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THAT-CLAUSES
IN NOUN PHRASE STRUCTURE

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I. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to discuss aspects of the grammar of non-relative *that*-clauses following head nouns.[1] Specifically, two aspects will be discussed here. The first has to do with the different types of expansions of head nouns which can appear under the form of non-relative *that*-clauses. The second, actually a ramification of the first, concerns the nature of the evidence for positing distinct types of *that*-clauses. In essence, this paper will focus on the complement/modifier divide, as this applies to *that*-clauses inside NP. Matthews (1981: 231 ff.) and Meyer (1992: 51 ff.), on the one hand, and Grimshaw (1990: 45 ff.), on the other, will be used as background for this discussion. Central to the discussion will be an attempt to sustain the thesis that *that*-clause complements of nouns do not exist.

2. *THAT*-COMPLEMENTS AND *THAT*-MODIFIERS

In principle, the grammatical tradition recognizes two types of *that*-clauses ocurring after nouns. These two types are represented by the sequences in italics in (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) below:

(1) His suggestion *that she should come* caused some concern.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to discuss aspects of the grammar of non-relative *that*-clauses following head nouns.[1] Specifically, two aspects will be discussed here. The first has to do with the different types of expansions of head nouns which can appear under the form of non-relative *that*-clauses. The second, actually a ramification of the first, concerns the nature of the evidence for positing distinct types of *that*-clauses. In essence, this paper will focus on the complement/modifier divide, as this applies to *that*-clauses inside NP. Matthews (1981: 231 ff.) and Meyer (1992: 51 ff.), on the one hand, and Grimshaw (1990: 45 ff.), on the other, will be used as background for this discussion. Central to the discussion will be an attempt to sustain the thesis that *that*-clause complements of nouns do not exist.

2. *THAT*-COMPLEMENTS AND *THAT*-MODIFIERS

In principle, the grammatical tradition recognizes two types of *that*-clauses ocurring after nouns. These two types are represented by the sequences in italics in (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) below:

(1) His suggestion *that she should come* caused some concern.
(2) The belief *that war will soon come to an end* is unjustified.

(3) Have you been told the ending, *that she got the divorce after all?*
(4) But you don't know her postcript, *that she is resigning in June,* do you?

Let us restrict ourselves to (1) and (3), to start with. The *that*-clause in (1) is usually considered to be a *complement* of the head noun *suggestion* (Huddleston 1971: 106 ff. & 1984: 263-4; Brown and Miller 1982: 134 ff.; Burton-Roberts 1986: 176-8; Radford 1988: 193-4, 218-9). By contrast, the *that*-clause in (3) is not a complement but an appositive modifier of the head noun *ending* (Matthews 1981: 231 ff.). The distinction between these two types of *that*-clause expansions hinges on the different argument-taking properties of nouns. *Suggestion* is an argument-taking noun (a *complex noun,* adopting the terminology of Grimshaw 1990: 45 ff.), that is, a noun whose lexical specification determines the existence of an argument structure, which in its turn must be satisfied by the presence of lexically-specified complements of the right kind.[2] In short, the case for the complement status of the *that*-clauses appearing after such nouns as *suggestion* and *belief* rests on evidence of *valency* or *subcategorization.* In order to prove the adequacy of this kind of lexical evidence, it is customary to show the parallelism existing between these nouns and the corresponding morphologically-related verbs. In (5)-(7) below, for instance, the complement-taking properties of the verb predicates seem to be consistently preserved in nominalizations. This fact is assumed to prove that complements of nouns are essentially the same as complements of verbs:

(5a) They *announced that the President would be here to host the ceremony.*
(5b) *The announcement that the President would be here to host the ceremony* had been a mistake.
(6a) I *wish that you would stop arguing.*
(6b) *The wish that you would stop arguing* is shared by most people here.
(7a) I *request that she stay at my office longer.*
(7b) *My request that she stay at my office longer* is because I am extremely busy right now.

In contrast with the pattern represented by such nouns as *suggestion,* the relationship between *ending* and its *that*-clause in (3) is not one of lexical subcategorization, but, rather, one of *predication.* This second type of *that*-clause is not an argument of the head noun *ending*, simply because this noun does not have an argument structure from which complements can be projected.[3] A consequence of this is that the *that*-clause must appear separated from the head-noun by strong intonation breaks in the same way as a non-restrictive, or appositive, modifier. Note that this non-restrictive, loose attachment to the head is obligatory for these nouns:

> (3b) *Have you been told *the ending that she got the divorce after all.*
> (4b) *But you don't know *her postcript that she is resigning in June,* do you?

Insofar as the lexical specification of argument-taking nouns has so perceptible a reflection as the restrictive or close attachment of their expansions —as opposed to the non-restrictive or loose type of attachment of non-argument-taking nouns— the sharp distinction between *that*-complements and *that*-modifiers appears to be quite justified. However, this clearcut distinction is challenged by Matthews (1981: 231 ff.) and Meyer (1992: 51 ff.), who point out that there are NPs whose *that*-clauses are subcategorized and yet non-restrictive. (8b) and (9b) below would be cases of this "mixed" class of NPs:

> (8a) *The suggestion that Bill should leave* disturbed everyone.
> (8b) Have you heard *her latest suggestion, that Bill should leave?*
> (9a) We all had *the feeling that it would not happen.*
> (9b) *Her only feeling, that it wouldn't happen,* was more influential than what was actually going on.

In view of the apparent clash of defining features exhibited by (8a)-(9a), on the one hand, and (8b)-(9b) on the other, Matthews concludes that the distinction between complements and appositive modifiers is sometimes blurred. Meyer goes further and argues that the *that*-clauses in (8b) and (9b) cannot be complements since "No other noun-complements . . . permit the restrictive and non-restrictive opposition illustrated" in them (1992: 51). These *that*-clauses must therefore be appositive modifiers, despite subcategorization.[4] Note that the point made by these two linguists receives some support from the fact that the subcategorized structures of (8b) and (9b) can even admit so-called appositive markers (Quirk et al. 1985: 1262),[5] just like the

postmodifying *that*-clause of the non-argument-taking noun *ending* quoted as (3) above:

> (8c) Have you heard *her latest suggestion, namely, that Bill should leave?*
> (9c) *Her only feeling, namely, that it wouldn't happen,* was more influential than what was actually going on.

> (3c) Have you been told *the ending, namely, that she got the divorce after all?*

In view of the observation made by Matthews and Meyer, then, the traditional sharp distinction between complement *that*-clauses (as in (1)-(2) above) and appositive *that*-clauses (as in (3)-(4) above) would not appear to be well-founded.

A slight correction of the nature of the doubts which Matthews and Meyer express about the status of the clauses under consideration constitutes the first point to be made here. It is important to realise that the evidence these two linguists raise for calling into question the traditional distinction between *that*-complements and *that*-modifiers is one of a lexical nature. It follows from their accounts that for some argument-taking nouns, but not for others, the distinction between a non-restrictive expansion and a restrictive one is entirely arbitrary (Matthews 1981: 232). In reality, however, this is far from being the case. Note from (8d) and (9d) below that the non-restrictive examples they mention become ungrammatical as soon as they are made restrictive, that is, as soon as the intonation boundaries disappear:

> (8d) *Have you heard *her latest suggestion that Bill should leave?*
> (9d) */?*Her only feeling that it wouldn't happen* was more influential than what was actually going on.

This proves that the choice of either a restrictive frame or a non-restrictive one is by no means arbitrary. Now, if the choice of expansion frame is not arbitrary, then it is not lexically-governed, and, if it is not lexically-governed, it must be syntactically so. This implies that general principles of the grammar of the noun phrase must be held accountable for that choice. In other words, general principles of the grammar of the noun phrase must explain why, in instances like (8b) and (9b) above, the non-restrictive type of expansion is obligatory *despite subcategorization*. It so happens that one such principle is indeed at work in these instances. As may have been guessed, this has to do with the modification processes which are licensed by

the structure of the NP as a response to its need to code reference. Note that the examples with obligatory non-restrictive *that*-clauses exhibit premodification by adjectives (Quirk et al. 1985: 1262). As soon as the premodification is left out, these phrases become acceptable:

> (8e) Have you heard *her suggestion that Bill should leave?*
> (9e) *Her feeling that it wouldn't happen* was more influential than what was actually going on.

What appears to be going on here, then, is that once the referential potential of the nominal constituent of the NP is *saturated* (that is, once it can identify a referent in the extralinguistic world), further expansions of the nominal must occur necessarily marked off from the rest. The grammatical effects of referential saturation are not only visible in the grammar of *that*-clauses, but in the grammar of the NP in general. In (10) and (13) below, for instance, the addition of certain constituents to the head nouns (*friend* and *doctor,* respectively) brings about the ill-formed strings (11) and (14). By contrast, when those additions appear after clear demarcative boundaries (as in (12) and (15)), the NPs become acceptable:

> (10) My friend Mary was here yesterday.
> (11) *My friend Mary's father was here yesterday.
>   (meaning 'my friend the father of Mary')
> (12) My friend, Mary's father, was here yesterday.
> (13) The doctor saved her life.
> (14) *The doctor an author of some reputation saved her life.
> (15) The doctor, an author of some reputation, saved her life.[6]

In fact, the exact point at which a head noun acquires a capacity for expressing full reference through the mediation of different kinds of expansions is a matter of some complexity. The restrictive/non-restrictive nature of the expanding constituents, together with their syntactic weight, are probably the most relevant factors in determining the cut-off point where further expansions to the head must appear in a detached fashion (after intonation breaks in speech, or commas in writing). Be that as it may, what is interesting here is that, as is evident from (8d)-(9d), subcategorized *that*-clauses are sensitive to the conditions that determine the referential build-up of the NP. I shall later have occasion to comment on the significance of this fact.

In sum, then, the fact that the non-restrictive frame is sometimes present after such argument-taking nouns as *suggestion* and *feeling* has nothing to do

with these nouns allowing either complements or modifiers as arbitrary syntactic realisations of their arguments, as Matthews appears to believe. Rather, it means that the non-restrictive type of expansion is obligatory (i.e. it is not arbitrary) in accordance with rules of NP structure which are sensitive to the coding of reference. The result of these rules may very well be a kind of neutralization of the habitual distinction between *that*-complements and *that*-modifiers (although I will soon refute this view). Their origin, however, is not lexical idiosyncrasy, but syntactic structure, particularly, the syntactic structure of the noun phrase.

This slight correction of the point brought up by Matthews and Meyer leaves us, provisionally, with a three-way distinction as regards *that*-clauses:

1. First, there are restrictive *that*-clauses which are subcategorized by noun predicates and hence are seen by the grammatical tradition as endowed with complement status:

> (1)   *His suggestion that she should come* caused some concern
> (5b) *The announcement that the President would be here to host the ceremony* had been a mistake.

2. Secondly, there are *that*-clauses which occur after non-argument-taking nouns and are necessarily non-restrictive. They thus function like any other kind of appositive, or non-restrictive, modifier:

> (3)   Have you been told *the ending, that she got the divorce after all?*
> (16) Have you read *the postcript, that your mother is also coming?* (Matthews 1981: 231.)

3. And thirdly, there are *that*-clauses which are lexically specified by their argument-taking nouns and yet non-restrictively attached to them. Apparently, the status of this latter group of *that*-clauses is indeterminate between complementation (by virtue of the lexical specification) and appositive post-modification (by virtue of the non-restrictive type of attachment to the head). The origin of this indeterminacy is related to ordinary syntactic processes which affect the structure of the NP:

> (8b) Have you heard *her latest suggestion, that Bill should leave?*
> (9b) *Her only feeling, that it wouldn't happen,* was more influential than what was actually going on.

3. THE STATUS OF *THAT*-CLAUSE COMPLEMENTS REVISITED

Having thus provisionally established the three-way taxonomy of *that*-clauses in NP structure as outlined above, I would now like to suggest that the indeterminacy of the third kind of *that*-clause just mentioned can be resolved if one abandons the traditional distinction between complements and modifiers altogether, as applied to nominal *that*-clauses, and posits that every *that*-clause in NP structure is a modifier, including type 1 above.

Grimshaw (1990: 74 ff.) takes up the case for the non-existence of *that*-clause complements of nouns. In her account she mentions as essential for the distinction between complements and modifiers aspects such as the obligatoriness of true complements, the possibility of using nominals with non-complements predicatively (i.e. across a copula), differences in meaning and in the choice of determiners, the possibility of "event control,"[7] and their compatibility with various aspectual modifiers (like *constant* or *frequent*). I cannot hope to go into Grimshaw's account now, but the important point to make here is that, by giving due consideration to the facts adduced by Matthews, one may add to Grimshaw's arguments yet another important piece of evidence that *that*-clause complements of nouns indeed do not exist. Consider (8a)-(8c) again, repeated below as (17)-(19):

> (17) *Her suggestion that Bill should leave* disturbed everyone.
> (18) Have you heard *her latest suggestion, that Bill should leave?*
> (19) *Have you heard *her latest suggestion that Bill should leave?*

As remarked before, and as (19) shows, the non-restrictiveness of (18) is obligatory. It has been argued that, as a result of this obligatoriness, the *that*-clause complement in (17) becomes in (18) a constituent of a somewhat unclear status. This change in the relation between the clause and its head noun is caused by the addition of the premodifying adjective *latest,* presumably because the mere addition of this premodifier to the head exhausts the referential capacity of the nominal constituent of the NP (which is now able to activate a reference extralinguistically). Now, the question one must ask oneself is the following: how is it possible that the introduction of a modifier (a dispensable element by definition) can cause a complement to be relegated

to an external position in the overall structure of the noun phrase, thus yielding a configuration in which the premodifier has a closer bond with the head than the complement itself? Indeed, it makes very little sense to contend that the modification processes at work in NP structure can come prior to (and impose conditions on) the complementation processes, because, unlike the former, the latter are a direct reflection of the argument-taking properties of head nouns. Since any constructional hierarchy one may wish to establish must give priority to complements over all other dependents, and since the evidence of (19) above is unquestionable, we are led to conclude that the *that*-clause in (17) cannot be a complement either, but is simply a postmodifier. This conclusion is corroborated by at least the following three facts:

1. In the first place, there is no parallelism in VP structure to what happens in (17)-(19) above. That is, no VP adjunct can bring about the obligatory separation of a *that*-clause complement from its verbal head:

(20) I say that you must go.
(21) I say *now* that you must go.
(22) I say *now* *, that you must go. (with obligatory pause)
(23) He told me *the other day when we met at the bar* that Liz is determined to kill the man.
(24) He told me *the other day when we met at the bar* *, that Liz is determined to kill the man. (with obligatory pause)

2. In the second place, and perhaps more relevantly, other constituents in NP structure which do appear to behave like true complements can coexist perfectly well with premodifiers, as (25) below shows:

(25) The latest expression *of her feelings* was shocking to the audience. (Compare with *she expressed her feelings*)

Note that *expression* in (25) is a complex noun and, as such, it requires the presence of complements of the right kind as projections of its argument structure. Its complement appears in (25) in the form of the PP *of her feelings,* and, in the adequate interpretation of *expression,*[8] the absence of this complement brings about ungrammaticality (e.g. *the frequent expression *(of offensive feelings) by players*). When the PP complement is present, however, no compatibility problems of the sort seen in (19) (**her latest suggestion that Bill should leave*) arise.[9]

3. In the third place, the looseness of the bond existing between argument-taking nouns and their *that*-clauses is evidenced by the fact that some of these clauses can even undergo *extraposition*. As (29) below shows, extraposition is not possible with relative clauses, even though relatives are modifying structures and therefore, in principle, less intimately attached to their heads than complements:[10]

(26) *The belief that she was going to resign* became quite widespread.
(27) *The belief* became quite widespread *that she was going to resign.*
(28) *The belief which she shared with us* became quite widespread later.
(29) **The belief* became quite widespread *later which she shared with us.*

So once again, (26)-(29) make it clear that *that*-clauses are not only tenuously connected with their argument-taking nouns, but in some respects even more tenuously connected than other typical modifiers.

4. EPILOGUE: PRIORITIES IN NP STRUCTURE

To sum up, then, the evidence that can be derived from the three noun phrases in (17)-(19) alone is enough in itself, if interpreted adequately, to reject the existence of nominal *that*-clause complements. And this in a way which follows from the general principles of NP structure. What is interesting about the initially indeterminate type of *that*-clause brought up by Matthews and Meyer is that it forces one to re-consider the criteria which have usually been invoked as evidence for the distinction between *that*-complements and *that*-modifiers. The standard view is simply that lexical subcategorization provides a direct, clear-cut pathway between the meaning of lexical items and the syntactic behaviour of their lexically-specified arguments. If a lexical item (a noun or a verb) subcategorizes an argument, then that argument must manifest itself syntactically as a complement (as opposed to non-arguments, which surface as modifiers). This view implies an intimate syntactic connection between the subcategorizing head and the subcategorized complement. Now this is true (with some complications) of VP structure. Indeed, simplifying a little, the structure of the verb phrase emerges largely out of the confluence of two independent axes: on the one hand, there is the need for the VP to give syntactic expression to the head/argument relationship (which is relevant here); on the other, there is also the need for the VP to code tempo-

ral, aspectual and modal meanings. These two axes are in total harmony in the VP, in the sense that the satisfaction of either one does not interfere with the satisfaction of the other. Since the two axes are given equal weight in the VP, the head/argument relationship is not affected by the coding of time, aspect and modality, which means that there is no impediment to arguments surfacing as true complements. The direct pathway between lexical meaning and complement structure, via argument structure, is therefore unobstructed.

But the structure of the noun phrase presents a different scenario. In this, one of the axes continues to be the head/argument relationship, but the other is now, in broad terms, the coding of reference. The fundamental difference between the NP and VP structures is that, in the former, one of the axes (the coding of reference) *does* affect the other (the head/argument relationship). As has been seen, this is evident from the fact that, in order to encode reference, via modification, the lexically-specified arguments of head nouns often surface, not as complements, as in VP structure, but as "second-rate" (i.e. detached) modifiers (that is, not even as ordinary modifiers: e.g. *her LATEST suggestion that she couldn't come / her LATEST suggestion, that she couldn't come,* where the modifier *latest* imposes conditions on the putative complement *that she couldn't come*, and not the other way round). The reference axis is thus given priority over the head/argument relationship. The pathway between lexical meaning and complement structure, via argument structure, is therefore blocked this time. There is then a fundamental distinction in the way in which argument-taking lexical items have their logico-semantic specification mapped on to syntactic structure. While verbs always have their arguments surface as complements, such is not always the case with nouns. In particular, *that*-clause arguments never do so. This is not, of course, a novel claim, but the order of the priorities in NP structure which have been documented here do more, I believe, than merely favour this interpretation. Indeed, these priorities can hardly admit of any other interpretation.a

NOTES

1. I wish to thank Teresa Fanego, Elena Seoane, M. José López and Belén Méndez for their helpful comments on an early draft.

2. The class of argument-taking nouns tends to coincide with those nominal predicates which denote mental processes (although nouns such as *fact* or *idea* do not easily fit in this description).

3. The distinction between argument-taking (or complex) and non-argument-taking (or simple) nouns accords with the traditional distinction between process and result nouns. Result nouns designate the output or result of a process, whereas process nouns code the process itself.

4. As a matter of fact, both Matthews and Meyer treat all these structures in their separate discussions of the nebulous notion of apposition. This fact should not affect the present discussion because: 1. there is no syntactic parallelism between NPs with detached *that*-clauses and canonical cases of apposition (e.g. *London, the capital of Great Britain*), which means that apposition, strictly speaking, is out of the question (see N. Burton-Roberts 1975); and 2. Meyer himself conceives of apposition as a gradable relationship ("Appositions can be either coordinative or subordinative. . . . Those that are subordinative will be considered peripheral appositions and on gradients between central apposition and coordination, peripheral elements (Matthews 1981: 123 ff.), modification and complementation", Meyer 1992: 41). This means that when he analyses "the gradient between apposition and complementation", the term *apposition* designates, as he uses it, what most linguists would loosely refer to as appositive postmodification, or simply, postmodification. For a review of Meyer's work, see Acuña (1994).

5. Note that true complements, like those in VP structure, cannot take appositive markers:

> a. Peter felt *that life was becoming senseless for him*.
> b. *Peter felt, *namely, that life was becoming senseless for him*.

6. For an account of the ungrammaticality of these constructions, see especially Burton-Roberts (1975: 395 ff).

7. Drawing on H. Lasnik (1988: 1-17) and E. Williams (1985: 297-315), Grimshaw contends that complex (*i.e.* argument-taking) nominals allow control into an infinitival purpose clause, and that the controller in such cases is the event denoted by the nominal (1990: 57-8):

> a. The translation of the book (in order) to make it available to a wider readership.
> b. *The exam (in order) to make it available to a wider readership.

But nominals containing *that*-clauses behave like non-argument-taking nominals (like *exam*) in that they do not allow control because they do not have "an internal semantic analysis of the event provided by the event structures" (1990: 59). Therefore the purpose clauses occurring after them are associated only with the lower clause. Note that the purpose clauses occurring in VP structure can be associated with either clause (1990: 76-7):

> c. Their statement that the president intends to retire in order to mislead the public was absurd.

    d. They stated that the president intends to retire in order to mislead the public.

    8. There is another interpretation of *expression* which reveals that this noun may be both a complex noun, as in (25), and a simple one, as in *he had such a sad expression (i.e. look) on his face*. For ways of disambiguating between the complex and the simple readings of various nominals, see Grimshaw (1990: 45 ff.).

    9. According to the subcomponent of Government and Binding theory known as *case theory*, NPs cannot assign structural case, which means that they require prepositions intervening between the head (*expression* here) and the NP complement (*her feelings*) in order for case to be assigned to the latter. The different acceptability of PPs and *that*-clauses in the noun phrase domain (compare (8d) with (25)) may therefore be related to the fact that *that*-clauses are not assigned case. However, Grimshaw (1990: 70 ff.) argues that it is not case but theta-marking that causes the observed differences. On *of*-insertion and case, see Chomsky (1986: 194) and Haegeman (1991: 162 ff.).

    10. Note also that in VP structure, the extraposition of the complement tends to result in the appearance of a syntactic *place holder* which guarantees that the close liaison existing between the verbal predicate and its complement is preserved (e.g. *I took it for granted that she was going to resign*).

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-IRONY AND THE OTHER OFF RECORD STRATEGIES WITHIN POLITENESS THEORY -

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1. INTRODUCTION

The present paper is part of a more complete study of the phenomenon of VERBAL IRONY within the framework of Politeness theory as presented by Brown and Levinson in their book *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Use* (1987, first published 1978). The possibility of combining an off record strategy such as irony with on record strategies has already been considered (Alba Juez, 1994a). In the present paper some examples are presented which illustrate the combination of verbal irony with the other off record strategies set out in the theory by Brown and Levinson. It is taken for granted that the reader is familiar with Politeness Theory, and hence many concepts are not explained or defined herein.

In previous papers (Alba Juez 1994a and b) I have tried to show the richness and versatility of the phenomenon of verbal irony, seen from the viewpoint of Politeness Theory. In particular, it was maintained that irony is not just a simple off record strategy and that it can be used in combination with on record strategies (in spite of what Brown and Levinson say). Some exam-

ples were given to support this hypothesis (in Alba Juez, 1994a), which showed that irony does not always fit perfectly within off record strategies, since they exhibit a clear use of Positive and/or Negative Politenes (both strategies placed within the on record superstrategy by Brown and Levinson). One of the examples presented is precisely one given by Brown and Levinson as an illustration for a strategy within Positive Politeness ("Joke"), but that I believe is also a clear instance of what I call "Positive Irony" (irony used to convey praise).[1]

How about lending me this old heap of junk? (1987: 124)

Here the speaker refers to the hearer's new Cadillac, and the irony is used in a joke in order to praise the car, since it is evident that the car is not old, but new and expensive. In the same paper I attempted to define irony within the framework of the theory, and I called it a "tentative" definition because I agree with Enright (1988) in that irony is so rich and elusive a concept that it is very difficult to define. Booth (1974) very wittily remarks that "its very spirit and value are violated by the effort to be clear about it" (1974: ix). The evidence of the numerous examples in our corpus showed that when a speaker is being ironical he is not always trying to convey "the opposite of the proposition or of the literal meaning of the utterance," as the traditional approaches define irony; nor is he always "echoing" some previous utterance or thought, as Sperber and Wilson state in their theory (1981, 1984, 1986 and 1992), nor is he always "pretending," as Clark and Gerrig state (1984). The ironic speaker may be doing all, some or none of these things and still be ironic.[2] The tentative definition was then, the following:

> Irony is a strategy[3] used by a speaker or writer, which is intended to criticise or to praise in an indirect, off record way, but which can occur in combination with some typically on record strategies as well. Sometimes, but not always, it is intended to mean the opposite of its literal meaning. In many cases it reveals an echoic mention, but in many others its variety and richness go beyond all this. It generally shows or expresses some kind of contradiction (which can be realised at different levels). (Alba 1994a: 10)

Later on I have found examples of verbal irony in which the speaker or writer is neither criticising nor praising, which led me to the conclusion that there is also a kind of "neutral" irony, as illustrated by the following example

from Pascal's Letters, quoted by Enright (1988) as being the best known of Pascal's ironies: it comes towards the end of Pascal's letter XVI, when he explains apologetically that "the letter is longer than usual only because he didn't have the time to make it shorter" (1988: 11). I am, then, still working on a better and all-embracing definition of irony, which I hope to complete at the end of my research. As can be deduced, the findings of this research have hitherto caused my disagreement with Brown and Levinson in their attempt to define irony, for they consider only the authors that have defined irony as *always* conveying criticism (1987: 262-3).

It has also been shown (in Alba Juez, 1994b) that when a speaker is ironic he can violate not only the Maxim of Quality (as stated by the theory) but also the other Gricean Maxims as well. Verbal irony goes beyond "meaning the opposite of what is said," and many times we are ironic and at the same time we are telling the truth, as can be illustrated by a speaker who says: "I love people with good manners" to a person who has obviously shown bad manners to him. It is true that "he loves people with good manners," but at the same time he is implicating that the other person did not have a proper behaviour, and that is what makes the utterance ironic. Leech (1983) also shows to a certain extent that not only the Quality Maxim can be violated when being ironic.[4]

In the present paper, the main objective is now to show —by means of examples taken from spoken and written discourse- how irony (an off record strategy) can co-occur with the other off record strategies presented by Brown and Levinson in their theory. These strategies are illustrated in the chart reproduced on the following page (Brown and Levinson 1987: 214).

Brown and Levinson explain that "a communicative act is done off record if it is done in such a way that it is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention to the act" (1987: 211). This is, then, an ideal strategy to use when the speaker wants to avoid responsibility for doing a Face Threatening Act (FTA). The clue to the correct interpretation of off record FTAs lies in the making of some inferences which will allow the addressee to understand what was in fact intended by the speaker. The off record speaker/writer, then, invites conversational implicatures by flouting, in some way, the Gricean Maxims of Communication. Though irony occupies a very definite position in the chart, as a substrategy violating the Quality Maxim, it seems (from the evidence of the examples found) that it can move upwards or downwards in the list of substrategies.

Off record
Do FTAx, but
Be Indirect

5.5.1. Invite
conversational
implicatures, via
hints triggered
by violation of
Gricean Maxims

5.5.2. Be vague
or ambiguous

Violate
Relevance
Maxim

Violate
Quantity
Maxims

Violate
Quality
Maxim

Violate
Manner
Maxim

1. Give hints

Motives for doing A

Conditions for A

2. Give association clues

3. Presuppose

4. Understate

5. Overstate

6. Use tautology

7. Use contradictions

8. Be ironic

9. Use metaphors

10. Use rhetorical questions

11. Be ambiguous

12. Be vague

13. Over-generalize

14. Displace H

15. Be incomplete, use ellipsis

(Brown and Levinson 1987: 214).

2. IRONY + OTHER OFF RECORD STRATEGIES

2.1. Strategies violating the Relevance Maxim

"Give association clues" is off record strategy nº 2 in the chart shown on the previous page, distinct and separate from strategy nº 8 ("Be ironic"). But a speaker can be ironic by giving association clues, although it does not follow that all the times we use association clues we intend to be ironic. In the following passage written by Bertrand Russell, the author gives association clues to the reader, who —by making comparisons— will be led to the conclusion that Professors of Philosophy and dictators are lunatics. This strategy constitutes, at the same time, an indirect, ironic criticism:

> Men who allow their love of power to give them a distorted view of the world are to be found in every asylum: one man will think he is the Governor of the Bank of England, another will think he is the King, and yet another will think he is God. Highly similar delusions, if expressed by educated men in obscure language, lead to professorships of Philosophy; and if expressed by emotional men in eloquent language, lead to dictatorships. (1958:25)

2.2. Strategies violating the Quantity Maxim

It has been observed that irony can also be conveyed by means of understatement (a way of generating implicatures by saying less than is required) or overstatements (a way of generating implicatures by saying more than necessary, i.e., exaggerating or choosing a point on a scale which is higher than is warranted by the actual state of affairs). These are strategies 4 and 5 (violating the quantity maxim) in the off record chart. In the following excerpt from a dialogue from the London Lund Corpus of English Conversation, the speakers (two academics) are criticising the temperamental nature of the Head of Department. They have previously said that he is a moody person and that one day he has great arguments with someone about

something and the next day he expounds that person's views as his own with great conviction, never admitting he had been wrong. B understates by hedging on the amount of criticism he is willing to make with such expressions as "a bit" or "in a way," which, together with their laughter (and the falling-rising intonation given to key words) also allow for an ironic interpretation:

B 11 *((but . ^that !is only :n\/atural#))*
A 11 a ^ra*ther 'weak ch\aracter#
A 11 ^d\oesn`t it#
B 11 ^m\ay'be#
B 20 *((untranscribable murmur))*
A 11 *^not 'quite b\ig e'nough#
A 11 to ^go* and 'say l\ook old 'chap#
A 11 ^y\ou were r/ight# -
A 11 or per^haps not _even _big e_nough _to .
A 11 r\ecog'nize#
B 11 I ^got the im:pr\/ession#
B 11 that he ^didn`t !r\ecog'nize it# .
A 11 ^n\o#
A 11 *^pr\obably#*
B 12 *^that '[@:](((m]))* - he ^just di!g\ested the
B 12 'id/eas#
B 11 and ^then _came _out with _them _quite
B 11 spont_aneously and without re!fl\ection#
B 21 *((but it`s a)) ^bit*
A 11 *^[\m]#*
B 11 d/\ifficult#
B 11 in a ^w\/ay# -
B 11 that a ^person could be "!s\o unre"fl/ective#
B 11 as ^not to _r/\ealize#
B 11 that he`d ^ch\anged his m/ind#
B 20 *(- laughs)*
A 11 *^[\m]#*

(Svartvik and Quirk, 1980: S.1.6)

An example of irony conveyed by means of an exaggeration (i.e., over-statement) can be observed in the following chunk of dialogue (taken from the scripts of the well known T.V. series "The Golden Girls"). The irony is found in Dorothy's reply to Blanche's comment that her boyfriend is younger than she is (implicating that she's lying and consequently that Dirk is much younger):

> *Blanche:* I've decided I can handle this relationship. I'm going out with Dirk Saturday night.
> *Dorothy:* Was it ever in doubt?
> *Blanche:* Momentarily. This is strictly off the record, but Dirk is nearly five years younger than I am.
> *Dorothy:* In what, Blanche? Dog years?

The Golden Girls (1991:65)

2.3. Strategies violating the Quality Maxim

"Use contradictions" (strategy nº7) belongs in the same group as "Be ironic" (i.e. strategies violating the Quality Maxim) and it seems that both work together more often than not. Although not all contradictions are ironic, it appears to be a fact that in all ironies a contradiction of some kind is implied. In prototypical ironies, i.e. those meaning "the opposite," contradictions are more obvious, but in the less prototypical cases, there always seems to be a contradiction of some sort. In the words of D. J. Enright: "Affirm and deny in one sentence, and you too can be a romantic ironist" (1988: 15).

Consider the case in which a teacher is angry at her students' behaviour (they are talking and not paying attention to her explanations) and so she says in a loud voice, with annoyance, "May I continue with my explanations?" or "Would you allow me to carry on? She is being ironical by asking for permission (and using negative politeness) to go ahead, but implicating that she should not be doing this, since she is the teacher and in general, in such a situation, it is the students who should be asking for permission to talk. Then the irony does not lie in the opposite of the literal meaning of the utterance, but in the *contradiction of speech acts*. That is, she should not be asking them for permission, in fact she has the power to perform an order or command, but she changes the speech act ironically to indirectly criticise the students' behaviour.

