relevant for other reasons: firstly, because of the parodic effect carried out on the traditional figure of the hero; what we have here is no doubt closer to an antihero who, nevertheless, undergoes his particular quest. Secondly, because it presents us with a hero that is physically pushed towards marginal positions; thus, his final self-seclusion is an acceptance of this ex-centred peripheral position. Once again, Saleem seems to advocate a postmodernist attitude: postmodernist fiction does not move the marginal to the centre; writing from, for, and of the margins implies situating the subject, that is, re-situating it, for it "teaches to recognize differences —of race, gender, class sexual orientation, and so on" (Hutcheon 1989: 159). Hence, Saleem's fragmentation should be understood as an attempt to represent a series of voices which would otherwise remain silent/silenced. The postmodernist act of writing may be defined as an attempt to reveal the ambivalent and carnivalesque nature of reality: in this way it stresses the existence of the margins and the peripheral, the existence

of different positions, as well as suggesting multiplicity, heterogeneity, and plurality.

The very process of writing reflects some of the conflictive issues which are developed in the novel: in the same way as Saleem is unable to stay at the centre, he realizes that, by the very nature of language, a narrative, of whatever type, will always be an incomplete, biased, and one-sided discourse which will unavoidably push other discourses to the margins. Despite his efforts, Saleem cannot but acknowledge that "always, in all the trains in this story, there were these voices and these fists banging and pleading . . . Let me in, great sir" (*MC* 67). Perhaps Saleem, at least initially, can be defined as an unreliable narrator² in that he tries to gain a central position for himself and his story/history, and still has not realized that the postmodernist novel "does not move the marginal to the center. It does not invert the valuing of centers into that of peripheries and borders" (Hutcheon 1990: 69). This confrontation between the narrator and the implied author stresses once again the reader's active role in searching for meaning by means of internal confrontations. Thus, the whole novel may be seen as an overcoming of this unreliability, as a coming to terms with the nature of language itself. This conflictive and contradictory nature may be noticed on several occasions. At times it is shown in a rather straightforward way: when the language riots take place (*MC* 185), language has become the differential element which divides and holds apart different ethnic groups. The chapter "A public announcement" begins with the official account of events confronted by an unofficial one inserted in brackets, thus underlining what is a fundamental trait throughout the novel, the ideology which supports any discourse. The importance of having access to language and to an audience is summarised when referring to Brass Monkey who "was sentenced, for day after day, to silence" (*MC* 151). Gradually, Saleem realises what his real stand is, and discovers that "one of the thrusts of postmodernist revisionist history is to call into question the reliability of official history" (McHale 1987: 96), that is, the ideology which it is favouring, and by which this discourse is being enforced. Paul Veyne, after asserting that everything is historical, underlines the personal selective process which is carried out: "puisque tout est historique, l'histoire sera ce que nous choisirons" (1971: 58). This selective process is based on what Veyne defines as *intrigue* (*MC* 46). Accordingly, Saleem's discourse stems from a different and particular *intrigue*, in this way establishing a contrast by means of which meaning is generated. Apparently, his alternative discourse can only be seen as an appendix to the centre. This is achieved in a

sort of casual way, as the narrator is "lucky enough" to realize that the most important events that took place throughout the world coincide with equally important moments in the history of his family. Thus, both terms of the duality seem to blend in the most natural way. And the reader, as little surprised as the narrator himself, discovers that "on the day the World War ended, Naseem developed the longed-for headache" (*MC* 27); and that on August 9th, 1945, as well as the dropping of the Atomic Bomb in Nagasaki, Mumtaz (the narrator's mother) was discovered to be a virgin (*MC* 60); that on August 15th, 1947, our hero is born at the very same time that India gains its independence (*MC* 116); that the partition of Bombay coincides with the discovery of the *Midnight Children* (*MC* 181); that the disintegration of the *Midnight Children's Conference* takes place the day the Chinese armies invaded the north of India (*MC* 254); that the death of the narrator's grandfather runs parallel to J. Nehru's death, the father of India (*MC* 278-281); that the defeat by China occurs when Saleem gets his sinuses fixed (*MC* 301); and that on June 25th, 1975, at the very same time that Aadam Sinai is born, India entered the state of Emergency (*MC* 419). In presenting the events in such a peculiar way, Saleem carries out a radical subversion as to their order of importance: he "*displaces* official history altogether" (McHale 1987: 90), for he attempts to make of the official events an appendix to his own story. In this way he tries to subvert the traditional order of history, and shows that the hierarchy which rules is an artificial construction which answers to clear ideological and political motivations, however internalized they may be.

This new perspective from which postmodernist narrators are looking at history has further implications: according to Hutcheon, "the very form of the texts themselves constantly reminds the reader of his/her own ethnocentric biases because these are encoded in the very words being read" (1989: 72). On several occasions, and in different ways, the reader is forced to realise that s/he belongs to a particular culture, based on its own traditions and beliefs. Thus, the very nature of language is brought to the foreground: not only does the reader face the fact that the novel has been written in English ("Godown, gudam, warehouse, call it what you like," "I do not need to tell you that aag means fire" [both in *MC* 71]), the language belonging to the conqueror, but it also tries to make clear that English has never managed to accomodate itself to this "other" reality it is trying to depict. By means of the content, Rushdie also underlines this same idea: when reading about what happened on August 9th, 1945, the reader's immediate reaction is to connect that date with the dropping of the Atomic Bomb, a fundamental event in Western European civilization, and the reader feels somewhat disturbed

when realising that for the narrator the dropping of the bomb is simply something complementary to the fact that his mother was discovered to be a virgin.

By means of this chance narration, Rushdie manages to vindicate the position of the individual when confronted with an overwhelming and obliterating history, with a totalitarian world-history. A secondary effect is to show how the individual is unavoidably linked to history; but history, too, is unavoidably linked to the individual. As Parameswaran has pointed out, commenting on *Midnight's Children*: "[W]riting history as autobiography is another way of connecting the individual component of society with the collective stream of history" (1983: 40). It is not only the reader who comes to this conclusion: Saleem Sinai had realised the same long ago. And this he magnificently shows by narrating the way in which he carried out a plan to teach his mother a lesson. The whole process deserves our attention and admiration, but the following quotation will do as a good example:

I began to cut pieces out of newspapers. From GOAN LIBERATION COMMITTEE LAUNCHES SATYAGRAHA CAMPAIGN I extracted the letters 'COM'; SPEAKER OF E-PAK ASSEMBLY DECLARED MANIAC gave me my second syllable, 'MAN'. I found 'DER' in NEHRU CONSIDERS RESIGNATION AT CONGRESS ASSEMBLY Cutting up history to suit my nefarious purposes, I seized on WHY INDIRA GANDHI IS CONGRESS PRESIDENT NOW and kept the 'WHY'; but I refused to be tied exclusively to politics, and turned to advertising (MC 259)

Within such a tragic tone, there is place for sarcastic humour to be exerted at its utmost

FURNITURE HURLING SLAYS DEPUTY E-PAK SPEAKER: MOURNING PERIOD DECLARED gave me 'MOURNING', from which deftly and deliberately, I excised the letter 'U'. (MC 260)

By gluing his note, Saleem glues, in an almost unnoticed way, the historical —whether it is politics, sports, advertising, gossiping— with the particular —Saleem's own private scheme. The reader's concern lies with Saleem's innermost plan, but the only way to follow this plan is to know about everything that was happening all over India at that very same moment. By gluing his note together, therefore Saleem carries out his "first attempt at rearranging history" (MC 260).

The strong relation between history and fiction had been a commonplace until the eighteenth century. What is new of the postmodernist approach is the emphasis that is placed on stressing their inseparability on grounds of their linguistic nature. Saleem's attempt to "encapsulate the whole of reality" in his narration proves a futile endeavour assailed by errors, mistakes, oblivions, misunderstandings... However, his very failure to provide an overall, totalitarian version of "reality" brings to the foreground a series of confrontations —centre vs. ex-centric, omniscience vs. partial knowledge, reliability vs. unreliability, real facts vs. imaginary facts...— by means of which meaning is generated. The outcome to this situation is the realisation that saying what-actually-happened is an impossibility, but also an unnecessary endeavour, for simultaneously the reader realises that Saleem's endless self-conscious fiction is more truth-revealing than the attempted totalitarian history mechanism used to fill in the fissures in knowledge. After all, the only Truth is:

It was —or am I wrong? I must rush on; things are slipping from me all the time — a day of horrors. It was then —unless it was another day. (MC 413)

However, this last quotation must not lead the reader to infer that a radical relativism, and complete scepticism are demanded. The truth must be looked for, but aware of the conditions which surround this search. The possibility of acquiring knowledge has been several times questioned throughout the novel, mainly due to human nature itself; but even if the narrator were given faithful access to events, dates and numbers, his narration would still be deficient because of the very nature of language. Saleem realizes that despite the fact that language reveals itself as an insufficient tool with which to carry out his task, there is no other. Throughout, Saleem learns to cope with the distance between language and reality, and becomes conscious of the limitations of the former. *Midnight's Children* is aware of this trait and therefore offers itself as a self-subversive discourse; first, by claiming to produce meaning, then, by denying it straight away.

In his 1981 paper, White explained why the historian is compelled to narrativize history:

I have sought to suggest that this value attached to narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a desire to have real events

display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary. (1981: 23)

He suggests that narrativization helps the historian to draw a general, abstract and totalizing version of reality. White defines the writing of history as an attempt to overcome the difficulties inherent in it. His attempt at closing the gap between history and fiction has been clearly defined: history, to become readable, must come close to fiction in that it must be coherent, display a recognisable structure (with beginning, middle and end), have a clearly argumented plot... But Rushdie offers a fiction which embodies the opposite effect: *Midnight's Children* avoids coherence, unity, wholeness, closure. Much of its meaning rises from the different lines of argumentation to be followed or which are pointed out as possibilities, from the blending of narrators, times and countries, from the multiplicity and diversity which is offered the reader, even from the reader's indecision while reading. In short, from its contradictory and fragmented nature. This fragmented discourse — reflected by the physical fragmentation of the narrator—seems to be offered as the only possible way in which the writers of the fringe can achieve self-representation, and most important of all, avoid voicelessness. a

NOTES

1. According to Genette, an analepsis is "any evocation after the fact of an event that took place earlier than the point in the story where we are at any given moment" (1980: 40).

2. I here follow Booth's concept of reliability/unreliability: "I have called a narrator *reliable* when he speaks for or acts in accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say the implied author's norms), *unreliable* when he does not" (1968: 158-9).

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
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a



„GOD, SHE IS BEAUTIFUL . . .":
**THE DISTURBING REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN
 IN *HANNAH AND HER SISTERS***

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WOODY ALLEN has been described as "a mirror of the American New Man"; a man who has adapted himself to the demands of a culture defined as "deconstructionist, post-feminist and post-Vietnam" (Babington and Evans 1989: 152). In his films, Allen attempts to inscribe a wide range of spectatorship by combining traditional film issues, such as love and sex, with sophisticated parodic and metafictional forms. If the former are addressed to a wide audience, the latter clearly try to appeal to a minority audience capable of recognising references not only to Classical Hollywood films but also to European cinema. The paradoxical mixture of the popular and the academic inscribes Allen within postmodernism.

Postmodern art has been accused of being either highly revolutionary or conservative. This essay tries to discuss the ideological scope of *Hannah and Her Sisters* (1986) in relation to gender and sexual difference, considering the importance of films as a source of information about society and human behaviour. Although in most American films there is a tendency to reflect, to a certain extent, dominant ideas, interests and values, an important number of films have challenged and altered them, providing different ways of understanding the world. In order to see whether Allen supports or questions the dominant patriarchal order I will analyse the visual and narrative mechanisms involved in the filmic representation of men and women and,

secondly, the intertextual aspects bearing on the representation of the different characters, especially their relationship with the conventions of classical comedy. In this paper the notion of intertextuality is taken in its largest sense, that is, I will consider not only other texts alluded explicitly or implicitly in the text, but also the Classical Hollywood mode, generic influence, Allen's previous works and stardom. Although the latter instances of intertextuality (genre and stardom) are usually neglected, Worton and Still (1990: 176) have pointed out their importance as unavoidably inscribed interactions with other filmic texts.

* * *

Semiotic theorists have pointed out that "cinematic signifiers, like their linguistic counterparts, are activated only within discourse, and that discourse always requires an enunciating agency" (Silverman 1988: 10-11). This enunciating agency is usually perceived by the viewer as "an unseen agency of control" from the very moment s/he becomes aware of the visual constraint marked by the frame (Silverman 1988: 11). Classical cinema has developed a system of enunciation that controls the spectator's access to the film. This system uses mechanisms from various film codes in order to enhance the realistic effect of the camera which presents images as from real life — camera as window to the world — and to reinforce the privileged viewing position of the spectator. Thus the classical narrative mode dictates certain rules that attempt to deny the existence of the camera as a technological device controlling the spectator's gaze (Dayan 1974). However, Woody Allen, like some other film directors (even classical ones),¹ makes us, viewers, constantly aware of the presence of the camera, underlying the limits of the visual enunciator, as well as using surrogates for that "absent one."

Hannah and Her Sisters consists of thirteen sections; each of them introduced by a title that more or less loosely sets up their thematic contents. The film opens with the title for the first section, "God, she's beautiful..." Immediately after, we hear those same words pronounced by a male voice-over and see a medium close-up of Lee (Barbara Hershey). A whole monologue continues while the camera follows Lee, in centre frame, moving around inside a flat and greeting people. The camera stops on Elliot (Michael Caine) when she passes in front of him; at this very moment, the viewer, retroactively, identifies the voice-over as Elliot's interior monologue and the

previous shots of Lee as his point-of-view shots. In these first shots, Elliot seems to be the character equipped with authoritative vision, hearing and speech that inscribes the viewer within the film's diegesis. In so doing, the first male-female relationship is articulated in a form of representation that corresponds to classical cinema's scopic and auditory modes (Silverman 1988: 31): woman as the pleasurable object for the male gaze and voice. This Hollywood convention that positions men as actors and women as spectacle was first pointed out by Laura Mulvey in her seminal article "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" (1975). If we follow Silverman (1988: 54), this primary association of the male voice and gaze with the apparent point of discursive origin is immediately disavowed. Elliot's voice-over expresses thoughts rather than speech, showing an internal register that contributes to diegetic immediacy and does not belong to the external enunciating subject. For Silverman diegetic interiority is equated with discursive impotence and lack of control, usually confined to woman's voice. In this film, the viewer is provided with the interior voice-over of every main character's monologues: those of Elliot's, Lee's, Mickey's (Woody Allen), Holly's (Dianne Wiest) and Hannah's (Mia Farrow).

The titles cannot be said to belong to a unique voice —that of Elliot's. Some are sentences or phrases uttered, or thought, by different characters: "We all had a good time" is said by Lee to Frederick (Max von Sydow); "Lucky I ran into you," etc. Others are lines taken from literary works by e.e. cummings and Tolstoi. And others keep a varying thematic relation to the main theme of the section introduced by them. The titles, then, are not the constructed surrogate for the enunciating subject, but they rather reveal the filmic text as an artificial construct. This is one instance of formal intertextual relationship with what was called "primitive cinema" or "early cinema," the cinematic mode developed before the classical period (1915-1955). During the primitive period, intertitles have no causality link to the image; they were used as devices to stir the spectators' memory, to remember the well-known story that appeared on screen (Bürch 1985: 117). In Allen's previous films, the artificiality of film as construct had been explicitly expressed by his direct address to the viewer, introducing himself as author and character, that is, as the enunciating subject and the subject of the enunciation. However, in *Hannah and Her Sisters*, Allen opts for an apparently neutral, anonymous voice. Despite Allen's efforts to disguise his authorship by combining the use of a non-diegetic enunciating subject with surrogates for this "absent one," a device commonly used in the classical mode, the film bears, in a covert way, his "signature" as author. Mirroring the

episodic structure of the film, Allen presents himself as a fragmented author, disguised under a multiplicity of voices and roles. As he acknowledged, the three leading male roles in the film —Mickey, Elliot and Frederick—"embody different aspects of his personality" (McCann 1990: 237):

Mickey, played by himself, is nearest to the conventional screen 'Woody' character: a television comedy writer who quits his job, a 'little man' who wrestles with the most daunting metaphysical questions, a lover who cannot understand why the finest of intimacies sometimes give way to the greatest distances. Elliot also has that sense of moral weakness and sexual appetite glimpsed in Allen's characters in *Manhattan* and in Martin Ritt's *The Front*. Frederick reminds one especially of the Allen character in *Stardust Memories*, a man making provocative but often quite plausible criticisms of contemporary *kitsch* culture, but doing so from a pathetically detached, impotent position.

Before examining the relationship of these male characters to the three female ones, there is still a question to be answered, a question usually posed by feminist critics like Silverman: is the enunciating subject of this film gendered?; if so, is it male, female, or both? Is there in the film a female discourse that is juxtaposed on the male gaze and voice mentioned above? According to some feminist critics, one of the central mechanisms of classical Hollywood cinema has been to create tensions between seeing and being seen, subject/object, identifying in this dichotomy the male with the subject of the look and the female with the object to look at (Mulvey, 1975). With this recurrent pattern, Classical Hollywood cinema has positioned the female spectator in an apparent contradiction, being simultaneously consumer and commodity, encouraging woman to "actively participate in her own oppression" (Doane 1987: 23).

If the voice-over discloses interior monologues of both male and female characters (Elliot, Lee, Mickey, Holly and Hannah — with Frederick's uttered as "lectures" addressed to Lee), flashbacks —the discourses-within-discourse— are a privilege enjoyed mainly by Mickey and, shortly, by Elliot —never by any of the female characters. Although some of these flashbacks function as interior monologues —usually confined to female voices, according to Silverman (1988: 54)—, there is one that Mickey addresses to Holly, intending to move her and consequently the audience, with his existential crisis. In addition to this discursive difference, female characters are denied the privilege of the gaze; in other words, the camera rarely shows

female POV shots that could enable the identification of the viewer with them. Immediately after Elliot's POV shots and identification of the camera with him, the camera seems to follow the female characters, "behaving" as a limited witness, using steady long shots and framing in which the characters seem to enter and disappear in an apparently uncontrolled way —another instance of intertextuality with "primitive cinema" that points to the "theatricality" of life. The scarce number of shot-reverse shots —surrogates for the absent enunciating subject— also contributes to the spectator's awareness of the camera as visual enunciator, revealing thus the limiting scope of the framing and the artificiality of the image .

The awareness of the frame as visual constraint is heavily underlined by the use of offscreen sound and space: for instance, in the first section there is a scene in which Elliot and Lee are talking in Hannah and Elliot's bedroom and the camera moves from one speaker to the other instead of shot-reverse shot cutting. As a result, the camera focuses on the wall and furniture rather than on the character speaking at that moment, as a witness unable to follow the conversation visually. At other moments in the film, offscreen space is used to reinforce the identification of the viewer with Mickey, played by Allen. There are many instances in the film where the viewer is presented with a more or less close shot of a character looking directly at the camera, the foreground offscreen space, where the spectator is supposed to be, being occupied at that moment by Mickey. This device is used not only in Mickey's flashbacks but also in the first level of the narrative. For example, in the section entitled "The Abyss," immediately after Mickey has been told that he has no cancer, Gail (Julie Kavner), at the TV office, looks directly at the camera, the position taken by Mickey, while saying: "What d'you mean you quit?. Why? The news is good. You don't have can . . . the thing." Although he shares the leading role with other characters, the camera framing, not only the use of offscreen space, but also close-ups and centre frame, make the audience identify with him —not to mention the interaction of our viewing experience of his previous films, which make us recognise Allen's typical themes and persona in this film.

Nevertheless, although the camera emphasises its limits in establishing relationships between the characters themselves, it seems to enjoy the voyeuristic pleasure of the male gaze introduced in the first shots by means of the constant centre frame, double framing and close-ups of the female characters that are sometimes narratively unjustifiable. An interesting example of a voyeuristic close-up can be seen in the section entitled "Dusty just bought this huge house in Southampton," when Hannah is at her parents'

trying to assist her drunken mother. Her parents' argument is soothed and Evan (Lloyd Nolan), her father, is playing the compasses of "You are too Beautiful" and asking "You remember this, Hannah?" while the camera moves to a close-up of Hannah immersed in her thoughts. This close-up is long enough to create expectations in the viewer of acceding to her memories by means of a flashback or voice-over. Instead, the shot is used to enable viewers to enjoy the beauty of her face and expression —linking image to the lyrics of the song. Another interesting shot that reinforces the idea of the woman as being seen and not as seeing can be perceived in the section entitled "The big leap." There Hannah, Holly and Lee are having lunch at a restaurant and, while they are discussing Holly's career and love life, the camera moves in circles around them, getting closer and closer, in a suffocating way, as the tension of their argument grows. The camera approaches them to the limit of distortion, and it becomes hard to distinguish their different facial features and identities; all suggesting their singular configuration of the feminine split into three different characters.

However obvious the conclusion that could be drawn from the above comments, the apparent voyeuristic pleasure displayed by the camera on the male gaze's behalf is also objectivised and ridiculed in the film. In "Dusty just bought this huge house in Southampton," Elliot's leering looks at Lee's nudes drawn by Frederick are shared by the camera as it suddenly stops on them when following Lee moving around the room and making for the bookshelf. Nonetheless, this clear instance of voyeurism is also ironically presented from a medium static shot of Elliot looking alternatively at the nudes and Lee, objectivising his voyeurism and, therefore, breaking the previous identification. If earlier we have enjoyed Lee's beauty through Elliot's eyes, now we see Elliot looking at Lee in a way that exposes his desire as ridiculous. The few shot-reverse shots appearing in the film are also used to expose Elliot's ludicrous behaviour. An instance worth mentioning can be seen in the section entitled "God, she is beautiful," where the camera frames Elliot's face immediately after Lee's words: "You're turning all red, Elliot," and the camera reveals his embarrassment.

The general conclusion that can be drawn from the above comments is that, despite the title and the centrality of the female characters, the film creates a male view of women and their relation to men and love. At the same time, the film problematizes that classical Hollywood dichotomy that identifies male with the subject of the look, the seeing, and the female with the object to look at, the being seen, through parody. The film departs from this dichotomy by including both male and female characters as objects to

look at. Nonetheless, this objectification is rendered differently for male and female characters. The parodic distance objectivises the male character as subject of the look and the female one as the object of the look, and of male desire.

Generic conventions always constrain artists' creative process. Previous experience of film viewing and making will unavoidably be inscribed in any artist's works, constituting the "old" aspect that he/she might, or might not, want to subvert or problematise by adding a "new" perspective and meaning. The new perspective is conferred by actuality —an identifying characteristic of comedy. Unlike tragedy, comedy is always a representation addressed to us providing pleasure through the recognition of ideas and objects of our own age (Watts cit. in Corrigan 1981: 116-117). As Potts says (Corrigan 1981: 118), the varying degree of our response to comedy "depends on the eye of the beholder, not on the character of the object he has in view." The immediate response to comedy is perceived as a double pleasure: the pleasure of recognition, and "that of exercising an extremely limited scale of values" (Watts cit. in Corrigan 1981: 117). This process of recognition should not be confused with the process of identification demanded by tragedy (Watts cit. in Corrigan 1981: 117). According to Watts, we recognise something 'as part of [our] experience, *but not an immediate part*'² (Corrigan 1981: 117). Thus, a distance between the "beholder" and the "beheld" must necessarily be present in comedy. Besides cinematographic devices to create, paradoxically, identification and its disruption, Allen uses irony and humour to produce comic distance. The ironic distance is created by the frequent use of the interior monologue, which often functions as a device to reveal the disjunction between people's thoughts and their actions, "between what they say and what they mean" (Bragg 1988: 48). An instance of this disjunction can be seen in the section entitled "Dusty just bought this huge house in Southampton," in which the artificiality of the polite small talk between Elliot and Lee contrasts with the impulsiveness of Elliot's inner passion. A similar resource was previously used in *Annie Hall* (1977), in which the small talk between Annie (Diane Keaton) and Alvy (Woody Allen) veils their real thoughts —this time presented to the viewer in the form of subtitles. Elliot's inner voice advises him to act cautiously, but his behaviour results in an impulsive, clumsy kiss that takes Lee completely by surprise. The textual situation makes the whole dramatic moment appear as comic and ridiculous.

The film contains the dramatic elements that comedy shares with tragedy (Corrigan 1981: 11), but, unlike tragedy, they are presented in a distanced manner. Mickey's infertility and its further consequences in his marriage, his search for the meaning of life and God, and his suicide attempt are narrated from a past perspective, some time after they have occurred. As Lester (Alan Alda) puts it in Allen's *Crimes and Misdemeanors* (1989), "comedy is tragedy plus time."³ This temporal perspective makes the tragic situations seem comical; a perception supported by jokes, ironic comments, and the hero's absurd luck —a parody of the logical luck the fool enjoys in the comic world. As Corrigan (1981: 9) puts it, "though a kind of logical luck, which does not seem like luck while we experience the play in performance, the fool assures us that somehow our freakishly individual fortune is capable of triumphing over our tragic fate." Mickey's attempt to kill himself, the uncontrolled shot and the explanation of his escape from death due to his excess of perspiration point paradoxically to that logical luck of the comic conventions. Luck is also thematised in the film as an important element in individual fate and happiness; the element uncontrollable by reason, intelligence or logic.

Allen, in the role of Mickey, is also the comic jester of his previous films, although this time the jokes have a tension-releasing function during the most tragic moments in the film. When Mickey confirms to Dr. Abel that he is having buzzings and ringings, the latter asks "Just in one ear?" and Mickey replies "Yes, well, ah, is it healthier to have them in both ears?"; a joke based on linguistic awareness of the use of the word "just" —a linguistic ambiguity that constitutes a recurrent device in Allen's humour. However, the humorous tone of the film is achieved more by the use of irony, and the characters' embarrassing situations than by the extensive use of jokes as is the case in his earlier films.

Despite McCann's claims that "comedy . . . allows Allen, and ourselves, to suspend moral and social judgement and to entertain imaginative possibilities that a more 'serious' stance toward a character or event would preclude" (McCann 1990: 247), I believe that the film does bear a "serious" social significance concerning gender and the relation between the sexes. Regarding these issues, Allen has been described as "a barometer of the times, independently measuring the changes in attitudes towards relations between the sexes . . ." (Babington and Evans 1989: 152). Thus, the next part of the analysis will deal with the female characters and their relationship with the male ones. As the film transcends its textual limits through references and

allusions to other films, the analysis will incorporate the film's relation to these other texts, namely Ibsen's *A Doll's House* and Bergman's *Fanny and Alexander* (1982), and the film's contribution to the star system, that is, the development of Allen's persona and the ironic incorporation of Maureen O'Sullivan and Lloyd Nolan.

Lee, as has been mentioned above, is the first female character presented as the object of desire for the voyeuristic gaze of Elliot and the spectator. From the early scenes in the first Thanksgiving Day party, we learn that her sisters, Holly and Hannah, disapprove of her relationship with Frederick: "a depressive person." The lack of communication between Lee and Frederick and the latter's unsocial character are visually confirmed by his blurred introduction behind a thick, transparent plastic curtain —the object representing a stumbling block in their relationship—and by Frederick's curt "no" answer to Lee's offer of tea or coffee. To Lee's complaint about his unsocial behaviour, Frederick replies "Lee, you are the only person I can be with or I really look forward to being with" while she passively lets herself be embraced by him. Lee's silence to the question "Isn't it enough that I can love you?" obviously suggests that it is not enough. Frederick's words—"There was a time when you were very happy to be only with me and you wanted to learn anything about poetry, music. Have I really taught you everything I had to give you? I don't think so"—clearly expresses the paternalistic attitude towards her, setting himself as Lee's guide and teacher in the world of art. This relationship that has proved to be satisfactory for a few years is now felt as suffocating by Lee. Paradoxically, when Lee announces that she is leaving him, he realises how dependent he is on her, as she is his only link with the chaotic world from which he seeks refuge in his orderly world of art, and his perfect model of beauty, as can be appreciated in the nudes. The close-up framing of Lee emphasising her beautiful face, her adolescent look (long curly hair, jeans and jumpers, and so on), her fixation with the father figure and her being still a student (although not a very convinced one) construct her as very similar character to Tracy (Mariel Hemingway) in *Manhattan* (1979). Although not so virginal, she, too, does not seem to be "corrupted" in the least by the post-feminist ideology of the New Woman.

Frederick is a character type that is usually present in plays of the Angry Young Men: a man making harsh criticisms on contemporary culture from a position of impotence. He mainly criticises the culture that uses art as a commodity, "I don't sell my work by the yard," he claims, reminding us of the character played by Allen in *Stardust Memories* (1980), Sandy Bates. In addition to this association, McCann (1990: 237-8) mentions Frederick's

comments on a television programme on Auschwitz as a further connexion with Allen, thus reinforcing his claim that Frederick's character constitutes one of the aspects of Allen's personality, as has been mentioned above. The characterization of Frederick, so easily identifiable with the feeling of "angst" in Bergman's works, is perceived much more as a stock type —a mask— than a real character.

Lee's relationship with Elliot will not mean any change. He is still the father figure represented by Frederick —both are much older than her. As in *Manhattan* (1979), the cultural myth of age similarity is emphasized as an important factor in "natural" love relationships. Their age and paternalistic attitude place both Elliot and Frederick in the same narrative position in relation to Lee, and both are presented as her inappropriate love partners. The shot of the print of a female nude in the book-shop insists on the idea of Lee as a model of beauty that will later be reinforced in a scene at Frederick's loft in "Dusty just bought this huge house in Southampton." Like Frederick, Elliot uses art to conquer her. This rivalry felt by Elliot is quite explicit at the bookshop: when Lee mentions that she and Frederick have been at the M.E.T. to see an exhibition of Caravaggio —a painter whose works apparently Elliot does not know— Elliot immediately responds with a reference to e.e. cummings. At the visual level, the scene at the bookshop forewarns difficulties in their relationship that very closely resemble those of Lee and Frederick; only this time the bookshelves —and not a plastic curtain— are presented as stumbling blocks. In the mise-en-scene of the first encounter in the hotel room, Lee is lying naked and covered by bed-clothes and Elliot is sitting on the bed covered with a gown. Their position in relation to each other underlines the protector-protégé (father-daughter) relationship that their dialogue verbalises: he wants to do things for her, to protect her —something that he cannot do with his self-sufficient wife, Hannah. Finally, Lee manages to gain self-confidence and finds the right partner to fulfil her desires: to marry and have children "before it's too late," as she confesses to Frederick. Although Lee's relationship with her husband, Doug (Ivan Kronenfeld), is not narratively developed, the film leads us to assume that she is happy and that his younger age does not fit him into the father figure of her previous relationships, although, ironically, he is a university teacher.

Elliot is split between the quiet life with and love of Hannah, his wife, and the passionate love he feels for Lee, his wife's sister. Elliot explicitly admits that he first fell in love with Hannah because she was the right woman to bring order into his chaotic life. Even the spelling of the name "Hannah" suggests symmetry and perfect balance. Elliot obviously does not want to

renounce either of them, but the situation produces in him a painful anxiety that makes him seek the help of a psycho-analyst. This masculine split of desires for women —the ancient, but still prevalent, division between the mother and the whore— bears an analogy to Ibsen's *A Doll's House* in the character of Nora's husband. However, the latter overcomes the dramatic suffering through daydreaming. Torvald Helmer's physical desires for his wife —not approved of by the society of the time— are aroused in the fancy-dress party by imagining her as his mistress with whom he has a secret love affair (Ibsen 1989). Elliot epitomizes —to borrow Babington and Evans' phrase (1989: 157)— the "prisoners of discourse" of male sexuality still present in contemporary society.

Holly, the other sister, is a nervous character trying to overcome a long succession of failures both in her personal relationships and her career as an actress. She progresses from complete disorientation to success as a writer. The way she dresses is a clear sign of her obsession to succeed in art, to be different —an artist. This self-pressure makes her reject non-artist men —"losers" as she calls them— and be fascinated with David (Sam Waterston), an architect. Her outward appearance and drug addiction identify her with the negative aspects of a modern, liberated woman, without a real personality, adopting roles culturally accepted by the arty coteries in New York. Her external image (shorter hair style, baggy trousers and extravagant hats) and gesticulation resemble those of Annie (Diane Keaton) in *Annie Hall*. Both female characters are constructed as neurotic, lacking self-confidence, self-questioning and slightly 'masculinised'. Without reaching the negative aspects of Allen's extreme feminist characterization like the one performed by Meryl Streep in *Manhattan*, Holly shares some of the characteristics of the New Woman at the beginning of the film. However, that too will prove to be a mask as she warns the viewer in her singing of "I'm Old Fashioned" in the section entitled "The Audition." The song functions as an unmasking gesture:

"This year's fancies/ Are passing fancies . . . But sighing sighs / Holding hands / This my heart / Understands / I'm old fashioned / And I don't mind it / It's how I want to be / As long as you agree / To stay old fashioned with me."

As a disoriented character, Holly resembles Mickey, her mirror image in the film. Despite their disastrous first date, "like the Nuremberg trials," where they seem to have incompatible tastes in music and in having fun, they finally overcome this lack of communication. In the scene at the record shop, where they just run into each other, the acting is more natural, contrasting with the contrived acting style that pervades the whole film. Ironically, when they arrange to meet again, they are behind a sign that says "jazz." Holly seems to

have evolved from punk music to opera, and from that to jazz, running parallel to her successive lovers' tastes.⁴

Hannah proves to be, rather than the heroine of the film, the bench mark used as a necessary reference for the other characters: she is Mickey's ex-wife, Elliot's present wife, and Holly and Lee's sister. Her function as a focal point is visually established in the first section. At the first Thanksgiving, in a long fixed shot of the dining-room with everybody at the table, we can see Hannah occupying the vertex of the two lines formed by the people at the table. She is also everybody's centre of attention when her father toasts to her success in the role of Nora, in *A Doll's House*. Her speech reveals her ideas, which identify her as a traditional female character:

Hannah: "I'm very lucky. When I had the kids I decided to stop working and just, you know, devote myself to having a family, and I'm very, very, very happy, BUT ... I secretly hoped that maybe some day a little gentleman would come along and take me back to the stage just for a second. So I've got that out of my system so I can get back to the thing that really makes me happy."

Hannah is the "talented daughter" for her parents, the ideal woman for Lee, the successful actress and lavish sister for Holly, the charming ex-wife for Mickey and "a wonderful woman" for Elliot. Lee is afraid of being a less passionate lover than her sister with Elliot. Holly resents Hannah's comments on her career prospects, taken as a lack of confidence in Holly's artistic talents: singing, acting, or writing. Elliot's joke on Holly's cooking ability, "That's where your talent lies," ironically expresses what Holly believes to be the general opinion about her artistic talents. It is quite likely that Elliot is expressing Hannah's opinions as he says "I'm her husband. She tells me anything." However, through Holly's script Hannah discovers she is seen by her sisters, parents, and husband as a model of perfection, shielded from life's events. The critical moment of self-discovery for Hannah takes place during the second Thanksgiving when Elliot confirms her identification with the character in Holly's script. In the middle of a tense argument Hannah says "I have needs," to which Elliot answers "I can't see them, and neither can Lee or Holly." Hannah discovers how the others really see her; she is "disgustingly perfect . . . competent . . . giving . . . too self-sufficient." When Hannah admits to not being as self-sufficient as she seemed to be by verbalising her loneliness, she recovers her loving husband again. As she and Elliot lie in bed in the dark, she says "It seems so dark tonight. I feel so alone." And the quick

caballero, as if waiting for a public confession of his wife's limitations, immediately responds by taking her in his arms and saying "You're not alone." This astonishingly rapid reconciliation after a blackout could be interpreted as the subjection of humanity to time; time will solve and even destroy everything. Allen seems to remind us that we are ephemeral and this condition belittles our despairs and joys and also that this is film art where everything is possible: the plausible and the bizarre. By "removing" her mask, Hannah seems to evolve from self-sufficiency towards the liberal concept of "humanity." The New Woman seems to be more tolerable when she shows her weaknesses. Thus, Hannah and Elliot's rapid reconciliation can also be interpreted as a comment on Hollywood's reinforcement of the myth of romance "as a process whereby companionship is defined by the 'natural' domination of men over women."⁵

In the character of Mickey, Allen presents one of his familiar alter-egos. As in previous films, the Allen character is still questioning key metaphysical mysteries such as the existence of God, the meaning of life, mortality, the purpose of human evil and the ability of any religion to provide answers to these questions. Overwhelmed by the lack of answers and by his own life's events, Mickey will also find solace in a work of art: the Marx Brothers' *Duck Soup*. In desperate mood, Mickey enters and sits in a cinema, as he narrates to Holly; a flashback and voice-over reconstruct the insight provided by the viewing of the film:

the movie was a film that I'd seen many times in my life since I was a kid, and I always loved it. And, you know, I'm watching these people up on the screen, and I started getting hooked on the film . . . And I started to feel how can you even *think* of killing yourself? I mean, isn't it so stupid? I mean, look at all the people up there on the screen. You know, they're real funny, and, what if the worst *is* true? What if there's no God, and you only go around once and that's it? Well, you know, don't you want to be part of the experience? You know, what the hell, it . . . it's not all a drag. And I'm thinking of myself, geez, I should stop ruining my life searching for answers I'm never gonna get, and just *enjoy* it while it lasts . . . And . . . after, who knows? I mean, maybe there is something. Nobody really knows. I know, I know 'maybe' is a very slim reed to hang your whole life on, but that's the best we have...

The tone of this speech resembles that of Gustav Adolf Ekdahl in the Christening celebration scene at the end of *Fanny and Alexander* (1982). The members of the Ekdahl family do not try to answer the "big" questions of life because they are not prepared for that; they just want to enjoy life while they are happy, being aware that the world's malice, death and sorrows are always there as a constant menace. The key question is to learn how to find pleasure in the microcosm we inhabit: in good food, kind smiles, fruit trees in bloom... in the tangible realities of this world. Artists, the world of actors and actresses, will always be necessary to provide us with a thrill of a different life. Allen's moment of anagnorisis seems to discover this same view of life. Both films, *Fanny and Alexander* and *Hannah and Her Sisters*, uphold the idea that theatre and film art have the capacity to alter reality through imagination by constructing a fictional world that both imitates and departs from the non-fictional reality. This view of happiness in life, and art's contribution to it, is also explicitly expressed in *Manhattan* (1979). In a moment of anagnorisis, Allen's character, Isaac, lying down on a couch and speaking into a tape-recorder, tries to give a list of little things that make life worth living.

The same idea about film art is explicitly supported in the film through Holly's script, which seems to coincide with what we have just seen. We are not clearly told to what extent the fictional work within the fiction resembles the "reality" of the fictional world we are seeing, but the hinted similarities suggest the unavoidable interconnexion between real life and fiction. This life-fiction interconnexion is also reinforced through both the intertextual relation to *Fanny and Alexander* and Allen's use of the star system —which includes him in the tradition of 'sincerity and authenticity' that prevailed in post-war America (Babington and Evans 1989: 159). The interaction between his personality and the characters he has played has contructed a persona; Woody Allen as a star. As Morin puts it:

The actor does not engulf his role. The role does not engulf the actor. Once the film is over, the actor becomes an actor again, the character remains a character, *but from their union is born a composite creature who participates in both, envelops them both: the star.* (Morin 1961: 39).

Thus, the role played by Allen in *Hannah and Her Sisters* immediately directs viewers to his previous performances, indicating the evolution of Allen's persona. Although Mickey's failure with Hannah due to his infertility

reminds us of Allen the loser in his early films, he finally succeeds in love. But his new worries are whether he can commit himself to anyone and love's ephemeral nature. As Mickey remarks "The heart is a very, very resilient little muscle." He epitomises the neurotic male whose masculine identity is in crisis —a personal drama in which women play a central role. Redefinitions of gender roles seem to be under way.

Shifts in conceptions concerning gender roles are underlined in another instance of stardom in the film: the presence of Maureen O'Sullivan, Hannah/Mia Farrow's mother in fiction and real life. Both her presence and Lloyd Nolan's are used not only to comment ironically on the ephemeral nature of human beings and, in turn, on the star system itself, but also on marriage and sex. Her fictional name, "Norma," establishes an intertextual relationship with Billy Wilder's *Sunset Boulevard*, in which Norma Desmond/Gloria Swanson also plays the role of an aging star. The old photographs on the wall and shelves and dialogue identify Norma with the myths of Hollywood glamour, pointing to an anachronized artificiality which contrasts with the aura of authenticity associated with Allen's persona. As Virginia Wright Wexman puts it,

The figure of the aging star lends itself especially well to a Hollywood-style exposé of beauty because it allows an emergent discourse (the power of women represented by the female star) to be depicted as a residual discourse (the anachronized "constructedness" of the mature actress's appearance and style). (1993: 148)

Maureen O'Sullivan's former persona is deglamourized, becoming an image of decay that resists old age —beauty and youth are the star's main assets. This actress is well known in Hollywood for her staunch Catholicism, which reinforces the irony in her new role as an alcoholic who flirts around with much younger men and who calls Othello, the Shakespearean character, "a black stallion." This excess associated with the figure of the female star pinpoints to a related anxiety about gender relations (Wexman 1993: 150). In her resentful attacks against her husband, Norma expresses past conventions of marriage —a good husband should support his family—and her husband's anxiety about his masculinity that her excess provokes.

Concerning women, Allen usually represents the equivocal and negative visions of the New Woman in minor characters like "subsidiary girl friends, friends' lovers and so on" (Babington and Evans 1989: 169). To a certain extent, April, Holly's friend, conveys these negative aspects of the New

Woman. She openly tells Holly that she has accepted an invitation to the opera from David, overtly admitting her attraction to the architect —a feeling that Holly detected and privately confessed to herself in an interior monologue after a tour around David's favourite buildings in New York. April does not mind sharing David with Holly, whereas for Holly this is the end of their friendship. For Hannah too, the worst thing she can think of to explain Elliot's strange mood with her is that "he's been seeing another woman." In this film female characters have the function of reinforcing the cultural myth of exclusive love that produces Elliot's anxiety, creating an outstanding difference and contrast with the female world depicted in Bergman's *Fanny and Alexander*. The extraordinary microcosm of the familial world in the latter is ruled by the powerful complicity of the female characters who support one another against the rigid social norms established by patriarchy. In the past depicted by Bergman's film, the notion of the male and the female microcosms as two separate spheres was closely associated with the patriarchal model of marriage. This model understands marriage as an economic rather than an erotic union, where the woman's role is to produce heirs and the man's role is to protect the family (Wexman 1993: 75-89). The women in *Fanny and Alexander* are conscious of the conflicting tensions created by the patriarchal split between marriage and romantic love at the time, which they resist through mutual support and complicity.

The two films and Ibsen's *A Doll's House* deal with two particular aspects concerning the issue of truth. One aspect is concerned with sincerity between husband and wife and the other is concerned with the relationship between imagination and truth, or between fiction and reality. Both *Hannah and Her Sisters* and *A Doll's House* reflect the dilemma on being sincere with your love partner: although telling the truth is regarded as a gesture of honesty denoting confidence and complicity with the other, this gesture can inflict a pain much too hard to bear when the truth disrupts social conventions on relationships, so inherent in ourselves. Elliot and Lee opt for not telling the truth as if they could anticipate Hannah's reaction and the dramatic consequences of doing so. If in *A Doll's House*, social conventions of love relationships are critically presented as too strict and unfair, *Hannah and Her Sisters* seems to suggest that these conventions are so deeply rooted in ourselves that they become the real rulers of our reactions and behaviour. In this respect, the little world depicted in *Fanny and Alexander* is much more liberal and tolerant, marking a significant contrast with the "greater world."

The other aspect of the issue of truth dealt with in these texts alludes to the blurred boundary between imagination and reality, or between lie and truth. Alexander's imaginative vision of reality, in *Fanny and Alexander*, is condemned and taken as lies, whereas when these same visions are put on stage or on screen, the lies are seen as art. The impossibility of discerning between truth and lie is stated by Helena in the last scene of the film, where she claims that everything is both plausible and bizarre. Out of spaceless and timeless unrealities, the imagination creates new images, in a mixture of memories, of events, of free inventions . . . "Bizarre" is the term that best defines the ending of *Hannah and Her Sisters*. All the characters have congregated in Hannah's flat to celebrate Thanksgiving day and "You Made Me Love You" can be heard on the sound-track. Hannah and Elliot are reconciled, Lee is happily talking with her new partner, and Mickey puts his arms around Holly's shoulders and kisses her in front of a mirror, which reflects their images with a tenuous light:

It'd make a great story, I think. A guy marries one sister... [he kisses her]... doesn't work out [kisses her again] many years later ... [another kiss] he winds up... married to the other sister. It's, you know, it's a... I don't know how you're gonna top that.

To which Holly responds very softly, "Mickey . . . I'm pregnant." Mickey is first shocked, and then, he embraces her again. Mickey's reaction to the 'magical' pregnancy is the sign of acceptance that everything is possible; love overcomes neurotic infertility. This happy ending fits within the generic conventions of comedy, demanding the audience's sympathy with this final attitude towards love, as if stating "this should be" (Frye in Corrigan 1981: 87). As Frye puts it,

Happy endings do not impress us as true, but as desirable, and they are brought about by manipulation. The watcher of death and tragedy has nothing to do but sit and wait for the inevitable end; but something gets born at the end of comedy, and the watcher of birth is a member of a busy society. (In Corrigan 1981: 89)

What is desirable is the familiar Hollywood film formula of romantic love that reconciles the contradiction inherent in the companionate couple, traditionally resolved by means of the conventional kiss representing wedding or its promise. Luhmann has pointed out the contradictory nature of the companionate couple which has romantic love —considered as an intense

passion of short-lived nature— as the basis for the lifelong monogamous marriage (Wexman 1993: 8).

Despite the convenience of the 'magical' pregnancy for the adjustment to the happy ending convention of comedies, the film insists a little too much on the importance of motherhood for women, thereby emphasising the idea of the attachment of women's fate to their bodies. Helena, Fanny and Alexander's grandmother, also admits, like Hannah, that she prefers being a mother to being an actress, although she enjoyed both. Lee, as has been mentioned above, also expresses her desire to have children as a primary one. The three sisters manage to incorporate into social life with a varying degree of difficulty and even to succeed in their careers. Hannah is a successful actress, Holly writes good scripts, and Lee, a former alcoholic, becomes a university student. Although the three of them are interested in finding their professional occupation, none of them questions motherhood, which appears as a natural and crucial aim in their lives. The association of women with motherhood as something natural has been constantly reinforced by patriarchy, and questioned by feminists since the early years of this movement. These three women, albeit intellectual and interested in social issues, represent traditional women characterised by an uncomplicated sexuality and a main interest in having a home and children. In a post-feminist context, Allen seems to reinforce old values concerning women and sexual love for the creation of the companionate couple.

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The happy ending seems to be possible through a re-discovery of old values in femininity, through women that are ready to be old-fashioned "as long as you agree / To stay old fashioned with me." Despite the order brought out of the chaos, there is still an ambivalence in the film that remains unsolved. It is not easy to decide whether the film ironically criticises those values or whether it considers them as extraordinary as the "magical" pregnancy. Is Allen suggesting that the suitable companionate couple can only be achieved by removing the masks imposed by new fashions and dogmatisms that veil the good old values to be discovered? Or, is he suggesting that the "perfect" combination of old and new values on femininity in women should be that which preserves male dominance, a balance that would require women as both companionable and subservient in order to become suitable romantic partners? Through visual mechanisms the film exposes the traditional male dominance of the gaze in classical cinema,

providing an ironic vision, covertly held from Allen's perspective, of men gazing at women. The relationships that the film narrative develops sustain old values concerning gender roles and love, values that are undermined by comic elements and intertextuality. Through the intertextual tensions pointing to texts that offer a greater resistance to patriarchy, Allen seems to underline the ironic attitude of the text concerning the artificiality of social conventions that constrain our behaviour; however, the strong emphasis on traditional views of romance makes it difficult to decide on the final attitude of the text —ironic or sublime. a

NOTES

1. Joseph von Sternberg, John Ford, Orson Welles among others.
2. Italics in the original.
3. I am indebted to Dr. Celestino Deleyto for this comment.
4. Music plays an important role in this film. It is associated with cultural connotations: classical music is connected to the cultivated community —the architect, painters, teachers and actors—, punk music relates to a fashionable community seen as depersonalized, jazz music is associated with Allen's character —Allen himself plays the clarinet in a jazz group—, and old romantic songs like "Bewitched", "You Made Me Love You", "Isn't It Romantic" or "You Are Too Beautiful" are connected to Hannah's parents' past world. These romantic songs also function as links among the love relationships in the film —Lee and Elliot, Elliot and Hannah, and Mickey and Holly—, denoting the same attachment to past values on love.
5. Wexman 1993: 156. The word "natural" appears in inverted commas in the original.

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A FUNCTIONAL-SEMIOTIC ANALYSIS OF VISUAL AIDS IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE

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1. INTRODUCTION

VISUAL aids constitute an explanatory technique often used in scientific discourse. I will consider visual aids all forms of non linear representation in which the display is in some way iconic. The purpose of this paper is to define the nature and properties of visual aids from a semiotic perspective. I will draw on Peirce's semiotic theory and on the contributions to the study of the iconic sign made by the French semiological tradition, and also by Eco.

Present-day researchers on EST that subscribe to a functional tradition provide us with guidelines for the interpretation of visual aids. For instance, Widdowson relates visual aids to his definition of the English used in science as "realization of universal sets of concepts and methods or procedures which define disciplines or areas of inquiry independently of any particular language" (1979: 24). He puts forward that there is a deep structure of communication in a particular discipline, which is the discourse consisting of its concepts and procedures and that is represented "in those universal features that appear overtly as intrinsic elements in the discourse itself; that is to say, the non-verbal modes of communication like formulae, tables, diagrams, etc." (Widdowson 1979: 24). These non-verbal representations can

express both the conceptual aspects of the deep structure of a discipline and the procedural aspects.

Trimble (1985: 103) includes visual-verbal relationships in the set of rhetorical functions of EST. He claims that visual aids used in scientific discourse appear only in conjunction with other rhetorical techniques, that is, they always occur accompanied by linguistic signs. According to him, the function of an illustration is to add to the discourse some information, which is either difficult or impossible to convey accurately by words or requires a big effort to be processed in the text.

Illustrations have different functions in different scientific genres, this function varying also from article to textbook. In an article many of the visuals are part of the evidence for the experimental results displayed in it, so they serve a persuasive function. However, there are also visuals that help the reader to visualize and interpret the complex experiments and results. The visuals in a textbook are used mainly to picture rather than prove, for they try to present the concepts or the process itself without any attempt to demonstrate results.

2. THE SEMIOTICS OF VISUAL AIDS: THE IDEA OF ICONICITY.

Peirce's (1931-1958) theory of signs provides a basic framework for the analysis of the visual aids in science. The sign is the main element in the signifying process. Peirce's definition of the sign is based on three aspects of a triad: the sign-aspect, the object-aspect, the interpretant-aspect.¹ According to the relation of the sign to its object, Peirce divides signs into three types:

- The *index* keeps a physical relationship with its object.
- The *icon* refers to its object because of certain similarity with it.
- The *symbol* holds an arbitrary relationship with its object, a relationship determined by a law.

This distinction has been widely used, although Peirce does not regard these categories as clear-cut, since there is not any sign that can be regarded exclusively as an icon, index or symbol. Eco (1978) discards this distinction as vague and proposes a new classification of signs, in which the concepts icon, index and symbol are brushed aside. Although Peirce's typology of signs can be improved, I consider the concept of icon very useful for the

study of visual aids. In an initial analysis it seems that the feature that distinguishes visual aids from other signs, especially from verbal discourse, is their iconicity, their analogical status, that is, the global perceptive resemblance to the represented object.

Peirce (1958) differentiates between three types of icons: *images*, *diagrams*, and *metaphors*. An image is an icon whose representamen only partakes of the quality of an object, representing it. Diagrams are indexic icons, the product of an analogical representation of the relations between the parts of the represented object: "those which represent the relations, mainly diadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts are diagrams" (Peirce 1958: 105). Finally, metaphor is, according to Pérez Carreño (1988: 67), the concept that allows for the possibility of verbal icons.

Peirce's definition of icon as a sign that represents its object mainly by its similarity poses some problems. This notion of similarity has been questioned by Eco, because of its imprecision. The definition of iconic sign was reformulated by Morris (1946), for whom a sign is iconic "to the extent to which it itself has the properties of its denotation." Eco (1970: 192) claims that this definition is a tautology, since we cannot state that the portrait of a person has the same properties as the person: the painted fabric has not got the texture of the skin, it cannot move, etc. Admitting that the portrait of a person is only iconic to a considerable extent, but not completely, Morris (1946: 7.2) states that "an iconic sign is a sign which is similar in some respect to what it denotes. Iconicity is a matter of degree." Now, the problem lies in the expression *in some respect*. Gombrich (1982: 107-108, in Peltzer, 1991) also considers that the concept of degree should be taken into account for a definition of the iconic sign. For him an iconic sign must preserve the effective nature of the prototype. In order to achieve it the sign can consist in a rather basic schema to which more features can be added in order to make it conventionally (i.e. according to a code) resemble the real object.

Eco claims that there are some naive notions related to "icon" that should be rejected, among them the following: that the so-called "iconic sign" has the same properties as its object, that it is similar to its object, that it is analogous to its object, that it is motivated by its object.

Given that an iconic sign does not have the same properties as the represented object, the problem for semiotics is to find out how graphic or photographic signs, which do not share any material element with the things they represent, can seem similar to them in appearance or in their relations. According to Eco (1970: 14) the iconic sign reproduces some conditions of

the perception and selects the stimuli (discarding the others) that enable the interpreter to build a perceptive structure with the same signification as the real experience denoted by the iconic sign. Eco illustrates this point by comparing the drawing of a horse to the real horse. When drawing the figure of a horse as a continuous line we do not reproduce the conditions of perception, because we perceive the horse according to a number of stimuli, none of which is similar to a line. Here is where "recognition codes" play an important role. The iconic sign reproduces conditions of the perception of the object, but these conditions must have been selected according to recognition codes and must have been reflected by graphic conventions that link an arbitrary sign to a condition of perception (for instance, lines are used to represent a zebra's hide). Therefore we select the main aspects of the perceived object following recognition codes.

Presuming that they exist recognition codes (like any other) make provision for conveying pertinent features of the content. The recognizability of the iconic sign depends on the selection of these features. But the pertinent features must be expressed. Therefore there must exist an iconic code which establishes the equivalence between a certain graphic device and a pertinent feature of the recognition code. (Eco 1979: 206)

The conclusion that can be drawn is that graphic signs are conventional, although they seem to be structured in a similar way to certain properties and relations of the represented object. The main point to understand iconic signs lies in the nature of these properties. Eco states that "the iconic object may possess: (a) optic (visible), (b) ontological (supposed), and (c) conventional properties of the object" (1979: 207). When drawing a car a child will represent only two wheels, because that is what he sees (visible properties), but before reaching this stage he will represent the car with four wheels because he knows that it has four wheels (ontological properties). A typical example of the third case is the representation of the sun as a circle with lines radiating from it. This iconic representation imitates some properties of another schematic representation, of a conventional image, like that of the sun as a fire sphere with lines of light. Thus "a graphic image reproduces the relational properties of a mental image" (Eco 1970: 18).

The iconic code can establish two types of correlations: that between a perceptual unit and a pertinent unit of the graphic system; and that between a graphic sign vehicle and a global perceived object denoted by it. By choosing

the pertinent features we carry out a reduction process that is specially manifest in cases such as stereotypes. For instance, a schoolboy is represented wearing a uniform in traffic signals, although we know that is not the normal case nowadays. Eco concludes that "the iconic sign builds a model of relations (between graphic phenomena) equivalent to the model of perceptual relations that we build by knowing and remembering the object" (1970: 21). Consequently the iconic sign does not share any property with the object, but with our perceptual model of the object. When we build an iconic sign we follow the same mental operations used to build the perceived object. That is why Eco claims that Morris' definition of iconic sign can be reformulated as "that which seems to reproduce certain properties of the represented object" (1970: 21). Eco regards the iconic sign as the result of a transformation process: "given a content-type that is in some way cognizable, its pertinent features must be projected into a given expression continuum by means of certain transformational rules" (1979: 189).

3. FUNCTIONAL AND FORMAL FEATURES OF VISUAL AIDS.

3.1. Functional features

As we said before, visual aids are an important part of the semiotic structure of scientific discourse, used to achieve a better and more precise understanding of the concepts displayed in it. They are non linear signs but they do not include everything we can consider "iconic sign" or we call "an image." In order to define visual aids and to fix their limits I will discuss their features.

They are visual signs, that is, perceived visually, which makes them spatial and timeless. These signs differ from linguistic systems, and especially from language, in their material. The signifier is a bidimensional one, characterised by three variables: the two dimensions of the plane and the variation of the ink "stains."

They are conventional signs. Segre (1990: 47) distinguishes between conventional and non-conventional signs taking the concept of code as a basis: conventional signs are coded. Conventional signs can be a personal creation or a collective creation, which has been transmitted (like the grammar and lexis of a language). They are characterised because they are

closed sets, grouped into systems whose elements are related. These signs belong to a type of communication where there is always an addresser (the writer of the scientific discourse) and an addressee. There is also a possibility of response and the reader of this discourse may become the addresser. The sender tries to communicate something and the receiver for whom this message is intended has a knowledge of the code that allows him to interpret the message.

Visual aids are intentional signs and are therefore communicative, produced to be used as artificial tools. Expressive signs, by contrast, are emitted spontaneously, without any intention to communicate (Eco 1976: 41). Thus visual aids reveal the intentionality to communicate something to a receiver, they are artificial signs created for the purpose of communication, opposed to natural signs. These signs are the product of a practical intentionality, as opposed to an aesthetic intentionality. A visual aid is a sign with a practical purpose: "a sign instrument serving an external aim" (Mukarovsky 1976: 236). The visual signs in scientific discourse serve the purpose of providing information when it cannot be depicted in words or it is too difficult or anti-economical to do it. It is this practical purpose that distinguishes an informative sign from the artistic sign, which is non-serving. In the visual aids the practical functions are foregrounded and the aesthetic function is backgrounded: the dominant function is the referential one.

Visual aids can be defined by their iconicity, but in order to make this claim it is necessary to define the notion of *iconicity* and to clarify its connection with *similarity*, *arbitrariness*, and *code*. Analogical has often been opposed to arbitrary, but in fact arbitrary is opposed to motivated. Taking Peirce's terminology the symbol would be arbitrary and the icon and index would be motivated, the first having a causal or contiguity link with the object, the second an imitative link. There is no opposition between analogical and arbitrary. Although an image can be analogical taken as a whole, it can contain different arbitrary relations.

If we take any visual we can think that the relationship between the signified and the signifier is one of similarity. But there is a part of what Veltrusky (1979: 250) calls "codified contiguity." In any visual sign there are graphic symbols such as the point, the circle, the triangle, the line, etc., which are combined to form crosses, spirals, etc. or to give rise to oppositions between straight line and curve, between horizontal and vertical. These symbols may convey different meanings in different contexts and in different visual signs. In some graphics we are even given the key to interpret them. So the visual sign, being as a whole iconic, contains relations that can be

systematised. This leads us to reject the opposition between the analogical and the codified. The fact that the code used is not the same as that of the linguistic signs does not mean that it does not exist. Metz (1970: 3) observes that this belief would bring about two mistakes: to confuse "langue" and code, to conclude the absence of a code from the absence of "langue."

Eco remarks that the iconic codes are "weak codes." According to him "in an iconic syntagm . . . there are contextual relationships so complex that it seems difficult to distinguish among them the pertinent traits of the optional variants" (Eco 1970: 22). The signs in an iconic syntagm do not conform to the double articulation of language, they do not have positional and oppositional value because they do not have a meaning by the fact of occurring or not. They have contextual signifieds without having a signified *per se*. For instance, a point does not have a signified because of its opposition to a line in an established system. Their value depends on the context in which they appear.²

Finally, let us consider in what sense "analogical" should be understood when speaking of visual signs. Verón (1970: 58) remarks that similarity is a perceptual criterion. We regard a photograph as an analogical message because it "resembles" the represented object, but if the photograph is enlarged to a great extent the similarity disappears to give way to a series of discrete points of different intensity, which leads to the conclusion that the passing from similarity to non similarity is progressive. This statement still leaves the concepts of analogy and similarity undefined. Eco claims that analogy must not be understood as a mysterious relation between things and image, but from an operational point of view: "a procedure instituting the basic conditions for a transformation" (Eco 1979: 201) which permits verification. The example of the analogical computer is very illustrative.³

3.2. Formal features of visual aids

As regards their structure and nature, visuals used in scientific discourse (hereafter SD) have some specific features already pointed out by Bertin (1970: 172) and Sager *et al.* (1980). Visuals lack the horizontal sequentiality of conventional linguistic representation. As they are not limited to one dimension, their layout can exploit the horizontal, vertical and diagonal dimensions of the page, presenting a simultaneous picture of the data.

The relationships between the information items in a visual are represented without syntactic links and signalled by non-linguistic conventions, pursuing the principles of economy and precision of expression. Owing to the absence of an order that follows established syntactic rules the understanding of visuals requires other types of ordering (e.g. numerical, alphabetical, in increasing or decreasing value, etc.) and prior knowledge of the conventions according to which these visuals operate.

The visual is built by means of three homogeneous dimensions: the two dimensions of the plane (x, y) and a variable z. The use of three dimensions facilitates the representation of highly complex relationships between the items of information and a multiple interpretation of the data provided. Since visuals are *ad hoc* systems, linguistic devices often have to be used so as to explain the meaning of the symbols, colour, grain and line differentiations (i.e. the variable z) employed.

The visual conveys a great quantity of information and it allows different levels of reading: we can read it as a whole, assessing the meaning of the whole visual, or we can pay attention just to a particular element. Between these two levels there are middle levels when we concentrate on groups of elements. Sager *et al.* (1980: 312) state that a visual text segment often supplies the reader with two types of information: one type is required for the development of the ongoing argument, a single datum necessary to go on with the message; the other type, where the first one is included, provides additional information, mainly used to test and verify the results.

3.3. Relationship between non-linguistic and linguistic elements

Visual aids do not appear in isolation but keep a narrow relationship with the linguistic message. They are often mixed messages, consisting of the visual and a caption. It has been claimed that verbal language is "the primary modelling system" (Lotman 1967) while the others are secondary. A supporting argument frequently used is that any content expressed by other semiotic devices can also be expressed by verbal language, while the contrary is false. However, we can make an objection to this statement: there are contents expressed by non-verbal units that cannot be translated into verbal units. Gombrich places the real value of the image in "its capacity to convey information that cannot be coded in any other way" (1972: 87). Garroni

(1973) states that linguistic devices are appropriate to convey a set of contents and non-linguistic devices are more appropriate to convey a different set of contents. Scientific discourse is a proof of this claim: owing to limitations of space every content is conveyed in the most economical way. Therefore visuals are used when the signified cannot be conveyed verbally or it would require too much processing effort and space. To quote Crystal:

The immediacy and economy of presentation achieved by these methods is self-evident. It would be impossible to provide a coherent account in words of all the interrelationships found on a map, graph or tree diagram, for example . . . On the other hand, linguistic and non-linguistic modes of expression are never totally independent of each other: verbal language is always needed in order to interpret and amplify the meaning or use on nonverbal representations (Crystal 1987: 381)

In scientific discourse text and image appear together, thus there is a relationship between them, but it should not be analysed in terms of subordination of one system to the other. As Metz (1970: 3) observes, the semiotics of the visuals must be studied in relation to that of the linguistic object that accompanies them. The visual is not an isolated element; it is related to and connected with the whole discourse in which it is inserted.

Barthes (1977) analyses the relationship between text and image in his study of the photographic images used in publicity, press, cinema, etc. Although these are totally different from the visuals used in SD, some of his statements about the relationship between text and image can also be applied to SD visuals. Barthes claims that while formerly the image was an illustration to the text, nowadays the situation has changed and the words are structurally "parasitic on the image," they load the image with cultural elements that amplify it. The SD visual is related to two different texts: the whole text of which it is a part, and the caption, or label that appears with it. In the first case text and image are in a complementary relation (Barthes' [1977] *relay* function), because they are both fragments of a more general syntagma, they interact to convey a message. The visual requires less effort on the part of the speaker, who is spared the costly verbal description. As for the caption, its function is similar to that called *anchorage* function by Barthes. It replies to the question: what is it? As Barthes remarks,

The text helps to identify purely and simply the elements of the image; it is a matter of a denoted description of the image . . . The

denominative function corresponds exactly to an anchorage of all the possible (denoted) meanings of the object by recourse to a nomenclature. (1977: 39)

The linguistic message guides the identification of the visual, the caption "identifies" the image. This is a proof of the arbitrary character of the visuals, especially of the graphics, since the text shows the conventional relation between the visual and the object.

Gombrich points out that "the chance of a correct reading of the image is governed by three variables: the code, the caption and the context" (1972: 86). The mutual support of language and image makes memorisation easier, because the use of two independent channels facilitates reconstruction. There are cases in which the caption is not necessary because the visual signs are self-explanatory owing to the context. In SD the caption is practically always necessary since the identifying linguistic message can only be omitted with signs that appear as self-explanatory, owing to their location in a context supported by prior expectations based on tradition. This is not the case of SD visuals, which try to convey new messages.

Visual aids are textual units, or sense units, as Peltzer remarks (1991: 50). This claim is an attempt to recover the idea that icons are texts. It has already been stated that although the iconic text does not follow the same code as linguistic units, it fulfils the essential function of a text: to provide sense, which is, according to Coseriu (1986: 284), the content of a text. Iconic texts are functional units that can be analysed into smaller units. However, the visual text differs from the linguistic one in that the latter always belongs to a specific language, while images represent ideas that go beyond language, although they are determined by culture.

4. A TYPOLOGY OF VISUAL AIDS IN SD: IMAGES AND GRAPHICS.

A number of classifications have been made of icons, following different criteria: similarity, arbitrariness, abstraction, nature of the represented object, modes of production, etc.⁴ Eco suggests that the term "icon" should be discarded and the great variety of concepts under this heading should be included in a wider semiotic classification made on the grounds of the

different modes of production. The validity of sign (especially icon) classifications will not be considered here. I will try to set up a classification of a particular kind of signs, the visual aids of SD, which intends to make clear distinctions between types of signs used in different scientific disciplines. There are two main groups, which I will call "images" and "graphics," the latter being the most frequent visual aids in SD. This distinction has been made taking two binary oppositions into account: figurative/non-figurative, and polysemic/monosemic.

Images (all kind of photographs and drawings) are figurative while graphics are non-figurative. The difference lies in the status of the represented object. In the case of images it is a real object, while graphics are tokens whose type not only has been established by convention but also is not the sign of a real but of an abstract object. For instance, a triangle is a token of the geometrical figure called "triangle," which is a concept that can be found in reality only as a token not as a type. This is the reason why images are mainly built taking as a basis optical (visible) or ontological (supposed) properties of the object, while graphics are built by means of conventionalized abstract properties. The creation of an image is guided by rules of spatial similarity with the mental image of the represented visible object. Graphics are visual representations in which the key word is relational similarity, or proportionality. They are defined by a specific organisation.

Images are polysemic, while graphics are monosemic. Bertin (1970: 170) defines a monosemic system as that in which the knowledge of the signification of every sign is a requirement to know the meaning of the whole. A graphic cannot be understood until the caption has identified the particular meaning of every sign. A polysemic system is that in which the signification arises from the joining of the signs to form a whole. In a monosemic system there is not any possibility of ambiguous interpretation because all the elements have already been determined and fixed before the interpretation of the whole. The distinction between monosemic and polysemic signs seems to be based on abstraction: "the greater the abstraction of the signified the greater the monosemy and the less the ambiguity" (Peltzer 1991: 35). Therefore, graphics, owing to their monosemic character, are not ambiguous.

I shall now focus on each type of visual aid in turn.

4.1. Images

In scientific discourse we can find different types of drawings and photographs (See Fig. 1 at the end of this paper): holograms, colour photographs, black and white photographs, figurative drawings (Fig. 2), outline drawings, etc. They can be distinguished by their level of iconicity, the photograph being more iconic than the drawing.

According to Barthes (1977) the real difference between photograph and drawing lies in the presence or absence of code. He claims that the iconic message conveyed by the photograph used in SD differs from that of the rest of the signs considered here in that it is non-coded. Barthes considers the photograph as the "perfect analogon" of reality, which makes it a "message without code," a "continuous message" (1977: 77). The literal information it transmits is not formed by means of discontinuous signs and transformation rules. The drawing differs from the photograph in that it is a coded message. The reproduction of an object is the result of some transposition guided by a set of rules. On the act of drawing (the coding) a choice must be made of the pertinent features of the object that will allow its recognition. In the photograph there is no selection of significant features. Therefore, while the relationship of signified to signifier in the drawing is one of "transformation," in the photograph it is one of "recording." The claim that photographs are non-coded, on which the distinction between photograph and drawing is based, is questionable, since anthropological research has proved that people not familiarized with photography have to be taught to understand and interpret photographs.

Gombrich (1979), who does not make any allusion to the concept of code, establishes a similar distinction between two types of visual representation, one following the paradigm of the map, the other that of the mirror: the first tries to represent the physical world, the second the optic world. Drawings, which belong to the first type and provide selective information about the physical world, represent *what* we see, they are produced by a transposition process that selects the pertinent features for the identification of the represented object. The photograph, which follows the mirror paradigm, reflects the appearance of one aspect of the world, "mirroring" the way in which it changes depending on light conditions. The information it provides concerns the optic world, since it represents *the way* we see the object at a particular moment: if light conditions change the representation of the object also changes. A drawing allows us to identify an object by means of the spatial relations, a photograph is concerned with the visual appearance of the object.

The difference between the photographic and the other types of visual language (graphic or iconographic) has also, probably more adequately, been set (Peltzer 1991: 34) on the type of code: particularizing or universalizing. Photographic language is a particularizing code, it is a "mirror," an "imprint" that reflects a singular reality visually. The other types of visual aids (drawings, diagrams, etc.) are, according to Peltzer, universalizing codes, because they imply abstraction. He claims that a photograph is always the image of a particular object (for instance, a house). By contrast, when a house is drawn the maker uses the universal image of a house he has in his mind. Although a drawing can also be particularizing, as when a specific object is drawn, the possibility of abstraction makes of it a more powerful instrument than the photograph: a drawing can reflect, for instance, a particular house, but also an abstraction of the concept house, and even a non-existent object (unicorns, events that have never happened, etc.). This capacity of abstraction allows the drawing to surpass nature more easily than photographs can. By the same token, photographs can represent images that express a universal concept, but it always happens from a particular and concrete object, since they are produced from a particularized and concrete reality.

The drawings that appear in SD conform to the features of scientific visuals mentioned above (practical function, communicative purpose, etc.). The most often used type is that called "infographic": a graphic representation that tries to reflect facts or events, information about how something works or what an object is like.

A view is a very explicit drawing where all the real elements are represented keeping the same proportions as in the original. Sometimes it is accompanied by explanatory words or numbers. A rather frequent one, especially used in biomedical articles is the *section* (Fig. 3): the view of a body's inside.

Explanatory visuals (Fig. 4) represent how a process or an event happens. It is mainly used to inform about the several stages in a natural or artificial process or to reflect the connections and steps in a process or in a series of procedures.

4.2. Graphics

Graphics are used exclusively with a practical function, which accounts for the fact that the principle that guides their interpretation is that of efficacy.

Eco's consideration of different modes of production will be useful as a first step in our classification. It is necessary to point out that what we call signs are "the result of many intertwined modes of production" (Eco 1979: 259). Since a sign can be produced in different ways a typology of signs based on modes of production is not definitive and clear-cut. Taking this into account, I will try to distinguish two types of graphics: those produced mainly by means of replica and those produced by invention.

Replicas "replicate an expression type which has already been conventionally correlated with a given content" (Eco 1979: 245). In these cases the type exists as a cultural product so the correspondence is between a token and the already known type.

Stylizations are a case of replica (Eco 1979: 238). They are replicas recognized because of their similarity not to a content model but to an expression type. The token does not reflect all the features of the type, only the pertinent ones. The double helix (Fig. 5), for instance, is a stylization.

The other type of replicas found in SD are *vectors*, defined by Eco as "features of a given system that must be added to a bundle or to a string of features from one or more other systems in order to compose a recognizable functive" (1979: 240). Graphic arrows are instances of vectors. They realise dimensional features such as "linearity," "apicality," "direction," etc. The attention of the addressee is directed towards parameters such as "left," "right," "up," "down," etc. The term "direction" we are considering in relation to vectors should be deprived of spatial connotations. The graphic arrows used in SD represent *vectors* (in the sense used in science). They are physical quantities that require, for their complete definition, not only a quantity but also a direction: these are movement, velocity, force, acceleration, etc.

Invention is the second mode of production used in SD. Signs produced in this way are undercoded because there is not a code previous to their interpretation, and their expression is not divisible into minimal units but into macrounits. According to Eco, "the producer of the sign-function chooses a new material continuum not yet segmented for that purpose and proposes a new way of organising (of giving form to) it in order to map within it the formal pertinent elements of a content type" (1979: 245).

The sign producer establishes the correlation between the elements of the expression and those of the selected content, since it is not fixed by convention. In graphics, maps, etc. the producer gives a key to interpret the elements of the expression as a code. Eco claims that what the producer does

is propose a new code,⁵ because the units in which the signifier is segmented do not form a part of other codes.

The invented signs in scientific discourse are visual representations of a piece of information, which reflect the correspondence between a finite series of variable concepts and an invariable component. This type of information is analogical in the same sense as an analogical computer: it represents the proportions in an analogical way, which makes them understandable. It represents in a real and concrete way, by means of analogy, some abstract data and proportions. The main use of these signs is not to represent objects as the images do, but observations, laws, etc. They are specially useful in the transcription of the data obtained after an observation. In order to set up a classification of graphic representations we need the notion of component of information, a concept of variation which is represented. A graphic consists in the transcription of every component by means of a visual variable. A "stain" of signification located in X and Y (the two dimensions of the plan) can vary in size, value, grain, colour, orientation and shape

The invented signs used in SD are of two types: diagrams and maps.

A. Diagrams. They are representations in which the spatial points in the expression correspond to non spatial aspects of the represented object. Peltzer considers them "geometrical drawings used to prove a proposition or to represent graphically the variation of an event or phenomenum"(1991: 130). They can be further divided into two types:

1. Graphics that represent relations between elements of a single component (A, B, C...). There are different types of configurations because these elements and the relations can be transcribed as points, lines or zones and they can form a line, a circle, etc. The most frequent example in SD is the genealogical map (Fig. 6)

2. Graphics that represent relations between components. There can be two or more components, whose representation can give rise to different configurations (Peltzer 1991: 130):

-Linear. The correspondences are represented by lines that express the two variable components on the two perpendicular axes of coordinates (Fig. 7).

-Rectilinear. The variable components are represented on a straight line, divided in proportional parts, which make up the invariable whole.

-Circular. The proportions of the variable component are represented as sectors in a circle, which differ in size and in colour or grain. This is the best way to represent percentages or parts of a whole (Fig. 8).

-Ortogonal. The proportions are represented by blocks with different colours or grains, the invariable component being the base (Fig. 9).

-Table. It is a mixed message, partly graphic, partly linguistic. The linguistic messages are grouped, classified, related, etc by means of an adequate design. They are very useful to represent systematically an information having extensive quantitative numerical or linguistic data that must be read carefully (Fig. 10).

B. Maps (Fig. 11). They are representations in which spatial points in the expression correspond to spatial aspects of the represented object. The relations that are mapped onto the expression are spatial, because maps represent a spatial component which is transcribed keeping the correct proportions. Bertin (1970: 183) points out that in a diagram a spatial component only uses a dimension of the plan and the other can represent n concepts. By contrast, in a map the spatial component requires the two dimensions x and y. The map appears as a powerful information instrument because it answers a lot of questions: What is there in a particular space? What's the distribution of a particular phenomenon? Which phenomena have the same distribution? etc.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Visual aids are a powerful tool for the conveyance of information in scientific discourse. What characterizes them is their function, rather than their "nature"; that is, a visual aid in SD must have a practical communicative function, it must provide information difficult or impossible to transmit with linguistic signs. Thus, these signs are "the product of a practical intentionality."

As for their iconic nature, it has already been discussed in this paper, particularly in relation to the validity of the concept of icon. There are two points I would like to stress: there is an iconic code, used to create visual aids, although it is a weak code, different from the linguistic one; iconicity is a complex concept that should not be simply or naïvely identified with similarity or sharing properties with the object. The similarity between a visual aid and the represented object is established by convention.

Finally, it may be convenient to assess the information value of visual aids according to the amount of information they encode. An image, used to

convey visual information, implies always a selection of pertinent features of the model's image, which reveals the sender's interpretation of what he considers relevant. Although the photograph has been considered a message without code by Barthes (1977), there is also a selection on the part of the speaker's, who sifts his material. The information value lies in the possibility of distinguishing the code from the message and this ease of distinction can be more important for information purposes than the "fidelity of reproduction." That is the point made by Gombrich when he states that

The easier it is to separate the code from the content, the more we can rely on the image to communicate a particular kind of information. A selective code that is understood to be a code enables the maker of the image to filter out certain kinds of information and to encode only those features that are of interest to the recipient. (1972: 91)

Therefore, a selective representation is so informative because the recipient's attention is focused on what the sender wants to transmit. a

NOTES

1. For Peirce,

A sign, or representamen, is something that stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call it the interpretant of the first sign, the sign stands for something, its object. (Peirce 1958: 99)

The interpretant, or meaning of the sign, is what a sign produces in the interpreter. The interpretant is always a development of the sign, an increment stimulated by the first sign. Thus it is "another representation which is referred to the same object" (Eco 1970: 68) for this reason it is possible to speak of *unlimited semiosis* as an interminable process of interpretation. The triadic relation in which the sign enters implies that the interpretant is another sign which must also be interpretable and hence it presupposes in turn another sign, and so on.

2. Eco (1970: 38) points out that the code is articulated into figures, signs and supersigns. Figures (e.g. geometric elements: points, lines, circles, etc.), "the conditions of perception transcribed into graphic signs, following the rules established by the code," are numberless and the meaning of the messages they produce cannot be deduced from any code but depends on context. Figures do not represent anything but they are used to form the signs and the supersigns; their combinations produce all the possible signs. The signs, which occur as non discrete elements in a graphic continuum, "denote, with the conventional graphic devices, "sèmes" of recognition (nose, eye, cloud, etc.); or with "abstract models," symbols, conceptual diagrams of the object (sun as a circle)." Supersigns (or sèmes), which are what we call

"images" or "iconic signs" (e.g. a house), have a whole proposition as their content (e.g. "man sitting on a chair").

3. An analogical computer establishes a constant proportionality between two series of entities, one being the sign vehicle of the other (for instance, x being an intensity of current that denotes a physical size (y) x1 corresponds to y1, x2 to y2 and so on). The correlation between x and y has been established arbitrarily from the outset. Analogy is rendered legitimate by the proportional relationship, which is the same between the elements of the sign vehicle and those of the object, but this relation is arbitrary, y has been give the value x by convention.

4. A criterion often used for classification is that of degree of iconicity, that is, of quantitative differences. Villafañe (1985: 39-43) establishes a scale of eleven degrees of iconicity, taking abstraction as the delimiting criterion. The first one is the natural image, the product of the perception of reality, which possesses all the perceptual properties of the object, and the last one is the non figurative representation, where all the perceptible and relational properties of the object have been abstracted.

5. In fact Eco regards invention as code making.

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


Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Strobili of *Gnetum gnemon* in the evening in a tropical rain forest in Sarawak. a, Sterile ovules emitting droplets (male strobilus); b, fertile ovules emitting droplets (female strobilus); c, a male strobilus visited by a pyralid moth, *Herpetogramma* sp.; d, a female strobilus visited by a pyralid moth, *Hedylepta* sp.




Fig. 3





Fig. 4



This figure is purely diagrammatic. The two ribbons symbolize the two phosphate-sugar chains, and the horizontal rods the pairs of bases holding the chains together. The vertical line marks the fibre axis.

Fig. 5

Fig. 1. (A) Traditional termite-roach phylogeny [adapted from findings in (3)]. Not all characters in the original tree are shown. Note that roaches are presented as a grade (paraphyletic group) leading to termites, and that Mastotermitidae is paraphyletic (with respect to Kalotermitidae). The striped line across the base of the tree indicates the break in the grade from termites to cockroaches. Circled letters on branches refer to the following characters that define these branches: a, symbiotic gut flagellates; b, coloniability and loss of wings; c, eusociality and deciduous wings; d, loss of mandibular tooth and *Metadevescovina* gut flagellates.

(B) Phylogeny of Thorne and Carpenter (4) based on 70 morphological and behavioral characters. The cladogram was rooted with the use of inferred ancestral states





Fig. 6



Gas evolution obtained using the closed apparatus.

Fig. 7





Fig. 8



Procedure injury rate by procedure duration for noncardiac (general surgery, gynecology, orthopedics, and trauma) ($P<.001$, χ^2 test for trend) and cardiac ($P=.7$, χ^2 test for trend) services. The first number in parentheses at the top of each set of bars is the number of procedures in noncardiac services and the second is the number in the cardiac service.

Fig. 9

Table 2. Representative receptors for which acidification responses to triggering have been demonstrated in the microphysiometer. The table indicates the receptor, the superfamily to which the receptor belongs and the second messenger pathway activated by the receptor, whether the response was derived from receptors native to the cells or whether the response was derived from receptors transfected into the cells, and citations for the data. N.D., not done.

Receptor	Superfamily, pathway	Native	Transfected	Reference
m1 Muscarinic acetylcholine	G protein, inositol phosphate	N.D.	Yes	(11)
Muscarinic, subtype unknown	G protein	Yes	N.D.	(18)
β_2 -Adrenergic	G protein, increasing cAMP	N.D.	Yes	(11)
Prostaglandin E	G protein, increasing cAMP	Yes	N.D.	(19)
Dopamine D1	G protein, increasing cAMP	No	Yes	(20)
Dopamine D2	G protein, decreasing cAMP	No	Yes	(20, 21)
Glutamate (kainate)	Excitatory amino acid, ion channel	Yes	N.D.	(15)
Insulin, insulin-like growth factor	Growth factor, tyrosine kinase	Yes	N.D.	(22)
Epidermal growth factor	Growth factor, tyrosine kinase	Yes	Yes	(3, 11, 14)
γ -Interferon	Hematopoietin	Yes	N.D.	(23)
Interleukin-2	Hematopoietin	Yes	N.D.	(14)
Interleukin-4	Hematopoietin	Yes	N.D.	(23)
GM-CSF	Hematopoietin	Yes	N.D.	(8)
T cell	T cell receptor	Yes	N.D.	(14)

Fig. 10




Fig. 1. Sketch geological map of the Arabian-Nubian Shield with Tertiary opening (dashed line) of the Red Sea restored (modified after Vail 1985).

Fig. 11

FUNCIONES PRAGMÁTICAS MARCADAS Y NO MARCADAS¹

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1. INTRODUCCIÓN

LA Gramática Funcional (Dik 1989) puede considerarse heredera de la tradición del Círculo Lingüístico de Praga en su distinción de tres niveles funcionales superpuestos, de manera que cada elemento está definido por un conjunto de funciones a tres niveles (pragmático o informativo, semántico y sintáctico). Así, por ejemplo, dado el enunciado en (1), el argumento *the man* desempeña la función pragmática tópico, la función semántica agente y la función sintáctica sujeto; el argumento *the door*, por su parte, tiene asignada la función pragmática foco, la función semántica paciente y la función sintáctica objeto:

(1) The man opened the door.

El tratamiento binario de la perspectiva funcional del enunciado (o estructura informativa) también puede inscribirse en la tradición lingüística de Praga, aunque el modelo propuesto por Dik difiere en algunos aspectos de la división clásica de los enunciados en tema (o punto de partida del mensaje) y rema (o juicio que se hace sobre el tema). En primer lugar, se introduce una nueva dicotomía entre las que se denominan *funciones pragmáticas clausales* (o intraclausales) y las funciones pragmáticas no clausales (o extraclausales), que incluyen, como mínimo, el tema y el apéndice.² El ejemplo (2) ilustra la función tema y el ejemplo (3) la función apéndice:

- FUNCIONES PRAGMATICAS MARCADAS Y NO MARCADAS¹

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(1) The man opened the door.

El tratamiento binario de la perspectiva funcional del enunciado (o estructura informativa) también puede inscribirse en la tradición lingüística de Praga, aunque el modelo propuesto por Dik difiere en algunos aspectos de la división clásica de los enunciados en tema (o punto de partida del mensaje) y rema (o juicio que se hace sobre el tema). En primer lugar, se introduce una nueva dicotomía entre las que se denominan *funciones pragmáticas clausales* (o intraclausales) y las funciones pragmáticas no clausales (o extraclausales),

que incluyen, como mínimo, el tema y el apéndice.² El ejemplo (2) ilustra la función tema y el ejemplo (3) la función apéndice:

- (2) As for John, he is a bloody poser.
- (3) Sheila put her foot in it, she did.

Como puede apreciarse en (2) y (3), el criterio para la distinción entre constituyentes clausales y constituyentes extraclausales, además de que los constituyentes tengan asignadas funciones semánticas y sintácticas clausales y que no se den casos de duplicidad funcional, es la existencia de una pausa y de un nuevo grupo de entonación, si bien dicho grupo de entonación no coincidiría con un nuevo grupo informativo.³ En segundo lugar, como ya hemos indicado, el inventario de funciones pragmáticas clausales se reduce sólo a dos: tópico, que normalmente aporta información ya conocida por el oyente, y foco, que es la información que el hablante considera más relevante para el oyente, y codifica por medio de recursos como un orden especial (4), una posición más destacada en la curva de la entonación del enunciado (5), construcciones particulares (6), duplicación (7) o morfología distinta (8):

- (4) Mary I like.
- (5) I like Mary, not Joan.
- (6) It is Mary that I like.
- (7) Le combre el libro a él.
- (8) Quechua de Ayacucho (Bossong 1989:43)

hantun-mi	wasi-qua
grande-FOC	casa-TOP
"La casa es grande"	

El tratamiento de las funciones pragmáticas que hemos descrito brevemente aquí tiene dos aspectos centrales: el primero es que la introducción de las funciones pragmáticas en la estructura jerárquica de la enunciación (Dik 1989, Hengeveld 1988 y 1990) supone la integración del receptor así como de su información pragmática en la formalización del enunciado; y el segundo es que un inventario reducido de funciones pragmáticas, como sucede en el caso de las funciones semánticas y, sobre todo, las sintácticas, facilita la comparación interlingüística y, en definitiva, la adecuación tipológica de la teoría. Sin embargo, la tipología de las funciones pragmáticas tópico y foco propuesta hasta la fecha en la GF (Dik et al. 1981: 41ss, de Jong 1981: 89ss, Dik 1989: 268ss), puede simplificarse si

se atiende al carácter marcado o no marcado de la asignación de dichas funciones.

2. CRITERIOS DE MARCA

Pasamos a continuación a considerar los posibles criterios de marca.

2.1. TIPOS DE CATEGORIAS LEXICAS

Atendiendo al criterio del tipo de categoría léxica al que se asignan las funciones pragmáticas, el foco no marcado sería asignado a constituyentes verbales, adjetivales o nominales (que tienden a aportar información nueva y suelen estar acentuados), como sucede en (9), y el foco marcado a constituyentes pronominales (que normalmente aportan información ya conocida y rara vez se acentúan), como sucede en (10):

- (9) A: Who was fired?
B: The boss's ex-wife.
- (10) A: Who was fired?
B: Me.

En cuanto al tópico, el tópico no marcado se asignaría a pronombres, nombres y adjetivos y verbos sustantivados, como puede verse en (11.a), (11.b), (11.c) y (11.d) respectivamente:

- (11) a. *She* was kicked out of the college.
- b. *Donkeys* are not stupid animals.
- c. *Horse-racing* is more popular in Britain than fox-hunting.
- d. *The young* are promiscuous these days.

El tópico marcado, si hemos relacionado correctamente el tópico no marcado con las categorías léxicas que ocupan las posiciones argumentales, podría asignarse, dado el criterio del tipo de categorías léxicas, con las categorías que normalmente ocupan las posiciones oblicuas, esto es, las de los satélites.

(12) A: In 1990 there was a war.
 B: *1990?* I liked it *in 1990*.

Así, la asignación de tópico al constituyente (*in*) *1990* sería marcada, mientras que las asignaciones presentadas en (11) serían no marcadas.

2.2. TIPO DE INFORMACION

Como es bien sabido, el tópico normalmente aporta información dada y el foco suele transmitir información nueva para el oyente⁴:

(13) A: What did *your mother* see?
 B: *My mother* saw a frog.

Este criterio no siempre es tan evidente como en (13), donde *my/your mother* aporta información dada y *a frog* constituye la información nueva. Dik (1989: 266) admite que tópico y foco no siempre aportan información dada y nueva respectivamente. Existe pues la posibilidad de considerar no marcados al tópico que aporta información dada y al foco que transmite información nueva, y viceversa: el tópico que aporta información nueva y el foco que contiene información dada constituirían, desde este punto de vista, asignaciones marcadas. Un ejemplo claro de tópico marcado puede encontrarse en los tópicos nuevos, que se introducen por primera vez en el discurso:

(14) There was *a man who drove a Jaguar*. *The man* wore a yellow suit
 (...) *The man dressed in yellow* people must have laughed at.

Así, al constituyente *a man who drove a Jaguar*, que consta de información nueva, se le asigna tópico marcado, mientras que a los constituyentes *The man* y *The man dressed in yellow*, que ya aportan información dada, puesto que en ambos casos se trata de la segunda o posteriores menciones en el discurso, se le asigna tópico no marcado. Una situación comparable se produce entre el foco no contrastivo, que consiste en información nueva, y el contrastivo, que selecciona una información entre dos o más informaciones dadas. El ejemplo (14) ilustra el foco no contrastivo y el (15) el contrastivo:

(14) A: What did you buy?
 B: I bought a car.

(15) A: What did you buy, a car or a boat?
 B: I bought a boat.

Según el criterio que hemos propuesto, el foco en (14) sería no marcado y en (15) sería marcado.⁵

2.3. ASIGNACION DE FUNCIONES SINTACTICAS

Podría también argumentarse que, puesto que tópico y sujeto no siempre coinciden, la asignación de tópico al constituyente sujeto es la posibilidad no marcada (16.a), mientras que la asignación del tópico al objeto (16.b), por ejemplo, constituiría una asignación marcada.

(16) a. *The arsonist escaped.*
 b. The police caught *him/the arsonist* after he had set fire to three more houses.

Dos observaciones deben ser tenidas en cuenta. Primeramente, considerar no marcada la asignación de tópico al sujeto es la conclusión directa de la falta de biunivocidad entre ambas funciones en la GF: si asignamos tópico siempre al sujeto, la función pragmática resulta, en principio, irrelevante. Dadas las prioridades metodológicas de la teoría, que van de la pragmática a la sintaxis y no al contrario, parecería más conveniente considerar la irrelevancia de la función sintáctica, en línea con los criterios para la relevancia de las funciones sintácticas sujeto y objeto enumerados en Dik (1989: 208). En segundo lugar, este criterio está directamente relacionado con el tipo de información contenida en los constituyentes, ya que el sujeto suele aportar información dada y el objeto información nueva; o, según la terminología de Givón (1990: 565ss), el sujeto es más tópico y predecible y el objeto es más focal y más difícilmente predecible. Efectivamente, el objeto es el primer candidato a llevar el foco cuando no hay oblicuos presentes en la cláusula:

(17) The elderly driver broke the speed limit.

Cuando existen oblicuos, como Downing y Locke (1992: 352) han puesto de manifiesto, dichos constituyentes son los principales candidatos a la focalización:

(18) The elderly driver broke the speed limit twice.

De esta manera, centrándonos ahora en el foco, la asignación del foco al objeto cuando no hay satélites (19.a) y a los satélites cuando éstos están presentes (19.b), representan las opciones no marcadas; la asignación del foco, por el contrario, al sujeto (20.a) o al objeto cuando a éste le siguen (o le preceden) uno o más satélites (20.b), constituye la posibilidad marcada:

(19) a. He inherited a fortune.
 b. He taught Mary the piano.
 (20) a. A: Who came?
 B: Max came.
 b. He taught the piano to her.

Los criterios examinados hasta ahora podrían dar lugar a algunas imprecisiones como que, en el caso del tipo de categoría léxica, los constituyentes suelen constar de más de un formativo; en este caso, podría identificarse el carácter marcado o no marcado de la asignación tomando como punto de referencia el núcleo del constituyente. Este procedimiento, con todo, parece problemático puesto que en instancias como (21) es precisamente el determinante lo que diferencia el estatus pragmático del constituyente:

(21) a. I saw *a nun* (tópico nuevo).
 b. I saw *the nun* (tópico dado).

De manera semejante, puesto que no existe una frontera totalmente precisa entre la información nueva y la dada, y que dichos conceptos se solapan cuando se consideran la información tópica y focal, el criterio del tipo de información por sí solo parece poco fiable; en efecto, una combinación de tópico-información dada / foco-información dada no parece marcada en casos como el del foco contrastivo, en el que la construcción sintácticamente menos compleja y la más frecuente —luego, muy probablemente, la no marcada— es la que aparece en (22.a), con preferencia sobre (22.b), (22.c) y (22.d):

(22) a. I like Peter, not Keith.
 b. Peter I like, not Keith.
 c. Who I like is Peter, not Keith.
 d. It is Peter that I like, not Keith.

2.4. ORDEN DE CONSTITUYENTES

El hecho de que el criterio real de marca entre (22.a) y (22.b) sea la posición absoluta en el orden de la cláusula indica que, si bien los criterios mencionados hasta este momento, esto es, las categorías léxicas, el tipo de información y la asignación de funciones sintácticas, pueden desempeñar un papel destacado, el orden de constituyentes es el criterio más fiable para elaborar una tipología unificada de las funciones pragmáticas clausales. Entenderemos orden de constituyentes como la sucesión no sólo de estructuras sintácticas sino también de estructuras prosódicas e informativas, de manera que el tratamiento del alineamiento incluya el *mapping* sintaxis-fonología. Considérense los siguientes ejemplos:

(23) a. I like SF films.
 b. Bird-spotting I like.
 (24) a. A: Where did you meet?
 B: We met in prison.
 b. A: Who was fired?
 B: I was fired/Me.

El tópico no marcado se asigna en posición inicial y el foco no marcado en posición final, como puede apreciarse en (23.a) y (24.a). Cualquier otra posición del tópico o del foco se considera marcada: en (23.b) y (24.b) el foco en posición inicial es marcado. El tópico marcado suele ser resultado del desplazamiento que produce el foco marcado en posición inicial, que relega al tópico a la posición intermedia o final, como puede verse en (23.b). Dado que la asignación de funciones pragmáticas constituye el punto de contacto entre la sintaxis —reducida casi exclusivamente al orden de los constituyentes de la cláusula— y la estructura prosódica, debe entenderse la asignación de funciones pragmáticas no marcadas como una correspondencia biunívoca entre las posiciones menos relevantes de la estructura prosódica con las menos relevantes de la estructura sintáctica (informativa) y viceversa; las posiciones prosódicamente más relevantes se asocian a las más destacadas

desde el punto de vista sintáctico-pragmático, como se indica en (25) y (26), donde se ha adoptado un análisis de niveles de la prominencia y tono acentuales.

(25)

ESTRUCTURA PROSODICA	x	x	x	x
ASIGNACION DE FUNCIONES PRAGMATICAS (NO MARCADA)	TOPICO		FOCO	
ESTRUCTURA SINTACTICA	P1	P2		P3

(26)

ESTRUCTURA PROSODICA	x	x	x	x	x
ASIGNACION DE FUNCIONES PRAGMATICAS (MARCADA)	FOCO		TOPICO		
ESTRUCTURA SINTACTICA	P1	P2		P3	

Deberíamos aclarar en este punto que la taxonomía de los componentes de la estructura informativa de la cláusula fue originalmente propuesta por Halliday (1967: 37ff; 1968a: 199ff; 1968b: 177ff; 1985: 38ff): Halliday, que sólo se ocupa del inglés, identifica tema no marcado con aquel que coincide con el sujeto, de manera que toda asignación temática a un constituyente que no desempeñe la función sujeto será marcada. En cuanto al foco, que para Halliday tiene una dimensión puramente fonológica (y que se superpone a rema e información nueva), su posición no marcada es sobre la última entrada léxica del rema. Habida cuenta de que la distinción de la GF entre funciones pragmáticas clausales y extraclausales representa un avance

sustancial respecto a la dicotomía clásica tema-rema, hemos querido proponer una tipología de las funciones pragmáticas clausales que incluye funciones marcadas y no marcadas, en la línea de Halliday, pero utilizando criterios distintos para la identificación de la marca.⁶ Más aun, esta tipología se basa en un mejor equilibrio entre lo fonológico, lo sintáctico y lo semántico/pragmático, puesto que los tres aspectos se integran por medio del orden de constituyentes entendido como la sucesión lineal de estructuras sintáctico-informativas y prosódicas. En consonancia con uno de los postulados básicos de la teoría de la GF, es la pragmática la que determina el orden en que las estructuras prosódicas y sintácticas se suceden, así como la relación que se establece entre ambos tipos.

3. EL TEMA COMO TOPICO MARCADO Y EL APENDICE COMO FOCO MARCADO

A continuación, nos ocupamos de las funciones extraclausales, y, más concretamente, de su carácter marcado o no marcado. Como ya hemos señalado, uno de los recursos para diferenciar la especial relevancia pragmática de un constituyente es la duplicación. Dentro de la cláusula, los ejemplos del español ilustran mejor este aspecto, puesto que la duplicación no es un procedimiento de focalización en inglés:

(27) Le ha hecho la comida a ella (no a él).

El foco contrastivo sobre el beneficiario se marca por medio de la duplicación pronominal. Este procedimiento también es aceptable cuando la duplicación es pronominal-nominal:

(28) Le ha hecho la comida a su madre.

También es posible la duplicación nominal-pronominal, que requiere el desplazamiento a la izquierda del constituyente focalizado:

(29) A su madre le ha hecho la comida.

Es conveniente destacar que el carácter contrastivo de (28) y (29) no es tan claro como el de (27), y que tanto (28) como (29) contienen información nueva. La duplicación puede combinarse con el cambio de posición y con construcciones especiales:

(30) a. A quien le ha hecho la comida es a su madre.
b. Es a su madre a quien le ha hecho la comida.

Estos cuatro últimos ejemplos insisten en la idea de que la relevancia pragmática de un constituyente puede marcarse con la duplicación. La duplicación puede combinarse con otros recursos para indicar focalidad o topicalidad, como posiciones y construcciones especiales. Volvamos ahora a los ejemplos (2) y (3):

(2') As for John, he is a bloody poser.
(3') Sheila put her foot in it, she did.

Para empezar, habría que insistir en el carácter marcado de ambos enunciados, puesto que ambos constan de dos grupos de entonación aunque estos dos grupos sólo constituyen un grupo informativo: lo que se considera no marcado es un solo grupo de entonación por enunciado, que coincide con un único grupo informativo (Cruttenden 1986: 83; Davidse 1987: 70). En segundo lugar, la cohesión sintáctica indica que tema y tópico en (2') y foco y apéndice en (3') hacen referencia a la misma entidad:

(2'') John-----he
(3'') Sheila-----she

Nos encontramos, por tanto, con un fenómeno de duplicación comparable con los que hemos presentado antes y que, al igual que los anteriores, sirve para resaltar el valor pragmático especial de un constituyente dado. Si el razonamiento es correcto, todo apunta a que el tema y el apéndice constituyen instancias similares de funciones pragmáticas marcadas; o, más exactamente, a que el tema es un tópico marcado y el apéndice un foco marcado, en tanto que duplicados y constituyentes de distintos grupos de

entonación pero no de distintos grupos informativos. Sin embargo, algo sugiere que tema y apéndice no pueden tratarse como fenómenos exactamente paralelos, ya que el tema, dada su posición a la izquierda del enunciado, es tópico y el apéndice, que aparece en el extremo derecho del enunciado, es focal por su posición (al igual que la posición no marcada del tópico es el extremo izquierdo y la del foco el extremo derecho):

(31) a. Yesterday, we met Paul and Susan. Paul was nice.
 As for Susan, she didn't do a thing except bitch.
 b. Mary married a Tarzan, she did.

El hecho de que el tema sea tópico y el apéndice sea focal responde a la conocida tendencia universal a colocar la información nueva (y la más compleja) en la posición que resulte más accesible al oyente, normalmente al final del enunciado. La afirmación de que el tema es tópico (y aporta información dada) y el apéndice es focal (y contiene información nueva) debe hacerse con prudencia, puesto que mientras (32.a) es aceptable, (32.b) no lo es:

(32) a. She put her foot in it, Sheila did.
 b. *As for he, John is a bloody poser.

Dos conclusiones se desprenden de este análisis de las funciones extraclausales:

(i) el tratamiento diferenciado de las funciones tema y apéndice debe mantenerse puesto que, como mínimo, se da la diferencia de que el tema sólo puede ser tópico mientras que el apéndice puede ser tópico o focal:

(33) a. She put her foot in it, Sheila did.
 (Who put her foot in it? Sheila.)
 b. Sheila put her foot in it, she did.
 (What did Sheila do? She put her foot in it.)

Como se ilustra en (33), el apéndice puede actuar de eco tanto del tópico (33.a) como del foco (33.b).

(ii) Es la secuencia tema-tópico la que constituye un tópico marcado, que queda relegado a la segunda posición en el enunciado aunque mantenga la posición inicial en la cláusula, al igual que la secuencia foco-apéndice, que da lugar a un foco marcado, puesto que la última posición del enunciado la toma el apéndice. Esto se resume en los siguientes patrones funcionales:

(34) [P1 (Tema) — P2 (Tópico) — Pi (Foco) — Pj (Apéndice)]+Marcado
 [P1 (Tema) — P2 (Tópico) — Pi (Foco)]+Marcado
 [P1 (Tópico) — Pi (Foco) — Pj (Apéndice)]+Marcado
 [P1 (Tópico) — Pi (Foco)]-Marcado

Añadimos, a modo de recapitulación:

(35) [P1 (Foco) — Pi (Tópico)]+Marcado

4. CONCLUSION: APLICACIONES TIPOLOGICAS

La primera conclusión de estas reflexiones es que una pragmática clausal no es una *contradictio in terminis* dado que la enunciación en la que la cláusula aparece está anclada en el contexto por medio de esa pragmática clausal, que establece la relevancia discursiva de los constituyentes clausales a los que se asigna tópico y foco y de los elementos extraclausales que desempeñan el papel de tema o apéndice. A modo de ejemplo, la continuidad tópica en el discurso, que constituye uno de los recursos para lograr tanto la cohesión sintáctica como la coherencia semántica, tendría su reflejo clausal en la asignación de tópico, así como en la reasignación interclausal de funciones, por la cual hablante u oyente reinterpretan tópicos como focos y viceversa.

La segunda conclusión es que es posible establecer una tipología de las funciones pragmáticas tópico y foco atendiendo a su posición en la sucesión lineal de estructuras sintácticas y prosódicas que conforman el alineamiento clausal. Así pues, las asignaciones no marcadas se definen por una correspondencia biunívoca entre una casilla prosódica y otra sintáctica (en el sentido dado por Connolly 1991). En cuanto a las funciones extraclausales, no es posible incluirlas en esta tipología marcado/no marcado puesto que el tema sólo puede ser tópico mientras que el apéndice puede ser tópico o focal. Sin embargo, el examen de estas funciones ha revelado que la secuencia tema-tópico constituye un tópico marcado y que la sucesión foco-apéndice da lugar a un foco marcado.

Por último, como se deduce de Dezsó (1978), Gundel (1988) y Harlig y Barlovi-Harlig (1988) entre otros, quienes identifican el acento sentencial de las lenguas SOV en la posición intermedia y el de las lenguas SVO en la final, las lenguas SOV tienen una posición focal no marcada delante del verbo y las lenguas SVO detrás. En su evolución de lengua SOV a SVO experimentada por una lengua como el inglés, las funciones pragmáticas clausales habrían cambiado su carácter marcado o no marcado de la siguiente forma: (i) el tópico, desplazado a la posición inicial, constituiría una función marcada, que iría perdiendo su carácter marcado hasta casi gramaticalizarse en posición inicial (cuando tópico =sujeto). (ii) El foco, desplazado de la posición intermedia a la final, constituiría una función marcada e iría perdiendo su carácter marcado en dicha posición. Esta evolución se adapta al patrón unánimemente aceptado marcado-no marcado-gramaticalizado y tiene la ventaja de que puede dar cuenta de los cambios no sólo fonológicos o sintácticos sino también pragmáticos y semánticos. a

NOTAS

1. La investigación conducente a este trabajo ha sido subvencionada por el Vicerrectorado de Investigación de la Universidad de Zaragoza a través del proyecto "Los compuestos nominales en una gramática funcional del inglés: aplicaciones e implicaciones" (245-30/94).

2. Dik (1989:264-5) introduce otras posibles funciones pragmáticas extraclausales, que sólo exemplifica brevemente. Dichas funciones no serán tenidas en cuenta en nuestro análisis:

Well (initiator), what about some dinner?
Ladies and gentlemen (address), shall we start the game?
John was, so they say (modal parenthesis), a bright student.
It's rather hot in here, isn't it? (illocutionary modifier).

3. Este criterio, que coincide con lo propuesto en Cruttenden (1986) y Davidse (1987), es el que permite a Dik (1989: 265) afirmar lo siguiente: *(extra-clausal constituents) are not essential to the integrity of the internal structure of the clause: when they are left out, the remaining clause structure is complete and grammatical.*

4. Por razones de espacio, nos limitamos a los conceptos de información nueva e información dada. La taxonomía de información dada y nueva ofrecida en Prince (1981: 226ss) es compatible con las conclusiones a las que aquí se llega.

5. Esta propuesta parece compatible con la de Givón (1993: 175), que sólo subdivide el foco en aseverativo y contrastivo.

6. Siguiendo a Watters (1979) Dik et al. (1981: 51) interpretan el foco no marcado como la ausencia de foco. En este trabajo, se asume que todas las predicciones subyacentes reciben, como mínimo, un foco, tal y como se recoge en Dik et al. (1981) —contradicciendo, aparentemente, la afirmación anterior— y en de Jong (1981).

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
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**WILLIAM GOLDING'S
RITES OF PASSAGE:
A CASE OF TRANSTEXTUALITY**

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IF "books always speak of other books, and every story tells a story that has already been told" (Eco 1983: 20), this is particularly true of *Rites of Passage*, a novel that expresses the determination of living inside the infinite text, rather than "the impossibility of living outside the infinite text," a statement that, in Barthes's view (1975: 35), defines intertextuality.

More or less consciously, all authors rewrite the work of their predecessors, since it is impossible to escape the influence of previous writings. Nevertheless, *Rites of Passage* uses and abuses the conventions of earlier works very overtly, flaunting its condition of postmodern literary artifact. This essay will show how *Rites of Passage* makes use of all the five types of transtextual relationships that Genette defines in *Palimpsestes* — intertextuality, paratextuality, metatextuality, hypertextuality and archtextuality — through which this novel foregrounds its postmodernist flavour. Thus, while noting the complex transtextuality of *Rites of Passage*, we will also point out its historiographic/metafictional character, since both features are closely related.

As is well known, Golding's fiction *en bloc* is a clear example of parodic transtextuality: thus, *Lord of the Flies* is, among other things, a reaction against Ballantine's *Coral Island* (1858), a Victorian adventure novel that anticipates many of the elements that, transformed, make up *Lord of the*

Flies. Similarly, *The Inheritors* reverses H. G. Wells's essay *Outline of History* and his pseudo-documentary story "The Grisly Folk."

Just as in *The Inheritors* Golding makes use of a prehistorical background to set the characters and the plot, *Rites of Passage* is also located in the past and takes both historical and literary sources as a point of departure. Nevertheless, *Rites of Passage* proves to be much more complex than any of Golding's previous novels in its handling of both historical and fictional sources. Quoting the terms that Linda Hutcheon (1988: 30) uses to define postmodernism, we could well say that *Rites of Passage* is "historically aware, hybrid and inclusive."

As I anticipated before, this novel can be taken as an example of historiographic metafiction, in virtue of its ingenious combination of history, parody and reflexivity. Thus, in *Rites of Passage* history is not presented as objective reality, but as a human construct which in turn is based on previous texts, which function as hypotexts of this novel: Scawen Blunt's *My Diaries: Being a Personal Narrative of Events 1888-1914* (1919-1920) and Elizabeth Longford's *Life of Wellington* (1969). Significantly, these sources, in their twofold character of historical and literary works, intensify the hybrid quality of *Rites of Passage*, and point to a postmodernist postulate: that we have access to the past only through its textualized remains.

The historical sources of *Rites of Passage* refer to an incident that occurred in 1797 on board a ship bound for Manila, involving Wellington, then Colonel Wesley,¹ and a young clergyman. Golding sums up the episode as follows:

the book [*Rites of Passage*] is founded on an actual historical incident. There was a man, a parson, who was on board a ship, in a convoy that was going from the east coast of India to the Philippines . . . there was a regiment of soldiers going, and there was a parson . . . a very respectable man. And one day... either he got drunk and went wandering naked among the soldiers and sailors, or else he went wandering among the soldiers and sailors and got drunk and naked, put it whatever way you like. But he came back, he went into his cabin and stayed there and no matter what anybody else said to him he just lay there until he died, in a few days. (in Baker 1982: 132)

It seems that although Wellington kindly tried to cheer him up, the parson forced himself to die. Significantly, Golding's impulse to write the novel originated in his desire to recreate the past in a critical way, as postmodernism does. For Golding, the clergyman's attitude was so horrific

that "I found that it was necessary for me, for my peace of mind, to invent circumstances in which it was possible for a man to die of shame" (in Baker 1982: 132).

Apart from this particular incident, *Rites of Passage* seems to have originated in other similar strange deaths in literature and life, which again, enhances the postmodernist symbiosis of literature and history. Golding remarks:

When you read nineteenth-century life and literature, it seems quite remarkable how many people suddenly died: Arthur Hallam, for instance lay down on a couch and just died. I don't understand it, but it is something that deeply interested me, and it seems to have occurred more often in the nineteenth century than at any other time. (in Haffenden 1985: 100)

In his study of *Rites of Passage*, Dick (1987: 113-14) mentions several characters which die strange, unexplainable deaths: Lucy in Walter Scott's *Bride of Lammermoor*, Fiers in Chekhov's *Cherry Orchard*, Elsa in *Lohengrin*, Elizabeth in *Tannhäuser*, Isolde in *Tristan und Isolde* (the three of them by Wagner) and Clarissa in Richardson's novel of the same name. It is logical to deduce that *Clarissa* is —among the preceding works— the closest influence on Golding, since the causes of both deaths —that of Clarissa in Richardson's novel and that of Colley in *Rites of Passage* have a great deal in common. Although Golding has not cited *Clarissa* as one of his sources, Richardson's literary features pervade the novel, as we shall see later.

From these references, it seems apparent that the network of hypertexts that support *Rites of Passage* —which is the hypertext, in Genette's terminology (1982: 11)— is more complex and varied than what could be expected at first sight, especially when we realize that none of the hypertexts mentioned so far is quoted or alluded to in the novel.

Although *Rites of Passage* does not indicate the exact dates in which the action is set (it was Golding who, in an interview, specified that the events of this novel take place in 1812-13 [in Baker 1982: 161]), it includes enough historical references to locate the story in time: at the end of the Napoleonic wars, an old British warship, loaded with passengers, emigrants and farm animals, sails to Australia, which had become a centre of attraction for British emigrants and adventurers who wanted to try their luck in the new colonies, at a time when convicts were also transported there.