Ironical effects can also be achieved by means of a metaphor (strategy nº9). For example, one could ironically criticize a singer one considers to be bad by saying: "He's a nightingale!" Similarly, in the following dialogue from the aforementioned London Lund Corpus, A refers ironically to the Board of the Faculty as a "Supreme Soviet" (a metaphor that is hedged by the particle "sort of"), after some mild criticisms concerning academic structure and its bureaucracy:

B 21 3thought that you were on this [@m] -
A 11 3^n\o# -
B 11 3^faculty board repre:s\entative ((2 to 3 sylls#
B 11 3what^ever you c\all it#)) .
A 11 3no [dh @] it`s ^{c\alled} . board of the
A 11 3f\aculty# *-*
B 11 3*^[=mhm]#*
A 11 3you ^s=ee#
A 11 3we ^we . are members of the :faculty of \/arts
A 11 3{*of* the uni^v/ersity#}# -
B 11 3*((^y/es#))*
A 11 3^but . [dhi] . !faculty of \arts# .
A 11 3^has . [@:] a sort of - su!preme s\oviet# .
A 21 3*.* . which is
B 11 3*^[/mhm]#*
A 11 3called the "^b\oard of the _faculty#
B 11 3^y\es#

(Svartvik and Quirk 1980: 1.2)

Rhetorical questions (strategy nº 10) can also be mixed with irony as can be appreciated in the following passage taken from the fictional diaries of a Cabinet Minister corresponding to the BBC T.V. series *Yes Minister* (published as *The Complete "Yes Minister"*). In this passage the Minister's wife ironically complains about the fact that her husband and his political adviser are together most of the time. She then makes use of some rhetorical questions:

The phone rang. I grabbed it. It was Frank Weisel, my special political adviser, saying that he was on his way over. I told Annie, who wasn't pleased.

"Why doesn't he just move in?" she asked bitterly.
 Sometimes I just don't understand her. I patiently explained to her that, as my political adviser, I depend on Frank more than anyone.
 "Then why don't you marry him?" she asked. "I now pronounce you man and political adviser. Whom politics has joined let no wife put asunder. (Lynn and Jay 1989: 11-12)

Besides the ironic rhetorical questions, there is a sardonic echoic irony in re-producing the performative act of marrying.

2.4. Strategies violating the Manner Maxim

Being ambiguous (strategy nº 11 violating the Manner Maxim) is also characteristic of most ironies (if not of all). Likewise, one may be vague or may overgeneralize (strategies 12 and 13) when being ironic. The examples given by Brown and Levinson (in the aforementioned book) illustrating these two strategies could also be interpreted as ironical in some particular situations. Example nº 81 (in which the speaker is vague) could in a given context be taken as an indirect criticism and reproach (for example, uttered by a wife who is tired of her husband's addiction to alcohol):

(81) Looks like someone may have had too much to drink. (1987: 226)

Similarly, example 86 (illustrating over-generalization) could be used ironically to implicate "you're not mature" and/or "you should help me":

(86) Mature people sometimes help do the dishes. (1987: 226)

It is also possible to ironically "displace H" (strategy nº 14). Brown and Levinson describe this strategy as one in which the speaker goes off record as to who the target for his FTA is, or he may pretend to address the FTA to someone whom it would not threaten, and hope that the real target will see that the FTA is aimed at him. This seems to be the case in the following scene from "The Golden Girls," in which Blanche, Dorothy and Rose are in a demonstration, and Dorothy criticises Rose's speech in an ironical way. They do not speak directly to Rose, though she can hear them:

Rose: (into megaphone) All creatures must learn to coexist. Back where I come from, they do. That's why the brown bear and the field

mouse can share their lives and live in harmony. 'Course, they can't mate or the mice would explode. You know what I mean.
Dorothy: (to Blanche) I think Rose needs to work on her metaphors.
(1991: 95)

In many cases, more than two of these strategies can work together, as can be seen from an analysis of many of the examples given. In the following passage there is a combination of irony, overgeneralization, giving association clues and being vague and ambiguous (Sophia's final remark is an indirect criticism towards Martha's decision to commit suicide):

Sophia: I don't care if you are paying for dinner. What you want to do is crazy.
Martha: It's time to go, Sophia. I don't want to see another Monday. I don't want to wait and end up going like Lydia. I'm going to decide when it's over.
Sophia: I always thought somebody named God did that.
                                            The Golden Girls (1991: 113)

3. CONCLUSION

It is hoped that this analysis of the above examples will have illustrated some of the many strategies an ironic speaker/writer has at his disposal, and will have helped to clarify the concept of verbal irony by showing that it is not an isolated strategy, separate and completely distinct from the other strategies. In a previous paper (Alba Juez 1994a) it was shown that it can combine very well with on record strategies, and in the present one I have tried to show how it can also work together and co-occur with the other off record strategies considered by Brown and Levinson in Politeness Theory. Thus we have seen that the use of one strategy does not exclude the use of another at the same time, and in particular, that an ironic speaker/writer can make use of a lot of resources in order to make his/her point.a

NOTES

1. Though many authors only consider irony as an aggressive weapon, there are many others who have also considered the possibility of its use with a praising intention, namely, Pelc (1971), who calls it "anti-irony", King and Crerar (1969), Haverkate (1988), Holdcroft (1983).

2. A more detailed discussion of these aspects is given in chapter 2 of my Doctoral Thesis (forthcoming). I do not consider it necessary to go further in the discussion of previous definitions for the purposes of this paper.

3. The concept of strategy is not defined by Brown and Levinson in the aforementioned book, but I understand it as an attempt from part of the speaker to reach (by means of various linguistic procedures) a given communicative aim.

4. Leech's position and viewpoint with respect to irony is analysed in a more complete way in Chapter 6 of the aforementioned thesis.

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REVISING
SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY:
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES
IN THE NOVELS OF
NADINE GORDIMER
_'

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I. HISTORY AND FICTION

A reexamination of the relations between literature and history is a character-istic of this postmodern era. History is thus considered, not only as the recording of events of the past, but as the telling of a story about the events of the past. The innovation lies not in the subject matter, but in a more daring crossing of the traditional boundaries between what had always been called "literature" and what had always been accepted as "history." The mixing is not new; the historical novel, as well as the epic, have long existed as literary genres. The problem, as Linda Hutcheon explains, seems to reside in the manner, in "the self-consciousness of the fictionality, the lack of the familiar pretence of transparency, and the calling into question of the factual grounding of history-writing" (Hutcheon 1989: 35).

Similarly, post-structuralist thought makes it clear that history is always "narrated," implying that the past is not available in pure form, but always as

"representations." History is thus understood to be the re-creation of past events, through a combination of memory and imagination, intuition and narrative discourse, signalling close parallels between it and what is considered "fiction." In this regard, the manner in which the discourse is presented, and, in particular, the perspective chosen to articulate it, are essential features for the understanding of history. In contrast, Stephen Clingman has observed how "history as it has been lived and experienced by people" is best shown in literature, "a perfect medium for exploring those questions, for it is in fiction that individual and social narratives are given visible and public voice" (1986: ix). This issue is of particular importance for post-colonial literature, an area of research that receives its name not only from a historical period of time, but also from a very specific historical event, such as colonization. South African literature, though its experience of colonization has unique peculiarities, can be considered within the group of post-colonial fiction. The notorious policies of apartheid, which can be viewed as a kind of colonization over a large sector of black South Africans, has bred a vision of history that is singular to that country, and which has been continually interpreted by fiction. A. E. Voss, in an article dealing with current South African writing, points to a new post-apartheid era in which "for knowledge and understanding of the past we will rely on writing of the future" (1992: 2). South Africa's main feature is an immense variety of human backgrounds and situations: an extraordinarily large number of ethnically separate groups, a great divide between rich and poor, between whites and non-whites, landowners and non-landowners. And everyday peaceful coexistence will depend a great deal on a general acceptance of different perspectives and attitudes toward the same realities.

II. NADINE GORDIMER, INTERPRETER OF SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

Nadine Gordimer, whose narratives blur the boundaries of history and fiction, has created debate on the issue of the values of the past, national culture and political situations. This writer is considered by many as an interpreter of South African reality, and many read her fiction primarily for its vivid record of life in a controversial country (Magarey 1974: 50). Clingman affirms that Gordimer gives us an extraordinarily unique insight into historical experience in the period in which she has been writing: "If we are searching for an inner pathway to guide us through South African history

over the past forty or so years, there are few better places to look for it than in her novels" (1986: 244). Jonathan White believes that a novel such as *Burger's Daughter* has exerted a considerable influence on the knowledge people have of history, claiming that novel-writing can be an alternative way of making history, as it delves into history, and, in this manner, influences the future: he affirms that history is not the opposite of fiction, but "its mirrored one" (1993: 220). Similarly, Barbara Temple shows how Gordimer's novels, if read from the perspective of the new historicism, are of great value in our understanding of South Africa, praising Gordimer's "astute and reflexive historical consciousness" (1991: 175).

Not all critics agree on this point. Katrin Wagner accuses Gordimer of providing a primarily subjective and necessarily partial vision of South Africa. She asserts that Gordimer bases the "sub-text" of her novels in an internal paradox between her open message against apartheid, her prejudices as a white writer with particular fears, and a subconscious discourse that opposes the challenge to change in South Africa. She accuses Gordimer of using stereotypes, clichés, simplifications, and idealizations that distort history, giving finally a particular ideological reading of history rather than a representation of it. Finally she concludes that Gordimer's work must not be read as a reflection of South Africa but as her own personal drama (Wagner 1990: 105).

Nonetheless, the claim that being "subjective and partial" in postmodernist fiction is not regrettable, but quite the opposite, may be sustained. The reflection of the past in a postmodern novel is not brought about as it was in the previous realist mode, but from a distorted, fragmented and partial vision of historical events, and from subjective and personal viewpoints. What critics like Katrin Wagner consider clichés or simplifications stem from a failure to appreciate the value of the novel's presentation of multiple viewpoints and different ideologies. Katrin Wagner accuses Gordimer, for example, of suggesting that Mehring's wealthy and careless way of life is "the way in which white South Africans in general live," arguing that "it distorts a far more complex reality" (Wagner 1990: 100-101). Gordimer's characterization of Mehring is particular enough so as not to imply that he represents an average white citizen of South Africa. He is one case, representing one possible type of conflict that is significant because the social injustice upon which South African society is built makes this kind of things probable. Similarly, she points out that the novel's conclusion is "politically simplistic" (Wagner 1990: 96). Mehring abandons the farm and flees overseas leaving the land to its "true" owners, the community of black farm labourers who live on it and

off it. This ending can only be considered simplistic if we ignore precisely the meaning and intention of the novel's form: the development of that amalgam of voices and perspectives displayed through the story, the growing ambiguity of the final chapters, and the fact that the problems of Mehring's farm and of land ownership in general are left unresolved when he leaves. Wagner's final point, that Gordimer's work must not be read as a reflection of South Africa but rather as a personal statement, is also easy to answer: though the dramas enacted in her novels are clearly personal ones, we may argue that the discourses are not exclusively reflections of Gordimer's personal point of view but that, in the different novels, she proposes to present different versions of the same drama of South African history. In particular, because she is white, Gordimer has been accused of not really understanding the black struggle. This article attempts to show precisely how her meticulous use of narrative perspective enables her to approach South African reality with a depth and scope that surpasses personal experience.

Clingman argues further that Gordimer's novels provide a deep understanding of the history of South Africa, not simply because of their content, but especially because of their form: "Gordimer's novels are so valuable historically because they are so accomplished and developed as fiction. Thus, form will often be the key to consciousness, and it is where the novels are aesthetically richest that they are most useful for tracing out our history" (1986: 19). Gordimer's achievement lies more in the perspective she provides than in the literal truth of the situations she presents. In particular, her recreation of South African history and identity can be discovered in the narrative frame through which she presents the various stories. Mieke Bal has stressed that "whenever events are presented, they are always presented from within a certain 'vision'. A point of view is chosen, a certain way of seeing things, a certain angle, whether 'real' historical facts are concerned or fictitious events" (Bal 1985: 100). Gordimer displays in her novels a wide range of different voices recounting how people experienced South African history, diverse perspectives that provide a deeper understanding of the second half of the twentieth century, up to the abolition of apartheid, and show the intersection of private lives and the public history of South Africa.

The point of view is, in the case of Gordimer's narrative, precisely the place in which history and fiction meet; the perspective from which each story is told marks the distance between South African history and culture and the "truth" Gordimer wants to convey. Her novels thus pose in acute form the question of whose story will be told, and who will tell it. Bruce King, in an analysis of the evolution of Gordimer's novels, asserts that we can

see how "the novel form evolved to become increasingly 'postmodern' and multivoiced" (1993: 3). This multiplicity of voices and the corresponding shifts in perspective, evident in each of the novels, provide ways to explore the close connection between the personal and the political. Aware of the possibilities of viewpoint manipulation, the writer often displays alternating points of view that show from very different perspectives how people were influenced and determined by the politics of South Africa. The flexibility in her manipulation of point of view is observed, in particular, in the four novels that will be studied here in detail: *A Guest of Honour* (1971), *The Conservationist* (1974), *Burger's Daughter* (1979), and *My Son's Story* (1991).

III. *A GUEST OF HONOUR*:
ALTERNATIVE FOCALISATION

A Guest of Honour, though a third-person narration, is channelled through different focalizers. For the most part, it is Bray, a retired British colonel and a former colonial officer who returns for the independence celebrations in the African country from which he had been expelled ten years earlier for co-operating with the independence movement. His stay is extended, partly because he becomes involved in writing a governmental report on education, and partly because he is having an affair with Rebecca, a young woman who has been living in Africa for years now, studiously ignoring politics. As the narrative aligns itself with Bray's perspective, the political theme predominates. The novel, seen through the eyes of an Englishman, implies that a post-colonial situation, ostensibly an improvement over the previous colonialism, is not the solution to every problem, and that native people can be as good or as evil as any foreigner. *A Guest of Honour* ultimately reveals what Neocolonialism means to Africa. It is shown as a social, political and economic pattern that comes into being after independence and ironically keeps Africa dependent. It is only a façade that conceals the reality of continued exploitation (Clingman 1986: 116). Only the people who rule the country seem to change, and this will inevitably bring tragedy.

At the beginning, Bray thinks that he will meet Mweta and Shinza, two African friends, again. The three of them had fought together for independence and now he expects them to be governing together. But he finds that Mweta is now in power and that Shinza has disappeared to form a guerrilla group that will eventually bring the country to civil war. Bray's

focalisation provides the story with a rather naïve interpretation of events, because, as a liberal white, he believes, at least at the beginning of the story, in future post-colonial prosperity (*GH* 126). In spite of Bray's focalization, the omniscient narrator chooses to portray many ironically symbolic images as significant hints to the reader that that initial enthusiasm will soon fade away. For example, after the independence day celebrations, we are given a description of how "the coloured bulbs that spelled out INDEPENDENCE HURRAH had been fused by the rain, and were not working" (*GH* 43). The novel shows Bray's learning process, from idealism to finally committing himself to a specific cause, that of Shinza, and he will also learn that violence is unavoidable in Shinza's cause: "He had no others [means] to offer with any hope of achieving the end, and as he had accepted the necessity of the end, he had no choice" (*GH* 465).

In spite of the fact that the country portrayed in the novel is imaginary, *A Guest of Honour* is an important aid to understanding the vision of post-colonial transitions as seen by liberal whites who tried to help in the process (later novels will also develop this theme of how the role of liberal whites in Africa is difficult, if not futile[1]). Nonetheless, this fictitious independence process bears some resemblance to that of Zambia in the late sixties. Jan Kees Van Donge explains the parallelisms; he argues that the main characters have strong similarities to real political leaders in Zambia, and that the political and economic situation described in the novel is similar to that of Zambia in the 60s (Van Donge 1982: 80-90). However, he concludes that the novel "fails to construct a believable reality" (1982: 81). This historical background provides Gordimer with the opportunity to explore the wider topic of post-colonialism and African independence, but this does not mean that she should adhere to any rule of realistic credibility:

> Gordimer is concerned not simply to repeat a real story in and for itself; rather she uses the original example to investigate at a level of typicality the changed social and historical realities of the moment from which it emanates. (Clingman 1986: 77)

Van Donge acknowledges that there are many remarks and incidents in the book which help to reveal the nature of African politics. Gordimer does change many of the facts known about Zambia's independence, and, as Van Donge suggests "this is Zambia seen through South African eyes, Zambia 'colonized' in the imagination as a setting for the South African problem" (1982: 81). In this sense, *A Guest of Honour* could be considered a "post-

apartheid" novel, showing how history does not stop with "independence": problems and commitments will continue.

When Bray is killed towards the end of the novel, the story shifts to Rebecca's focalisation. By aligning her narrative with Rebecca's steadily inward-looking and unapologetically apolitical point of view, Gordimer emphasizes the significance of the relationship between Rebecca and Bray in the earlier part of the novel and calls attention to the way in which Rebecca's presence has not only influenced the course of Bray's experience but has also shaped Bray's perception of his own political commitment (Donaghy 1988: 21). This shift in focalisation not only distances readers from the moment of Bray's murder involving them as it does in the young woman's attempt to explain his death and life: it also redirects the narrative focus inwards, toward the private and the personal terrain, far removed from political debate. Rebecca is a foil to Bray: she cannot appreciate the historical ironies surrounding Bray, but the very limitations of her outlook enable readers to evaluate Bray's personal experience beyond the criterion of the efficacy of his political action. She realizes at the end of the novel how much she has learned with Bray: "He had made his life in accordance with some conscious choice—beliefs she supposed. . . . She had never lived with anyone like that before" (*GH* 519). In the integration of Bray's perspective with Rebecca's, this novel allows for the possibility of meaningful personal engagement even as it depicts the failure of a revolution (Donaghy 1988: 32). The novel follows Rebecca's isolation through Mozambique, Zurich and London, and at the end there is another shift in focalizer. The omniscient narrator chooses to show final events through a newspaper report:

> The two airlifts of troops who were flown in at Mweta's request for help from Britain succeeded in bringing order to the country for the time being. It was the same order of things that had led to disorder in the first place, but Mweta was back in his big house and Shinza was in exile. (*GH* 525).

This final detached perspective brings out the ambiguity and difficulty involved in considering post-colonialism in Africa, and the various perspectives show the inclusive nature of the novel's approach to the common problem in all African countries: independence and the formation of a new country.

IV. *THE CONSERVATIONIST*:
FRAGMENTED VOICES FROM THE LAND

The Conservationist is considered to be Gordimer's foray into postmodernist fiction (King 1993: 4). The foreshadowing of the many voices, the confusion of facts with fantasies, its intertextuality, the unreliable or dislocated multiple narration mark this novel off from the previous ones. This formal presentation acquires significance in the story of a white industrialist, Mehring, who represents white dominion over a land inhabited by blacks, a land that becomes the subject of the novel. In South Africa, after the Native Land Act of 1913, Africans were prevented from acquiring land outside their reserves, so the situation the novel presents must be read against this historical background of injustice. Mehring also embodies to a certain extent a major reality of this time, namely the sense that the cohesion of South Africa was beginning to crumble: the massive 1971 strike against the system of contract labour in Namibia (explicitly mentioned in *The Conservationist*); the Natal strikes in 1973-74; the Black Consciousness movement that was beginning to take a strong hold amongst a black student intelligentsia, which led to the Soweto Students Revolt in 1976, etc. The independence of Mozambique in 1974 also had a tremendous symbolic significance for South Africa.

It is important to remember that Mehring is no great racist; he represents a capitalist sector in South Africa, for which apartheid has been little more than an embarrassment. He acknowledges injustice: "What percentage of the world is starving? How long can we go on getting away Scot free? . . . Soon, in this generation or the next, it must be our turn to starve and suffer" (*TC* 46-47). The main flaw seems to lie in the fact that Mehring fails to think of himself in specific historical terms, and also to acknowledge his lack of a land-owning tradition. Mehring's exploration and realization of what the land means to him is narrated mostly in the form of an inner monologue or imaginary dialogues, in which it is difficult to determine who is speaking (*TC* 79). Inside his mind, there is frequently an obsessive debate with absent characters —formulated occasionally in contracted forms, with dislocated constructions, and constant use of unfinished or verbless sentences. He addresses his former mistress (a liberal) after she has fled the country, in his thoughts (*TC* 160); he addresses his absent son, who is first in Namibia, later in New York with his former wife, whom he also addresses in this way (*TC* 220); he addresses the farm worker, Jacobus, when the latter is not there (*TC* 80). All of these are addressed without name, simply as "you." This narrative technique is most adequate to the experience of the white man in South

Africa. As we will also see in *Burger's Daughter*, the protagonist addresses imaginary people, so most of the action takes place only inside their own minds, which shows their inability to act in the real world of South Africa — though for profoundly different reasons in each novel. But the ultimate "you" for Mehring, the (literally) underlying absent character of the novel, is a black body found in his farm which will cause him a lot of problems. It "refuses" to stay buried (it comes back to the surface several times after being buried, as the result of different causes), while the police do not put much effort into finding out why the body is there, and its people insist on giving it a proper burial. It becomes a symbol for the instability of the land. "The narrative takes its impetus from the farm's landscape, more specifically from the claim to the farm made by this dead African beneath its surface" (Cooke 1985: 154). The novel actually ends with the description of the burial of this dead body:

> The one whom the farm received had no name. He had no family but their women wept a little for him. There was no child of his present but their children were there to live after him. They had put him away to rest, at last; he had come back. He took possession of this earth, theirs; one of them. (*TC* 267)

As the author moves in and out of Mehring's consciousness, his narrative focalisation generally predominates; his arrogant ego dissects and mocks the motives and honesty of everyone else (*TC* 69). Nonetheless, the unreliability of Mehring's vision is made manifest through the sections that appear to stem from a consciousness that is more subtle and more authorial than his and yet is directed by what has caught his attention (*TC* 149). In this manner, narrative vision extends beyond Mehring's consciousness. Moreover, the confusion of Mehring's focalisation with a more authorial one, and the confusion of imaginary and real events (especially after section 26) show the instability of a white farmer who cannot find his place in this land. His name, Mehring, although apparently Afrikaner, is actually German, so he does not even belong to that tradition of Afrikaner farmers. By denying even the self-protective comfort of a stable narrative angle of vision, Gordimer opens a re-vision of a South African history of land property to new understanding.

The constantly shifting focalisation incorporates not only the thoughts and memories of its protagonist, but also the attitudes of a wide range of characters, blacks (Jacobus and his family) (*TC* 171), whites (the three-generation Afrikaner clan from a neighbouring farm), or Indians (the four-genera-

tion Indian family running the shop). The omniscient narrator focalises through these other groups, emphasizing the fact that all of them seem to have reasons to stay on the land: they, not Mehring, are part of it. As Michael Wade observes, "natives possess precisely what he lacks: continuity, tradition, authority, a family structure, moral values" (1978: 203). Mehring bought it for diversion. Furthermore, the perspective in the novel is ostensibly enriched by the epigraphs from a nineteenth century treatise on the religious beliefs of the Zulus that bind sections of the text with a superbly resonant commentary. These intertexts from Zulu mythological texts suggest a native voice claiming property of the land[2]:

> So we came out possessed of what sufficed us, we thinking that we possessed all things, that we were wise, that there was nothing we did not know. . . . We saw that, in fact, we black men came out without a single thing; we came out naked; we left everything behind, because we came out first. But as for white men . . . we saw that we came out in a hurry; but they waited for all things, that they might not leave any behind. (*TC* 213)

As Thorpe suggests, "the effect is to introduce suddenly a sharply contrasting glimpse of another world, of ordered customary ritual, of a relation between the human and a supernatural spirit world utterly apart from that of the novel" (1990: 118). At the end, it seems as if Zulu myth had gained control of the narrative. Nonetheless, the novel does not present a revolution of black people in South Africa claiming their rights of property. What Nadine Gordimer does in this novel is to articulate the different perspectives and narrative voices in such a way as to make that global perspective the viewpoint of history (R. Smith 1991: 178).

This multiple-voiced narration has also been criticized for providing a coldly detached and pessimistic view of South Africa on the part of the author. But a close look into the story reveals a tone of optimism that stems from a belief in historical inevitability, rather than from a present reality, because there is always a feeling that things will improve in time. The ironical facts presented (such as the dead body as the action's motivating force) and the fragmented perspective reinforce the feeling that the land will inevitably come to be owned by natives in the future, as they are an overwhelming majority. We can feel how Mehring, if not to blame personally for it, is somehow out of place and going against a growing current of common sense in this crucial issue of the ownership of the land in South Africa.

V. *BURGER'S DAUGHTER*:
MULTIPLE NARRATORS AND NARRATEES

In her next novel, *Burger's Daughter*, postmodernist strategies are more evident, as the boundaries between fiction and reality are made more subtle. Many perspectives are presented, along with intertexts from real documents; these create a mixing of the real with the imaginary, the subjective with the objective, and parallels to actual events and lives that show the multicultural history of South Africa. It is a baroque formal structure "in which, despite the focus on Rosa Burger's story, other stories, perspectives, voices and historical events intrude to disrupt and impinge on the narrative" (King 1993: 7).

    Burger's Daughter is set in South Africa between 1948, the year the first Nationalist government took office, and 1976, the year of the Soweto students' school boycott. This historical framework is juxtaposed with Rosa Burger's personal history —a burdensome background, as she is the daughter of a famous leader of the Communist party, Lionel Burger. Rosa tells of her childhood through her present in a quest for self-definition, at first trying to distance herself from her family's commitment, but finally coming back to it and —inevitably— to jail. The personal memories and flashbacks span the historical and political changes of those years. *Burger's Daughter* shows how public realities are interiorized, how the destiny of a nation is crucial for private lives. Some sections of the novel are intertexts from actual historical documents such as the Soweto Students Representative Council manifesto (*BD* 346-47). These are combined with other fictitious texts based on historical facts, such as surveillance reports for the Bureau of State Security (*BD* 173-77), Lionel Burger's speech at his trial for treason (*BD* 24-27), fragments of his biography (*BD* 88-94), a headmistress's school report (*BD* 12).

    Lionel Burger had become a member of the Communist Party of South Africa in the late 1920s, and had remained a member of its Central Committee when the Party dissolved in the face of the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950. Captured in the mid-1960s and sentenced to imprisonment for life, he died in gaol in the early 1970s. His fictional career has therefore coincided with most of the major developments during the period of revolutionary opposition in South Africa in the twentieth century. In most of these respects the character of Lionel Burger bears a strong resemblance to the real-life figure of Abram Fischer, one of the most prominent leaders within the South African Communist Party, upon whose personal history his

career has evidently been based. "The figure of Burger acts as a bridge in the novel between fact and fiction, and past and present, as the methods of the novelist and a more orthodox historian coincide" (Clingman 1986: 172).

Clingman describes Gordimer's strategy of unattributed quotation as a "textual collage," claiming that if the original document is good enough for the story's purposes, there is no reason, for the sake of convention, to invent another one that looks exactly like it, another manifestation of that daring crossing of boundaries between fiction and history mentioned above (1986: 187). "There is a sense in which the whole fiction is designed to point out of itself, out of the whole protocol of European fiction, to a historical reality which finally engulfs it" (Ward 1989: 129-30). Rosa, for example, quotes Lenin to her father, once again pointing out of the fiction to history: "You knew it couldn't be; *a change in the objective conditions of the struggle sensed sooner than the leaders did"* (*BD* 348).

The novel basically alternates sections in third and first person narration, and this device is the main axis that supports the multivoiced narrative strategy of the whole story. This alternation is not carried out in a uniform manner, but each kind includes a whole variety of focalisations and approaches. The third-person narrator weaves a fabric of varying public and private modes of perception. The account of Rosa's interview with the Swedish biographer, for example, never aspires to go beyond publicly knowable facts: "Lionel Burger had been born in 1905 . . ." (*BD* 88). The public mode of perception has multiple voices, however. When Rosa seeks a passport from Brandt Vermeulen, the narration sounds like surveillance: "She was known to have driven to town . . . Perhaps it was a favour she wanted..." (*BD* 173). On the other hand, there are other instances in which the omniscient narrator is either openly sympathetic to Rosa, or simply neutral and dispassionate (*BD* 259, 272). What the third-person narrative attempts, in fact, is to capture and represent a social totality against the more personal first-person narration of the protagonist.

In the first-person sections, Rosa holds unspoken conversations with three absent narratees, because, as Rosa explains, "one is never talking to oneself, always one is addressed to someone" (*BD* 16). She addresses gradually someone closer to her father's life, and therefore closer to her ultimate mission in life. Through this strategy, we become aware of the importance of dialogue in the construction of personality. Rosa is trying to come to terms with her father's heritage, and she does this by addressing different people from whom she can get some kind of feedback in her quest for an identity. In the first section she addresses Conrad, a friend and lover whose view of her

she contests as a way of constructing her own. In the second section, she converses with Katya, her father's first wife, or with her friend Bernard. In the last South African episodes she finally addresses her father: a connection is resumed, as she will end up following his political steps. In this frame, "the outer world of South Africa and the inner world of Rosa's direct apprehensions of it —or Gordimer's textual representations of it— . . . have become indistinguishable" (White 1993: 223). In this novel, we can also appreciate some of that "historical inevitability" mentioned in the analysis of *The Conservationist.* From a political and historical perspective, the narrative strategy highlights precisely how the pressure that ideological and social forces exert on the individual make inevitable, in spite of individual resistance, the acceptance of that political commitment initially rejected by Rosa.

The alternation between first- and third-person narrative creates a tension that is echoed in the novel as "the tension between creation and destruction in yourself . . . wandering between your fantasies and obsessions" (*BD* 47). Tension is achieved by the absence of an omniscient narrator in the moments of inner climax, where an explanation is expected. The linear narrative is thus challenged and subverted by interruptions, digressions, contrasts, ambiguities, gaps, "contrasting materials which modify the significance of the narrative" (King 1993: 8). Rosa is the centre of the action, yet much of the action is composed not of external political events, but rather of meditations on those same events by Rosa herself and by several other characters. "When they saw me outside the prison, what did they see?" (*BD* 13). Aware of the importance of the focaliser in any story and any history, Gordimer uses in this novel a whole variety of focalizations, which prevent the reader from "simplifying" Rosa and consequently shows her from many different angles, in such a way that it is impossible to claim that any one view of Rosa triumphs, or has priority in the text. Furthermore, the novel also denounces certain simplifications that have occurred when writing history. When Rosa meets Baasie, a black boy adopted by her family, after many years, he harshly condemns her and her kind. He is against any contribution of whites to the struggle and therefore hates Rosa and her father for their efforts: "why do you think you should be different from all the other whites who've been shitting on us ever since they came?" (*BD* 322). Rosa comes to the conclusion that his violent attitude is due to "the position their history books back home had ready for us: him, bitter; me guilty" (*BD* 330). The symbolic significance of this scene is a powerful one in the context of South Africa in the mid-1970s. Here the accusations of Black Consciousness are clearly hitting home. The direct challenge that Baasie has thrown to Rosa

makes her decide to return to South Africa to renew the social commitment her father left off.

VI. *MY SON'S STORY*: THE CREATION OF A NARRATOR

Gordimer employs once more the technique of multivoiced discourse in *My Son's Story* and, in that manner, explores the intersection of a black boy's private life with his father's commitment to the political struggle. *My Son's Story* is about the ways in which political commitment slowly but ineluctably transforms the lives of four members of a black South African family. Will, the son, tells us the story of his father from two different perspectives: his adolescent voice in present tense alternates with a more mature voice that speaks in third person and in the past tense. This second voice is, in fact, Will himself, years later, when he has become a writer. These two voices echo the moral complexity and ambiguity of the father-and-son relationship that makes Will a writer.

The father, Sonny, transforms himself from a schoolteacher into a revolutionary leader and orator for the struggle against apartheid. The central storyline of the narrative focuses on the affair between Sonny and a white woman, Hannah Plowman, agent of a human rights organization who visits him in prison. The novel opens with 15-year-old Will's discovery of this affair. This is the origin of Will's obsessive discourse, the story of his father and himself, focused as a story of disillusion. In the course of the narrative, as the father perpetuates this transparent infidelity against his family and his risky disregard of political prudence, the son, in turn, deceives him by exploring through his writing the intimacy of the affair; the daughter, Baby, will secretly join a militant group and marry away from home; and the ostensibly domestic mother, Aila, will hide her participation in the guerrilla group until she is arrested. An endless chain of deception and distrust is what involvement in the political struggle in South Africa has brought to this family.

The disillusion also has a formal manifestation reflected in the narrative perspective from which the story is told. Gordimer outlines it, step by step, in the present tense account of the adolescent Will. This disillusion is balanced, but also reinforced, by an apparently omniscient narrator that gives gradual revelations of the events in Sonny's life. The narrative strategy Gordimer employs in order to enter the experience of the "other" also contains an implicit criticism of the lack of privacy in South Africa in those times. Will,

as omniscient narrator, is like the secret police in South Africa; both know of Sonny's whereabouts.

In *My Son's Story* Gordimer uses a very self-conscious style of writing. Will explores, in the apparently omniscient parts, what he imagines his father and other people feel and think, to try to reconstruct a past that he had no direct access to, to try to understand what really happened. The son presents himself as the interpreter of events: "I don't think my father knows any of these things about himself. Only I know, only I" (*MSS* 95). This shifting of the focus from which the story is told, from inside the central character to outside influences, is done, according to Bruce King, with the purpose of showing ambiguity (1993: 8). This ambiguity is the real boundary between fiction and reality, because, though there are apparently two alternating points of view being presented, there is only one voice speaking, and there are also many different focalizers in the apparently omniscient parts.