As a travel narrative, *Rites of Passage* emphasizes its twofold quality: like historical novels, it displays characters that are representatives of a

specific period; as a postmodernist work, it rewrites the past in the light of the present, in this case by contemplating the historical events from the perspective of class divisions. In fact, the social discrimination is such that "the ship as traditional literary microcosm is here specifically a class structure," as Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor (1984: 270) have pointed out.

It is worth noting that although *Rites of Passage* cannot be regarded as a historical novel in the traditional sense of the term, its background and sources relate it to that genre, which points to another transtextual relationship, archtextuality. In Genette's classification, archtextuality is the most abstract and implicit transtextual connection, that which links texts by genres. Thus, it is only explicit when the name of the genre is incorporated in the title or subtitle of the text. In this novel, archtextuality is completely unobtrusive, since there are no indications whatsoever about its generic status.

The protagonist, Edmund Talbot, is a young man who is going to take up his new assignment as secretary to the Governor General in Australia. He is also the narrator of most of the book's events, as he records them in his journal for the entertainment of his aristocratic patron and godfather, who is its addressee. Robert Colley, the character who impersonates the historical parson, becomes another narrator of the story, since the letter addressed to his sister is included in Talbot's journal after Colley's death.

By using this technique, Golding achieves a twofold effect: on the one hand, *Rites of Passage*, following the historical trend of the 18th- century, uses the epistolary mode, one of the dominant types of the fiction of that time, and preserves the diarist quality of one of its sources: it is estimated that over a thousand epistolary fictions were written in the Augustan age (Rogers 1978: 68). Note also that in Smollett's *Humphry Clinker*, an 18th-century travel novel that uses the epistolary technique, the same event is narrated through letters from different points of view (Dick 1987: 115-17). If the use of the epistolary mode betrays another archtextual relationship, the features of *Humphry Clinker* make of *Rites of Passage* a hypertext of the former.

On the other hand, the double narrative provides two opposed points of view, a device that Golding employs recurrently in his works because it undermines the assumptions built by the first perspective and forces the reader to see the events in a new light. Significantly, this technique is both a characteristic of historiographic metafiction —it emphasizes uncertainty (Hutcheon 1988: 117)— and a new version of Golding's recurrent structural device, which underlines the contrived quality of *Rites of Passage*. Thus, Golding's previous novels become hypotexts of *Rites of Passage*, since,

among other things, this work echoes their structure. Due to the close connection between the novels of the same author, we may well speak of *sister-text* relationship, a term recently coined by Ann Jefferson to describe "the relations between one text and another within the corpus (and more particularly between those texts which fall within the same generic category) of a given author" (1990: 110-11)

In this novel, the confrontation of points of view is particularly significant, since it symbolizes not only two approaches to the same events, but also the contrast between the values of Neoclassicism and those of Romanticism. From a transtextual perspective, this characteristic is of paramount importance, since it presupposes the use of neoclassical and romantic sources, which again takes us to the abstract realm of archtextuality. Needless to say, *Rites of Passage* abounds in concrete, hypertextual references to these movements, which will be analysed later on.

As many critics have pointed out, Talbot embodies the characteristics of the Augustan age: he could be described as "a classist young man classically educated" (Boyd 1988: 158). He is not only an individualized character but a type, a representative of a historical period, a feature that Lukács (in Hutcheon 1988: 113) associates with the historical novel. As could be expected of a well educated, aristocratic, 18th-century man, Talbot's journal abounds in allusions to the classics. These correspond to the most concrete type of transtextual relationships according to Genette's classification: that of intertextuality. Thus, he mentions authors, works and mythological figures such as Martial, Theocritus, Servius, Lucullus, Pan, Circe, the *Aeneid*, Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle seems to be a favourite among Talbot's authors, since he refers to him repeatedly, emphasizing his agreement with the philosopher's doctrines.

For example, Talbot endorses Aristotle's theory of the orders of society, which he recalls when expressing his dislike of Colley's ridiculous appearance and obsequious manners; in Talbot's opinion, they betray the parson's low origin: "Colley was a living proof of old Aristotle's dictum. There is after all an order to which the man belongs by nature though some mistaken quirk of patronage has elevated him beyond it" (RP 67). As this allusion to Aristotle includes a comment on his work, the relationship involved is not only intertextual, but also metatextual, that is, "la relation de 'commentaire,'" "la relation *critique*," in Genette's definition (1982:10).

In turn, this explicit allusion to Aristotle implicitly echoes Pope's *Essay on Man*, in which this author, as spokesman of the Augustan age and Aristotle's follower, expresses similar thoughts: "Order is heaven's first law;

and, this confess'd, / Some are, and must be, greater than the rest, / More rich, more wise . . ." (1975: 207). Although Pope is not mentioned in *Rites of Passage*, Talbot's narrative is interspersed with frequent allusions to 18th-century authors and works, like Goldsmith, Richardson, Fielding, Smollett, Dr. Johnson and Sterne; his bookshelf contains texts such as *Moll Flanders*, *Gil Blas* and Hervey's *Meditations Among the Tombs*, which fall off the shelf at Talbot's comic attack on Zenobia. Again, these intertextual relationships become metatextual—and even hypertextual—in the case of Richardson and Sterne.

Evidently, Golding has used Richardson's and Sterne's literary technique as a basis for his novel. The parallels between Sterne's *Tristram Shandy* and Talbot's journal are inescapable: both include digressions, sudden starts and stops and share irregularities in the chapter headings. Precisely, these irregularities point to another type of transtextuality: paratextuality, which describes the connections between a text and the title, or subtitle, preface, epigraph, notes, illustrations... of another one. Similarly, both narrators are chronically self-conscious, "anticipating" the time-manipulating devices of modern literature: "Good God! Look at the time! If I am not more able to choose what I say I shall find myself describing the day before yesterday rather than writing about today for you tonight!... I find that writing is like drinking, a man must learn to control it" (RP 29).

If these elements prove the hypertextual relationship, Talbot's comment on Richardson's and Sterne's works shows the metatextual one:

I begin to understand the limitations of such a journal as I have time to keep. I no longer credit Mistress *Pamela* 's pietistic accounts of every shift in her calculated resistance to the advances of her master! (RP 28).

My entries are becoming short as some of Mr Sterne's chapters! (RP 72)

Strikingly enough, Talbot himself, as a Tristram-like narrator, is aware of the similarities and contrasts between his journal and its literary models. On the other hand, the parallels between *Tristram Shandy* and *Rites of Passage* are highly significant, since they reinforce the postmodernist quality of Golding's novel. It is worth noting that *Tristram Shandy* is regarded as the prototype for the contemporary metafictional novel (Waugh 1984: 23, 70).

Talbot also expresses his interest in Falconer's *Marine Dictionary* — intertextuality again— whereas his narrative shows a tendency to "fine

writing" (*RP* 67). He wishes to create "sparks of wit" (*RP* 18) and entertain his influential godfather with them, inserting terms of Tarpaulin language, in which Talbot takes great delight. Therefore, the tone of his journal is, in general, light-hearted, rhetorical and even theatrical, which enhances the metafictional character of the novel.

Against this neoclassical world of common sense and refinement, Colley prefigures the advance of Romanticism. Unlike Talbot, Colley is less a type than a contradictory, "ex-centric" individual, like the characters of many a postmodernist novel and historiographic metafiction in particular (Hutcheon 1988: 113-14). An analysis of the figure of Colley quickly reveals him as reflecting the tensions of a transitional world, but aggravated by his religious profession and his uncertain social status. Significantly, Colley's letter points out what Talbot's journal omits. Nature, which is ignored in Talbot's journal, or only mentioned in so far as it hinders his comfort, is now contemplated with awe and wonder. Nevertheless, these romantic traces may only be the sentimental overflow of a rather naïve—not to say silly—character.

In fact, Colley reflects the change of taste that occurred in England in the second half of the 18th-century, or rather, the split that appeared between "official culture" and actual taste. Whereas the institutions supported rationalism and the Enlightenment, many people began to feel attracted by the irrational and the cult of sensibility, as reflected for example in the success of Gothic fiction, Graveyard Poetry and Richardson's novels. As can be seen, these characteristics reflect a complex network of transtextual relationships that we may well call archtextual, rather than hypertextual, since they go beyond the influence of concrete works to embrace the literature and culture of two periods: Neoclassicism and Romanticism.

Colley, then, has a sentimental character, but his letter, like Talbot's journal, reveals his faith in the social pyramid. No doubt, Colley is depicted from an ironic perspective, since Golding undermines the respect and authority traditionally accorded the cloth. In the novel, this parson becomes a victim of his own magnification of class distinctions.

Thus, despite Colley's apparent simplicity and his sister's lack of scholarship—she is the addressee of his letter—Colley's writing also includes several instances of learned intertextuality: allusions to the classics and a quotation from the Bible. He mentions Sophocles, Hercules, Leviathan and the legend of Talos; he quotes from Homer and reads some "profane literature" (*RP* 209), *Robinson Crusoe*, a very appropriate reading, since Colley, like the protagonist of this book, is all alone on the island of the ship. On the other hand, his library includes Baxter's *Saints Everlasting Rest*, the

title of which ironically points to the circumstances of Colley's restless, unsaintly death.

Nevertheless, Colley's acts and feelings are more significant than the quotations of his letter. Thus, the episodes of his debasement and death are worth recalling. Given Colley's indefinite status —his being a *parvenu*²— his lack of social support and his grotesque appearance, it is no wonder that he should become the scapegoat, the fool: the officers Deverel and Cumbershum select him as the victim of the "Badger-Bag." According to Glascock's *Naval Sketch Book* (1825) (in Tiger 1982: 226), which Golding may have consulted, this naval term refers to a ceremony conducted by the sailors in honour of Neptune during the crossing of the Equator. Generally, it consisted in harmless tricks that the crew played on the passengers, but Colley is brutally abused and humiliated, ironically by the sailors he so much admired: obviously, this is one of the rites of passage alluded to in the title of the novel. Significantly, it recalls the ritual murders of Golding's previous novels like *Lord of the Flies* and *The Inheritors*. In fact, it is Summer's gunshot that stops what could have become another killing.

In turn, these scapegoat rituals have their antecedents in the Dionysian worship as reflected in the *Bacchae*, where Pentheus is savagely dismembered and killed. As can be seen, *Rites of Passage* rests on a far-reaching, almost never-ending framework of hypotexts that a brief study cannot exhaust. On the other hand, the title of the novel, *Rites of Passage*, points to the transtextual connection of paratextuality, since it is borrowed from Arnold Van Gennep's classic study of initiation rituals and ceremonies (*Les Rites de Passage*, 1909).³

However, the ceremony of the "Badger-Bag" is only a preliminary to the next rite —the climax— of the novel. Despite his public humiliation, Colley decides to pay a visit to the sailors, more out of a wish to restore his tainted religious authority —his badge of class— and his attraction to them, than out of Christian humility. Nevertheless, his well-meaning plans end up in his death: according to the information gathered by Talbot, who has not witnessed the event, it seems that Colley, made drunk by the sailors and in a state of frenzy, performs fellatio on his idolized sailor. Then, stripped of his wig and most of his clothes, he makes a spectacle of himself by urinating in front of the passengers, who have assembled on the quarterdeck. Colley's degradation thus constitutes an ironic reversal of his social and religious expectations.

In fact, the episode of Colley's debasement can be interpreted as a conscious parody of the romantic *topos*. It is no coincidence that before being

lugged to his cabin, and in expression of his rapture, he exclaims: Joy! Joy! Joy! (RP 117), words that bring to mind some verses in Coleridge's "Dejection: An Ode":

Joy, virtuous Lady! Joy that ne'er was given,
Safe to the pure, and in their purest hour,
Life, and Life's effluence, cloud at once and shower,
Joy, Lady! is the spirit and the power,
Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower
A new Earth and new Heaven. . . . (in Abrams 1986: 376)

Just as Coleridge's "Joy" expresses a feeling of vitality and harmony between one's inner life and the life of nature, and offers the experience of a renewed world, Colley's exclamation displays his exultation at the fulfilment of his inmost desires. But unlike Coleridge's joy, Colley's is not given "in [his] purest hour" and only offers him the transient pleasure of forbidden sexual satisfaction. Therefore, his euphoria is followed by feelings of despair and shame. Despite Talbot's and Anderson's half-hearted attempts at reconciling him to life, Colley, rigid and motionless on his bed, prefers to die. On the other hand, the name of Colley can be interpreted as a parodic transformation of that of Coleridge, whose works pervade the whole novel.⁴

Significantly, this intertextual and hypertextual relationship with Coleridge's poetry is not the only one. Thus, Mr. Brocklebank, one of the passengers of the ship, claims to have painted a portrait of Coleridge, whereas his would-be daughter, Zenobia, has met the poet and knows his verses by heart: "*Alone, alone, / All, all alone, / Alone on a wide, wide sea!*" (RP 59). It is precisely the recitation of these lines from *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* that initiates a discussion between Prettiman —the archrationalist— and Brocklebank about the killing of an albatross. Whereas Brocklebank says that he would never shoot one, Prettiman plans to kill one himself in order to disprove all superstitions, though he has never fired a shot in his life. His obsessive determination offers Talbot the opportunity of writing a witty statement that is also metafictional, since it suggests the contradictions of the novel's plot: "He [Prettiman] demonstrates to the thoughtful eye how really irrational a rationalist can be!" (RP 73).

As in the previous case, the references to the Ancient Mariner are highly parodic, since they point out both the similarities and contrasts to the episodes in this novel. Thus, both the albatross and Colley are victims, though the latter is not so innocent as the former. Like the Mariner, Colley is

"all alone" ("I was alone! Yes, in that vast ship with her numberless souls I was alone. . ." [RP 233-34]) and his description of the landscape and the motionlessness of the ship echoes that of Coleridge's poem:

Our huge ship was motionless and her sails hung down. On her right hand the red sun was setting and on her left the full moon was rising, the one directly across from the other. . . . Here plainly to be seen were the very scales of GOD. (RP 233)

In the corresponding passage of Coleridge's poem, the same astral images are used : "The bloody Sun, at noon, / Right up above the mast did stand, / No bigger than the Moon" (in Abrams 1986: 339). Note, however, that in the poem the sun and moon do not symbolize the divine scales, at least explicitly: it seems obvious that Coleridge's verses have been rewritten in order to emphasize Colley's religious bias. Significantly, though, it is in Colley and Colley's letter that the closest affinities between both works are to be found, which enhances the romantic associations that this character evokes.

Besides, Colley is directly involved in an affair which recalls another romantic work, Melville's *Billy Budd* (hypertextuality again): Billy Rogers — Colley's "Young Hero" (RP 227) and Zenobia's "Sailor Hero" (p.101)— is an ironic inversion of the former. If Billy Budd stands for innocence, Billy Rogers represents corruption. In fact, Rogers resembles Claggart, the depraved officer of Melville's story. Both sailors play a decisive role, because their beauty sets in motion the tragic events in both works. Note also that Golding has replaced Budd by a surname that brings to mind one of the most wicked boys of *Lord of the Flies*, Roger.

Golding's parody of Melville's story proves to be particularly metafictional, since it mixes history and fiction in more ways than one. Like *Rites of Passage*, *Billy Budd* is also based on a historical event, the Somers mutiny case, which took place in the American Navy in 1842. Like Golding, Melville modified both the date and the place of the historical events, setting his story in the British Navy in 1797, the period of the Napoleonic wars and, strikingly enough, the year in which the historical parson chose to die.

Rites of Passage includes other tacit hypertextual allusions to works written in a later period than that portrayed in this novel. As Crompton (1985: 134-35) has pointed out, Talbot's decision with regard to Colley's sister echoes that of Marlow in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* : Talbot decides to appropriate Colley's letter to his sister and write her another one, thus concealing the truth from her, as Marlow does from Kurtz's fiancée. Although

Golding (in Baker 1982: 162) has repeatedly denied the influence of Conrad's work on his fiction, some similarities between them are evident. Thus, Boyd (1988: 160) has studied the parallel between Conrad's "The Shadow Line" and *Rites of Passage*, emphasizing the passage from youth to maturity in both of them.

Evidently, the rites that Golding portrays in his novels should not be understood only in a literal sense, since they involve a journey from ignorance to experience which in the present novel affects both protagonists, Talbot and Colley. Unfortunately, "poor old Colley fails to make the grade," as Golding has remarked (in Baker 1982: 162). As can be seen, these recurrent elements in Golding's fiction provide further instances of hypertextuality and *sister-text* relationship.

However, it is in its anachronisms that *Rites of Passage* demonstrates its quality of postmodernist construct most openly. Wheeler, Talbot's servant in the ship, alludes indirectly —intertextuality again— to de Quincey's *Confessions of an Opium Eater*, a work published in 1821, and therefore a later date than that fixed by Golding for his novel. On the other hand, Talbot mentions *Emma* to compare Zenobia's flirtations to those of Austen's heroine. Although Talbot could not have read *Emma* —it was published in 1816 and *Rites of Passage* is set in 1812-13— Austen's literary world of manners and class pervades Golding's novel.

Thus, while the structure of *Rites of Passage* can be seen as a parodic rewriting of Richardson's and Sterne's works, its central concern constitutes an ironic reversal of Austen's fiction. Needless to say, Golding goes far beyond Austen's limits, and for that reason, *Rites of Passage* becomes an ironic inversion of her fiction, since it shows the aspects of life that Austen conceals: as Boyd (1988: 156) has pointed out, it is impossible to imagine any Austen character vomiting or going to the lavatory, let alone committing *fellatio* or urinating in front of an audience. In fact, Golding's manipulation of Austen's fiction represents the aim of historiographic metafiction: to rewrite the past in a new context, filling the historical blanks with new, subversive material. Evidently, Golding's treatment of class in *Rites of Passage* is deeper than any that might be found in an 18th- or early 19th-century novel; in that sense, this novel also reverses Austen's harmless classist world.

Above all, *Rites of Passage* is a novel about class: all the events in the book turn around it, particularly Colley's death. As we have seen, the characters are very much aware of it; Summers, for example, says to Talbot, "Class is the British language" (RP 125). In fact, Golding has always been worried about the rigidity of the British class system, which he calls "the

classic disease of society in this country" (in Baker 1982: 136). In this respect, *Rites of Passage* echoes Golding's previous works, particularly *The Pyramid*, which can be taken as another hypotext or *sister-text* of *Rites of Passage*. Golding stresses that *Rites of Passage* "[is] making some urgent statements about class. Unless we can get rid of it or at least blunt the pyramid or make it a little less monumental, we're done, we're finished, and it had better happen quickly" (in Baker 1982: 160).

This "endogamic" transtextuality becomes apparent when recalling Golding's early autobiographic essay, "A Touch of Insomnia" (*The Hot Gates*, 1966: 135-39). In it, Golding refers to his memories of a voyage in a liner crossing the Atlantic. Shipboard life in that ship seems to be only a 20th-century version of our historical vessel:

Here the class system was axiomatic. You could not invade a plusher bar simply by readiness to pay more. Nor could you descend to a comfortable pub if you wanted to pay less. Where you were born, there you stayed. At the beginning —a sort of privileged babyhood—you could glimpse the other worlds. You could pass through doors marked First Class and see the wide bedrooms, the stupendous still lives of sea food on the side tables of the dining-room. Perhaps this was a concession to our brief stop in republican France —for after that, the doors were locked. We had to be content with our middle station, right aft, where you got any vibration that was going. And I supposed there was some sealed-off hold where the base of our social pyramid rested; where tourists were chained to the kelson under the whips of savage taskmasters, while their flesh was subdued by a diet of weevily biscuit and stale water.

In both ships, there are demarcation lines that cannot be crossed. In *Rites of Passage*, the "gentry" are the only ones who have individual cabins and live in the stern of the ship, whereas the emigrants and the sailors are huddled together in the prow. Finally, the quarterdeck is the domain of the captain and the officers: passengers only have access to it by invitation. Although both Talbot and Colley visit the quarterdeck without permission, the different treatment they receive is a proof of the tyranny of class, exacerbated in this novel by the captain's anticlericalism, which in turn, has its origin in class problems.

In agreement with Ann Jefferson (1990: 110-12), we think that this kind of transtextual relationship between novel and autobiographic essay by the same author could be called metatextual, due to the commentary role of the

latter. In fact, both Golding's autobiographic essays and public declarations should be considered metatexts of his fiction. Thus, in *Rites of Passage*, Mr. Oldmeadow's fear of the dead on account of his Cornish origin (*RP* 181) recalls Golding's essay "The Ladder and the Tree" (*The Hot Gates*, 1966: 166-75), and particularly his conversation with John Carey (1986: 177), in which Golding openly confesses his irrational fears: "I'm scared stiff of the uncanny—always have been. This is the Cornish coming out."

As I pointed out before, Anderson's behaviour is conditioned by class problems. In the last pages of his journal, Talbot records the "dénouement" (*RP* 266) of the drama. He has learnt from Deverel that captain Anderson detests the clergy as the result of having a parson for his foster father despite the fact of being the illegitimate son of Lord L__. His father, Lord L__, had arranged for his mistress (Anderson's mother) to be married off to a parson so that he could marry a rich heiress. As the lord had another son, Anderson's dreams of preferment in the social pyramid vanished. What Talbot fails to realize is that Anderson not only hates clergymen, but Talbot's lordly behaviour, too. Once again, we come across transtextuality: if the name Lord L__ is an echo of Richardson's Mr B. in *Pamela* (intertextuality), the story of Anderson's origin is the parody of many an 18th-century novel, and of Fanny Burney's *Evelina* in particular (hypertextuality).

Probably, one of the most significant influences on *Rites of Passage* is that of drama. As I noted before, Talbot narrates the incidents of the story in an overtly theatrical way, discussing also the characteristics of the play:

It is a play. Is it a farce or a tragedy? Does not a tragedy depend on the dignity of the protagonist? Must he not be great to fall greatly? A farce, then, for the man appears now a sort of Punchinello. (*RP* 104)

In agreement with this class-ridden world, Talbot experiences Colley's affair not as a tragedy, but as a farce, due to the parson's low rank. Significantly, the text betrays its self-reflexivity by showing the narrator's awareness of this unorthodox "play": therefore, we could speak of a metatextual relationship of this novel with itself.

A further metatextual relationship can be seen in Talbot's comments on Shakespeare's and Racine's plays, and on the problems of translation. We can note, in passing, that Talbot includes in the last page of his journal a quotation from Racine taken from his godfather's own translation of this author, which constitutes the final instance of intertextuality⁵ in the novel. Talbot seems to prefer Shakespeare's tragedies to those of Racine —his

godfather's favourite ones— because while Racine rigidly excludes the comic from his tragedies, Shakespeare freely combines the tragic and the comic in his. In this respect, *Rites of Passage* also reveals its metafictional character, since it mixes the dramatic features of these playwrights. Thus, whereas the circumstances of the parson's fall are tragicomic—"by turns farcical, gross and tragic" (RP 276)— like Shakespeare's tragedies, the novel's structure recalls that of Racine's plays, for the most crucial actions of the story take place offstage: Talbot witnesses neither the "Badger Bag" nor Colley's visit to the sailors.⁶

What is more, *Rites of Passage* echoes the tragic structure of other Golding works (*sister-text* relationship) which in turn, originates in classical tragedy (hypertextuality and archtextuality). Significantly, although he has never denied his indebtedness to classical Greek literature, it was not until the publication of this novel that he discussed the structure of his fiction:

I think of the shape of a novel, when I do think of a novel as having a shape, as having a shape precisely like Greek drama. You have this rise of tension and then the sudden fall and all the rest of it. You may even find the technical Greek terms tucked away in the book, if you like, and check them off one by one. So the Greek tragedy as a form, a classical form, is very much there. The idea of the character who suffers a disastrous fall through a flaw in his character, that you find there, I think. (in Baker 1982: 165)

In addition, Golding has defined *Rites of Passage* as black comedy (in Baker 1982: 164), declarations that corroborate the ambivalent characteristics that Talbot has noted.

If, as Foucault says, "the frontiers of a book are never clear-cut" since "it is only a node within a network" (Hutcheon 1988: 127), this statement is particularly true of *Rites of Passage*, a novel caught up in a system of endless transtextual references, among which those pointing back to 18th- and 19th-century literature and Golding's previous fiction are particularly conspicuous. Thus, *Rites of Passage* contains the typical elements that characterize Golding's works: a fixed and limited setting, the sea surrounding it, tragic structure, a shift in point of view, the scapegoat figure, the protagonist that matures through the experiences —rites— that he undergoes, the related themes of evil, guilt and social class, and, last but not least, the ironic rewriting of previous texts.

In characteristic metafictional style, Talbot sums up the features of *Rites of Passage* by commenting on his journal:

Wit? Acute observations? Entertainment? Why —it has become, perhaps, some kind of sea-story but a sea-story with never a tempest, no shipwreck, no sinking, no rescue at sea, no sight nor sound of an enemy, no thundering broadsides, heroism, prizes, gallant defences and heroic attacks! Only one gun fired and that a blunderbuss! (*RP* 277-78)

As he notes, his narrative has little to do with conventional sea novels: in fact, it can be read as an ironic inversion of them. Contrary to this kind of fiction and traditional historical novels, *Rites of Passage* proves to be a complex, postmodernist text in which both history and fiction are rewritten. In accordance with its metafictional character, this novel problematizes the possibility of historical knowledge, and Talbot sounds like a new historicist when he records his awareness of it: "Life is a formless business. . . . Literature is much amiss in forcing a form on it" (*RP* 265).

As we have seen, *Rites of Passage* contains the elements that characterize historiographic metafiction: use and abuse of the canon, irony, parody and multiform transtextuality. However, as Umberto Eco (in Hutcheon 1988: 39) has said about his own fiction, this "game of irony" has, despite appearances, a serious aim. Thus, in *Rites of Passage* parody has, apart from the teasing effect, an ideological purpose, for the manipulation of its historical and literary sources functions in such a way as to direct the reader to the moral and social concerns of the novel. a

NOTES

1. His original surname (until 1798) was Wesley. Later, it changed to Wellesley.
2. "[A] promoted peasant," in Golding's words (in Haffenden 1985: 103).
3. On this relationship, see Crompton's *A View from the Spire* (1985: 99, 151, 153).
4. Significantly, the term "colley" echoes "cully," which originally meant "one easily tricked or imposed on: DUPE, GULL." (*Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, 1986: 552).

5. Note that, throughout this paper, the term "intertextuality" is not used in its general sense, but in the concrete, restricted one defined by Genette in *Palimpsestes* and discussed previously in the text.

6. With regard to the theatrical characteristics of *Rites of Passage*, Golding notes: "It had to be theatrical because [Colley] had to make an exhibition of himself, and therefore the ship had to be turned into a theatre in which he could do it" (in Baker 1982: 132).

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**-' INTERVIEW WITH
PROFESSOR NORMAN BLAKE,
CO-EDITOR OF THE *CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE***

-

**MARIA PILAR NAVARRO ERRASTI
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CAMBRIDGE University Press is publishing the most extraordinary team-work text so far done on the history of English. The publication has brought together the most outstanding experts on each particular subject and the result is an amazing body of knowledge gathered in six volumes. Professor Blake is the editor of the second volume.

—*The main questions will be about the publication of the Cambridge History of the English Language, as you are more popular now because of that big volume. Thus the first question will be, why did you think of writing a book like this?*

BLAKE: Well, I think the first answer to that is that there is no comprehensive history of the English language. Most of the books about the history of the English language are actually student text-books, which are one-volume and which cover quite a lot of ground. Many of them actually spend, perhaps, most of their time on the Old and Middle English period and not enough on the more modern periods, particularly on the development of English abroad; so that to have a comprehensive history of the English language would bring a lot of the writings that other people have done together in a complete set of volumes so that people would be able to have access to an authoritative and also fairly complete history of the language. The second thing, perhaps, is that the history of the language is a subject that

needs to be improved from the attitude of teachers of English, both in universities and in schools, and producing a large edition with six volumes in itself tends to alter people's attitudes. They tend to think that the history of the language must be important because there is such a heavy set of volumes which show how important the history of the language is.

—*Was this publication also meant to fill a gap in the bibliography on the history of the English language?*

BLAKE: Yes. There are a lot of people working on particular aspects of the language; but if you wanted to know something, say, about place names in the 17th century in England you might find it difficult to know precisely where to go to. By having the consolidated history of the English language in six volumes, it should, in the future, give you the first place to go, so that you can read the chapter, or the part of the chapter about what you may be interested in. And then, there is, of course, an extensive bibliography in each of the volumes. In the bibliography of Middle English that I worked on, I think the bibliography runs to 70 pages; that gives a lot of information. Naturally the volumes will become out of date and there are no plans as yet to produce a second edition because the first edition is not even complete. But the possibility always exists that even if we did not produce a second edition that was completely revised, we might produce a second edition which had a new bibliography.

—*What people did you think of when you decided to write the book: specialists, teachers, general people..?*

BLAKE: All those people. I think it would be difficult to write for the general public entirely because you have to have a general understanding of linguistics but there are chapters within the volumes which could readily be used by the general public and we do have to remember that there are a lot of general people who are interested in the history of their own language, and perhaps people in other countries who might be interested in the history of the English language. But the main audience was intended to be students and scholars rather than the general public. However, in so far as the volumes that have been produced until now have sold extremely well, and Cambridge University Press is delighted with the number of copies that they have sold, I imagine it is found in a lot of university and other libraries throughout the world.

—*Professor Hogg is the General editor. Where and what does he teach? Does he teach the history of the English language?*

BLAKE: He is professor of the English Language at Manchester University. He teaches the History of the English Language and Historical

Linguistics. But I think he probably teaches Anglo-Saxon as well. He has written a book on the phonology of English which has been published recently. He is more interested in Anglo-Saxon than in other periods, but like all people who teach the History of English, they are interested in all the periods as well, but Anglo-Saxon is what you may call his first love.

—To what extent is he responsible for the distribution of the whole subject matter into the different volumes? Did he decide? Did you all decide?

BLAKE: Well, he is the general editor and at the meeting in Sheffield, when the concept of the Cambridge History was decided, we agreed that he would edit the first volume and I would edit the second volume, and we had certain proposals for who would edit the other volumes, but we also agreed that the editors of the six volumes would form an editorial team, and we discussed from time to time who might write particular chapters and how the volumes would be distributed. But because it is the first time something like this has been done, we tended to follow what is the traditional division. So we had a volume on Old English, we had a volume on Middle English, we had a volume on early Modern English, and so on.

It would have been possible for us to think of other divisions. The main debate that we had really, was whether we would do a history of the English language where the language was divided up into periods or whether the language was divided up into topics, so there might be a history of English syntax, a history of English phonology, and so on. But these books would be quite independent and therefore you would not get the sense of a continuous, chronological development and a lot of the information that you might have about the Anglo-Saxon period would have to be repeated in each period because, if you want to take aspects like sociolinguistics and other modern attitudes towards language into account, you have to provide a certain amount of historical, cultural background, and that might have to be repeated in every volume if we had decided to do it by topic rather than by period. So, essentially, right at the very beginning, it was decided that we would discuss it by period, and at one or two of the meetings of the International Conference on English Historical Linguistics, the one at Sheffield, and then the one at Amsterdam, and the one at Cambridge, there were meetings of the various editors and some times we met separately in London or Oxford or Cambridge and we had various editorial meetings. Once we had allocated the volumes to the general editors and the individual chapters to the specific scholars, there was less reason for us to meet, because what happens now is that when somebody completes a chapter, say, for the sake of the argument,

somebody completes a chapter on the syntax in Early Modern English, he would send that chapter to Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press would then photocopy the chapter and send it to each of the editors. We would then, as editors, read the chapter, make comments, and send comments both to the editor of the volume as well as to the original author, and they would decide what changes they needed to make in the light of the various comments they have received from the different editors. Thus, although there is an editor to each volume, there is a level of, what I might call, co-operative aspect about the work in general.

—*So you did a lot of reading...*

BLAKE: I did and I am doing. Not all the chapters have been written yet. It is only if you are the editor of the volume that you would see the revised version: We see the original version and then make comments, but the revisions we leave to the editor of that volume and the author of the chapter. So as editors we read each chapter two or three times as it goes backwards and forwards between the editor and the author.

—*From the point of view of teaching. Do you think it is better to teach the history of the English language taking into account the different periods, Old English, Middle English, etc., or rather the different fields, morphology, syntax, phonology, etc.?*

BLAKE: Well, I think that depends upon how English is taught within the University in question. If you were doing a course which was mainly linguistic and you had courses in syntax, phonology or whatever, you might want to teach the history of the English syntax, the history of the English phonology, in part because you were teaching the theoretical aspects of syntax or phonology. But, if, as is generally true in England, people study the literature in a historical way, so they study Old English literature, they study Middle English literature, they study Shakespeare and early Modern English literature, and so on, then it makes more sense in a way to tie the history of English to the period because people can then use the literature they are reading as a support for the history of language and the history of language as a support for the literature, and it makes perhaps more sense to them to look at it in that way. I do not think there is any right way to do it. I think the matter is very much a practical matter, depending on what the ethos in the university is like. We have more of a problem in England than you possibly do in Spain, in so far as we have only three years as undergraduates, and therefore the amount of material you can cover in three years is naturally much less than that you could cover in five years in Spain, or, unless you are

going to reduce to four or whatever, you have more time to develop it in this way.

—*At the same time, the English students are more familiarised with the language than the Spanish students...*

BLAKE: Well, they are more familiarised with the modern language, they are not necessarily more familiar with the older language.

—*But it is easier for them to understand the language of older periods. Don't you think so?*

BLAKE: I do not know.

—*Especially based on English patterns?*

BLAKE: Well, no. They have a problem which may or may not be true of your students that they think that they can understand it because they often make an assumption that a word or a syntactic expression, because there is an equivalent one in Modern English, therefore it is the same in Middle English and so they very easily mistranslate or misunderstand and they do not necessarily perceive the nuances in the development of the language which are taking place. So, obviously they have some advantages, but generally speaking, many of our students in England who are studying English may not know any other language or they may not know any other language very well. Most of them do not know Latin any longer and they certainly do not know Greek, and therefore, looking at the historical development of a language is more difficult for them. Equally, they don't often have the same grammatical background as students in Spain have because grammar is not taught very much in English schools anymore, so they have no [basis] . . . in order to understand the history of language, so it is not just studying the history that they are looking at, they are trying to look at how to study language generally, so I do think they have certain disadvantages.

—*Going back to the History of the English Language, in which way can it be considered innovative?*

BLAKE: I think it will be innovative in the way that a lot of histories of the language have tended to be rather technical in the sense that they have shown that this sound has changed to this sound and this sound has changed to that sound, or this syntactic feature has been replaced by that syntactic feature. Now, because we have a much bigger book, or series, it is possible for us to try to put these changes within a historical and sociocultural context so that people will not just think of, for example, the Great Vowel Shift and certain vowels being changed into some other vowels. The whole question of why and how it happened and various stages at which it happened, there is more time in which this can be developed and so we hope it will sort of make

people more attuned to studying language as a cultural and historical phenomenon and not just a series of linguistic changes, as it were, in isolation. It is not innovative in the sense that other people have not looked at this, because clearly this has been looked at by individual scholars and things have been written about this or that, but it has not been put in a whole framework and I think it will alter the overall teaching of the English language or the history of the English language in the universities because it will tend to make people sort of... pay more attention to this. Perhaps in some ways it may have gone too far in that way if you think of a History of the English Language like Baugh's that tends to be much more about attitudes to English rather than about sociology of English. It may be for example that we have tended to neglect too much attitudes towards English and the attitudes of people who are writing about the language as distinct from people who are using the language, and it may be that we have not quite attained that balance quite correctly, but that remains to be seen.

—*Would you say that this history is the voice of experience? I have that feeling.*

BLAKE: You could just as easily call it the voice of prejudice, I suppose, couldn't you? Because clearly you can only write a history in the way in which you want to write it. The fact that professor Hogg and others are interested in seeing the history of the language within the sociological context perhaps makes us want to produce a history in that sort of context; it reflects I think our views. No doubt, this will change views about what the history of the language should be about, and so it could be that in twenty years' time *The Cambridge History* will be regarded as old fashioned; but I think at the moment it is very much in the forefront of producing a new attitude towards the teaching of the language.

—*It is a fact that we have emphasized the study of the Old English and the Middle English language as the language in those periods is more difficult. But, what about early Modern English and late Modern English? The teaching of those periods has been more neglected. Do you think we should emphasize the teaching of those periods as well?*

BLAKE: Yes. I think the problem is that people who are interested in English are often medievalist and they have therefore studied Old and Middle English. Therefore there is a lot that has been written about Old and Middle English. People who study literature are often not interested in the language and therefore they have not studied, for example, the language of the 18th century. If you write about Dr Johnson or something of this sort you are often not very interested in the background; and the medievalists who are often

teaching the history of the language are often more interested in the medieval period and they encourage their students to do historical topics which are concerned with Old and Middle English, and so one does need to think about making people or encouraging students to take topics in Early Modern or later Modern English and this, I think, has not been done because people who study Modern English are often sociolinguists who are interested in the language synchronically as it were in the last twenty or thirty years. We are not very interested in 19th-century English or 18th-century English, so there is a big gap and certainly we hope that the Cambridge History will encourage people to fill that gap because there is a volume on early Modern English, and that will certainly cover the period up to about 1700. But the Modern English volume tends to be written by people who are perhaps more interested in twentieth century English than in 19th or 18th century English. So I do not think that we will necessarily give full coverage to those centuries as far as the history is concerned.

—Professor Algeo said in the Valencia Conference that British English exists because American English came into existence. He is American and he is proud of his language. You are English and I suppose you are proud of your language too. As Europeans we pay a lot of attention to English English and to its history. How much attention should we pay to the history of the American language? Are we not neglecting the history of the American language? or even the importance of the American Language? — as Europeans, I mean.

BLAKE: Well, I think that different people have different interests, and up to a point it may depend on how much time you have. But I think it is probably true to say that the American language has been neglected, but that is probably because the development of American English falls into the 18th and 19th centuries, which are almost equally neglected in British English. So it is not necessarily that American English has been neglected in favour of British English. It is perhaps because American English does not have an Old and Middle English variety other than the English variety and therefore people have not studied it as much. And I think the same would be true of Australian English or New Zealand English. There has been a lot of work on those languages as it were for the last twenty or thirty years. Not so much Australian English in the 18th or 19th centuries because there is such a strong influence of British English on these countries that the differences are not very noticeable quite so early, because with English officials, English newspapers, English books and everything else it is sometimes difficult to

see. But as we have a volume on North American English it could be said that we are giving full attention to North American English.

—*What do you think is the interest of studying the history of languages, say the history of English, now that people are more worried about more materialistic, chrematistic problems?*

BLAKE: Well, that is a long and difficult question to answer. I suppose it has to do with the whole question of culture and attitudes, doesn't it? If you are interested about knowing something about your country, your language and everything else, then you will think that language is as important as anything else, and there is an immense amount of interest on historical aspects of all kinds of English culture and the language is one of those and I do not think the material interest some people have is necessarily going to alter that in any case. The so-called material development is something that is as much a newspaper fiction as a reality.

—*What level of knowledge of the History of the English Language would you expect to be good for a foreign student?*

BLAKE: I would expect them to have read one of the standard text books and to know that sort of information that is contained in there. If they read Professor Fernández's book or one of the books written by English or American scholars, like Barbara Strang, that is not necessarily going to help them to speak English better but it will give them some indication about what lies behind English speech and the way in which people speak in England today.

—*What do you think about Barbara Strang's History of English?*

BLAKE: I think it is actually a very dense book and it is a very difficult book for students to read and get something out of it. I do not think it is actually a very good book for a university course. The students in our university do find it extremely difficult to read.

—*And what about Professor Mitchell's Guide to Old English?*

BLAKE: I think it is a very good book. It makes the subject much more alive for students and it gives them a wider range of information to deal with and I find it is quite a good book to teach.

—*Do you think it may be difficult for foreign students?*

BLAKE: No. Why should it be more difficult for foreign students than for British students? It is a very good book because it has texts and a glossary, so they do not need a dictionary. However not having a dictionary has a disadvantage because the glossary is obviously connected only to the texts that are being read, so they do not see the word as it might be used in other contexts because they will then just use this book.

Now obviously from a teaching point of view that is very good because the students have all the information that they need immediately. But they are not encouraged to look beyond the book, to go to dictionaries or other sources to supplement what they get from the book.

—*But perhaps that is enough for them.*

BLAKE: Oh, yes. I agree entirely. That is the book we use for our own students.

—*Really? It is the book I want to use for my students too. And do you know the one by Professor Burrow of Bristol?*

BLAKE: The Middle English one?

—*Yes. What do you think of it?*

BLAKE: I think that is very good too. It is not so detailed naturally. But I like it as well.

—*Do you also use it for your students?*

BLAKE: Well, we do not use that one. We use a variety of different books. We use the early Middle English book by Bennett and Smithers and then we use separate editions for Chaucer, Piers Plowman, Sir Gawin, etc. So we make the students buy individual editions of a variety of different texts. Our students complain that they have to buy too many books and it may well be that we have to come back to a book like Burrow's but we want to encourage the students to read all of Piers Plowman so we give them an edition of Piers Plowman; and we want them to read more Chaucer than is found in Burrow's book.

—*In your opinion, what is there left to be researched about the older periods of the language? Is there anything left?*

BLAKE: Of course there are thousands of things left, because we are only just beginning to have a dictionary of Middle English, that is not complete, and we are only just beginning to have the atlas of early Middle English as compared to the atlas of later Middle English. There are still an awful lot of books that need to be edited. We do not know how many of these texts may contain new words, new constructions that may alter our views about the language generally and as we develop new linguistic philosophies and attitudes so we have different ways of looking at things. I do not imagine for a moment there is ever going to be a shortage and you think about Ana Hornero's thesis on *Ancrene Wisse*. You might say everyone knows about *Ancrene Wisse* and has done it, but you can look at it in a different way and produce a different approach and produce different data or perhaps the same data which is being used to express a different point of view and I can foresee that it is going to be very easy to do this. And as we develop computer

technology, so it may be possible to put the various versions of *Ancrene Wisse* into computer and compare the language, vocabulary, syntax and morphology by using the computer. I do not think there is going to be a shortage for the foreseeable future of work to be done in the Old and Middle English period.

—*Are you in favour of using computers?*

BLAKE: Well, I think there is no reason why you should not use the technology available. I mean, it is a bit like saying you should not use printed books because they used to be manuscripts. There is no reason why you should not use printed books. I mean, computers is a different form of a printed book; in a way it gives you different sorts of information. We produced concordances, or used to produce concordances by hand, now we can produce concordances by computer. Why not exploit those sorts of possibilities when they exist?

—*I remember Chomsky said "Computers are good for linguistics; the problem is that linguists always ask computers the wrong question." Do you think that is true for historical linguistics as well?*

BLAKE: Well, I do not know, because I do not think they have actually been used enough so far, but I think always one has to be careful using computers. They do not provide you with answers; they provide you with data and they will answer the question you are asking. But they might not necessarily provide you with the right answer because you might not be asking the right question.

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**'APROXIMACION SINTACTICA
A LOS TERMINOS DE POLARIDAD
NEGATIVA EN INGLES**



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1. HECHOS EMPIRICOS

AUNQUE la mayoría de las expresiones de la lengua se pueden utilizar en contextos tanto afirmativos como negativos, existen términos que son sensibles a la polaridad oracional, bien a la polaridad positiva (hablaremos, por tanto, de “términos de polaridad positiva”) o bien a la polaridad negativa (“términos de polaridad negativa”; en adelante, TPN). Entre los primeros se encontrarían adverbiales como *already*, *pretty* o *still*, cuantificadores como *far* y expresiones idiomáticas verbales como *could just as well*, *would rather* o *had better* (vid. Baker 1970 y McCawley 1988, donde se ejemplifican sus posibilidades de uso).¹ Términos de polaridad negativa serían cuantificadores y adverbiales como *any* (y sus compuestos), *ever*, *all that*, *yet*, *in years...*, expresiones nominales como *a red cent*, *in a coon's age...* y expresiones idiomáticas verbales como *bother V-ing*, *care to*, *lift a finger*, *budge an inch*, *give a damn...*

(1) a. He didn't study *any* English
 *He studied *any* English
 b. I won't see you *anymore*
 *I will see you *anymore*

- c. I haven't *ever* met her
*I have *ever* met her
- d. This isn't *all that* bad
*This is *all that* bad
- e. I haven't finished *yet*
*I have finished *yet*
- f. He hasn't published a book *in years*
*He has published a book *in years*
- g. I won't give you *a red cent*
*I will give you *a red cent*
- h. He didn't *care* to see me
*He *cared* to see me
- i. She won't *lift a finger* to help you
*She will *lift a finger* to help you
- j. I don't *give a damn*
*I *give a damn*

Nuestro objetivo será profundizar en el análisis de los términos de polaridad negativa y, en concreto, en las condiciones estructurales que se requieren para su legitimación. Para aligerar la exposición, vamos a centrarnos en las propiedades de *any* y de sus compuestos, puesto que este TPN es el que permite un mayor número de contextos de legitimación.² Previamente conviene, no obstante, hacer dos consideraciones. La primera es que, aunque *any* se considere un TPN, es posible encontrarlo también en contextos no negativos, lo cual iría en contra de lo que hemos señalado más arriba:

(2) She'll marry *anyone*

Ahora bien, no debe confundirse la significación de *any* en (1a) con la que tiene en (2). Mientras que en el primer caso *any* sería equivalente a la negación suboracional (ie. *He studied no English*), en (2) —y citamos a Quirk *et al.*(1985: 391)— *any* aporta el significado de “no importa qué/quién”.³ Sin embargo esta lectura de *any* no se limita a los contextos asertivos; de hecho, *any* en (2) es un cuantificador universal de referencia libre y, como tal, susceptible de aparecer en oraciones afirmativas y negativas, así como de ser modificado por adverbiales como *just* o *almost*. Esto no ocurriría con el *any* que aquí estamos considerando, y que es un cuantificador existencial.⁴ Puede observarse claramente esta distinción en una oración como (3):

(3) She won't marry *anyone*

Puesto que el TPN aparece en contextos negativos y el cuantificador universal también puede hacerlo, la oración de (3) será necesariamente ambigua y podrá desarrollar el doble sentido de:

(4) a. ...she wants a clever, rich and handsome man
 b. ...she is decided to remain single

Ahora bien, si modificamos *anyone* con *just* sólo el sentido de (4a) podrá mantenerse. En Laka (1991: 169) también se destaca esta función del adverbial *just* como elemento que fuerza la interpretación de cuantificador universal de libre referencia y descarta, por tanto, la de TPN:

(5) I didn't eat *just anything*, I ate truffles/*I starved

En adelante, al referirnos a *any* y sus compuestos sólo aludiremos a los casos en que se interpreta como TPN, es decir, cuando su significación no es libre sino que está condicionada por un inductor no asertivo.

Este es, precisamente, el segundo aspecto que debemos matizar. Aunque la etiqueta que la tradición gramatical ha sancionado para aludir a *any* y a los sintagmas de (2) es la de *términos de polaridad negativa*, el concepto de negación es demasiado restrictivo ya que, en general, los TPN son posibles en distintos contextos no asertivos. En este sentido, la mayor parte de las gramáticas al uso han tratado de delimitar los contextos que implican no aserción y por tanto, que legitiman TPNs. Así, en Jespersen (1961: 607) se señalan las oraciones negativas (6a), las interrogativas (6b), las condicionales (6c) y las comparativas (6d); por su parte, Huddleston (1984: 427) menciona, además de éstas, las oraciones encabezadas por *only* (6e), las cláusulas de infinitivo que dependen del adverbial de grado *too* (6f) y las cláusulas complemento de verbos o adjetivos con significación negativa (6g)⁵:

(6) a. He doesn't want *anything*/**something*
 b. Do you want *anything*/**something*?
 c. If you steal *any*/**some food* they'll arrest you
 d. Peter was taller than *anyone*/**someone*
 e. Only John has *any*/**some hope of passing*
 f. He was too tired to do *anything*/**something* about it
 g. He was reluctant to do *anything*/**something* about it

En Quirk *et al.* (1972: 223) se señalan también otros constituyentes negativos, además de la negación oracional, que legitiman a los TPN (vid. también, Quirk *et al.*, 1985: 780-781); esto es, partículas como *never*, *no*, *neither* o *nor* (7a), ciertos constituyentes que denominan “negativos incompletos”: *hardly*, *nearly*, *almost*, *little*, *few*, *least*, *but*, *only*, *seldom*... (7b), y, finalmente, los llamados “negativos de implicación”: *just*, *before*, *fail*, *prevent*, *reluctant*, *hard*, *difficult*... (7c):

(7) a. John will never manage to do *anything*/**something* useful
 b. There was little chance *anybody*/**somebody* would come
 c. It was hard to keep *any*/**some* hope

Los ejemplos de (6) y (7) constituyen una muestra parcial de los hechos que deberá abordar cualquier aproximación al problema de los TPN. Pasemos a reseñar, brevemente, algunas de las hipótesis más difundidas en este sentido dentro del marco de la gramática generativa.⁶

2. ESTADO DE LA CUESTION

Uno de los primeros trabajos sobre la negación, y por tanto sobre los términos de polaridad negativa, fue el de Klima (1964). En él se propone un rasgo semántico-gramatical [+AFECT(IVO)] que caracteriza a todos los constituyentes que pueden legitimar un TPN, entre los cuales señala: los sintagmas con rasgo [+NEG] (ie. *not*, *n't*, *no*, *in-*, *un-*, *dis-*, *-less*, *seldom*, *doubt*, *without*...); sintagmas con el rasgo [+WH]: *what*, *when*, *whether*...; *only*; ciertas conjunciones como *if*, *before*, *lest*, *than*; ciertos predicados como *surprised*, *ashamed*, *stupid*, *reluctant*, *against*; y ciertas construcciones como *to be absurd to*, *to be afraid to*, *to be annoyed that*, *to dare one to*, *to defy one to*, *to be difficult to*, *to forget to*, *to refuse to*, *to deny that*, *to dissuade from*, *to be amazed that*, *to warn against*, *to hate to*... Así pues, junto a los ejemplos señalados hasta ahora, debemos tomar también en consideración oraciones como⁷:

(8) a. Who expects him to write *any* more novels?
 b. He left before Mary had eaten *any* vegetables
 c. He was ashamed (/*glad) to take *any* more money

- d. He was stupid (*smart) to become *any* heavier
- e. He was against (*in favor of) doing *anything* like that

Klima fue el primero, además, en señalar qué requisitos estructurales deben darse para que los constituyentes afectivos legitimen un TPN; en concreto señala que deben estar “*en construcción*” con él. Se encuentra aquí un claro precedente de lo que después sería la condición estructural unánimemente defendida por los lingüistas como base para justificar la existencia de estos sintagmas: la relación de *mando de constituyente* (en adelante, *mando-c*) entre el sintagma no asertivo y el TPN.⁸

En este sentido, Baker (1970) propone dos posibilidades de legitimación para los TPN: que la negación (o constituyente no asertivo) ejerza mando-c sobre el término de polaridad en la estructura superficial o que, si no se da esta condición, sea posible reconstruir una interpretación de la proposición (por *vinculación* semática) donde este requisito estructural sí se dé. La primera posibilidad estaría ejemplificada en la mayor parte de los ejemplos de (6)-(8). Respecto a la segunda, pensemos en una oración como la de (6d); a pesar de que no existe ningún constituyente no asertivo que mande-c a *any*, es posible reconstruir una proposición donde sí se cumpliría este requisito, es decir, una proposición con el significado *Neg $\exists X$, X is taller than Peter* (el subrayado destaca la relación de mando-c de la negación sobre la variable en el componente interpretativo).

Baker introduce, por tanto, la idea de que no sólo la estructura sino también la significación de una oración puede legitimar un TPN. Este ha sido también el camino explorado por otros lingüistas como Linebarger (1987), que refina la distinción de Baker en el sentido de que defiende que el nivel de estructura relevante para la legitimación estructural de los TPN es el de la Forma Lógica, y no el de la estructura-S; también argumenta que el concepto no estructural pertinente es el pragmático de *implicatura* y no el semántico de *vinculación*.

Para ejemplificar el primer punto, Linebarger utiliza oraciones como (9) [su ej. 42]:

- (9) He didn't move because he was pushed

Esta oración es ambigua en el sentido de que permite dos lecturas, una donde la negación tiene un ámbito amplio (10a) y otra donde éste es más reducido (10b):

- (10a) NOT CAUSE (he was pushed, he moved)
- (10b) CAUSE (he was pushed, NOT [he moved])

Es decir, la interpretación de (9) puede ser la de que el hecho de que hubiera sido empujado no fue la causa de que no se moviera (correspondiente a (10a)), o la de que no se movió precisamente porque fue empujado: (10b). Pues bien, un TPN como *budge an inch* sólo puede ser legitimado en este segundo caso; la oración (11) no sería, por tanto, ambigua:

- (11) He didn't budge an inch because he was pushed
(interpretación: 10b)

Así pues, hasta el nivel de la Forma Lógica no se clarifican completamente las condiciones para garantizar la aceptabilidad de algunos términos de polaridad negativa.

Por lo que se refiere al concepto pragmático de implicatura, éste debe ser tenido en cuenta si se quiere explicar el contraste entre oraciones condicionales como las representadas en (12) y (13) [ejemplos 181, 182, 185 y 186 en Linebarger (1987); véase también nuestro (6c)]:

- (12) a. If you drink *any* water, you'll get dysentery
- b. *If you drink *any* water, you'll feel better
- (13) a. If you think that John had fun, you should have seen Fred!
- b. *If you think that John had *any* fun, you should have seen Fred!

Las diferencias entre los pares de ejemplos representados no pueden ser de tipo estructural, dado que en ambos casos el TPN se encontraría bajo el mando-c de *if*, elemento inductor de polaridad. Lo que sucede es que en (12a), frente a lo que ocurriría en (12b), la condicional expresa una amenaza y por tanto la implicación de la cláusula con *if* es negativa (cf. “O no bebes agua o sufrirás de disentería”); de manera semejante, el uso —pragmático— de una expresión como la que aparece en la cláusula de *if* en (13a) tiene implicaciones positivas (“Tú crees que John se divirtió; pues Fred se divirtió mucho más”), lo cual excluye la aparición de un TPN.

Estos y otros ejemplos demuestran la importancia que los factores de tipo semántico y/o pragmático tienen en la legitimación de los TPN⁹. Sin embargo, en lo que sigue vamos a obviarlos para concentrarnos en los aspectos estructurales que han de ser también tenidos en cuenta, y que

pueden servirnos, al tiempo, para justificar la conveniencia de mantener en la representación sintagmática un tipo de categorías cuya existencia ha sido muy controvertida estos últimos años: nos estamos refiriendo a las denominadas categorías funcionales o gramaticales.

3. MARCO TEORICO

Debemos referirnos previamente, aunque sea de una forma esquemática, al modelo gramatical en que nuestra hipótesis se inscribe y que condiciona tanto la forma como el fondo de la misma. Se trata del denominado *modelo de los principios y de los parámetros*, inicialmente formulado por Chomsky (1981). En este modelo, el Léxico es el componente inicial de la gramática, y a partir de él se articulan cuatro niveles de estructura: la estructura-I(nicial), la estructura-S, la Forma Lógica y la Forma Fonética. El primero de ellos se obtiene tras proyectar el Léxico en un esquema categorial general que se denomina esquema X' , donde se recogen las propiedades estructurales de las categorías, tanto léxicas como gramaticales. Sobre la estructura-I se aplica la transformación de Movimiento de α (a la que en la actualidad está reducido el componente transformacional) obteniéndose la estructura-S, en la que figuran las huellas de los constituyentes desplazados. A partir de este nivel de estructura se realiza la interpretación semántica de la oración (en la Forma Lógica) y su interpretación fonológica (en la Forma Fonética).

Centrándonos ya en los aspectos que inciden directamente en nuestro trabajo, la organización categorial que defendemos para la oración en inglés será básicamente la siguiente¹⁰:

(14) [SComp [SConc [ST [S Σ [SV...

Existe un claro contraste entre el sintagma verbal (SV) y las categorías que lo dominan. Para empezar, el SV tiene como núcleo una categoría léxica, cuyas expansiones forman una clase abierta (siempre es posible incrementar

el número de verbos de una lengua mediante nuevas acuñaciones), y en su interior se desarrolla la relación predicativa imprescindible para que exista una oración.

El resto de las expansiones que aparecen en (14) carecen de contenido descriptivo, forman clases léxicas cerradas y su función es esencialmente gramatical o relacional. Aportan la información básica de concordancia entre el sujeto y el predicado (SConc), de tiempo gramatical (ST) y de polaridad ($S\sum$), y permiten la legitimación de otros sintagmas en su entorno; en concreto, la polaridad negativa (una de las opciones de $S\sum$, SNeg, cuyo núcleo en inglés es *not*) permite, como hemos tenido ocasión de comprobar, la aparición de TPNs.

Por lo que respecta a SComp, es el sintagma introductor de oraciones, en cuyo núcleo se expanden los elementos léxicos *that*, *whether*, *if* y *for*, en inglés, y cuyo especificador acoge, tras movimiento, ciertos constituyentes en oraciones interrogativas, relativas...

La derivación de una oración comenzará entonces desde el léxico, seleccionando qué predicados, con su red temática correspondiente, se requieren, y proyectando la estructura necesaria para acogerlos (estructura que se organiza según los requisitos del esquema X'). Esta estructura inicial está después sujeta a determinados movimientos, unos obligatorios y otros opcionales. Entre los primeros hay que señalar el movimiento de uno de los argumentos verbales —normalmente el argumento externo— que desde su posición inicial dentro del SV asciende a la del especificador de SConc donde recibe Caso¹¹; por su parte, los núcleos de las categorías funcionales SConc y ST descienden al SV adjuntándose al verbo, que adquiere así sus rasgos de tiempo y de concordancia.¹²

4. FACTORES ESTRUCTURALES EN LA LEGITIMACION DE LOS TERMINOS DE POLARIDAD NEGATIVA

Tras esta breve caracterización de los aspectos teóricos que van a guiar nuestro acercamiento al tema, retomamos las ideas esbozadas hasta el momento para, en primer lugar, formular la condición estructural básica necesaria para que *any* y sus compuestos puedan ser interpretados como TPN y no como cuantificadores universales:

(15) Condición estructural para la legitimación de los TPN: el constituyente no asertivo debe ejercer mando-c inmediato sobre el TPN en la Forma Lógica.

Esta condición se cumple en las dos oraciones de (16); en la primera, *not*, en SNeg, ejerce mando-c sobre el objeto verbal *anything*, y lo mismo ocurre con el núcleo interrogativo de SComp respecto de *anybody* en (16b):

(16) a. He didn't want *anything*
 b. Have you seen *anybody*?

La restricción de que el mando-c debe ser inmediato es necesaria para explicar casos como el de (17), donde el complementador que manda-c inmediatamente a *anybody* es el asertivo *that* (no *if*) y, por tanto, su interpretación como TPN no es posible.

(17) *They wanted to know if it was true that *anybody* knew the answer

La condición estructural de (15) predice, además, que una oración como (18) será agramatical, ya que tras el movimiento del argumento interno de *buy* a la posición de sujeto, esto es, al especificador de SConc, el núcleo de SNeg ya no manda-c a este sintagma¹³:

(18) **Any* books haven't been bought

También se excluye a partir de (15) la posibilidad de que una partícula negativa sub-clausal (cf. Huddleston 1984: 427) pueda legitimar a un TPN, puesto que si la negación está inserta en un constituyente no va a poder ejercer mando-c sobre otros constituyentes externos a éste:

(19) *A not inconsiderable number of people had *ever* been there

Sin embargo, como ya en su momento hizo notar Laka (1991), parece que la condición (15), aunque necesaria, no es suficiente para que *any* o cualquier otro TPN pueda ser correctamente interpretado. De hecho, en los ejemplos de (20) se cumpliría el requisito estructural del mando-c (el término no asertivo también aparece en cursiva), y, sin embargo, las oraciones son agramaticales puesto que *any* no recibe la interpretación adecuada¹⁴:

(20) a. *Her *denial* of *any* human rights shook the audience

b. *I *wonder* about *any* questions

Laka (1991) argumenta que verbos como *deny* o *wonder*, a pesar de su significación negativa, no pueden legitimar a un TPN excepto si éste se encuentra dentro de una cláusula subordinada dependiente de estos verbos. Nótese, en este sentido, el contraste entre (20) y (21):

(21) a. Her *denial* that *any* human rights should be respected shook the audience
 b. I *wonder* whether *any* questions should be asked

Todo indica que el papel relevante en la legitimación lo desempeña COMP, no el verbo. De hecho, tal y como señala Laka (1991), ciertas lenguas como el euskera poseen un complementador positivo (*ela*) que se diferencia morfológicamente del negativo (*enik*) y del interrogativo (*en*); sólo en el ámbito de estos dos últimos, además, puede darse un TPN. Se podría suponer que en inglés sólo es léxica la distinción entre el complementador interrogativo (*whether*) y el asertivo (*that*), pero que el complementador negativo sería homófono al asertivo; en otras palabras, el inglés no distingue morfológicamente entre el *that* [-neg] y el *that* [+neg], pero esta distinción sí es relevante en el Léxico, donde determinados verbos aparecerían marcados como predicados que seleccionan un argumento asertivo ([-NEG]; i.e. *think*), otros que toman complementos [+NEG] (i.e. *deny*) y otros que requieren complementos [+INTERRG] (i.e. *wonder*). Este carácter asertivo o no del argumento se transmite a partir del núcleo de la cláusula que funciona como complemento, y este núcleo, según el análisis estándar que recogimos en (14), no es otro que COMP.

La importancia de COMP como categoría legitimadora de TPNs queda de manifiesto en otros ejemplos como (22), donde la aparición de *anyone* en la cláusula que funciona como sujeto no podría explicarse si no aceptamos este presupuesto:

(22) That *anyone* was ever here is unlikely

En esta oración, la cláusula con *that* es el argumento interno del predicado *unlikely*, que llega a la posición de sujeto tras una operación de movimiento.¹⁵ Así pues, *unlikely* no tiene mando de constituyente sobre *anyone* ni en la Estructura-S ni en la Forma Lógica, pero el COMP [+NEG]

que introduce la cláusula —y que es seleccionado por el predicado *unlikely*— sí, y es él por tanto el que legitima a este TPN.

Situaciones similares a las señaladas se dan también en oraciones como:

(23) a. *They had been *unhappy* about *any* of his actions
 b. *I'll leave *before* *any* of you

El adjetivo semánticamente negativo *unhappy* y la preposición *before*, considerada [+AFECTIVA] por Klima (1964), son incapaces no obstante de legitimar a *any*, mientras que oraciones similares, como (24), sí pueden hacerlo mediante el complementador negativo que tanto el predicado *impossible* como *before* seleccionan:

(24) a. It is *impossible* for him to do *anything*
 b. I'll leave *before* *any* of you have finished

Finalmente, nótese que en aquellos casos en que un constituyente negativo se desplaza al SComp —por un proceso, por ejemplo, de Topicalización— el SComp “hereda” el carácter negativo del constituyente desplazado y esto le permite legitimar un TPN que se halle bajo su ámbito¹⁶:

(25) Under no circumstances would *anyone* help us
 At no time did *anything* unusual happen

Sin embargo, si el constituyente negativo simplemente aparece dislocado (es decir, bajo los supuestos habituales, adjuntado al SConc), a pesar de ejercer mando-c sobre el resto de los constituyentes oracionales no podrá legitimar a un TPN, ya que requeriría al SComp para poder llevar a cabo esta tarea:

(26) *For no reason, he suddenly punched *anyone*
 *In no time, we are approaching *anywhere*

Los hechos que hemos analizado parecen indicar que la condición de (15), siendo esencialmente correcta, debe ser revisada para dar cuenta del papel que dos categorías funcionales, en concreto (SNeg y SComp), juegan en la legitimación de términos de polaridad negativa. Habremos de modificarla, por tanto, en la línea de (27):

(27) Condición estructural para la legitimación de los TPN (revisada): el constituyente no assertivo debe ejercer, a través de una categoría funcional, mando-c inmediato sobre el TPN en la Forma Lógica.

Lógicamente, para que la condición (27) sea empíricamente válida debe ir acompañada de una formulación explícita y detallada de las categorías funcionales que deben aceptarse en las representaciones.¹⁷ Hasta el momento, sin embargo, esta tarea sólo se ha abordado con rigor en el marco de la oración, y los trabajos sobre la estructura funcional de otros constituyentes son más escasos. Quizás por ello, la tesis de Abney (1987) sobre la estructura funcional del sintagma nominal sigue siendo un punto de referencia obligado. Pues bien, entre las categorías funcionales que Abney defiende dentro del sintagma nominal y del sintagma adjetivo, encontramos el Sintagma Cuantificador (SQ, que permite expansiones léxicas como *few*, *many*, *little*, *much*...) y los denominados Sintagmas de Grado (SGrad, donde se expanden *too*, *enough*, *more*, *than*...). Significativamente, en el ámbito de mando-c de estos constituyentes es posible también encontrar un TPN:

(28) *Few* people have *any* interest in him
 (29) John is *too* tired to do *any* work

Finalmente, nuestra condición de (27) explicaría, además, el contraste existente entre las oraciones de (30a) y (30b):

(30) a. *Only* John has *any* hope of passing
 b. *John's sister will *only* expect him to write *any* novels

En el primer caso, *only* funciona como un cuantificador del sintagma nominal; se expande, por tanto, dentro de una categoría funcional y ello le permite, en última instancia, legitimar al TPN que tiene bajo su ámbito. Sin embargo, en (32b), aunque sigue cumpliéndose el requisito estructural imprescindible (*only* ejerce mando-c sobre *any*), *only* está ejerciendo función adverbial; dado que el sintagma adverbial es una categoría léxica, no funcional, la legitimación de *any* desde ella ya no es posible.

Así pues, todo parece indicar que las categorías funcionales participan activamente en la legitimación de ciertos sintagmas que son sensibles a la polaridad, y, por tanto, que es necesario afianzar su estatus como proyecciones independientes dentro de las representaciones sintácticas. a

NOTAS

1. La etiqueta “término de polaridad positiva” no implica, lógicamente, que estos elementos léxicos no puedan modificar a otros de carácter semánticamente negativo, i.e. *That's pretty good/bad*. Lo único que señala es que no pueden aparecer bajo el ámbito de la no aserción: **That isn't pretty good/bad*, aunque también en este aspecto existen excepciones que tienen que ver más con el uso que con la norma.

2. En McCawley (1988: 563) se analiza qué contextos permiten la aparición de qué TPNs, demostrándose que *any* es el que admite un abanico de posibilidades más amplio.

3. Esta distinción aparece tradicionalmente recogida en las gramáticas, aunque no siempre se dé cuenta de los hechos empíricos con total precisión. Por ejemplo, Huddleston (1984: 425) distingue, correctamente, entre un *any_{n/aff}* (el TPN) y un *any_{neut}* que podría aparecer en todo tipo de contextos. Sin embargo, en Jespersen (1961: 601) se mencionan dos significados distintos de *any* que estarían determinados por el contexto sintáctico en que aparece: “a (person or thing) no matter which, a (person or thing) of whatever kind or quantity”, en cláusulas interrogativas, negativas, condicionales y cláusulas de comparación; y “whichever (of all) is chosen” en cláusulas afirmativas. Como veremos, sin embargo, este segundo significado de *any* puede manifestarse también en oraciones negativas.

4. Se asume comúnmente que los TPN funcionan como cuantificadores existenciales, aunque sean cuantificadores universales en otros casos. Sin embargo, Jackendoff (1972: 339) señala que filósofos como Vendler argumentan que *any* se comporta, en cualquiera de sus usos, como un cuantificador especial cuya significación sería básicamente la de una oferta cuyo referente debe determinar el receptor (no el emisor). No habría que distinguir, por tanto, entre dos tipos de *any* o de cuantificación, sino entre tipos de contextos que favorecerían una u otra interpretación de ese referente.

5. Aunque oponemos *any* a *some*, hay que recordar que este último puede aparecer también en contextos superficialmente no asertivos: ie. *Would you like some wine?*

6. Utilizaremos la etiqueta *gramática generativa* para referirnos a la corriente chomskyana en su evolución desde la teoría estándar representada en Chomsky (1965), hasta lo que se conoce como *modelo de los principios y de los parámetros* (formulado en Chomsky, 1981 y trabajos posteriores). Se trata simplemente de una simplificación, en ningún caso de negar el carácter generativista —es decir, de modelo formal, explícito— de otras gramáticas no inspiradas directamente en las obras de Noam Chomsky.

7. Los ejemplos (8c-e) pertenecen a Klima (1964: 314). Hay que señalar que este autor también propone que *any* se derive transformacionalmente de *some*, idea que fue descartada

cuando se impuso la corriente lexicalista a principios de los años setenta (vid. Jackendoff, 1972, donde se discuten detalladamente estas dos alternativas).

8. La idea que subyace a la definición de mando-c (en la línea de Aoun y Sportiche, 1983) es la de que un constituyente ejerce dominio estructural sobre todos aquellos que están bajo la primera proyección máxima (es decir, categoría sintagmática) que lo domina a él.

9. Vid. también Ladusaw (1983), con una aproximación netamente semántica al problema.

10. En este punto estamos simplificando; de hecho, los análisis recientes de la oración amplían el número de categorías gramaticales que se recogen en (14) para incluir información sobre el aspecto, el modo o la concordancia con el objeto. Puesto que no es nuestro objetivo aquí la exploración exhaustiva de la estructura oracional, simplemente reseñamos las categorías sobre las que existe un mayor consenso. En concreto, adoptamos la estructura defendida en Chomsky (1989) tras adaptarla la que anteriormente había propuesto Pollock (1989).

11. El modelo gramatical que estamos reseñando se completa con una serie de principios independientes que interaccionan entre sí para regular el componente categorial y el transformacional. Entre ellos se encuentra el "principio de Caso" que exige que la cadena formada por un sintagma nominal y sus huellas reciba Caso, bien gramatical (en las lenguas con un sistema flexivo rico) o bien abstracto.

12. Una vez más seguimos a Pollock (1989) y Chomsky (1989) al asumir que en inglés (frente a lo que ocurriría en las lenguas románicas) los afijos descienden al verbo en la estructura-S para después ascender en la FL, legitimando así la derivación. Ambas propuestas ofrecen también una explicación sobre qué motiva la inserción de *do* en las oraciones negativas e interrogativas sin verbo auxiliar en inglés, asunto éste que no podemos reseñar aquí porque sus implicaciones nos alejarían excesivamente del tema que estamos tratando. También sacrificamos, en aras de una mayor sencillez teórica, cualquier referencia a las modificaciones que del modelo de los principios y de los parámetros se realizan en lo que ya se conoce como la *propuesta minimalista* (Chomsky 1991).

13. Obviamente, la oración activa correspondiente a (16) será gramatical, ya que aquí la negación sí manda-c a *any books* : *They haven't bought any books*.

14. En adelante, el asterisco representa la imposibilidad de que *any* se interprete como un TPN, lo cual no implica que su valor de cuantificador universal no sea posible en estas oraciones.

15. El adjetivo *unlikely* se considera un predicado monádico cuyo argumento —si, como en este caso, es oracional— puede desplazarse opcionalmente a la posición de sujeto de la oración; (22) es equivalente, por tanto, a una secuencia como *It is unlikely that anyone was ever here*, donde el argumento de *unlikely* permanece en su posición inicial.

16. Los ejemplos (24) y (25) pertenecen a McCawley (1988: 558), pero él articula una explicación diferente a la nuestra.

17. Es necesario también tener en cuenta los elementos léxicos (ciertamente escasos) que legitiman a un TPN sin necesidad de ninguna categoría funcional en su entorno; por ejemplo, el verbo *to lack*, el adjetivo *unaware* o la preposición *without*.

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"THE EBONY TOWER":

TEXT AND INTERTEXTS¹

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READERS of the fiction of John Fowles have often pointed out Fowles' ability to transcend the barriers of classical realism, combining in his novels and short stories the realism-enhancing mechanisms of the traditional novelistic conventions with a much more mythopoeic and fantastic tendency, expressed in the archetypal nature of his characters, situations and landscapes.

In a much-quoted interview, Fowles explained to Lorna Sage (1974: 33) that his writing was the result of his double background in the English and the French literary and critical traditions, and that, when writing, he often felt "an opposed pull" between the "crushing sort of [the English] realistic tradition" and the more experimental French temptation.

This constant pressure on Fowles' writing may account for his desire to reject an art that, in Daniel Martin's words, "does not say, not only in, but behind the images, the real" (1977: 454), counterbalanced by the simultaneous tendency to undermine the reality-enhancing mechanisms he has just created, thus giving his novels and short stories a baffling contradictory nature: stylistically clear and easy to read and realistically set in

well-known places, at the same time his novels and short-stories manage to call into question the very reality they depict, offering beneath the literal interpretation, other alternative readings, according to which the apparently simple style becomes disturbingly complex and multilayered and the realistically-drawn situations turn out to be more archetypal and mythical than realistic and commonsensical.

A good example of this duality is provided by Fowles' collections of short stories, *The Ebony Tower*, first published in 1974. As is well known, this collection consists of four short stories ("The Ebony Tower" [pp. 7-113], "Poor Koko" [pp. 143-84], "The Enigma" [pp. pp. 185-239] and "The Cloud" [pp. 241-99]) as well as Fowles' translation of the twelfth-century Brythonic Celtic romance by Marie de France, *Eliduc* (pp. 117-41), which is preceded by "A Personal Note" (pp. 117-22).

In "A Personal Note" Fowles explains that his intended title for the collection was *Variations*, "by which I meant to suggest variations both on certain themes in previous books of mine and in methods of narrative presentation," adding that "[o]ne reason the working title was discarded was that the first professional readers, who do know my books, could see no justifications for *Variations* whatever . . . beyond a very private mirage in the writer's mind." (ET 117).

Likewise, in an interview broadcast in 1974 by B.B.C. 2 within *The Book Programme*, Fowles explained to Robert Robinson that the short stories "were variations on the books I had previously done. I wrote them all in two or three months, and I certainly didn't think, 'I'll do a variation on some past story,' but that is how they came out" (ET 584).

Fowles' insistence that the four short stories were variations both on the themes and on the narrative methods employed in his previous novels interestingly contradicts the reaction of the first professional readers, who were unable to see these avowed connections, even though, as Fowles himself said, "they do know my books."

In "John Fowles' *The Ebony Tower*: Unity and Celtic Myth" Raymond J. Wilson III (1982: 305) sums up the position of this kind of early reviewers. Rene Kuhn Bryant, for example, would typically remark in the *National Review* that "[w]hether others would recognise a common base and see a web of intricate relationships among these five stories, without the prompting proffered in 'a personal note' inserted in the middle of the book, is debatable." Jan B. Gordon complained in *Commonweal* of the fact that "[t]here is

invariably a contrived incompleteness" in the short stories, while Foster Hirsch, in *America*, pronounced himself convinced that Fowles' short-story technique "probably could not be sustained over the length of a novel," thus openly disregarding Fowles' statement that the short stories are variations on the books he had previously done. As Wilson explains, the reason why these reviewers felt irritated and frustrated with the collection was that they did "not perceive that Fowles uses the myth of the quest for rebirth" as a recurrent pattern knitting together the short stories and the romance that make up *The Ebony Tower* collection.

It is my purpose in the remaining pages of this study to analyse the short story that gives the whole collection its title, simultaneously focusing on the intratextual form and meaning of the short story proper and on its intertextual² connexions with Fowles' avowed sources: medieval romance and Fowles' own earlier parody of it, *The Magus*.

In general terms, a narrative may be defined as a semiotic representation of a series of events linked in a temporal and causal way and a narrative text as a narrative which makes specific use of one particular semiotic system: language. As a complex linguistic sign considered in isolation the narrative text can be analysed on two different axes: horizontally, dividing the narrative into a number of successive parts arranged along a longitudinal structure of time and actions. And vertically, regarding the narrative as a sign analysable at different levels of abstraction. A third level of analysis is further suggested by Gérard Genette in *Palimpsestes* (1982) when he says that the narrative text should be considered as a sign related to other such signs within the same semiotic system.

Now, if we focus our attention on "The Ebony Tower" with these notions in mind, we will find that, at fabula level (in Mieke Bal's terminology [1977]), the short story may be summarised as the uneventful three-day circular journey from London, via Paris, to Coëtminais in Britanny and back, undertaken by the young art critic and painter, David Williams, in order to interview the older, world-famous, British painter, Henry Breasley, with a view to writing a book of criticism on his work. At the level of the story, we may say that the novella follows the Aristotelian formula of unity of action (*mythos*). It begins *in medias res*, with David Williams on the point of arriving at Coëtminais and, after a brief analepsis summarising Williams' and Breasley's personalities and respective backgrounds, it develops in chronological order through three days in "early September" (*ET* 1) of a year

we soon learn (*ET* 19) is 1973, that is, a year before *The Ebony Tower* itself was first published and so, very near Fowles' own present. It ends with Williams' return to Orly, where he meets his wife Beth, who was to have accompanied him to Coëtminais, but who was delayed in London due to the realistic enough chickenpox (*ET* 13 and 34) of one of their daughters.

As a text, "The Ebony Tower" is literally sandwiched between an epigraph taken from the eighth-century Brythonic Celtic romance by Chrétien de Troyes, *Yvain*, and Fowles' translation of *Eliduc*, thus reinforcing the writer's open statement in "A Personal Note" that "The Ebony Tower" short story is a "variation" on Brythonic Celtic romance in general and on Marie de France's love story, *Eliduc*, in particular.

At the same time, Fowles refers to *The Magus* as a "variation" on another twentieth-century romance, Alain-Fournier's *Le Grand Meaulnes*, even though, as he ironically comments, "[a] number of young thesis-writers have now told me they can see no significant parallels between *The Magus* and *Le Grand Meaulnes*. I must have severed the umbilical chord —the real connection requires such a metaphor— much more neatly than I supposed at the time; or perhaps modern academic criticism is blind to relationships that are far more emotional than structural" (*ET* 118).

Fowles' metaphor of the umbilical chord accurately points to the kind of indebtedness that exists between his fiction in general and the romance, for it underlines the fact that it is carried out more in *generic* than in any narrowly *thematic* terms. That is, translating Fowles' remark into narratological terminology, we could say that his claim is that the literary critics should be able to recognise between his fiction and *Le Grand Meaulnes* the type of relationship Genette (1982:11) calls "archtextuality," that is, an abstract kind of relationship, very often implicit, or at most, only barely mentioned paratextually, and which basically serves to orientate and determine the "horizon of expectation" of the reader by alluding to its generic status.

In the case of *The Magus*, the relationship Fowles claims to exist between his novel and *Le Grand Meaulnes* is already implicit in the title of the novel, the word "magus" immediately guiding the readers' expectations towards one particular kind of fiction: the romance. But the relation also appears explicitly in the novel's structure, which neatly follows the pattern of the hero's quest of the traditional romance. And indeed, although Fowles attributes the incapacity of young thesis-writers to see the relationship between *The Magus* and *Le Grand Meaulnes* to the fact that this connection

is "more emotional than structural" (*ET* 118), in fact Fowles' complex intertextual game is neither simply emotional nor even simply generic, but rather complex and operates simultaneously between Fowles' fiction and the romance in general and between each of his novels and short stories on both the thematic and the structural levels.

The first clear glimpse we have of this far-from-innocent game in "The Ebony Tower" appears both paratextually and architextually in the double meaning of the title. As Wilson, following Barnum, has pointed out,

The ebony tower of the title can be connected with the dark tower of Browning's poem, "Childe Roland to the Dark." Browning had drawn the image from an earlier literary work, a scene of the mad Lear expressing something akin to despair. Both Shakespeare and Browning make the dark tower an unquestionably negative image: for Lear the pathetically ironic figure where the defeated, anguished former monarch washes like a piece of flotsam; for Childe Roland, the object of his dangerous quest, the place toward which he must steel himself to approach despite his knowledge that many knights died approaching it. (1982:304)

Generically, then, the black ebony tower visually stands in parodic relationship to the pure white ivory tower of traditional romance; but it simultaneously evokes the "ivory tower" seclusion of the Modernists, with its implications of elitism, cosmopolitanism and rejection of representational art in favour of abstraction, a meaning which, of course, points to the literal message of the short story:

'What on earth did the last thing he said mean?'

'Oh'. She smiled. 'Nothing. Just one of the bats in his belfry.' She tilted her head, 'What he thinks has taken the place of the ivory tower?'

'Abstraction?'

She shook her head. 'Anything he doesn't like about modern art. That he thinks is obscure because the artist is scared to be clear... you know.' (*ET* 53)

So, apparently, the title suggests at least two different fields of connotation: contemporary art and the romance, delimiting from the start the "horizon of expectation" of the attentive reader, who is thus warned by the title to expect a (parodic) romance about contemporary art. But the "ebony tower" also evokes another dark tower, that of the sixteenth card in the major arcana of

the Tarot, "the Tower," described by Alfred Douglas (1988: 93) as a "sturdy tower, erected on a grassy rise [and] struck by lightning." As Douglas further explains, the lightning-flash

is a symbol of the overpowering light of truth in which all falsehood, and ultimately all duality, is destroyed. It is the flash of inner illumination which brings the freedom of enlightenment. . . . The devastating impact of this fire can free the mind from its fetters and open the way that leads to the centre; but if the conscious mind is not prepared, not strongly built on firm foundations, it may end in catastrophe. In psychological terms the outcome will be dissociation, the division of the mind against itself . . .

In mundane terms the Tower suggests the destruction of an outdated philosophy which is unable to adapt to new conditions . . . the lesson here is that any structure is only defensible as long as it remains flexible and capable of evolution. (1988: 93-95)

Originally, each of the twenty two Tarot trumps were meant to represent one crucial grade or stage in a hermetic system of initiation, the whole set symbolising the initiate's quest for enlightenment in spiritual terms. The Tarot symbolism of the tower, therefore, reinforces the romance idea of the hero's quest, adding to it a spiritual or psychological dimension, according to which Williams' quest becomes both an artist's quest for maturation and a psychological quest for individuation. Interestingly, the Tarot symbolism of the title also connects "The Ebony Tower" with *The Magus*, a novel entitled after the first greater arcanum, "the Magician," and whose structure neatly follows, as Ellen McDaniel (1980/81: 247-260) has pointed out, the pattern formed by the twenty-two card pack as a whole.

In *The Magus* Fowles used the pattern of the greater arcana of the Tarot as a way of expressing both the Jungian idea of the individuation of the self in psychological terms and also the existentialist idea of life as road for, as he explained in an interview,

when I was well below half of my present age, we were in England at that time . . . we were on our knees before Camus and Sartre and French existentialism. It was not because we truly understood it but we had a kind of notion, a dream of what it was about. Most of us were victims of it. *I quite like that philosophy as a structure in a novel and in a sense I still use it.* (Onega 1988: 64; my emphasis)

So, the title of the novella, "The Ebony Tower," hides a whole wealth of connotations pointing at diverse hypertexts and hinting at a multiplicity of layers of meaning underneath the apparent simplicity and chronological linearity of the short story.

Again, immediately after the title, the epigraph that precedes the short story reproducing a few lines from the Brythonic Celtic romance by Chrétien de Troyes, *Yvain*, explicitly refers to the medieval knight's *dangerous journey* through strange and heavily forested places, thus hinting at a possible relationship between the adventure undertaken by the hero of the novella and the archetype of the hero's quest of the traditional romance. This epigraph, like the novella's title, acts not only paratextually, but also archtextually, implicitly determining the generic status of "The Ebony Tower":

. . . Et par forez longues et lees
 Par leus estranges et sauvages
 Et passa mainz felons passages
 Et maint peril et maint destroit
 Tant qu'il vint au santier tot droit . . . (ET 9)

The implicit parallelisms that run between both paratexts (title and epigraph) and the short story proper are further developed hypertextually: although, as happens in *The Magus*, the setting of "The Ebony Tower" is contemporary and although at the level of the fabula the purpose of the journey appears in principle to be a straightforward one —the interviewing of an elderly world-famous painter by a young painter and art critic— the atmosphere in which the journey and actual meeting take place is much more suggestive and complex, constantly generating intertextual and archtextual perceptions with concrete romances and with the genre as such. So, for example, it is easy to realise that both Breasley and Williams are of Celtic origin, as, "David knew [Breasley's] mother had been Welsh" (ET 26) and, as Ruth Morse points out, "there is an unmistakable, if unemphatic, Welshness about 'David Williams'" (1984: 18). Furthermore, it is easy to see from a comparison of "The Ebony Tower" and the romance following it, Fowles' translation of Chrétien des Troyes' *Eliduc*, that the journey Williams undertakes from Britain to Brittany and back to Britain again neatly reproduces in parodic inverted form the journey undertaken by Eliduc from Brittany to Britain and back. Like Eliduc (and also like Nicholas Urfe in *The Magus*), David Williams has undertaken a journey which will prove both exhilarating and dangerous, a hero's quest

for maturation through "one of the last large remnants of the old wooded Brittany" that fills the young painter with a strange "sense of discovery [and] a pleasant illusion of bachelor freedom" (ET 9).

In the course of this journey David Williams will have to meet a series of ritual tests set by another character in the story, a magus-like figure who, as John B. Humma points out, cannot be found in *Eliduc* "or in the *Lais* of Marie generally, with the exception of *Lanval*" (1983: 33). As Humma further explains "one has only to compare the deliberate, indeed systematic, testing of Nicholas Urfe in *The Magus* with the same deliberate and systematic testing of the hero in the English Celtic romance *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* to note how provocative the parallels are" (1983: 33-4).

It seems, then, that the intertexts of "The Ebony Tower" are not only those explicitly alluded to by Fowles in "A Personal Note," namely Brithonic Celtic romance and *The Magus*, but also other unmentioned Celtic romances, either Brythonic or English, like *Lanval* and *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*. In the text, the only explicit allusion to English Celtic romance comes as a passing reference to the Arthurian cycle in connexion with Pisanello's *Vision of St Eustace* (ET 19), but we should not forget that, as David Williams finds out by contemplating Henry Breasley's Coëtminais series, his work, like the old painter's own personality, was, behind the French mask, truly and radically English:

It began to seem almost the essential clue; the wily old outlaw, hiding behind the flamboyant screen of his outrageous behaviour and his cosmopolitan influences, was perhaps as simply and inalienably native as Robin Hood. (p. 82)

As English as Fowles' work, no doubt.

Analysing the title of the novella we found that the ebony tower echoed and parodied not only the medieval *topos* of the ivory tower but also the Tarot, Shakespeare's, Browning's, and the Modernists' earlier versions of the same concept. Similarly, the novella itself recasts the theme of the archetypal hero's quest for maturation but taken, as Raymond J. Wilson III (1982: 302) points out, not directly, but "as modified by T. S. Eliot."

Following Weston, Wilson synthesises this myth as the quest to restore fertility to the waste land. In the Grail legends of Celtic romance, he adds,

the quester enters a waste land, the troubles of which stem from the fact that its ruler, the Fisher King, is dead or excessively aged or suffering from a sexual wound; and to cure the Fisher King, restoring fertility to the land, the knight must pass a series of tests [involving] a temptation by a fiend, in the form of a fair maiden on a luxurious barge. [In the Indian version of the same myth a] hermit-youth must succumb to the temptation in order to restore fertility to the land, while to attend the same end, [the Christian knight] must resist the temptation. (Wilson 1982: 303).

Coming at the end of a centuries long literary tradition, therefore, Fowles will attempt to recast in his novels and short stories the archetypal myth of the hero's quest for maturation simultaneously absorbing the cumulative emotional drive of both the Western and the Eastern versions of the quest theme with their opposed solution of the hero's dilemma, i.e., either resisting or yielding to the temptation, using as sources not only the Tarot and romance versions of the myth but also its most important contemporary parodic version: that developed in *The Waste Land* by T. S. Eliot.

Fowles attempted to carry out this complex experiment for the first time in *The Magus*. In it, an upper middle-class young man called Nicholas Urfe, named after his French ancestor, "Honoré d'Urfé, author of the seventeenth-century best-seller *L'Astrée*" (Fowles 1977: 15), undertakes a journey from England to Bourani in Greece in order to take up a job as school teacher and to get rid of "a girl he was tired of" (1977: 18). There, contrary to his expectations, he will undergo a complex process of manipulation at the hands of Conchis, a baffling magus intent on teaching his chosen pupil the difference between real life and a fake life of appearances. So, Urfe will be made to encounter two beautiful and disquieting identical twins: Lily/Julie and Rose/June, and will eventually be made to choose between one of the two. In order to help Urfe make the right choice, Conchis will lecture his pupil, will tell him stories with a moral and episodes of his own life story that interestingly echo Urfe's present situation and will organise for him the "Godgame," a kind of living "metatheatre" in which Nicholas himself will be asked to play the leading role, hand in hand with Lily and Rose. As I have shown elsewhere (1989: 35) *The Magus* follows the threefold pattern of a hero's quest for maturation. The first section, from chapters 1 to 9, shows the hero still in his homeland, at the crucial moment in his evolution from adolescence into manhood when he has finished his university training and is trying to orient his life. The second section goes from chapters 10 to 67, and takes place in Bourani, a mysterious domain set in Phraxos, a remote island

in the Aegean. In it the hero undergoes the different phases of trial and testing that constitute his ritual initiation into knowledge. The third section, covering chapters 68 to 77, constitutes the hero's return, his maturity now achieved. "The Ebony Tower," likewise, follows a threefold pattern: David Williams' dangerous journey from Britain to Brittany and back to Britain again takes place over three days and includes the passing from "the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder" (Campbell 1973: 30) through the crossing of a most straightforward archetypal threefold threshold:

He turned off down an even smaller forest road, a deserted *voie communale*; and a mile or so along that he came on the promised sign. *Manoir de Coëtminais. Chemin privé*. There was a white gate, which he had to open and shut. Half a mile on again through the forest he found his way barred, just before the trees gave way to sunlight and a grassy orchard, by yet another gate. There was a sign-board nailed to the top bar. Its words made him smile inwardly, since beneath the heading *Chien méchant* they were in English: *Strictly no visitors except by prior arrangement*. But as if to confirm that the sign was not to be taken lightly, he found the gate padlocked on the inner side. . . . Guard-dog or not, one couldn't . . . he went back to his car, switched off and locked the doors, then returned to the gate and climbed over. (ET 10)

The paragraph echoes Urfe's penetration of the barbed-wire fence that offered a token protection to Conchis' domain. Like Williams, Urfe encounters a notice in French with the incongruous words *Salle d'attente*, which stood "in the sort of position one sees *Trespassers will be prosecuted* notices in England" (1977: 71). And again like Williams, who dismisses the danger of finding the "*chien méchant*" in his way, Urfe disregarded the notice's advise and crossed over into the domain. As invariably happens to the archetypal hero, Williams will soon after discover that Macmillan, the dog, is well tied up and that the padlocked gate was in fact open (ET 13), and so, that, like the archetypal guardian of the threshold, in truth the dog simply offered a token protection, and was in fact harmless for the daring visitor. So, he finds himself in an orchard "whose aged trees were clustered with codlings and red-cider apples" (ET 10), that is, he enters an ancient apple orchard, brimful with codlings, which are unsuitable to eat, but also with tempting — and intoxicating — red cider-apples. With admirable accuracy, then, Williams

is offered the edible and the inedible apples that inevitably evoke the double nature of the paradisal apple tree.

Purblind to the subtleties of this archetypal symbolism, however, Williams crosses the orchard, registers the sight of two "old climbing roses [and] a scatter of white doves" (*ET* 11) and, as he had done with the white codlings and the red-cider apples, he completely disregards the color symbolism of the (red ?) roses and the white doves although, ironically, he considers himself a "colour painter" (*ET* 20). He then arrives at the front of the manor-house, where he finds that the main door is open, tempting him for the second time to trespass over a threshold: "[h]e hesitated, aware that he had arrived sooner than suggested; then tapped on the massive main door with his knuckles. A few seconds later, realizing the futility of the weak sound, *he stepped over the threshold.*" (my emphasis, *ET* 11)

When Williams decides to step over the threshold of the main door, he finds, like Urfe in Bourani, the atemporal world of art, and beyond it, protected by a high pink wall, the heart of the heart of Coëtminais: the *hortus conclusus* proper, with its single tree springing up in midlawn, a "catalpa pruned into a huge green mushroom," beyond which "in a closed pool of heat, two naked girls lay side by side on the grass. The further, half hidden, was on her back, as if asleep. (p. 12).

With characteristic accuracy, Williams' painter's eye registers the "warm tones" of the scene:

the two indolent female figures, the catalpa-shade green and the grass green, the intense carmine of the hat-sash, the pink wall beyond with its ancient espalier fruit-trees. Then he turned and went back to the main door, feeling more amused than embarrassed. He thought of Beth again: how she would have adored this being plunged straight into the legend ... the wicked old faun and his famous afternoons. (*ET* 12)

And, ironically enough, although he himself uses a metaphorical language that evokes the world of the romance with its legends and fauns, Williams is unable to go beyond the mechanical optic recording of what he sees. He considers only the effect of green that the catalpa-shade casts and misses the clear dual sexual symbolism of the tree, standing at the centre of the garden, with its (feminine) heart-shaped leaves and (masculine) trumpet-shaped flowers. He also notices the "ancient espalier fruit-trees" and again dismisses them, although in fact, as he himself later reflects, the whole countryside

reeks of "fecundity [with] so many ripening apples" (*ET* 34). Interestingly, he tries to convince himself that he is more amused than embarrassed by the sight of the two naked girls, but refuses to cross the third threshold that separates him from them and, returning to the main door, rings a bronze handbell that was standing on the stone-floor and "waited on the threshold" (*ET* 12). Although he concludes that what he has seen has to be interpreted simply as evidence of Henry Breasley's famous sexual promiscuity, he cannot help associating the naked girls with his own wife and so, with the memory of what makes him feel "a little guilty to be enjoying himself so much, to be here so unexpectedly alone, without Beth" (*ET* 9). Just before he leaves Coëtminais for ever, two days later, this little feeling of guilt will have metamorphosed into "terror" (*ET* 98).

The ambiguity of the literal and the symbolic readings of *fabula* and *story* are enhanced at text level. At first sight, "The Ebony Tower" appears to be the realistic account by a traditional external (or hetero-extradiegetic, in Genette's terminology [1972]) narrative instance who focalises its retrospective narration through the mind and eyes of David Williams. This narrator never makes any comments of its own, preferring to show the actions and thoughts of the characters either through Williams' own perspective or by allowing them to speak in their own voices. As we begin to read, therefore, we are offered an account of the journey in Williams' own matter-of-fact terms: the business-like reason for his journey, the triviality of the reason why Williams' wife was not able to accompany him, the accurate and detailed explanations of why and how Williams was commissioned to write a book on Breasley's painting, the apparently objective and detached description of Williams' family and artistic background —all function as powerful realism-enhancing mechanisms, working to convince the reader that s/he is witnessing the narration of an action that could perfectly well have taken place in the real world of 1973. Indeed, the "touches" of realism go to the length of making Williams' wife, Beth, a brilliant ex-student of his, who had given up her career for motherhood and who had subsequently come to resent the drabness of comfortable middle-class married life, until she found an outlet for her creativity in the illustration of children's books:

His marriage had been very successful, except for one brief bad period when Berth had rebelled against 'constant motherhood' and flown the banner of Women's Liberation; but now she had two sets of

illustrations for children's books to her credit, another commissioned and a fourth in prospect. (ET 21)

David Williams himself is described as the brilliant, energetic, ambitious and successful painter, capable of combining critical activity, teaching and lecturing with painting in a way that would please both the critics and the general public, so that

his own work began to get enough reputation as it moved from beneath the Op Art umbrella to guarantee plenty of red stars at his exhibitions [...and] to put it crudely [his paintings] went well on walls that had to be lived in, which was one good reason (one he knew and accepted) that he sold; another was that he had always worked to a smaller scale than most non-figurative painters. (ET 20-21)

But we must not forget that the narrative instance is focusing the narration through David Williams' perspective, and so that it is in principle simply reporting in indirect speech Williams' own version of the journey and of himself. As the action progresses, we begin to realise that, in fact, Williams' deeds break quite away from his original intention and that, like the Aristotelian tragic hero, he is the victim of a basic ignorance, a *hamartia* that precludes his interpreting his and the other characters' actions in their true light. So, for example, when he arrives at Coëtminais, the narrator tells us that Williams had

only one small fear: that Breasley had not realized that he was a painter —to be precise, what kind of painter he was— as well as writer on art [and that] since he lived so far from the London art scene, [Breasley] was genuinely unaware of the partial snake he had taken to his bosom. (ET 21-22)

As the reader will soon learn, however, the situation is precisely the contrary, for Breasley not only knows what kind of painter he is, but has, in fact, as Conchis did with Urfe in *The Magus*, chosen him as the subject of a sophisticated experiment aimed at re-educating him and at making him grow out of abstract art. In this light, Williams' metaphor of the "snake in his bosom" acquires added irony and becomes a pointed "amorce" or hint (Genette 1972: 112), anticipating Williams' incapacity to see that Coëtminais is a replica of the Garden of Eden, with Breasley, not him, playing the role of snake and offering Williams the tempting apple of (true artistic) knowledge.

So, the function of the heterodiegetic narrator in "The Ebony Tower" is comparable to that of the homodiegetic narrator in *The Magus*: although both narrators restrict their knowledge to the perspective of their respective heroes, an ironic tension is also established on the one hand, between the often wrong and biased knowledge of the heroes, whose awareness of the events is partial and limited by their *hamartia* and can, obviously, only improve progressively, after they actually live the events, and on the other, the better knowledge of their respective narrators, who enjoy the advantage of knowing the whole story in advance, including their *dénouements*.

The similarity of this ironic tension can be further explained through the fact that, from a characteriological point of view, Nicholas Urfe and David Williams have striking traits in common. Both are brilliant upper-middle class, University-trained young men with artistic inclinations, who are, nevertheless, in a sense, wasting their potential, due to a flaw in their characters. Interestingly, Urfe is a rake and a woman-chaser while Williams, who considers himself a monogamist, may be seen as Urfe's mirror-opposite. Urfe, as a woman "collector," is totally ignorant of what true love is and tends to see women as sex-objects. This character flaw has led him to reject Alison and to take the complete love she offers for a sexual pastime. Williams, on the other hand, considers himself "a crypto-husband before he married" (*ET* 54) and is reluctant to cheat on his wife, although he is deeply stirred and tempted by Diana. However, his reason for being faithful to Beth is simply the fear that "if he was unfaithful, then she could be" (*ET* 97). Furthermore, he envisages matrimony just as a satisfactory arrangement based on a relationship of friendship and concord, not love: "David had always admired his parent's marriage. His own had begun to assume that same easy camaraderie and co-operation" (*ET* 21).

From the archetypal point of view, then, Nicholas Urfe, like the medieval Celtic knight, must restrain his sexual impulses and resist temptation, while Williams, like the hermit-youth of the Indian version of the quest myth, must give up his fear and succumb to it.

In this sense we can say that, although Urfe and Williams apparently champion opposite qualities (the former sexual promiscuity and the latter perfect monogamy), they really suffer from the same deficiency: an inability to live and love truly that effectually thwarts their attempts at creative expression: while Nicholas Urfe confesses himself incapable of accomplishing his ambition to become a poet, David Williams limits his

potential as a painter by neglecting representative painting for abstraction. The aim of the teaching they will receive from the magus-like figure they will encounter at the end of their journeys, therefore, will be to shatter their assumptions about love as a necessary prerequisite to their true understanding of life and art.

Henry Breasley, the old man Williams encounters, like Maurice Conchis in the former novel, has the baffling complex nature of the archetypal magus. With Tiresias, the magus figure in *The Waste Land*, both Conchis and Breasley share an ambiguous ambivalence. At one point in the novella Williams is astonished to see how Breasley's "disingenuous mask of ignorance slipped and the face of the old cosmopolitan that lay beneath began to show" (*ET* 32); at another, the old painter is described as a living "paradox" with his

straight white hair, brushed across the forehead in a style . . . which Hitler had long put out of fashion . . . It gave him a boyishness; but the ruddy incipient choleric face and the pale eyes suggested something much older and more dangerous. (*ET* 26)

Furthermore, Henry Breasley's oxymoronic dual traits: ignorant / cosmopolitan, boyish / older, ruddy-choleric / pale-eyed, inoffensive / dangerous-Hitlerian, are simultaneously combined with a protean capacity for metamorphosis that also recalls Conchis' ever-changing personality: he is "an old demon" (*ET* 43); a *senex iratus* full of "[h]atred and anger" (*ET* 48); the girls' "tyrant" and lover, and "a smirking old satyr in carpet-slippers" (*ET* 56). To match his multilayered personality, his language is muddled and fragmentary: he has

a quirky staccato manner, half assertive, half tentative; weirdly antiquated slang, a constant lacing of obscenity; not intellectually or feelingly at all, but more like some eccentric retired . . . admiral. (*ET* 26)

In *The Magus* the first-level narrator, the older and mature Urfe, would occasionally relinquish his narrative role in favour of Maurice Conchis who, in order to carry out his task of re-educating the young and purblind hero, undertook to narrate a series of episodes of his own past life that shockingly resembled recent events occurring to Urfe at Bourani. Other times Conchis would narrate a series of allegorical tales with a moral that also prefigured Urfe's present situation. As I have shown elsewhere (1989: 50 ff.), these

iconic tales and the episodes of Conchis' life function as proleptic warnings meant to help Urfe succeed in the rode of trials of his hero's quest for maturation. From the narrative point of view, the handing over of the narrative roles by the older Urfe to Conchis means that a second level of narration has been created: Conchis turns from character into second-level internal narrator addressing the young Nicholas in his new role of second-level narratee. From this point of view, the iconic tales and episodes of Conchis' life have a certain autonomy, they are tales within a tale reflecting in allegorical form complementary aspects of the primary story, that is, functioning as elements of what Mieke Bal, following Ricardou (1977: 107), has called a *mise en abyme éclatée*, that is, a *mise en abyme* whose elements appear scattered and intertwined with the elements of the main story and with each other.

If we turn out attention to "The Ebony Tower" we will see that the first-level external narrator also relinquishes its narrative role in favour of the magus-like figure in the novella, Henry Breasley who, like Maurice Conchis in *The Magus*, will undertake to narrate to his pupil, David Williams, brief episodes from his past life and work as well as a summary of the plot of Marie de France's *Eliduc* which, like Fowles, Breasley considers a "[d]amn' good tale [he has read] several times" (ET 58).

On the very first page of the novella, the external narrator had warned the reader that Coëtminais was at the heart of

the forest of Paimpont, one of the last largest remnants of the old wooded Brittany. Later on, Henry Briesley explained to Williams that the forest of Paimpont was nothing less than "the Brocéliande of the *lais* of Chrétien de Troyes (ET 57),

that "Coët- meant wood, or forest: *-minais*, of the monks" and that the surrounding forest had once been abbatial land (ET 43). As he explained, this part of the Haute Bretagne was the very land that had filtered to the rest of Europe the twelfth- and thirteenth-century romantic legends and the "mystery of island Britain" (ET 57), and Coëtminais was literally in fact the same forest and abbatial land that once belonged to Eliduc in Marie de France's romance. In an attempt to give the inattentive Williams the clues and links he needs to understand the situation he is living, Henry Breasley even takes the trouble to point out the parallelism between the two women in *Eliduc* and the two girls in Coëtminais:

Then he went off on Marie de France and *Eliduc*. "Damn good tale. Read it several times. What's that old Swiss bamboozler's name. Jung, yes? His sort of stuff. Archetypal and all that."

Ahead, the two girls turned off on a diagonal and narrower ride, more shady. Breasley and David followed some forty yards behind. The old man waved his stick.

"Those two girls now. Two girls in *Eliduc*." (ET 58)

Now, the fact that Henry Breasley feels this fascination for *Eliduc* has interesting implications. First of all, it suggests an intellectual identity between Fowles himself and his literary creation, thus equating Breasley's opinions about life and art with the author's own opinions, and so allowing for the interpretation that Breasley is the author's *persona*, a mere spokesman of Fowles' own ideology and morals. This suggestion is strengthened by the parallelism that exists between Breasley's and Fowles' roles: the former is a magus-like teacher with omniscient control over his domain and over the creatures that inhabit it, the latter a God-like writer with overall control over the fictional universe of his own creation. By summarising the plot of *Eliduc* and by pointing at a possible parallelism between the Freak and the Mouse and Guilliadun and Guildelüec Henry Breasley hopes to open up the eyes of Williams to the perception of a richer and more complex reality than the reality of commonsense observation. But Henry Briesley's metaphorical suggestion is also addressed to the reader, who is asked to ironise and complete David Williams' short-sighted and too literal interpretations of what he is living and experiencing at Coëtminais. Indeed, when the old painter begins to tell the story of *Eliduc*, Williams, like the thesis writers and early reviewers Fowles mentioned in "A Personal Note," is bored and cannot see the connection:

his distinctly shorthand manner of narration was more reminiscent of a Noel Coward farce than a noble medieval tale of crossed love, and once or twice David had to bite his lips. Nor did the actual figures of the two girls, the Freak in a red shirt, black dungarees and Wellingtons, the Mouse in a dark green jersey (all bras were not burnt, David noted) and pale trousers, help. (ET 58)

So, dismissing Breasley's hint that the connection between the Freak and the Mouse and the story of *Eliduc* has to be read in archetypal and symbolic terms, Williams insists on carrying out a flat, literal interpretation of the girls.

Typically, "David detected [but was incapable of interpreting] a difference between the two girls. One wanted to play down the sexual side, the other to admit it" (ET 68). Observing the Freak, he realised that "[s]omething about her, perhaps just the exotic hair and the darkness of her tan, was faintly negroid, aboriginal, androgynous" and that [p]sychologically she still repelled something in [him]" (ET 62), while the Mouse "had a much more feminine figure, long-legged, attractively firm small breasts . . ." (ET 62-3); and when during the trip to the lake, he contemplated Diana peeling an apple, David noticed her "Quattrocento delicacy" which he paradoxically found "antiseptic; and disturbing." (ET 63).

At the same time, David belatedly detected, beneath the girls' temperamental and physical differences, a paradoxical "closeness between them, a rapport that did not need words" (ET 40). As the second day elapsed, he intuited that the Mouse had a complex, multilayered personality as "he glimpsed a different girl beneath the present one" (ET 77) and he found himself correcting his first negative impression of the Freak, reluctantly admitting that she was not simply the absurd sex doll with a past of promiscuity and drugs he had thought her to be, and guessing "at an affectionateness beneath the flip language —an honesty . . . something that had been got the hard way, by living the 'bloody mess'" (ET 72).

If Williams had listened to Henry Breasley's advice that he should see the girls in the light of Carl Jung's archetypal symbolism, he would have immediately realised that the Freak with her "frizzed-out hair that had been reddened with henna [and her] singlet, a man's or a boy's by the look of it, dyed black" (ET 25) and the Mouse, with her "brown and gold hair" (ET 13) and her "plain white cotton *galabiya*" (ET 12), appear as simultaneously opposed and mutually dependent, because each embodies one of the two antagonistic qualities that, put together, make up the archetypal concept of *anima*, expressed in the duality virgin/whore, or the pure white lily/red rose of passion of Browning's poem. But the most powerful "amorce" hinting at the *anima* complementarity of the Freak and the Mouse appears in the fact that, when Williams sees them for the first time, one girl is awake and the other asleep, thus literally following the archetypal symbolism that equates the conscious with a state of vigilance and the unconscious or instinctual with sleep. In this sense, the scene foreshadows a similar one in *A Maggot* (1986) in which Rebecca Lee, in a vision of Heaven, discovers a young man and his twin, one awake and the other asleep.³ Indeed, the archetypal

complementarity of the Freak and the Mouse echoes and parallels not only *A Maggot* but John Fowles' fiction *en bloc* for, as I have shown elsewhere (1989: 172), from *The Magus* onwards every heroine of John Fowles has in herself the archetypal duality of the *anima*. This duality is expressed in the splitting into twin characters in *The Magus*: in accord with their names, Lily is spiritual and virginal, and Rose down-to-earth and sexually aggressive. This archetypal dichotomy reappears in *The French Lieutenant's Woman*, where Sarah is alternately seen as an innocent, virginal maiden, and as a succuba; in *Daniel Martin*, in the parodically Victorian "Heavenly Twins," Nell and Jane; in the "Fairy Sisters" Marjory and Miriam; and in Nancy Reed's twin sisters, Mary and Louise; in *Mantissa*, in the splitting of the muse into (the white) Dr. Delfie and (the black) Nurse Cory; and in *A Maggot*, where Rebecca Hocknell, a barren prostitute, mysteriously transforms herself into a pious visionary and the mother of a religious reformer.

The Jungian archetype of the *anima* lies, therefore, at the back of Fowles' picturing of woman but we should not forget that this archetypal dichotomy also recurrently appears in the Brythonic Celtic romances that act as intertexts of Fowles' works. Indeed, the complementarity of the Mouse and the Freak echo the medieval romance *topos* of the two women who turn out to be one, expressed in *Eliduc* in the figures of Guilliadun and Guildelüec, the sleeping virginal bride and the rejected haggish wife, and also implicitly alluded to in the epigraph from *Yvain* for, as Robert Huffaker explains,

The epigram [sic] describes the archetypal quest of the knight who, often leaving a lover behind, reaches some mysterious master's castle and gains entry against dubious odds . . . Once inside the castle, the knight usually becomes somehow involved with at least one nubile damsel —more often two— rarely more. Of the customary two, one is distant and desirable, the other accessible and less attractive —occasionally not pretty at all, but haggish instead. Sometimes the hag is transformed; sometimes the two maids prove to be one; but the hero usually discovers to his eventual surprise that the master is not as mysterious, nor the princess as distant, as he had supposed. Almost inevitably, she at last becomes available whether he decides to keep her or not. (1980: 117)

Like Eliduc in the Brythonic Celtic romance, and also like Urfe in *The Magus*, Williams will be asked to choose between one of the two women. One, matter-of-fact and experienced, will offer him fun and "a quickie" (ET

105); the other, pure and romantic, a unique moment of fulfilment, involving commitment and renunciation.

Anne, with her sexual promiscuity and her red hair, embodies the quality of the whore or red rose but, as her flat breasts and her negroid, androgynous bodily features simultaneously suggest, she also stands for the masculine facet of the *anima*, the *animus*. Diana, on the other hand, with her blond hair, her delicate beauty and her "antiseptic" (ET 63) sexuality, stands for the virgin, or white lily and so for the feminine facet of woman; but she is also the muse, the artist's source of inspiration, as Henry Breasley explains to William with his pun on her nickname:

"Know why I call her the Mouse?"
 "I did rather wonder"
 "Not the animal"

The old man hesitated, then reached and took a sheet of notepaper from a drawer beside him. Standing at his shoulder, David watched him . . . print in pencil the letter M and then, after a space, the letters U,S, E. In the space between the M and the U the wrinkled hand drew, in five or six quick strokes, an O-shaped vulva. Then Breasley glanced drily back up at David; a wink, the tip of his tongue slipped out like a lizard's. Almost before David had grasped the double meaning the piece of paper was crumpled up. (ET 80-1)

As the critics have pointed out, the real names of the girls, "Anne" and "Di-ana," implicitly allude to their archetypal complementarity. But the names suggest more than that. As a prefix indicating reduplication, the "Di-" in "Di-ana" also seems to suggest that Diana is like two Annes or rather, that Anne is just one single (recessive) facet of Diana's complex wholeness, as Williams intuits: "[the Freak] seemed so much a mere parasite of the other girl's poise and honesty." (ET 62). Diana has the timidity (or should we say, coyness?), characteristic of the little animal. But, as Breasley's pun on her nickname indicates, she also has the strong sexuality of the pure woman, a sexuality which, when properly understood and shared is much stronger and more fulfilling than that offered by Anne, a sexuality capable of raising her status from woman to muse, and that of her lover from man to artist, for as Breasley explained, love and passion are the true prerequisites of real art: "Don't hate, can't love, can't love, can't paint" (ET 49).