The narrative voice in *My Son's Story* is also rendered ambiguous by the pronoun of the title, which suggests that the novel is composed by the father in the voice he imagines for his son. Moreover, the book's epigraph from Shakespeare's Sonnet XIII reinforces the ambiguity.[3] In the context of the sonnet it is clear that a father's story can only be told by his son, but this narrative has its origin in the absence of the father. Only the son, who must imagine his father's life from which he is excluded, is able "to record and validate that life" (Weinhouse 1993: 70). Will, as a writer, becomes the interpreter of Sonny's life. Interestingly enough, it may be argued that the main story being told is not "my son's story" or "my father's story," but that it is "my mother's story" which silently occupies the text. Aila's interiority is never breached, her story never told. Treated as a beautiful face and a quiet enigma throughout, she turns out to be a peripherality that has all along been at the centre, to the profound shock of her son: "the secret life she was living. I've been the cover for both of them. That sticks . . ."(*MSS* 234). M. Van Wyk Smith has claimed that Aila's silence all through the novel is an allegory of the writer's enforced silence in the late 1980s in South Africa (1991: 97-98).

In the omniscient sections of the novel, Will focalizes through many different characters. Occasionally the point of view is Hannah's as she gazes at Sonny. At other times, it appears to be Sonny focalizing. Not until the end does Gordimer reveal that the only narrator of the novel is Will, a voice that judges and formulates. This narrative technique has been highly praised:

> It's a brilliant device: the novel becomes not a series of internal
> monologues, but the effort of the family's most articulate victim to
> conjecture, to comprehend, what really happened to them all. It turns
> a bleak ending into one that suggests how social as well as personal
> redemption may lie in acts of selflessness, empathy and forgiveness.
> Writing the novel was such an act. I think Will gives the title to his
> father, "My Son's Story," because the voice isn't really his anymore,
> but Gordimer must also mean it to imply a larger wrenched-apart
> family than Sonny's. (Flower 1991: 322-323)

Will reveals in the last chapter that he wrote the story in order to under-
stand: knowledge and acceptance of his destiny comes only through writing
his story. In the last chapter Will himself answers the question of whose story
is being told, linking it to the sense of writing literature: "It's an old story —
ours. My father's and mine. Love, love/hate are the most common and
universal experiences. But no two are alike, each is a fingerprint of life.
That's the miracle that makes literature and links it with creation itself in the
biological sense" (*MSS* 275). The development of Will into a writer is evi-
dent in his manipulation of the events that shape the story: both those he was
a witness to and those he was not: "In our story, like all stories, I've made up
what I wasn't there to experience myself. . . . I've imagined . . . the frustration
of my absence, the pain of knowing them too well, what others would be
doing, saying and feeling in the gaps between my witness" (*MSS* 276). Will
suffers his father's defection as a betrayal of family and self-respect. Yet at
the same time, through the power of fiction, he is able to portray the strong
attractions of Hannah and Sonny's love by leaving his own perspective
behind and entering imaginatively into their state of mind and heart in writing
about them. The last chapter is a full account of his transformation into a
writer, and we hear Will's "authentic" voice explaining how he has learned to
be a writer: "And so I've learned what he didn't teach me, that grammar is a
system of mastering time; to write down 'he was', 'he is', 'he will be' is to
grasp past, present and future" (*MSS* 276). Nadine Gordimer herself has
pointed out, "*My Son's Story* is also about writing fiction" (Coles 1991: 19).
It is a novel concerned with the mystery of becoming a writer, and the
construction of a myth of authoring (Greenstein 1993: 201). Will becomes a
writer by telling of his painful relationship with his father; alternating his
adolescent perspective with a more mature one that tries to understand or
even justify. "What he did —my father— made me a writer" (*MSS* 277). The
time that has elapsed between his adolescence and his adulthood is the time

he has needed to become a writer. Will is in rebellion against his father, and yet a writer, made so by him and against him. These two voices echo the moral complexity, ambiguity and hypocrisy in their relationship: Sonny's love for Shakespeare, his involvement in politics, his disillusionment, his deceptions. Will had to try to understand what Sonny taught him. Sonny's story is Will's background for his life and art.

As a writer, Will lends his voice to the struggle, linking thus his personal drama with a wider historical context and performance: "I'm going to be the one to record, someday, . . . what it was like to live a life determined by the struggle to be free," the writer who will write the book of freedom's struggle as he has lived it in his home and his South Africa (*MSS* 276). Furthermore, "Will's narrative strategy is Gordimer's evidence that a writer can penetrate the lives of people who have experiences the writer cannot share" (Weinhouse 1993: 73). It enables Gordimer to write from the point of view of a black character. Gordimer was conscious of her limitations as a white writer, but "through Will . . . she imagines her way into a world which she can only have experienced tangentially" (Greenstein 1993: 196). Gordimer has depicted the mind of a black person from an inner perspective that makes us consider the South African problem from a personal as well as a political point of view. Moreover, Will's intimate drama of personal conflict parallels the public struggle taking place in South Africa; the tension of black South Africans between public politics, jail, violence, and committing oneself, at the cost of one's family's peace; between fighting with the prospect of certain defeat, and not fighting at all.

VII. CONCLUSION

"Is it not the function of some writing, of stories, to suggest that truth may be beyond both fact and opinion, may be rather an imaginative re-construction, a re-creation of life?" (Voss 1992: 1). Through imagination Gordimer explains many complex aspects of human lives. Her novels shed light on the specific consequences of the historical circumstances of life in South Africa. This is why the perspective from which the story is told is essential to the meaning and richness of the message of the novel. How those circumstances have affected specific individuals and families is ultimately a discussion of Gordimer's discourse with reality. A novel may conduct a reader towards a more concrete insight into reality, which transcends a merely common-sense

apprehension of things; the reader is always aware that the work is not itself reality but rather "a special form of reflecting reality." It is, therefore, Gordimer's specific representation of reality that matters.

Any future narration of the history of South Africa (Soweto Student's Revolt in 1976, the Suppression of the Communist Party, the end of apartheid politics, landownership, the imprisonment of political leaders and revolutionaries...), will be enriched by taking into account the enriching variety of perspectives and interpretations presented by fiction in the recreation of these important events. It is specifically in fiction where we can best appreciate how public events affect and determine every day life, and also how the interpretation of the same events can change depending on who is telling the story or who is "seeing" history. Furthermore, Nadine Gordimer's use of a complex narrative perspective does not turn her novels into historical novels, but into new recreations of history from the re-imagining of personal conflict and dramas. A new dimension is added to the relationship of fiction and history, and this requires a new kind of representation of the images and messages; fragmentation, ambiguity, dislocation, gaps, etc, are not aims in themselves, but new means to convey new situations, new historical sites, and, ultimately, new perspectives.a

NOTES

1. This theme can in fact be traced in every novel by Gordimer. There is usually at least one character that finds him/herself in this dilemma. In *Burger's Daughter*, Rosa's confrontation with Baasie reveals this tension. In a lesser way, in *My Son's Story*, Hannah Plowman, Sonny's white lover, is also ironized in her contribution to the black struggle. At the end she is free to move out of South Africa and get on in her career, while the black leaders are to suffer the worst consequences.

2. These were gathered from *The Religious System of the Amazulu*, compiled by Reverend Henry Callaway in 1868.

3. "You had a father; let your son say so."

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
REFLEXIVE NARRATIVE IN *LOLITA,*
BY VLADIMIR NABOKOV

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> Reality is a very subjective affair . . . you never get near enough because reality is an infinitive succession of steps, levels of perception. . . . Whatever the mind grasps, it does so with the assistance of creativity, fancy.
>
> Vladimir Nabokov, *Strong Opinions*

Vladimir Nabokov's novels show that imagination creates its own reality by giving order and meaning to a subject. They do not reflect reality; instead, they express their own individual reality. Nabokov's novels are usually written in the form of manuscripts which narrate several events in an anterior temporal sequence. The narrator tells his personal story from his point of view, which is always different from that of the characters around him. Therefore, there are two realities, that of the narrator's and that created by the way in which he narrates, as the unreliable narrator inadvertently lets the reader know what the other characters think. For instance, in *Lolita* Humbert Humbert sees his stepdaughter as a nymphet, while other characters perceive

Lolita as an ordinary teenager; in *Despair* nobody but Hermann Hermann sees any likeness between him and Felix.

The way in which the narrators tell their stories makes the meaning of the novel different from or even contrary to what they wish to express. What Nabokov's narrators produce is not a faithful record of their past but an imaginative invention. As Patricia Waugh says in her book on metafiction, "[t]o write about oneself is implicitly to posit oneself as another, to narrate or historize oneself as a character in one's own discourse" (1984: 135). There is, then, a difficulty in portraying reality, because any point of view on reality is a subjective one, in which memory and imagination are mixed. Or, again, in Linda Hutcheon's words,

> We have only access to the past today through its traces, its documents, the testimony of witnesses, and other archival materials.... There are important parallels between the processes of history-writing and fiction-writing and among the most problematic of these are their common representation. . . . In fact, that teller —of story or history— also constructs those very facts by giving a particular meaning to events. (1989: 58)

In both *Despair* and *Lolita* the narrator's invention displaces reality, and the outcome is madness. That happens with Hermann Hermann in *Despair*, Humbert Humbert in *Lolita* and Kinbote in *Pale Fire*. Such neurotic distortions are well studied by Freud, who describes, for instance, a man who thinks that the doctor has advised him to flirt with his mother. This is of course not true. This patient substitutes fantasy for reality because of his excitement on meeting his mother (Freud 1988: 1575). Nabokov's characters distort reality for different reasons. When the external world fails, when they cannot achieve what they really want, they reject it by recreating a new reality. Their narcissism leads them to impose their point of view as the sole reality. Memory and imagination seem to overlap in the recollection of their experiences. The result is a gradual disorientation and madness.

Lolita is introduced by John Ray, a Ph.D. from Widworth who is the fictional editor of the book. John Ray and Humbert Humbert live in the same fictional world. Ray informs us that the writer of the text, which is presented as a true story, has entitled it *Lolita, or the Confession of a White Widowed Male*. Ray defends its publication because he considers it to be a lesson for everybody to learn —a classical justification similar to the one Fernando de Rojas used in his *Celestina*. However, the function is different because

Nabokov is just parodying this traditional device. In this introduction, John Ray tells in advance what has happened to the characters within the novel. Consequently, this introduction is a prolepsis (Genette 1980: 67) with respect to the following text, as it tells the reader in advance what has happened to those people who appear in the novel. Besides, Ray acknowledges adverse criticism of the novel: "The cynic may say that commercial pornography makes the same claim; the learned may counter by asserting that 'H.H.'s impassioned confession is a tempest in a test tube"(*L* 6). He also criticizes Humbert's attitude, "He is horrible, he is abject, he is a shining example of moral leprosy" (*L* 7). Therefore, this fictional editor draws criticism about the story into the text itself as he criticizes the hero of the novel. In a way, this foreword is a reflexive device. John Ray's moral and didactic point of view collides with Nabokov's comments about art.

> Why did I write any of my books, after all? For the sake of the pleasure, for the sake of the difficulty. I have no social purpose, no moral message. (Nabokov 1990: 16)

The reader soon discovers that this editor is one of Nabokov's constructions. This editor is a pretext for the author to make fun of what he stands for, an ironic device. As Humbert does in his narrative later, John Ray parenthetically comments on his own ideas: "('Do the Senses make sense?')" (*L* 5) and he also plays with words. Moreover, there is a game with his name. He is called **J**ohn **R**ay, **Jr**. His name is, then, symmetrical and reflexive (Field 1967: 331). The result is ironic because John Ray, Jr. seems to be a real moralist, but he turns out to be a rhetorical exercise.

This type of ironic editor can blur the frontiers between reality and fiction. At the beginning the reader does not know if John Ray is an unreliable narrator or a reliable witness who is telling the truth. One could easily believe what John Ray says, and the story could be seen as Humbert's true autobiography —but of course the reader knows that the real author of the novel is Nabokov, and that, therefore, this is not an autobiography, but a novel.

Boris Tomashevski developed the concept of motivation in fiction. The strategies which *Lolita* and *Despair* show are not those of the realistic motivation, to use the term introduced by this critic to characterize those novels whose aim is to be realistic. *Lolita* does not attempt to be a realist novel. It shows, rather, features of *artistic motivation,* as Nabokov tries to defamiliar-

ize the traditional device with which an editor prepares the reader for the book that he is going to read.

> Artistic motivation. As I said, the use of a motif results from a compromise between realistic illusion and the demands of the artistic structure. (Tomashevski 1965: 84)

The story itself begins with Humbert's autobiography. If the reader happens to know that "Nabokov regards with profound skepticism the possibilities of autobiographical revelation" (Appel 1967: 125), s/he should not take it for granted that Nabokov is imitating a straightforward memoir. Like *Despair*, *Lolita* is written in retrospect. The whole story is an analepsis (Genette 1980: 48). It introduces a present time and the narrator talks about what happened previously. It is the typical device used by a "first-person narrator" for the purpose of exposition. Humbert, the narrator, tells the reader his experiences with Lolita in a self-conscious way:

> I am now obliged to describe in some tedious detail . . . (*L* 81)
> But a few incidents pertaining to those four or five days after Charlotte's simple death, have to be noted. (*L* 98)
> I am only a brute, never mind, let us go on with my miserable story. (L 190)

His narrative also seems to be a first draft which has been written in haste and which has not been altered. This is due to the fact that Humbert, like Hermann in *Despair,* is constantly using brackets, square brackets, hyphens and the form of a conventional diary to introduce his thoughts within his story; it does not present itself as carefully revised.

The way the narrator sometimes introduces his thoughts and explanations is different from techniques used in general in realistic novels. This is not only because he appears to be a self-conscious narrator, ("to retrieve the thread of this explanation"; *L* 124), but for other structural reasons. For instance, on one occasion he uses the form of a diary to make it part of his fictional memoirs:

> *Saturday*. For some days already I had been leaving . . . (*L* 48)
> *Sunday*. Changeful, bad-tempered, cheerful, awkward, graceful . . .
> *Monday*. Rainy morning. . . (*L* 49)

These are entries from a pocket diary where he wrote what happened during some of those days at Charlotte Haze's. He lets the reader know what he has experienced during a day, sometimes using "boring" entries to enhance realism. As it is a diary, this form appears as something natural within his biography because he is recalling his memories. Diaries and confessions are confidential and subjective. This form is chosen when the information is of a private nature and Humbert wants to narrate previous secret events of his life. But Nabokov mocks these techniques, as he is sure he cannot show reality as such (Nabokov 1990: 94).

There are frequent digressions and interruptions introduced in a variety of ways such as brackets, square brackets and dashes, to explain and comment on Humbert's story:

> The boxer had fallen extremely low when he met the good old priest (who had been a boxer himself in his robust youth and could still slug in a sinner) (*L* 45)

> In a few minutes —say, twenty, say half an hour, sicher ist sicher as my uncle Gustave used to say— I would let myself into. . . (*L* 123)

> (judging by the partisan flurry here and there among the audience) (L 219)

These commentaries give the narrator the opportunity to establish a distance from what he is telling. A conventional story does not have so many digressions introduced by the narrator as is the case here. This device used in the novel produces an effect of freshness on the reader, as if the narrator had not checked his notes before handing them in to be published.

Moreover, Humbert comments on the circumstances under which he is writing his memories, as Hermann also did in his. Thus, he tells the reader that he is writing in jail ("I am writing under observation"; *L* 10), which can be read as a metafictional comment. Humbert also comments on the circumstances in which he has to give more explanations following his lawyer's instructions. It appears, then, that the narrator is not totally free to describe whatever he wants.

> My lawyer has suggested I give a clear, frank account of the itinerary we followed, and I suppose I have reached here a point where I cannot avoid that chore. (*L* 151)

This seems to produce an effect of blurring of frontiers between fiction and reality. This occurs because Humbert makes the lawyer part of his story as he does with the jury, that is, the readers, who are reading his memoirs — yet another conjuring trick for the reader's benefit.

His narration is character-bound, told "in the first person" (Cohan and Shires 1988: 90) or autodiegetic, in Genette's terms (1980). The first person pronoun refers to the narrator and he is a main character in the story. Narrators of autobiographies often use the first-person to narrate their experiences as they are autodiegetic narrators. This is Humbert's case. But Humbert is not a traditional autodiegetic narrator.There are passages in *Lolita* which are written in the third-person in Humbert's story though he does not cease to be an autodiegetic narrator. Consequently, the focalization changes; that is, the perspective from which the events that are narrated changes. Humbert narrates using mostly internal focalization (Genette 1980: 192), that is from his point of view, as one knows his thoughts and perceptions. But, in the following example Humbert uses external focalization (Genette 1980: 190) to explain what is happening to him.

> Three doctors and the Farlows presently arrived on the scene and took over. *The widower,* a man of exceptional self-control, neither wept nor raved. *He* staggered a bit, that *he* did; but he opened *his* mouth only to impart such information or issue such directions as were strictly necessary in connection with the identification, examination and disposal of a dead woman, the top of her head *a porridge of bone, brains, bronze hair and blood.* (*L* 98) (emphasis added)

Here the narrator tells his experiences from an external point of view. He talks about himself in terms of *the widower* instead of *I.* He does not allow the reader to know his feelings or thoughts. Nabokov plays with the language, points of view and perspectives. Although this is not the type of focalization that Humbert normally uses, it gives the narrator the opportunity to be more objective and cool at portraying the situations. It is a sort of deceptive mask he uses to play with the reader. In this example the use of a "third-person narration" for Charlotte's death stresses his coldness, as Humbert, the narrator, was not in love with his wife. It is hypocritical behaviour. Besides, one also notices his coldness by the way he describes his wife. Her head is "a porridge of bone, brains, bronze hair and blood." This is what he can objectively see, but is an ironic description. She was for him a vulgar housewife and he cannot see her as his beloved wife.

Humbert's narration mixes two different times, that of the story which is the narrative content of his narration and that of the narrating (Genette 1980: 27). This is what usually happens in autobiographies, such as Nabokov's own *Speak, Memory* when, for instance, he says: "I did not know then (as I know perfectly well now) what to do with such things" (1969: 165). And since Humbert is writing after the events have happened, the narrator sometimes projects events which will occur later. Consequently, there are, according to Genette, several prolepses (1980: 76) in his narrative. Therefore, on several occasions he briefly comments on what will happen later.

> to Louise and the poplars (whom and which she —Lolita— was never to see again) (*L* 66)

> Lo, leaving the dog as she would leave me some day, rose from her haunches. (*L* 118)

From these examples one can infer that there are also two HHs; the Humbert who experiences the events narrated and who does not know what will happen next and the Humbert who writes his story in a wiser retrospect. "Here as throughout the novel one has the sense of a narrator performing for the benefit of an audience. There is Humbert the actor and Humbert the observer, a dichotomy stressed by the artificially didactic tone" (Clancy 1984:105). It is an instance of doubling, as the reader is learning about a character who is also the narrator of the story. But the latter Humbert really learns from his experiences. This is why Humbert makes some comments on what he should have done with Lolita but he did not. This is the case when they are alone for the first time in the hotel The Enchanted Hunters.

> If my happiness could have talked, it would have filled that genteel hotel with a deafening roar. And my only regret today is that I did not quietly deposit key '342' at the office, and leave the town, the country, the continent, the hemisphere— indeed, the globe —that very same night. (*L* 123)

He should have left the key instead of entering the room and making Lolita his lover. He would have avoided many problems; but he did not. The result is that the Humbert who writes the story regrets having harmed her to this extent, and he is able to recognize his guilt.

> It had become gradually clear to my conventional Lolita during our singular and bestial cohabitation that even the most miserable of family lives was better than the parody of incest, which, in the long run, was the best I could offer the waif. (*L* 286)

It is not till the end of the story that he understands that Lolita is not a nymphet but a young woman, now pregnant. He offers his commentaries to explain his innocence in the hope of being forgiven for Lolita's rape, though not for Quilty's murder. Humbert does not recognize his guilt for killing Quilty because he thinks that Quilty has not only robbed him of Lolita but has also made her his lover. The commentary gives him the opportunity to ask his audience for understanding of his life so that he may eventually be forgiven and be able to demonstrate the purity of his motives.

> Now I wish to introduce the following idea. Between the age limits of nine and fourteen there occur maidens who, to certain bewitched travellers, twice or many times older than they, reveal their true nature which is not human, but nymphic. (*L* 16)

> I had thought that months, perhaps years, would elapse before I dared to reveal myself to Dolores Haze; but by 6 she was wide awake, and by 6.15 we were technically lovers. I am going to tell you something very strange: it was she who seduced me. (*L* 132)

> Oh, do not scowl at me, reader, I do not intend to convey the impression that I did not manage to be happy. (*L* 164)

The narrator has to explain his behaviour and he must allow the reader to understand the reason for past events.

> To be convicted Humbert needs only to recall facts, to be pardoned he must ask his audience to read his life with the aid of the commentary, to compare it with other written lives, to see that child rape and murder can be disturbing but convincing metaphors for a desire, for moral and aesthetic perfection. (Maddox 1983: 67)

The narrator addresses himself to the reader in order to explain his past actions. He is the focalizer who filters the story the reader reads. There is an *I* which talks directly to a *you* that is a reader. It produces an effect of closeness and confidence between them, even the effect of a confessional tone. However, the author builds up a tension by this means. On the one hand

the narrator uses a tone of confidence and confession but, on the other, he distances himself from what he is telling by making ironic comments or descriptions and referring to himself in the third-person, which lends it a cool distant tone. He does this when describing the way Charlotte dies or the way Lolita gets rich as a result of negotiating with him while he is using her for sex.

Examples can be found of other rhetorical effects achieved by the narrator. He sometimes addresses himself directly to specific people instead of the average reader.

> (I notice the slip of my pen in the preceding paragraph, but please do not correct it, Clarence) (*L* 32)

> (Jean, whatever, wherever you are, in minus time-space or plus soultime, forgive me all this, parenthesis included) (*L* 104)

The narrator asks them to act. This constitutes another way in which fiction and reality merge into one. How does this come about? The narrator makes those people part of his fiction by naming them, and so, they are real within his fiction. The reader, once more, has to analyse the text and see what is fiction and what is not.

There are several other features of the narrative which lead the reader to understand that Humbert is not a traditional narrator. One such incident would be when the narrator recognizes that he is going out of his mind. That is, he himself recognizes that the reader cannot totally trust him: "Perhaps I was losing my mind" (*L* 227). Besides, he invents words or plays with their sounds. Therefore, if he is capable of twisting separate words, what is to prevent him from twisting the total sum of the words, that is to say the text itself? When the narrator invents words he may be giving clues designed to detract from his story's credibility. He could be consciously making himself unreliable.

> I would coach in French and fondle in *Humbertish.* (*L* 35)

> She had entered my world, *umber* and black *Humberland,.* . . To think that between a *Hamburger* and a *Humburger*, she. . . (*L* 164)

> 'That was my *Lo,*' she said, 'and these are my *lilies* 'Yes', I said, 'yes. They are beautiful, beautiful, beautiful!' (*L* 40)

> *Mr Edgar H. Humbert* (*L* 187)

> I would find him through *Uncle Ivory* if she refused. (*L* 273; emphasis added in all instances)

Within the text there are many words which Humbert himself has invented, such as in the first two examples. But the narrator also plays with the sound of the words and with associations of words and meanings of words. That is what is demonstrated in the third example, where the narrator compares Lolita with flowers. The fourth example is an instance of wordplay with the names of Humbert and Edgar Allan Poe. It refers to the fact that Poe also fell in love with a beautiful teenage girl who also died very young (Maddox 1983: 73). In the last example, "uncle Ivory" refers to Dr Ivor Quilty, the dentist.

Apart from being a witty narrator, as the previous examples show, Humbert is also a lazy one who does not want to waste time in his descriptions. He consciously wishes not to be seen as a narrator in the realist tradition. In order to achieve this he avoids releasing information to the reader. Therefore, the reader is compelled to use his/her imagination.

> changes in outlook *and so forth.* (*L* 34)

> replacing them by others, *and so on.* (*L* 77)

> co-operative, energetic, *and so forth.* (*L* 80)

> B-room Room-BA *and so on.* (*L* 195; emphasis added in all)

The reader has to imagine the rest of the description because the narrator does not finish it. The reader has to be active because s/he is forced to create part of the text as the narrator avoids completing it. The reader also creates a fictional world as the narrator does. The reader always creates such a world, but this becomes especially true in Nabokov's fiction. Moreover, Humbert/Nabokov stresses the overuse of stock phrases which are supposedly used to explain things but do not really add any information. A further example would be the narrator's failure to copy all that he should have copied. This is what the reader finds in the shortest chapter of the book:

> Lolita, Lolita, Lolita, Lolita, Lolita, Lolita, Lolita, Lolita. Repeat till the page is full, printer. (*L* 109)

The narrator is too lazy to bother repeating her name till the page is full. He provokes the reader. He shows the reader that he is narrating but his story must be finished by others too. However, the printer does not fulfill his job either, and the reader has to imagine it. As is also the case in *Despair*, reading is shown not to be a passive comfortable act. Another device Humbert uses to provoke the reader is to play with the form of the words. For instance, the narrator uses capital letters to draw the reader's attention, to shock him or to mark something such as alliteration:

> I produced a small vial containing *Papa's Purple Pills.* (*L* 121; emphasis added)

Moreover, in some cases the narrator deliberately plays with the reader in order to confuse him/her. This happens, for instance, when Humbert reads Charlotte's declaration of love after having confessed his love for Lolita and having had a warm good-bye because Lolita goes on holiday. When the reader starts reading the declaration of love, s/he does not know who has written it.

> And simultaneously Lolita arrived, in her Sunday frock, stamping, panting, and then she was in my arms, her innocent mouth melting under the ferocious pressure of dark male jaws, my palpitating darling! . . . . The hollow of my hand was still ivory-full of Lolita.... *She* had a message for me . . . an unstamped, curiously clean-looking letter in my shaking hand. This is a confession: I love you (so the letter began; and for a distorted moment I mistook its hysterical scrawl for a schoolgirl's scribble). . . . Pray for me —if you ever pray. CH (*L* 66-68)

In this example, the reader is told that Lolita has kissed Humbert when she leaves the house for the camp. Then, the narrator reveals that she has a message for him. But he does not inform us who "she" is, "she" could be either Lolita's mother or Lolita. The reader does not discover the identity of the author of the letter until the end, where it is signed by Charlotte Haze.

The narrator makes use of other confusing coincidences. This is the case of the use of number 342:

> Dr Edgar H. Humbert and daughter, 342 Lawn Street, Ramsdale. A key (342!) was half shown to me . . . 'Say, it's our house number,' said cheerful Lo. (*L* 118)

The narrator uses the same number to provoke the reader and to produce another reflexion. Humbert does not want to be realistic. His desire to avoid realism is also shown through his use of irony. An early example of this is the seaside love scene involfing Humbert as a boy and Annabel Leigh; considerable erotic tension is built up but their attempt at sex is frustrated (together with the reader's expectations) when some fishermen intrude upon them. Another example is when Humbert speaks about the book he is reading in order to get to "know" his daughter. Its title is *Know your own daughter* (*L* 172), read by Humbert in the Biblical sense related to sex. This is ironical because he does not treat her as a daughter but as a nymphet and in fact carries out (in the Biblical sense) the behest of the title. This irony is also made explicit through the adjectives he uses to address the readers who are reading his story: "Oh, winged gentlemen of the jury!" (*L* 124) "Frigid gentlemen of the jury!" (*L* 132). Another strategy for avoiding realism is through the use of ambiguity, as a result of which the reader is forced to doubt what the narrator is telling him/her. That is the case with Quilty's murder. It seems impossible to believe that Humbert cannot have killed Quilty after shooting so many bullets into him. Humbert's confusion jumbles up his syntax as he describes the fight with Quilty:

> He was naked and goatish under his robe, and I felt suffocated as he rolled over me. *I rolled over him. We rolled over me. They rolled over him. We rolled over us.* (*L* 297; emphasis added)

As Humbert's goal is not to follow the conventions of the realist novel, he feels no remorse about giving false information. Rampton says that if one believes that Humbert's confession is sincere, one has not only lost the game to the author, but also his "game of worlds." This critic thinks that the literary self-consciousness that Nabokov stresses is very important because it involves the reader "in a complex range of responses" (Rampton 1984:108).

Finally, the narrator allows the reader a role within his confession. The obvious tactic that the narrator employs to make the reader explicit is by means of addressing him directly as reader, as jury or as *you*. He knows that his reader is his judge. Therefore, the narrator forces him/her to read his memories and, while he does so, Humbert makes him/her participate in his

evolution throughout the story. "The reader, then, shares in the enacted evolution and development of the narrator's consciousness and moral sensibility" (Clancy 1984: 112). At the beginning the reader cannot refrain from thinking of Humbert as a monster in the light of his behaviour with Lolita and his previous lovers. In the end, the reader understands better Humbert's guilt and sadness, but the narrator maintains a consistent ironic distance and this attitude makes it difficult for the reader to reach a conclusive judgment.

In this relationship created between the narrator and the reader, the narrator at times obliges the reader to accept a certain idea which he particularly wishes to stress.

> Now, in pursuing what follows, *the reader should* bear in mind . . . . (*L* 152)

> *The reader must* now forget Chestnuts and Colts, and accompany us further west. (*L* 215)

> And now *see* what I was repaid for my plans. (*L* 62)

The narrator uses modal verbs which mean obligation or expressions which make the reader take notice. Therefore, the reader is faced with statements of duty or commands which compel him to follow the instructions given by the narrator; he is invited to become an active partner in the act of reading. The reader has to rearrange the information and has to imagine the remainder of the information that the narrator has omitted.

> (who, as the reader will mark, was more afraid of. . . .) (*L* 55)

> as the reader knows (*L* 104)

> The reader may well imagine what I answered (*L* 158)

> I am, as the reader has gathered by now, a poor businessman; (*L* 171)

> the name that the astute reader has guessed long ago. (*L* 270)

The reader is not passive in his reception of all the information that the narrator gives. He has to take part actively, remembering, imagining and guessing. S/he is forced to revise his/her understanding. It is a kind of uncomfortable reading since the reader cannot be passive. S/he has to develop

an awareness of literature and language as subjective human artifacts. Besides, the narrator may stand at a distance and ask for something or demand a specific attitude from the reader:

> Please, reader: no matter your exasperation with the tender-hearted, morbidly sensitive, infinitely circumspect hero of my book, do not skip these essential pages! *Imagine me; I shall not exist if you do not imagine me;* try to discern the doe in me, trembling in the forest of my own iniquity; let's even smile a little. (*L* 129; emphasis added)

> (. . . let's talk to them, please —let's talk to them, reader! —please I'll do anything you want, oh, please . . .) (*L* 155)

In all the examples the narrator wants the reader to take an active role. That is why he uses mainly imperatives and an imploring tone. In the first example the narrator desperately cries for the reader's help to create the story. He openly acknowledges that he is a fiction. He cannot exist if the reader does not imagine him. He draws attention to the importance of the act of reading. It is a statement which sums up the narrator and the reader's behaviour in a metafictional novel. The reader is forced to take an active role within the fiction and the narrator acknowledges he is a fiction.

Another device that the narrator uses on purpose is an overuse of realism in some of his descriptions. Realist novels usually display very careful descriptions of places or objects. The narrator seems to have explored those places or to have looked at those objects very closely. However, Humbert mocks the detailed descriptions. The result is that the reader himself realizes both that the narrator is fully aware of the use of this device and that his aim is to shock the reader:

> Oh, you know (noisy exhalation of breath)— the hotel you raped me. Okay, skip it. I mean, was it (almost in a whisper) The Enchanted Hunters? Oh, was it? (musingly) was it? (*L* 200)

> began to pick up the pebbles between her feet . . . —and chuck them at a can. *Ping*. You can't a second time. *Ping*. (*L* 41)

> Ah-ah-ah, said the little door. (*L* 266)

The explanations the narrator gives between brackets are too detailed. The same is true of the other two examples. The narrator transcribes even the

sounds and noises produced by movements and objects. These descriptions do not help the reader to guess Humbert's thoughts or indeed, the reasons for his actions with Lolita. They are descriptions which hinder the flow of the story itself and draw attention to the style of the description instead. However, this device is not original to *Lolita*, as Nabokov already employed this technique in *Despair*, one of his first novels. These descriptions have a hilarious effect on the reader. That is, a result opposite to the one the narrator was supposedly aiming at.

The narrator sometimes achieves comic effects with other kinds of descriptions as well. This happens when Humbert recalls how he recognizes that Lolita is a nymphet. He appeals to the device used in fairy tales when the king recognizes his long-lost kidnapped child by seeing a special mark on the child's body (*L* 39). Another playful literary allusion appears when the narrator confides to the reader where Lolita has hidden her money.

> Once I found eight one-dollar notes in one of her books (fittingly—*Treasure Island)*. (*L* 182)

Humbert stresses the fact that her money, which is her hidden treasure, is kept out of sight in the novel whose story has also to do with a hidden treasure; there are eight notes because that was the number cried out by John Silver's parrot ("Pieces of eight!"). The reader must have some literary knowledge to understand these intertextual games.

The previous examples are intended to obtain extra narrative effects from the reader's activity. However, there are other effects within his narrative that Humbert wants to produce. Both Hermann and Humbert attempt to impose their imagination on the real world. The former thinks he has carried out the perfect crime and the latter believes he has found his nymphet. Neither of them is right. Hermann does not fulfil his expectations and Humbert finds an average American girl. What Humbert pursues is just a figment of his imagination —a state of affairs he is sometimes able to recognise.