This synthetic message constitutes the core of Breasley's teaching, as can be seen from the discussion on painting that takes place during the first

dinner. Williams tries to defend abstract art by comparing it to philosophy and mathematics, insisting on viewing it in logical terms as a search for pure forms. Breasley's dismissive answer is interpreted by Diana:

"Pair of tits and a cunt. All that goes with them. That's reality. Not your piddling theorems and pansy colours. . . ."

Once again the Mouse interrupted, in an absolutely neutral voice. "You're afraid of the human body."

"Perhaps simply more interested in the mind than the genitals."

"God help your bloody wife then."

David said evenly, "I thought we were talking about painting."

(ET 45)

David's answer evinces his conception of art and life as distinct and separate. He cannot understand why Breasley is always speaking about women and sex in connection with painting or why he thinks of abstract painting in terms of castration and destruction (ET 46). The episode foreruns a similar one in *Daniel Martin*, when having made up his mind to abandon script writing for novel writing, Daniel Martin makes the momentous decision to reject cultural fashion, imposed feelings and prescribed recipes for his novel in order to create an art capable of expressing "behind the images, the real" (1977: 454). Daniel Martin rejects "elitist guilt" and "existentialist nausea" and toys with the possibilities offered him by the Marxist social realism of Georg Lukács. In "The Ebony Tower," likewise, David Williams interprets Breasley's defense of representational art as a return to socialist realism, which he rejects with the argument that it presupposes the acceptance of totalitarian restrictions of freedom (ET 46). The dialogue, which is pretty long, synthesises the respective positions of teacher and pupil. Williams thinks that abstract art is the result of creative freedom and of a post-atomic world-view (ET 47), while for Breasley the apparently free election of abstraction hides at heart a crucial fear: the fear to accept life and commitment: "[t]oo many people die for decency. Tolerance. Keeping their arses clean" (ET 46).

As we have seen, Diana translated Breasley's incoherent remarks on Williams' views on abstract art saying that Breasley thought that he was afraid of the human body. According to the old painter, Williams' art—and contemporary abstraction in general—is barren and lifeless because behind the refusal to represent the human body lies a castrating fear of life. In order to overcome this sterilising limitation, therefore, Williams will have to undergo a complex process of re-education. Firstly, he will be invited to

Coëtminais, a remote "domain" hidden from the rest of the world by the very same forest that was "the Brocéliande of the *lais* of Chrétien de Troyes" that had been peopled by "wandering horsemen and lost damsels and dragons and wizards, Tristran and Merlin and Lancelot . . ." (ET 57). That is, Williams is invited to cross a threshold that separates the barren and sterilising world of common day from the richly suggestive world of literature. On contemplating the two girls for the first time Williams immediately thinks of his wife and of how "she would have adored this being plunged straight into the legend" (ET 12). His thoughts are meant to be metaphorical but, ironically enough, will prove to have literal meaning, for David Williams is, like Nicholas Urfe, literally plunged into a fictional world paradoxically made up, again like Conchis' "metatheatre," of real objects and flesh-and-blood people. After this, Williams will be made to participate in a series of picture-like scenes: first, as we have seen, he will be offered a sight of the two girls, one awake and the other asleep, in the centre of an edenic garden strongly reminiscent of the medieval *hortus conclusus* with its high pink walls and its ancient apple trees. Next, Williams will be invited on a trip by the lake that, as Breasley hints, amounts to a re-enactment of Manet's controversial picture: "[g]els suggest a little *déjeuner sur l'herbe*. Good idea, what? Picnic? . . . 'Rather proud of my forest. Worth a dekko?'" (ET 54).

With his critical eye trained to detect the influence of earlier painters in contemporary pictures, Williams had detected behind Breasley's *Kermesse* the echo "of the Brueghel family and even a faint self-echo, of the *Moon-hunt*" (ET 29). Now, during the trip to the lake, David finds himself applying the same technique to what he is living and finding to his astonishment that each stage of the trip reminds him of a concrete painter. Just as he enters the forest he has the strange feeling that he had seen it before, that "[t]he place had featured in two of the last-period paintings, and David had a sense of familiarity, of *déjà vu*" (ET 59). After the girls undress for swimming, the association with Breasley's paintings gives way to "[a]nother echo, this time of Gaugin; brown breasts and the garden of Eden" (ET 61) and then "Gaugin disappeared; and Manet took his place" (ET 62). The painting Williams is now thinking of is, of course, Manet's *Déjeuner sur l'herbe*, originally entitled *Le bain*. Manet's *Déjeuner sur l'herbe* is an oil painting portraying two men dressed up in the contemporary fashion of the mid-nineteenth century, leisurely sitting on a blanket on the grass and sharing a picnic with a beautifully serene and strangely detached stark naked woman.⁴

Williams' lake trip follows Manet's picture with remarkable accuracy: like the two men in the *Déjeuner sur l'herbe*, Breasley and Williams sit in their contemporary clothes and watch the archetypal Venus and her *animus* serenely undress and bathe. Watching them bathe David is for the first time seriously tempted by "the ghost of infidelity" (ET 63). He compares Beth to Diana and, although the night before he had been angered by the old painter's insistence on mixing sexuality with art, he finds himself incongruously comparing Diana's poise and dignity with "something that he aimed at in his own painting, a detachment and at the same time a matter-of-factness" (ET 63). Williams' first temptation ends with a mockingly parodic Eve-like scene: Diana peeled an apple and "passed a quarter back to the old man, then offered another to David" (ET 63).

Still, like Sir Gawain, Williams rejects the temptation as "a safe impossibility and a very remote probability" (ET 63) but, later on, when Breasley is asleep, he gathers courage to undress and swim "out after the distant head" (ET 74). And, as a result of this swim, Williams suffers a second, much more erotic, bout of temptation that sends him daydreaming of "the primeval male longing for the licitly promiscuous, the polygamous, the caress of two bodies, sheikdom" (ET 75) and he even "had a complete knowledge of a brutality totally alien to his nature: how men could rape" (ET 76). But he again manages to overcome this temptation by thinking of Beth, although this time he feels much more alienated from her: "[h]e would tell Beth, because sooner or later he told her everything; but not till they had made love again" (ET 76).

After this second temptation Williams is again offered the paradisal apple, this time in an even more matter-of-fact parodic form. On their walk back home through the forest the girls suddenly insist on taking a slightly different route in order to pick blackberries to make "a good old-fashioned English blackberry-and-apple pie" (ET 76), thus casting on the paradisal connotations of the apple the more playful and merry shade of Chaucer's locution, "goon a-blacheberied" in "The Pardoners' Prologue" (line 118), (and also of the popular French expression, "aller aux fraises"). In what structurally is a proleptic "amorce" prefiguring the *dénouement*, Williams sadly reflects that "he would not be there to enjoy the eating" (ET 76).

After the trip to the lake Williams is still, technically speaking, faithful to his wife, but his attitude towards women has gone a long way from the sexless camaraderie and friendship he felt for Beth. And although he knows that in another setting "as a contemporary arrangement, a *ménage à trois* of beautiful young uninhibited people, it would very probably fail" (ET 81), he

even indulges in the dream that he would be able to recreate the whole experience with Beth, not in contemporary England, but "perhaps [in] Wales or the West Country" (ET 81).

In *The Magus*, Urfe rejected Alison motivated by an egotistic instinct of self-defense only to fall under the spell of Lily's purity apparently being offered to him at Bourani. In *Eliduc*, the knight deceived both his wife and his new bride, breaking his oath of fidelity and eternal love to the former and promising what in truth was an impossible marriage to the latter.

In the medieval romance Eliduc's mistake lay not so much in his choice of woman as in the fact that he had allowed his passion to lead him to a breach of faith. Consequently, redemption, when it comes, must arrive from the hand of Eliduc's wife, Guildeüec who, giving proof of a much more constant and impressive capacity for love, would bring about the miraculous awakening of Guilliadum from her sleeping death, and would retire to a convent, thus allowing her husband to marry again. Interestingly enough, Eliduc and Guilliadum marry only to separate for ever: the penitent knight sobered up by his former wife's sacrifice of love, decides to give up his property and enter the Church, renouncing Guilliadum, whom he sends "to join his first wife." (ET 141).

At the end of *The Magus*, betrayed by Lily and abandoned by Conchis, Nicholas Urfe is allowed to meet Alison again. His whole process of maturation has taught him to abandon his womanizing and to distinguish reality from unreality, true life from flattering illusion. Although the open ending of the novel leaves the reader undecided about whether Nicholas will be able to start a new project of life in common with Alison, there is no doubt that his schooling at the hands of Conchis, like Eliduc's teaching at the hands of Guildeüec, has had a sobering effect.

In "The Ebony Tower," however, we are offered the contrary situation. After the trip to the lake Anne will offer David sex and Diana will offer herself utterly, demanding from him complete commitment and renunciation of the past in exchange for true love. When on the night before leaving, Diana and David kiss in the dusk, he is struck by the realisation that "[h]e was wanted physically, as well as emotionally; and he wanted desperately in both ways himself" but feels at the same time "the terror of it, the enormity of destroying what one had so carefully built" (ET 98) and so fails the test:

He watched her go into her room, the door close; and he was left with all the agonized and agonizing deflation of a man who has come to a

momentous decision, only to have it cursorily dismissed . . . The horror was that he was still being plunged forward, still melting, still realizing . . . he knew it was a far more than sexual experience . . . it was metaphysical . . . an anguish, a being bereft of freedom whose nature he had only just seen.

For the first time in his life he knew more than the fact of being: but the passion to exist. (*ET* 102)

So, in an episode that closely recasts Urfe's bathetic sexual encounter with Lily, Williams undergoes a cathartic experience which brings about for him, on the one hand, a bout of existentialist nausea as he finds himself unfree and trapped and understanding the true nature of freedom. On the other hand, as he intuits for the first time the possibilities of a full life, Williams has a paradoxically exhilarating experience he describes as "the passion to exist" (Urfe's *feu de joie* or *deliriums vivens* [Fowles, 1977: 129, 534]), the dazzling realisation that man is free to choose whatever he will if he is ready to risk all, from loss of comfort to damnation itself.

At the end of the novella, Williams is left at the Orly visitor's lounge (*ET* 112) —Urfe's "*Salle d'attente*" — in a scene that strongly echoes the ending of *The Magus*, frozen in the present moment and sadly reflecting, in words that recall the opening movement of "Little Gidding," on "the collapsed parallel of what he was beside the soaring line of all that he might have been" (*ET* 112). However, Williams is also simultaneously aware of something that G. P. , the mature painter and magus figure in *The Collector*, had always taken for granted, that "art is fundamentally amoral" (*ET* 112).

At Orly David Williams feels the anguish, expressed by John Fowles in *The Aristos*, of knowing that he is conditioned by his education and temperament to behave like "a decent man" (*ET* 112) and so, that he will never have the courage to burn "every boat" in order to affirm his "free will" (*ET* 113). He also knows, however that although he has "a numbed sense of something beginning to slip inexorably away," he will always recall the dream-like "shadow of a face, hair streaked with gold" (*ET* 113) pointing, like the thrush in "Little Gidding," to the rose garden.

Therefore, although we can say that, by rejecting Diana, Williams failed the test and so lost the chance of starting a new, fuller life both artistically and emotionally with the woman and the muse, the painful realization of his own failure and of the possibility of personal freedom he had let slip also works in the contrary direction. It opens his eyes to the true, uncompromising, nature of life and art and so paradoxically succeeds (like

Charles Smithson, in *The French Lieutenant's Woman*) in bringing about the (existentialist) hero's maturation or, in Jungian terms, his psychological "individuation."

With the aid of Anne and Diana, then, Henry Breasley has succeeded in explaining to his pupil the possibilities and true nature of life and art. The other lesson he has tried to teach him is how to express this fuller life through his art. In order to do so Breasley showed him his Coëtminais pictures. Williams' reaction recalls Harold Bloom's "anxiety of influence":

There hung the huge Moon-hunt, perhaps the best-known of the Coëtminais *oeuvre* As with so much of Breasley's work there was an obvious previous iconography—in this case, Uccello's *Night Hunt* and its spawn down through the centuries; which was in turn a challenged comparison, a deliberate risk... just as the Spanish drawings had defied the great shadow of Goya by accepting its presence, even using and parodying it, so the memory of the Ashmolean Uccello somehow deepened and buttressed the painting before which David sat. It gave an essential tension, in fact: behind the mysteriousness and the ambiguity (no hounds, no horses, no prey... nocturnal figures among trees, but the title was needed), stood both a homage and a kind of thumbed nose to a very old tradition. (ET 23)

David Williams looks at the picture and is quite unsure whether "it was a masterpiece" (ET 23) or not. First of all, he realises that the *Moon-hunt* is so different from its hypertext that he would have been unable to trace the influence of Uccello's picture without the help of the allusive title ("the title was needed"). He, then, establishes a parallelism between the kind of indebtedness to Uccello he finds in the *Night Hunt* and the kind of indebtedness that exists between Goya's paintings and Breasley's Spanish pictures: both Uccello and Goya are openly acknowledged and parodied, thus establishing "an essential tension" between the old and the new, simultaneously accumulating and recreating the emotional drive of the previous pictures.

Rimgaila Salyshas pointed out how "[t]he medieval paintings of "The Ebony Tower" . . . in both their style and subject reveal the heart of Fowles' thinking on nature and the depiction of nature in art" (1983: 11). To this might be added the observation that Henry Breasley's multilayered absorption and recasting of the Western tradition of painting iconically reflects Fowles'

own approach to the literary tradition he stems from. Like Breasley's recasting of Uccello's *Night Hunt* and also like Manet's *Le déjeuner sur l'herbe*, John Fowles' "The Ebony Tower" is meant to stand both as "a homage and a kind of thumbed nose to a very old tradition." This is the more technical lesson Breasley has tried to teach David Williams, the young, successful painter and critic, who has given up intuition for technique, the response of the general public for specialised applause and representational art for abstraction, a man who "always inclined to see his own life (like his painting) in terms of logical process" (ET 56), instead of, as Breasley does, in terms of intuition and passion: "Don't hate, can't love. Can't love, can't paint" (ET 49).

With the image of Breasley's *Moon-hunt* in mind we can better understand Fowles' technique in writing "The Ebony Tower." Right through the novella David Williams, and the reader with him, has been offered a series of clues some of which look quite trivial; others, clumsily overdone: so, for example, as we have seen, just before he meets the two naked girls for the first time in the back garden, Williams sees a colourful display of (white) codlings and (red?) cider apples, and notices "two old climbing roses [and] a scatter of white doves." Later on Williams notices a dark blue daisy tattooed in the hollow of the Freak's armpit (ET 42) and also a little "healed scar" the Mouse has "on one of her toes" (ET 63). While the red and white colouring of the apples, the doves and the roses and the Freak's blue daisy could easily have been interpreted by Williams, had he cared to listen to Breasley's recommendation to read Jung, as symbols of the archetypal complementarity of the girls, the tiny scar on Diana's toe could not possibly be interpreted by Williams in the same way, for it doesn't have any intrinsic symbolic or archetypal meaning. At an intertextual level, however, Diana's little scar echoes the scar on Lily's wrist through which Nicholas Urfe was able to distinguish her from Rose, her identical twin. So, while its symbolism escapes the diegesis-bound character, it strikes the attentive reader as a self-reflexive blink underlining the artificiality of the reality created within the boundaries of the literary text s/he is reading.

Indeed, the whole "Ebony Tower" is clotted with intertextual allusions binding the novella to *The Magus* and to *Eliduc*. We have already pointed out the striking structural analogies of romance, novel and novella: the three have the same three-fold quest structure and, in the case of "The Ebony Tower" and *The Magus*, the structural, situational and characteriological analogies are taken to such extremes that we have the overall impression of deliberate pastiche. We have already pointed out the similarities between, for example,

the threefold barrier enclosing Conchis' and Breasley's domains, with even the same type of notice in French forbidding the crossing of the threshold. We have also mentioned the characteriological parallelisms that exist between Conchis and Breasley; between Eliduc, Urfe and Williams and between Guilliadun / Guildelüec, Lily / Rose and Anne / Diana. These analogies are often consciously overdone, working as reality-deflating mechanisms aimed at underlining the unrealistic and overtly literary nature of the novella. So, for example, Diana's Edwardian blouse (*ET* 36) refers back to Lily's portrait in her Edwardian dress in *The Magus* (1977: 104); Diana's "Quattrocento delicacy" (*ET* 62) echoes Lily's "Botticelli beauty" 1977: 115), Williams' "passion to exist" literally translates Urfe's *delirium vivens* and *feu de joie* (1977: 129, 534), while Williams' accidental killing of the weasel openly parodies the symbolic sacrifice of the weasel in *Eliduc*. When Williams sees it on the road, he first thinks it is a mouse, then that it was "too big for a mouse, and oddly sinuous like a snake, but too small for a snake" (*ET* 106) and when he runs over it and kills it he finds that "a tickle of blood, like a red flower, had spilt from the gapping mouth" (*ET* 107). As if the mention of the mouse and of the snake were not obvious-enough clues for the reader to associate the weasel with Diana, and so Diana with Guilliadun and Guildelüec, the external narrator still feels obliged to report the meaning this episode has for his hero: "[t]he key of the day had been set" (*ET* 107). Now, the insistence on interpreting the episode figuratively, as well as the careful statement that the blood oozing from the weasel's mouth was "like a red flower," signifies that the text is clogged with "annonces" or announcements (Bal 1977: 65-66): explicit allusions whose signification appears evident from the start and so work to undermine rather than to enhance the realism of the novella.

However, besides these overt intertextual references to *The Magus* and to *Eliduc*, "The Ebony Tower" also contains, as we have seen, an important number of "amorces" (Genette 1972: 12), a much more subtle kind of anticipation or hint, whose presence is so unobtrusive that it is usually ignored in a first reading. A very interesting instance of this appears just as Williams discovers that the book the Freak is reading is entitled *The Magus*. Watching her reading it by the lake, Williams suddenly "had a brief and much more absurd recall of a painting: two little boys listening to an Elizabethan sailor" (p. 64). Williams does not know why he has had this vision in his mind's eye of that particular Victorian picture, but the reader

who has also read *The Magus* knows very well that the painting is the same one Urfe considers his favourite Victorian picture: "I remembered that favourite Victorian picture of the bearded Elizabethan seaman pointing to sea and telling a story to two goggle-eyed little boys" (1977: 311). Coming as it does exactly at the same time as Williams manages to read the title of the Freak's book, Williams' association functions as an ironic hint for the knowing reader, pointing, on the one hand, at the identity between Urfe and Williams, who are made to share characteriological traits, flaws, situation and even thoughts. In this sense, the shared mental association works to underline the fact that Urfe and Williams are not human beings but rather two actants fulfilling similar roles in their respective fictions. On the other hand, the picture also has further interesting structural implications: For Urfe, the Victorian picture of the seaman explaining the mysteries of the sea to two avid children iconically reflects his own situation at Bourani, with Julie/Lily and himself playing the roles of pupils and Maurice Conchis that of teacher. As a synthetic pictorial reflection of Urfe's situation at Bourani, therefore, the Victorian picture functions as a proleptic icon pointing at the true nature of *The Magus*. Like Nicholas Urfe, David Williams also intuitively associates the situation he is living with this picture, but while Urfe acknowledges the meaning of the association ("[i]n some way we were both cast now as his students, his disciples" [1977: 311]), Williams dismisses the intuition and, reading the title "guessed at astrology, she would be into all that nonsense." (ET 64).

Throughout the novella David Williams, and the reader with him, have seen the Freak engrossed in this novel. Eventually, he learns that the novel is entitled *The Magus* and has an "absurd recall of a painting." Ignoring it, the young rationalist, who has never before heard of this novel, allows his prejudices to come to the surface and, instead of guessing at its archetypal or symbolic meaning, wrongly "guessed at astrology [because] she [the Freak] would be into all that nonsense" (ET 64). By so doing he lets slip the unique opportunity of asking the Freak for the novel and even perhaps of reading it himself, and so of discovering his own fate in advance, and even of changing it, as he could have learned from Urfe's mistakes how to pass his own tests for, in Gabriel Josipovici's words: "[c]losed, the book becomes an object among many in the room. Open, and read, it draws the reader into tracing the contours of his own labyrinth" (1971: 309). This is precisely what Roderick Usher did, in Edgar A. Poe's "The Fall of the House of Usher." He read Sir Launcelot Canning's the *Mad Trist* and learnt, with enough time to save his life, from the striking coincidences between his own situation and that of the

medieval knight in the romance, that the House of Usher was going to collapse.

As we can see, then, the appearance of *The Magus* within the diegesis of "The Ebony Tower," an apparently innocent and simple author's joke, has unexpected implications. At a superficial level, David Williams' mistake about the real contents of the novel the Freak is reading may be interpreted simply as evidence of his inability to understand the real value of other human beings regardless of their physical appearance: Williams is wrong about both the contents of *The Magus* and the Freak's personality.

Another possible interpretation, however, is that Williams' mistake is partly caused by his own ignorance of the original, archetypal, meaning of the word "magus," so the episode would ironically reflect the kind of devaluated twentieth-century culture Williams champions and against which the painter Henry Breasley, the archetypal magus figure in the novella, fights. In this sense, the fact that Williams' own choice of books is thrillers (ET 53), acquires ironic and also iconic significance.

A third reading of Williams' mistake about the Freak's novel is to see it as a prolepsis, prefiguring Williams' major mistake at the end of the short story when, blinded by his prejudices and his shallow cultural background, he finds himself incapable of adequately responding to the decisive test set by the Mouse.

Fourthly, if we take into account the fact that David Williams is presented both as painter and critic, and one who, according to Henry Breasley, has gone astray by sacrificing art to technique, we can conclude that, at an intertextual level, Williams' failure to make the right guess about *The Magus* neatly echoes and prefigures the blindness of Fowles' critics to establish the "emotional" connexion between *The Magus* and *Le Grand Meaulnes* and between "The Ebony Tower," *Eliduc* and *The Magus*: in brief, a metatextual ironic comment on the subtle complexities of contemporary fiction.

But the embedding of *The Magus* within "The Ebony Tower" also functions in a different direction. First of all, it provides evidence for Fowles' contention that *The Ebony Tower* short stories were a series of variations on "certain themes in previous books" (ET 117) and secondly, it helps the reader qualify the relationship of hypertextuality that exists between both texts.

As we have seen, hypertextuality is the relation established between two different texts through transformation or imitation by text B of text A. We

can, then, see *The Magus* and "The Ebony Tower" as two different texts, written and published separately, united by a relationship of hypertextuality where text B ("The Ebony Tower") functions as hypertext of text A (*The Magus*), or hypotext. By embedding *The Magus* within "The Ebony Tower, however, *The Magus*, without losing its condition of pre-existent hypotext, simultaneously and paradoxically becomes subordinated and dependent on "The Ebony Tower," although the short story was generated as the novel's hypertext, that is, as the thematic and stylistic transformation and imitation of *The Magus*.

At the same time, it becomes clear from Ruth Morse's specialist article, "John Fowles, Marie de France, and the Man with Two Wives" (1984: 17-31), that Fowles' translation of *Eliduc* is not the literal translation of a philologist, but rather, in Morse's words, "his own creative misreading [as] Fowles found in the haunting Old French poem just those emotional ghosts he brought with him" (1984: 29). This means that, like *The Magus*, Fowles' *Eliduc* enjoys a paradoxical double status: *qua* romance it is the hypotext of "The Ebony Tower," and *qua* creative translation it is the hypertext of Marie de France's *Eliduc*. But it can also be seen as both hypotext and hypertext of *The Magus*: on the one hand, as Brythonic romance, it may be said to have influenced Fowles' novel generically; while on the other, as creative translation, it was undoubtedly influenced by *The Magus*. Once this double status of *Eliduc* is thoroughly grasped, Fowles' decision to place his translation after, and not before, "The Ebony Tower," as one would have expected, acquires added significance.

Similarly, by including *The Magus* within the diegesis of "The Ebony Tower," Fowles is reversing their relative positions and turning *The Magus* into what Lucien Dällenbach (1977) would call a paradoxical or aporistic *mise en abyme*, that is, a kind of reflexion where the reflected text is supposed to contain within itself the work that contains it, thus producing what is now considered by the critics to be one of the characteristic effects of the postmodernist text: an ever-involuting structure endlessly pivoting within itself, incapable of getting out of the prisonhouse of fictionality, a never-ending parodic text simultaneously capable of absorbing within itself all pre-existing texts and of yielding new "variations" on the same. The only opportunity Williams is given to escape the logic of events of his own story is that of transcending the boundaries of the fictional world within which he exists by crossing over into the literary world of *The Magus* and returning, like the mythical hero, with the cherished hidden knowledge he needs to succeed in the test. This becomes pointedly ironic, acting as a further

potential *mise en abyme* of the mythical hero's quest, the first one of a self-begetting and endlessly prolongable *mise en abyme ad infinitum*.

At the intertextual level, therefore, "The Ebony Tower" appears immersed in an ever-more involuting structure of analogies where the categories of hypo- and hypertexts are easily reversed, and so, by implication, levelled to the same category. Thus, thanks to John Fowles' magus-like games of intertextuality, original romance, translation, short story and novel become aspects of the same, unique and yet polymorphous text, appearing as interchangeable variations of what (David Williams is astonished to discover) is the only possible theme, both in real life and in art, a story of love and death that goes back to the myth of Tristram and Yseult:

You read about Tristram and Yseult. Lying in the forest with a sword between them. Those dotty old medieval people. All that nonsense about chastity. And then... (ET 99)

This is the myth around which centuries of artists have incessantly developed their numberless variations, both in painting and in literature, and the one we can glimpse at the bottom of the whirl of mirror games, the endlessly prolongable interplay of *mises en abyme ad infinitum*, that Fowles' novella in truth is.

So, analysed vertically and intertextually, the horizontally straight and simple narrative appears as a multilayered palimpsest of echoes which, like the *Moon-hunt* reveals its indebtedness both to Fowles' own earlier fiction and to other earlier authors in the same tradition, all of whom have variously attempted to create their own "variations" on the same myth: a simple story of love. And yet, for all these echoes, Fowles' "The Ebony Tower," like Breasley's *Moon-hunt*, is primarily a unique work of art, the product of the mastery and unique genius of the man that created it. a

NOTES

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2. Or "transtextual" in Genette's terminology (1982).

3. "These two men were one, the only one, the man of men: our Lord Jesus Christ, who died for us . . ." (Fowles 1986: 379).

4. This painting, which was first exhibited in Paris in 1863, provoked a tremendous scandal not because it contained a nude, a common-enough topic in nineteenth-century painting: for example, Cabanel's *Venus*, erotically stretching on the waves, was exhibited in the same "Salon" the very same year Manet's painting was exhibited and received widespread praise by the same critics who denounced the immorality of Manet's picture. What the critics and the general public alike found immoral was the presentation of a classic theme in a contemporary context: the parodic juxtaposition of the classic, ideal Venus and the contemporary men and picnic. Also offensive for the critics was the somewhat chaotic arrangement of the figures that seem hardly related to each other, awkwardly standing against a toneless and depthless background.

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WENDY COPE'S USE OF PARODY IN *MAKING COCOA FOR KINGSLEY AMIS*

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IN an article published in the late 1980s, Fredric Jameson argues that parody has been replaced by pastiche in the postmodern world. As he puts it:

That is the moment at which pastiche appears and parody has become impossible. Pastiche is like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique style, the wearing of a stylistic mask, speech in a dead language: but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody's ulterior motive, without the satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still latent feeling that there exists something *normal* compared to which what is being imitated is rather comic. (1988: 16)

Postmodernism, according to Jameson, arises from a late-capitalist, postindustrial, consumer society characterized by ideological fragmentation

and a lack of belief in individual identity. In art, "all that is left is to imitate dead styles, to speak through the masks and with the voices of the styles in the imaginary museum" (Jameson 1988: 18). These masks and voices of the past are no longer perceived as objects of imitation or targets of parody and satire. Although Jameson speculates that this sort of mimicry may have some revolutionary potential, he also points out that in the postmodern world art (both that of the present and of the past) becomes a commodity with no value other than its value of exchange.

Jameson's analysis of the postmodern condition can be applied, at least in some superficial ways, to the work of Wendy Cope. Cope is a British poet who became a best-selling poetic parodist in the late eighties —the period from which this article by Jameson dates. Although her poems have sometimes been presented as feminist parodies, they might also be labelled as *pastiche* in Jameson's sense of the word. It is often difficult to tell whether Cope truly satirizes her poetic models —the Great Male Poets of the English canon—, or simply apes them randomly in order to sell. The same applies to Cope's hypothetical feminism, which can be seen as no more than a commercial gimmick with no conviction behind it.

Indeed, it may be argued that Cope sets out to please everybody: her mildly shocking "feminist" parodies make her poetry palatable to the readers of *Vogue* —where she has been published—, and she has been presented as "an astringent alternative to the post-Plath, only-women-bleed school of poetry" (Dickson 1992: 47). Similarly, her command of canonical masculine styles makes her acceptable to Faber and Faber or *TLS*. If the essence of art in the postmodern era is its commercial, consumer-oriented bent, then Cope is certainly a postmodern poet: her first book sold no less than 40,000 copies, placing her just behind such poetic super-stars as Ted Hughes and Seamus Heaney on the bestseller list (Grove 1992: 1).

However, it seems to me that Cope's poems are also genuinely satirical at times and, especially, her use of masculine models is far from neutral: it betrays admiration as well as rejection. Therefore, the concept of *pastiche* is problematic when applied to her writing. Considering the general applicability of this concept to postmodern writing is beyond the scope of this article, yet it seems to me that its relevance to women's poetry is somewhat doubtful and deserves discussion.

There is behind *pastiche*, as Jameson defines it, an utter indifference towards the aesthetic and ideological models of the past. However, a woman poet writing in a patriarchal environment can hardly afford this particular kind of neutrality if she wants to be heard at all. Since the masculine poetic

tradition is a site of power, she has to take it seriously —whether it is to imitate it or to satirize it. She may appear playful, and yet her own survival as a poet is at stake.

I am going to argue here that Wendy Cope's use of parody exemplifies this especial plight of the woman poet, who cannot fully believe in a tradition that excludes her, yet can only view it with indifference at her own risk. Cope's puzzling parodies verge on postmodernist pastiche but do not totally fit in with this category. They stand in a sort of nowhere land, full of gaps and contradictions that seem more accidental and unconscious than deliberate and willed.

Certainly, much of her poetry wavers between the certainties of parody and the disorientations of pastiche. I will consider this dual nature of her poems with relation to the "parodies" in her first book, *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*, which appeared in 1986. A second volume, *Serious concerns*, was published in 1992, and in this book the poet's use of parody is less pervasive, although much of what I will argue here probably applies to it as well.

In an interview that appeared in *The Sunday Times* in 1992, where the poet was presented as a pathetic spinster-poetess—"She does not look like she eats men for breakfast —she looks like she might be defeated by the chunkier kind of muesli" (Dickson 1992: 47)—, Cope defiantly declares that "being aggressive about men is the good part of feminism" (Dickson 1992: 47). She has indeed published poems that, nominally at least, criticize males, like the fairly obvious "Bloody Men" that was quoted prominently when the poet was interviewed in *Life and Times* (Grove 1992: 1):

Bloody men are like bloody buses—
You wait for about a year
And as soon as one approaches your stop
Two or three others appear.

Arguably, there is nothing very radical or feminist about this poem from *Serious Concerns*, and the same applies to similar ones that appear in *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*, where about half of the poems are in line with "Bloody Men." They project the stereotypical image of a woman who nags, but is still bound to the conventions of heterosexual romance.

However, Cope's use of parody is far more complex and, I believe, says more about Cope's position as a woman poet. The way in which Cope herself justifies her use of parody is revealing:

What I wanted to do when I was starting out, and what I do now, is to write about my own experience. But in the Seventies and even in the Eighties, the male literary establishment wasn't very keen on a woman telling it like it was. I'm sure they would all be terribly offended at the suggestion that they were discouraging to women; but the fact is that they were. So writing parodies of acceptable male styles was a way of breaking out, of saying, OK, if that is the kind of thing we're supposed to be writing, then I'll show you I can do it, but don't expect me to take it seriously (Dickson 1992: 47).

Indeed, parody can be seen as a strategy on the poet's part to overcome the "anxiety of influence" that she is bound to experience as a woman poet in a world of men. And yet to write a parody of a poet is, ultimately, to take him seriously. Although in the above-mentioned quote Cope partly dismisses masculine literary tradition, she also implies that she cares about it: "I'll show you I can do it." Indeed, parodies are always imitations —twisted, distorted, hyperbolic imitations, but imitations nevertheless. By writing them, Cope is also showing her skill at writing in "acceptable male styles," and thus seeking acceptance from the establishment.

The title of Wendy Cope's first book of poetry, which I am going to discuss here in some detail, already suggests mixed, perhaps contradictory intentions behind Cope's use of parody. She provides a somewhat puzzling interpretation of this title in the final poem of the volume, "Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis" (*MC* 69):¹

It was a dream I had last week
And some kind of record seemed vital.
I knew it wouldn't be much of a poem
But I love the title.

We are not told why the poet loves the title, although we may infer that, since the title appeared in a dream, this love is beyond her conscious control. If we take Kingsley Amis as a representative of "The Movement" —and therefore of one canonical style in contemporary British poetry—, Cope presents herself as bound to a tradition of "acceptable male styles." In the above-mentioned interview, Valerie Grove reports the following:

Her first collection, in 1986, was called *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*, a bold move since she had never, at the time, met him, a man

not hard to vex. It was I who brazenly rang him on her behalf, to find out what he thought of her stuff. Luckily he thought it bloody good. He admired her adherence to traditional metres ("She might never have heard of Ezra Pound," he said approvingly) and, to her amazement, turned up to her launch party. (Grove 1992:1)

Apparently, Kingsley Amis liked *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*, which seems to suggest that the book is in line with The Movement's aesthetic. As a reviewer put it shortly after the volume was published, "if the title does hold an implication, it might be paraphrased 'offering something soothing to the conservative formalist'" (O'Donoghue 1986: 616).

However, Cope is not so subservient to this aesthetic as it might seem. Indeed, it is difficult to read the book's title without perceiving some irony in it. For one thing, Cope's subject matter should be distasteful to Kingsley Amis, since her poems often deal with the theme of love and with the complexities of heterosexual relationships. One of Kingsley Amis's best-known poems, "A Bookshop Idyll,"² criticizes women poets who write about love:

We men have love well weighed up; our stuff

Can get by without it.

Women don't seem to think that's good enough;

They write about it,

And the awful way their poems lay them open

Just doesn't strike them.

Women are really much nicer than men:

No wonder we like them.

On the one hand, Wendy Cope's style resembles Kingsley Amis's —I think this is obvious from a comparison between, for example, this quote and "Bloody Men": the rhymes, the humorous-bitchy tone, the prosaic language. However, Cope writes about love like the women that Kingsley Amis criticizes, and presents herself as a proud confessional poet who is not afraid to lay herself open: "And if some bloodless literary fart/ Says that it's all too personal, I'll spit" ("Manifesto," *MC* 42).

From this point of view, making cocoa for Kingsley Amis is making cocoa for a "bloodless literary fart." In the context of the book, where the relationship between the female poet and her male partners is presented as far from idyllic —"There are so many kinds of awful men," she says in

"Rondeau Redoublé" (*MC* 39)—, "making cocoa" for a well-known male poet suggests subservience on the woman's part. Yet cocoa is popular among children—there is a drawing of a child of indistinct gender drinking a cup of cocoa on the front cover of the book—, and mothers often make cocoa for them. This turns "Kingsley Amis" into a child, and "Wendy Cope" into his mother rather than his wife, his lover or his disciple. The mother is perhaps the child's slave, and yet she is also an adult with some power.

However, Cope's position with regard to Kingsley Amis is difficult to define. Depending on how we read the book's title, Kingsley Amis—or rather, what he represents as a male poet—is a target of satire. And yet, although the book is full of parodies of established male poets, there is no parody of Kingsley Amis. This is particularly striking since a poem like the above mentioned "A Bookshop Idyll," which Cope must have read, would have given her brilliant subject matter for one of her parodies. It seems odd, for example, that she includes a parody of the Liverpool poets ("Strugnell in Liverpool," *MC* 52): they are pretty anti-establishment themselves, and authors of literary parodies as witty as Cope's. But she makes fun of these poets, and not of Kingsley Amis, or at least not explicitly.

On the other hand, there is also a parody of Shakespeare in the book, and this seems to indicate that Cope will make fun of absolutely everybody famous and male in the English poetic tradition, regardless of their style or status. However, not all poets male and famous receive the same sort of treatment in *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*. In fact, Cope's selection of poets for her parodies seems to indicate that her literary taste would not displease Kingsley Amis. In two instances—"From Strugnell's Rubáiyát" (*MC* 63) and "Strugnell's Haiku" (*MC* 65)—the object of the parody is a literary form, but all the others are send-ups of famous male poets. The list includes, apart from Shakespeare and the Liverpool poets, William Wordsworth, T. S. Eliot, Ted Hughes, Seamus Heaney, Craig Raine and the "Martian" school, Basil Bunting—or perhaps Ezra Pound: "E pericoloso Sporgersi" (*MC* 50) could be a parody of either—and Geoffrey Hill.

Implicitly, therefore, Cope rejects Romanticism, Modernism and their derivations, which is exactly what the poets of The Movement, Kingsley Amis included, did in their time. If we consider Cope's professed dislike of "bloodless literary farts" and canonical poets, her apparent allegiances to The Movement are difficult to explain. Indeed, Movement values are still a dominant part of the canon, to the point of becoming limiting and even oppressive to younger generations of poets (Edwards 1988: 265-270).

However, Cope's sympathies are not very clearly defined. Even with the proviso that we are here referring exclusively to "Wendy Cope" —the nominal author of *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis* as opposed to the Wendy Cope who talks in interviews and makes public statements in prose—, it is difficult to find a consistent authorial point of view in the book. Perhaps, as deconstruction argues, this is true of all writing, but I believe it is especially true of *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*. I have already discussed some of its ironies and uncertainties, but perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of the volume is Cope's use of a poet-persona that she names "Strugnell." This character is the fictional author of most parodies in the book, and therefore an alternative point of view needs to be taken into account. This complicates interpretation quite a lot, as I am going to argue here.

A distinction can be made between the parodies by "Wendy Cope" and those that are attributed to "Strugnell." If we take, for example, "Waste Land Limericks" (*MC* 20-21) —by Cope, not Strugnell— the parody is straightforward: "No water. Dry rocks and dry throats, /Then thunder, a shower of quotes/ from the Sanskrit and Dante. /Da. Damyata. Shantih./ I hope you'll make sense of the notes." This is obviously written by someone who finds Eliot's style ridiculous, and makes fun of it. In "Usquebaugh" (*MC* 48), similarly, Cope mocks Seamus Heaney's notions of language: where Heaney implies that poetry is the language of roots and the earth, Cope links poetry (Heaney's poetry) with excessive drinking—"Whiskey: its terse vowels belie/ The slow fuddling and mellowing/ Our guttural speech slurring/ Into warm, thick blather."

These sort of poems are "orthodox," classical parodies, and they should not present special problems for the reader. However, interpretation becomes more difficult when Strugnell is presented as the author, and I therefore believe that Strugnell and "his" poems deserve more detailed consideration. First of all, Strugnell's identity needs to be established and Cope encourages us to do this by including a poem about him ("Mr Strugnell," *MC* 45-46) at the beginning of part II —the section where Strugnell's poems appear. The poem, however, complicates rather than clarifies the issue of Strugnell's personality and point of view.

On one level of interpretation, the poem can be read as a parody of Philip Larkin's "Mr Bleaney."³ Both poems are about the lonely, squalid life of a bachelor, and Cope uses the same stanzaic pattern as Larkin, but the perspective is different. In Larkin's poem, the poet has just moved into the bedroom which Mr Bleaney used to occupy, and he empathizes with the old lodger and perhaps fears a repetition of his sad story in his own life.

In Cope's poem, however, the bachelor is described by a woman, his ex-landlady "Mrs M.," who finds him a bore: like Larkin, Mr Strugnell works as a librarian in Hull, he is a John Betjeman fan, he likes jazz, he is a bachelor and he did not go out with women much until "sixty-three" —an obvious allusion to Larkin's "Annus Mirabilis": "Sexual intercourse began/ In nineteen sixty-three / (Which was rather late for me) / Between the end of the *Chatterley* ban/ And the Beatles's first LP."⁴ The caricature is not devoid of sympathy—"He was the quiet sort who liked to read"—, and there is no real malice in it. However, where Larkin presents his character in an almost tragic light, Cope's perspective is humorous and debunking.

Cope implies here that Larkin's self-commiserating pathos towards Mr Bleaney (an extension of himself) is typically masculine, whereas the woman's perspective is more practical and down-to-earth. And yet, while Cope is criticizing Larkin's choice of tone and subject matter, she is not attacking his poetic style as a whole. In fact, Cope is indebted to Larkin, and not just in terms of poetic form. Since I mentioned Larkin's "Annus Mirabilis," the mixture of regret and humour in that poem is not alien to Cope's style. On the contrary, Cope often deals with love and sex in the context of everyday life, and she looks at human mediocrity and frustration with critical, but also sympathetic eyes —for instance in "Lonely Hearts" (MC 27).

It seems to me, therefore, that in "Mr Strugnell" Cope is writing a caricature of Larkin's character, but not a parody of Larkin's poetic style. To the extent that Larkin can be considered representative of The Movement's aesthetic, Cope can be seen as supporting this aesthetic. From this perspective, Strugnell-Larkin-the Movement poet has a lot in common with Cope. He has some moral foibles inherent to masculinity. Yet, as a poet, he is perhaps indistinguishable from Cope. If this is true, we can assume that Strugnell's point of view is more or less identical with Cope's.

However, this interpretation is not supported by the rest of the poems in the section, especially those signed by Strugnell. Among these, "Budgie Finds His Voice" (MC 47) is a case in point. The poem with its subtitle, "From *The Life and Songs of the Budgie* by Jake Strugnell," can be read as a parody of Ted Hughes's acclaimed book *Crow: From the Life and Songs of the Crow* (Hughes 1972). The ponderous image of the crow is replaced by that of the more domestic budgie, which seems to imply a criticism of Hughes's mythically charged style.

Yet Cope seems to have different views from Strugnell as far as Ted Hughes is concerned. In "A Policeman's Lot" (MC 15-16), she sympathizes

with him. She quotes Hughes in the epigraph—"The progress of any writer is marked by those moments when he manages to outwit his own inner police system." The poem is spoken by a not very bright policeman—he sings to a rhythm by W. S. Gilbert—who is "Patrolling the unconscious of Ted Hughes" and "Attempting to avert poetic thought ('etic thought'), and not succeeding. The poem corrects Hughes's notion of the "inner police system"—in "Cope's" more down-to-earth view, the "police system" is not so much a psychic reality as a social one. However, beyond this slight criticism, she definitely takes his side against a repressive society, and presents him as a poet of strong imagination, capable of defeating the "policeman."

But there are further complications for the reader. To go back to "Budgie Finds His Voice," it is probably a parody, but it is also in line with Hughes's style. The bathetic ending "Who's a pretty boy then? Budgie cried" is paralleled by some such moments in *Crow*, which after all revolves around a trickster figure, and is not without humour. Admittedly, it is more often than not gallows humour, whereas "Budgie" is light-hearted comedy. But "Budgie Finds His Voice" also contains some grim images—"And the last ear left on earth/ Lay on the beach, /Deaf as a shell"—which would probably not be out of place in *Crow*. Seen in this way, this poem is an imitation as much as, or perhaps rather than, a parody.

Of course, this hypothesis gives rise to further questions. If Strugnell is a poet with his own (Larkinesque) style, why is he imitating Hughes? I will venture one answer to this question, and it is that Strugnell is imitating Hughes, the present Poet Laureate, to share in his fame. From this perspective, the poem's title is ironic: Strugnell is not "finding his voice" at all, just aping somebody else's. If this is the case, "Budgie Finds His Voice" becomes a pastiche of Hughes by Jake Strugnell, and it is not intended as a parody of Hughes at all. In fact, the poem is Cope's parody of Jake Strugnell's imitation of Hughes...

Just in case all this seems far-fetched, let us look at "God and the Jolly Bored Bog-Mouse" (MC 55). The subtitle informs us that this is "Strugnell's entry for the Arvon/Observer Poetry Competition 1980. The competition was judged by Ted Hughes, Philip Larkin, Seamus Heaney and Charles Causley." We may infer that Strugnell has written this poem in the hope that all four judges will like it: "God" may please Causley, who is supposed to be a poet with a strong religious sensibility; "Bored" is in tune with Larkin's personae, the "Bog" is an emblem of Heaney's poetry, and the "Mouse" evokes Hughes's nature and animal poetry. So far, this confirms my theory of

Strugnell as an author of pastiche (at its commercial worst) rather than a witty parodist—and therefore a different entity from "Wendy Cope."

Indeed, the poem is a mixture of styles. It is written in regular stanzas, and rhymed, which approaches it to the style of Causley and Larkin, but the imagery is stereotypical Crow-Hughes ("Mouse dreamed a Universe of Blood) and stereotypical Heaney ("Mouse squelched away across the bog"). As an imitator, however, Strugnell is far from succeeding, because the mixture is odd—it shows the lack of commitment characteristic of pastiche. It could also be argued that Strugnell was trying to write a parody. However, the writing is so recognizably Strugnell's—the stereotypically English "jolly" that he uses as a refrain can only be a mark of his own style—, that the parody loses its edge. A good parodist would not let his own style interfere with the style of the poets he is making fun of. He would simply draw on their distinctive traits, and exaggerate them.

However, having reached this point in my argument, some more complexities need to be considered. One detail in the subtitle is thought-provoking. Strugnell has entered the Arvon/Observer Poetry Competition, and Wendy Cope has been both a student and a teacher in the Arvon courses (Grove 1992: 1). Is Cope criticizing herself here? Cope's involvement with the Arvon courses as a teacher probably came after the publication of *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis* (she was an unpublished poet before that). Nevertheless, perhaps Wendy Cope is criticizing here her own aspirations to fame in the literary business. In this respect, Strugnell is indeed a parody of herself.

This leads me to the provisional conclusion that the main objects of Cope's satire are Strugnell and Cope herself (to the extent that she shares Strugnell's values), and not so much the Great Poets that Strugnell imitates. If we take a poem like "Duffa Rex" (MC 51), for example, the nominal object of parody is Geoffrey Hill, since the poem imitates Hill's style in *Mercian Hymns*. But the poem makes more fun of Strugnell than it ridicules Hill. Strugnell is not explicitly mentioned, but there is an allusion to him as "King of the primeval avenues, the municipal parklands: architect of the Tulse Hill Poetry Group" —in "Mr Strugnell" (MC 45-46) we were told that the character had lived on Tulse Hill before he moved to Hull. In "Duffa Rex" Strugnell is a ludicrous king named "Duffa," and in spite of the grand-sounding language—"Treasure accrued in a sparse week, to be invested in precious liquid"—, he is in fact an anti-hero, a duffer who gets drunk in the pub.

As I argued before, the poem makes fun of Strugnell, not so much of Geoffrey Hill. If we consider the opening section of his 1971 collection *Mercian Hymns*, it is as ironic and anachronistic as "Duffa Rex": for example, Hill's King Offa (a medieval king of Mercia) is "King of the perennial holly-groves, the riven sandstone: overlord of the M5" (Hill 1985: 105). Cope's style is certainly more light-hearted and less complex than Hill's. Nevertheless, Hill is himself a parodist (in this case of medieval state-poetry) among other things, and in this respect Cope —like Strugnell in the poems where he is the "author"— dutifully imitates rather than parodies the poetry she draws from.

However, the distinction is not so clear. To the extent that Cope deflates the poetic style that she imitates, "Duffa Rex" can also be read as a conventional parody, and the same probably applies to other poems in the book. Cope's "parodies" are ambiguous, and it is difficult to tell whether this is a deliberate strategy, or just the product of unresolved conflicts in Cope's mind. At any rate, the results are intriguing, and perhaps slightly disorienting.

In my opinion, this is especially true of a series of poems where Cope apparently makes fun of the archetypal Great Poet: "From Strugnell's Sonnets" (MC 56-62). On a first level of interpretation, Strugnell's seven sonnets are parodies of Shakespeare. This is evident from the humorous misquotes—"Let me not to the marriage of true swine/ Admit impediments" (sonnet vi) would be a representative instance. Moreover, the refinements of spiritual love in Shakespeare's sonnets are transmuted here into a vulgar, unidealistic sexual business: "I had this bird called Sharon, fond of gin — / Could knock back six or seven. At the price/ I paid a high wage for each hour of sin/ and that was why I only had her twice" (sonnet i). The love that Shakespeare describes is supposed to last when immortalized by poetry, whereas Strugnell's love is much more commonplace, and his poetry ephemeral: "Your beauty and my name will be forgotten — / My love is true, but all my verse is rotten." (sonnet iv)

Cope seems to be criticizing courtly-love poetry written from a man's perspective, which she presents as unrealistic. This is in tune with the rest of love poems in *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*, for example "Fom June to December" (MC 31-35), where a love affair that started in romantic fashion ends with the woman hating the man: "Decapitating the spring onions,/ She made this mental note:/ You can tell it's love, the real thing,/ When you dream of slitting his throat." Here and in other poems, Cope presents sexual

relationships in a domestic urban environment, and concentrates on the mediocrities of the partners, especially the men.

In this respect, Strugnell's sonnets parody and correct Shakespeare's. This would suggest that Strugnell is neither a pathetic imitator nor a postmodern author of pastiche, but a true parodist. However, the authorial position is not so simple. On the one hand, Strugnell is laughing at Shakespeare. And yet he is not simply critical of Shakespeare and contented with his own style and personality. On the contrary, he is aware of his own shortcomings:

My glass shall not persuade me I'm senescent,
 Nor that it's time to curb my virile hunger.
 I'm still as randy as an adolescent
 And didn't have much fun when I was younger.
 Pursuing girls was hopeless with my looks
 (I used to pick my spots and make them worse)
 So I consoled myself by reading books—
 Philosophy, pornography and verse.
 For years I poured my unfulfilled desire
 Into sad songs —and now, to my delight,
 Find women love a bard, however dire,
 And overlook my paunch because I write.
 One doesn't need much literary skill
 To be the Casanova of Tulse Hill.

(sonnet iii)

From this point of view, Strugnell resembles an Eliotian anti-hero, a sort of Prufrock who knows he is not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be, yet lacks the moral courage to raise himself above mediocrity. However, Strugnell is probably more cynical and arrogant: "One day I'll make my mark,/ Although I'm not from Ulster or from Mars, / And when I'm published in some classy mag/ You'll rue the day you scarpered in his Jag," he warns the woman who has left him for a wealthier man. Strugnell is jealous of other poets' achievements, and hungry for literary fame, which he equates with sexual success. In this respect, he is a stereotypical masculine figure and therefore the target of Cope's satire.

And yet, since Cope publishes in "classy mags" (the symbol of Strugnell's ambition), the figure of Strugnell has something in common with the nominal author of *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*. Both Cope and Strugnell criticize their own literary ambition, and yet they also imply that

they have a right to be ambitious. They are critical of poetic tradition, and yet strive to be accepted by the literary status quo. From this perspective, therefore, Cope and Strugnell are very similar to each other. However, my point is that they are not identical. It is difficult to know to what extent we are meant to read Strugnell's words as an expression of Cope's position since irony is so pervasive. At any rate, the authorial point of view is not at all clear.

For example, in the last sonnet of the sequence, Strugnell quotes Andrew Motion: "At the moment, if you're seen reading poetry in a train, the carriage empties instantly." The author of *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*, "Wendy Cope," would probably sympathize with Motion's concern about Britain's lack of interest in poetry. In "Engineer's Corner" (MC 13), for instance, she takes an advertisement where the Engineering Council complains that "in Britain we've always made more fuss of a ballad than a blueprint," and she writes an ironic poem that apparently supports this view, and yet shows its absurdity: "That's why so many poets end up rich, / While engineers scrape in cheerless garrets." Strugnell, however, sees nothing wrong with Britain's lack of interest in poetry. In fact, he enjoys it: "A few choice bits from Motion's new anthology/ And you'll be lonelier than any cloud. / This stratagem's a godsend to recluses/ and demonstrates that poetry has its uses."

However, this is only one possible reading. If we read "Engineer's Corner" as an ironic poem, why argue that Strugnell is speaking in earnest in sonnet vii? The obvious answer is that Cope is not Strugnell—Strugnell is an impostor poet who does not really care about poetry, except as a means to literary fame and sexual conquest. But, as I have argued throughout, the distinction between Cope and Strugnell is not so clear. As I said in connection with her poem "Manifesto," Cope dislikes chauvinistic men and "bloodless literary farts" who dismiss poetry when it is "too personal." According to this definition, Motion is a "bloodless literary fart": in the anthology that Strugnell is probably referring to, *The Penguin Book of Contemporary Poetry* (co-edited with Blake Morrison), Motion implicitly rejects "candid personal poetry" (Morrison and Motion 1982: 12).

Moreover, Motion includes poets like Seamus Heaney and Craig Raine in this anthology—poets who are targets of Cope's parody, and also of Strugnell's ("Ulster" and "Mars" in sonnet vi). If we consider, therefore, that at least in that instance "Cope" coincides with Strugnell, she seems to be saying that institutional poetry is to blame for British people's rejection of poetry in general. Strugnell/Cope offers an alternative with his/her more accessible, down-to-earth, personal style. However, considering *Making*

Cocoa for Kingsley Amis as a whole, it is very difficult to decide what Wendy Cope's stand is. The authorial point of view in the book is not stable, and the reader can never be quite sure whether Cope agrees with Motion or not, whether a certain poem is ironic or not, whether it parody, pastiche or straightforward imitation.

Whether this is intended or not, such ambiguities and contradictions seem to be an essential part of Cope's style, and they are everywhere in the book, even in its dedication. Significantly, Cope dedicates *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis* "To Arthur S. Couch and everyone else who helped" (MC 7). As Cope has explained in interviews (Dickson 1992: 47), the appositely named Mr Couch is her psychiatrist —a masculine figure with patriarchal connotations, since he plays the symbolic role of father, priest and judge. As such, he is the recipient of Cope's "confessions," especially in the poems where she deals with the problems of heterosexual relationships. On the one hand, Cope's confessions are bold and critical of traditional patriarchal morality. On the other, her female speaker is keen on "Good, old-fashioned men like you" ("Message," MC 40) —suggesting a patriarchal father-lover figure—, and she seems eager to seduce such men with her poems.

More strikingly, perhaps, the name "Arthur S. Couch" evokes "Sir Arthur Quiller Couch": the man who was the first professor of English at Cambridge, and used to address his predominantly female audience as "Gentlemen" (Eagleton 1983: 28 and 30). This figure probably stands for the traditional masculinist bias of literary institutions, and Cope's dedication to him "and to everyone else who helped" can be read as ironic —if Couch and his ilk have helped, it is as targets of Cope's satire. However, I have argued here that Cope's parodies of male poetic tradition and her attitude to the masculine canon are ambiguous. From this point of view, her explicit dedication of the book to Couch and her implicit dedication to Amis are not altogether ironic.

Indeed, in *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis* the poetic fathers can be laughed at, but within limits, because they are powerful and therefore dangerous. It is significant that in the only poem in the book where Cope mentions a poetic mother, "Emily Dickinson" (MC 23), the female precursor is seen as an impossible model: "Nowadays, faced with such / Idiosyncrasy, / Critics and editors / Send for the cops." Cope praises Dickinson, and yet implicitly rejects her as a poetic model. To follow the "idiosyncratic" mother is to become vulnerable, and much of Cope's writing in the book seems geared to avoid prosecution from the literary "cops."

"Manifesto" (MC 42), a poem that stands at the centre of *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*, takes this attitude to the extreme. The poem is addressed to a "you" by a female poet who sounds quite proud of herself as a writer and as a woman: "I am no beauty but I'm pretty smart / And I intend to be your favourite — / I'll work, for there's new purpose in my art." However, this woman's self-confidence is not as strong as it might seem. She writes to be a "favourite" rather than to be herself, and she intends to "write the poems that will win your heart."

The woman speaking in the poem does not say whose heart this is, but since "Manifesto" comes after a series of love poems addressed to men, we can assume that she is addressing a masculine figure —a lover, or perhaps Kingsley Amis, or perhaps the Great Tradition of (Male) Poetry that serves as a background to the book. This puts Cope's female speaker in a position of subservience. Her tone is defiant—"And if some bloodless literary fart/ Says that it's too personal, I'll spit"—, but she has no other powers than the stereotypical female teaser's powers of seduction. Ultimately, her strategy is one of survival.

To conclude, I believe that the uncertainties of Cope's parodic style may be a symptom of the postmodern condition but, above all, they derive from her special position as a female poet: a female poet who feels oppressed by the weight of the masculine canon and yet strives for a place in it. Her ambivalent parodies betray an unease towards the poetic forefathers, a conflicted relationship to poetic tradition that is specific to women's poetry.

As Harold Bloom has argued in his famous book *The Anxiety of Influence* (1973), every new generation of poets, consciously or not, perceives the canonical poetic tradition as a threat as well as a source of power. From a Freudian point of view, Bloom argues that male poets become engaged in an Oedipal struggle against the poetic fathers, a bitter fight for dominance that involves imitating, but also rewriting, "misreading" and subverting the canonical texts. Bloom, oddly enough, does not use any female examples, but in the case of female poets the "anxiety of influence" can be overwhelming. The canon has always been masculine, and there has always been room in it for new male poets, but very rarely for women poets. Marginalized by literary history, systematically obliterated or denigrated by the literary institutions, women poets have tended to perceive the dominant poetic tradition as an oppressive weight: "those patriarchal interdictions that have historically caused women poets from Finch to Plath anxiety and guilt about attempting the pen" (Gilbert and Gubar 1979: xxiii).

Feminist criticism has studied the ways in which women relate to their poetic forefathers. The relationship is often overtly oppositional. Significantly, Alicia Suskin Ostriker's feminist study of the emergence of women's poetry in America is titled *Stealing the Language*. Female poets have often subverted the dominant poetic traditions in an attempt to reshape literary history and thus gain a space for themselves within the established canon. Ostriker, for example, studies the ways in which American women poets have rewritten patriarchal myths of femininity. Their point of departure is poetic tradition, but they adapt it to their own needs (Ostriker 1986: 10-238).

In some cases however, the subversion is more radical. Women writers sometimes try to produce a language of their own outside the dominant language. I am referring especially to avant-garde, experimental poets who try to "write the body" and who reject not only poetic tradition, but the very notion of language as it is understood in the patriarchal world. However, these radically subversive tendencies coexist with the will of many women poets to simply "steal the language" of men and usurp their power. In Cora Kaplan's words:

The decision to storm the walls and occupy the forbidden place is a recognition of the value and importance of high language, and often contradicts and undercuts a more radical critique in women's poetry of the values embedded in formal language itself (Kaplan 1986: 58).

Indeed, the attempt to "occupy the forbidden place" sometimes involves imitating masculine models in an absolute manner, at least at some stage of the female poet's career (the poetry that Adrienne Rich published before she became a militant feminist is a clear example of this). However, in some cases sheepish imitation can become a permanent habit, since her cultural environment makes it particularly difficult for a woman poet to break free from patriarchal restrictions.

As Julia Kristeva puts it in an analysis of women's writing:

There are two extremes in their writing experiences: the first tends to valorize phallic dominance, associated with the privileged father-daughter relationship, which gives rise to the tendency towards mastery, science, philosophy, professorships, etc. . . . On the other hand, we flee everything considered "phallic" to find refuge in the valorization of a silent underwater body, thus abdicating any entry into history. (Kristeva 1981: 166)

Kristeva's reference to the "silent underwater body" is probably an allusion to "écriture féminine," a kind of language propounded by French feminists: avant-garde writing of the body and the instinctual, ungrammatical and unbounded. Kristeva's argument here suggests that women writers are in a no-win situation: either they reject patriarchal language altogether, thus remaining marginal, inaudible and powerless, or they resign themselves to becoming "honorary men." Certainly, if the dominant poetic language is the language of power, it is understandable that many women poets try to invade the canon rather than be outside it in a position of marginality.

However, in doing this, they risk reproducing the values that they set out to attack. To some extent pastiche —a non-committal, and therefore potentially disrespectful replica of canonical models— can overcome these dangers. However, to go back to the article by Jameson that I quoted from at the start, pastiche is politically ambivalent:

There is an agreement that the older modernism functioned against its society in ways which are variously described as critical, negative, contestatory, subversive, oppositional and the like. Can anything of the sort be affirmed about postmodernism and its social moment? We have seen that there is a way in which postmodernism replicates or reproduces —reinforces— the logic of consumer capitalism; the more significant question is whether there is also a way in which it resists that logic. But that is a question we must leave open. (Jameson 1988: 29)

Answering this question at large is beyond my scope here. Yet it seems to me that, to the extent that Cope's poems exceed the limits of both parody and pastiche, they resist the patriarchal logic that in other ways dominates her writing. Far from replicating her models neutrally, Cope problematizes them. In this respect, although her style is different from theirs, there are similarities between Cope and other British female poets of her generation. I am thinking of writers like Liz Lochhead, Wendy Mulford, Grace Nichols or Denise Riley —just to mention some poets whose writing had some impact, if only in academic environments, in the eighties.⁵ They are more experimental and more liberated from poetic tradition. Yet, like Cope's, their writing often wavers between feminist parody and postmodernist pastiche. For example, they often use feminine stereotypes while presenting them in a critical light. As Lochhead puts it in a poem titled "Bawd":

I'll rouge my cleavage, flaunt myself, my heels
 will be perilously high, oh
 but I won't sway.
 I'll shrug everything off the shoulder,
 make wisecracks, be witty off the cuff.
 Tell blue jokes in mixed company.

I'll be a bad lot.
 I've a brass neck. There is mayhem in my smile.
 No one will guess it's not my style.
 (Lochhead 1984: 76)

Lochhead theorizes on one possible model of rebellious behaviour that is open to women in a sexist world: to explode clichés by taking them to the extreme and using them in a self-conscious, somewhat cynical way. Wendy Cope also flaunts herself and "tells blue jokes in mixed company," posing as a seductress yet often implying that this is not her true "style."

However, whereas the above mentioned women poets make it clear to the reader that they are playing roles in a comedy of their own making, Cope's stand is less well-defined —it is often impossible to "guess" whether this is her style or not. While her peers effectively challenge the canon by creating their own experimental styles, in many ways Cope remains trapped in the language of the forefathers, whether she uses parody or pastiche.

On the other hand, since she published *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*, Cope has started to speak more in her own style, and this suggests that the book helped her move towards a more personal kind of poetry. In her 1992 book *Serious Concerns* she seems less willing to seduce and more eager to shock:

Write to amuse? What an appalling suggestion!
 I write to make people anxious and miserable and to worsen their
 indigestion.
 (Cope 1992: 15)

Given the limitations and contradictions of her style, it is doubtful that she will achieve this, and yet Wendy Cope's parodies can be seen as resulting from "serious concerns." Even in *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*, there is more to her poetry than light-hearted comedy. Whatever the dubious

connotations of her fame —she can be seen as playing into the hands of the literary establishment—, I personally believe that Cope deserves the attention that she has received. She definitely has a gift for communicating with her audience. What she communicates may not worsen anybody's indigestion, and yet her poetry raises some questions: to what extent are women writers free to challenge the masculine literary tradition? How do women fit in with this tradition? What happens when a woman "makes cocoa for Kingsley Amis"? Cope does not answer, and perhaps she does not even ask. But her writing may encourage her readers to consider such disturbing questions. a

NOTES

1. *Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis*, hereafter *MC*.
2. For example, this is one of the two poems by Kingsley Amis that appear in *The Penguin Book of Contemporary Verse 1918-60* (Allott 1962: 331-332).
3. A poem from *The Whitsun Weddings* (1964). See *Collected Poems* (Larkin 1988: 102-103).
4. A poem from Larkin's *High Windows* (1974). See *Collected Poems* (Larkin 1988: 167).
5. Like Cope, they all published books in the mid-eighties. See "References."

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NARRATIVE EMBEDDINGS

IN FLANN O'BRIEN'S

AT SWIM-TWO-BIRDS

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"FRAME narratives" are narrative texts "in which at second or third level a complete story is told" (Bal, 1985: 143). The device of including a story within another story implies that one story, the embedded one, is subordinated to the one that frames it, and it always entails a change of enunciative level and/or a change of fictional level. In other words, an embedded narrative is a narrative told by a character in the first narrative who thus becomes a narrator, and/or a narrative that represents events other than the ones related in the first narrative. Therefore, the embedding may be either enunciative —implying a change of narrative level— or fictional —implying a change of represented reality— or both, and it may be reproduced and create further enunciative and/or fictional embeddings.

Embedded narratives form part of the literary tradition, as the *Arabian Nights* and *The Canterbury Tales* attest, and they have appeared in all periods and in different genres. Traditionally, the inclusion of an embedded narrative, which can be oral or written, has tended to be justified or motivated in a realistic way¹ so that the semblance of verisimilitude, the illusion of the "real," could be preserved, or at least parodied. Several devices have been used for this purpose, such as the gathering of characters

who tell stories to each other, dreams or hallucinations experienced by a character, or the discovery of written documents, either diaries or manuscripts. Frame narratives have continued to be written in the modernist and post-modernist periods, although now, and in accordance with the particular concerns of these literary movements, giving the illusion of reality has ceased to be a major preoccupation. On the contrary, it would seem that the previously solid narrative frame which contained the invented within the invented tends to get vaporous and boundaries are blurred in two different directions: those separating the frame and the framed and those separating the whole narrative text and the real world outside.

A further distinctive trait of many twentieth-century frame narratives could be that the figure of the editor who has found an interesting manuscript and wants to divulge it or the device of the character who tells a story are often replaced by the figure of a writer who includes the novel s/he is writing in the text, a writer that makes any intermediary redundant and directly vouches for the authenticity of her/his narrative. In this case, it could be said that, very often, the main interest of the narrative is the creative process itself, thematized through the figure of this diegetic writer, for s/he usually comments on the problems encountered in her/his task as creator. Frequently the narrative levels created in the text are not just two, frame and embedded narrative, but rather proliferate in a nesting of authors, narrators and diegetic worlds. The authorial and narrating stances and the diegetic world may be put *en abyme*, suggesting, as Patricia Waugh has remarked, "the possibility of endless repetition or circularity" (1984: 141-142). Jorge Luis Borges's "El jardín de los senderos que se bifurcan" (*Ficciones*, 1944) provides a clear dramatization of a textual reflection *ad infinitum*, for in it a character remembers a version of the *Arabian Nights* in which one of the stories that Scheherazade tells is precisely the *Arabian Nights*, and consequently she remains forever trapped in her telling. According to Lucien Dällenbach (1977: 52) *mise en abyme* is an internal reflection which mirrors the totality of the work of art within which this internal reflection is included. In his study *Le Récit Spéculaire* (1977), Dällenbach devised a typology based on the structural level of reflection in order to account for the different realizations of the *mise en abyme*, which may reflect the enunciated or represented world, the enunciating or narrative process and the code, either narrative or linguistic. The concept of *mise en abyme* is then applicable not only to reflections of fictional worlds —fictional embeddings— but also to textual reflections —enunciative embeddings, that is, diegetic reproductions of the communicative structure of a narrative text.

Besides suggesting infinite regress, this multiplication of worlds, narrators and authorial surrogate figures may also indicate fragmentation and discontinuity, for the unity of the work of art is split up in a multiplicity of diegetic worlds and controlling subjectivities. It may also point towards the possibility of self-generation that a literary text has, or it may parody the conventions of the realistic novel by highlighting the fact that the narrative in question is an artefact. In any case, the effects achieved are multiple; they depend on the individual text and should be considered against the background provided by the whole text.

Flann O'Brien's novel *At Swim-Two-Birds* (1939) could be seen as a case study for the question of narrative embeddings, for it presents different situations and poses a variety of problems and so it becomes a perfect example to illustrate and analyse the issue. In it, the proliferation of authors, narrators and diegetic worlds seems to have been taken to extremes and infinite regress functions as a vital element of the textual structure, acting as a mechanism which thematizes the creative process. Due to the structural complexity of the novel, and for reasons of space, I will concentrate my analysis on the written narratives present in *At Swim* rather than on the oral ones, which are justified and realized conventionally. My purpose here is to provide a narratological description of the narrative embeddings in this text without disregarding the ideological implications that such a structure posits.

1. FANTASY AND PARODY IN *AT SWIM*

At Swim has been studied both as an experimental text intent on undermining literary assumptions and as a literary fantasy. Both perspectives account for its subversion of artistic rules claiming to represent "the real," but while the consideration of *At Swim* as a novel which experiments with narrative techniques will seem quite obvious to any reader, its classification as a literary fantasy deserves clarification. According to Rosemary Jackson (1981), fantasy literature is a literature of desire, a literature which escapes the real and projects unconscious desires. It is grounded on the real but then undercuts it through the introduction of elements which are manifestly unreal and effect a destabilization of a previously solid and familiar world. Jackson considers that literary fantasies are the product of a certain culture, although at the same time they signal the limits of that culture and bring to light the

constraints that society exercises upon the individual subject. Fantasy is potentially subversive, for it attempts to dissolve the dominant cultural order, which is experienced as oppressive by the subject. Jackson's approach to fantasy is grounded on psychoanalysis and she characterizes fantasy literature as a literature of the unconscious, of desire and lack, a literature that endeavours to shatter the boundaries between self and other, rational and irrational discourse, or the Lacanian symbolic and imaginary. Seen in this light, I would argue that *At Swim* both is and is not fantastic.

The novel can be regarded, at least apparently, as an example of a frame narrative, composed not of one single text, but of several; that is, several stories are told and they are held together and contained within an autobiographical frame. These embedded stories —or rather narratives— are not fantastic in Rosemary Jackson's sense. More appropriately they would belong to the mode of the marvellous, for they are naturalized as pure invention, as figments of the autobiographical narrator's imagination. These narratives are imbued in folklore and magic, and the principle governing them would approximate to that of "anything goes." Yet they do not actually present a single marvellous diegetic world either, such as a fairy tale would do, but rather they juxtapose literary modes and elements from highly dissimilar worlds, modes and elements which are never allowed to merge, never allowed to impinge a sense of alterity on the reader's mind. In this mishmash, it seems to me that it is not the unreal that interferes with the real. On the contrary, I would say that it is the real that disrupts and breaks into the unreal by constantly undercutting the unfamiliarity or strangeness of the diegesis with prosaic situations or with dialogues in the most vivid colloquial language. Even though this reversal would still leave us in some doubt about the fantastic nature of these embedded narratives, a question that certainly deserves more attention than I can give it here, what is unquestionably fantastic is the structure of the whole novel. What is fantastic is the way in which *At Swim* consciously plays with narrative conventions and presents us with a fictional world ruled, not by conventions, but by the systematic transgression of these conventions.

The overdetermination of *At Swim*'s textual level is expressed through a hyper-conscious play with conventions and works towards the underdetermination of the diegesis to such an extent that the world of actions and characters seems devoid of life, its vitality vampirized by the tremendous power of narrative conventions. In *At Swim* it is paradoxically the artificial world of Literature that breathes life into the novel. Yet, conventions appear to be present here only to be transgressed, but so much does the text flaunt

and display them that they bounce and come to occupy the foreground. The result is that transgression in *At Swim* represents the text's desire both to destroy and preserve conventions. The indeterminacy of the overall narrative structure together with the shifting nature and position of the various elements present in the text —two points that I will try to demonstrate through my analysis— results in transgression and confusion. However, confusion and transgression in *At Swim* are always heralded, are always signalled, not as random points of resistance, but as systematic normative points of reference. In other words, the text establishes transgression as its norm. This leads us to consider *At Swim* in the light of Linda Hutcheon's discussion of parody (1985: 76) as a "double-directed" discourse that presupposes both a law and its transgression, as an authorized transgression dominated by two contradictory impulses: a normative one that preserves authority and tradition and a revolutionary one that challenges norms. This contradiction is reproduced in the text in forms other than the purely parodic, a contradiction without resolution that ultimately transforms *At Swim* into a textual paradox which exists in the area that Rosemary Jackson reserves for fantasy literature (1981: 19), a paraxial area, a spectral zone of indeterminacy neither real nor unreal where the text moves between being and non-being. Yet I would like again to stress that this novel is fantastic, not so much in *what* it tells as in *how* it tells it.

The first page of the novel is enough for the reader to realize that this is not a conventional novel. The narrative opens with a heading in capital letters (*AS* 9) saying "CHAPTER I." There is nothing peculiar about it, for novels are conventionally divided into chapters. The fact is that no more chapters will be encountered. Then there follows a paragraph in which an "I" reflects on his "spare-time literary activities" (*AS* 9) and says that he finds no reason why a book should not have more than one beginning or one ending. He immediately offers examples of three narrative openings in three different paragraphs which are typographically separated and marked by headlines printed in italics. Later on the reader knows that the "I" is writing a novel and s/he may think that the openings belong to this novel, which is not the case. The so-called openings are not actual beginnings but an anticipation of three different narrative threads that will come together in the fiction the "I" is building. Moreover, the sequential nature of language precludes any possibility of technically having more than one beginning, which in *At Swim-Two-Birds* is none of the three that the "I" gives, but the very first words that the text offers, coming from this nameless "I." These are just two examples of

the many ways in which *At Swim* plays with—and displays—narrative conventions.

2. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE NOVEL

As I have said above, *At Swim-Two-Birds* is, apparently, an example of a frame narrative where numerous stories are told and where, at any moment, a character is likely to turn into a narrator, the novel being the epitome of the well-known Irish passion for storytelling. The text presents, again apparently, a highly sophisticated stratification of levels, going down in a nesting of writers and narrators who belong to different fictional worlds, which would imply a vertical multiplication of enunciative embeddings combined with a vertical multiplication of fictional embeddings. The main relation that this novel seems to propound is, then, a vertical one of embedded embeddings with frequent changes both of enunciative hierarchy and fictional world. The writers and narrators in *At Swim* are, of course, diegetic and their narrative acts, the novels they write or the stories they tell, become, then, events in the fabula of *At Swim* but they simultaneously create further narrative texts in which other characters may write other novels and/or tell other stories. It is important to remark that this textual structure theoretically entails a hierarchy, a dependence and subordination of embedded narratives with regard to the narrative that frames them.

The frame or first narrative of *At Swim*, its primary level, consists in an episodic narrative in which a narrator tells the reader about his own life as a student at University College, Dublin. His life is spent in constant arguments with his uncle and in meetings with different friends, which he turns into occasions to discuss and get appraisals for the novel he is writing. In its condition of fictional autobiography of an artist, the frame makes parodic use of the compositional and thematic devices of a well-established genre: the *Künstlerroman*. At the same time, the episodic nature of the narrative, the student's confrontation with his uncle, who represents low middle-class values, and the student's own attitude, quite amoral and standing on the sidelines of socially accepted principles, point to another genre: the picaresque novel.

The student, then, is writing a novel and this novel represents the first, although not the last, embedded text encountered. Varied and singular offshoots will come from it, for the student's novel deals with another writer, Dermot Trellis, who, in turn, is intent on writing another novel. The

characters in Trellis's novel belong to very different stocks: some of them have been taken from a repertoire of traditional Irish literature, others belong to nonexistent fictional works and the others can be considered representatives of the contemporary Irish working class. The alleged three separate openings in the student's novel precisely announce the three levels of fictionality from which the characters in Trellis's novel will come: Irish folklore, heroic bardic literature and realistic fiction in general. The speech of these characters parodies the style which would be most appropriate for their respective procedence and the juxtaposition of their different registers and their different idiosyncrasies, all presented at the same level, results in eccentricity and comicity. This combination of fictional worlds and literary discourses characterizes *At Swim* as a heterogeneous product and one potentially partaking of Mikhail Bakhtin's definition of the *polyphonic novel* as "a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices" (1984: 6). Whether *At Swim* is trully polyphonic in a Bakhtinian sense is an issue that will be considered later on in more detail.

At some point or other most of the characters in the embedded narratives tell stories, and one of them, Orlick Trellis, who is Dermot Trellis's son, will write a further narrative. From what has been said so far, it may be deduced that *At Swim* is structured upon the Chinese-box principle, a narrative within a narrative, within a narrative, etc.² Thus, Orlick's narrative would stand at a third remove from the student's autobiographical account. Yet, things are never so simple in this novel and appearances are not to be trusted. A first complication arises from the fact that *At Swim* does not only present the well-known instance of a character who turns into the narrator of an oral narrative, although examples of this situation abound as well. What the reader gets from the outset is an *extra-autodiegetic* narrator (Genette, 1980: 245-248), that is, a narrator of the first or primary narrative who is also the main character in that narrative, and this narrator, as a character, becomes the diegetic author of an embedded written text. He is the author, not merely the narrator, and responding to a traditional notion of omnipotent authorship, he will do what he pleases with the materials that his narrative imagination creates. And he will cheat. The structural summary that I have provided accounts for the declared intentions of this diegetic author, but he himself will contravene them, for this hyper-controlling enunciating agency — extradiegetic writer and narrator of a fictional autobiography and diegetic writer and narrator of an embedded narrative — is the manifest main source of the multiple narrative transgressions that may be found in *At Swim*, overtly

as author of the embedded narrative and much more covertly as writer and narrator of the autobiographical frame. The other two figures, Dermot Trellis and Orlick Trellis, who are allegedly responsible for the embedded texts at a second and third remove respectively, act as authors too and not just as narrators. In its penchant for textual excess, *At Swim* reflects —and parodies— *ad infinitum* both the fictional communicative act contained in a narrative text, the act which involves a narrator and a narratee, and its empirical counterpart, the communicative act which involves an author and a reader. The nesting includes authors and readers, together with narrators and narratees.

3. THE NARRATIVE FRAME

The autobiographical account that seems to frame the student's novel is composed of eleven introductory pages (*AS* 9-20) followed by ten "biographical reminiscences." The beginnings of these reminiscences are typographically marked by separate headlines in italics, "*Biographical reminiscence, part the first*," "*Biographical reminiscence, part the second*," etc, and their endings are sometimes signalled, sometimes not, by phrases such as "Conclusion of the foregoing," "Conclusion of reminiscence." Several non-narrative texts—letters and extracts from other books—are also included within the reminiscences. Finally, the student's novel will be embedded in the frame, but only partially, for most of it will exist side by side with the student's autobiography, contradicting the apparent vertical structure of embedding.

3.1. The autobiography

There are two points that I would like to make here in relation to the autobiographical frame. Firstly, that it purports to be *At Swim* 's representation of reality, a window on the real world outside through which the reader catches glimpses of the Dublin of the day and of different types who people it. This semblance of reality is reinforced by the fact that it poses as an autobiographical narrative, that is, a truth-telling narrative. However, the reader realizes that it is just a fiction, much in the same way as the student's embedded novel, although placed on the outer side of the text, in a

superior hierarchical position. This autobiographical frame, then, is just a textual disguise to stress the idea that the events told are pure fact. Secondly, I keep wondering what the narrative justification of this autobiography could be. In other words, what is the purpose of the telling? Why does this narrator want to talk about a period in his life when he was leading a dull and prosaic existence, nothing interesting or exciting happened, and nothing seemed to move him? In strict structural narrative terms, the answer could be that the frame mainly serves to provide a rhetorical foil for the student's wild novel while it also helps to anchor it and even exercises a repressive function of containment, preventing this wild narrative from spilling over and contaminating the autobiographical frame. Yet I would also argue that this autobiography provides a pre-text, a perfect occasion for the narrating subject to disclose his "talents," to turn outwards and become spectacle. Maud Ellman has related autobiographies to the myth of Narcissus, "the patron saint of autobiographers" and has stated that in autobiographical time,

the present folds back narcissistically upon the past, to seize the fading image of the self. Like the autobiographer, the narcissist longs to expunge the temporal and spatial difference that separates him from his image — yet he can only love himself because that self is severed from within. Time frustrates narcissism but sustains it, too, for the time in which the narcissist eludes his own embrace is the time which perpetuates desire. (1987: 370-379)

In narrative terms, the "difference" alluded to above translates into the temporal, spatial and psychological distance that separates the student as narrator and as character, that is, the difference between the "I" that writes the autobiography and the "I" that experiences the events. The autobiographer, like the narcissist, is intent on bridging that gap, while he also knows that, should both selves collapse, his identity would collapse too, for desire first provoked his writing, a desire to repeat his life actually masking a desire "for himself," which is always a desire for his former self. Now, desire always presupposes distance, difference, separation from the object of desire. Within this scenario, it is quite understandable that the autobiography should become a conflictive writing space where a subject may both fight to establish distance and work to circumvent it. It is my contention that *At Swim's* autobiographical narrator, and the text as a whole, manifest this contrary pull towards both distance and proximity, differentiation and undifferentiation, a centrifugal and centripetal force that

works in opposite directions and renders *At Swim*'s reduction to a monolithic interpretation impossible. In his paper "Fetishism" Freud elaborated on the function of the fetish in relation to the castration complex and found evidence that many fetishists present a divided attitude to the question of the castration of women. In these cases the fetish becomes the site where the male subject both negates and affirms castration so that two mutually incompatible assertions are held within it: "the woman has still got a penis" and "my father has castrated the woman" (Freud: 1977, 356-357). As Tania Modleski has stated (1991:119) the fetish in Freudian theory is the means "whereby a 'multiple-belief' may be maintained," a project that comes close to that of *At Swim*.

This contradictory and paradoxical movement towards both distance and proximity is structurally illustrated by the temporal relationship that the autobiographical frame establishes between its narrating time and the actual occurrence of events in the fabula. According to Genette's typology (1980: 217) the frame in *At Swim* would be a *subsequent* narrative without any indication of the temporal interval gone by between the two points — narration and action. The reader takes it for granted that the telling follows the events just because the past tense has been used. Yet, on further readings and due to the artful tone of the whole novel, several objections may come to mind. The least that could be said is that at certain points the situation is ambiguous. For a start, the conventional process of maturation of the *Künstlerroman* seems to be missing and there is a lack of psychological distance between student-character and narrator, which could be a consequence of a lack of temporal distance. Furthermore, there is a passage in the novel which favours ambiguity and questions the entire narrative situation of what purports to be a retrospective account of events. In this passage, the narrator tells us that one day he realized that he had lost some pages of his novel and began to speculate what would happen if he were to lose the whole of it. In principle, the missing pages belong to the novel that the present narrator wrote when he was a young student and so the novel forms part of his past and in his past it should remain.

With regard to my *present* work, however, the forty pages which *follow* the lost portion *were* so vital to the operation of the ingenious plot which I *had devised* that I *deemed* it advisable to spend an April afternoon —a time of sun-glistening showers— glancing through them in a critical if precipitate manner. (AS 60; my emphasis).

The mixture of present and past is quite confusing. He refers to the novel that he was writing in his past as his "present" work. Or is he creating it now, at the same time as he is inventing his biographical reminiscences? Undoubtedly, the use of present and past tenses in the same sentence and in connection with the same referent causes ambiguity and relational incongruities. On the one hand, these devices could be meant to strengthen the mimetic illusion, for they attempt to weaken the temporal and psychological distance between narration and diegesis and give the impression of immediacy, bringing the reader closer to the text. On the other hand, they also bring to the fore the aesthetic status of the narrative, its rhetoric and artificiality, and they destabilize the dividing line between the act of narration and the narrated world, between exteriority and interiority or between enunciating subject —the "I" that writes and narrates— and subject of the enunciated —the "I" inscribed in the text.

3.2. Non-narrative texts

The non-narrative embedded texts included in the autobiography are two letters from the narrator's tipster and several extracts from books as diverse and obscure as the *Literary Reader* by the Irish Christian Brothers, *A Conspectus of the Arts and Natural Sciences*, *The Athenian Oracle* or *The Wise Sayings of the Son of Sirach*. This literary device, the inclusion in a narrative text of quotations from other texts, is known by the name of *intertextuality*³ and points to the dialogue that any text maintains with other texts. The effect that these interpolations create in *At Swim* is again double and contradictory. On the one hand, they help promote a feeling of immediacy and contribute to bringing the reader closer to the fabula, to making her/him believe that s/he is witnessing the development of the events and that the narrator is willing to share all the information he has with her/him. This effect is achieved through a *realistic* or *quasi-mimetic* (Sternberg 1978: 247) motivation for the introduction of the non-narrative texts. The diegesis itself justifies their presence, which is prompted by the characters' actions and is not the narrator's direct responsibility:

Wait till I show you something, I said groping in my pocket. Wait till you read this. I got this yesterday. I am in the hands of a man from Newmarket.
I handed him a letter.

Mail from V. Wright, Wyvern Cottage, Newmarket, Suffolk . . . (AS 36-37)

Papers and periodicals were perused in a desultory fashion for some time. Afterwards Byrne searched for an old book purchased for a nominal sum upon the quays and read aloud extracts therefrom for the general benefit and/or diversion of the company.

Title of Book referred to; The Athenian Oracle . . .

Extract from Book referred to . . . (AS 102).

We find ourselves reading the letter at the same time as the character is supposed to be doing it. We participate in his action and have a feeling of simultaneity and closeness between the fabula time and our reading time. On the other hand, how is it possible that the narrator has *The Athenian Oracle* handy, such an old book which belonged to Byrne, just to offer us the precise extracts that his friend read out loud on that occasion? Once again, a pretence of *vraisemblance* is forcefully counteracted by the underlying artificiality and proximity rapidly gives way to distance. In the final analysis, the incorporation of these texts stresses the fact that a narrative can never reproduce a lived experience and that it is only a network of printed words. As Patricia Waugh has remarked (1984:112), the use of intertextuality is one way of reinforcing the notion that the ontological status of literature is different from that of the everyday world.

These embedded non-narrative texts bear a thematic relationship to the rest of the narrative. Several of them are heavily loaded with moral or religious tones, and would perfectly fit in the kind of novel —didactic and Victorian—that Dermot Trellis, a character in the student's novel, intends to write. Yet, they do not belong there, but form part of the narrator's autobiographical world, a world which is unethical and in which religion plays no obvious part. One of the extracts (AS 21) deals with the perils that the consumption of alcohol entails. Its tone is utterly apocalyptic, recalling *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* in its description of the tortures to be suffered in hell. Another piece talks about "the fear of the Lord" (AS 96) and another one about the moral effects of "tobacco-using" (AS 209). In contrast, our student is a drunkard and a compulsive smoker and does not care about God at all. The irony is evident and the reader is compelled to distance her/himself from these texts, for they contradict the world created in the frame. What the inclusion of these non-narrative pieces brings about is a humorous and ironic effect achieved by sheer juxtaposition of styles and

mainly of moral and didactic literature set against the unedifying narrative that the narrator provides.

4. THE STUDENT'S NOVEL

Narratology conceives of the narrative text as a hierarchical structure whose highest authority is the fictive author or the narrator of the first narrative. In *At Swim*, this authority is embodied by the student, who is the fictive author and narrator of his biography, its main character and the author and narrator of an embedded narrative. His subjectivity is, nevertheless, not diluted and diffuse because it has been split into so many stances but is ever-present and becomes the unifying focal point, the centre of the text. His evident reluctance to delegate responsibilities to other textual figures mirrors his will to power, his tyrannical and egotistic personality disguised under a layer of democracy. He wants to be inside his novel while pretending to be outside and only at the very end will his claim to control and total discursive mastery be overtly questioned. If formerly he has been characterized as a narcissistic figure, in epistemological terms his personality responds to the figure of the solipsist who translates the world, both real and fictional, into his own terms, for any conceivable thing starts and ends in his consciousness, which is perpetually doubling itself. In order to convey such a personality, the most suitable narrative voice and narrative situation are the ones present in *At Swim*, where the narrator can approach not only the objective world but also the subjective world of his imagination phenomenologically, and he is able to observe and manipulate not only external events and characters, but himself as well. Returning to Bakhtin's elaboration of the polyphonic novel (1984) and to *At Swim*'s relationship with it, I would argue that it is precisely the narrator's authoritative position that prevents the novel from being plural, polyphonic and dialogical. Although there is potential enough for it to be so, its fragmentary surface is filtered through a unifying and central consciousness. Moreover, this consciousness objectifies the characters, whom the reader never feels to be autonomous subjects, and objectifies their stereotyped discourses too.

Since the student is both narrator and fictive author he is endowed with divine privilege and authority and he is utterly self-conscious about the task he is performing. He is omnipotent and by definition he should be omniscient

too. In his biographical reminiscences he mentions the "prescience" of any author (AS 9), a power that he himself will lack, for he will alter the course of his narrative. As one reads *At Swim*, the impression is that the student's novel is not a finished product. The suggestion is that the student-author is writing a novel and the reader is witnessing this creative process, but for all the reader knows, the student will never bother to convert it into a conventional narrative. It should be remembered that the narrating time apparently follows the events, that is to say, the biographical reminiscences in which the writing of the novel is embedded. Consequently, the narrator of the frame, in retrospect, should be omniscient in his own right and able to offer us the final version of the novel that he wrote while a student. The fact that he does no do so may intimate that the whole narrative situation in *At Swim* is a fake, backing the previous suggestion concerning the questionable status of *At Swim* as a subsequent narrative and attesting to the text's determination to demolish the same barriers that it has created elsewhere.

4.1. Authors and Readers

The narrative that the student-author is writing will reach the readers in three different ways. Sometimes the extracts will be *quasi-mimetically* motivated (Sternberg, 1978: 247). Speaking in Genette's terms (1980: 227-231), the student-author, a character in the first narrative, turns into a diegetic author of an embedded narrative. Consequently, these extracts are included within the biographical reminiscences and are justified by the characters' actions. They take place as events in the fabula of the first narrative, and the narratee, the agent addressed by the narrator, is situated at the same narrative level as this narrator. In the case of *At Swim*, it is not so much a question of narrators and narratees as a question of authors and readers. The student-author will have his own character-readers. His friend Brinsley will feature prominently in this role. Sometimes the student-author himself will read aloud and Brinsley and/or other friends will act as listeners. On these occasions, which somewhat resemble the communicative situation established in an oral tradition or which, at least, are not as artificial as the private reading act, the listeners do not remain passive but interrupt the narrative with their own comments. The second way in which we learn about the embedded narrative is quite similar

to the one mentioned: that is to say, it takes place at the level of the *fabula* and from character to character/s. The difference lies in the fact that now the extracts will not be marked with headlines and will not constitute a separate text. The student-author will simply explain or summarize parts of the *fabula* of his novel, in direct speech and in the midst of a scene pertaining to the frame. The situation here is far more spontaneous. The diegetic narrator addresses a diegetic narratee and the narratee's feed-back and interruptions are more numerous. At one point, a group of friends will meet at Byrne's and the student will find occasion to entertain his attentive audience (*AS* 99-102). One of his narratees, his friend Kerrigan, will even make his own contribution to the narrative.

The two Greeks, I continued, were deaf and dumb but managed to convey, by jerking their thumbs towards the bay and writing down large sums of money in foreign currency, that there was a good life to be lived across the water.

The Greeks were employed, said Kerrigan, as panders by an eminent Belgian author who was writing a saga on the white slave question. They were concerned in the transport of doubtful cargo to Antwerp.

I recall that the dexterity and ready wit of this conversation induced in all of us a warm intellectual glow extremely pleasant to experience.

That is right, I said. I remember that they inscribed contours in the air by means of gesture to indicate the fulness of the foreign bosom. A very unsavoury pair of rascals if you like (*AS* 101).

In the cases exemplified above there are no signs of any transgression of narrative conventions and the exchange is easily naturalized. It would seem that the physical presence of the participants in the communicative act serves to curb any disruption and preserves the narrative hierarchy. But when it comes to "writing," where both speaker and listener are absent, "strange" things start to happen. It could be said that the autobiographical frame, as representation of reality, of physicality, represses the excessive and transgressive impulses of writing, thus backing the logocentric formulation of the opposition presence/absence or speech/writing, which as Jacques Derrida has argued (1976) privileges the first term over the second. Nevertheless, *At Swim* will gradually relinquish these claims and will find gratification in its own transgressive textuality.

As *At Swim* progresses, some extracts from the student's novel will appear interpolated between two biographical reminiscences and from page 103 onwards none of them will be framed by the autobiographical

reminiscences. It would seem that the student becomes increasingly absorbed in his novel —in writing— and loses interest in a reality which never trully had much interest for him anyway. In narrative terms, there has been a shift from inside to outside, from subordination to coordination, and the initially embedded narrative runs parallel to, and coexists with, the first narrative. To put it differently, the vertical relationship of subordination becomes a horizontal one of coordination, which means that if the student's novel is actually "embedded" in something, it is embedded in *At Swim*, exactly as the biographical reminiscences are. What passed off as a framed section in the middle of the "reality" of the student's life is revealed as independent from it or, in other words, the biographical reminiscences are as fictional as the student's fantastic novel.

This new horizontal relationship implies that there has been a change of fictional world, but the enunciating agency and hierarchy remain the same. That is, there was initially a textual split between a fictive author of an autobiography and his younger self —the protagonist of the autobiography who was also the author of a novel. However, this structural and psychological division into different narrative roles, into fictive autobiographer-character-author, threatens to collapse now. Once again, the boundary separating the inside and the outside has been transgressed. Yet it becomes difficult to abandon the idea that the autobiography actually frames the student's novel, probably because at the beginning it did frame it. What I mean is that saying that it does would be as inaccurate as saying that it does not, which forces the critic, in a way, to jump over the mere description towards a possible interpretation. And precisely because of this unsteady position between affirmation and negation, at this point the reader may pose the following question: "Who is the author of the novel within *At Swim*?" The character? The narrator? Or, maybe, neither of them?

Meir Sternberg has considered the narrative text as a dynamic system of gaps actualized by a reader who is engaged in a thoroughgoing process intended to reconstruct the fictive world that the text creates. This reader poses "such questions as, What is happening or has happened, and why? What is the connection between this event and the previous ones?" (Sternberg 1978: 50). It could be said that the student's novel does not fit Sternberg's definition. The reader can make such questions and answer them only to see that knowing the answers does not make any difference. Her/his curiosity and surprise do not so much spring from the events or from the way the information has been manipulated as from the lack of information and from the realization that the importance of the fabula has been diminished in

favour of other aspects. The narrative may attract the reader's interest, but s/he will be more interested in knowing how the student-author—if it is still believed that he is actually responsible for this narrative—handles his materials, how he manages to transgress conventions, than in knowing what happens to Trellis and the rest of characters. The text itself makes it quite clear that the student's novel would appear utterly odd and eccentric—in fact impossible—were it not viewed as a foil for the biographical reminiscences, exactly in the same way as the biographical reminiscences act as a foil for the student's novel, for it is difficult to understand one without the other and their existence is intimately linked. At the beginning it seemed that the student's novel was subordinated to the biographical frame. Then both narratives appeared to coexist independently at the same textual level but, as the reading process goes on, they come to be interdependent, for, in the last analysis, they form a unity, like the two sides of a coin, and they together create a single diegetic world: that of *At Swim*. Yet, let us suspend our disbelief and consider the student's novel on its own, while trying to unravel the relationships that it establishes with the other narrative texts theoretically subordinated to it, that is, with Trellis and Orlick's manuscripts.

4.2. How many embedded novels are there in *At Swim*?

At Swim-Two-Birds resembles a maze of two-way corridors which link its different layers, but the boundaries are crossed so often that establishing the number of embeddings that there exist becomes somewhat problematic. Some critics have pointed out (Clissman 1975: 95; Imhof 1985: 14) that Aldous Huxley's *Point Counter Point* provided a model for the narrative structure used in *At Swim*. It seems that the apparent multiplicity of embedded narratives and the proliferation of authors were prompted by a paragraph in Huxley's novel where Philip Quarles reflects upon the possibility of a novel in which a novelist is writing a novel in which a novelist is writing a novel and so on *ad infinitum* (Huxley, 1963: 409). *At Swim* attempts to actualize Quarles's reflections, the result being a narrative in which constant attention is drawn to the compositional method, to some framing devices which are indeed deceiving.

A narrative text may opt for a very complicated structure which combines enunciative embeddings —changes of narrative level—with fictional embeddings —changes of diegetic world—and establishes

relationships of subordination as well as coordination among the different levels, enunciative and fictional. Even so, if the changes have been marked, are justified and follow the logic of the real, an attentive reading should be able to expose the narrative structure of the work. But this is not the case with *At Swim*, which provokes critical disagreement and confusion. Some critics talk about number of "books" or "novels" (Clissman 1975: 84; Imhof 1985: 14; Mellamphy 1985: 142), while, for example, J. C. C. Mays (1973: 85) refers to the existence of different "plots" or "narrative threads," a concept which is not equivalent to that of "novels." Anne Clissman (1985: 84, 147) finds four books or narratives —the frame narrative, the narrator's book about Trellis, Trellis's book about sin and Orlick's manuscript. She considers that these narratives are structured *en abyme* and she later on adds a fifth narrative level composed of Finn, Sweeny, the Pooka and Shanahan because she thinks that these characters are more independent of any of the narrators in the book than the rest of characters, an argument which is questionable. John Mays (1973: 85) mentions three main plots or narratives: the story of the narrator himself, his ventures into the legendary world of Finn and Sweeny and his incursions into the fictional world of Dermot Trellis. Mays's description seems accurate enough to account for the number of plots or narrative threads, although I would add a fourth thread formed by the folklore world of the Pooka and the Good Fairy. In any case, it sidesteps the question of the frequent structural transgressions that can be found in the text. Moreover, the establishment of independent fictional worlds is somewhat problematic, as I will try to show later on. If the reader believes what the narrator of the biographical reminiscences says, we have the four books mentioned by Anne Clissman; however, the relationships among them will not actually be what they seem to be. For a start, the student's novel is not totally dependent on the purported frame, and this sole fact completely breaks down the textual structure *en abyme*. The analysis of the relations established for the rest of the alleged levels will also reveal to what extent there is a discrepancy between what *At Swim* says and what it really does. It could be said that the text is always divided within itself. In Derridean terms, the text differs from itself and consequently its meaning is forever deferred, caught in this play, in this parodic, paradoxical, paraxial, fetishistic and narcissistic movement that implies a double and contradictory statement which is never resolved. Let us first consider the textual link between the student's novel on Trellis and Trellis's novel on sin.

4.3. The student's novel and Trellis's novel

The novel that the student is writing deals with a certain Mr Trellis, a publican who owns the Red Swan Hotel. He is a weird man, an odd moralist, and lives with his woman servant, Teresa. Mr Trellis wants to write a novel on sin, on the eternal conflict between good and evil.

In his book he [Trellis] would present two examples of humanity —a man of great depravity and a woman of unprecedented virtue. They meet. The woman is corrupted, eventually ravished and done to death in a back lane. Presented in its own milieu, in the timeless conflict of grime and beauty, gold and black, sin and grace, the tale would be moving and a salutary one (*AS* 36).

These are Trellis's initial intentions as reported by the student. For that purpose Trellis borrows and/or hires some characters from the Irish literary tradition and others from already existent fictional works —existent according to *At Swim*, though not in reality. Finn MacCool is a "true legendary" Irish hero and Mr Paul Shanahan and Mr Antony Lamont are characters created by Mr Tracy, himself a fictional writer of cow-boy stories. Yet, the protagonist of Trellis's novel, John Furriskey, is to be so villainous and wicked that no existent character fits his figure and Trellis must create him *ab ovo et initio*. He literally does so in a humorous scene which parodies Stephen Dedalus's equalling of the artist to the God of creation. Trellis also creates the Pooka Fergus MacPhellimey, "a species of human Irish devil endowed with magical powers" (*AS* 61). As for Peggy, Furriskey's potential victim, it is not clear enough whether he hires her or creates her too, but, as Peggy is a domestic servant and "in order to show how an evil man can debase the highest and the lowest in the same story" (*AS* 61), Trellis creates another woman, beautiful and refined, named Sheila Lamont.

It would seem that *At Swim* rejects traditional novelistic conventions, although it does not opt for utter chaos but establishes its own particular norms, norms which actualize the student's literary theories as he himself has expressed them in one of his biographical reminiscences (*AS* 25). It is, to say the least, remarkable that a text which is split into an autobiography and a fantastic novel should simultaneously subsume a fictional universe, the student's novel, where there is no difference whatsoever between fiction and reality, that is, where at any moment a sign may suddenly become its referent.

This means that all the characters Trellis has gathered, and some other characters who seem to appear out of the blue, have a real life and can exist and act in the same narrative text and in the same structural —hierarchical— position as their creator. Language, whether oral or written, has the power to bring to life and materialize situations and people. Consequently, the appearance of some characters is justified because at one point or another, they have been mentioned or have formed part of a story told by another character. Likewise, the characters lead their own lives and have their own wills. Trellis controls them only when he is awake, but the moment he falls asleep they are free to act as they please. And they do not approve of Mr Trellis's plans for them, which provokes their rebellion and triggers off Trellis's fall. The characters' final vengeance against Trellis is carried out through his own son, Orlick, who writes a story in which his father suffers atrocious tortures and is finally tried for his crimes. Following the rules of this fictional universe, Trellis actually suffers the tortures and most of the characters who have appeared so far feel happy enough to participate in Trellis's torments. At this point, this wild narrative becomes entangled with the student's biographical reminiscences, for its hasty and abrupt ending acquires significance in relation to the events in the student's life.

Furriskey, Shanahan and Lamont are determined to execute Dermot Trellis by writing his death. Just then, the text shifts fictional world and we move to the last biographical reminiscence to see the student coming back home. He has passed his final examination and feels happy about it. He meets his uncle, who congratulates him on his success and gives him a watch as a reward. The student feels genuinely surprised at this gesture and for the first time he seems to be sincerely moved. Nevertheless, the irony could not be missing and is subtly conveyed by a wily detail: the watch does not tell the right time. It marks five-fifty-four while church bells are chiming for the Angelus. Immediately afterwards we get the resolution of Trellis's narrative. Teresa, Dermot Trellis's servant, enters her master's room, finds it empty, decides to tidy it up and stokes the fire with none other than the pages of Trellis's novel which are lying scattered on the floor. Her act means the end of Furriskey and company because the narrative that sustained their existence has been consumed by the flames. It also means that Trellis's life has been spared as a consequence of the student's final reconciliation with his uncle. It is quite obvious that the uncle and the despotic Trellis both represent figures of authority against whom the student in the biographical reminiscences and the characters in Trellis's novel rebel, but it is also true that Trellis is the

student's projection, one of the narrative masks that he uses to exercise his will, and it is only natural that Trellis's life should be spared.

This sudden ending could be explained through its relation to another event in the fabula of the biographical reminiscences, to the fact that the student has passed his exam and the academic year has come to an end. This interpretation brings in the transtextual dimension of *At Swim*, which takes a parodic form here. It has been repeatedly said that *At Swim* parodies Joyce's fictions, mainly *A Portrait of the Artist As A Young Man*.⁴ Both partake of the *Künstlerroman*, their main protagonists are highly aware of language and they are presented as solipsists to the core. The references to *A Portrait* in *At Swim* are constant and accounting for the multiple allusions would constitute a complete study in itself. Yet *At Swim* manages to spare us such a long task. In *A Portrait* (1928: 238) Stephen Dedalus snaps at his friend Davin: "—Do you know what Ireland is?— asked Stephen with cold violence. —Ireland is the old sow that eats her farrow." *At Swim* responds as follows: "Professor Unternehmer, the eminent German Neurologist, points to Claudius as a lunatic but allows Trellis an inverted sow neurosis wherein the farrow eat their dam" (AS 217). The subversion of terms that the concept of parody implies could not have been better exemplified. It is true that Flann O'Brien's novel can be said to provide answers for many of the questions concerning aesthetic creation that *A Portrait* had raised, but the tone, the ethos, is completely different and it could not be otherwise, for in *At Swim* the irony is double. If in *A Portrait* the butt of irony is Stephen, in *At Swim* it is *A Portrait*. Art and Literature play an important role in both novels, but their consideration can never be the same. Stephen pictured the artist "forging anew in his workshop out of the sluggish matter of the earth a new soaring impalpable imperishable being" (AS 196). The student-author in *At Swim* is a lazy bed-ridden creature unwilling to transcend or dive under the surface of things. The mystic quality that Art seems to have for Stephen turns into "spare-time" activities which entertain the student during the academic year. He starts his novel at the beginning of it and consequently, once it has come to an end and he has attained his goal, why should he not do away with his novel?

But returning to the question of the relationship between the student's novel and Trellis's novel, I would like to remark that the student-author explicitly refers to Mr Trellis's novel as if it existed within his own novel:

Further extract from my Manuscript on the subject of Mr Trellis's Manuscript on the subject of John Furriskey, his first steps in life and

his first meeting with those who were destined to become his firm friends; the direct style. . . (AS 49).

The reader is told that Dermot Trellis wants to write a novel on sin and that for that purpose he hires some characters and creates others. The student-author says so, and he also relates the plot devised by Trellis. Yet, that is everything the reader will get about Trellis's narrative, for the student will never hand over to this new author. Dermot Trellis will always be referred to as "he" and his actions or intentions will always be reported, as the following example shows.

Extract from Manuscript where Trellis is explaining to an unnamed listener the character of his projected labour:... It appeared to him [to Trellis] that a great . . . (AS 36).

The headline says that Trellis "is explaining" something. The situation, nevertheless, would be better described as "I will now narrate how Trellis explained something." The present tense of the headline, indicating a direct speech situation and thus the presence of a speaker, is contradicted by the past tense of reported speech which signals his absence. The reader will never get a word coming directly from Trellis and no change of enunciating agency will be effected, which means that there is no enunciative embedding either. The problem is that Trellis's novel both exists and does not exist. I mean that it exists in so far as the world in which Trellis moves does, but it is not "his" novel, nor "his" world. It is the novel and the world of the student-author although he pretends that it belongs to Trellis. It is precisely this ambiguous status that gives rise to confusion and has provoked the following remark:

It is often difficult to ascertain whose is the speaking voice in all of this. One narrative level often shades into another. In the account of the multi-clause colloquy between the Pooka and the Good Fairy, is it Trellis or the narrator who is writing? (Clissman 1975: 86).

I would answer that it is the narrator of the biographical reminiscences, for the enunciating agent, the voice that narrates, is exactly the same and only one that will be found throughout the novel, and I mean the whole text. Even though in *At Swim* there are three different authors writing their manuscripts —four indeed, if we take into account the biographical reminiscences— and this would imply the existence of different narrators, whenever a narrator

shows up, his voice is the one heard in the student's autobiography. All the narrators will betray the same peculiarities in their descriptive manner, providing a wealth of information which is, nevertheless, irrelevant. They will show the same detachment towards the contents of their narration and will linger on the more sordid aspects of life, often concentrating on physiological functions though approaching the escatological in an unordinary, quasi-scientific way.

All the narrators are highly aware of the workings of language and of rhetoric, an awareness which is passed down to some characters as well. The narrator of the biographical reminiscences realizes that his talk has been "forced, couched in the accent of the lower or working classes" (*AS* 24). Immediately after his birth, Furriskey is startled by his own voice, which has "the accent and intonation usually associated with the Dublin lower or working classes" (*AS* 49). The Good Fairy takes pains to count the number of subordinate clauses that the Pooka has used in a sentence (*AS* 110) and Orlick announces that he will pierce Dermot with a "pluperfect" tense (*AS* 168). The narrator of the biographical reminiscences foregrounds the artificiality of his narration by frequently interrupting it with descriptive asides marked with headlines, a stylistic peculiarity that, curiously enough, Orlick will also use in his manuscript. These are some examples which attest to the fact that the different authors are but their master's spokesmen, or else scapegoats for his aggressive impulses, but, in any case, they are completely lacking in consciousness, in that internal projection so fundamental in Bakhtin's conception of the polyphonic novel. A unitary consciousness and a self-duplicating voice link this text and hold it together, becoming a forceful integrating element which fights against the surface fragmentation. Furthermore, this cohesive drive will not stop just with "voice" and will act at other levels, mainly at story level, knitting a pattern of echoes that traverse the whole text, whereby it would seem that the text, responding to its narrator's onanistic tendencies, conducts a love-affair with itself.

I have tried to demonstrate that the purported change of enunciating agency between the student's novel on Trellis and Trellis's novel on sin flickers in an indeterminate zone between being and non-being. Trellis both is and is not the author of a novel, but, what about a change of fictional level? Since there is no clear structural distinction between both narratives, can we talk about a change of represented world? In fact, *At Swim* will be structurally composed only of two narrative spaces: that of the biographical reminiscences and that of the student's novel, the latter being a magical space resembling a heterotopia, a world in which different literary traditions are

juxtaposed to finally collapse in a unidimensional space which lacks any depth. It is true that there are proper fictional embeddings—and enunciative embeddings—in the stories that some characters tell, precisely because their stories will correspond to their respective fictional domains. Thus, for example, Finn will introduce the world of the Irish sagas with Sweeny's story. Yet this world was already present, in a way, just in the mere presence of Finn, and mainly in his discourse. The fact that the different characters in the student's novel belong to different literary traditions creates this confusion between fictional worlds and fictional embeddings, the former overlapping the latter. Several fictional worlds are represented but all these different worlds will eventually come to coexist in the student's novel and if Sweeny's existence was formerly dependent on Finn's narration, which represented both a fictional and an enunciative embedding, later on Sweeny, his misfortunes and his world will form part of a fragmented though unique space. Again, what started off as a vertical relationship of subordination becomes a horizontal one of coordination—or rather juxtaposition—and again, the existence of different fictional worlds cannot be fully affirmed or denied because of the interaction and fluidity which exist among them.

Dermot Trellis will never be an autonomous author. However, the crew of characters who, always according to the first narrator, will feature in Trellis's novel are granted independent existences and private lives, which means that they appear to jump the barrier that separates their "imagined" world from the "real" world of their creator, and I say "appear" because, if that barrier does not really exist, if Trellis's novel is not an autonomous narrative, how can these characters jump a barrier not represented in the text?. And yet, they appear to jump it. The student's novel reaches a point where what seems to be a narrative transgression, that is, a denial of the structural demarcations that determine positions in a text, cannot be fully considered as such but cannot be disregarded either. Gérard Genette has stated (1980: 234) that this specific transgression of barriers—when it is a real transgression—is a rhetorical figure called *author's metalepsis* by the classics and it "consists of pretending that the poet himself brings about the effects he celebrates." Any transgression of the barriers, either enunciative or diegetic, that a text builds represents a *metalepsis*. Metaleptic jumps may take different forms, but always involve a confusion between sign and referent, reality and fiction, and they do away with the logic of a text that wants to preserve the illusion of reality. They flaunt the artificiality of art by undoing the hierarchy between outside and inside, high and low, narrating subject and narrated object.

The starting-point of *At Swim'* s apparent and real *metalepses* is what Patricia Waugh (1984: 88) has defined as the *creation/description* paradox, an inherent condition of all fiction. Any fictional text creates its own ontological context, a verbal context within which naming and describing amount to bringing into existence. *At Swim-Two-Birds* pushes this idea to its limits and actualizes it, effecting a *reductio ad absurdum*. The characters, then, become real people, lead their parallel lives, refuse to play the roles ascribed to them and plot against the despotic Dermot Trellis. The status of Shanahan, Lamont, Furriskey, Finn, the Pooka, etc. is a curious one. They are supposedly characters in Dermot Trellis's novel and that is the only justification for their presence in the text. However, they are not cast in such roles but as people living on the same ontological level as their creator. Some of them will perform oral narrative acts, mainly Shanahan, Finn and Orlick, and their narratives will favour real *metalepses*. Finn relates Sweeny's story, then Sweeny jumps from this story and becomes a character in the student's novel alongside Finn and the rest. Shanahan mentions Jem Casey and Casey makes his entrance. Orlick's manuscript is perhaps more interesting to comment on for it presents another example of an author writing yet another story and a written narrative offers a more complex stratification of levels and may pose more structural problems than an oral one.