> What I had madly possessed was not she, but my own creation, another, fanciful Lolita —perhaps, more real than Lolita; overlapping her; floating between me and her, and having no will, no consciousness —indeed, no life of her own. (*L* 62)

Lolita becomes a symbolic construction, she is not just a teenager. The girl seems to be a metaphor for literary creativity. Lolita is the desired work created by the author. She has no life of her own. Humbert has imagined her but the reader also has to imagine the story in order to be able to understand the author's work. That may be another reason why Humbert calls Lolita Carmen. "'My Carmen', I said (I used to call her that sometimes)" (*L* 242). He knows she is the result of his imagination, she is his construction, his creation. Something similar happens with Humbert's description of Lolita at tennis. Rampton sees it as "an exercise in the special art of seeing her as an object" (1984: 19). This theme has been criticized and rejected by feminist criticism. Feminist critics often draw attention to the fact that women have always been considered as an object by men. Women have always been related to passivity because they are constructed by men. Therefore, men have always denied women's subjectivity and responsibility for their actions (Moi 1991: 92). These examples reinforce the fact that Humbert sees Lolita as a sculpture he has moulded. Moreover, the meaning of the Latin word Carmen also has to do with creation. According to the dictionary, it means:

> Carmen-inis: (Cano) n: canto, música // poema, composición en verso. . . // parte de un poema, canto // fórmula mágica, sortilegio, hechizo. . . // respuesta de un oráculo, predicción. (*VOX)*

The name Carmen is connected with magic. Consequently, "A nymphet is magical always" (Long 1984: 142) and Humbert speaks about the "demoniac" nature of nymphets (*L* 16). Besides, he introduces that name, as a way to show that she is his own creation. It is a metafictional feature used to dehumanize the characters, to show that they are fictional. Hutchison notices that Humbert calls Lolita "Carmen" especially at the end of the novel. He thinks that Humbert uses it to build up a reference to Prosper Mérimeé's *Carmen* which turns out to be deceptive at the end, since in Mérimeé's *Carmen* Carmen's lover kills her when she deserts him for another man. But, in Nabokov's *Lolita,* Humbert asks Lolita, addressing her as Carmen, to go with him. She rejects that offer and instead of killing her, Humbert kills Quilty (Hutchison 1983: 102). However, I feel that he calls her Carmen because she is his construction. In the novel Humbert has possessed not her but his own construction. As Pifer notes,

> he does behave towards Lolita as though she were the mere instrument of his will. Like an author dreaming up a character, Humbert

despotically transforms the twelve-year-old American kid into an aesthetic mirage. (Pifer 1981: 164).

Apart from that, calling Lolita "Carmen" is a fiction-within-a-fiction device as well —a *mise en abyme*. "Carmen" is Humbert's creation, while both creator and creation are the work of another author. There is another *mise en abyme* related to Lolita. It is the use of the theatrical play. The script of the play is a summary of Lolita's role within the novel:

> the complete text of The Enchanted Hunters, the playlet in which Dolores Haze was assigned the part of a farmer's daughter who imagines herself to be a *woodland witch,* or Diana, or something, and who, having got hold of a book on hypnotism, *plunges a number of lost hunters* into various entertaining trances before falling in her turn under the spell of a vagabond poet. (*L* 198; emphasis added)

The play is another reflexion, this time of Lolita's story. Lolita is a nymphet; Lolita is Carmen, a magic formula, a little witch who makes both Quilty and Humbert love her by means of her enchantments. In the play Lolita is also a woodland witch persecuted by two lost hunters such as she is persecuted by both Quilty and Humbert in the novel. As happens with Hermann in *Despair*, Humbert rejects the real world as he does not adopt either of the roles he should; he is neither a husband nor a father. He is a "nympholept" and that is the passion which rules his life. Accordingly, in the first part of the book he justifies himself by explaining his passion and fulfills his dream by living with Lolita. But in the second part of the book he loses his nymphet. On finding her again, he realizes that she is not his little Carmen but just a young woman. In *Lolita*, the narrator who is the hero finally matures and is able to see reality. As a result he feels guilty of having robbed Lolita of her childhood.

> He has already acknowledged his own greater guilt, his having robbed her of her childhood and turned her into an idealized object of desire. Before confronting Quilty he has found Lo, again, and discovered in himself a genuine love for the person she has become. (Nicol and Rivers 1982: 161)

Humbert shows a different Lolita at the end of the book. "He has only this one scene to show how the twelve-year-old girl so clearly stabilized in our mind has changed into a more mature and more reflexive young woman"

(Rampton 1984: 114). She is not called Lolita but *Mrs Richardson Schiller.*
Her body and her face have changed. She resembles her mother, she was "be-
coming only a slightly altered version of her mother" (Maddox 1983: 79).
For instance, when Humbert imagines Lolita to be Charlotte rising from her
grave ("Gracefully, in a blue mist, Charlotte Haze rose from her *grave"* —*L*
273). This is a sentence which could be taken as a prolepsis (Genette 1980:
67) referring to Lolita's death as her mother also died quite young. Lolita
turns out to be an ordinary young woman who loves her husband and baby,
though she still thinks of Quilty as "a great guy in many respects" (*L* 274). It
is then that Humbert realizes that Lolita has a life apart from his world.
Robert Kiely asserts "Lolita repeatedly eludes Humbert's desire to compre-
hend and possess her completely. She eventually escapes from him, grows
older, and takes charge of her own story" (1993:143). The end of the book is
filled with an outburst directed against himself for depriving her of her child-
hood. However, nothing can be changed. She will not be thirteen again. She
will not live with him anymore and she will die in childbirth. Humbert dis-
covers that he really loves her, though she starts being another version of her
mother (Maddox 1983: 79), a woman Humbert has rejected. But this love is a
mature one as he understands that nymphets only live in his imagination. His
only thought is to see art as a way to "the only immortality" he and Lolita can
"share" (*L* 307). Humbert uses art as a way to share eternity with her; they
will live forever through literature. In fact, it could be a metaphor for artistic
creation. Humbert creates something which ends up by having a life of its
own. This fantasy, then, is a reflection of Nabokov's fiction-making since he
introduces a motif which deals with creation and invention.

　　Humbert relates adventures where his memory overlaps with imagina-
tion. Nabokov shows with these examples what he has usually asserted, as in
the following extract:

> The past is a constant accumulation of images, but our brain is not an
> ideal organ for constant retrospection and the best we can do is to
> pick out and try to retain those patches of rainbow light flitting
> through memory. The act of retention is the act of art, artistic se-
> lection, artistic blending, artistic re-combination of actual events.
> (Quoted in Maddox 1983: 117)

　　Nabokov recognizes that he cannot show reality in a simple form. There
is a more problematic relationship between fiction and reality than the one
realist fiction has led the reader to believe. Nabokov's use of madmen as the

protagonists of several of his novels questions our sense of reality and shows it to be something nobody can take for granted. He reveals that problematic relationship between fiction and reality. Autobiographies are supposed to depict reality. Nabokov shows, though, that autobiographies can create a reality of their own. This hero admits having committed murder and child rape, but they could be taken as metaphors for an author's search for aesthetic perfection. Moreover, the reader realizes that s/he cannot trust this narrator. He cannot believe his stories *à la lettre*. The reader is a modern reader who has to remember information or reshape it. In addition, the narrator can address himself to the reader. This openly makes the reader part of the act of reading. The relationship between author and reader is explained by Nabokov in an image in *Speak, Memory* :

> . . . but every time the delicate union did take place, with the magic precision of a poet's word meeting halfway his, or a reader's, recollection. (1969: 209)

This narrator imposes an aesthetic pattern on real life. Humbert offers the story he is writing to Lolita as it is the only eternity that they can share. Humbert blurs the frontiers between fiction and reality in order to go on living by means of art, in literature.a

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THE POETRY OF
JUDITH WRIGHT:
INVENTING AUSTRALIA,
INVENTING THE SELF

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My first encounter with the poetry of Judith Wright in 1986 was a very special one in the sense that it was the reading of her *Collected Poems* (1971) that put me on the track of poetry firmly and definitely; a track I have not left since then.

I was especially attracted by the honesty and intensity of her vision, by the relevance of her message urging the reader to fight for the values of love and life, and by the clarity of her language and the beauty and transparency of her symbols. But, above all, the reading of some of her poems made me feel the pleasure of recognising aspects of my own experience, which is a very rewarding feeling for poetry readers and, for that matter, for readers in general. Keats put it beautifully when he said that poetry should surprise by a fine excess and not by singularity. It should strike the reader as a wording of his own highest thoughts and appear almost a remembrance.

Woman to Man, Judith Wright's second collection of poems, published in 1949, had this kind of effect on me. In this volume, a number of lyrics express her most intimate experiences as lover and mother with tenderness

and delicate eroticism but also with fear and anxiety. The poems are firmly set in the matrix of love but the awareness of irreversible change in her own body and life and in the lives of those she loves constitutes an inevitable source of conflict which adds tension and credibility to the lyrics.

Woman to Man also reflects one of the most important aspects in the poetry of Judith Wright: the desire to make connections between the random particular and the universal in an attempt to relate man to the cosmos. Judith Wright seldom remains at the immediate level of things. Through a constant effort to crack the moulds of the mind, she endows the physical reality with a transcendental meaning which she perceives as lying beyond it. And she does this because her personal experiences and metaphysical concerns are pressing towards speech, but also because she is a moralist who believes that poetry may rescue our mind from the lethargy of custom and routine by directing it to the wonder and mystery of being. Thus, for Judith Wright, poetry is both an inward journey and a social activity and this blend of classicism and romanticism pervades all the stages into which her poetic development may be divided.

The first stage corresponds to *The Moving Image,* published in 1946. In this first collection of poems Judith Wright introduces us to her country, Australia, through an intricate pattern of trails that take the reader to the visible and unseen realities of her land. In other words, Judith Wright offers us an insight into the face and soul of her country.

The reasons why she chooses to begin her poetic journey by reproducing the most relevant aspects of Australia's past and present as well as her emotional response to them are explained by the poet herself in her book *Because I Was Invited* (1975) a collection of articles in which the writer explains her philosophy and main concerns in life and which, therefore, constitute a valuable aid in understanding her poems.

With regard to the relationship between self and place, Judith Wright refers to Australia as a land which still looms large in the mind of most Australian writers:

> Australia is still for us not a country but a state of mind. We do not speak from within but from outside. From a state of mind that describes rather than expresses its surroundings or from a state of mind that imposes itself upon rather than lives through landscape and event. (1969: 301)

And later on, she implies that writing about Australia is a necessary therapy for overcoming conflicting feelings of love and rejection towards the land and, as some poems suggest, a deep sense of guilt for what the white man did to the natives. She believes that writers must achieve reconciliation with their land before they can turn confidently to other concerns:

> Before one's country can become an accepted background against which the poet's imagination can move unhindered, it must be first observed, understood, described and, as it were, absorbed. (1965: xviii)

This compulsion to write about her personal background also responds to her own conception of the meaning and value of literature and to her intimate desire to be fully understood:

> The real bearing of literature is not in its structure and language, but in the way it emerges from and reflects our total situation, as individuals and as societies. . . . The writer is a human voice, literature a mirror, sometimes even a source of our values and our reactions, our problems and our attempts to come to terms with them.... Academic criticism very often disregards the content of a work, the background of a writer, what, in a word, he is "trying to do," in order to concentrate on those questions. Important as these may be, I think it is the bearing of the work in the context of its time that makes that work more or less worth study. (Wright 1975: viii)

The reading of *The Moving Image* is therefore essential for anyone who desires to gain an understanding of the life and work of this Australian poet. Through the poems included in this book, Judith Wright introduces us to her country providing an appraisal of the exploits of the early European settlers, sounding a note of grief and guilt for the sufferings inflicted upon the Aborigines and setting all this in a landscape of fertile lands and barren soil. Line by line, Judith Wright reproduces the Australian contour and her emotional response to it. Thus, her poems are imbued with moving lyricism while retaining the impact of the physical reality.

"Bullocky" is one of the poems which celebrates the courage and endurance of the European pioneers. This composition is based on an actual person, Jack Purkiss, a bullock-driver who had worked for the Wrights. The poet evokes the past pioneering days and gives those arduous expeditions a

remoteness and a sense of adventure that transforms them into legendary events.

As the poem unfolds itself, we realize that it narrates the progressive insanity of a pioneer brought about by years of suffering and deprivation. Grief purifies the vision of the bullock-driver to the point of a kind of religious delusion which makes him see himself as a Moses leading the Children of Israel into the Promised Land:

> Beside his heavy-shouldered team,
> thirsty with drought and chilled with rain,
> he weathered all the striding years
> till they ran widdershins in his brain:
>
> Till the long solitary tracks
> etched deeper with each lurching load
> were populous before his eyes,
> and fiends and angels used his road.
>
> All the long straining journey grew
> a mad apocalyptic dream,
> and the old Moses, and the slaves
> his suffering and stubborn team. [1]

By identifying the bullock-driver with the prophet Moses, Judith Wright endows this figure with a mythical significance which renders him timeless and part of the Australian heritage. And, in doing so, the whole poem becomes a tribute to those whose suffering helped to make Australia fruitful:

> O vine, grow closer upon that bone
> And hold it with your rooted hand.
> The prophet Moses feeds the grape,
> and fruitful is the promised land.

In "Bullocky," Judith Wright raises an aspect of Australia's past to the level of myth thereby contributing to a sense of tradition the poet feels is so important for the development of an Australian identity, a task to which she is fully committed.

However, the European pioneers were not the only people whose sufferings helped to fertilize the land for a future vintage. Significantly, Judith Wright incorporates the Aborigines into her poetry as a very important part of Australia's cultural heritage. She believes that by simply ignoring the fate of the natives, white Australians will never be able to rid themselves of an uneasy sense of guilt for what they did to the former inhabitants of Australia. However reprehensible the actions against them might have been, the very fact of recognising and regretting these actions opens a door to a new understanding of and respect for Aboriginal custom and ways of life. Besides, as Judith Wright is deeply concerned about environmental issues, she sees the Aborigines' reverence for the natural world as an example to be followed. Thus, Judith Wright's purpose in reintroducing the Aborigines into the mind of Australians is not so much to recall the violence of the European takeover but to make white Australians realize that the natives are human beings who deserve respect and humane treatment and who may help us find new and more intimate ways of relating ourselves to the physical world. As has already been suggested and as the poet herself confirms, Judith Wright also wants to alleviate a feeling of guilt for what her people did to the former inhabitants of Australia:

> I have, I suppose, been trying to expiate a deep sense of guilt over what we have done to the country, to its first inhabitants of all kinds, and are still and increasingly doing. (Wright 1975: 172)

This feeling of guilt underlies "Bora Ring" where the memory of the Aboriginal tribes forced out of their lands pervades the verses. The poet recreates the setting, brings the local colour into focus and draws our attention to the deserted tribal territories with ghostly dances and echoes of ritual chants. The description of an empty landscape full of memories of the Aborigines increases the sense of usurpation and the feeling of guilt is intensified by the Biblical allusion in the last stanza:

> The song is gone; the dance
> is secret with dancers in the earth,
> the ritual useless and the tribal story
> lost in an alien tale
> ....
> Only the rider's heart
> halts at a sightless shadow, an unsaid word

that fastens in the blood the ancient curse
the fear as old as Cain.[2]

A plea for humane relationship underlies this poem, for although the tone is highly accusatory, the final lines also imply that the urgent lesson to be learned is the final unity of mankind.

In an age of appalling brutality and genocide, Judith Wright's plea is, unfortunately, extremely relevant. Very often the magnitude of the issues involved in today's conflicts makes us, writers and teachers of literature, conscious of the triviality of our work. There is hardly any more important task in the world of writing and teaching literature than denouncing and helping to alleviate the atrocities of man's bestial behaviour towards man. In this sense the poetry and prose writings of Judith Wright bespeak an artist torn between her faith in the redeeming power of poetry and the awareness that no significant number of people have yet found it to be so. Hence her desire to convince the reader that we have the power to change the world by changing our ways of seeing and relating ourselves to it. Hence too, her recognition that poetry is a medium through which she tries to come to terms with her own uncertainties and contradictions.:

> It may be legitimate to say what I think the general direction of my work is- that is in so far as I know it myself. I am using natural symbols to work out human problems, (my own of course), and to try to cast some incidental light on their relation to the whole modern situation.[3]

Indeed, in *The Moving Image,* Judith Wright attempts not only to revaluate her country's past in order to narrow the emotional gap between Australians and their land, but also to achieve a personal reconciliation with the harshness of the Australian landscape and some of the figures that move in it. In "South of my Days," one of her finest descriptive pieces, the poet seems to be seeking this reconciliation. She revives her childhood and adolescence while reproducing the impact that both the beauty and ruggedness of the land made on her. The lines are studded with contrasting sounds and images which suggest that although Australia is a land in the heart of the poet she is at the same time digesting the sterility of the country and enjoying its beauty:

South of my days' circle, part of my blood's country,

> rises that tableland, high delicate outline
> of bony slopes wincing under the winter,
> low trees blue-eyed olive, outcropping granite—
> clean, lean, hungry country, the creek's leaf-silenced,
> willow-choked, the slope a tangle of meddlar and crabapple
> branching over and under, blotched with green lichen;
> and the old cottage lurches in for shelter.[4]

The gentle alliterative rhythms of the adjectives "delicate," "low," "blue-eyed," "olive," "clean" and "lean," and the peaceful atmosphere they recreate contrast significantly with the harsh and unfriendly vision brought into focus by the terms "outcropping granite," "hungry," "creek" and "lurches." Once the setting has been described, the poet moves inside the house and her thoughts go to old Dan with "seventy years of stories clutched round his bones," tales of drought and death which affected the sensitive young mind and which "still go walking" in the adult's dreams. Judith Wright recognizes that only when she has reconciled these contradictory feelings

> Then will my land turn sweetly from the plough
> and all my pastures rise as green as spring.[5]

As we have seen, she achieves this reconciliation by endowing people and landscape with an extra dimension of reality which gives new significance to the Australian contour. Every presence becomes a symbolic situation to be explored and, on doing so, she not only creates a beautiful Australian symbolism but also transforms her land into an emotionally accepted background from which she can grow confidently as a writer.

Woman to Man illustrates this growth in the sense that, at this stage, the poet's concern for the retrieval of Australia's past recedes in her mind and the immediate forefront is occupied by a renewed desire to establish links between the concrete and the remote, the visible and the unseen, the particular and the universal. Consequently, the poems in *Woman to Man* are intensely metaphysical, for apart from the lyrics condensing her most intimate experiences which the poet relates to the sexuality of the universe, the verses in which she expresses her encounter with nature are also permeated by the metaphysical idea of a continuous universal epic of generation. Far from being taken for granted, creation is, for Judith Wright, a new miracle every time it happens. The new-born baby or the budding flower are perhaps for us mere daily observable objects deprived of their magic, but through her poetry,

Judith Wright retrieves these acts of creation from the world of the mundane and elevates them to a higher plane of awareness thereby reawakening the reader's capacity for feeling and emotion.

"Woman to Man," the lyric that gives its title to the volume, is a song to conception, a special metaphysical vision of woman which takes her from the sexuality of the couple to the whole mystery of reproduction. Although in this lyric the act of passion is described delicately but vividly, the emphasis is not upon love-making but upon life-making. The language is intensely metaphorical and it is this metaphoric quality that accounts for the poem's mystery and passionate appeal.

Significantly, in the first stanza, the artist concentrates on the powerful thrust of love or life force breaking its way through darkness. For Judith Wright the concepts of love and life force are inextricably intertwined since she believes and feels that "life is the basis of truth and for life love is the dynamic principle" (quoted by Moore 1968: 77). In the poem, the final triumph of love over darkness, which will eventually culminate in the birth of a child, is advanced by giving the newly-formed cell of life a distinctive human shape and individuality:

> The eyeless labourer in the night,
> the selfless, shapeless seed I hold,
> builds for its resurrection day-
> silent and swift and deep from sight
> foresees the unimagined light.[6]

Paradoxically, the child's identity is conveyed through the same terms that express its non-existence. The suffix "less" is more an anticipation of what the seed will later become than an assertion of what is not yet. We visualize the child through the terms "eyeless" and "shapeless" and infer its identity as a human being from the word "selfless." However, the fact of describing the unborn child in negatives is also a way of emphasizing the sovereign independence of the life force, a force which cannot be bridled or tamed by language. Thus, the poet's explicit disapproval of naming implies that this vital impulse she experiences so intensely is beyond language. The quick rhythm of the last two lines reproduces the urgent pressure of the life force striving for itself, and this impression of celerity is intensified by the image of the swift labourer who steadily and diligently gains ground over darkness.

In the second stanza the poet continues to stress the outcome of the act of love more than the act itself and to draw our attention to the existence of a

vital force which works through the lovers. Man and woman play both a passive and active role in the process of conception and in the artist's poetic landscape, this feeling of being artificer and instrument of love is symbolized through a hunting image with the lovers being, at the same time, hunter and prey. Three characters participate in the act of conception: woman, man and the life force:

> This is no child with a child's face;
> this has no name to name it by:
> yet you and I have known it well.
> This is our hunter and our chase,
> the third who lay in our embrace.

In the third and fourth stanzas, the vital impulse continues to intrude with force in the lovers' intimate relationship. That which is physically seen and touched during sexual intercourse captures momentarily the universal unseen. This vision is so powerfully conceived by the poet, the conflict between light and darkness so intensely apprehended in the form of "the blind head butting at the dark" and "the blaze of light along the blade," that she is overwhelmed by this metaphysical experience and looks for shelter in the physical and concrete reality of the embrace:

> This is the maker and the made;
> this is the question and reply;
> the blind head butting at the dark,
> the blaze of light along the blade.
> Oh hold me for I am afraid.

The final exclamation provides a moving culmination for the poet's intense experience of creation. As Andrew Taylor suggests,

> Swaddled in metaphor, the origin of the child and the origin of creativity are cleary there in the poem, yet, if we look closely enough they are clearly unseen. (1987: 97)

The same fascination for the generative process as the force of love springing from the grip of chaos pervades the poems where Judith Wright expresses her encounter with nature which is meditative, intuitive and imbued with strong metaphysical searching. The poet sees in the recurrence of the seasons a victory of the life force over death and likens this struggle to man's

creative spirit and the odds against which it manifests itself. Nature offers man a splendid example of the quenchless flame of the life force and of its endless possibilities for renewal.

Invariably, the point of departure for the poet's meditation is her emotional response to some concrete object or event observed in the outside world. A budding flower, a tree in blossom or an animal may spark off a poetic journey from which the poet and the object having departed separately return as if joined by the same desire for being. In the poem "Flame-Tree in a Quarry," the vision of this tree flowering in an apparently barren landscape triggers off the poet's metaphysical projection. She observes the physical object, empathises with it and the tree becomes the symbol of life's fiery spirit defeating an uncongenial environment:

> From the broken bone of the hill
> stripped and left for dead,
> like a wrecked skull,
> leaps out this bush of blood.
>
> Out of the torn earth's mouth
> comes the old cry of praise.
> Still is the song made flesh
> though the singer dies—
>
> flesh of the world's delight,
> voice of the world's desire,
> I drink you with my sight
> and I am filled with fire.
>
> Out of the very wound
> springs up this scarlet breath—
> this fountain of hot joy,
> this living ghost of death.[7]

Much of the lyrical intensity of the verses derives from the immediate local reference of the setting. Judith Wright seldom quits the Australian landscape when she writes and this strong link with her immediate reality prevents her from getting lost in metaphysical heights and gives her poems shape and clarity. The intense sense of place also suggests that Australia has a strong hold on the poet's imagination and that she is still engaged in the retrieval of her country by endowing every presence with poetic significance.

Just as in "Flame-Tree in a Quarry," a flame tree and its beautiful scarlet flowers serve Judith Wright as springboards for her metaphysical projection, so in "Conch-Shell" it is an empty shell that lifts the poet above the physical. She picks up the object and it suddenly becomes the symbol of a life cycle since it held the cell of birth and the flesh that died, a whole process she imagines as "the brilliant arch from darkness into darkness." Then, the poet addresses the former inhabitant of the conch and identifies herself with it as sharer of the same life that once animated the animal:

> And here, half guess, half knowledge, I contract
> into a beast's blind orbit, stare deep down
> the cliffs not I have climbed; your prodigal,
> probe with my sense your senseless life—
> since life, the force that leapt between your poles,
> burns forward in me against the night.[8]

The same pulse of life that beats with force in the last line is heard in another poem, "The Builders," but this time love works through the insects that swiftly and silently build life on the Australian coral reef against the "dark eroding seas." This poem has a special significance for the poet because she played an active role in the defence of the Australian Great Barrier Reef against oil-drilling. As in the other lyrics, the factual account of reality, this time the insects' frantic activity, is only the surface of the poem. Judith Wright strikes deeper to find in the animals' instinctive labour the force of love breaking out of darkness. The emphasis is not laid on the tiny creatures but on "the quick, the sensitive, the lover" who "dares to hold his love against the world." The lower and the higher orders of life become again an imagined whole, partaking of the same impelling drive.

Only love may save man from the bleak encroachment of death, but the love must be active and daring like that of the insects because Judith Wright is a vitalist and the focal point of vitalism is not being but becoming. Reality is a condition of unrest for it is precisely unrest, struggle and contradiction that ensure progress, the alternative being inaction, passivity and stagnation.

There is no doubt that Judith Wright is enamoured of life and fascinated by the incessant turning of the wheel of creation. However, in subsequent volumes such as *The Gateway* (1953) and *The Two Fires* (1955), the dark vision of war leaves the poet stranded in a landscape from which the flow of life has been completely drained away. In the poem "The Two Fires," the artist leaves no door open to the future because love has been defeated in the

battle between the two fires: the ancient, creative, and eternal fire of being, and the modern destructive fire epitomised in Hiroshima and Nagasaki:

> For time has caught on fire, and you too burn:
> leaf, stem, branch, calyx and the bright corolla
> are now insubstantial wavering fire
> in which love dies: the final pyre
> of the beloved, the bridegroom and the bride.
> These two we have denied.[9]

All the elements which formed the world of the vitalist giving evidence of the existence of a self-perfecting principle or life force are denied one by one. Time, as the frame within which evolution was possible, "has caught on fire," and with it the chances of future life. "The lovelier distance ahead" which sounded so promising in "The Moving Image" has become a cul-de-sac. The idea of annihilation pervades the poem and is intensified by the reference to the destruction of the two great nuclei from which love expands on Earth, that is, the vegetable world symbolized in the leaf, the stem, the calyx and the corolla and the animal world represented by its most evolved creatures, Man and Woman, the bridegroom and the bride. The spiritual communion the poet establishes with nature in previous poems is also destroyed and replaced by a weird and almost macabre relationship. Man has eaten the seed of the creative fire contained in the "yellow wheat," but through hate he has transformed and released this seed as a destructive fire:

> and have we eaten in the heart of the yellow wheat
> the sullen unforgetting seed of fire?
> And now, set free by the climate of man's hate,
> that seed sets time ablaze.

In the last lines of the poem Judith Wright identifies the two fires, but no sign of hope springs from this identification:

> Look, the whole world burns.
> The ancient kingdom of the fire returns.
> And the world, that flower that housed the bridegroom and the bride,
> burns on the breast of night.
> The world's denied.

In "The Two Fires" the note sounds inflated and the images seem to have been deliberately sought to make the world's troubles more significant. This style contrasts sharply with the delightful spontaneity of earlier lyrics where poetic vision seemed to spring from the poet's mind effortlessly, already clad in language. However, in spite of this impression of artificiality one does not doubt that the poet's despair is genuine. Yet, at the same time one cannot help missing the stir of feeling that the lyrics in *The Moving Image* and in *Woman to Man* produce. Fortunately, "West Wind" and "Western Star," the poems which follow "The Two Fires," bring back part of the lyrical emotion we find lacking in Judith Wright's long poems. In these shorter lyrics the language sounds less grandiose and her pessimism more real and convincing. In "West Wind," Judith Wright states the causes of her grief. She is not afraid of the evil which is part of the world's harmonious order and which in the poem is symbolized by "the snake in the flowering bush" or "the crow that sharpens his beak for the day." What frightens her is the vision of a world bent on destruction. It would be far easier to cease opposing resistence to death, yield to it, and rest, as the voices of the living dead, the victims of war, advise her to do:

> You will find no rest in time or being; forget to be—
> blow as we do down the black wind into an easy grave.[10]

The poet's sorrow is so overwhelming that not even the soothing power of Venus, the star of love, can alleviate it:

> Too late, most lovely, most sad,
> you touch our sight.
> Your still small dew cannot quench
> the hellfire blaze of the heart.[11]

About Judith Wright's intense pessimism in *The Two Fires,* the Australian critic Inglis Moore writes:

> She has deserted the metaphysical for the social, and social poetry is of its nature ephemeral. . . . It is to be hoped that she will return to the metaphysical in her future development, that the lost traveller in her quest for reality may turn from the time's troubles to some timeless form, as she did in the lyrical richness of *The Moving Image,* and the intense affirmation of *Woman to Man.* (1968: 87)

Moore's hope is not without foundation. The poet's brooding over the world's conflicts is only a temporary emotional state. Her pessimism, although well-founded, is too intense to be emotionally sustained for a long time by a poet who is as forward-looking and forward-urging as Judith Wright has proved to be. As for Inglis Moore's commentary on the poet's change from the metaphysical to the social, it should perhaps be added that this change is not as radical as may be inferred from the reading of the passage quoted above. In "The Two Fires," the vision of the primal creative fire triggered by the ravaging evidence of man's deadly fire suggests that the term metaphysical still fits the work of this artist. What she has abandoned is the metaphysics of love in exchange for the metaphysics of death. Her positive view of a universe animated by a creative impulse stronger than any of the forces opposing it has been replaced by the vision of the forces of chaos defeating the power of love.

However, unequivocal signs of recovery come from the poet's renewed desire to peep through the keyhole of darkness to see the other world, "the secret one, the flower-hearted,"[12] a world which, as Judith Wright reminds us in the poem "For a Birthday," is worth fighting for:

> Build though the world be falling,
> that crystal, your truth.
> Its eight sides shall be your dwelling
> though time take your breath.[13]

If we assess Judith Wright's poetic production by her own standards we have to consider both the bearing of her work in her immediate context, Australia, and the relevance of her message to the world's modern concerns. In the first case it must be borne in mind that Judith Wright published the main bulk of her work during the forties and the fifties, a time when Australian literature was beginning to forget that it was adolescent and antipodean. The desire to create a recognizable Australian tradition and its sustaining myths was strong in some artists while many others preferred to remain sheltered, in one way or another, from the problems of identity. In *Because I Was Invited* Judith Wright explains that two Australian literary groups, the Jindyworobacks and the Angry Penguins represented these two attitudes, that is, the confrontation between indigenous values and values of European origin in its purest form.

The Jindy movement, alive from the 1930s to the 1950s, attempted to create an indigenous tradition based upon Aboriginal myth and custom. Although they introduced a new and more positive attitude towards the natives, they overemphasized a culture which was alien to the White man and was, consequently, not accepted as the foundation for the building of his literature. The Angry Penguins stood in opposition to the Jindys' Aboriginal claims but failed to provide any real alternative. Instead they sought to incorporate European movements into the Australian context but did not contribute much to the creation of a distinctive Australian voice.

Against this literary backdrop, Judith Wright's poetry may be seen as an attempt to achieve a balance between the strict regionalism of the Jindys and the bush balladists who concentrated exclusively on local values, and the vision of the Angry Penguins or poets like Christopher Brennan whose work did not invoke any recognizable Australian features. The kind of Australianism she proposes does not fall into either an aggressive regionalism or an excessive dependence on European modes. Judith Wright believes an exalted patriotism narrows the scope for cultural development, but she also realises that the artist cannot ignore his country or its problems since this would mean to neglect a very important part of himself. Her poetry is a poetry of integration which weaves the positive and negative elements of the Australian experience into a richly-textured reality and has had a great influence on the way Australians see their past and, therefore, on the way they inhabit the present.

As regards the relevance of her message to modern concerns, her defence of all forms of life and her belief in the regenerating power of love contribute to the universal appeal of her poetry. But the validity and effectiveness of her philosophy also lie in her ability to convey that the poet is enmeshed in the same net of joys and uncertainties as the rest of human beings. Judith Wright knows what it is to be subject to time, suffering and death. She is aware that it is a love for life which provides human beings with the resilience necessary to overcome all obstacles and to look forward to the future with hope. Provided we give ourselves the opportunity to develop our inner potential, we can transform our world into a more humane home.a

NOTES

1. Judith Wright, "Bullocky," from *The Moving Image* (Wright 1971: 17).

2. Wright, "Bora Ring," from *The Moving Image* (Wright 1971: 8).

3. As quoted by Inglis Moore (1968: 76).

4. Wright, "South of my Days" from *The Moving Image* (Wright 1971: 20).

5. Wright, "For New England," (Wright 1971: 22).

6. Wright, "Woman to Man" from *Woman to Man* (1971: 29).

7. Wright, "Flame Tree in a Quarry" (1971: 62).

8. Wright, "Conch Shell" (1971: 31).

9. Wright, "The Two Fires," from *The Two Fires* (1971: 123).

10. Wright, "West Wind" (1971: 124).

11. Wright, "Western Star" (1971: 124).

12. Wright, "Dialogue," from *The Two Fires* (1971: 127-8).

13. Wright, "For a Birthday" (1971: 151).

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a

-IDENTIDAD Y DIFERENCIA
EN
THE CLONING OF JOANNA MAY
DE FAY WELDON

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"Que la diferencia se deslice subrepticiamente hacia el lugar del conflicto". La diferencia no es lo que oculta o edulcora el conflicto: se conquista sobre el conflicto, está más allá y a su lado.