4.4. Orlick's manuscript

Orlick starts writing his manuscript surrounded by Furriskey, Lamont and Shanahan. These characters constantly interrupt Orlick's text because they do not approve either of his methods or his style, and their multiple objections slow down the manuscript's progress. It is true that the reader now gets Orlick's narrative directly, which would imply a change of enunciative level, but it is also true that this change passes unnoticed due to the fact that the narrative voice recalls the student's in every respect. Consequently, it is difficult to forget that the same agency is actually behind the scene and Orlick cannot be considered an author but just the student's mouthpiece, a puppet in his hands. In any case, the characters' interruptions bring about frequent transitions from the student's text to Orlick's manuscript, transitions which are not signalled and thus may be regarded as metaleptic. Orlick's creative act follows the student's "transgressive norms," and the conventions underlying the creation/description paradox are laid bare again. The

transgression gives rise to humorous situations. Orlick leaves the room for some minutes and Shanahan suggests taking up the story in the meantime, which he does, resuming Orlick's narrative orally in his own colloquial and lively style. Thus, in Shanahan's version, Dermot Trellis and the Pooka, whose discourses have always been grandiose, radically shift register. Furriskey and Lamont contribute to this oral narrative as well, and the three of them decide that the Pooka should metamorphose Dermot Trellis into a rat and himself into an Airedale terrier, "the natural enemy of the rat from the start of time" (*AS* 182). The student relates how, on hearing Orlick coming back, Lamont manages to put things back as they formerly were:

Noises, peripatetic and external, came faintly upon the gathering in the midst of their creative composition and spare-time literary activity. Lamont handled what promised to be an awkward situation with coolness and cunning.

And the short of it is this, he said, that the Pooka worked more magic till himself and Trellis found themselves again in the air in their own bodies, just as they had been a quarter of an hour before that, none the worse for their trying ordeals (*AS* 183).

Nothing could have been easier.

Orlick's manuscript provides further examples of displacement of characters. The Pooka and Dermot Trellis exist in the student's novel but they go down one step and become part of Orlick's story. The final turn of the screw comes when Orlick decides to include Furriskey, Shanahan and Lamont in his narrative, cast as Justices of the Peace. Now that these three characters are present in Orlick's manuscript at the same time as they are witnessing what purports to be the actual creative process of that same manuscript, that is, now that they simultaneously belong as characters in two different enunciative levels, the text marks the difference of level by highlighting the materiality and artificiality of Orlick's narrative, a written narrative occupying a certain physical space in which a finger may be inserted.

Proceeding on a carpet of fallen leaves and rotting acorns they [the Pooka and Trellis] had not travelled a distance longer in length than twenty-six perches when they saw (with considerable surprise, indeed) the figure of a man coming towards them from the secrecy of the old oaks. With a start of pleasure, the Pooka saw that it was none

other than Mr Paul Shanahan, the eminent philosopher, wit and raconteur.

Shanahan at this point inserted a brown tobacco finger in the texture of the story and in this manner caused a lacuna in the palimpsest (*AS* 185).

Orlick himself will remain outside his narrative and whenever he is mentioned the reader also knows that the text has gone back to the first narrator's discourse. In it, the characters get tired of the procedures in Trellis's trial and decide that it is high time they finished him off, but they will not be allowed to get down to business for at that precise moment the last biographical reminiscence breaks in.

5. THE ENDINGS

On the first page of the text (*AS* 9), the narrator offered three fake beginnings for his novel. *At Swim-Two-Birds* will have three false endings as well, a triadic structure again reproduced in the last three words of the text, "good-bye, good-bye, good-bye" (*AS* 218). The first ending closes the biographical reminiscences and its headline reads as follows: "*Conclusion of the book antepenultimate. Biographical reminiscence part the final.*" (*AS* 208). With it, the figure of the student as fictive author of his biography and as character leaves the scene. The second ending marks the conclusion of the student's narrative: "*Conclusion of the Book, penultimate:*" (*AS* 215). Here the figure of the student as author of a novel exits. If there had been a relationship of enunciative embedding between both narratives, the first one to leave would logically have been the student-author, while the biographical reminiscences would have closed the whole text, actually framing it. The highest enunciating agency that the reader has known so far and who has been playing God throughout the text has disappeared in his three roles: narrator of the biographical reminiscences, character in these reminiscences and author of a novel. There should be no one left to go on writing or narrating, but the text has not reached its end yet: "*Conclusion of the book, ultimate.*" (*AS* 216). We may ask ourselves who is responsible for this last section, the section which ends the novel entitled *At Swim-Two-Birds* and puts the final full stop to it, and the answer is anything but easy.

The passage is deliberately cryptic and enigmatic, both its style and contents mirroring its subject-matter, which seems to be the always shifting dividing line between sanity and insanity. This narrating voice also recalls the student's and it is a voice that "knows," that refers to Sweeny and Trellis, that reproduces sentences spoken by the Pooka and that, in my view, is trying to draw a conclusion while evincing the impossibility of doing so. It is precisely its pensive comments and its attempt at interpretation that distinguish it from the detached and pompous manner of the student, and confer upon it an air of solemnity and transcendence completely missing in the biographical reminiscences and in the student's novel. More significantly perhaps, and contributing to this air of transcendence, the "I" has completely withdrawn in this final passage and the voice seems to have no physical origin within the text. Kaja Silverman has elaborated on the theological status of the disembodied voice-over in film and has said:

In other words, the voice-over is privileged to the degree that *it transcends the body*. Conversely, it loses power and authority with every corporeal encroachment, from a regional accent or idiosyncratic "grain" to definitive localization in the image. (1988: 49)

Silverman is discussing film here, but I would argue that the effect is analogous in a written narrative which has shifted from the overwhelming presence of a unitary consciousness signified by the first-person pronoun to this coda where such presence is transformed into a voice coming from above, hence not immediately present in the text.

Are we to consider that this final enunciating agency is the actual master of *At Swim*? Is this passage the real frame, formerly veiled by the reader's willing suspension of disbelief, of both biography and novel, of life and fiction? Or, is it just the mature narrator of the biographical reminiscences musing about his creation? Or the student's epilogue to a novel he never finished? What is clear is that this passage rounds off the whole text and adds to the reader's perception of it. In a way, the passage overtly shatters the mimetic illusion sustained through the biographical reminiscences by introducing a voice which seems very close to that of a real author, thus revealing that the communicative situation represented is a fake. In this light, the two main narrative spaces comprised in the text share fictional status. One purports to be an autobiographical account, objective and transparent, and the other a fantastic tale but, however different, both are fictions devised by an "other." Literary conventions vary from mode to mode and from genre

to genre, but once these conventions are laid bare, the common core is revealed.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to demonstrate that the narrative structure of *At Swim* is deceiving and manifests itself, not as a stable and finished entity, but rather as a fluid process throughout which the various elements keep shifting position. If we concentrate on the narrative embeddings and separate the text into its two main components, that is, autobiographical frame and student's novel, the relationship between both can be illustrated by means of a syntactic analogy. At the beginning, and responding to a vertical embedding, the relationship would be hierarchical, similar to the relationship of dependence that is established between a main clause and its subordinate. Later on both parts are placed side by side in a horizontal independence whose syntactic parallel would be that of two coordinate clauses. As the reading process goes on and both worlds get increasingly entangled, independence gives way to interdependence. To put it differently, these two coordinate clauses keep being coordinate while simultaneously there is the suggestion that both are subordinate to a superior design. It is precisely their interdependence that signals the presence of a master-plan, a totality that is composed of both and neither of them, that includes yet transcends them. This transcendence is explicitly signified in the text by the cryptic final section, the final full stop that announces silence.

The shift from initial subordination to subsequent coordination between the two narratives is quite in accordance with the general purpose of this peculiar novel, which, in my view, is the simultaneous erection and demolition of barriers. If the project of the text is to exist in a zone of indeterminacy, it is quite understandable that it should choose to replace subordination with coordination, for the former is always much clearer in its relational proposals, while the latter very frequently implies that it is left to the reader to decide what the actual relationship is.

Taking up two of the main points of my analysis, the excessive awareness of narrative conventions that *At Swim* presents and the two contrary pulls towards distance and proximity or differentiation and undifferentiation that preside over this text, it is my contention that both

express the text's abandonment of a conventional narrative logic and its choice of a para-logic, the prefix "para" representing what the text simultaneously affirms and denies, an alternative logic whose purpose and effect are analogous to those of the erotic fetish. I have said before that *At Swim* relinquishes narrative linearity and progress in favour of textual excess, thus developing spatially rather than temporally and becoming spectacle rather than narrative. In its condition both of fetish and of spectacle the text is subject to a process of objectification which transforms it into a sexual object, a process which I have initially ascribed to the narrator's narcissism but which I would like now to extend to the text as "an other's" creation, an other who uses the student-narrator in the same way as the student-narrator uses Trellis and Orlick, an other that in its narcissistic desire feels compelled to create its own double and finally fulfils this desire in the transcendence of the final section, where an imaginary unity of fictional and flesh-and-blood authors is achieved. a

NOTES

1. I do not mean here that all literature before modernism was realistic, but that the strategies used to introduce embedded narratives almost always responded to the logic of the real.

2. According to Mieke Bal (1977: 62), this structure, which she calls *encadrement*, involves a simple subordination, either of characters or of action. She distinguishes it from the structure of *enchaînement*, which entails a double subordination, of both characters and action: the action in the embedded narrative determines and is determined by the action in the first narrative. The *Arabian Nights* provides the paramount example of *enchaînement*. In any case, my analysis will try to demonstrate that the initial subordination of the student's novel to the biographical reminiscences turns into a relation of coordination.

3. Gérard Genette (1982: 7-12) has devised a typology for the different relations that a text can establish with other texts which precede or follow it. The general phenomenon, the textual transcendence of the text, is called *transtextuality* and is defined (1982: 7) as "tout ce qui le met en relation, manifeste ou secrète, avec d'autres textes." Genette distinguishes five forms of transtextuality. *Quotation*, *plagiarism* and *allusion*, all of them widely used in *At Swim*, are expressions of the most explicit and literal modality of transtextuality: *intertextuality*.

4. Anne Clissman (1975: 100-115) has drawn interesting parallels between *At Swim-Two-Birds* and both *A Portrait* and *Ulysses*.

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a

LEWIS GRASSIC GIBBON AND HISTORY: THE SHAMELESS STONE OF SISYPHUS



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The world's sought faith for thousands of years and found only death or unease in them. Yours is just another dark cloud to me —or a great rock you're trying to push up a hill. (Gibbon 1946: 495)

THE untimely death of James Leslie Mitchell (1901-1935) deprived Britain of a promising novelist. However brief and compressed within only five years, his career produced over fifteen books, including two masterpieces: *Spartacus* (1933) and the trilogy *A Scots Quair* (1932-34), written under his Scottish pseudonym, Lewis Grassic Gibbon. The projects he left unfinished may give an idea of the nature and wide scope of his interests: a *Story of Civilization*, a *Story of Religion*, a biography of the Scottish national hero William Wallace, a long historical novel about the Covenanters, and an ideological autobiography entitled *Memoirs of a Materialist*. The comparison quoted above from the last pages of *A Scots Quair*, of its hero's struggle to the Sisyphean task of pushing a great rock up a hill, profoundly suits the man whom his biographer describes in his last days, his health collapsing under gastric trouble as much as overwork, still "desperately using his limited

strength in unnecessary efforts to persuade publishers to commission more work when he could not cope with what he had" (Munro 1966: 202). The urge to write became tragically straining for an author who regarded writing as a momentous ideological enterprise.

Some generalizing misconceptions that have affected Mitchell's works are related to the sweeping political statements he made, such as "all great literature is propaganda" (Munro 1966: 106). Even *A Scots Quair* has sometimes been regarded as committed Communist writing,¹ failed Scottish Nationalism,² or absolutely permeated by his Diffusionist ideas.³ More recently, he has begun to come into his own by being related to "those modern European writers from Kafka and Sartre to Camus and Beckett who have made high art out of the belief in the inherent hopelessness and incoherence of the human condition" (Malcolm 1984: 174). An approach to human reality that only a few years later might have been called existentialist is, in our opinion, the starting point for an improved understanding of the author's politics, and not the other way round.

The keys to the ideas behind Mitchell's fiction are best sought in his minor novels, and particularly in his largely autobiographical *The Thirteenth Disciple* (1931). Its hero Malcolm Maudslay, like his creator and fictional editor of his memoirs, comes from a peasant family of Aberdeenshire. The narration opens with Malcolm's memory of how, at the age of five, he set out to commit suicide. Significantly, the idea of suicide is also at opening of Albert Camus's *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* (1942), the collection of essays in which he expounded for the first time in full his philosophy of the Absurd, which can be defined as man's anguished awareness of the gulf between himself and the world (Camus 1942: 20). What prevents Malcolm from drowning himself is precisely a sudden consciousness "of the long wall of the autumn day . . ." and "of the wonder of the horizon" (Mitchell 1981: 14). Unlike Camus, however, Mitchell's hero does not dwell upon the problem itself, but, rather like the later Sartre, tries to find a positive solution in militancy, or, as Mitchell (1981: 15) puts it, in "an incredible adventure."

Mitchell bases Malcolm's adventurous life on the Diffusionist belief⁴ in a Golden Age of happy primitive hunters before the spread of agriculture that ended, as the author explains in his essay "The Antique Scene", with "the beliefs and practices, the diggings and plantings and indignations and shadowy revilements of Archaic Civilization" (Gibbon and MacDiarmid 1934: 20). Hence Malcolm begins to make sense of life by observing the landscape of his native valley of Leekan, a place without recorded history

except for a medieval legend about Wallace, but rich with pre-historic evidence. The " 533), a Bronze Age circle of standing stones, is meant to stand for the advent of civilization, which he regards as "no progress from the beast, but a mind-tumour and disease" (132). For Mitchell, this first sign of civilization corresponds to what Camus would call "The Absurd Walls" in the title of the second chapter of *Sisyphe* (1942: 26-47), in other words, the only precise knowledge that remains once man has found himself at the centre of the "colourless desert" of his existence, "where all certainties have turned into stone" (1942: 44).

Camus's *désert sans couleurs* can be compared to peasant life in *Thirteenth Disciple*, "a grey, grey life. Dull and grey in its routine . . ." (Mitchell 1981: 23). Agrarian life since the Neolithic is envisaged by Mitchell as the first stage of decay after the loss of primeval plenitude. However, in the Scottish peasantry he finds a remnant of the primitive spirit, akin to the one that inspired Wallace's struggle against English domination: "Except in romantic novels of claymores and stag-hunting and bonnie brier bushes, the Scottish tenant farmer keeps his immortal soul intact by markedly not raising his hat to the northern equivalent of squire" (1981: 18). These ideas, which are related to the view of national culture in the Scottish Literary Renaissance,⁵ will be central in his conception of *A Scots Quair*. The crucial moment of the present novel, as that of the trilogy, comes as the peasant moves into the city.

For Mitchell large cities are modern civilization par excellence. When Malcolm recalls his early days in Glasgow, "that strange deplorable city, . . . the vomit of a cataleptic commercialism" (1981: 67-8), he sees himself as "merely the Old Stone Age wanderer, astray and unresting with dream-blinded eyes" (1981: 123). This experience is narrated in a chapter entitled "The Walls of the World", which brings Camus's *murs absurdes* to mind. It also bears witness to the generation of British intellectuals of the 1930s, their disenchantment with post-war politics, and their shift from the utopian socialism of William Morris and H. G. Wells to extreme leftist positions. Malcolm, "out on his adventure against the World's Walls" (1981: 73), wavers between National Socialism and Marxism until he falls under the influence of two prophetic characters, a woman of Cro-Magnon features called Domina, and Metaxa, a "philosophic anarchist" and expert on the Maya, who acts as the author's Diffusionist mouthpiece. They point to him an "Adventure beyond the imagination of the orthodox socialist" (1981: 85), "beyond the Walls of the World [where] there's the flame of a splendid

Light" (1981: 138), also called "the Expedition of Consciousness against the dead universe —and the Thing behind it" (1981: 196). Thus what the novel presents as an escape from the absurd is in fact a new quest for El Dorado, the City of the Sun where the Maya "may have attempted and failed a civilization to escape the horrors of civilization" (1981: 154). The hero dies in the course of his impossible quest, and the novel ends with no hint of a solution to his conflicts.

The Thirteenth Disciple may not hold water as a novel, yet on the whole it is an interesting reflection on the angst of its author's time, besides providing a very complete introduction to the recurrent motifs and ideas of his novels.⁶ Escapism finally prevails in it, as in several of his other minor pieces. It was one of two likely responses in a generation who were, like the heroine of another of Mitchell's novels, haunted by what they read daily in the newspapers, "with their dreary listings of tariffs and bickerings, strikes and hunger marches, mounted police charges on London unemployed, the drowsy mummings of the English parliament, the growing poverty and cumulating horror of a civilisation in the agonies of every civilisation's contradictions. War and the rumours of war again... Hunger and murder and famine coming on seven-league boots, the beasts and savages of civilisation gathering under the swastika flag . . ." (Mitchell 1989: 10). The other typical response was political commitment. Mitchell's epic novel *Spartacus* is a clear-cut statement of how far he would go as a committed writer, and a fine critique of the making of History.

Spartacus is historically based on the episode of the rebellion of slaves against the Roman State that Plutarch relates in his *Life of Crassus*. Malcolm Maudslay's urge for an expedition against the World's Walls here receives a defined shape in a real adventure against the walls of the city of Rome, which in the novel adopts all the negative attributes of civilization in the Diffusionist sense: Rome, "the City of the Masters" (Mitchell 1990: 140), "the Violent City" (1990: 32), and, above all, "that Beast that would tear and devour the unborn" (1990: 201), utterly opposed to the Natural Life of Man embodied in the slaves as a whole, and particularly in Spartacus. At the same time the choice of this subject has a political meaning for Mitchell, one of whose early poems was dedicated to the murder of the leaders of the Spartacist Rising of German Communists in 1919.⁷ He said he was as deeply moved by the crucifixion of the Spartacist slaves "a hundred years before the crucifixion of Christ" (this is a point he emphasizes by repeating it at the beginning and at the end of *Spartacus*, 1990: 3, 210), as by the torture and

killing of the Covenanters in seventeenth-century Scotland or "the face of a ragged tramp" of his own days (Gibbon and MacDiarmid 1934: 304).

Mitchell's approach to Spartacus is, at first sight, one of an orthodox Marxism. In his *Grundrisse* (Moscow, 1939-41) Marx presents Spartacus as an archetypal proletarian hero, and Terry Eagleton's comment may apply to Mitchell's novel: "We respond to Spartacus or Greek sculpture because our own history links us to those ancient societies; we find in them an undeveloped phase in the forces that condition us, and a primitive image of 'measure' between man and Nature which Capitalist society necessarily destroys, and which socialist society can reproduce at an incomparably higher level" (Eagleton 1976: 13). Indeed, Spartacus reminds his woman Elpinice of a Greek statue (Mitchell 1990: 21), and there is a moment in which he appears larger than life, in the eyes of a Roman observer, like a marble God or a proletarian hero in a propagandist poster of the 1930s: "he [Gnaeus Manlius] saw more than the Strategos Spartacus, he saw THE SLAVE himself" (128) (capitals as in the original). The relentless crudity in which Mitchell describes gory details of battles and the depravity of the Romans would have upset Georg Lukács, who complained about the same in Flaubert's *Salammbô*, one of Mitchell's favourite novels, saying that "There is never any humanity in this suffering; it is simply horrible, senseless torment" (Lukács 1981: 229). But, in the famous debate that took place between Lukács and Brecht during the 1930s (see Eagleton 1976: 24), most modern Marxists would differ from Lukács's opinion, and agree with Bertold Brecht's (and Mitchell's) idea of art as a means to expose the contradictory and violent aspects of a society in need of radical transformation.

Nevertheless, Mitchell did not like to regard himself, nor his art, as Communist; rather, as "anarchist" (Malcolm 1984: 25). This he makes clear through the leading characters of *Spartacus*. The protagonist himself never says anything that could be regarded as a political manifesto. Most significantly, he hardly ever utters a word at all, even though he is called "a voice for the many, the Voice of the voiceless" (Mitchell 1990: 194). He is mostly presented through others, and he is markedly a man with no history before being enslaved as a gladiator, because he suffers amnesia due to a sword wound. It is the Greek ex-noble Hiketas that presents Spartacus, not as a Thracian like official history has him, but as a man from beyond Scythia, where the Golden Age still flourished (1990: 58-9); and it is the Greek intellectual Kleon that gives him a political purpose. But Kleon is an embittered man whom the Romans have rendered an eunuch. He stabbed and mutilated his master in retaliation, and ran away with a copy of Plato's

Republic to join the rebels (1990: 3). As the brain of the rebellion Kleon might seem an idealist in comparison with another of the leaders, the pragmatic Jewish aristocrat Gershom who sneers at his plans of "a Republic in the skies" (1990: 71) after the defeat of Rome. But the "eunuch literatus" (1990: 12) is spiritually as well as physically maimed. He is moved by hatred against Rome (1990: 4), and unable to shed tears of compassion as Spartacus does. He begrudges the child that Spartacus is going to have, and secretly rejoices over the death of the baby and its mother Elpinice, because this loss makes the leader throw himself the more desperately at the onslaught on Rome. In short, through Kleon the novel implies the danger and contradiction of turning the great myth of Spartacus into mere ideology.⁸

The character of Kleon echoes doubts about Communism that Mitchell expressed from his first novel, *Stained Radiance* (1930). At the end of *Stained Radiance* James Storman resigns from the "Anarchocommunist Party of Great Britain" alleging that in Stalinist Russia, "I saw the same aimless enslavement to an archaic economic machine; I saw a ruling class —the Communist Party— in power —a class differing in no fundamentals from those ruling elsewhere" (Mitchell 1993: 209), and concluding that "Mob salvation is a proven lie" (1993: 210), while he hopes that his son, "his immortality", would "presently bear out into the world a torch to add to . . . the Light that men call by many names, by the names of Freedom and Knowledge, of Anarchy and of God" (1993: 212). By contrast John Garland, with a mutilated hand and recently bereaved of a baby, finally accepts the secretaryship of the Party "just to hit back" because he has "grown bitter" (215). Spartacus suspects the philosophy that inspires Kleon, because there are also slaves in Plato's *Republic*, though he rather naively approves of the "Lex Servorum" that Kleon has drafted (Mitchell 1990: 136), seemingly his plan for a dictatorship of the proletariat. In Communism Mitchell admired the means of revolution to put an end to the cruelties of a civilization that would allow even babies to die, but he distrusts its political ends: he thought that Revolution, too, ultimately devours its own children. The orthodox Marxist reader of *Spartacus* may be surprised at the end of the novel, when the dying Kleon, contemplating Spartacus's agony on the cross, has a vision of the crucified Christ superimposed on the image of Spartacus gladius in hand. An "image" of suffering and rebellion turning into a "superscription" of universal love was also the final message of another novel Mitchell had written in the same year of *Spartacus*, *Image and Superscription* (Munro 1966: 106).

Spartacus represents the ideal of humanity that Mitchell imagined in primitive men, "Christians it seemed to him without Christianity" (Malcolm 1984: 29). He is also the kind of hero Joseph Cambell defines as "the champion of things becoming",⁹ that is, a positive force of Nature as opposed to the ravages of human History. As the embodiment of the rebellion of slaves the statuesque but dynamic Spartacus is a Sisyphean stone, and Kleon is his Sisyphus, the main spokesman of the absurd.¹⁰ From the start Kleon knows, like Macbeth in the last act of Shakespeare's tragedy, that "there were neither Gods nor beginnings nor ends, plan in the blood and pain of birth, plan in the blood and pain of death, only an oft-told tale that went on and knew neither reason nor rhythm nor right" (Mitchell 1990: 5). Yet he carries on with his dream of the "Sky-Republic" and with the rebellion to its tragic end just because, as an outlawed slave, he has no alternative. He is painfully aware of History and of the fact that "a time would come when historians told of this revolt, and figure the Thracian as a wild barbarian, sure of himself if dim of a plan" (1990: 151-2). He tries to give the revolt a plan, to write another history, and fails. However, even if he had succeeded, the negative traits of his personality (his barrenness, his hatred...) suggest that things would have been much the same, only with some new men as masters and the old masters as slaves.

The previous discussion of the leading ideas in Mitchell's novels provides a sufficient background for the analysis of his most complex work, *A Scots Quair*. Besides revealing in full the Scottish identity and concerns of the writer, the trilogy introduces three new narrative elements: (a) a collective narrative voice; (b) an articulate heroine; (c) a cyclic form.

a) The heavily omniscient narrator of a novel like *Thirteenth Disciple* which expressed the author's opinions too narrowly is now replaced by a stereoscopic outlook on events, which are narrated in free indirect style. There is a collective voice that represents the dominant ideology in each of the three novels of the trilogy, from the Aberdeenshire Scots dialect of the first one to a more anglicized and urban idiom in the third, while the main characters have an individualized voice.¹¹

b) The one constant voice is that of the only character appearing in the three novels, Chris Guthrie. However, she is no cliché character like Domina in *Thirteenth Disciple* and most of Mitchell's other feminine creations. Mitchell's adoption of his pseudonym Lewis Grassic Gibbon from his own mother's maiden name, Lilias Grassic Gibbon, was an apt choice for creating a character like Chris: it has been argued that Gibbon displays "features and

devices that are absolutely commonplace" "in poetry and prose by women, and certainly in explicitly feminist work",¹² and also that "the whole Gibbon personality is intensely feminine".¹³ Thus enabled to observe a markedly male-made history, Chris is articulate both in her voice and personality, and we see her evolving with the historical experience she has mainly through the men in her life: her father, her two husbands, and her son.

c) The form of the trilogy itself reflects the combination of permanence and change embodied in the heroine. It combines the linear development of History with a cyclic evolution imitating Nature. Each novel has a quaternary structure that brings its progression full circle: thus *Sunset Song*, taking its progression from the agrarian ritual, begins with a prelude called "The Unfurrowed Field", and then goes through "Ploughing", "Drilling", "Seedtime" and "Harvest", to end back at "The Unfurrowed Field", which is, again, the title of its epilogue; *Cloud Howe*, in turn, adopts the progression of clouds from lowest to highest density and probability of rainfall (Cirrus-Cumulus-Stratus-Nimbus), and *Grey Granite* represents the progressive solidification of granitic rock (Epidote-Sphene-Apatite-Zircon).

While admitting that too much attention to the allegorical aspects of *A Scots Quair* may be to the detriment of interesting human and social aspects of the work,¹⁴ we must acknowledge that the *Quair* is as firmly inlaid with symbolism as a modernist poem could be, and that its symbols are hardly more independent from its meaning than they would be in such a poem. Furthermore, they are central to an understanding of the author's view of history. The titles of the three novels represent, not only their respective subjects, but also the main recurrent motifs throughout the trilogy, and the progression of elements in Gibbon's materialist approach. *Sunset Song* is a lament for the end of the traditional spirit of the Scottish peasantry, which is seen as expressed by their folk-songs, and as dying at World War I; here we glimpse, especially through Chris's brief rural idyll with her husband Ewan Tavendale, "the splendour of life like a song, like the wind" (Gibbon 1946: 300). From the pure air of wind and song we move into something increasingly more solid in *Cloud Howe*, as the vapour of clouds gradually turns into the water of rain, and the socialist ideals fail, as it were, falling like rain at the 1926 General Strike, on which Chris's second husband, the Reverend Robert Colquohoun, spends the hope that kept him alive. Finally, in *Gray Granite* there is the progressive hardening of Chris's son (named Ewan after his father) as he is suffering the effects of the early 1930s world crisis, until his conversion to Communism. This process of transformation of

wind into rock points forcefully to an ultimate significance in the fact that, at the end of it all, Chris says that her son seems to be pushing a great rock up a hill, and then retires to rest, perhaps to die, on another rock.

A few other significant threads of Gibbon's historical fabric must be unravelled before reaching its ultimate Sisyphean stance. Rocks of many kinds are ever present in the trilogy. They are part of the buildings and ruins often described in its pages. Ancient Standing Stones on a hill dominate the farm of Blawerie in the village of Kinraddie, to which Chris's family had to move from a better farm in Cairndhu because her father, John Guthrie, a stern Scotch Presbyterian proud of his peasant stock, had quarrelled with his former landlord. Guthrie dislikes the Stones, "coarse, foul things, the folk that raised them were burning in hell" (Gibbon 1946: 43), but for Chris they are the place "where ever she could come and stand back a little from the clamour of the days" (1946: 89). As the remnants of the first civilization and its bloody religious rites, the old stone circle provides a trans-historical perspective on current events. The ruins of Dunnottar Castle, which Chris visits on her first date with Ewan, are likewise a reminder of the torture and execution of the old Covenanters, who throughout the *Quair* stand for truly revolutionary Scots that, in 1685, gave their lives in a war for their national ideas and their peasant class disguised beneath religious motivations.¹⁵

Religion was of paramount importance in Scottish history, and so it is in the *Quair*. While denouncing the superstitious and oppressive side of all religions, Gibbon acknowledges the powerful political legacy of "the God of old Scotland fighting on the side of the people since the days of John Knox" (Gibbon 1946: 82). It is both the grandeur and the misery of John Guthrie: it makes him meddle in his son's life until he feels compelled to migrate; harass and abuse his wife sexually until she kills herself to avoid the pain of a twin childbirth, and even attempt to rape his own daughter. Chris feels relieved and free when her father dies, but it is from him mainly that she inherits her peasant spirit, just as she receives her intimacy with Nature from her unfortunate mother. Later she suffers a comparable kind of degrading lust from her husband Ewan, after he has been morally corrupted by his training as a soldier (1946: 170). When Ewan and other peasants are beguiled by jingoism into fighting and dying at World War I, their tragedy is given its full significance through a sermon pronounced by the new Reverend Colquohoun before the Standing Stones. In his incoming sermon he had quoted the words the ancient Caledonian chieftain Calgacus against Rome's imperial policy, to denounce the British government's war policy: "They have made a desert and

they call it peace" (1946: 189). Now he uncovers an inscription to commemorate the death of the socialist peasant Chae Strachan which, placed upon one of the great stones, recalls the one commemorating the Covenanters at Dunnottar Castle. The bagpipe tune "The Flowers of the Forest", originally the lament for the death of the Scots at the battle of Flodden against England in 1513, closes the final ceremony. Through these among other details Gibbon shapes a pattern in which history, taking different forms but always leading to a sacrifice of the folk for an oppressive civilization, repeats itself destructively as if moved by "the grinding mills of God."¹⁶

The struggle goes on in *Cloud Howe*, a novel which dramatizes a chapter of Scottish history that T.C. Smout suitably calls "The Rise and Fall of Socialist Idealism" (Smout 1986: 255-75), just the kind of idealism that clouds symbolize in Gibbon's work. Chris, whose peasant husband died at the Great War, is now married to the Reverend Robert Colquohoun. Robert is the son of an old idealist reverend who had preached about the Golden Age of prehistory and its possible return (1946: 52), but who had been displaced by the drunken demagogue Reverend Gibbon, a supporter of official propaganda who presented the Kaiser as the Antichrist and the Great War as a godly crusade (1946: 149). Thus the arrival of Robert to the kirk after Gibbon's death had brought some hope for humane religion at the end of *Sunset Song*. Robert is one of those Kirk ministers that the author described as "champions against lairds and factors and such-like fauna" in his essay "Religion" (Gibbon and MacDiarmid 1934: 321). His true god being Humanity, he is only an actual believer in God in his moments of weakness. Through his struggle for social reform we are presented with the mostly grotesque tableau of the people from the small industrial town of Segget, which has replaced the rural setting with feudal traits of the previous novel. It is a class-ridden society where the main opposed groups are the weavers, a traditional working class with bourgeois aspirations, and the spinners, imported workers with radical tendencies.

There is an episode in *Cloud Howe* that comprises much of the symbolism pervading the trilogy. On a Sabbath morning MacDougall the postmaster, a man with a zest for blood and patriotic songs, is conducting his choir of the Salvation Army when they meet a very different choral group on the square of Segget: that of the revolutionary spinners singing their red songs. Songs were the true expression of an enriching natural tradition in *Sunset Song*, but in the present novel they have become a crude expression of ideology; thus the evangelical hymns of the Salvation Army and the red ones

of the spinners are the two extremes between which Colquohoun wavers. Furthermore the episode interlaces the image of songs with that of the rock: the workers's leader Jock Cronin urges his choir to shout down MacDougall's, and defies him to move a mountain with his faith, as the Gospels say they could do; infuriated at such humiliations, MacDougall makes his men sing the biblical hymn "Rock of the Ages" at the top of their voices, but it is Jock Cronin's final derisive cry that lingers about the novel: "Where is the rock of your faith?" (1946: 234). It is no coincidence that in the next episode Chris discovers in her son Ewan something "hard and shining and unbreaking as rock, something like a sliver of granite within him" (1946: 235). Hence these episodes project great expectations on the character of a boy who is brought up amidst these limits, the son of true Scottish peasants, and the stepson of a socialist minister of the Kirk.

From his pulpit and in his labour as minister Colquohoun promotes his "League of the willing folk of Segget" (1946: 230), its name perhaps a parody of William Morris's Socialist League, which was one of the bases of the British Labour Party. In one of his most inspired sermons he compares his people with Samson and the landlord family of Mowat with the Philistines, but nobody seems impressed (1946: 214-5), and, as it turns out, it is Colquohoun who, blinded by his faith in Socialism and the human race, presently appears to be an absurd Samson bringing down the whole Philistine temple of Segget on himself to no avail.

In the sermon that closes *Cloud Howe*, preached when he is sick to death in body and mind at people's cruelty and lack of solidarity, at the severe decline of people's interest in religion, and at the failure of Labour politics in the hands of Ramsay MacDonald,¹⁷ Colquohoun renounces his utopian socialism and calls for "a stark, sure creed that will cut like a knife, a surgeon's knife through the doubt and disease -men with unclouded eyes may yet find it . . ." (1946: 350).¹⁸ That he is somewhat ideologically maimed and barren like Kleon in *Spartacus* is suggested by his gradual detachment from Chris, who "counted for little with Robert, compared with his cloudy hopings and God" (1946: 312). He is ultimately to blame for the abortion that Chris suffers while he is wasting his last energies in the agitation of the General Strike. The lung disease he had from the Great War only healed in proportion to his socialist hopes, and it finally kills him. His agonized sermon with its implicit appeal to healing violence is at odds with the one he had preached to launch his campaign on Segget, when he still hoped that good will could put an end to the violence and hatred of History, inspired by the blade of a

Bronze Age spear that little Ewan had brought from one of his lonely wanderings on the hills (1946: 240).

Grey Granite narrates the psychic process through which Ewan would come to the "stark creed" that his stepfather had finally preached. The novel, set near the previous two in a fictional city called Duncairn, analyses what George Steiner called "that explicit myth of the human condition and the goals of history which we call Marxism."¹⁹ Grassic Gibbon alters actual historical chronology in order to bring dramatic scenes from the mythic "Red Clyside" of 1919, when Glasgow "had come within an ace of revolution" (Smout 1986: 259), to the 1930s crisis. Ewan moves into Duncairn with Chris, who is now running a guest house, and he finds a job at the steel factory of Gowans and Gloag's, whose initials are probably meant to coincide with "Grey Granite", in turn recalling a feature of Duncarain's architecture (many of its buildings are made of this material, like those in Aberdeen), as well as the hero's inner quality.

During his childhood in the previous novel Ewan is presented through the eyes of his mother, for instance when he uses a Scots word when his English fails him, and she proudly muses: "he'd do strange things yet in the world, Ewan, who hadn't a God and hadn't a faith and took not a thing on earth for granted . . . he was one of the few who might save the times, watching the Ice and winter come . . . , unfrightened, with quiet, cold eyes" (1946: 339). He appears isolated and safe from the surrounding world by his liking for books about prehistory, his collection of flints, and his contemptuous indifference for culture and politics. Thus the author makes him his characteristic type of noble savage in modern life, much like the hero of *Thirteenth Disciple* and "nine-tenths of the intelligent men and women in the after-War years" (Mitchell 1931: 244). However, the young man's transformation is presented more logically in *Grey Granite*. Belief in the Golden Age, which had been filtering unobtrusively into the trilogy from the preaching of Robert Colquhoun's father, is made to converge quietly with Ewan's precocious attraction to the song "Red Flag" (1946: 270), the bitter experience of his family, the Scottish spirit of the old Covenanters (1946: 464), and the legend of the revolutionary John MacLean²⁰ to make up the Communist hero of the novel.

The story of Ewan, however, is not "overtly propagandist writing" as Johnson claimed,²¹ because it entails a tragic flaw. At first he refuses to have anything to do with the socialist ideas of his girlfriend Ellen Johns, even though she insists that, according to his angry feelings towards history as

symbolized in the stones of an old Pict fort, he must be a Socialist (1946: 386-7). However, Chris soon begins to doubt the grey granite core of her son, who, she had thought, "would never be touched by any wing of the fancies of men" (1946: 399). He does not want to see himself as part of his workmates' History (1946: 404-5), until the day he visits the local Museum only to find that there was a head of Caesar but none of Spartacus, and that all the "the poor folk since history began, bedevilled and murdered, trodden underfoot, . . . hungered, unfed, with their darkened brains, their silly revenges, their infantile hopes . . ." are missing from the pictures (1946: 406-7). And then "you gave a queer sob that startled yourself. Something was happening to you: God —what?" (1946: 406). Thus the novel presents Ewan's conversion to what Ma Cleghorn, a wise character in her simplicity, calls "this daft Red religion" (1946: 417). From then on he attends Marxist quasi-religious ceremonies and takes a leading part in labour strife, renouncing his own being to become what he calls "History" (1946: 473).

Chris is the only one who shows a clear consciousness of herself and the world, especially in those moments in which she is able to detach herself from history and observe it more cold-heartedly: in her lonely walks in solitary places and when she looks at herself in the mirror. In one of these episodes, as she realises that Ewan is slipping away from her, she expresses her only real belief: "nothing in the world she'd ever believed in but change, unceasing and unstaying as time" (1946: 429). In contrast Ewan has given himself over to the belief in a myth that gives history the shape and goal that it does not really have. Thus Ewan takes the tragic road to self-immolation to God under a new mask, the road that Chris's father and her two husbands had taken before. The results of this are reflected in his changed attitude towards his girlfriend, which, like the reactions of the other three men towards Chris in their moment of decline, bespeaks sexual degradation: Ewan rejects Ellen together with her Labour Party politics calling her "a filthy name, consideringly, the name a keelie [a rough male city-dweller] gives to a leering whore" (1946: 490), even though before his conversion he had despised that same callousness of keelies towards girls (1946: 389). As Deirdre Burton points out, "it is that recourse to the irrelevant insults of sexuality that finally marks Ewan out as the person of limited vision . . . — both personal and political".²² In his pose we may feel the symbolical barrenness of Kleon again, in spite of Ewan's efforts to identify himself with Spartacus or with Christ, because in order to become History and aspiring to a mystic communion with the suffering and down-trodden, he renounces

freedom, compassion and love. What Chris thought of her father's death, "only God had beaten him in the end" (1946: 95), may now apply to her son, the last victim of History in *A Scots Quair*.

Ewan's often quoted words as he makes his farewell to his mother on joining the Hunger March to London sum up an essential subject of the trilogy, and bring the narration to a necessary close:²³ "There will always be you and I, I think, Mother. It's the old fight that maybe will never have a finish, whatever the names we give to it —the fight in the end between FREEDOM and GOD" (495) (capitals as in the original). Since to some extent Chris stands for the land of the Scots,²⁴ by leaving her Ewan is forsaking his Scottish self, and with it his individuality and freedom.²⁵ In still another sense their parting also suggests the "schism in the soul" that Arnold J. Toynbee found in disintegrating civilizations.²⁶ Ewan, whose great human mistake is paradoxically to dehumanize himself, might have been like the Nietzschean *Übermensch* after the death of God, had he turned his eyes towards Mother Earth (Chris's *Geist*).²⁷ Instead, he turns away from Scotland and yields to a new God, the Marxist myth. Karl Marx himself had betrayed his own materialism by mystifying history; for example, in *The German Ideology* Marx wrote that "the truly historical appears to be separated from ordinary life, something extra-superterrestrial" (ed. Tucker 1978: 165). When Spartacus says that "There's a God in men. But an Unknown God" (Mitchell 1990: 195), it seems a warning against giving too definite a shape to history, as, for example, when the Nazi ideology turned Nietzschean philosophy into *Realpolitik*.

The words of Chris that prompt Ewan's "Freedom and God" speech and serve as epigraph to the present article, epitomize Mitchell's view of history just as meaningfully. Communism, then, turns out to be the rock of Ewan's faith, not unlike his grandfather's Presbyterianism or his stepfather's Utopian Socialism. All Chris can see in it is something like the stone of Sisyphus. Thus the predicament of Mitchell's heroes parallels that of the Greek hero. In Robert Graves's words: "As soon as he has almost reached the summit, [Sisyphus] is forced back by the weight of the shameless stone, which bounces to the very bottom once more; where he wearily retrieves it and must begin all over again, though sweat bathes his limbs, and a cloud of dust rises above his head."²⁸ Chris is wiser, but wearier of life. All she can do is return to her native Cairndhu and rest on a *natural* stone, accepting "that Change who ruled the earth and the sky and the waters underneath the earth, . . . Change whose right hand was Death and whose left hand Life, might be

stayed by none of the dreams of men . . . , gods or devils or wild crying to the sky" (496). This last warning against dreamy idealizations of history was especially significant at the time *A Scots Quair* was written, when political bigotry disguised as idealism threatened Europe, and would soon lead into a new World War.

Time was up against both Grassic Gibbon and his heroine. In *Grey Granite* Chris abandons a projected marriage with her old friend Ake Ogilvie because she already feels too old and attached to her past for a third marriage (1946: 468-9). Interestingly, Ake Ogilvie is a Liberal. Hence this character, a remarkable insight on the part of the author, invites the reader to wonder how the *Quair* would have continued with him as the hero. Yet Mitchell belonged to a generation who had experienced what appeared to be the ultimate failure of Liberalism,²⁹ and he died far too soon to witness to the success of the Labour Party in Britain after World War II, the fall of European Communist systems, and the "End of History" with the recent rise of Neoliberalism.³⁰

Mitchell sympathized with none of the major British political parties because he saw them as too complacent about cruelty and social injustice, and he distrusted the Fascist elements he saw in the nationalist parties of Scotland.³¹ His sympathies were decidedly leftist: for him as for Chris, life is the left hand of Change; rather than with any party, they lay with a peculiarly Scottish nonconformity embodied in the Communist Ewan, the tragic hero with the serious flaw of becoming an unfeeling bigot. Worse still, Ewan allows himself to be enslaved by a God and so lose his humanity. This distinguishes him from Camus's godless Sisyphus. Nevertheless, he is to be admired for his courage and strength, for his anger at the injustice of human history, and for being a living force of Change. It is the strength of living characters that makes Grassic Gibbon's work a great cultural study of his time and country.³² In the end Chris knows better, but Ewan is happier in his own way, for, as Camus (1942: 168) says at the close of *Sisyphe*: "La lutte elle-même vers les sommets suffit à remplir un cœur d'homme. Il faut imaginer Sisyphus heureux."³³ a

NOTES

1. See Craig 1974 and Johnson 1976.

2. See Carter 1978.

3. See Young (1973) and next note. Douglas Gifford has qualified Young's argument properly: "This isn't to say that Young is wrong in arguing that Diffusionism permeates all [Mitchell's] work —it does— but where it is most successful, as in *Sunset Song* or *Spartacus*, it is a theory transmuted into a sub-stratum of haunting poetic idea, never, as in these propaganda-novels, clots of argument and lecture, or clumsy and improbable symbolic action" (Gifford 1983: 49).

4. The diffusionist theory of history assumed that the discovery of agriculture in Ancient Egypt, and the subsequent "diffusion" of the civilized life that rose from it, put an end to the primitive life of nomad hunters, a free life that was supposed to have ignored social inequity, depravity, and war. It was postulated by G. Elliott Smith, who, besides writing several books on the subject, edited the series "The Beginning of Things", which included H. J. Massingham's *The Golden Age: The Story of Human Nature* (1927), possibly the most popular book on the subject. The influence of Diffusionism is behind all Mitchell's novels, as a utopian counterpoint to their historical subjects, and the expression of the author's ironic resentment against modern life.

5. Mitchell's main intellectual contribution to the Scottish Literary Renaissance is in *Scottish Scene* (Gibbon and MacDiarmid 1934), a book of essays and short literary pieces he produced jointly with the leader of the movement, the nationalist poet Christopher Murray Grieve ("Hugh MacDiarmid"). The "romantic novels of claymores and stag-hunting" are mainly Walter Scott's romances and novels, which the modern Scottish writers regarded as a distorting view of their modern nation, while the "bonnie brier bush" is a reference to Reverend Ian Maclaren's *Beside the Bonnie Brier Bush* (1894), a famous example of the sentimental novel of the "Kailyard", against which Mitchell's generation reacted most strongly. *A Scots Quair* includes two similar allusions to the "brier bush" (Gibbon 1946: 31, 73).

6. For example, the need for a saving belief in the confounded modern world is in all his novels from his first, *Stained Radiance* (1930); visions of the Golden Age and escapes to it appear in his science-fiction works *Three Go Back* (1932) and *Gay Hunter* (1934); the search for the initial moment in which Western Civilization went wrong is in *The Lost Trumpet* (1932); the sense of adventure in his non-fiction *Hanno: or the Future of Exploration* (1928) and *Niger: the Life of Mungo Park* (1934) (the only one among these works that he published as Lewis Grassic Gibbon), and his own interest in the Maya in *The Conquest of the Maya* (1934).

7. The poem has been edited by Malcolm (1984: 187-8).

8. Spartacus and Kleon thus stand for the contraposition between the realist and idealist interpretations of myth, a distinction which can be seen to have originated with Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) and which C. Nash finds relevant to Mitchell's literary context: "Man must,

Vico says, 'descend' into the 'vast imagination' of his own beginnings, and myth is a principal medium for the expression of the primeval and universal in human experience, and thereby for the direction of human consciousness. Myth is a story, not a statement. It seems false only when we try to extend it as an idea into other realms. Myth and idea are two distinct attitudes of human consciousness towards truth. Mythology is the seed-bed of the idea —but as the idea emerges, myth disintegrates." (Nash 1980: 166). Kleon tries to turn the idealist myth of Spartacus into an idea, or realist myth, by putting it to direct political purposes.

9. Campbell 1988: 234.

10. William K. Malcolm actually relates the contrast between Kleon and Spartacus to that between the impulse of Absurd and of Wrath in Camus's philosophy (1984: 126). In my opinion Wrath is also a feature of Kleon, while Spartacus's deeply symbolic entity suggests an ideal rather than a character with his own impulses.

11. There are two notable Spanish studies of the relationship of language, culture and politics in Lewis Grassic Gibbon's work, by Fernando García García and Ramón López Ortega.

12. Burton 1984: 38.

13. Wagner 1955: 41.

14. Isobel Murray and Bob Tait put it very explicitly: "We would like to see much less attention paid to Diffusionism and, much more importantly, to the 'symbolic' or 'allegorical' meaning of the *Quair*. For convenience, we can point to the two appendices to J T Low's edition of *Sunset Song* (Longman, 1971, pp 293-6), where these ideas are summarised" (Murray and Tait 1984: 11). Their reference to the appendices of Low's edition is useful as far as Diffusionism is concerned, and their own study of the *Quair* is a positive contribution to the study of the "non-symbolic", human side of Gibbon's work, particularly with regard to its heroine.

15. Mitchell's treatment of the Covenanters as the Scottish archetype of modern revolutionaries coincides with current Marxist interpretations of seventeenth-century British history. Thus Christopher Hill deals in a similar way with the proletarian mass that filled the Puritan party in the English Revolution. See Kaye (1984). The fact that the Covenanters were fighting for their Scottish religion gives them an added nationalist dimension.

16. In *Sunset Song* Tony the Daftie is endowed with a role not unlike that of Tom the Fool in Shakespeare's *King Lear*: his apparent madness shows greater common sense than the tragic heroes of the novel. Thus when Chae is on leave just before joining the Great War, which he wrongly believes to be a fight for Socialism,

... Tony looked up and aside, *Ah, Chae, so the mills of God still grind?*

And Chae went on, and he thought of that, a real daft-like speak he thought it at first, but further up the brae . . . , he scratched his head, was the thing so daft? He stopped and looked back, and there, far below, was the Tony childe, standing, glued to the ground. And Chae shivered in a way, and went on. (Gibbon 1946: 156)

The scene suggests the English proverb "God's mill grinds slow but sure", which the author seems to use ironically to suggest the destructiveness of History, and the no less ironical fact that, of all men in Kinraddie, it is the "daftie" that keeps his feet planted firmly on the ground during the War.

17. James Ramsay MacDonald (1866-1937) represented much of what the British left associated with the failure of Labour politics and their estrangement from the working-class values, particularly in Scotland, his native country. He had been the great hope of the socialist movement when he became the first Labour Prime Minister in January 1924, though the Conservative Party headed by Stanley Baldwin regained office less than a year later. His 1929 ministry was scarcely more successful in coping with the growing economic crisis and political discontent. His definite affronts were a cut in unemployment benefit and his formation of the National Government in coalition with Baldwin and a Conservative majority in 1931. *A Scots Quair* contains many direct references to his career, and his "treason" against socialist ideals is most dramatically satirized through the fictional Jock Cronin, who moved into London to become a professional Labour politician while his elderly father starved at home. Mitchell's essay "Representative Scots (I). The Wrecker Ramsay MacDonald" strikes a catastrophic note similar to that of the trilogy: "The Labour Movement may win again to shadowy triumphs, but the spirit, the faith and hope have gone from it... New armies are rising, brutal and quick, determined, desperate, mutually destructive, communist and fascist. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has completed to perfection the task set him by the play of historic movements and blind economic forces" (Gibbon and Mitchell 1934: 107-8). Like many of his angry young contemporaries, Mitchell did not understand the National Government as a political measure to help prevent that same catastrophe.

18. The simile of the surgeon's knife is also used in *Thirteenth Disciple* (Mitchell 1931: 84), and it is commonplace in the 1930s leftist literature: see Cunningham 1988: 93-7.

19. George Steiner, "Epilogue" from *The Death of Tragedy* (1961) (in Steiner 1984: 164).

20. John MacLean (1899-1923) was the legendary hero and martyr of the Red Clydeside, during which workers and trade-unionists took the Town Hall of Glasgow, established a Soviet, and attempted a Communist Revolution. See Raszkowski (1979: 9-12). The most decisive incident leading to Ewan's conversion to Communism in *Grey Granite*, a violent confrontation between mounted policemen and demonstrators against the Meant Test, is based on the so-called "battle of George Square", in which the Red Clydesiders also wielded bottles against the police. The scene in which the Communist Ewan, explicitly compared to an *Ecce Homo* after being beaten up by the police, scarcely able to stand on his feet, yet obstinately heading a demonstration (Gibbon 1946: 457), clearly recalls the historical figure of MacLean, who died young after repeated imprisonment. The figure of Jim Trease in the novel, the Trade Union leader who becomes Ewan's Communist mentor, might suggest William Gallacher, the true political brain behind the Red Clydeside, who in 1935 would be elected to Parliament for the Communist Party. Hugh MacDiarmid, who met Maclean personally and became one of his myth-makers, praised James Leslie Mitchell as "a Scottish Communist-Nationalist à la John MacLean" (MacDiarmid 1946: 121-30, 41).

21. Johnson, op. cit., p. 51.

22. Burton, op. cit., p. 45.

23. Two very interesting studies may be consulted with regard to the dissociation of the two main characters at the end of *A Scots Quair*: Wilson (1980) and Norquay (1984).

24. See Campbell 1974.

25. See Fromm 1984. First published in 1942, Fromm's analysis of the psychological mechanisms that led many Europeans of Mitchell's time away from freedom, undermining their own individuality, might provide another way of accounting for what happens to Ewan.

26. See Toynbee 1987: 429-532. First published in 1946, *A Study of History* is also close to the historical feelings of Mitchell's period. I think it would not be too far-fetched to compare Chris and Ewan's final reactions to those of archaism and futurism, respectively, which are violent escapes from reality. Chris archaism is unusual in that she accepts the fact of change, but typical enough in her wish to regress to what she regards as the natural state of Man in the Golden Age.

27. Nietzsche's Zarathustra advises men to be truthful to the Earth above all things, and never to believe those who speak of ultra-terrestrial hopes: "Ich beschwöre euch, meine Brüder, bleibt der Erde treu und glaubt denen nicht, welche euch von überirdischen Hoffnungen reden!" (Nietzsche 1985: 6). Mitchell echoed the famous Nietzschean dictum "Gott starb" in one of his few poems: ". . . the World is better / Since God has died . . ." (ed. Malcolm 1984: 190-1). Even more remarkable is the similarity between *Sunset Song* and the German novel *Jorn Uhrl* (1905) by Gustav Frenssen: see Young, op.cit., pp. 146 ff. Mitchell did not acknowledge a particular interest in German culture, but his representation of the Scottish peasantry often coincides with it.

28. Graves 1960: 1.218.

29. See the popular contemporary book by George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England* (London, 1935; rpt. Paladin-Grafton Books, 1988).

30. See Fukuyama (1994), and Valdés Miyares (1991). In this study I have analysed the Civil War as a turning point in the view of history, particularly for those British writers who had held a Marxist view of history during the earlier 1930s, whose disillusionment with it anticipated that of many other Europeans in the following decades.

31. Mitchell's view of Scottish Nationalism is expounded in his essay "Glasgow" (Grassic Gibbon and MacDiarmid 1934: 136-7) and in a letter of 1934 to the Neil M. Gunn (Malcolm 1984: 7). In *A Scots Quair* (1946: 408) Chris puts it more plainly: "Nationalism was just another plan of the Tories to do down the common folk."

32. I am referring purposefully to Raymond Williams's positive appraisal of *A Scots Quair* (1973: 268-70). Raymond Williams is one of the founders of the modern British school of Cultural Studies, and Grassic Gibbon's approach to historical change converges remarkably with one of its main focuses as defined by Fred Inglis: "Ideology-critique still constitutes one of

the main sources of energy for Cultural Studies." He then points out something that would help explain Mitchell's attitude to ideology, especially Communism: "the truth first discovered by Hegel that ideas about the world live always in conflict with one another and that, as Isaiah Berlin puts it, the very history of thought and culture is 'a changing pattern of great liberating ideas which inevitably turn into suffocating straightjackets, and so stimulate their own destruction by new, emancipating, and at the same time, enslaving conceptions'" (Inglis 1993: 21). For a further confirmation of Mitchell's coincidence with the mainstream of Cultural Studies, one may turn to Richard Hoggart (1957) and his approach to traditional working-class culture, particularly the role of popular songs in it.

33. "The very effort to reach the summit is enough to fill a man's heart. We should imagine Sisyphus happy."

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**"STANDARD ENGLISH"
AS A METAPHOR OF LANGUAGE IN THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDUCATION DEBATE**

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim of this paper

The ways in which language is used reflexively¹ to discuss and analyse the medium of language itself have a profound effect on our perceptions of its nature. Graddol et al. (1987: 3) observe that articulate and useful explanation of the nature of language requires "a special *metalinguistic* skill brought about by an extensive consideration of language as an object of knowledge."

People have various reasons to discuss language "as an object of knowledge" in the course of their daily lives and occupations. Obvious examples are language professionals (linguists, educationalists, teachers, translators), lawyers, broadcasters, writers, politicians, etc. But virtually no one can escape from the universal necessity to engage in discourse about the very language one uses. Indeed, in everyday speech and writing we come across much metalinguistic analysis of common language events, in expressions such as:

She took the words out of my mouth
Reading between the lines, the real message became clear
I've already put my thoughts in writing, read them.

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Many users of those expressions would recognise in them a degree of metaphoricity. However, those expressions contribute to our image or perception of what communication involves.