Roland Barthes

Luckily when someone says "woman", one still doesn't know what that means even if one knows what one wishes to say. Even if at birth they said that it was a girl, afterwards, it is a whole long story, a whole lifetime. And then I wonder what's man and what's woman and what I am, which is what she too was wondering in the bathroom, while I no longer know when I say "a woman" whether I am speaking of a person whom you would call "a woman"....

Hélène Cixous

La construcción de la identidad normativa, es decir, de la identidad que corres-ponde a una norma dictada por una cultura dominante (en nuestro caso se trata obviamente de la cultura occidental), ha defendido un discurso que nos ha vinculado, entre otras cosas, a una idea esencialista de la mujer. Según

Jeffrey Weeks: "The seeking out of a 'true identity' . . . claims to be finding what we *really* are, or should be, and as a result identity becomes an imposition" (Weeks 1987: 37). Así que parece lógico preguntarse ¿quién construye nuestra identidad?, ¿cuándo empieza todo el proceso que nos convertirá en *yo*, *tú*, *ella*, *él*? Por ejemplo, en "Sorties" Hélène Cixous se enfrenta a las dicotomías que han encerrado el concepto de mujer en una identidad preconstituida —en una identidad que se desarrolla y crece en las dicotomías y gracias a ellas— y se pregunta, irónicamente, dónde está, en realidad, la mujer:

> *Where is she?*
> Activity / passivity,
> Sun / Moon,
> Culture / Nature,
> Day / Night,
> Father / Mother,
> Head / heart,
> Intelligible / sensitive,
> Logos / Pathos
> (Cixous 1992: 366)

Cixous ha sabido resumir en estas ocho celebérrimas líneas todos los tópicos que han creado el *alma femenina*, única, eterna e inmutable. La representación de la mujer hecha por cierta parte del Aparato Cultural o por los *media* (pienso con horror, por ejemplo, en las mujeres de Tele 5) ayuda a consolidar esta manera de ver y enfrentarse al universo femenino. Volviendo a apoyarnos en las palabras de Hélène Cixous, se podría decir que: "Theory of culture, theory of society, the ensemble of symbolic systems —art, religion, family, language— everything elaborates the same systems" (Cixous 1992: 366). Todo este sistema de valores y de oposiciones se centra en delimitar y decidir el concepto de mujer, como si existiera una manera de ser mujer y otra de ser varón, o probablemente tendría que decir una de ser varón y *otra* de ser mujer, porque la otredad ha pertenecido desde siempre a las mujeres y a los locos. Escribe a este propósito Rosa María Rodríguez: "No existe la verdadera mujer, pues 'verdadera' y 'mujer' son conceptos que *desde otro* fueron creados, y únicamente como apariencia, como superficie, como producción existen. Debajo de ello no hay nada que pueda ser llamado mujer...." (Rodríguez 1987: 38) o, como resume magníficamente Johnatan Dollimore: ". . . identity is *essentially* informed by what is not" (Dollimore 1991: 282).

La investigación que se ha llevado a cabo en los últimos veinte años sobre lo que es la identidad normativa y sobre los mecanismos que el "discurso de la normalidad" utiliza para definir como diferente a toda subjetividad que se aleja de la norma establecida por los códigos de la cultura dominante se refleja, entre otros, en el proyecto filosófico que Michel Foucault llevó a cabo a lo largo de su labor intelectual.[1] Sus reflexiones sobre el papel que las relaciones de poder juegan en la construcción de la subjetividad han sido utilizadas por la parte de la crítica feminista que, dentro del marco de lo que conocemos como postestructuralismo, utiliza el discurso foucaultiano para poner en tela de juicio la relación que existe entre el discurso del patriarcado y la definición del concepto de identidad femenina.[2] Como subraya Chris Weedon: "The term 'patriarchal' refers to power relations in which women's interests are subordinated to the interests of men. . . . In patriarchal discourse the nature and social role of women are defined in relation to a norm which is male" (Weedon 1987: 2). En semejante contexto hay que subrayar cómo la opción feminista se convierte en una opción no sólo social sino política cuyo objetivo es cambiar, en el conjunto de la sociedad, las relaciones de poder dentro de las que se mueven los individuos de ambos sexos. Otro punto fundamental del proyecto feminista es poner en tela de juicio la construcción de la identidad normativa que responde a unas tecnologías definidas por unos conceptos pensados exclusivamente desde una perspectiva occidental, masculina y heterosexual. En este sentido la teoría postestructuralista (y sobre todo la parte que se apoya en el pensamiento foucaultiano) nos proporciona un análisis de la relación que existe entre las prácticas discursivas, las relaciones de poder, el conjunto de la sociedad y la construcción de la subjetividad. Volviendo a tomar las palabras de Weedon como punto de referencia, podemos afirmar:

> The assumption that subjectivity is constructed implies that it is not innate, not generically determined, but socially produced. Subjectivity is produced in a whole range of discursive practices —economic, social and political— the meanings of which are a constant site of struggle over power. (Weedon 1987: 21)

En otras palabras, lo que se propone es una teoría de la subjetividad que se basa en la interrelación entre el individuo, el lenguaje, las relaciones de poder y la sociedad y que, además, engloba una perspectiva histórica. Este punto de vista nos abre el camino hacia la posibilidad de considerar también el concepto de diferencia —o en términos foucaultianos, el sujeto excluido— únicamente como un constructo social e histórico. Esto significaría que no

sólo la idea de "diferencia" perdería su connotación negativa, sino que se po-
dría explotar para aceptar y entender otras formas de subjetividad (McNay
1992; Sawicki 1991). En este sentido, Lois McNay escribe:

> Foucault's insistence on the relational nature of identities, whether at
> the level of the individual or the group, emphasizes the need for a
> radical politics to move away from the preservation of identity or its
> imposition on others and to move toward the exploration of types of
> coalition between various groups with the ultimate aim of ending
> social injustice. (McNay 1992: 111)

Dentro de este marco teórico, la representación discursiva de las
prácticas y de las tecnologías que definen a los individuos y de la relación
que ellos mantienen con la estructura social se puede entender, entre otras
cosas, como un medio para adentrarse y hurgar en la compleja red que las
relaciones de poder forman en el conjunto de la relación poder/saber. La
cultura occidental está pasando por una difícil y delicada transformación y,
como nos recuerda Jane Flax en su artículo "Postmodernism and Gender
Relations in Feminist Theory": "It seems increasingly probable that Western
culture is in the middle of a fundamental transformation: 'A shape of life' is
growing old. In retrospect, this transformation may be radical [but as gradual]
as the shift from a medieval to a modern society" (Flax 1990: 30). Nos
referimos a una sociedad que vive la realidad, aunque la más terrible, como
espectáculo[3] (y pensamos, entre otras muchas cosas, en las campañas
publicitarias de Benetton, en la guerra del Golfo,[4] que nos han presentado
más como una batalla en unos video-juegos que como la tragedia humana que
ha sido o en los diferentes *reality shows*). Se quiere quitar a la realidad su
materialidad y presentarla como un simulacro de sí misma donde se pierden
los significados para dar paso a los meros significantes. Estamos viviendo un
momento histórico en el que se están poniendo en tela de juicio valores que
hasta hace pocos años se consideraban como verdaderos y absolutos y esta
transformación se refleja, necesariamente, en la vida de las mujeres y de
todos los individuos.

En este contexto, la literatura feminista se convierte en un instrumento
de gran importancia cuando se trata de individuar y definir los mecanismos
que definen a la mujer no sólo como ente, sino también como sujeto social,
es decir desde una perspectiva no sólo ontológica sino también epistemoló-
gica. Estos textos suelen mantener unas características comunes; sus autoras
escriben sobre la vida de las mujeres que trabajan fuera o dentro de casa,
hablan de malos tratos, de maternidad responsable o no, escriben sobre rebe-

lión o frustración, pero siempre desde un punto de vista femenino, y, como subraya Jennifer Breen, "The most provocative fiction not only makes a truthful representation of our world, but also exposes and subverts what is wrong with it" (Breen 1990: 123).

Nuestro propósito en este trabajo es demostrar, a través de una lectura que se basa en unos postulados postestructralistas, cómo, en el marco de la literatura feminista contemporánea, la novela de Fay Weldon *The Cloning of Joanna May* representa un lugar de resistencia y contestación de las normas que definen a la identidad femenina. En el texto que nos ocupa, el hilo conductor es representado por la respuesta irónica dada por la escritora inglesa Fay Weldon a una cultura que utiliza la negación de la diferencia como medio para seguir encerrando al sujeto femenino dentro de los límites de la identidad normativa que la ontología del *cogito* ha asignado a la mujer. Como también nos recuerda Flora Alexander en *Contemporary Women Novelists,* Weldon reproduce en sus novelas aspectos de la sociedad contemporánea desde una perspectiva que se mueve entre el realismo y la fantasía.[5] Sus personajes son casi todos mujeres que existen en un mundo a veces grotesco, poblado por hombres egoístas y gobernado por unas normas estrictamente patriarcales. La obra de Weldon asume un interés particular en la literatura británica escrita por mujeres no sólo porque en muchos de sus libros es manifiesta la intención de reescribir algunos de los mitos de nuestra cultura (pensemos, por ejemplo, en el controvertido *The Life and Loves of a She Devil*), sino porque su trabajo literario se centra en la producción de textos donde el discurso del género está estrictamente relacionado con el de la identidad. Además, Weldon no sólo propone una revisión y una reescritura de las historias de mujeres de toda clase social y nivel cultural, sino que relaciona dichas historias con temas que exploran la relación existente entre la identidad de la mujer y la estructura social:

> Although her novels vary in content and approach, she typically uses a method of exaggeration and caricature, so that the behaviour of characters is preposterous and ridiculous, and yet sufficiently connected with what goes on in the real world to produce an analysis of actual problems. Her central focus is on personal relations between men and women, but she relates the personal to social change. . . . (Alexander 1989: 52)

Fay Weldon empezó su actividad de escritora durante los años sesenta, cuando en la sociedad y en el campo cultural se empezaba a percibir de manera importante la influencia del movimiento feminista (Kenyon 1988:

104). Como nos recuerda Flora Alexander (1989: 42), el concepto de "the personal is the political" hace su aparición en toda la narrativa feminista de la época y es la conciencia de la existencia de la relación entre lo personal y lo político lo que llevó a Weldon, entre otras autoras, a enfocar su trabajo de escritora hacia la representación discursiva de personajes femeninos. Su búsqueda personal en la representación de mujeres de las más diferentes clases sociales le ha permitido dar voz a una narrativa que se interesa por las relaciones que los varones y las mujeres, pero sobre todo las mujeres, mantienen entre sí y con las estructuras sociales. Su examen de la sociedad contemporánea pone siempre de relieve cómo los cambios que tienen lugar dentro de la misma se reflejan directamente en la vida de las mujeres. Sus personajes, tanto los masculinos como los femeninos, son siempre el producto de unas determinadas condiciones históricas, culturales, económicas y sociales. La protagonista femenina de *Leader of the Band* (1988), por ejemplo, es una famosa y conocida científica que descubre ser el producto de un experimento de ingeniería genética llevado a cabo por su padre, un oficial de las SS alemanas. Según Weldon este personaje representa toda una generación porque: ". . . she has a history of insanity, of war crimes, of the general behaviour of nations, and she is trying to make sense of it" (en una entrevista a Olga Kenyon, 1989: 169). En otras palabras, lo que la autora nos propone es la representación discursiva de la mujer como sujeto social, hurgando —a veces de manera desagradable, otras de manera irónica y divertida— en lo más hondo de la sociedad inglesa y describiendo el desconcierto, la marginación y el sufrimiento que están esperimentando todos los sectores más débiles de su población. La misma Weldon declara que "There are too few writers who are preoccupied with the actual state of the world. It's unfortunate that novelists are professionals who think 'Now I'll write a novel' instead of thinking what there is to be said —and if there is nothing shut up, I never run out of things to say" (en Kenyon 1989: 159).

El resultado de este trabajo de análisis social es que en las novelas de Weldon no sólo sobresale su capacidad de elegir unos temas que tratan de ex-periencias comunes a muchas mujeres occidentales, sino que, debido a los ar-gumentos que la autora aborda en sus novelas y al modo en el que los desarrolla (sean estos la transformación de un ama de casa de los suburbios burgueses en una diablesa o los textos que revelan la actitud ambivalente de Weldon hacia la maternidad como *Female Friends* (1975), *Little Sisters* (1978) o *Puffballs* (1980)), se puede decir que su narrativa tiene un carácter "subversivo". Según Jennifer Breen, el signifcado del término subversivo

aplicado a la narrativa escrita por mujeres se puede resumir con las siguientes palabras:

> By 'subversive', I mean any writing that shows up the *status quo* instead of supporting it. In the case of women writers, 'subversive' fiction is usually that which consciously or unconsciously undermines the received idea that men are superior to women and that men should dominate women. (1990: x)

No obstante, tenemos que poner de relieve que, como nos recuerda Kenyon, el trabajo de Weldon no está exento de críticas. A menudo se la acusa de seguir demasiado las demandas del mercado en su producción literaria y, por esta razón, de simplificar excesivamente los temas que trata, utilizando un estilo repleto de *slogans*.[6] Tenemos que reconocer que en estas críticas hay un fondo de verdad y que los años que Weldon ha pasado escribiendo para la publicidad la llevan, a veces, a redactar párrafos que parecen sacados de un anuncio en una revista femenina. Sin embargo, aun reconociendo todos los límites ínsitos en su narrativa, es su estilo, tan parecido al de la publicidad, el que al fin y al cabo lleva su trabajo y su crítica social a los sectores más dispares de nuestra sociedad. En las novelas de Weldon, la representación discursiva de la mujer se puede entender como un estudio de la representación de la posibilidad que tiene el sujeto de actuar dentro de un marco histórico y social determinado (el mismo que lo ha definido como sujeto sexuado) y, sobre todo, nos brinda la posibilidad de investigar qué posibilidades de cambio real tiene dicho sujeto y qué condiciones necesita para que se lleve a cabo este cambio.

The Cloning of Joanna May se podría considerar como la historia de la relación, la mayoría de las veces paradójica, que la mujer mantiene con la sociedad y con las normas que definen su identidad y su lugar en la compleja estructura social contemporánea. Cada uno de los personajes de esta novela de Weldon representa uno o más aspectos de dicha estructura y, una vez más, la escritura se convierte en la articulación de la crítica social que Weldon suele llevar a cabo en sus novelas y su obra en general. El mismo título nos su-giere que la autora se va a enfrentar a un tema de candente actualidad, el de la clonación humana. En el universo que Fay Weldon nos describe en el texto que nos ocupa, cada una de las figuras que nos dibuja en su narrativa se convierte en un icono de los símbolos de una sociedad que en un futuro no muy lejano podría utilizar la ciencia para crear seres perfectos o individuos a la carta.

En *The Cloning of Joanna May*, la pregunta que en una de las primeras páginas del libro se hace (¿o nos hace?) Joanna, antes de empezar a relatar todos los sucesos que en el plazo de un año han cambiado por completo su vida y su manera de ser y de sentir, es: "But is the 'me', the 'I', really the same as that initial 'you' with which we all begin; the sudden bright consciousness of the self as something defined by others?" (*CJM* 9). Luego empieza el relato, esta vez en tercera persona, de la historia de otras cuatro mujeres que pertenecen a cuatro mundos completamente distintos y que viven cuatro vidas que, en apariencia, no tienen nada en común. Todas tienen la misma edad, treinta años, y todas viven en la misma ciudad, Londres. Jane Jarvis es una profesional de los medios de comunicación, independiente, racional y sin ninguna intención de convertir en estable su relación con Tom: "'You're cold', he said. 'Cold and over-educated and selfish'. 'Just rational', she said, but Jane Jarvis was hurt" (*CJM* 11). Julie Rainer es una acomodada ama de casa, la mujer de un ejecutivo nunca presente, aburrida por su vida y deprimida por su vocación maternal frustrada: "The wind lobbed someone else's chimney through the neat suburban roof of the home of Julie Rainer, aged thirty, and spoiled its perfection in many ways. . . ." (*CJM* 11). Gina Herriot es una mujer proletaria, madre de tres hijos y maltratada por un marido borracho y violento: "Gina was thirty, but born seven weeks prematurely, and this initial misfortune, this first hard, grating sharpening of the knives of fate, echoed like a sound, a siren song, through her life" (*CJM* 13). La última de las cuatro es Alice Morthampton, una famosa modelo: "Alice was smiled upon by different stars than were Jane, Julie and Gina" (*CJM* 13).

Cuando Weldon nos introduce en las vidas de Jane, Julie, Gina y Alice, ya no es Joanna May la que cuenta la historia. Es como si volviendo atrás en el tiempo, al comienzo de todos los acontecimientos que han cambiado para siempre las vidas de estas cinco mujeres, Joanna hubiese perdido el poder sobre su discurso y su historia volviese a ser contada por otro. Por un narrador, irónico y a veces cruel, del que desconocemos el sexo.[7] Weldon define de esta manera el poder que la sociedad y la cultura mantienen sobre las vidas de las mujeres: el cambio entre las primeras dos páginas, donde es Joanna May la que relata lo sucedido, y las siguientes marca la frontera entre la consciencia de la propia identidad y la identidad que el Discurso dominante escoge para cada una. Un ejemplo de cambio de narrador, de primera a tercera persona y viceversa, pueden ser los capítulos cinco y seis. En el quinto capítulo Joanna habla del presente y de sus sensaciones; lo que ella siente, sin embargo, nunca está separado de la realidad que la rodea, del mundo exterior. El descubrimiento del *yo*, de su yo, no deja de lado la

historia, sino que las dos cosas se complementan. Hablar en primera persona, recalcar constantemente en su discurso no sólo el pronombre 'I' sino su nombre, significa afirmar su individualidad y hacer valer sus derechos sobre su vida ("By the morning the wind had died down and *I, Joanna May*, was my proper self again, or thought I was" (*CJM* 7, cursiva mía)). Otro ejemplo pueden ser las siguientes líneas, en las que se hace referencia a la catástrofe de Chernobyl y al peligro ínsito en la utilización de la energía nuclear:

> A couple of days before Chernobyl went up, making a large world into a small one, by reason of our common fear of radiation . . . flying through the air and causing death and decay wherever it fell, at any rate in the popular imagination —*I, Joanna May,* read of another strange event. (*CJM* 27, cursiva mía)

En el sexto capítulo Weldon, esta vez en tercera persona, cuenta la historia de Carl y Joanna: "How had it come about that Joanna Parson, that English rose, had married Carl May, this upstart from a kennel?" (*CJM* 31). Como ya hemos subrayado anteriormente, el cambio de la primera a la tercera persona en la narración marca la diferencia entre la vida pasada de Joanna y su vida presente; es lo que define Joanna la mujer a la que clonaron mientras dormía, y Joanna la mujer que tiene que empezar a vivir sola y enfrentarse con el descubrimiento de sus cuatro copias. El relato de los acontecimientos empieza presentándonos a las otras cuatro mujeres en cuestión, se nos dice sus nombres y el papel que desempeñan en el marco de la sociedad. Esta presentación es fundamental para comprender el sitio que cada una ocupa dentro de los límites de la estructura social y cultural occidental. Escribe Eugenio Trías a este propósito:

> Comenzaremos a comprender que la "identidad personal" es un mito, probablemente burgués, en cualquier caso occidental. Que ese mito se halla asegurado por un bautismo y el consiguiente cobro de un "nombre propio". Podemos decir, en efecto: Yo ahora ya soy *yo*. En efecto: me reconozco en el carnet. El *cogito* pasa siempre por la comisaría de distrito. El *ego* es eso: un trozo de papel, a veces recubierto de plástico. (Trías 1984: 80)

Los carnets de estas cuatro mujeres nos dicen sus nombres y quiénes son: Jane, Julie, Gina, Alice. Dicen también lo que son, es decir, su sexo: mujeres. Será verdad si lo dice la voz de uno de los Aparatos más potentes de la sociedad. Sin embargo lo que el carnet no nos puede contar es el comienzo de esta historia. Ni siquiera Joanna, la nueva Eva, sabe que en realidad ella es

el origen de los cuatro diferentes discursos de Jane, Julie, Gina y Alice, o mejor dicho que su cuerpo es el origen. Es aquí donde empieza todo: "Jane, Julie, Gina, Alice: these were the clones of Joanna May" (*CJM* 14).

Joanna May, una mujer de sesenta años, está casada con un hombre, Carl May, que se ha hecho a sí mismo y que nunca quiso tener un hijo. Joanna aceptó sus condiciones y a cambio obtuvo una vida muy cómoda, dinero y ropa elegante. Sin embargo, Joanna, desde la perspectiva de Carl, no respetó el pacto y tuvo un amante. Weldon, con el estilo escueto e irónico que la caracteriza, nos cuenta en pocas palabras lo sucedido, y en dos líneas nos permite comprender el carácter de Carl: "After Carl May divorced his much loved wife Joanna May, for infidelity and had her lover killed, he lived celibate for several years (as he did) concentrating upon his business interests, which were many and various" (*CJM* 15). El personaje de Carl May es una de las claves que nos da el texto para poder entender el discurso de Joanna. Es un elemento importantísimo en su historia y en su narrativa, como ella misma reconoce no sin amargura:

> I dedicated my life to Carl: I threw away the children I could have had, for his sake, to keep him happy. . . . Of course Carl is dead, dying: so am I, without him. But Carl is at least able to blow up the world while he waits. I'm not. (*CJM* 62)

Carl puede volar el mundo, Joanna es todavía incapaz de controlar su vida y vivir sola. La figura de Carl, a lo largo de los primeros capítulos, se va convirtiendo en la materialización de los discursos que parecen tener prioridad en nuestra sociedad. Su personaje parece estar relacionado con todo lo que significa poder, dinero y especulación. Carl representa quien hace las normas:

> 'Let there be buildings!' Carl May had only to cry, pointing to an arid landscape, and lo, so there would be... 'Let there be beauty!' Carl May had only to murmur... and yes there would be beauty of all sorts. (*CJM* 24)

La vida de Joanna Parson se borra por completo en el momento en el que se convierte en Joanna May, la esposa de Carl. Es a este punto que él empezará a decidir lo que Joanna tiene que ser o lo que no tiene que sentir. Desde el punto de Carl May, Joanna es su creación, ella existe en tanto en cuanto existe él. Nadie más puede tenerla ni ella puede querer a otros, ni siquiera a unos hipotéticos hijos:

> Wait! Joanna knew well enough I didn't want children: I told her the day before our wedding. . . . I took that phantom pregnancy of hers badly . . . let her conscious mind be loyal and loving, in her unconscious, in the depths of her being, Joanna May betrayed me, went against me. (*CJM* 44)

En este punto entramos en la historia de Joanna May, pero no sólo en la suya sino en la de otras cuatro mujeres. Hace treinta años Joanna se durmió en un quirófano para someterse a un aborto y, cuando se despertó, se había convertido en la protagonista de un experimento de genética sin precedentes. Un día, un hombre, su ex marido ("Let there be light! Carl May ordained, and nuclear power stations sprung up at his command and pumped their power into the National Grid") (*CJM* 25), decidió ocupar el sitio de Dios y crear a la mujer, o sería mejor decir a otras cuatro mujeres, todas iguales: científicamente, sin barro, ni magia, ni manzanas, ni serpientes. En un laboratorio. Después de un falso aborto. El falso aborto de un embarazo histérico:

> While she was opened up we took away a nice ripe egg; wisked it down to the lab: shook it up and irritated it in amniotic fluid till the nucleus split, and split again, *and then there were four*. Holly thought we could have got it to eight, but I said not. Growth begins so quickly: there wasn't time. A truly vigorous egg, that one. We kept the embryos in culture for four whole weeks, had four nice healthy waiting wombs at hand on a tap, for implantation. All four took like a dream: there they grew until they popped into the world, alive and kicking. . . . What passive creatures women are: they just lie there, trusting, and let the medical profession do what it wants. (*CJM* 45; cursiva mía)

En la cáustica narración de Weldon, Carl May y el Dr. Holly asumen el papel de los dos representantes del pensamiento de lo Uno: Carl tiene la seguridad que viene del poder del dinero y el Dr. Holly se convierte en representante del Aparato médico-científico. La de ellos no es una guerra personal, desde su perspectiva no es ni siquiera una guerra sino la materialización de la negación de la diferencia. Lo que ellos hacen, desde su punto de vista, es dar vida a cuatro seres; desde el nuestro, el personaje de Joanna May se convierte en un ejemplo de cómo la construcción de una categoría ficticia en la que encajen todas las mujeres da lugar a una idea de identidad colectiva que obliga a la sociedad a no tomar en consideración las diferencias que existen entre mujer y mujer y a desinteresarse, como

consecuencia, por los conceptos de raza, clase o género. Según las dicotomías examinadas por Cixous, la mujer pertenece a la esfera de lo irracional; lo mismo opinan Carl May y el Dr. Holly y, por esta razón, no consideran oportuno comunicar a Joanna su "pequeño" experimento científico:

> Joanna May, the calm, normal, healthy, beautiful and apparently well-balanced woman whom they had, out of love, respect and admiration so successfully reproduced, was still a woman, and therefore liable to extreme, hysterical and unhelpful reaction: she was a creature of the emotions, rather than reason. That was the female lot. (*CJM* 122)

Las palabras que acabamos de citar ponen de relieve el respaldo que cierta parte del aparato cultural o algunos medios de comunicación brindan a un ideal femenino común y que da lugar al reconocimiento oficial de una identidad colectiva. La supuesta existencia de dicha identidad ni reconoce ni admite el concepto de diferencia en el ámbito del discurso de lo Mismo: es decir que mantiene la *diferencia* dentro de la Otredad, fuera de los confines de lo que es culturalmente admitido por el patriarcado. La diferencia es el castigo que se reserva a los que no han aceptado el orden y sus códigos. Bethany, la joven amante de Carl May conoce las normas:

> 'One day you might tell her' she said. 'You never know what's going to happen next. One day you might, to punish her. To take away her singularity'. (*CJM* 47)

Bethany es aparentemente la materialización de todos los tópicos que definen al personaje de la joven amante del hombre de negocios rico y maduro; sin embargo, la representación discursiva de esta mujer se puede interpretar como el análisis de las relaciones que se han ido desarrollando en la sociedad contemporánea entre las relaciones de poder y la comprensión de su funcionamiento por parte del sujeto:

> she had her mother's chin: it would droop and double by the time she was thirty: she was all artifice: she inspired lust not love: she was cunning not wise: bright not clever: could memorize well but not categorize easily. . . . These things Bethany knew about herself. . . . Never mind, when she lost her capacity to charm she would start a business: an employment agency: a chain of them perhaps: Carl May would help her, pension her off: she would be powerful through money, that safe and snazzy stand-in for sexual pleasure. (*CJM* 48)

Así es como Weldon describe el personaje de Bethany, una chica de los suburbios marginales de Londres que utiliza sus encantos para abrirse camino en el mundo. Aparentemente, la relación entre Bethany y Joanna es especular, una se opone a la otra. Las dos mujeres parecen ser antitéticas, pensemos, por ejemplo, en sus orígenes, su educación, su conocimiento e introyección de las normas establecidas. Sin embargo, ambas representan las dos caras de la construcción de la identidad de la mujer llevada a cabo por la epistemología dominante. Si la historia de Joanna se convierte en un ejemplo de la representación de una sociedad que niega y aniquila cualquier elemento que represente a lo que se considera como extraño o diferente, la figura de Bethany recoge las paradojas presentes en nuestra sociedad. Bethany, al contrario que Joanna, nunca tendría un embarazo histérico porque, como subraya Weldon: "Not that she wanted or anticipated children herself, belonging to a younger generation, one which did not define women as people who had babies" (*CJM* 43). La amante de Carl May es consciente de las reglas, se deja utilizar al mismo tiempo que utiliza las normas para llegar donde ella quiere. Es, como hemos sugerido anteriormente, la otra parte de la medalla y sin embargo, y sigue siendo la representación de unos de los productos de las categorías del discurso del patriarcado.

Utilizando como ejemplo los personajes de Weldon, es interesante subrayar, una vez más, cómo en el marco teórico de la crítica feminista, el proyecto foucaultiano puede resultar útil en el examen de la relación que el sujeto mantiene con la sociedad y la cultura. Las respuestas que podría darnos la analítica de la finitud o, si preferimos, la filosofía del *cogito*, con su fe en un sujeto dueño de sí mismo y de sus decisiones (¿Y Joanna, y sus clones?), o las respuestas de filósofos como Louis Althusser —que aun reconociendo el poder de la ideología sobre la formación del individuo seguía viendo en el proyecto marxista la solución para la creación de un sujeto libre— ya no parecen ser representativos de una sociedad que ha visto los horrores y sufrido las heridas provocadas, sólo por citar algún que otro ejemplo, por la bomba atómica, los campos de exterminio, el segundo conflicto mundial[8] o, en el primer lustro de esta década, la limpieza étnica que se está llevando a cabo en algunas zonas de la ex-Yugoslavia. Joanna es, como hemos dicho antes, una mujer de sesenta años que ha vivido la mayoría de estos acontecimientos históricos. Sin embargo, su consciencia se despierta sólo cuando descubre lo que han hecho con su cuerpo. Su pasividad se convierte en rabia sólo cuando se entera de la existencia de sus clones y de la pérdida de su singularidad; es ahora cuando descubre que ella también, y no

sólo Carl, tenía una identidad y lo que ha hecho Carl ha sido quitársela, convertirla en una copia de otras mujeres. La realidad televisada en la que vivimos, y en la que de repente tiene que vivir la misma Joanna con Julie, Jane, Gina y Alice, nos obliga a cuestionar, y, como subraya Luce Irigaray, a reinterpretar la relación entre el sujeto y el discurso, el sujeto y el mundo, el sujeto y el cosmos, el macrocosmos y el microcosmos:

> He (God) knew he was beaten. For Lucifer read John Logie Baird, inventor of TV, toppling the Ultimate Identity from his seat of power: spoiling the currency of "I" forever. The "you" that is the real "I", the one perceived by others, the one understood by the child in that initial bright vision, now watches the "you" that you perceive. There is no end to it. Our little shard, our little divine shred of identity, so precariously held, is altogether lost as we join the oneness that is audience. My clones and I. (*CJM* 60)

En el contexto del fin de siglo, la filosofía y las teorías contemporáneas ponen en duda todo el conocimiento del hombre y niegan la existencia de un sujeto entero, dueño de su ser y de sus pensamientos. En un momento de rabia, entre muchos otros de desconcierto y luego de desesperación, Joanna se rebela contra un pensamiento que anula su identidad y que la convierte en una mera copia de otras mujeres. Sus palabras están llenas de ironía y cinismo por lo que le han hecho, por cómo han decidido por ella sin que ella supiera nada:

> Why bother to preserve the "I"? It's too much of sights not fit for human eyes, it is not fit to live. It no longer believes in life: all it gets to see is corruption, seared, torn and melting flesh. There is no "I" left for any of us. The great "I" has fled, say the eyes in the wallpaper: only the clones remain, staring. If the I offend thee pluck it out. Idopectomy. (*CJM* 61)

La reflexión que Joanna lleva a cabo en un momento de desconcierto sobre su subjetividad, parece acercarse a los postulados de las consideraciones históricas y epistemológicas de los últimos años y que, entre otras cosas, se deben también al cambio de perspectiva que ha tenido lugar en nuestra sociedad. El surgir del Tercer Mundo, la presencia de los inmigrantes en nuestras ciudades, calles y colegios nos ha obligado a reflexionar sobre la existencia de otras culturas, religiones y puntos de vista. Como sugiere Gianni Vattimo:

> L'ideale europeo di umanità è stato svelato come un ideale fra altri, non necessariamente peggiore, ma che non può senza violenza, pretendere di valere come l'essenza vera dell' uomo, di ogni uomo. (Vattimo 1989: 11)

La utilización a gran escala de los medios de comunicación ha sido también un factor de considerable trascendencia a la hora de difundir imágenes de otras culturas y de presentar una realidad fragmentada por la multiplicidad de los canales y de las interpretaciones de las diferentes cadenas:

> Realtà per noi, è piuttosto il risultato dell'incrociarsi, del "contaminarsi" (nel senso latino) delle molteplici immagini, interpretazioni, ri-costruzioni [sic] che, in concorrenza tra loro o comunque senza alcuna coordinazione "centrale", i *media* distribuiscono. (Vattimo 1989: 15)

Aunque de manera inconsciente, el ideal de pluralidad —no importa si lo entendemos de manera negativa o positiva, de momento nos interesa simplemente su presencia en nuestras vidas— ha entrado en nuestra realidad, transformándola y convirtiéndola en una variedad de impresiones que nada tienen que ver con "il mondo della nostra infanzia, dove le autorità familiari erano insieme minacciose e rassicuranti" (Vattimo 1989: 16). ¿Dónde está la seguridad de una figura paterna que vigila y dirige? Difícil pregunta. Ni siquiera sabemos si existe o si jamás ha existido dicho personaje; desde luego ahora su idea se está pulverizando en el afuera foucaultiano, en la entropía sin fin de otros mundos, en las diferencias y las discontinuidades de la *episteme*; ésta es la conclusión a la que también llega Joanna May:

> Miss Watson taught me, I remember, that the concept of One God, Jehovah, was a great step forward for mankind —an end to all those piddly little Gods with brazen feet it thereafter became a capital offence to worship. I had done my best to believe her, but as Isaac and I unpacked and recorded from straw and sand the little artefacts, the various little deities of Ancient Egypt. . . . I began to see the concept of a single God as a narrowing of our perception, not an expansion: the beginning of the long slow end of civilization and not its dawn at all —this cowardly insistence of ours on leaders, fuehrers, the someone who knows exactly what's going on and what's best for everyone; the One above All who demands our loyalty, our obeisance. Undemocratic. The truth is many, not one.... More and more Gods, each to be worshipped in a different way before lightning strikes us to death. (*CJM* 128)

El escepticismo con el que Joanna se enfrenta a la cultura que ha recono-cido las "tecnologías del yo" del discurso dominante como las únicas válidas en la construcción y definición del individuo sexuado, es comparable con el cuestionamiento que las teóricas feministas hacen de esta misma identidad. La duda nunca abandona a Joanna que, en una de las últimas páginas declara:

> How desperately I, Joanna May, tried to be myself, not Carl May's wife.... She married to him is so different from he married to her.... She is squeezed in there, in his head, without room to manoeuvre. (*CJM* 323)

En este sentido, la crítica feminista ha puesto de relieve cómo el sujeto racional de la filosofía cartesiana es esencialmente un ente pensado y definido exclusivamente desde una perspectiva masculina. Además, las intelectuales feministas postestructuralistas han hecho hincapié en el hecho de que la subjetividad es una construcción ficticia que depende de una multitud de factores dife-rentes, como el lenguaje, la historia, la raza, el sexo o la clase social. Como nos recuerda McNay,

> This argument has been used in various ways by feminists — particularly socialist feminists— to criticize the tendency amongst certain radical feminists to construct women as a global sisterhood linked by invariant, universal, femenine characteristics, i.e. essentialism. (McNay 1992: 2)

La historia de Joanna y de sus clones se convierte así en una pregunta sobre el problema de la identidad de la mujer y sobre la necesidad de encontrar un sitio en el que se puedan desatar todos los nudos que atan al sujeto sexuado a unas formas de identidad definidas por unos constructos sociales y culturales que imponen sus parámetros. Lo que Carl May y el Dr. Holly han hecho a los clones de Joanna es lo que el aparato cultural hace con la idea de mujer. En las siguientes palabras de Carl es patente toda la herencia de la ontología occidental, es decir, la necesidad de definir lo que es bueno y lo que es malo según unas pautas que han pertenecido desde siempre a un sistema de valores androcéntrico:

> I, man, want to teach nature a thing or two, in particular the difference between good and bad; for who else is there to do it? But how can I, because woman makes man bad, I know it, I feel it. . . . You have

made me bad, Joanna May: if I'm the devil that's your fault: if I create monsters, you've no one to blame but yourself. (*CJM* 145)

Sin embargo, el ataque de Carl a la singularidad de Joanna se convierte en el detonante que llevará a las cinco mujeres primero a encontrarse y después a juntarse para descubrir toda la verdad sobre sus orígenes. Jane, Julie, Gina y Alice son los clones de Joanna May. Cada una de ellas tiene su historia y cada historia resulta ser única y diferente. Cuando descubren la existencia de las otras, el golpe es tan fuerte que tienen que aprender a comunicarse con el mundo y entre ellas a través de un nuevo lenguaje. O al menos a través de un lenguaje nuevo para ellas: "They had repeatedly acquired the habit, now they were together, of dividing up a sentence amongst them, and handing it out with fourfold emphasis" (*CJM* 230). Gracias a la apropiación de este nuevo lenguaje, las cinco mujeres se constituyen como sujetos, pertenecen todas al mismo género y sin embargo son diferentes entre ellas. Cada una se enfrenta al mundo con su discurso y a través de su propia narrativa. Es por medio del lenguaje que han aprendido a utilizar desde que sus vidas se han vuelto a cruzar que borran la huella que la eliminación de la diferencia había dejado en sus historias; es gracias a las palabras que pueden contar su versión, relatar lo nunca dicho y transformar su discurso en un *texto de identidad*. Es el descubrimiento de esta capacidad de hablar, es decir, de utilizar su voz y articular su propio discurso, que al final llevará a Joanna a declarar con orgullo: "Thank you Carl, for the gift you have given me, said Joanna May, cheerfully, and now I'm off to find my sisters, and I bet I find them different every one, different as sin and yet the same" (*CJM* 146).

Desde nuestra perspectiva, el punto crucial de la novela de Weldon está en la intersección de dos directrices. La primera está representada por el énfasis que la escritora pone en la relación que existe entre la representación discursiva de la identidad femenina y la manifestación de la negación del concepto de diferencia en los ámbitos sociales y culturales. La segunda se centra en la utilización de una escritura y de un estilo que eligen erosionar los límites que existen entre la literatura consagrada y la cultura popular (*high and popular culture*). El encuentro de estos dos puntos de vista convierte el texto que nos ocupa en un terreno ideal de contestación ideológica de la política de diferencia que se sigue llevando a cabo en algunos sectores de nuestra sociedad.

Lo que sobresale a lo largo de la lectura del texto de Fay Weldon es cómo su narrativa no sólo cuestiona la relación que los individuos mantienen

con la sociedad, sino también las prácticas discursivas que toman parte en la definición de un sujeto preconstituido. En términos prácticos, los resultados de dicho proceso nos parecen nefastos: sobre todo porque se vuelve a encerrar a las mujeres en los límites de una identidad cultural común a la de muchas otras, negándoles, de esta manera, la posibilidad de constituirse en una identidad singular y única: diferente, pero no por eso menos igual. Resulta también muy complejo separar los conceptos de identidad y de género construidos por la epistemología dominante. Como ya hemos subrayado anteriormente, la teoría postestructuralista propone un análisis crítico de la construcción de la identidad normativa y utiliza como punto de partida la idea de que la subjetividad se ha de entender como un concepto contradictorio, sujeto a un cambio casi constante y estrechamente relacionado con el momento histórico y social en el que se constituye:

> In making our subjectivity the product of the society and culture within which we live, feminist poststructuralism insists that forms of subjectivity are produced historically and change with shifts in the wide range of discursive fields which constitute them. (Weedon 1987: 33)

Así que sólo si atacamos el proyecto ideológico del patriarcado y sus mecanismos de reproducción cultural, las bases ontológicas sobre las que se construye el concepto de identidad colectiva, será posible desatar todos los nudos que atan la idea de *mujer* a la de un sujeto colectivo y a la idea de una sexualidad estrechamente relacionada con la idea de género. A este propósito Pat Caplan afirma que: "People are encouraged to see themselves in terms of their sexuality, which is interpreted as the core of the self" (Caplan 1987: 2). En este contexto, una crítica social postestructuralista ha de centrarse en un análisis de la naturaleza del objeto o del sujeto social que está estudiando, por ejemplo la posición de los individuos dentro del marco de las relaciones de poder. En el caso que nos ocupa, el de la representación discursiva de los personajes femeninos, hay que tomar en consideración la realidad histórica y cultural en la que se mueve la mujer como sujeto social. A este propósito Lois McNay pone de relieve que:

> Certain characteristics of a postmodern feminism . . . would be a) theoretical but with historical stress; b) non universalist —its mode of analysis would be comparative rather than universalizing; c) it would be dispense with the idea of a subject of history. Unitary notions of

> woman and feminine identity would be replaced with more complex and pluralistic constructions of social identity. (McNay 1992: 121)

Las directrices de análisis que McNay propone están, en nuestra opinión, presentes en el texto de Weldon. Las figuras que ella describe y de las que relata la historia son la representación discursiva de seres que toman forma y vida en un contexto en el que la historia, la ecología o la polémica sobre la clonación humana, por ejemplo, influyen de manera poderosa en el proceso de definición y construcción de la identidad del individuo. El concepto de ser, tal y como lo entiende el Discurso de lo Uno, sirve para poder reconocer lo que es ajeno —y por eso peligroso— y encerrarlo, delimitarlo en una jaula que llamamos subjetividad, sexualidad, género. En este concepto de identidad está ya gestándose lo que él o ella serán, cómo hablarán, actuarán o se relacionarán con los otros sistemas de la sociedad. Por esta razón, es fundamental subrayar no sólo la relación que la obra literaria mantiene con la realidad social sino su vinculación con la historia; hay que entender el texto como la materialización de unos discursos ideológicos y como la articulación de un determinado período histórico y social. Es por esta razón que nos parece apropiado citar a Cranny-Francis cuando declara que

> Feminist writers are using generic fiction both to decribe or reveal . . . the naturalization of patriarchal subject positions and causal sequences or narratives, and *to expose the use of fiction as ideological practice*. (1990: 205; cursiva mía)

Los personajes que encontramos en *The Cloning of Joanna May* llaman la atención sobre las estructuras sociales y culturales en las que vivimos y ofrecen una poderosa crítica de este mismo orden que, dependiendo de las circunstancias y de manera más o menos visible, sigue marginalizando a las mujeres. A lo largo del texto, Joanna y sus clones, engendrados y nacidos como sujetos pasivos, se convierten en sujetos activos y capaces de admitir, reconocer y reivindicar su diferencia porque, como subraya Betsy Ford, "Weldon's female characters are clones, yet not even their genetic identicality can make them identical" (Ford 1992: 323). Es en este sentido que los personajes de Weldon no sólo superan los límites que les habían impuesto sus creadores, sino que llegan a reivindicar y reapropiarse de su diferencia.a

NOTAS

1. Véase sobre todo Foucault 1964, 1978, 1987, 1990.

2. Véase a este propósito: McNay 1992; Probyn 1993; Ramazanoglu 1993; Scott 1988; Sawicki 1991; Weedon 1987.

3. Véase Debord 1990.

4. Véase, por ejemplo Baudrillard 1991.

5. La bibliografía sobre Weldon es numerosa pero no extensa. Entre los textos y artículos publicados, se pueden citar Chessnut 1979; Ford   1992; Humm 1991; Kenyon 1988; Sage 1992; Salzmann-Brunner 1988; Waugh 1989; Wilde 1988.

6. "Ironically, part of her success stems from providing what many consumers want: easily-digested paragraphs, action packed stories, a clear-cut message, indeed sometimes too clearcut. Her experience in copywriting has given her an original voice, usually energising, but occasionally too obvious" (Kenyon 1988: 125).

7. Según Betsy Ford, en estos capítulos la voz del narrador sigue siendo la de Weldon: "This third person voice might be read as Weldon distancing herself from the female protagonist, handling her experience with scathing irony. But are there really two voices? Clues in Weldon's text suggest that there is no alternate speaker, that the third person narrator is also Joanna May" (1992: 324).

8. "I cannot accept the facile comfort that this catastrophe was a purely German phenomenon or some calamitous mishap rooted in the persona of one or another totalitarian ruler. Ten years after the Gestapo quit Paris, the countrymen of Voltaire were torturing Algerians and each other in some of the same police cellars. The house of classic humanism, the dream of reason which animated Western society, have largely broken down. Ideas of cultural development, of inherent rationality held since ancient Greece and still intensely valid in the utopian historicism of Marx and stoic authoritarianism of Freud (both of them late outriders of Greco-Roman civilization) can no longer be asserted with much confidence. The reach of technological man, as being susceptible to the controls of political hatred and sadistic suggestion, has lenghtened formidably towards destruction" (Steiner 1967: 15).

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THE TEACHING OF GRAMMAR

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In Spain, during the 1980s, the communicative approach was adopted in most educational institutions related to the teaching of English as a foreign language. Today, nobody would dare to say she does not teach in a communicative way. Nevertheless, reality is somewhat different and the real sense of Communicative Language Teaching is often misunderstood. Furthermore, different critical positions have frequently been adopted by applied linguists and teachers.

The purpose of this paper is to examine a number of theoretical principles concerning the teaching of English grammar in EFL contexts. Section One begins with an examination of the strengths and drawbacks of product and process approaches. I will argue that there is no single right methodology for the teaching of grammar and will advocate a variable balance between product and process perspectives. Section Two will give recognition to the role of individual differences in learning style. In Section Three, I will focus on the relationship between instruction and second language learning. I will suggest that learners require formal instruction and informal exposure and that the two together work better than either on its own. Finally, Section Four considers the role of consciousness-raising in the acquisition of grammatical structure. It examines the question of whether second language learning is conscious or unconscious. I do not intend to ignore the relevance of uncon-

scious processes, but I will argue for a serious reassessment of the notion of consciousness and its role in language learning.

1. PRODUCT AND PROCESS APPROACHES TO THE TEACHING OF GRAMMAR

Among the various ways of exploiting grammar in the classroom, product and process approaches have been enormously influential in language teaching.

Whether the focus is form, function or skills, product approaches segment the target language into discrete linguistic items for presentation one at a time. The assumption behind such approaches seems to be that language is analysable into a finite set of rules which can be combined in various ways to make meaning. Moreover, these approaches rely "on learners' assumed ability to learn a language in parts . . . which are independent of one another, and also to integrate, or synthesize, the pieces when the time comes to use them for communicative purposes" (Crookes and Long 1992: 28). Rutherford (1987: 4) calls this the "accumulated entities" view of language learning. Product approaches focus on what is to be learned (i.e. L2), on the knowledge and skills which learners should gain as a result of instruction.

However, product approaches have been the object of the following criticisms:

a. Samples of the target language lack authenticity. It is also difficult to isolate and present one discrete item at a time, especially if teachers want to provide some sort of context for the language.

b. SLA research offers little evidence to support the model of language acquisition that product approaches assume. Learning does not occur in simple additive fashion. Nor could immediate targetlike mastery of the linguistic form be attained. However, progress in one area depends on progress in the others. Studies of language acquisition demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that learning is an active process of gradually working things out. The L2 learner progresses along the interlanguage continuum, which consists of formulation and reformulation of hypotheses about how language works. Learners do not jump from one stage to the next. Rather, learning grammatical forms involves a gradual revision and re-structuring of the interim hypotheses to accommodate new systems about the target language. Furthermore, "progress is often not even unidirectional. SLA frequently involves temporary 'deterioration' in learner performance (so-called

backsliding), giving rise to U-shaped and zigzag developmental curves" (Crookes and Long 1992: 31).

   c. The previous analysis of the target language seems to have priority over considerations about the psychological processes involved in learning. As Crookes and Long argue, "language learning is a psycholinguistic process, not a linguistic one"; however, product approaches "consistently leave the learner out of the equation" (1992: 34).

   But product approaches to grammar teaching also have their strengths. They can provide the learner with a strong sense of direction, since she is presented with target language which is pre-selected and already systematized within a clear framework. This fact can contribute positively to the learner's feeling of security and purpose. Such an approach, it is argued, facilitates the processes of noticing and structuring grammar. Specific grammatical structures are made as salient and noticeable as possible. This perspective can also provide the learner with repeated opportunities to structure and re-structure target forms.

   In traditional models of language teaching, considerations of syllabus design (what to teach) have tended to be kept separate from methodology (how to teach). White's (1988) Type A or Crookes and Long's (1992) Synthetic syllabuses will see the syllabus as primary, since the syllabus designer or teacher intervenes in the language learning process through the selection, ordering and presentation of the discrete linguistic items. Methodology is put to the service of syllabus, "directed at facilitating this internalization process" (Widdowson 1990: 119). Nevertheless, one can argue that the syllabus itself is an abstraction, a framework, a resource, a guide. Consequently, it can only give you ideas; the syllabus cannot prescribe the methodology. Teachers can always find some room for manoeuvre, even in cases when syllabus and methodology seem to be incompatible. As Widdowson puts it,

> the syllabus itself is an inert abstract object . . . , a set of bearings for teacher action and not a set of instructions for learner activity. What learners do is not directly determined by the syllabus but is a consequence of how the syllabus is methodologically mediated by the teacher. (1990: 129)

Product syllabuses provide teachers and learners with a clear outline of what should be taught. But they need not determine the methodology. Consider, for example, a case where the syllabus is structural; however, a teacher can

exploit it in an interactive fashion and the syllabus may be as "communicative" as a notional/functional or a task-based one.

Nonetheless, there are risks in taking the product perspective to extremes. We will now turn to the concept of language use as a process. In process approaches, there is a shift in emphasis from the outcomes of instruction to the learning experiences themselves. Therefore, the concern is with the learning process and pedagogical procedure rather than with the content. Accordingly, in such an approach, "there is little or no attempt to intervene in the language learning process through the selection, ordering and presentation of content by the syllabus designer or teacher" (White 1988: 47). Instead of thinking in terms of grammar for the learner (as in product-oriented approaches), we can now think of grammar by the learner. Grammar, then, can be seen as a device which language users call upon when motivated by a communicative need to make their meanings clear. In this sense, as Widdowson concludes, "grammar is not a constraining imposition but a liberating force: it frees us from a dependency on context and the limitations of a purely lexical categorization of reality" (1990: 86).

The focus will be on communication and the aim is to have learners communicate effectively. Learners will be given the opportunity for productive and creative language and the negotiation of meaning in the classroom. In normal language use, competent speakers deploy a highly complex number of skills and subskills simultaneously. The learners' language has to be appropriate, relevant to the occasion, sensitive to the other discourse participants; they may have to turn-take, ask, check, re-formulate, handle misunderstandings etc. when under pressure. Learners do not generally attain the same kind of competence as native language speakers, but they too manage to operate the systems of communication as a whole and develop the skills and strategies of the discourse process. Teachers will have to shift their learners to a situation where they use the various skills they have already learnt automatically. They have to learn to be able to engage, assemble and have access to their knowledge of the system, so that they can free their resources and perform automatically when focusing on meaning.

Process approaches, therefore, provide opportunities for learners to exploit strategies for negotiation and interaction in language use. It is argued that grammatical forms are unlikely to become internalized unless proceduralization can take place. Noticing and structuring grammar are not enough. This is where the third dimension of language learning comes in. Following Ellis (1985), a distinction can be drawn between two types of L2 knowledge: declarative and procedural. The former refers to what the learner

knows about the language, i.e. internalized L2 rules and memorized chunks of speech. The latter is "how to" knowledge; that is, it comprises "the strategies and procedures employed by the learner to process L2 data for acquisition and for use" (Ellis 1985: 164). Proceduralizing refers to the mental organization of knowledge, so that accessing is made easy. Competent language users' knowledge of the language seems to be stored in the mind ready for use, already assembled for immediate access. This prefabricated speech has both the advantage of more efficient retrieval from memory and of permitting speakers to devote their attention to the larger structure of the discourse (see Bolinger 1976, Pawley and Syder 1983). In short, the mechanism of proceduralization "refers to the embedding of factual knowledge into productions so that the products of frequently executed productions can be retrieved directly from memory and declarative knowledge need not be activated in working memory for their execution" (Schmidt 1992: 363).

However, there is a second dimension which is sometimes referred to as "procedural skill" (Batstone 1994; Schmidt, 1992). If proceduralized knowledge is concerned with the formation and storage of knowledge, procedural skill relates to the accessing and efficient performance in language use (e.g. being economical and avoiding undue repetition or excessive pausing, controlling pace, engaging strategies to be fluent). So learners need plenty of practice to proceduralize grammar in real-world language use. Without regular opportunities to put their grammar into action more or less automatically when negotiating meanings, much of the grammar learners may have noticed and structured through product work will gradually disappear. Furthermore, learners are likely to revert to a more lexical language system, which predisposes to fossilization and lack of intellectual development.

There is evidence, therefore, that process teaching encourages both the proceduralization of knowledge and procedural skill. However, as Batstone (1994) points out, process work may be more effective in developing procedural skill than in promoting proceduralized knowledge. In a similar vein, Skehan suggests that "there is the possibility that communicating meaning predominates as an aim, and that learners achieve this aim by using strategies which by-pass the underlying language system, so that they may not be driven to develop their interlanguage systems" (1992: 185).

We see, then, that there are dangers with both product and process approaches. As Skehan clearly puts it,

excessive priority given to analysis will compromise the process of synthesis and the acquisition of a memory-based fluency in performance. Too much emphasis on synthesis may well detract from the learner's ability to be accurate and restructure. (1992:193)

It would appear that not too strict an adherence to either product or process perspectives will prove satisfactory. We need to reconcile these opposites and admit there is no single effective methodology for the learning of grammar. Consequently, in the day-to-day world of teaching, an eclectic position will probably emerge. My position, as I hope will become clear, would be in favour of a mixed methodology, with a variable balance between product and process. Both approaches may be combined in different ways according to varying circumstances. In view of this, product and process should best be thought of as points on a pedagogic continuum, rather than extremes. Once again the issue is how to achieve a balance between a controlled approach to language development and the learners' direct involvement in the discourse process.

2. INDIVIDUAL LEARNER DIFFERENCES

We need now to consider briefly the question of the relationship between individual learner variables and second language acquisition (SLA). The results of individual difference research are not entirely satisfactory, since the study of individual factors is not an easy task and has often been neglected. Nevertheless, there is well-sustained evidence that individual differences have a considerable effect on language learning success in general (Skehan 1989: 136-50). This is not, of course, a new discovery. As Ellis observes, "to claim that individuals vary in the rate at which they learn or the level of competence they eventually attain is not controversial. Indeed, it is part of most language learners' and teachers' experience" (1985: 99). A separate issue, however, is whether the route of SLA is significantly affected by individual learner factors (personal and general ones, the latter including differences in age, aptitude, cognitive style, motivation and personality). In this respect, it has been shown that the natural sequence for the development of grammatical knowledge in SLA is not influenced by these variables.

Therefore, overall, it can be said that individual learner differences are major factors in determining the rate of SLA and the ultimate level of proficiency achieved. Moreover, as Skehan (1989, 1992) notes, the available evi-

dence indicates that there are learner types, who have systematic preferences in information processing. Two types of learner can be identified: the memory-driven and the analysis-driven. This distinction corresponds to the kind of orientation the learner has towards the internal mechanisms, i.e. memory and analysis, which are present in all effective learning. All learners must have access to both systems, though the balance may vary. However, some will tend to emphasize the analytic view of language, while others will rely more on memory. The ideal learning environment for the analytic learners would be an informal one; memory-oriented learners, by contrast, might benefit from a more analytic learning situation. But Ellis points out some problems:

> An experiential learner, whose natural learning style predisposes her to focus on communication, may be held back if she is faced with an input that is predominantly form-focused. Likewise, a studial learner who is required to participate extensively in meaning-focused instruction may be inhibited. In addition, learners who find that their learning style is incompatible with the instructional style may develop anxiety and so lose confidence and motivation, perhaps even to the point of abandoning instruction. (1990: 188)

What would seem desirable, I believe, is a degree of balance between the learner's affective and cognitive orientation to learning on the one hand and the instructional style on the other. To summarize, then,

> the ideal would be a methodology which adapted to the predispositions of each learner to provide appropriate instruction in each case. But where this is not possible, it is important to include learner predisposition when one is assessing what sort of balance is likely to be found between fluency, accuracy, and restructuring. (Skehan 1992: 194)

3. THE ROLE OF INTERACTION AND FORMAL INSTRUCTION IN SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION

The principal goal of this section will be to explore a number of theoretical positions concerning the relationship between interaction, formal instruction and SLA.

With the advent of Communicative Language Teaching and its emphasis on learning to communicate rather than on the language as a structured system of grammatical patterns, it would seem that teachers should focus on promoting communicative language use and should give priority to creating an environment in the classroom which approximates to the real-life communicative use of language. Materials should reflect the real world, since the stress will be on helping learners to rehearse in class what they will need to do outside. Authenticity is an all-pervasive feature in materials currently proposed. Authentic materials include language-based realia (e.g. newspapers, magazines, advertisements, signs) and visuals or graphic sources which can trigger off communicative activities (e.g. maps, pictures, symbols, graphs, charts). Consequently, teachers have been encouraged for some time to discard commercial materials which draw attention to the grammatical forms of the target language because of their lack of authenticity.

Teaching can be considered in two different ways: as interaction and as formal instruction. However, they should not be treated as mutually exclusive alternatives, assuming that all teaching is one or the other. Such a contrast, it seems to me, is misleading. As Ellis clearly explains,

> the instructional input in many lessons will be mixed, affording the learner the opportunity to attend to both meaning and form.... Teachers shift the focus as the lesson unravels —at one moment engaging the learners in meaningful communication and at another directing their attention to the linguistic code. (1990: 188)

Now that the roles of interaction and formal instruction have come into the discussion, we need to examine them more closely. There is no question that interaction is a key facilitating factor for learning to take place. Learners need the opportunity to communicate in order to develop fluency. The interactional hypothesis states that SLA occurs most efficiently when learners engage in a meaning-negotiation exchange whenever there is some kind of communication difficulty. Grammar, it is said, grows out of active negotiation in discourse. As Hatch puts it, "one learns how to do conversations, one learns how to interact verbally, and out of this interaction, syntactic structures are developed" (1978: 409). In conversation, vertical structures supply the framework within which grammar emerges out of turn-taking, clarification of meaning and all other strategies of the discourse process. In first language acquisition, evidence of vertical constructions has also been found in

caretaker speech: children are constantly helped in their language acquisition by typical interactions with other language-users, characterized by simplified models, a lot of repetition and two-party conversational structures. Therefore, collaborative discourse in the guise of scaffolding (i.e. learner utterances which are constructed over several turns through interaction with another speaker) constitutes one of the principal means by which learners acquire new linguistic structures. Interaction enables L1 and L2 learners to notice and renotice lexis, morphology, structures, etc., as they become salient in language use; at the same time, learners automatize their existing knowledge. This natural process of negotiation of meaning in interaction helps to make input containing new linguistic material comprehensible and so facilitates its acquisition. Thus, the very mechanisms of interaction can convert the conditions for input so that it becomes intake and, consequently, the actual L2 data can be assimilated into the learner's interlanguage system.

Another way in which interaction might influence SLA is by providing learners with pre-assembled chunks of speech associated with certain contexts, which can be efficiently retrieved from memory from a very early stage in learning a foreign language. Later on the learner can pick them apart analytically as the need arises. Ellis observes that "formulaic speech, therefore, contributes indirectly to the route of SLA by providing raw materials for the learner's internal mechanisms to work on" (1985: 155).

There have been a number of studies which have sought to investigate the importance of "comprehensible output," suggesting that comprehensible input may not be sufficient in interlanguage development. So meaning-focused instruction is said to facilitate learner output, which contributes to the acquisition of implicit knowledge. As Swain (1983, cited in Ellis 1985: 158-9) notes, output is relevant to learning on several grounds: (a) learners need to be pushed to their ultimate repertoire in order to develop a full grammatical competence; (b) to force learners to move from semantic processing into a more syntactic processing mode; (c) to enable learners to test out hypotheses about the L2; (d) to develop fluency and automaticity; (e) to enable learners to acquire discourse skills ; (f) to develop a personal voice. It can be argued that efforts should be made to present a more balanced view of the dichotomy of comprehension and production. Teachers should give learners opportunity to acquire and combine both listening and speaking skills.

In view of all this, strong claims have been advanced that SLA is essentially aided by interaction. The question now is, does formal instruction work? Does second language instruction promote second language acquisition? Some research findings conclude that instruction does not help or even

that it is counter-productive; others find it beneficial. I will now consider briefly whether formal L2 instruction has positive effects on SLA processes, on the rate of acquisition and on the learners' level of ultimate L2 attainment. Some studies of the last-mentioned point even suggest that learners may need more than interaction in order to reach full native speaker competence. Ellis points out that "studies of naturalistic acquisition (e.g. Schmidt, 1983) have shown that learners sometimes do not develop high levels of linguistic accuracy even though they do become communicatively effective" (1990: 165). This would suggest, I believe, that some degree of focus on form may help the acquisition of linguistic competence.

a) The Effect of Instruction on SLA Processes
I will review research that has examined a number of process features. The first concerns L2 errors, since they are the external manifestation of the hypothesis-testing process and provide information about language acquisition. Several studies indicate that instruction does not prevent developmental errors. However, as Skehan (1991: 17-18) notes, classroom learners usually make errors of commission (i.e. they over-apply the forms which are the current focus of instruction), whereas naturalistic learners tend to make errors of omission (i.e. they do not use specific forms). The former tendency is more likely to decrease over time, while errors of omission will probably persist.

Similarly, with regard to the morphology of a language, Pica (1985) found that instruction has some effects on acquisition by triggering over-supply of grammatical morphemes and inhibiting the use of ungrammatical forms. As Long explains,

> naturalistic acquirers . . . may be less likely to begin supplying what are often, after all, communicatively redundant and probably still nonsalient forms, especially after prolonged periods of communicatively successful TL use of their grammatically reduced codes. (1988: 123)

To shift our focus from morphemes to syntax, the results of several studies show that the effects of formal L2 instruction are extremely limited and not sufficiently powerful to disrupt the sequence of acquisition. Pienemann's study (1985) supports the above-mentioned findings and puts forward the learnability / teachability hypotheses, which claim that "instruction can only promote language acquisition if the interlanguage is close to the point when the structure to be taught is acquired in the natural setting (so that

sufficient processing prerequisites are developed)" (1985: 37). The teachability hypothesis rules out the possibility of instruction enabling the learners to skip a stage in an acquisition sequence if they are not psycholinguistically ready. Direct instruction aimed at structures which are more than one step ahead of the learner's current interlanguage may even interfere with the acquisitional process. However, according to Pienemann, instruction for which learners are ready can improve acquisition in three different ways: (a) by increasing the speed of acquisition, (b) by increasing the frequency of rule application and (c) by making available the application of the rule in a wider range of linguistic contexts. There is also evidence that instruction has a positive influence on the acquisition of variational features (i.e. those that can be acquired at different stages of development, such as the insertion of the copula). As Ellis puts it, "instruction may serve a particularly important function here as it may help communicative-oriented learners to avoid early fossilization" (1990: 158). Similarly, the results of Ellis' study (1984) of the effects of three hours of teaching on the acquisition of *WH* interrogatives by a group of thirteen ESL children show no influence on the developmental route. This study argues that ESL children follow a uniform route of development and that formal instruction will affect only the rate of acquisition under certain conditions. Ellis finally claims that "language teaching involves both 'formal instruction' and 'exposure', and that for ESL children of the type investigated in this study, it is 'exposure' rather than 'instruction' that facilitates the development of *WH* questions" (1984: 150). Taking into account much of the SLA research findings in this area, one may conclude that instruction has no major impact on the acquisition of linguistic rules. Considerations about the possible delayed effect of instruction are dealt with below.

Thus, the research available shows that SLA involves certain natural processes that can not be bypassed. As a result, there are constraints on the effects that instruction can have on the sequence of development. Formal L2 instruction, as Long explains, "does not . . . seem able to alter acquisition sequences, except temporarily, and in trivial ways which may even hinder subsequent development" (1988: 135). This fact is due, it seems to me, to the universality of the interlanguage continuum and the failure of instruction to take into consideration learnability / teachability issues.

b) The Effect of Instruction on Rate of Acquisition
Long (1983) reviewed a total of twelve studies exploring the effects of instruction. Six of these studies showed that instruction helped; two reported

results which were ambiguous but were arguably in the same direction; three indicated that instruction did not help and an additional study found that exposure helped. The studies used designs addressing the issue of the absolute effect of instruction or its relative utility, with the alternatives being simple exposure to the second language in use, or a combination of instruction plus exposure. Long interprets the above results claiming that "there is considerable evidence to indicate that L2 instruction does make a difference" (1983: 374). Further, he concludes that instruction is beneficial (a) for children as well as adults, (b) for beginning, intermediate and advanced students, (c) on integrative as well as discrete-point tests, and (d) in acquisition-rich as well as acquisition-poor environments.

Instruction seems to be especially useful, however, in the early stages of SLA and/or in acquisition-poor environments. Formal instruction also contributes to L2 acquisition more effectively than exposure. As Ellis puts it, "in general, classroom learners learn more rapidly and progress further than naturalistic learners" (1990: 165). However, many of the studies fail to consider other variables which might be responsible for the advantage, such as the learners' motivation (which may be stronger on the part of the instructed learners) and classroom input (classroom learners may obtain more comprehensible input. They may also benefit from their exposure to planned discourse, which contains a higher degree of grammaticalization, including more marked linguistic forms). Furthermore, as I have already indicated, "formal instruction may work best when there are also opportunities for informal language use" (Ellis 1990:133).

c) The Effect of Instruction on the Level of Ultimate L2 Attainment

This area is concerned with the long-term effects of instruction on L2 proficiency. A number of studies lend support to the claim that instruction can have an immediate effect, providing that certain conditions are met. Thus, linguistic structures need to comply with the following criteria in order to be teachable:

> (a) They must not require complex processing operations.
> (b) There must be a one-to-one relationship between form and function.