What makes this of interest to linguists is that, despite appearances, much of this common "language about language" can be seriously misleading. According to Reddy (1979), about 70 per cent of the expressions people use to talk in English about English communicate a biased view of communication. Reddy attributes this to the prevalence of what he terms the *conduit metaphor*. This is a metaphorical conception of language that Reddy has identified as widespread across registers and styles of English. It is evident in both written and spoken language: in routine expressions, in concepts underlying discourse, even in the semantic structure of the language.

Reddy also highlights a number of alternative metaphorical metalinguistic expressions. To these, however, he attributes no particular coherent metaphorical orientation. In the English language education debate there is some evidence that, in addition to the pervasive effects of the *conduit metaphor*, there is another metaphorical metalinguistic tendency: this we will refer to as the *negotiative metaphor*.

In this article we will be examining metaphors of language employed in the area of the recent and continuing educational debate on the teaching of English in the United kingdom. This field is chosen as the site for analysis, because, in spite of the apparent impression that the language of the debate is clear, rational, objective and non-metaphorical, we found that many of the key terms in the debate are themselves metaphorical labels. As a consequence, interpretation and use of these labels is not as straightforward as is often thought.

1.2. Procedure

Section 2 begins with a statement of the position that metaphor is an essential and fundamental element in normal language meaning and use. Then metaphor is analysed as a semantic and pragmatic phenomenon. Finally, the relationship between the concept of generative metaphor and schema theory is considered.²

Section 3 explains the methodology and then applies the view of metalinguistic metaphor to an analysis of the use of the labels "standard" and

"English" in the English language education debate. Metaphors of language are explored with particular reference to the "generative" opposition of *conduit* and *negotiative* metaphors that forms the background of this study.

In Section 4 the major conclusions and prospects are summed up.

2. METAPHOR

2.1. Metaphor is fundamental to language

Metaphor is a normal feature of language, not simply an embellishing literary figure. It is difficult to isolate for study, however, partly because it operates at many different linguistic "levels" (itself a metaphor): at the grammatical level, at word level, at sentence/utterance/text levels, and at the level of the context and underlying concept of a discourse. "Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3).

The English word *metaphor* is derived from the Greek *meta pherein* (=carry across), indicating the importation of understanding or insight from one sphere of experience to another. If metaphor is then broadly, but usefully, described as "experiencing or understanding something in terms of something else" or "seeing as" (Schön 1979), it can be observed that this principle informs a great many aspects of linguistic activity,³ and cognitive activity in general. Metaphors, especially conventionalized metaphors, are a mode of dealing with experience that pervades our cognition; and they are so pervasive that we tend to overlook them and accept the views they present as "literal," natural and non-negotiable.

2.2. Metaphor: semantic aspects

Certain theorists (Cohen 1979) have described metaphor as a phenomenon interpretable only within the semantic system of language. Lee (1992) has pointed to grammatical categorization as a semantic classificatory instrument determining a language's metaphorical perspective on objects and actions. Others (Sadock 1979) have argued that metaphor is not properly within the

sphere of linguistics, narrowly conceived, at all: they have aimed to provide an account of its operation purely within a theory of pragmatics. This study proceeds on the basis that metaphor can be reasonably understood to operate in both semantics *and* pragmatics.

A frequent view of metaphor regards it as arising from semantic anomaly in language. An example would be the utterance *John's a teapot*, in which the speaker's intention would more likely be to highlight John's predilection for tea than to suggest he had a handle and spout and was made of china, etc.

Aitchison analyses this type of metaphor as "the use of a word with one or more of the "typicality conditions" attached to it broken" (1987: 144). This view is related to componential analysis, but is rather less restrictive in that it does not attempt to pin down word-meaning to a definable set of features. In the example above, the typicality conditions attached to *teapot* are mostly inapplicable to John, so most of them are broken leaving only "tea capacity" as a possibly appropriate condition. Aitchison (1987) cites Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Sperber and Wilson (1986) in juxtaposition to demonstrate that, viewed from different perspectives, language can either be seen as fundamentally metaphorical, or metaphor can be seen as linguistically normal:

Our ordinary conceptual system . . . is fundamentally metaphorical in nature (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

Metaphors . . . are in no sense departures from a norm. (Sperber and Wilson 1986).

This is an important point for this study, because it may be objected that much of what we are dealing with on the word or sentence level is not metaphor at all, but rather questions of fuzzy semantics. Aitchison's point suggests that the distinction is at least partially an artificial construction of the linguist. Metaphor, as writers such as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have pointed out, has been sidelined and marginalized by much of modern linguistics. It has been seen as inessential to a study of language meanings. This is the result of the pervasive influence of the generative-transformational grammar paradigm that stresses rule-governed creativity as basic to language as opposed to rule-changing creativity which is applied to the norm-challenging activity of, say, artists and scientists. Such rule-governed creativity is obviously important, but Lee suggests the paradox that norm-challenging creativity in meaning extension is itself a linguistic norm. The

neglect of this fundamental metaphorical process produces a view of language that overlooks significant linguistic encoding of ideology, and this is not a consequence that linguists can afford to accept.

However, a renewed interest in metaphors has recently stressed their importance as instruments of cognition. Metaphors have been assigned a central role in our perceptual and cognitive processes; in fact, "we live by metaphors," as the title of Lakoff and Johnson's influential study on the subject says.

Graddol and Swann (1988) identify "conflicting discourses" in the English language education debate. Those discourses can be illuminated as structured by metaphorical perspectives on language. Further, the individual terms systematically understood in different senses in linguistics and lay discourse can be seen to be powerful local metaphors within overall structuring metaphorical frames. As Lee (1992) demonstrates, a study of metaphorical aspects of texts often allows identification of the unifying ideological tendencies that otherwise may escape attention in the narrow concentration on more traditional paradigms of linguistic analysis. That is the reason why we have chosen this view.

2.3. Metaphor or "slippery semantics"?

Concerning the expression "coming out of a coma" and "to be under age," Aitchison poses and then answers a crucial question:

So are these metaphors? Or ordinary uses with a typicality condition broken? As these examples show, the two are indistinguishable. . . . The necessity of breaking typicality conditions —or in other words, the inevitability of metaphor— is so high in some semantic fields that one cannot communicate without it. (1987: 145)

One such field is the discussion of language. It is not, then, a case of arguing that certain features in the texts (e.g. the variable meanings of words such as *standard*) are accountable for as "metaphor" rather than, for example, as "slippery semantics" or as "weasel words" (Cameron and Bourne 1988: 155). The deeper issue appears to be "Why are particular words prone to the effects of slippery semantics so consistently in particular contexts?" Or put another way, "What motivates or drives the semantics in these cases?" The analysis of such issues in terms of local and generative metaphor goes a long way

towards explicating the root causes of particularly problematic and pragmatic phenomena in ideologically motivated texts.

2.4 Classification and selection

Lee (1992) observes that "classification is fundamental to the encoding of our experiences." He points out that the experience is encoded to make sense of the world somewhat arbitrarily and in culturally-specific ways. The generally accepted set of metaphors, or ways of perceiving, in each speech community is agreed by social convention, not by any inherent correctness or objective accuracy. Lee presents the example of the English noun *dog*, which is used to stand for creatures as diverse as "poodle" and "alsatian," despite the fact that in some respects the latter more closely resembles "wolf" than it does "poodle." The same arbitrariness applies to other word-classes: for example, to different senses of the verb *climb* in the following sentences: "She climbed down the rock face"; "See how the ivy climbs up to that window"; or in the variability of the adjectival force of *strong* in such combinations as: "a strong cup of tea," "a strong possibility."

Lee also demonstrates the way in which grammatical classes themselves are arbitrary categories related to the world-view. For instance, English refers to concepts such as "storm," "wave," "lightning," "wind" by constructing sentences around the noun phrase (e.g. "There's a *storm* in the west"), whereas in other languages (Whorf 1971) these concepts are structured around verbs (e.g. "It is *storming* in the west"). This demonstrates that language inclines its speakers to consider events and objects in certain largely pre-determined ways —for example, a "storm" as some sort of object, when it is arguably more like a collection of events.

"Language . . . is clearly not simply a mirror that reflects reality . . . it is also highly selective" (Lee 1992: 8). The selectivity of language means that there is considerable underspecification in utterances: for hearers to achieve any sort of meaning, they must assume relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986) and their own knowledge base must fill in a great deal of information not encoded in the speakers' utterances. Selection then allows certain features of a situation to be highlighted while others are hidden. This selection is often achieved through the use of metaphorically extended vocabulary in particular metaphorically structured texts and contexts: such contexts select particular meanings from all the potential meanings of a particular word as the preferred meanings. From this it will be seen that there is a complex

interaction in the creation and comprehension of metaphor between the metaphorical potential of the *individual word*, its location in a *text*, and the location of that text in a *context of situation*. These three sites of metaphor will have to be considered in the analysis of the texts.

This will be seen to have relevance in the case of such metaphorical items as *standard English*. It is most usual to consider such items as perfectly straightforward and literal. Perhaps there may be difficulties in reaching agreement concerning specific definition and application, but basically it is usually agreed that in such cases there exists an entity to be defined and subsequently referred to. The epiphenomenalistic view supported by Lee, on the other hand, points to the fact that such labels are metaphorical linguistic constructions rather than uncontroversial entities.

2.5. Pragmatic aspects of metaphor

A recent influential approach broadly defined within a pragmatic perspective is that of Sperber and Wilson (1986). They argue that metaphor and related tropes can be accounted for in terms of relevance theory:

On this approach, metaphor and a variety of related tropes (e.g. hyperbole, metonymy, synecdoche) are simply creative exploitations of a perfectly general dimension of language use. The search for optimal relevance leads the speaker to adopt, on different occasions, a more or less faithful interpretation of her thoughts. The result in some cases is literalness, in others metaphor. Metaphor thus requires no special interpretive abilities or procedures. . . . (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 237)

This account provides an interesting angle from which to view the production and comprehension of metaphor, relating it to general linguistic processes —an approach supported in this study. The significance of this view is that wider contextual aspects of a text or situation will be predicted to have an influence on the interpretation of metaphors: and this is clearly demonstrated in the section of textual evidence. However, Sperber and Wilson do not provide any more than this interesting angle: an insight into how metaphor is related to "literal" language through the common search for "optimal relevance." Their theory does not account for the characteristic difference of metaphor, for example, in its role of "seeing as" (Schön 1979).

In short, they appear to acknowledge the commonly recognized difference between metaphorical and literal language, but do not account for that difference in their description of processes of production and comprehension. Schön's explanation of metaphorical processes as basically redescription through "seeing as" will be taken as the most useful for the purposes of this study.

2.6. Generative metaphor and schema theory

One of Schön's examples is the following: *Metaphor is a linguistic microchip*. It is well known that the silicon microchip of computer technology saves space and time in processing: operations that previously took up space, power and time are now performed instantaneously by a tiny object, freeing the consequently smaller machine for other tasks. In a similar fashion, metaphor can be seen to have a compacting, concentrating function in language and communication, whereby several ideas or feelings are communicated by the use⁴ of a shorter word or phrase. In Schön's graphic terms, the device of metaphor thus provides "great economy and high leverage": equally, we might choose to unpack Schön's image of "lever," and see the use of metaphor as the use of a lever: raising increased meaning with reduced effort!

The above example is consciously explanatory. Not all generative metaphor is so deliberate and overt. In fact, Schön's discussion of generative metaphor, mainly in the context of social policy, begins by observing that such metaphors regularly arise as part of the normal process of problem setting.

Problem settings are mediated . . . by stories people tell about troublesome situations —stories in which they describe what is wrong and what needs fixing. When we examine the problem-setting stories . . . it becomes apparent that the framing of problems often depends upon metaphors underlying the stories which generate problem setting and set the directions of problem solving. One of the most pervasive stories about social services, for example, diagnoses the problem as "fragmentation" and prescribes "coordination" as the remedy. But services seen as fragmented might be seen, alternatively, as autonomous. Fragmented services become problematic when they are seen as the shattering of a prior integration. The services are seen something like a vase that was once whole and now is broken.

Under the spell of metaphor, it appears obvious that fragmentation is bad and coordination good. But this sense of obviousness depends very much on the metaphor remaining tacit.

... We can spell out the metaphor, elaborate the assumptions which flow from it, and examine their appropriateness in the present situation. (Schön 1979: 255).

Identification and analysis of generative metaphor is therefore a useful tool in making unexpressed assumptions explicit, and it underlies the analytical methodology used in this paper.

The following example will lead us into a useful linking of the compacting and framing functions of metaphor with aspects of schema theory.

From nineteenth century German history, Otto von Bismarck, the "Iron Chancellor," stands out as a compelling and powerful figure, his supposed characteristics summarized aptly in the epithet "Iron." In a similar manner, a prominent, recent British politician rejoiced in a similar title for over a decade; equally, this naming was intended to summarise characteristics, and allowing a degree of *seeing as*.

In this case, the effect is perhaps less specific than in the case of the microchip discussed above. In the case of the "Iron lady," a whole range of popular opinion and folkloric historical interpretation, that might otherwise have taken laborious paragraphs to convey, is immediately communicated by the use of a short phrase. In a lengthy explanation of the British Prime Minister's attributes, the immediate force of reference would be reduced. Such language is often described as "evocative": this is the main effect of metaphor: the evocation of schemata, making communication richer, quicker, and inevitably more complex and difficult to analyse.

Certain instances of this sort of use of metaphor lead to disputable and indeterminate effects, however. Unlike the focused "redescription" of the metaphor of microchip, the term "Iron Lady" has evoked different schemata for different people. It is a term alluding either to strength of character (for her supporters), or to lack of sympathy (for her detractors). One term, while obviously meaning a lot, means *different* things to different people.

As will be found in the textual evidence section, many of the metaphorical terms argued over are, in fact, being interpreted by two (or more) groups according to how these terms are framed in opposing powerful generative metaphors. Interpretation seems to involve an interaction of metaphor and schemata in which not only do metaphorical expressions

themselves evoke particular schemata, but prevailing schemata determine the interpretation of certain local metaphors in context.

3. TEXTUAL EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDUCATION DEBATE

3.1. A methodology for analysis

The basic framework of the methodology is the notion of generative metaphor, involving, as we have already stated, a *seeing as* redescription of an event. The particular instances of generative metaphor important to this investigation are the metalinguistic *conduit* and *negotiative* metaphors.

Richards (1936) coined the well-known terms *tenor* and *vehicle* to denote respectively the *subject* and the *metaphorical expression* ascribed to it. Following a more recent usage, this study uses the more accessible *topic* and *vehicle* in the same senses.

While Schön's basic insight provides the framework for the analysis, Stevick's (1989) discussion of "attributive and reminiscent connections" is the starting point for the detailed dissection of the two metaphorical labels in our analysis. Stevick points out that

any metaphor . . . carries its own set of what we may call 'attributive and reminiscent connections', though, of course, the precise contents of this set will vary from person to person and from occasion to occasion. Here we shall refer to these as 'associative features'.

The use in this study of associative features of certain of the metaphors is simply an analytical tool to make certain schematic features more explicit: to slow down the process of interpretation and allow reflection on the range of meanings and associations being evoked. By thus making the features explicit, we can observe their interactions, and see which ones are highlighted and which hidden, as we relate the use of individual metaphors to overall structural metaphorical frames as realized in the textual context. As

Lee (1992) has observed, "meaning is not an inherent property of words, but is strongly influenced by contexts of use."

The sort of metaphors that are socially or politically problematic, and are therefore frequently employed, are those that serve powerful ideologies⁵ and have a wide range of potential associations. As will be seen in the discussion below, a metaphor such as *standard* may be introduced in one part of a text with one set of associations active, in that its co-text determines which schema has been activated. Thus, it may be relatively uncontroversial and gain acceptance. Later, however, the metaphor is reintroduced with a different co-text: the term *standard* remains the same, and it brings with it the activated associations from the previous occurrence. But the co-text has been altered to evoke a different schema: what was previously, for example, a concept of "lowest common denominator" has now been imbued with notions of status, prestige and exclusivity. This has not happened overtly, no explicit propositional sentence has been written to redefine the word *standard*.

In such cases, however, we are not dealing with a clean switch between separate meanings, as Cameron and Bourne (1988) appear to suggest. Lehnert (1979: 80, cited in Cook 1989: 71) points out that ordinary words with more than one meaning (such as *nail* or *seal*) are interpreted through schemata relevant to the particular discourse giving the appropriate meaning in context, "a phenomenon referred to in Artificial Intelligence as 'expectation driven understanding'"(Cook 1989: 71).

3.2. Textual evidence

In this article we will be examining metaphors of language employed in the area of the recent and continuing educational debate on the teaching of English in the United kingdom. Over the last decade or so a debate on language has been going on in Britain. Crowley points out that similar debates on language education have been with us for at least 150 years, and probably a lot longer. He states that "language becomes a crucial focus of tension and debate at critical historical moments, serving as the site upon which political positions are contested" (1989: 258). This field has been chosen as the site for analysis, as it is, by virtue of the metalinguistic subject matter and the political heat generated, potentially a most rewarding area in terms of covert, yet powerful, metalinguistic metaphor.

The capacity of language to talk about itself or "language reflexivity" (Sinclair 1991) is not confined to conscious and carefully considered

deliberate definition (as found, for example, in dictionaries and reference grammars): it is a phenomenon that pervades normal language use in different contexts and in a variety of subtle and often unnoticed ways. Everybody, at certain times, reveals their particular views on the process of communication through language in their everyday metalanguage, without even realizing it. For example, expressions such as "get your thoughts down in writing" seem to imply an understanding of linguistic communication that involves a view of ideas, thoughts, concepts, feelings, etc. as essentially objectifiable and separable from their place of origin —the human mind. This logically implies that such ideas, concepts, etc., can themselves be transferred intact from place to place, and from person to person. The natural conclusion is that the primary means of such transference must be language. Hence we frequently speak of ideas and thoughts as though they were objects to be passed across the linguistic counter in straightforward, transparent, uncomplicated transactions. This is the metaphorical concept of language as *conduit*.

On the other hand, there is another coherent tendency in every day metalanguage, encountered in expressions as: "I read between the lines and then I understood." This view apparently stresses the effort of the hearer/reader in "making sense" from an essentially incomplete message. This view is less pervasive than that previously mentioned, but it is nevertheless important. It is the *negotiative*⁶ view of language.

3.3. Metaphors under discussion

The main metaphorical labels significant in the English language education debate that can be examined against the background of conduit-negotiative generative metaphor are as follows: "standard," "English," "dialect," "linguistic equality," "linguistic diversity," "linguistic uniformity," "grammar," "correctness," "appropriateness," "language," "knowledge about language," "language awareness." It would be desirable to discuss each of these metaphorical labels in relation to the others, but in this article we are going to concentrate on the first two ("standard," "English") in the collocation "standard English."

3.3.1. *Standard*

The label "standard" as applied to language has received countless definitions from commentators anxious to stress one or more of the range of meanings it can evoke. Haugen's (1966) classic treatment aims at separating out functional and formal aspects of the standard language issue, providing the well-known matrix (see figure 1), "within which it should be possible to discuss all the major problems of language and dialect in the life of a nation" (1966: 110):

		<i>Form</i>	<i>Function</i>
<i>Society</i>	Selection	Acceptance	
<i>Language</i>	Codification	Elaboration	

Figure 1

So often, however, popular and politically-motivated discussion of issues encompassed in this matrix fails to distinguish categories of "language," "society," "form" and "function," leading to the arbitrary and linguistically unprincipled judgements towards certain forms of language. This general unclarity can therefore be in the interests of groups aiming to preserve the social *status quo*. Such groups are observed in this article to exploit the metaphorical aspects of words such as "standard" or "English" to evoke emotive schemata.

Lee refers to "standard English" as "an artificial object, constructed by the collaborative efforts of lexicographers, grammarians and educators over the centuries" (1992: 188). Downes (1984) points to the ideological character of standard English as "a complex of belief and behaviour towards language, which evolves historically." These views stress the metaphorical nature of the label "standard English," which stands for and evokes particular values, perceptions, beliefs...—leading to a "*seeing as*-effect" where disparate and fuzzy phenomena and attitudes appear to be fused in one coherent, uncontroversial socio-linguistic entity.

Discussing the historical origin of the term "standard," Joseph, like Downes, refers to a development of cumulative, self-confirming metaphor:

like most metaphors, 'standard language' was chosen for its aptness to a particular concept, and subsequently worked to channel thought about that concept in the direction of its own implications. (1987: 14)

This shows *standard* to have an element of Schön's generative metaphor, channelling thought in a particular direction. Joseph (*ibid.*) cites Weinreich's

understandable desire to disambiguate discussion of standard languages by resorting to the use of a different terminology:

it is necessary to distinguish between standardized and non-standardized language. This set of terms is proposed to avoid the use of the ambiguous word 'standard' , which among others has to serve for 'socially acceptable', 'average', 'typical', and so on.

Our purpose is not to avoid the word, however, since many participants in the debate evidently make capital out of its metaphorical connotations. Our aim is to disambiguate the use of the label itself, by exposing its metaphorical features as they relate to aspects of the textual and the situational context or "topic." To this end, some main associative features of the word *standard* are listed below:

Standard

<i>Vehicle</i>	<i>Topic</i>
basic version	unmarked form
common	resource for all
usual type	normal, most frequent
"high standards"	educational achievement
the gold standard	accepted currency
"British standard"	minimum safety requirement
approved measure	pass mark

Individuals must compile their own lists, since in any such list there is bound to be an element of selectivity: what this partial listing aims to do, however, is begin to alert the reader to the wide range of associative features attached to such labels that can become metaphorically salient in particular contexts.

The Language Trap

The content of the pamphlet *The Language Trap* (Honey 1983) has been aptly summarized by Graddol and Swann:

Honey's pamphlet directly challenges the 'linguistic equality' claim and attributes to linguists some measure of responsibility for *declining standards* —both educational and moral— in British schools. The argument, briefly, is that linguists are playing a 'cruel trick' on working-class children and those from ethnic minority

groups by encouraging teachers to foster the vernacular at the expense of standard English —the language of social improvement, hence the use of the expression 'language trap' in the pamphlet's title. (1988: 97)

The label to be examined here is *standard*. It is interesting that in the extract from Graddol and Swann (1988), the word *standard* is used in two widely separated senses: firstly in the collocation *declining standards*, and secondly in the term *standard English*. This demonstrates the way in which the word is often used in close proximity in the same discourse —even the same paragraph— with these different senses. Of course, in the text cited, a linguistically aware audience believes that they *are* meant as different senses. The overall textual and situational contexts determine this for the reader. The paragraph was written by two linguists as a summary of Honey's views, so there is a significant distancing of both the sentiments and the expression.

In the following passage from Honey (1983), however, we observe a similar co-occurrence, but may perceive a rather different textual relationship between the two uses of *standard*:

It is true that gradual change, on a small scale, is always possible — indeed it is apparent now in regard to the notion of the '*standard*' or '*correct*' for both spoken and written English, which is changing in small ways all the time, and especially widening the range of variation *it regards as acceptable* compared with the past. . . . While the concept of *standard English* becomes in some respects more accommodating, the prejudices against non-standard become, if anything, even stronger. (Honey 1983: 22-3).

Firstly, it is interesting to note a case of metaphorical *seeing as* effect achieved through grammatical classification, as discussed by Lee (1992). Honey gives grammatical-subject status to the notion of "standard" or "correct": the italicized phrase (*it regards as acceptable*) even makes this notion itself responsible for attitudes, exonerating people from any blame of prejudice. No doubt a stylistic case could be made for this grammatical choice, but it would be disingenuous to deny the effect of removing human agency in this social context.

The co-text of "standard" in its first occurrence here strikingly includes the word "correct," and is loosely related to the meaning of the word as seen in the first occurrence in Graddol and Swann passage above ("declining standards"). The second occurrence is again the collocation "standard

English." The repetition in Honey's text suggests to the reader, in the absence of contrary information, that the second occurrence of the word is a cohesive anaphoric reference back to "standard" or "correct." This linguistic link is supported and confirmed by both the overall argument on a whole-text level and by the text's social position as part of a political debate. Since promotion of the traditional teaching of "standard English" is one of the main issues in Honey's text, it is important for him to establish a clear link between this variety of English and authoritative notions of "correctness." But as Trudgill has pointed out,

The fact is that there is no such thing as 'correct English', and notions such as 'corruption' have no part to play in discussions about language. 'Standards' will not fall if we encourage the use and tolerance of non-standard dialects. (1975: 71)

In the last sentence of this passage Trudgill deliberately juxtaposes two uses of *standard* in a co-text aimed at distinguishing them. He also employs inverted commas to highlight the contentious use of the word in public educational debates. This is in sharp contrast to Honey's co-text which is angled to identify the notion of "correctness" with notions of "standards" of all sorts: thus, "non-standard" language is conversely associated with injurious social prejudice and unacceptability. The occurrence of different co-texts can therefore be seen to lead to the activation of disparate set of associations for standard and thereby quite different schemata.

*The Kingman Report*⁷

The concept of "standard English" is especially important to the politically-motivated aims of the *Kingman Report*. Cameron and Bourne (1988) have traced the significance of the label in *Kingman*. Their analyses note that the report's account of "standard English" omits any explicit reference to dialect variation as a function of social class, but only explains historical and geographical variation. Although it would be fair to say that class-based groups may be implicit in references to "particular social groups" and so on (Kingman 1988: 9), it is reasonable to point out that "standard English" is presented in *Kingman* as, *per se*, an entirely classless concept. Whatever education may aim at, and whatever provision may be made for non-standard dialect tolerance in schools, such a presentation is a deliberate masking of an important aspect in the make-up of the metaphorical label of "standard English."

In the process of pointing to the omissions of a consideration of class, however, Cameron and Bourne give the impression that *Kingman* is exploiting a simple dual ambiguity of the label "standard English" as meaning either "ordinary" or "excellent," "normal" or "normative":

thus, the normative is passed off as the merely normal; or . . . the language of a class is passed off as the common tongue of a whole people (in Kingman's terms, which exclude the concept of class, SE (standard English) is the language of the nation rather than that of the family and immediate circle). (Cameron and Bourne 1988: 155).

To present the problem only in terms of the opposition between two readily distinguishable senses of a word is, however, to overlook the complexity of the metaphor of "standard English." Such an analysis may perpetuate polarized argument of the sort "It means this," "No, it means that." Standard English, as a metaphor, means both and more besides; and unless proponents of mutually opposed political views acknowledge this, such debates will continue.

"Standard English," therefore, is far from being a straightforward label for an uncontroversial entity: it is profoundly metaphorical in the interpretation of each of its two component words. The other component of the "Standard English" label, "English," is discussed below and is found to be at least as potent a metaphor as "standard."

3.3.2. *English*

The State of the Language

In the opening pages of the collection of essays *The State of the Language* (Ricks and Michaels, eds., 1990) a chart is presented based on a column of text from the Oxford English Dictionary. The column represents part of this dictionary's noun entry for "English," and draws arrows from salient definitions and examples in the entry to brief references to articles published in the collection. This is a neat way into the contents of the volume: it is also a striking reminder of the range of meanings that the one label "English" interacts with —the (singular?) English language, literary and standard forms, issues of grammaticality, and so on.

Greenbaum's contribution to the volume begins by quoting Enoch Powell's speech:

Others may speak and read English —more or less— but it is our language not theirs. It was made in England by the English and it remains our distinctive property, however widely it is learnt and used. (Powell 1988, cited in Greenbaum 1990: 150).

The ownership attitude to the English language of which this is a vehement expression is explained by Greenbaum as deriving "partly from the use of the same name for the language and for the largest ethnic group in the British Isles" (1990: 160). So here we observe metaphor arising through a case of *seeing as* effect of the type discussed before, when one entity is redescribed in terms of another, just because the two quite separate things share the same name.

Powell's own contribution to the volume, "Further thoughts: Grammar and Syntax," contains the following prescription to protect "the structure of English":

a cultural elite which has absorbed its English while being educated in Latin grammar and the Latin classics. (Powell 1990: 485)

The appeal to Latin syntax as standard by which to judge English is almost universally considered by linguists to be misguided. Powell's argument is based on the claim that the loss of certain linguistic distinctions results in an impoverished language (his example is the lack of the British English distinction between so-called "aorist" *I saw* and "perfect" *I have seen* in American English). Linguists generally point to other ways in which these losses are counterbalanced by new uses, but as Milroy and Milroy indicate,

it is noticeable that guardians of the language do not generally recommend the 'superior systems' of non-standard dialects: they confine their claims about superiority to aspects of standard English grammar (such as the shall/will distinction). It can be suggested therefore that their real concerns are not wholly linguistic but largely social: they are in some way promoting the interests of the variety most widely considered to have prestige. (1985: 15)

Powell's desire for a cultural elite may be seen as an explicit manifestation of one of the associative features held for many by the metaphorical label "English."

An example of this association is discussed by Greenbaum (1990). Greenbaum relates that in Illinois, USA, in 1923 a law was enacted which "proclaimed that the official language of the state should be known from then

on as the American language and not the English language" (Greenbaum 1990: 17). This concern over the force of the metaphorical label "English" was echoed at the Reading Sociolinguistic Symposium (April 1992) at which a paper entitled "Creolisation and the Tense-Aspect-Modality System of Anglo-Nigerian Pidgin" was presented by G. O. Simire (Université de Nice). It was pointed out that the designation "Anglo-Nigerian Pidgin" for this pidgin deriving from English had been coined to avoid the inclusion of the label English in the name of this language variety (Nigerian Pidgin English). The use of the word "English," it was claimed, would have focused attention on one particular stage in the development of the variety, and thereby given the impression that the pidgin was inferior to the high-prestige standard English of which it would be judged a "corruption."

English our English

The metaphorical label ""English" is, not surprisingly, central to the pamphlet *English our English* (Marenbon 1987), published by the centre for Policy Studies. As Cameron and Bourne indicate, the social context of *English our English* is that of "right-wing political lobbying, which in the 1980s regularly pointed to a "crisis" in the teaching of this and that" (1988: 149). Marenbon's pamphlet has been described by Crowley as having as its underlying aim

to construct a certain view of the social order and to propagate it. Thus this is a text which uses language as the site upon which political contestation can take place; and in particular the contestation of the prevailing modes of education. Its political intent slips through in the last lines in which the writer declares: 'in the future of its language there lies the future of a nation'. The irony is that this essay is based upon a rejection of the task of renewing our language in order to meet our present and future demands and needs. For what is being said in this text and others like it is this: 'in the past of our language there lies the future of our nation'. (1991: 243)

A *conduit* metaphorical view of unitary speaker/writer-controlled meaning is seen to be a generative force in *English our English*. Marenbon might even have been laying claim to the invention of the conduit metaphor when he wrote:

Such unanimity in usage makes standard English an excellent vehicle for clear communication, for conveying information and ideas without

misunderstanding. It is no accident that standard English, rather than a dialect, has become an international language. (Marenbon 1987: 25)

This is an expression of conduit metaphor par excellence!

4. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS

In this study it has been argued that language is fundamentally metaphorical in its basic creativity, and that local word metaphors emerging through the processes of classification and selection are oriented in generative metaphorical frames operating at text and concept levels.

This has been demonstrated in the analysis of two metaphorical labels ("standard" and "English") as they have been used in the case of the English language education debate, where the conflicting discourses identified by Graddol and Swann (1988) have been seen in the context of an opposition between generative conduit and negotiative metalinguistic metaphors. a

NOTES

1. Cf. Sinclair, J. H. (1991) on "language reflexivity."

2. The notion of generative metaphor involves a *seeing as* redescription. Schön's first example of generative metaphor is drawn from the real experience of industrial researchers enabled to improve a synthetic-bristle paintbrush through the use of the generative metaphor "pump": *seeing* a paintbrush *as* a pump allowed them to understand the process of "painting" in terms of "pumping." Schön explains metaphorical processes as basically redescription through "seeing as."

3. Rumelhart (1979) assigns a crucial role to metaphor in the acquisition of language, in which learners are using a kind of metaphorical extension in applying old words to new situations and objects. The creative rule-formation and lexical innovation of children acquiring a language demonstrates the generative principle of metaphor at work.

4. The phrase "by the use of" is employed on purpose, in preference to the word "in," as will become clear below.

5. Bloor and Bloor point out that "when we talk about a language being powerful we are using a transferred epithet, a type of metonymy. Such metaphors suggest that in some sense power resides in the language itself" (1990: 40). It is useful to expose this metonymy, but while this is clearly not the case, it is worth noting that the conduit metaphor makes it possible for non-negotiable power to be encoded in language, in that it engenders a belief in fixed, authoritative meanings. So perhaps terms such as "powerful language" are not so wide of the mark in their acute perceptions of what is going on in manipulative uses of language.

6. Linguistic communication is characterised as a means of bringing individual worlds into convergence by negotiation (Widdowson 1984: 860).

7. *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Teaching of English Language*. Chairman: Sir John Kingman

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ABSTRACTS

HLENKA REGAINED: IRONY AND AMBIGUITY IN THE NARRATOR OF WOODY ALLEN'S *ANOTHER WOMAN*

María del Mar Asensio Aróstegui

When *Another Woman* begins, its character-narrator Marion affirms that her life is successful and complete. Yet, as the film progresses, Marion's self-assurance is shown to be a delusion, a self-imposed mask which she has adopted in order to achieve personal, social and professional fulfilment. What I propose in this article is a narratological approach to the film that will show how it is precisely through the technique of voice-over narration, on the one hand, and through the narrator's clever use of irony and ambiguity — she spreads inconsistent and incomplete clues all through the film, transforms the process of narration itself into a source of suspense and emotion, consistently breaks the coherent temporal order of events, and constantly questions and blurs the limits between fiction and reality —, on the other, that this reversal is achieved.

DOUBLES, DECEIT, AND REFLEXIVE NARRATIVE IN TWO NOVELS BY VLADIMIR NABOKOV

María Asunción Barreras Gómez

Nabokov's novels show that imagination creates its own reality by giving order and meaning to a subject. They do not reflect reality but instead they

express their own individual reality. The motif of the *Doppelgänger* or double is one of the main devices used by Nabokov. It allows the novelist to parody consciously and symmetrically the actions of the characters. It is a recurring design by which the novel refers to itself. The heroes of both *Despair* and *Lolita* describe their relationship with their double and his murder. However, the reader is never sure whether the story of the double is true or whether the doubles are in fact just part of the protagonists' imagination. The reader has to decide whether the story is true or not. This is a metafictional feature. The reader creates the novel as well, when he decides what to believe. Both novels remind the reader that fiction is an illusion, and not the reality it may seem.

**DISCURSIVE CONFLICT IN 'BENITO CERENO':
NOBLE SAVAGE VERSUS WILD MAN**

Jesús Benito Sánchez

This article departs from the classical controversy on whether Melville's authoritative point of view in "Benito Cereno" can be discerned. Taking for granted the impossibility to ascertain Melville's position with regards to slavery, this article proposes to analyze Delano's rendering of the story. This analysis uncovers the discursive conflict generated by the existence of two contradictory images of the black man —as Noble Savage and as Wild Man— deployed by Delano.

**EL NARRADOR DE *PEARL* A LA LUZ DE LA
*CONSOLATIO PHILOSOPHIAE***

Antonio Bravo

The Middle English poem *Pearl* can be read as an instance of the literary genre known as the *consolatio*, and belonging therefore to the classical tradition of poems which consist in a moralizing dialogue intended to console and instruct the narrator, a tradition which follows the model of

Boethius' *Consolatio Philosophiae*. In both works the instruction derived from moral teaching is the sole remedy and consolation for the narrator, and, consequently, for the readers.

THE THREE HOSTS OF DOOMSDAY IN CELTIC AND OLD ENGLISH

Andrew Breeze

Late Old English homiletic literature contains a characteristic motif, that it is better to feel shame for one's sins before a confessor in this life, than to feel shame before the hosts of heaven, earth, and hell on the day of Judgment. This theme is discussed in M. R. Godden, "An Old English Penitential Motif," *Anglo-Saxon England* 11 (1973): 221-39, where it is described as "peculiarly Anglo-Saxon." Yet this view is unfounded. The reference to the three hosts of Doomsday, which occurs in Hiberno-Latin writings known to have circulated in Germany and Austria in the eighth century, as well as in later writings in Irish and Welsh, is almost certainly of Irish origin. In its allusion to these hosts, therefore, the penitential motif discussed by Professor Godden, far from being "peculiarly Anglo-Saxon," shows Celtic influence.

WEIGHING DELIGHT AND DOLE IN CANADIAN POETRY

Nela Bureu Ramos

The analysis of the relationship between man and nature in Canadian poetry written in English shows that Canadian artists have traditionally been both attracted and repelled by the vastness and savage beauty of the Canadian landscape and, consequently, have described their land as both heaven and hell, a matrix of life and a source of terror and death.

This article highlights this dialectic of opposites by opening an angle on the work of well-known Canadian writers such as the Confederation poets, who are treated as a group with similar concerns and ways of writing, Edwin John Pratt (1882-1964), and John Newlove (1938-).

All of them have incorporated the tension inherent to the Canadian experience to their poetry though they have articulated it in a different way as each age has its own rendering of the same idea.

INSULATION VS. DISSOLUTION? AN INTERVIEW WITH ERIC KRAFT

Francisco Collado

The New York novelist Eric Kraft tells in this interview about his main literary sources (Nabokov, Barth), and comments on some of the aspects that make his fiction a very interesting combination of metafictional writing and accurate realism. Aspects such as the notion of a postmodern realism, insulation vs. fuzziness, quantum mechanics and chaos theory, or the role of the reader combine with other comments on specific contemporary issues such as the value of electronic books or the necessity to improve readership among young people.

THE WARRING VOICES OF THE MOTHER: MAXINE HONG KINGSTON'S TALE OF THE MOTHER-DAUGHTER STORY

Angeles de la Concha

Postmodern feminist theories of identity have warned against the use of general categories of gender in favour of more complexly structured conceptions in which gender is but one relevant strand among others such as class, ethnicity or race.

Maxine Hong Kingston's *The Woman Warrior* is a beautiful version of the daughter's growth away from the omnipotent and powerless mother within the patriarchal family, a well known female plot, or subplot, in Western literature. This paper explores the ambivalence of the mother's voice carrying the fantasies and deceptions of feminine power, autonomy and authority. The powerfully compelling female images the mother builds through her story-telling are eventually contradicted either by the story itself

or the bare facts of life, revealing the mother's uneasy collusion with patriarchy while voicing ways of overcoming it.

I wish to point out how the novel shows that for all the nuances and idiosyncracies allowed by the Chinese familiar background and the childhood in a working class immigrant milieu, gender traits socially constructed in a relational matrix loom the largest in the constitution of the girl's subjectivity.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PERFORMANCE AND LEARNERS' INTUITIONS

Josep M. Cots

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship existing between the oral performance of a subject in a "gatekeeping" encounter such as an office appointment with a teacher and his/her definition of the situation and of the role that language plays in it. In a real context of language use, the outcome is connected with the speakers' fulfillment of the goal with which they approached the encounter, a fulfillment which does not exclusively depend on the nature of the object being negotiated but also on how it is negotiated.

IMAGINARY HOMELANDS REVISITED IN THE NOVELS OF KAZUO ISHIGURO

Rocío G. Davis

Taking as a point of departure Salman Rushdie's essay "Imaginary Homelands," this paper will analyze the three novels of Japanese-born English writer Kazuo Ishiguro in order to demonstrate how the peculiarities of memory and a cross-cultural imagination work to create novels in which Japan and the Japanese culture, either physically or subliminally, plays a vital role. Each novel is analyzed separately to reveal the cross-cultural elements, as well as how aspects of one culture shed light on another. To perceive parallels and articulate similarities in differences is perhaps the specific territory of the between-world writer. Kazuo Ishiguro's principal

commitment in his novels is to observe interaction of the past and present, of East and West, and capture the evocative texture of memory.

FOCALISATION IN ALFRED HITCHCOCK'S *THE BIRDS*

Celestino Deleyto

This essay is an attempt to clarify several points regarding the concept of focalisation as used by theorists of fiction and film. Two theoretical points are made in the introduction: firstly, focalisation must be theorised as both perception and manipulation/selection of visual information; secondly, in its application to the analysis of film narratives, Mieke Bal's distinction between internal and external focalisation is to be favoured in film analyses against Seymour Chatman's introduction of the concepts of *filter* and *slant*, as the most accurate way to account theoretically for the multiplicity of points of view in the texts and the relationships between them. However, the concepts of external and internal focalisation are slightly changed with respect to Bal's and Rimmon-Kenan's theoretical discussions of them. In the subsequent analysis of focalisation in *The Birds*, I explore the narrative position of the birds and their relationship with the film's heroine, Melanie Daniels (Tippi Hedren) in terms of omniscience and subjectivity. Finally, a consideration of the complex relationships between internal and external focalisation in the text leads to an overall interpretation of the film as a modern fantasy characterised by the dominance of a mysterious but powerful female subjectivity.

METHODOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A FUNCTIONAL LEXICOLOGICAL MODEL

Pamela Faber

Ricardo Mairal

Although recent work in theoretical linguistics has stressed the important role of the lexicon within linguistic theory, its description is still too deeply-seated in theory internal qualifications. Then, it is the aim of this paper to present the theoretical foundations of a Lexicon/Dictionary which can

account for speakers' actual lexical knowledge. These theoretical foundations have been gathered under the rubric of Functional Lexicology.

TAKING RISKS: A READING OF OSCAR WILDE'S *THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY*

Isabel Fraile

The aim of this paper is to analyse Oscar Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray* from a postmodernist standpoint. By drawing on a variety of critical perspectives, such as psychoanalysis, deconstruction, and reader-response criticism, it tries to suggest an alternative reading in which the picture that gives the novel its title is regarded not as a "work of art," but rather as a text in which many conflictive meanings play and interact with one another. The relationships between the main characters, Dorian, Henry, and Basil, are interpreted as illuminating in turn those between the text, the author, and the reader / literary critic. In this light, *The Picture of Dorian Gray* finally emerges as a metaphor for the very act of reading.

**THE BATTLE OF MALDON Y ST EDMUND:
UNA APROXIMACION PRAGMATICA DESDE LA TEORIA DE LA
CORTESIA LINGÜISTICA**

Pilar Garcés Conejos

Julia Fernández
Cuesta

This paper analyses, from the standpoint of the literary pragmatics, and more specifically from linguistic politeness theory, two Old English texts: the heroic poem *The Battle of Maldon* and Aelfric's prose narrative of King Edmund's life. The aim is double: first, to show that this type of linguistic analysis is adequate for the study of texts from other historical periods, since the pragmatical focus on the text opens up a new interpretive and evaluative dimension. Second, to validate the applicability of politeness theory as an

analytical framework in texts and contexts where it has not been commonly applied.

**ENUNCIACION, FICCION Y NIVELES SEMIOTICOS
EN EL TEXTO NARRATIVO**

José Angel García
Landa

This paper examines some conceptual connections between the areas of narratology and pragmalinguistics, with a specific focus on the enunciative peculiarities of fictional discourse. A descriptive model for semiotic analysis is proposed, taking into account the complex and stratified structure of narrative fiction and the difference between levels of enunciation and levels of fictionality.

**COMPLEX EVENT NOMINALS IN ENGLISH AND SPANISH:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH**

María del Pilar García Mayo

Grimshaw (1990) argues that only nouns that refer to what she calls complex events —nouns that have an internal aspectual analysis— have argument structure. She also proposes (following Emonds (1985)) that nouns have no direct theta-marking capacity. Thus, argument-taking nouns cannot directly accept arguments because they are defective theta markers; they will only take arguments when they combine with a preposition. This paper analyzes the behavior of complex event nominals in English and Spanish as well as the behavior of CPs within NPs and matters of control in infinitival purpose clauses. We suggest that the relationship between event control and a-structure is not as simple as one could infer from Grimshaw's account of the phenomenon.

I DON'T CARE WHAT YOU MEANT: I HEARD WHAT YOU SAID

Leo Hickey

In recent work on interpersonal communication, it is broadly assumed that a sincere Hearer attempts to cooperate with a Speaker in order to interpret the semantic and pragmatic import of what the latter says. However, it sometimes suits the Hearer's purposes better to ignore the Speaker's intentions and seek some other interpretation, so long as it is somehow justified by the literal meaning of the utterance itself. It is suggested that this kind of hostile or uncooperative behaviour is analogical to the Hearer's part to lying on the Speaker's, although its motivation may not always be malicious or negative.

SALEEM'S HISTORICAL DISCOURSE IN *MIDNIGHT'S CHILDREN*

Luis de Juan Hatchard

It has been the aim of this paper to analyze *Midnight's Children* with regard to the evolution undergone by history writing, and specially with the position it actually holds. This has been done with a view to discovering that much of postmodernist fiction, among which we must include Rushdie's novel, is dealing with similar issues to those which have become the subject of the New Historicism.

The first half deals with the narrator's ambivalent position: his oscillation between internal and external narrator serves to underline the uncertainty and relativity of the task he has undertaken. By underlining the discursive nature of history, and by consciously choosing an impossible task —the struggle towards objectivity and reliability— Saleem manages further to blur the frontier that differentiates fiction from history.

The second half deals with Saleem's position both as a character and narrator. Saleem's fascination with the *unknown* allows him to write from new angles, and therefore to offer different perspectives, and points of view.

this concern with history (writing) must be understood as an attempt to suggest multiplicity, heterogeneity, and plurality. This task is carried out by continually stressing Saleem's position as a self-conscious writer, and by commenting on the linguistic nature of his discourse.

**GOD, SHE IS BEAUTIFUL: THE DISTURBING REPRESENTATION
OF WOMEN IN *HANNAH AND HER SISTERS***

Hilaria Loyo

This paper discusses the ideological scope of Woody Allen's *Hannah and Her Sisters* (1986) in relation to gender and sexual difference within American postmodernism —the cultural phenomenon in which Woody Allen has been inscribed. The analysis uses a theoretical framework derived from feminist film theory and focuses mainly on visual representation and its enunciative process. More particularly, the analysis centres on the representation of women within the film as well as on its intertextual aspects, that is, its parodic allusions and references to other films, generic influence, and stardom. The final aim is to account for the unresolved ambivalence manifested in the representation of women in this film.

**A FUNCTIONAL-SEMIOTIC ANALYSIS OF VISUAL AIDS
IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE**

María José Luzón Marco

This paper attempts to explore one of the aspects of scientific communication: visual aids. The study of non-linguistic representations is best approached from semiotics, which permits the description of visual aids as conventional tools of scientific research and expression. The notion of iconicity proposed by Eco (1979) is the basic concept for this analysis of visuals used in scientific discourse. The vague idea of similarity is discarded and iconic signs are defined as the result of a transformation process by means of which a content type is projected into a given expression continuum.

This paper aims at a functional and formal analysis of visuals: they are conventional informative iconic signs which stand in a narrow relationship to the linguistic message of the scientific text and which can be categorized according to their mode of production. As a conclusion, the paper reveals the relevant role of visuals in the representation of a message, since these devices conform to two basic principles of scientific discourse: economy and precision.

FUNCIONES PRAGMATICAS MARCADAS Y NO MARCADAS

Javier Martín Arista

This paper puts forward a typology of pragmatic functions which differs in some basic respects from the ones proposed so far in the Functional Grammar literature by Watters (1979), Dik et al (1981), de Jong (1981) and Dik (1989). In the first place, it is argued that a distinction between unmarked and marked pragmatic functions contributes to the typological adequacy of the theory. As regards intra-clausal pragmatic functions, four possible criteria of markedness are revised: lexical category, type of information, assignment of syntactic function and the order of clause constituents. The pragmatically-governed syntactic alignment of clause constituents that includes the syntax-phonology mapping is selected as the most accurate criterion for pragmatic function markedness. With reference to extra-clausal pragmatic functions, the marked status of the topic as theme and of the tail as focus are discussed.

**WILLIAM GOLING'S *RITES OF PASSAGE*:
A CASE OF TRANSTEXTUALITY**

Marita Nadal Blasco

More or less consciously, all authors rewrite the work of their predecessors, since it is impossible to escape the influence of previous writings. Golding's *Rites of Passage* uses and abuses the conventions of earlier works very overtly, flaunting its condition of postmodern literary artifact. This paper shows how *Rites of Passage* makes use of all the five types of transtextual

relationships that Genette defines in *Palimpsestes* —intertextuality, paratextuality, metatextuality, hypertextuality and archtextuality— through which this novel foregrounds its postmodernist flavour. Thus, while noting the complex transtextuality of *Rites of Passage*, we also point out its historiographic/metafictional character, since both features are closely related.

**AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR NORMAN BLAKE, CO-EDITOR OF
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE**

María Pilar Navarro

In this interview professor Norman Blake, co-editor of the Cambridge History of the English Language and editor of the second volume, answers a number of questions connected with the publication of the work and the teaching of the history of the language inside and outside Great Britain, in non-English speaking countries such as Spain.

This masterpiece was meant to gather the writings of the most authorized experts on the various topics, to provide a basic starting point to researchers, both concerning knowledge and bibliography, and also to change the attitude of the teachers of English towards the subject. Professor Blake also informs of how responsibilities were assigned to the participants and about the careful process followed by the editorial team in order to produce such an outstanding work.

**APROXIMACION SINTACTICA
A LOS TERMINOS DE POLARIDAD NEGATIVA EN INGLES**

Ana I. Ojea

Negative Polarity items are those lexical elements and expressions which are only licensed in non-assertive contexts (i.e. *any*, *ever*, *in years*, *lift a finger*...). The purpose of this paper is to explore the structural conditions which regulate their appearance in the sentence.

After reviewing some of the proposals on the issue made under the generativist approach, we focus on the role played by the so-called functional categories, in particular the negation, the complementizers or subordinators,

and certain quantifiers and degree words. We conclude that Negative Polarity items must be expanded under the categorial command of a non-assertive constituent, and that this structural relationship has to be mediated by one functional category.

"THE EBONY TOWER": TEXT AND INTERTEXTS

Susana Onega

Fowles's insistence in "A Personal Note" and elsewhere that the four short stories that make up *The Ebony Tower* collection were *variations* both on the themes and on the narrative methods employed in his previous novels interestingly contradicts the reaction of Fowles's own editor and of the first professional reviewers, who were unable to see any kind of connexion among them. My purpose is to analyse the short story that gives the whole collection its title, "The Ebony Tower," with a view to establishing the intratextual form and meaning of the short story proper and its intertextual connexions with Fowles's avowed major sources: medieval romance and *The Magus*.

**WENDY COPE'S USE OF PARODY
IN MAKING COCOA FOR KINGSLEY AMIS**

Marta Pérez Novales

Making Cocoa for Kingsley Amis, an English best-seller of the late 1980s, established Cope's reputation as a parodist of canonical poetic styles. Yet, in some ways, her writing is subservient to the canon: her style is heavily indebted to the poetics of the Movement, and her seeming obsession with the writing of "the forefathers" betrays a desire to gain a place in the masculine literary establishment. However, Wendy Cope's attitude to poetic tradition is not without ambivalence. This article analyses Cope's use of postmodernist

pastiche, and discusses the possible implications of her style from a feminist point of view.

**NARRATIVE EMBEDDINGS
IN FLANN O'BRIEN'S *AT SWIM-TWO-BIRDS***

Constanza del Río

This paper examines one narrative aspect of Flann O'Brien's novel *At Swim-Two-Birds* (1939): the complex structure of narrative embeddings that has been built in the text. The underlying intention is to dismantle this structure in order to show the unstable and undecidable nature of a novel which seems to be as much interested in establishing a hierarchy and delimiting spaces and voices as in democratically erasing differences and bringing together what has already been set apart.

**LEWIS GRASSIC GIBBON AND HISTORY:
THE SHAMELESS STONE OF SISYPHUS**

Rubén Valdés Miyares

This article is a cultural study of the writer James Leslie Mitchell / Lewis Grassic Gibbon in his historical context, the early 1930s in Scotland. It analyses especially his novels *The Thirteenth Disciple*, *Spartacus* and *A Scots Quair*, and their critique of the workings of ideology, its relation to faith in humanity, and its distortion of the radicalism necessary to change a sick world. A crucial image in his materialist approach to culture and politics bears a significant resemblance to the existentialist angst in Camus's *Mythe de Sisyphe*: it is the rock of creative faith that falls back on violent ideology every time a courageous Sisyphus tops a hill of History.

**'STANDARD ENGLISH' AS A METAPHOR OF LANGUAGE
IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDUCATION DEBATE**

Ignacio Vázquez Orta

This paper investigates a specific area of language about language in the English language education debate. It has been argued by Reddy (1979) that English metalanguage is dominated and structured by one major metaphorical framework, the *conduit metaphor*. In opposition to this frame is the *negotiative metaphor*, an alternative framework of generative metaphor (Schön, in Ortony, ed., 1979). Within these frameworks, key terms in the debate are seen to be metaphorical labels through which partial perspectives are expressed.

The chosen context of the English language education debate is one in which metalanguage has significant consequences for the linguistic and social outlook of future generations.

Although the main focus here is going to be on the metalinguistic metaphor rather than on the context, this study tries to complement existing work in this area of "language in language education" (e.g. Graddol and Swann 1988, Crowley 1989). In fact, it takes up the invitations of Graddol and Swann to join the debate on "the problem that variability in discourse meaning poses for those professionally concerned with language and education."

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FE DE ERRATAS

(Correspondiente a *Miscelánea* vol. 14)

PÁG. 131. El *abstract* del primer artículo debería ser como sigue:

**LANDSCAPE DESIGN AND DRAWING IN
THE DRAUGHTSMAN'S CONTRACT: PEEPHOLES TO AN AGE**

Chantal Cornut-Gentille D'Arcy
Universidad de Zaragoza

The basic plot in Peter Greenaway's *The Draughtsman's Contract* is no more and no less than an ingeniously planned murder and its dramatic consequences for a guest artist. However, the views of Mr. Herbert's house and property, which the draughtsman is commissioned to reproduce on paper, do not serve merely as a background setting for the story. Close attention to the mise-en-scène, to remarks made by characters about gardens, garden elements or garden produce and to the artist's work technique reveal how much the insight into the times in *The Draughtsman's Contract* accords to the period, while it also provides interesting clues that help the viewer elucidate several otherwise obscure or baffling scenes.

Para contribuir a
MISCELÁNEA
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MisCELÁNEA: A Journal of English and American Studies es una publicación anual del Departamento de Filología Inglesa y Alemana de la Universidad de Zaragoza. Disfunde artículos sobre lingüística inglesa, literaturas escritas en inglés, pensamiento, cine y estudios culturales del ámbito anglosajón. Se agradecen contribuciones originales escritas por profesionales de la filología inglesa, que deberán recibir dos informes positivos emitidos por lectores especialistas en la materia. Al menos uno de estos informes se encomendará a un miembro del Consejo de Redacción de la revista. Los lectores no conocerán la autoría del artículo, y el informe que emitan es asimismo confidencial, si bien se puede dar a conocer su contenido a los contribuidores que así lo soliciten. La selección de los artículos se hará principalmente sobre la base del interés global y originalidad de los artículos, su rigor teórico y metodológico, el desarrollo de una tesis bien definida, la calidad de su estilo y su adecuación a las normas del trabajo académico.

También se aceptan reseñas de libros de interés general para los estudios de Filología inglesa que hayan sido publicados en los dos últimos años (máx. 5 págs.).

Las contribuciones deberán enviarse al Director de la revista (Departamento de Filología y Alemana, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Zaragoza, 50009 Zaragoza). Los originales, escritos en inglés o en español, se presentarán por triplicado en hojas tamaño DIN A-4. Estarán impresos a doble espacio por una sola cara. El nombre y la dirección del autor figurarán en página aparte. Se aconseja que los artículos no superen las 30 páginas, incluyendo referencias bibliográficas, esquemas, etc., aunque se dará preferencia a artículos más breves. Se incluirá asimismo un resumen en inglés no superior a doscientas palabras. De ser posible, se entregará además una copia del artículo en soporte informático (preferentemente MsWord / Macintosh). Las páginas y notas se numerarán consecutivamente; estas últimas aparecerán al final del artículo pero antes de la sección de referencias



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FISHMAN, Joshua, ed. 1968. *Readings on the Sociology of Language*. The Hague: Mouton.

HALLIDAY, M. A. K. 1967. "Notes on transitivity and theme in English I." *Journal of Linguistics* 3.1: 37-81.

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