As Ellis observes, instruction directed at structures that are not learnable can produce various results:

> the instruction may be simply ignored with the result that the learner falls back on developmentally easier rules. . . . (It) can interfere with

> acquisition —by encouraging the learner to avoid what she finds psycholinguistically difficult. . . . (It) can also result in the learner abandoning a transitional construction which serves as a necessary stepping-stone to the acquisition of the target structure because she is made aware of its incorrectness. In this way, instruction may actually impede acquisition. (1990: 167)

We may say, then, that the immediate effect of instruction must be considered to be limited, since very few features are amenable to instruction and they also have to be taught at the right time. Moreover, the effects may only be temporary and wear off over time. It follows from this that instruction can have a delayed effect. In this way, it facilitates acquisition of new linguistic material when the learner is at the right stage of development. As Ellis puts it, "(instruction) speeds up learning in the long term and helps to prevent the kind of grammatical fossilization found in adult naturalistic learners" (1990: 169). According to this interpretation, by focusing on some specific property of the target language at a time (e.g. third person singular -*s* or progressive -*ing*), instruction raises the learner's consciousness about the existence of that linguistic feature. The increased saliency of that form in the input may cause instructed learners to notice and use it earlier, and so acquire it procedurally. Following Long,

> increased awareness of and attempts to use what are often . . . communicatively redundant grammatical elements may also lead to faster rates of acquisition and/or to higher levels of ultimate L2 attainment. In addition, instructed learners may ultimately become more nativelike in the sense of exhibiting greater grammatical accuracy. (1988: 120)

Ellis (1990: 170) also suggests that instruction is likely to contribute to declarative rather than procedural knowledge. Declarative knowledge, however, serves as a facilitator of subsequent procedural knowledge by drawing the learners' attention to forms which they would otherwise ignore. So one of the main functions of instruction is to facilitate initial change.

It is also proposed (Skehan 1992: 195) that explicit teaching motivates learners to persist at a difficult task, since it signals to learners that they have failed in mastering the interlanguage system of the target language and that further restructuring is required.

My purpose in this section has been to examine the effect of instruction on both the rate/success and on the process/sequence of acquisition. The evi-

dence available shows that instruction may be associated with faster progress and higher ultimate attainment in language learning. I would claim that a focus on form is probably essential in L2 instruction. Skehan suggests that formal instruction exerts a strong influence on the balance between analysis and synthesis, and it is a way to combat unbalanced memory-driven development. As he explains,

> learners are not easily allowed . . . to forget about structure, when their tendency might be to concentrate on communication and meaning. In this way, instruction pre-emptively reduces the likelihood of inflexibility and fossilization in language development. (1992: 195-96)

This argument for the beneficial effects of instruction does not imply, however, a return to traditional grammar teaching. Form-focused instruction, I believe, should be considered as a means to the attainment of grammatical competence, not as an end itself. In this sense, Ellis (1990: 170) finds evidence that supports an instructional approach involving consciousness-raising, an issue which is taken up in the next section. However, as I have already indicated, there needs to be a principled basis for how form-focused and meaning-focused instruction can be combined in the classroom, something which is crucial for ESL/EFL and language teaching in general.

4.   CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING   IN   SECOND   LANGUAGE LEARNING

The principal goal of this section is to examine the role of consciousness-raising (CR) in the development of L2 linguistic competence. CR provides a link to the study of individual learner differences, as well as to consideration of the role of instruction in making aspects of language organization more salient for learners and facilitating restructuring, both of which I referred to earlier (see particularly Sections 2 and 3). To begin with, I will briefly consider three theoretical positions which have been advanced to explain the effects of formal instruction on SLA reported in the preceding section. Finally, I will dwell on the issue of the implications of CR for language pedagogy. As I have already pointed out, the current assumption in many EFL contexts, including Spain, is that formal instruction has a minimal or even non-existent

role to play in language learning. I intend to sketch out what the nature of such a contribution might be.

The above-mentioned explanations are as follows: (a) The interface position, (b) the non-interface position, and (c) the variability position.

a) The interface position.
The interface position postulates two types of linguistic knowledge in SLA, but argues that they are not entirely separate and unrelated. A distinction is often drawn between a weak and a strong interface position.

The weak position, as proposed by Seliger (1979) states that "learnt" knowledge (or pedagogical rules) does not so much turn into "acquired" (or internalized) knowledge as facilitate it, when the learner is ready. Seliger argues that the conscious rules learners construct are typically anomalous reflections of the pedagogical rules. The latter act as "acquisition facilitators" by focusing the learner's attention on "critical attributes of the real language concept that must be induced" (Seliger 1979: 368, cited in Ellis 1985: 234). In this way, pedagogical rules facilitate the internalization of the salient features of the rule and also the retrieval of features which are rarely used by the learner. Instruction, therefore, may ease the way for later acquisition.

As I stated earlier, formal instruction does not, in general terms, affect the natural route of SLA; however, it facilitates the rate/success of development. The weak position provides arguments to account for both effects. As Ellis puts it, this position

> acknowledges that pedagogical rules will not alter the sequence in which L2 rules are naturally 'acquired', as their effect will be felt only when the learner is 'ready' to acquire the rules. However, pedagogical rules will enhance the speed of development, because they make the 'acquisitional' process shorter. (1985: 236)

The strong position has been advanced by Stevick, Bialystok, McLaughlin and Sharwood-Smith. Stevick's model of SLA (1980) allows for the possibility that the materials held in secondary (short-time) memory may transfer to tertiary (long-time) memory, so that learning can become acquisition. This transformation is achieved via "use." Bialystok (1979) also posits two types of knowledge which can interact. These are called "implicit" ("acquired") and "explicit" ("learnt"). It is through practice that "explicit" knowledge, which is non-automatic, turns into "implicit" knowledge, which is automatic. McLaughlin (1978), in a critical review of Krashen's model,

develops this view of automaticity and claims that SLA involves going from controlled (which requires active attention) to automatic (without reflection) processing. The process whereby the transformation takes place is called "routinization."

Drawing on Bialystok's and McLaughlin's positions, Sharwood-Smith proposes a full interface model. Formal instruction can contribute to development by encouraging CR and providing the learner with the opportunity and motivation to practise and so to automatize new rules. Instruction can both provide explicit knowledge and help to convert it into implicit knowledge. Learners, therefore, gain control over their L2 knowledge through practice. As Sharwood-Smith points out,

> whatever the view of the underlying processes in second language learning, it is quite clear and uncontroversial to say that most spontaneous performance is attained by dint of practice. In the course of actually performing in the target language, the learner gains the necessary control over its structures such that he or she can use them quickly without reflection. (1988: 57)

By practice Sharwood-Smith means "controlled practice." In other words, proceduralization takes place through conscious rehearsal of linguistic forms. The strong interface position can easily explain why learners who receive formal instruction outperform naturalistic learners through its claim that form-focused instruction facilitates development. Ellis notes that the former have two potential sources of implicit or acquired knowledge:

> (1) directly, by means of the 'intake environment' supplied by the classroom, and (2) indirectly, by automatizing explicit knowledge through practice. In contrast, naturalistic learners will be almost entirely reliant on (1). (1985: 237)

The strong position, however, does not provide a convincing explanation of why the natural order of development is hardly disturbed by formal instruction, despite the process of practice and subsequent automatization Sharwood-Smith's model advocates. It seems to me that one possible solution would be to include, as Larsen-Freeman and Long suggest, "the notion of processing constraints, . . . governing when and how instruction is effective" (1990: 325). Pienemann's Learnability / Teachability Hypothesis, which was reviewed in the preceding section, would be highly pertinent to this issue.

b) The non-interface position.

The main representative of the non-interface position is Krashen (1982). The two knowledge types, acquisition and learning, are stored separately and are entirely unrelated. Krashen claims that formal instruction results in learning (i.e. conscious knowledge of "easy" rules of a L2). This knowledge can be accessed by learners who are monitor-users when they focus on the formal properties of the L2, know the rule and when there is time. Acquisition (i.e. subconscious knowledge of L2 rules), which accounts for most of a L2, occurs automatically through the processing of comprehensible input when the learner is focused on meaning in authentic communication. The acquired system is primary in L2 use; the learnt system can be used only in highly restricted circumstances and acts as a monitor of the output generated by the acquired system. Krashen further claims that learnt knowledge cannot be converted into acquired knowledge. As Krashen argues, "language acquisition ... happens in one way, when the acquirer understands input containing a structure that the acquirer is 'due' to acquire, a structure at his or her 'i+1'" (1982:84). Sometimes a rule can be learnt before it is acquired. However, we cannot state that learnt knowledge has been transferred to acquired knowledge (i.e. learning is not a prerequisite of acquisition). So a distinction is made between rules which learners learn (consciously) and those which they acquire.

Another point raised by Krashen is that most of the grammatical rules of the L2 are too complex for the learners to follow. Thus, young children cannot profit from formal instruction because of their cognitive development. Similarly, instruction shows a greater effect on beginners than on intermediate or advanced learners, as Krashen claims that it is only possible to master easy grammatical rules. Learning, in this view, is limited to linguistic forms that are simple in structure and transparent in function.

Krashen concludes that the main function of formal instruction is to provide comprehensible input (for acquisition) to beginners, especially in foreign language teaching situations, where learners cannot obtain input data elsewhere. The role of teaching, as Krashen asserts, is to afford opportunities for communication, rather than to raise learners' consciousness about the formal properties of the L2. As Ellis comments, "in this interpretation, therefore, it is not consciousness-raising or practice that aids development, but simply exposure to input pitched at the appropriate level to facilitate acquisition" (1984: 139).

The non-interface position is able to explain why formal instruction does not affect the natural sequence of SLA by arguing that acquisition is respon-

sible for the sequence, and that the learning resulting from instruction cannot alter it. Krashen also develops arguments, which I think are less clear, to account for the positive effect that formal instruction has on the rate/success of SLA. Classrooms that provide comprehensible input will accelerate acquisition, since "they constitute 'intake environments', whereas for many learners, particularly adults, natural settings only afford 'exposure environments' and thus do not enable acquisition to take place" (Ellis 1985: 232). Therefore, it is comprehensible input, rather than formal instruction, that aids development.

c) The variability position.

This position is associated with Tarone (1983) and Bialystok (1982). It recognizes a number of different styles. Each style calls on knowledge types that vary in terms of analycity and automaticity. As Tarone (1983) explains, the style learners use will depend on the amount of attention they pay to their speech. The variability position sees acquisition and language use closely linked. Ellis points out that

> the kind of language use that the learner engages in determines the kind of knowledge that he acquires. Similarly, different kinds of knowledge are used in different types of language performance. Thus, acquiring the necessary linguistic knowledge to perform one kind of activity does not guarantee the ability to perform a different kind of activity. (1985: 237-8)

This position can comfortably account for the route finding. As the natural sequence of development is only a reflection of a particular kind of performance, it will never change. Formal instruction will enhance automatization of the analysed knowledge the learner has learnt through practice. It can also explain the rate/success finding if it is assumed that the access to different knowledge types enables the instructed learner to perform a wider range of linguistic tasks than the naturalistic learner, who is more reliant on a single kind of knowledge.

However, at the moment it is premature to make a clear choice between these positions. More research is needed, I believe, to substantiate these positions. It can also be argued, as Ellis (1985) seems to suggest, that the variability position is part of the interface perspective.

For the purposes of this section, I will now return to consider some of the implications of CR for grammar teaching. This is not to deny, as I pointed

out earlier, the role of unconscious processes in language use. Doubtless, both conscious and unconscious processes are involved in second language learning. The following is prompted, therefore, by an attempt to achieve a balance between these different positions.

To what extent should instruction be directed at drawing attention to the L2 code, as opposed to providing opportunities for interaction? Sharwood-Smith (1988) considers grammar teaching as a short cut to communicative ability. Adult learners, as Sharwood-Smith explains,

> can use conscious applications of rules to practice in and out of class and to communicate in the target language at a higher level of proficiency. . . . Fluency is assumed to come later and as a result of practising TL (target language) structures in formal and informal, naturalistic ways. (1988: 52)

Grammatical CR differs from conventional notions of grammar teaching in many major ways. Thus, Rutherford suggests that

> CR is the means to an end, not the end itself. That is, whatever it is that is raised to consciousness is not to be looked upon as an artifact or object of study to be committed to memory by the learner.... Rather, what is raised to consciousness is not the grammatical product but aspects of the grammatical process. . . . (1987: 104)

In this way, learners play an active role in the processes of the language and are not simply exposed to the final product.

There are many ways of drawing attention to form, not only the traditional articulation of rules. However, the key issue is that

> the discovery of regularities in the target language, whether blindly intuitive or conscious, or coming in between these two extremes, will always be self-discovery. The question is to what extent that discovery is guided by the teacher. The guidance, where consciousness-raising is involved, can take more or less time or space and it can be more or less direct and explicit. (Sharwood-Smith 1988: 53)

CR can have, then, degrees of explicitness and extent of elaboration. The former dimension comprises covert clues and standard pedagogical rules. The latter refers to whether the teaching is characterized only by simple formulations or by accurate, technically sophisticated explanations. As a

result of the combination of the above dimensions, Sharwood-Smith distinguishes four basic types of manifestation as far as language CR is concerned. It is also pointed out that learners are not required to have the metalinguistic ability of verbalizing rules.

As Rutherford and Sharwood-Smith put it, CR should not be understood "as an alternative to so-called communicative language teaching or as a substitute for the attainment of communicative skills" (1988: 114). It is claimed that conscious knowledge functions as an acquisition facilitator of linguistic competence, enabling the learner to notice L2 features which would otherwise be ignored. A diary study by Schmidt and Frota (1986) lends support to this view. The learner they describe (referred to as R), kept a journal throughout his five months of exposure to Portuguese in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The influence of instruction was clearly positive, since the learner obtained information about the structure of the L2 which could have been derived only with great difficulty from interaction with native speakers alone. The researchers also identify numerous aspects of the target language that R was taught but did not learn to produce accurately and spontaneously in interaction. In contrast, "R learnt and used what he was taught if he subsequently heard it and if he noticed it" (Schmidt and Frota 1986: 279). Several journal entries show that R, very commonly, noticed linguistic forms in input immediately after they were taught and that he considered CR a necessary step in the process of learning. As the diary study indicates, "R subjectively felt as he was going through the learning process that conscious awareness of what was present in the input was causal" (1986: 281). Schmidt and Frota also present evidence in support of a conscious notice-the-gap principle (i.e. learners come to notice the lack of correlation between their own interlanguage and the input as a result of the explicit knowledge they had acquired). They claim that this hypothesis provides a way to include a role for correction, and instruction in general, in an integrated theory of SLA.

Further, Schmidt (1990) supports the above-mentioned findings and concludes that conscious processing is a necessary condition for converting input into intake, and "paying attention to language form is hypothesized to be facilitative in all cases, and may be necessary for adult acquisition of redundant grammatical features" (1990: 149).

Not all language-teaching professionals allocate a significant role to CR in the classroom. Once more the answer may well lie somewhere between both extremes. The approach taken in this paper does not exclude pure acquisition, but it allows for a major role of explicit knowledge. That is, CR functions as a facilitator of acquisition by making the learner conscious of

specific linguistic features in the input. Nevertheless, noticing is not a sufficient condition for mastery of another language: the learner also has to be ready to incorporate those features into her interlanguage. In Ellis' words,

> in the main, it is the learner who is in charge of both what can be learnt and when it can be learnt, not the teacher. But the teacher has a definite role to play both by ensuring that there are adequate opportunities for meaning-focused communication to foster the acquisition of implicit knowledge and also by helping the learner to develop explicit knowledge. (1990: 196)

Consequently, it seems to me that CR is to be seen as one part of a larger pedagogical framework, where formal instruction should be conceived as a means of developing a knowledge of the target language rather than the object of such learning.a

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a

THE LICENSING
OF PARASITIC GAPS

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1. INTRODUCTION

The parasitic gap phenomenon may be illustrated by the well-known example in (1). Besides the gap created by wh-extraction, indicated by *t*, there is a second gap, indicated by *e*, which is parasitic on the first one:

(1) Which articles$_i$ did you file t_i without reading e_i ?

One of the syntactic characteristics attributed to parasitic gaps in the literature is that they require the presence of an S-S variable (i.e. the trace of movement to an A'-position). This licensing variable (t_i in (1) above) must not c-command the parasitic gap. In this paper I argue that an operator/variable pair is not the only essential environment allowing the licensing of parasitic gaps in Spanish at S-S contrary to what happens in English, where only variables license these constructions. Evidence from *tough* and clitic constructions in Spanish and other Romance languages as well as wh-in-situ with echo readings in Spanish support this claim.

2. AN ANALYSIS OF PARASITIC GAPS AND *TOUGH* CONSTRUCTIONS

Chomsky (1986) proposed an analysis of parasitic gap constructions according to which a null operator within the adjunct clause moves to the [Spec, CP] of that clause, and then enters into a composed chain with the overt licensing operator. A similar null operator analysis is proposed by Chomsky (1981, 1986) for *tough* constructions. These analyses are illustrated in (2) and (3) for English:

(2)   This book is difficult (to convince students) to read
      [This book]$_i$ is difficult [$_{CP}$ Op$_i$ ([*PRO* to convince students [$_{CP}$ t'_i)
      [*PRO* to read t_i]]]]

(3)   Which articles did you put on reserve without convincing the students to read?
      [Which articles]$_i$ did you put [e]$_i$ on reserve [without [$_{CP}$ *Op$_i$* [*PRO*
      convincing the students [$_{CP}$ t'_i [*PRO* to read t_i]]]]]

(2) and (3) illustrate successive movement of the null operator from a more deeply embedded clause to the highest [Spec, CP]. Now it has been frequently observed that Romance *tough* constructions are clause-bounded, a feature which carries over to parasitic gap constructions, as shown in (4):[1]

(4)   a. *Ese libro es difícil de convencer a los estudiantes de leer
      b. *¿Qué artículos pusiste en reserva sin convencer a los estu-diantes de leer?

If parasitic gap constructions and *tough* constructions in Romance languages are analyzed as movement of a null operator, as in English, one would not expect these long-distance dependencies to be ungrammatical in those languages.

   In the light of these locality constraints, it is proposed in García Mayo (1993) that there is an important difference in the nature of the null operator in English and its counterpart in Romance. In Romance, the null operator is base-generated in [Spec, CP]. At D-S this operator lacks an index, given that

it is generated in an A' rather than an A-position. Assuming that the null operator, like other empty categories, must be licensed and identified, the following condition on null operator indexing (along the lines of Stowell 1985) was posited:

> (5) Condition on Null Operator Indexing (CNOI)
>   A null operator α receives an index if
>   (i) α is head-governed by β, β a lexical head, and
>   (ii) α is identified by a coindexes category XP, where XP is subjacent to α

Thus, the null operator is licensed by means of head-government and identified by a coindexed category. As for the empty category in object position bound by the null operator, it is proposed, following Cinque (1990) that it is *pro*. This *pro* must be identified in its own clause, hence the clause-boundedness effect. This analysis is illustrated in (6):[2]

> (6) a. [Este libro]$_i$ es [$_{AP}$ difícil de [$_{CP}$ Op_i [PRO leer pro_i]]]
>   base-generated
>
>   b. [Qué artículos]$_i$ archivaste t_1 [$_{PP}$ sin [$_{CP}$ Op_i PRO leer pro_i]]
>   base-generated

The essential insight behind this analysis is that languages which otherwise license *pro* in object position, as do the Romance languages, will also have *pro* in parasitic gap constructions and hence display clause-boundedness. English, which does not have recourse to *pro*, can only utilize a strategy based on movement of a null operator base-generated in a A-position, and so has cases of long-distance dependencies as in (2) and (3).[3]

3. A'-BOUND *PRO* LICENSING PARASITIC GAPS

As we have just seen, evidence from parasitic gap and *tough* constructions in Spanish in contrast with their English counterparts, has led us to posit the structure in (6) above, with a base-generated operator binding a pronominal variable. Now, what we observe in the data in (7) is that an A'-bound *pro* is able to license parasitic gaps:

(7) a. Esta teoría$_i$ es difícil de [$_{CP}$ Op_i [$_{IP}$ *PRO* [$_{VP}$ [$_{VP}$ explicar *pro*$_i$]

[$_{PP}$ sin [$_{CP}$ Op_i [$_{IP}$ *PRO* entender *pro*$_i$]]]]]]

b. Esta carne$_i$ es difícil de [$_{CP}$ Op_i [$_{IP}$ *PRO* [$_{VP}$ [$_{VP}$ tragar *pro*$_i$]

[$_{PP}$ sin [$_{CP}$ Op_i [$_{IP}$ *PRO* masticar *pro*$_i$ cuidadosamente]]]]]]

What I would like to claim is that a similar structure, with *pro* bound from an A'-position, exists in other constructions in Spanish, specifically, in clitic constructions which also license parasitic gaps.

A characteristic of certain clitic constructions with third person clitic pronouns in Spanish is that, unlike their French counterparts, they license parasitic gaps. The data in (8)-(10) show a contrast between the two languages regarding the licensing of parasitic gaps by clitics:

(8)   a. Voilà le livre$_i$ que vous avez rangé t_i sans avoir lu e_i

Here is the book that you put away without having read

b.*Vous l$_i$'avez rangé _____$_i$ sans avoir lu e_i

You put it away without having read

(Tellier 1991:135)

(9)   Lo$_i$ puse _____$_i$ sin estirar _____$_i$ bien
(10)   *Lo$_i$ puse _____$_i$ sin bañar _____$_i$ antes

In (8) we observe that parasitic gaps in French are licensed in the operator/variable environment but are not licensed in a clitic structure. (9) shows that parasitic gaps in Spanish are licensed in clitic structures when the clitic refers to a [-animate] argument and the parasitic gap appears in an infinitival adjunct clause. However, clitics that are [+animate] cannot license parasitc gaps, as (10) shows.[4] A situation parallel to (9) is found with dative clitics; the data in (11) show that [+animate] dative clitics do not license parasitic gaps:

(11) a. *Le$_i$ hablé por teléfono _____$_i$ antes de mandar _____$_i$ la carta

b. *Le$_i$ dí _____$_i$ la noticia antes de hablar _____$_i$ en persona

When the dative clitic refers to a [-animate] entity, the sentences are acceptable:

(12) a. ?Le$_i$ pasé la gamuza _____$_i$ antes de aplicar más pintura _____$_i$

     b. ?Siempre le$_i$ cambio la rueda _____$_i$ antes de poner más   aceite

       ——$_i$

Let us go back to our sentences (9) and (12), with a parasitic gap licensed by an accusative clitic in the former and a dative clitic in the latter. The structure we posit for them is given in (13) and (14) (these structures are slightly different but they have the same coindexing relationships):

(13) Lo$_i$ puse _____$_i$ sin estirar _____$_i$ bien

                        IP

[Cl$_i$+[V+I]]   IP

                   Spec   I'

               [t$_{V+I}$]]   VP

                    VP   PP

              t$_V$ **[pro]$_i$**

                     P   CP
                            sin

                              Op$_i$ IP

PRO estirar ***pro***$_i$ bien

(14) ?Le$_i$ pasé la gamuza ____$_i$ antes de aplicar más pintura ____$_i$

IP

[Cl$_i$ +[V+I]]   IP

Spec   I'

[t$_{V+I}$]]   VP

VP   PP

V'   **[*pro*]$_i$**   antes de   CP

t$_V$ DO   **Op$_i$**   IP

la gamuza   *PRO* aplicar más pintura *pro*$_i$

In (13) and (14) I assume the possibility of head adjunction to IP[5] along the lines of Kayne (1991); Kayne argues for this kind of adjunction to account for differences in the order [clitic + infinitive] in Italian vs French (I will re-

turn to this point shortly). If head adjunction to IP is possible in infinitival clauses in Italian (and Spanish), head adjunction could be an option in finite clauses in those languages as well.

Now, neither the structure in (13) nor the one in (14) has a licensing variable; yet, the parasitic gap is allowed in that environment. In those structures the clitics in the complex head [Cl+V+I] identify *pro* in object position and provide it with an index (*i* above). This identification is similar to what one finds in instances of V-to-I movement where the verb in the [V+I] segment identifies its trace (cf. Baker 1988). The *pro* in object position is thus identified from the A'-position in which the complex head [Cl+V+I] functions like an operator. My claim is that *pro* bound from an A'-position is what licenses the presence of a parasitic gap construction.

What about the parasitic gap null operator? Following the CNOI (cf. (5) above), the null operator will be head-governed by the preposition *sin* in (13) and by *antes de* in (14) and will be identified by the clitic in the IP-adjoined position. Once the null operator is identified, it will in turn identify the empty category in object position (*pro*) in the adjunct clause. A chain of identification will be established between the clitic in IP-adjoined position, the null operator and *pro* in object position of the adjunct clause. Therefore, a parasitic gap is licensed in Spanish in an environment with a *pro* bound form an A'-position.

As I mentioned before, Kayne (1991) posited head-adjunction to IP to account for differences in the order [clitic + infinitive] in Italian vs. French. To obtain the relevant order [infinitive + clitic] that we see in Italian (16) and Spanish (17) he posits the following structure:[6]

(15)
```
          TP
         /  \
   V+Infn    TP
            /  \
        Cl+T    Infn
               /  \
            [e]    VP
                  /  \
                t_v   [e]
```

(16) Parlar**gli** sarebbe un errore
(17) Hablar**le** sería un error

In (15) the infinitive adjoins to Infn and [V+Infn] adjoins to TP. The clitic can now adjoin to the free node T, a node that the infinitive can skip because it does not need to merge with Tense or Agreement. French infinitives, on the other hand, will involve raising of V to Infn but the verb will not move any further; the clitic will adjoin to [V+Infn] resulting in the surface order [clitic+infinitive]:

    (18) a. **Lui** parler serait une erreur
           b.*Parler**lui** serait une erreur

Now, if the possibility of V+I adjunction to IP is what allows the licensing of parasitic gaps, languages like Catalan and Italian, with the order [infinitive+clitic] (and with evidence, then, for adjunction of a head to IP vs. French), should share with Spanish the same judgments regarding clitic licensing of parasitic gap constructions. This prediction is borne out as the data in (19)-(23) illustrate. (19) and (20) show that both Catalan and Italian allow the licensing of parasitic gaps in clitic structures. (21) illustrates that these languages also exhibit the restriction that we saw for Spanish, i.e. parasitic gaps are not licensed in clitic structures when the clitic refers to a [+animate] entity (obviously, (21) is grammatical in Spanish, Catalan and Italian with the corresponding accusative clitic after the infinitive *bañar*).

    (19) a. La$_i$ envié _____$_i$ sin firmar ____$_i$ como indicaban las instrucciones
        b. El$_i$ vaig enviar _____$_i$ sense signar _____$_i$ como indicavan les instrucciones
        c. L$_i$'ho spedito ____$_i$ senza firmare _____$_i$ come indicato nelle instruzioni

    (20) a. Lo$_i$ cociné ____$_i$ sin meter _____$_i$ en el horno
        b. El$_i$ vaig cuinar ____$_i$ sense posar _____$_i$ al forn
        c. L$_i$'ho cucinato _____$_i$ senza mettere ____$_i$ al forno

    (21) a.*Lo$_i$ vestí ____$_i$ sin bañar ____$_i$
        b.*El$_i$ vestir ____$_i$ sense banyar ____$_i$
        c.*L$_i$'ho vestito ____$_i$ senza lavar ____$_i$

Let us consider now the relevant data with dative and locative (**ci** in Italian) clitics:

(22) a. ?Le$_i$ pasé la gamuza ____$_i$ antes de aplicar más pintura _____$_i$

b. ?Li$_i$ vaig passar la baieta ____$_i$ abanse de posar mès pintura ____$_i$

c. ?Ci$_i$ ho passato le straccio ____$_i$ prima di mettere piu vernice ____$_i$

(23) a.*Le$_i$ hablé por teléfono ____$_i$ antes de mandar la carta ____$_i$

b.*Li$_i$ vaig parlar per telèfon ____$_i$ abans de enviar la carta____$_i$

c.*Gli$_i$ ho dato la notizie _____$_i$ prima de parlar di persona____$_i$

(22) shows that a parasitic gap reading is allowed both in Catalan and Italian when the dative/locative clitic refers to a [-animate] entity; on the contrary, when the dative clitic refers to [+animate] entities, as in (23), the parasitic gap is not acceptable.

There exists, therefore, an interesting correlation between the infinitive+clitic order and the licensing of parasitic gaps in Spanish, Catalan and Italian and the order clitic+infinitive and the non-licensing of parasitic gaps in French. The [+/-animacy] distinction is yet to be accounted for.

We have seen then how an A'-bound *pro* allows the existence of parasitic gap constructions in [-animate] accusative and dative clitic constructions in Spanish, Catalan and Italian. The claim that an operator/variable pair is not the only essential environment allowing parasitic gaps is thus supported.[7]

4. WH-IN-SITU

In English, unlike in Spanish, a wh-in-situ with an echo reading cannot license parasitic gaps:

(24) a. ¿Mandaste QUÉ CARTA sin certificar debidamente?
      *You sent WHICH LETTER without certifying properly?
b.*Kim filed WHICH ARTICLES without reading?

Wh-words in situ with an echo reading in English seem to be grammatical in exam-type questions but apparently not even this type licenses parasitic gaps:

(25) a. Winston Churchill appointed WHICH MINISTERS to his cabinet?

b.*Winston Churchill appointed WHICH MINISTERS to his cabinet
   without interviewing?

Dumitrescu (1990) claims that all wh-echo phrases are instances of
D(iscourse)-linked wh-phrases (cf.Pesetsky 1987). Their only well-chosen
answer is forced by context and they, therefore, do not need to move at LF.
Independent evidence for her claim seems to come from the following data in
Spanish:

(26)   a. *¿A quién$_i$ visitó su$_i$ madre?
       b. ¿Su$_i$ madre visitó A QUIÉN$_i$?

Whereas weak crossover effects appear in (26a), no such effects show in
(26b); if wh-echo questions do not need to move at LF, no weak crossover ef-
fects are expected. Also, the data in (26) should be contrasted with (27):

(27) *Su$_i$ madre visitó a [cada estudiante]$_i$

(27) shows that Quantifier Raising (movement at LF) does cause weak
crossover effects.
    Let us now provide the structure corresponding to the wh-echo question
in (28b), given in (29), along the lines of Dumistrescu (1990):

(28) a. S1. Mandé [murmullo] la semana pasada y ...
      b. S2. Mandaste QUÉ la semana pasada?

(29)   CP

       Spec   C'
       Op$_k$

               C⁰   **CP$_k$**

                       Spec   C'

                               C⁰   IP

                       [*pro*] mandaste **QUÉ$_k$**

In (29) the wh-echo word is directly generated in the D-Structure of the recapitulatory echo question, like all other constituents. The structure posited for these echo questions is a two level CP structure;[8] this structure consists of a higher CP which takes as a complement another CP marked as interrogative by a null operator base-generated in the topmost specifier position. This base-generated interrogative discourse operator is lexically null but it is realized phonetically as the rising intonation characteristic of recapitulatory echo questions of the wh-type. The role of the operator is twofold: through a coindexing mechanism, it assures that the structure at LF is interpreted as a recapitulatory echo question and that in PF this structure acquires the corresponding contour. As for the C^o of the higher CP, Dumitrescu assumes that it contains a non-overt complementizer with quotative function which can be filled with material optionally (cf. Spanish *qué* in "(Que) si soy qué?") or remain null as in English. Dumitrescu's claim is that wh-echo words, due to their D-linked nature, are not quantifiers and, therefore, do not need LF movement to be interpreted. Their intepretation comes, as we see in (29), by coindexing of the wh-echo word in situ with the discourse operator in the higher CP and the quoted CP itself.

So far we have seen that wh-in-situ words with echo readings do not behave in the same way as normal wh-in-situ; wh-in-situ with echo readings can be interpreted without any movement at LF because they are linked to a higher discourse operator at S-Structure. The basic question that one needs to answer is what makes Spanish wh-in-situ with echo readings different from their English counterparts regarding the ability of the former to license parasitic gap constructions.

The data in Spanish in (30)-(33) show different combinations of moved and in-situ wh-phrases and parasitic gap constructions; these data will shed some light on the contrast between English and Spanish as to the licensing of parasitic gap constructions by wh-in-situ with echo readings in the latter language:

(30) ¿A quién$_i$ viste t_i sin Op_i saludar e_i?

(31) a. *¿A quién$_i$ lo$_i$ viste ec_i?
     b. ¿Lo$_i$ viste A QUIÉN$_i$?
     c. ¿Lo$_i$ viste A QUIÉN$_i$ sin saludar ____$_i$?

(32) *¿Viste a quién$_i$ sin *Op*$_i$ saludar ___$_i$?

     *¿You saw who(m) without greeting?

(33)   ¿Viste A QUIÉN$_i$ sin *Op*$_i$ saludar ___$_i$?

     *¿You saw WHO(M) without greeting?

(30) is a standard parasitic gap construction in which the parasitic gap *e* is licensed by a variable at S-S. (31a) might be ruled out by some principle along the lines of the Parallelism Constraint on Operator Binding: an operator is binding a pronominal element (*lo*) and a variable (cf. Suñer 1988). (32) shows that wh-words in-situ do not license parasitic gaps in Spanish: *a quién* is a true wh-in-situ and, as such, moves at LF. LF movement does not license parasitic gaps in Spanish, as (34), a sentence with Quantifier Raising (movement at LF), shows:

(34) *Archivé [cada artículo] sin leer

One crucial difference, however, between (32) and (33) is that *a quién* at S-S in (32) is not coindexed in any way with an A'-position whereas in (33) it is coindexed with a discourse operator.

    Obviously, the same can be said of the English counterpart of (33). What makes the difference then? The difference lies in the nature of the licensing mechanism. In English only S-S variables (i.e. traces of wh-movement to an A'-position) license parasitic gaps. In Spanish, however, we have already seen evidence to the contrary. Thus, besides the 'standard' parasitic gap construction licensed, as in English, by an S-S variable (cf. (30)), we have seen parasitic gaps in Spanish licensed by an A'-bound *pro*, both in *tough* and in clitic constructions.

    The structure we posit for a wh-in-situ with an echo reading licensing a parasitic gap in Spanish is given in (35) (irrelevant structure omitted):

(35)   CP

     Op$_k$ **CP$_k$**

        Spec   IP

          pro   VP

        VP   PP

mandaste **QUÉ CARTA$_k$**

        sin   CP

        Op$_k$ IP

        PRO   VP

        certificar ***pro***$_k$ ...

In this case we find a parasitic gap construction licensed by an A'-bound wh-phrase in-situ with an echo reading. The parasitic gap null operator is head-governed by the preposition *sin* and identified by the higher discourse operator.[9] Once the null operator is identified, it will in turn identify the *pro* in object position in the adjunct clause. There exists a parallelism between the two level CP structure in (35) and the double IP structure posited for clitic constructions: a wh-in-situ with an echo reading in the former and a *pro* in the latter are bound *from an A'-position* and license parasitic gap constructions.

    Parasitic gap constructions licensed by a wh-in-situ with an echo reading are, therefore, another instance of our claim that an operator/variable pair is not the only essential environment allowing the licensing of parasitic gaps in Spanish; an A'-bound *pro* in *tough* and clitic constructions as well as echo wh-in-situ words A'-bound at S-S can license these constructions as well. In English, however, an A'-bound echo wh-in-situ does not have the possibility of licensing parasitic gaps because no movement is involved and, as is well-known, an S-S variable is the only gap allowed to license those constructions in this language.

5. CONCLUSION

In this paper we have presented evidence from *tough* constructions in order
to show that an analysis relying on the idea of movement of a null operator to
the [Spec,CP] position in this kind of structure, as proposed by Chomsky
(1981) for English, must be rejected for Romance. The clause-boundedness
characteristic of Romance *tough* constructions, a feature which carries over
to parasitic gap constructions, leads us to propose that both *tough* and
parasitic gap constructions are characterized by a base-generated null
operator in [Spec,CP]. This base-generated operator is coindexed at S-
Structure with a *pro* in object position. The standard movement of a null
operator to [Spec,CP] is maintained for English, with a structure of [*Op ....*
variable].

We have also presented evidence arguing against the claim that parasitic
gaps are exclusively licensed by an S-S variable (i.e. the trace of movement
to an A' position). An A'-bound *pro* licenses parasitic gaps in Spanish *tough*
and clitic constructions. An echo wh-in-situ, bound by a discourse operator,
allows the licensing of parasitic gaps in Spanish in contrast to their English
counterparts.a

NOTES

1. Data from other Romance languages:

Italian
a.*Il livro é facile da convincere la gente da leggere
b.*Quale articolo hai catalogato dopo haber convinto la gente a leggere?
Romanian
a.*Cartea este usor sa convingi oamenii de citit
b.*Ce articole ai clasificat dupa ce ai convius oamenii sa citeasca?
Portuguese
a.*O livro é facil de convencer as pessoas de ler
b.*Que artigos voce arquivou depois de convencer as pessoas de ler?
French
a.*Ce livre est facile à persuader les gens de lire
b.*Quel article avez-vous classé sans convaincre les gens de lire?

2. It might appear that the clause-bounded effect can be 'subverted' by subsequent
movement of the base-generated operator to a higher CP, resulting in a structure such as (i):

(i) ......[$_{PP}$ P [$_{CP}$ *Op*$_i$ [$_{IP}$ ....[$_{CP}$ *t*$_i$ [$_{IP}$ .... *pro*$_i$ ....]]]]]

García Mayo (1993) rules out such structure by a proposed parallelism condition on operator binding, along the lines of Safir's (1984) Parallelism Constraint on Operator Binding. This condition rules out an operator binding two elements which do not agree for the feature [α pronominal].

    3. A strong prediction that our analysis makes is that if a language has access to *pro* in object position, that language has to use a base-generated null operator strategy in parasitic gap and *tough* constructions and these, therefore, will be clause-bounded. This prediction works for Romance languages and for Basque, which also has access to *pro*.

   (i) a. Zein artikulou gorde zenituen irakurri gabe?
        which article-pl file aux read without
        Which articles did you file without reading?
     b.*Zein artikulou gorde zenituen ikasleen buruan irakurtzeko ideia sartu gabe?
        which article-pl file aux students-gen head-loc read of idea put without
        Which articles did you file without convincing students to read?

  (ii) a. Liburu hau irakurtzeko erreza da
        book this read- of easy is
        This book is easy to read
     b.*Liburu hau jendearen buruan irakurtzeko ideia sartzeko erreza da
        book this people-gen head-loc read of idea keep of easy is
        This book is easy to convince people to read

    4. One has to be careful with the sequence *sin*+infinitive in Spanish because it can act as an adjectival modifier clause (cf. (ia)) or, one could even say, as an adjectival small clause (cf.(ib)):

   (i) a. La carne sin aliñar no me gusta
      b. Prefiero [el café sin calentar]

Three different readings can be provided for a sentence like "Lo archivé sin leer":

  (ii) a. a parasitic gap reading
        Lo archivé sin leer(lo)
     b. an adjectival reading
        Lo archivé sin leer (I filed it unread)
     c. an intransitive reading
        #Lo archivé sin leer (otra cosa)

The adjectival reading in (iib) cannot be adverbially modified, as (iii) shows:

  (iii) *Lo archivé sin leer cuidadosamente
      *I filed it unread carefully

The intransitive reading in (iic) is grammatical but highly implausible. When we use the sequence *sin*+infinitive we are careful to use an adverb to avoid the adjectival reading.

5. This claim is against *Barriers* where it is posited that heads can only adjoin to heads.

6. TP in (15) is the maximal clause projection. Following Raposo (1987), Kayne takes the infinitival *-r(e)* suffix of Italian and French to correspond to a 'functional head having nominal properties somewhat like English *-ing*" and refers to it as *Infn* (Kayne 1991:651).

7. Campos (1991) argues for an analysis of clitics licensing parasitic gaps in Spanish in which the gap related to the clitic is a silent operator [+WH] *OP* which is coindexed with a silent topic as shown in (i) and moves at LF:

   (i) [$_{TOPIC}$ X$_i$ [$_{CP}$ [$_{IP}$ lo archivaron *Op*$_i$ sin leer *e*]]]

One argument against this analysis is that when OP moves the gap left is a variable and one would then expect Condition C effects; however, those effects are not found, as (ii) indicates:

   (ii) El vestido$_i$ está arrugado porque lo puse ____$_i$ sin estirar ___$_i$

This lack of Condition C effects supports our analysis of a pronominal variable instead of a pure variable as the empty category coindexed with the clitic.

8. A two-level CP structure has also been posited by Suñer (1991a) to account for Spanish indirect interrogatives of the type in (i):

   (i) Me preguntaron [que] [a quién] invitarás tú al concierto

The two-level CP structure accounts for (i) by providing the appropriate position for both the complementizer *que* and the wh-phrase that cooccurs with it. See also Plann (1982) for a two-level S'.

9. One will have to assume that the matrix CP is not a barrier for identification of the parasitic gap null operator (there is already a barrier (PP)) or that the operator receives an index from the quoted CP.

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a

THE REFERENTIAL MANIA OF "SIGNS AND SYMBOLS":
READING NABOKOV'S SHORT STORY

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> *Life is a message scribbled in the dark*
> Anonymous
> Vladimir V. Nabokov, *Pale Fire*

I

Vladimir Vladimirovich Nabokov often expressed his feeling of intense confinement within the cell of artistic imagination:

> The type of the artist who is always in exile even though he may never have left the ancestral hall or the paternal parish is a well-known biographical figure with whom I feel some affinity. (quoted in Tanner 1971: 35) [1]

This remark engages with a whole gallery of characters and narrative developments in Nabokov's fiction which write and rewrite the same claustrophobic obsession of the individuals who experience intense isolation of consciousness: either the mad artist like Cincinnatus, Fyodor, Sineosov, Van and Ada, Hugh Person or Krug, or else the criminal artist like Alex, Rex, Hermann, Humbert Humbert or Van Veen. Consciousness and subjectivity are for Nabokov the fundamental dimension of existence, the greatest and ultimate mystery, at the same time the scenario for both freedom and exile.[2] Nabokov's fiction writes and rewrites the solipsistic struggle for liberation from the constraints of consciousness through imagination, through art as the only means of catching a glimpse of transcendence. His belief in the primacy and universality of subjective experience involves, in turn, a concomitant belief in the individual imagination (especially through art) as a primal source of truth; in an interview he declared:

> Average reality begins to rot and stink as soon as the act of individual creation ceases to animate a subjectively perceived texture (Tanner 1971: 33).

The metaphors underpinning this statement are extremely revealing of Nabokov's conception, or rather fiction, of the artistic performance. Such fiction, as I read it, presupposes a double division of experience. The objects of average reality are separated from the transcendental purifying realities they signify, and the individual consciousness is separated both from average reality and from the transcendental realm of uncorrupted truth. The act of individual creation based on these assumptions is an act that brings about a change in man's relation to the world of average reality. It animates an otherwise inanimate texture, as it were, without *anima,* without life, that incurably rots and stinks —these words posit the need for a healing and purifying creation as an ethical imperative. Thus the subjective process of creation animates, gives true life to a reality doomed otherwise to inertia and putrefaction in virtue of its averageness, its standardness, a coinage debased in the daily exchange. Such a perception of reality results from the enactment of a struggle which may take the artist to the very brink of truth. The individual creator must avoid at all costs a perception which is average and must become sensitive to a texture that is not commonly accepted or standardized —but which in fact is more real or true than average reality:

> I have often noticed that after I had bestowed on the characters of my novels some treasured item of my past, it would pine away in the artificial world where I had so abruptly placed it. Although it lingered on my mind, its personal warmth, its retrospective appeal had gone and, presently, it became more closely identified with my novel than with my former self, where it had seemed to be safe from the intrusion of the artist. Houses have crumbled in my memory as soundlessly as they did in the mute films of yore, and the portrait of my old French governess, whom I once lent to a boy in one of my books, is fading fast, now that it is engulfed in the description of a childhood entirely unrelated to my own. The man in me revolts against the fictionist, and here is my desperate attempt to save what is left of poor Mademoiselle. (Nabokov 1960b: 95)

The figure of the artist who partakes of some aristocratic disdain for the masses labouring heavily in more constricted and straitened versions of reality matches the solipsistic consciousness in the works of Pound, Eliot, Woolf, Joyce or Faulkner. Nabokov's characters have their peculiar features and inscribe peculiar sets of assumptions in his work, but if any background is needed for or against them, it is within this tradition that they fall. In fact, "Signs and Symbols" —signed "Boston 1948"— is permeated by some features of the non-totalizable topography of classical modernism.[3] This short narrative presents a decadent family: they are a sterile old couple of Chekhovian exiles whose son is "incurably deranged in his mind"; their economical situation has brought about his internment in a sanatorium which is "miserably understaffed"; this damaged family make ends meet thanks to the charity of a rich relative, the husband's brother, presumably another Jewish emigrant who has been able to buy his way into the American society and become a "real American." However, the situation of this family has not always been so distressing and arduous: in the old country, in Leipzig, he had been a "fairly successful businessman" and they enjoyed a comfortable life, for they even had a "German maid." If I were to qualify this depiction of a family with one word —something which, of course, is unpermissible— an apt epithet might be "Faulknerian," or "Chekhovian": an elderly couple (the "silvery" bearded husband needs a dental plate, suffers from a stomach disease and eats "pale victuals," his wife's "tired old heart" "trudges heavily upstairs"), too old to be able to procreate any longer, whose phobic only son is driven to suicide by the claustrophobia of his obsession, present a landscape of hopeless sterility; they cling haggardly to their golden past: he has not been able to learn to speak fluently the language of his new country; he has

created a defence, as it were, against the corruption of his relief-giving memory: he reads "his Russian language newspaper" and wears over his nightgown "the old overcoat with astrakhan collar" which he much prefers to his new bathrobe; she unsleeps the night examining old photographs. There is something Eliotic, I feel, about the celebration of a life-returning spring in a world already enjoying death and avoiding natural regeneration: the mother does not wear any makeup, unlike her neighbour, who rebels against the poignancy of the "fault-finding light of spring days" with an awkward pink and mauve embalment and artificial flowers. The narrative sequentiality of "Signs and Symbols" is also inhabited by the structures of Faulkner's, Woolf's or Joyce's novels: the narrator, the open ending, the topography of narrative "clues." I will return to this when discussing the assumptions about the reading process which sustain "Signs and Symbols."

However, the critical readings of Nabokov do not seem to agree as to the presence of Anglo-Saxon modernist writing in Nabokov's text: it seems there is an uncanny tension in the pathos of his solipsistic characters. The writing of solipsism and of its transcendence through artistic imagination, through the animation of a subjectively perceived texture, is divided in "Signs and Symbols" —into signs and symbols. Nabokov's story inscribes the affirmation of artistic "creative" language in a general economy that prevents its affirmation.

II

The pathos of "Signs and Symbols" depends on and is constituted by the dramatization of the clash between different modes of perception and interpretation of reality and their hierarchization, that is, between two ways of reading: the "average" reading and the "subjective" reading.[4]

The exile couple's son is secluded in a sanatorium because of his strange "system of delusions": "referential mania."

> "Referential mania," Herman Brink had called it. In these very rare cases the patient *imagines* that everything happening around him is a *veiled reference* to his personality and existence. (Nabokov, SS 54. My emphasis.)

This boy is trapped in "a dense tangle of logically interacting illusions" whereby he considers the movement of trees, the sounds of the mountain, the

surfaces of still pools and store windows to be the activity of an awful conspiracy threatening his personality and existence. For him, "[e]verything is a cipher and of everything he is the theme"; for him, "phenomenal nature" is a huge coded message which, within the folds of its coding, carries information regarding him; natural phenomena such as clouds, firs, rivers, pools, are veiled references, they are relational objects intertwined through a strange hidden logic which withdraws them from their literality in the realm of phenomenality in order to name what does not belong to this realm, to name this boy's ultimate truth. They are ciphers, that is, messages whose referent is another message; they are figures of his personality and existence. His reading of the world around him is —as I read it— *figural,* as opposed to the average literal one, the one shared by, among others, his mother, scholars like Herman Brink who write papers "in a scientific monthly," and us, that is, the people who are not incurably deranged in their minds. But we shall soon realize how these assumptions or illusions are inmediately outplayed by this narrative —particularly the latter.

The dramatization of the binary opposition real/fictional is to be found at all levels: the son is caught by means of a dense tangle of illusions, of fictional objects imagined *by* figural language; he inhabits a fictional realm he has brought about around him by subjectively animating average reality. Such dramatization leads logically to a consideration of figural language and fiction as derivative activities that depend for their existence on the literal and real ones. Moreover, their beauty and existence is threatened by literality, in much the same way that beautiful weeds are menaced and mangled by the farmer:

> She thought of the endless waves of pain that for some reason or other she and her husband had to endure; of the invisible giants hurting her boy in some unimaginable fashion; of the incalculable amount of tenderness contained in the world; of the fate of this tenderness, which is either crushed, or wasted, or transformed into madness; of neglected children humming to themselves in unswept corners; of beautiful weeds that cannot hide from the farmer and helplessly have to watch the shadow of his simian stoop leave mangled flowers in its wake as the monstrous darkness approaches. (SS 57)

Creative imagination, fiction, figurality, are thought of by average minds as beautiful weeds, parasitical, suspect, pernicious, secondary.

Nabokov, then, has been often read as privileging —in the aristocratic hierarchy-producing fashion referred to above— the second term in these op-

positions (figural and fictional), identifying them with the special gifts of creative imagination whereby the human mind may catch a glimpse of the ultimate truth of his being, of transcendence. However, the pathos of "Signs and Symbols," as I read it, is somehow distanced, biased, is the echo of the pathos of the romantic isolation of a young imaginative mind bent on self-destruction — a recurrent theme in Nabokov's short stories (Boyd 1992: 550).[5] Some statements produce a quaint weaving of meanings in the sorrowful portrayal of the son: he is a "prodigiously gifted child" who "considers himself to be so much more intelligent than other men." The hierarchization of this character, isolated, creative, pathetic, the type of the Chekhovian decadent romantic artist, physically weak (he had suffered from pneumonia and insomnia), is disrupted at source, not only by those mocking (remarkable) remarks, but by the pointing out of, and obedience to, a linguistic necessity: "Signs and Symbols" displaces and undoes the oppositions literal/figural and real/fictional which sustain the given order of priorities of logocentrism. The deviations of the son's deranged consciousness are repeated by his mother: her son painfully elaborates fictional patterns derived from the real ones around him —*outside* him, *outside* language— and whose theme is his own personality and existence. But she is already trapped in the overwhelming law of the *veiled reference* :

> [I]t gave her a kind of soft shock, a mixture of compassion and wonder, to notice that one of the passengers, a girl with dark hair and grubby red toenails, was weeping on the shoulder of an older woman. *Whom did that woman resemble? She resembled Rebecca Borisovna, whose daughter had married one of the Soloveichiks —in Minsk, years ago.* (SS 56. My emphasis.)

Her perception of the features of the woman who is sitting in front of her in the bus leads her mind to "hook on" to a presence that is not part of her immediate environment "[d]uring the long ride": the presence of Rebecca Borisovna, of her daughter, of a marriage, of the Soloveichiks, of long gone Minsk. It is the presence of an absence, it is a fictional presence; it is a story unleashed by the veiled reference to the physical appearance of a woman within a bus.

The same logic which relates physical objects to a narrative account —to her past, to the clues of the existence to which her husband stubbornly clings— of "incredibly detailed information regarding" her, is at work when she is examining the photographs from her old albums —in a situation of

longed for isolation at night, alone in the living-room where she has pulled
the blinds down. The coordination of the two activities in the sentence "She
pulled the blind down and examined the photographs," creates an intimate
link between these two modes of action, isolating herself from outside activ-
ity to interpret the messages coded in and by her photographs; in Nabokov's
tale, isolation is somehow the condition of introspection —which much
resembles her son's mania:

> From a fold in the album, a German maid they had had in Leipzig and
> her fat-faced fiancé fell out. Minsk, the Revolution, Leipzig, Berlin,
> Leipzig, a slanting house badly out of focus. Four years old, in a park:
> moodily, shyly, with puckered forehead, looking away from an eager
> squirrel as he would from any other stranger. Aunt Rosa, a fussy,
> angular, wild-eyed old lady, who had lived in a tremulous world of
> bad news, bankruptcies, train accidents, cancerous growths —until
> the Germans put her to death, together with all the people she had
> worried about. Aged six —that was when he drew wonderful birds
> with human hands and feet, and suffered from insomnia like a grown-
> up man. His cousin, now a famous chess player. He again, aged about
> eight, already difficult to understand, afraid of the wallpaper in the
> passage, afraid of a certain picture in a book which merely showed an
> idyllic landscape with rocks on a hillside and an old cart wheel
> hanging from the branch of a leafless tree. Aged ten: the year they left
> Europe. The shame, the pity, the humiliating difficulties, the ugly,
> vicious, backward children he was with in that special school. (SS 56)

The echoes, "silhouettes," or rather —to extend Nabokov in a Nabokovian
way— the ghosts of modernist experimental stream (extreme?) of
consciousness narrative devices "flit over" and within this quote. The
grammatical structure of this paragraph creates —but also, by this very same
move, destroys— immediacy of experience by obliterating the terms usually
sustaining the rendering of experience, by this detour of language called
zeugma. There are no verbs designating the physical activity of this woman
while she examines each photo, her movements, nor is there any (literal)
mention of the objects, of each fold in the album, each photo. Instead, the
narrator's omnipresent words overlap, blur, embody the old woman's lan-
guage —almost completely, for there is still the ironic distance marked by
"they"—, trying to efface the presence of outside reality in order to release
the contents of this mother's consciousness —by now, a set up familiar to us:
the obliteration of phenomenality as a condition for introspection and imagi-

nation— the activity of this special form of imagination called memory. The law of the referential mania spreads its implications at every moment in this paragraph. The photographs, physical objects, "man-made" objects which copy —and distort dimensionally— physical objects, reveal incredibly detailed information regarding her. Moreover, she does not name these man-made objects by means of (supposedly) literal terms: she does not design them using the terms "a photograph of ...." Instead, she names them directing her language backwards to the resources of memory, of imagination. It is not a photograph of a woman and a man that falls out of the album: it is a "German maid they had had in Leipzig and her fat-faced fiancé"; such a reading repeats the features of her son's mania, for the woman in the photograph (later we know her literal name, Elsa) is read only in terms of her past relationship to the family: a German *maid they had had* in Leipzig; a maid, in Leipzig, terms —like any other— which designate and depend on a relation, the professional engagement of that woman with the family, with the past of the family. Furthermore, the man who appears in the photograph is read only in relation to the family, for he is *her fiancé,* another relational term : this man is the boyfriend of a German maid of the family when they lived in Leipzig. Moreover, the qualifier "fat-faced" (later "bestial") testifies to the inevitability of a subjective "slanting" in any reading or interpretation of the world: probably we could not properly locate these words within Elsa's mind —if we were allowed to do so, which we are not.

The dictatorial partiality of subjectivity describes a picture of "rocks on a hillside and *an old cart wheel hanging from the branch of a leafless tree* " as an "*idyllic* landscape" [my emphasis]. The imprisoning and devouring nature of subjectivity inhabits the following sequence: "The shame, the pity, the humiliating difficulties, the ugly vicious backward children he was with in that special school." This loving mother's words for the sanatorium — "special school"— are euphemisms for (and used by) institutions that treat mental deviation, and have the effect of creating an opaque screen over what would otherwise be dangerously unsettling definitions. She applies to her son's former fellow-patients a group of terms which easily apply to her own beloved child: his son's "poor face" is "ill shaven," "blotched with acne," words the reader readily relates to terms like ugly or vicious; besides, the other children are depicted as "backward," a word which is at odds with the description of her son as being "totally inaccessible to normal minds," falling in the region of the institutional euphemistic strategy above mentioned.

The (non)logic of the veiled reference is also at work when the photograph of the "wild-eyed old lady" directs the mother's consciousness to a nar-

rative of "bad news, bankruptcies, train accidents, cancerous growths," the German invasion and the Soah; this woman is called *Aunt* Rosa. The photograph of a boy, "*his* cousin "[my emphasis] —again relational terms—, reveals a glimpse of a brilliant career as chess player. A photograph of her six-year-old son brings about —and around— the story of his quaint drawings and his distressing insomnia.

The overwhelming pointing-to-something-else of both readings problematizes the ontological status of reality. In the first section of "Signs and Symbols" referential mania was named in —by— a non-manic reading, in a reading that denominated natural phenomena by their literal average name. The link between an object and his name was safe there, stable, this stability being (institutionally) guaranteed by the capacity to detect deviations from literal reading, from the perception of things as they really are, the capacity to perceive and name, or rather, to both name and perceive a fir as a fir, a mountain as a mountain, a store window as a store window, and not "sullenly confuse" them with anything else. Her son's behaviour is "a very rare case," which sets him apart from average models of conduct. It is a "system of delusions," "a dense tangle of logically interacting illusions." The words *illusion* and *delusion* de-nominate difficulties, mistakes, deviations from average perception which, nevertheless, by their relational and derived (and derivative) nature, involve average straightforward perception. They are produced, according to literal reading, by the impossibility of reading literally, that is, they are produced by figural reading. Literal terms are disfigured, drawn away from their realm and thrown aside —de-ranged— into a different realm: the objects of phenomenal nature are displaced from their natural location in the ordered system of average reality to designate such things as giants, conspiracies or spies. This displacement, which feeds on the firm ground of literality, is nothing but a momentary —as the semantic play field suggested by "illusion" and "delusion" indicates— swoon of language, a fainting fit, a sudden malaise which feeds on the texture of literality and deranges this healthy system. The illusions and delusions of figurality and fictionality are —I am echoing J. Hillis Miller (Hartman 1979: 271-273)— something of a parasite, like "beautiful weeds" that uncomfortably appear in the tidy rows of crops within the economy of the farm. However, these weeds are sometimes indistinguishable from the flowers of crops. Weeds and crops grow entwined in a mutual invasion because both have the same natural drive, to the same beating energy which fights bravely to emerge everywhere, menacing and squeezing in the stability of the farmer's caring selection or animation of a specific vegetal texture within the manifold realm of nature.

Literality and figurality somehow blur the frontiers of their opposition, and even reverse its terms, when objects of phenomenal nature, such as photographs, are thrown beyond their realm to designate the objects of this peculiar form of fiction we call memory —in Nabokov's works, memory requires the animation of creative imagination (Clark 1986: 108-109). Thus, reality and fiction subjectively intermingle in the dense tangle of levels of meaning deployed by the term "imagination." There is no way out of figurality, nor is there a way out of fiction. We —I, the reader, Nabokov, the mother, the son— are plotting beings (proleptically and analeptically), and also plotted beings, for we inhabit the plots of other beings. In "Signs and Symbols" the metaphorical denomination "the Prince," which carries with it the seed of the fictional milieu inhabited by the now depending husband, becomes later the usual name for his brother:

> ". . . We will have the doctor see him at least twice a week. It does not matter what the Prince says. He won't have to say much anyway because it will come out cheaper." (SS 58)

Yet there is a contradiction —one among many— in what I have said so far about Nabokov's emphasis and aristocratic affirmation of imagination as the only means to prevent reality from rotting away, since imagination, figurality, fictionality, appear to be not the means but the condition of any reading of reality, that is, of reality. The inscription and reversal of the logocentric hierarchization literal/figural and real/fictional in "Signs and Symbols" produce a double, paradoxical logic: if average reality, the reality of normal minds is also the product of imagination, resulting from the animation of a subjectively perceived texture, governed by the deferring strategy of the veiled reference, then any attempt to (pathetically) favour subjectivity and imagination over normal reality is smashed, "crushed." The pathos of this story urges the reader to grant a privilege to solipisistic imagination while the possibility of such granting is eliminated.

III

The animation of a subjectively perceived texture is for Nabokov a matter of finding unexpected relationships and patterns between and within unnoticed details. In one of his first poems the Apostles are disgusted by the vision of worms leaking from the swollen corpse of a dog, but Christ is the only one

who marvels about the pure whiteness of the corpse's teeth (Boyd 1992: 318-319). The narrators of *Transparent Things* recognize in a pencil the presence of the tree and, furthermore, the moment of its falling on. Nabokov luxuriated in the perception of the unforeseen qualities and coincidences in the geometry of snow, in a pothook, in the wing of a butterfly, in the chink between the inner shutters:

> On a summer morning, in the legendary Russia of my boyhood, my first glance upon awakening was for the chink between the inner shutters. If it disclosed a watery pallor, one had better not open them at all, and so be spared the sight of a sullen day sitting for its picture in a puddle. How resentfully one would deduce, from a line of dull light, the leaden sky, the sodden sand, the gruel-like mess of broken blossoms under the lilacs —and that flat, fallow leaf (the first casualty of the season) pasted upon a wet garden bench.
>
> But if the chink was a long glint of dewy brilliancy, then I made haste to have the window yield its treasure. With one blow, the room would be cleft into light and shade. The foliage of birches moving in the sun had the translucent green of tone grapes, and in contrast to this was the dark velvet of trees against a blue of extraordinary intensity, the like of which I rediscovered only many years later, in the montane zone of Colorado.
>
> From the age of seven, everything I felt in connection with a rectangle of framed sunlight was dominated by a single passion. If my first glance of the morning was for the sun, my first thought was for the butterflies it would engender. (Nabokov 1960b: 119-120)[6]

The watery pallor of a line of light is also a veiled reference to a "sullen" future. The brilliancy of the glinting chink is the embryo of myriads of butterflies. A choir of sounds becomes related backwards over a past time span to some paragraphs within a book, and forward to a future delightful experience:

> After making my way to some pine groves and alder scrub I came to the bog. No sooner had my ear caught the hum of diptera around me, the guttural cry of a snipe overhead, the gulping sound of the morass under my foot, than I knew I would find here quite special Arctic butterflies, whose pictures, or, still better, nonillustrated descriptions I had worshipped for several seasons (Nabokov 1960b: 138).

Patterns that relate elements from different regions of experience are inherent in, and created by, figurality as a mode of perceiving relationships, of finding parallels, of sending alternatives. The experiencing of patterns cannot escape from figural language.

The perception of patterns of Nabokov's characters is also displayed by the narrator of "Signs and Symbols." This narrator, whose consciousness is almost always married to the consciousness of the character of the mother and speaks for it without ever using "I," also uses figures to render the existence of unexpected patterns. The modernist new sense of the spatial dimension, which was a reading of the New Science and of Bergsonian relativism, is thematized in "the last dregs of the day were mixed with the street lights" or "he removed his hopelessly uncomfortable dental plate and severed the long tusks of saliva connecting him to it." The characterization of the father as a pathetically decadent figure is powerfully inscribed in the following figural (metaphorical and metonymical) sequence:

> A few feet away, under a swaying and dipping tree, a tiny half dead unfledged bird was *helplessly twitching* in a puddle.
>   During the long ride to the Underground station, she and her husband did not exchange a word; and every time she glanced at his old hands (swollen veins, brown-spotted skin), clasped and *twitching* upon the handle of his umbrella, she felt the pressure of mounting tears. (SS 54. My emphasis)

For Nabokov —if we allow ourselves another (the same) swoon into generalization— the perception of patterns is not just a ludic investigation. It is not a merely hedonistic practice, but the way to avoid putrefaction:

> I confess I do not believe in time. I like to fold my magic carpet, after use, in such a way as to superimpose one part of the pattern upon another. Let visitors trip. And the highest enjoyment of timelessness —in a landscape selected at random— is when I stand among rare butterflies and their food plants. This is ecstasy, and behind the ecstasy is something else, which is hard to explain. It is like a momentary vacuum into which rushes all that I love. A sense of oneness with sun and stone. A thrill of gratitude to whom it may concern —to the contrapuntal genius of human fate or to tender ghosts humouring a lucky mortal. (Nabokov 1960b: 139)

This densely figural fragment has something of the account of a mystical experience. The observation of patterns is the "hard to explain" interpretation

of the veiled reference to this "something else" which stands behind aesthetic joy and ecstasy, which secures a contact with either "the contrapuntal genius of human fate" or with "tender ghosts humouring a lucky mortal," that is, a glimpse of transcendence, of true reality. As my epigraph puts it, "Life is a message scribbled in the dark" (Cooper 1983: 17). The attempt to transcend solipsism is one of Nabokov's major themes and constantly writes the beating existence of *something else,* of transcendental existence. The narrator in *The Gift* :

> The unfortunate image of a "road," to which the human mind has become accustomed (life as a kind of journey) is a stupid illusion: we are not going anywhere, we are sitting at home. The other world surrounds us always and is not at all the end of some pilgrimage. In our earthly house, windows are replaced by mirrors; the door, until a given time, is closed; but air comes in through the cracks. (Nabokov 1979: 549)

This quote metaphorizes the possibility of transcendence. Transcendence both permeates and tautens the texture of reality and the fabric of fancy. This possibility is in fact the *logos* which organizes and hierarchizes the whole network of presuppositions sustaining Nabokov's assumptions about language and existence. The affirmation of ontological transcendence is so involved with the basic concepts of logocentrism that it is very difficult for me to get rid of even if I wish to. The tradition of writers such as Woolf, Faulkner, Joyce or Eliot, explores and inscribes the epistemological possibility of transcendental truth in an *intolerable wrestle with words and meanings—* although other possibilities are reworked and redramatized in Nabokov's fiction against and within the modernist pathos of frustration, like the failure through sexual union of Ada and Van in *Ada* or Humbert and Lolita in *Lolita,* or through friendship, as thematized in the narrative of Kinbote and Shade's experience in *Pale Fire,* or even through liaison with ghosts, as Fyodor and his father in *The Gift* or Krug and his wife in *Bend Sinister*. The interpretation of the texture of reality thus becomes a vital — transcendental— experience. "Signs and Symbols" provides us with a family obsessively devoted to this task. The son is constantly absorbed in the deciphering of the dense tangle of references to the patterns he perceives. The mother "examines" the photographs of the album and interprets their hidden messages; she compulsively asks herself for patterns ("Whom did that woman resemble?") dwelling on the resemblance of phenomenal nature with

her past experience. "[S]he and her husband" sadly "puzzled out" the eccentric behaviour of their "prodigiously gifted child." The silvery bristled father "re-examined with pleasure" the little jars, reading aloud "his clumsy moist lips spelled out their eloquent labels" (which in fact do not name, again, the jelly they actually contain, but the fruit it is made of). Reading is the only true life:

> This, and much more she accepted —for after all living did mean accepting the loss of one joy after another, not even joys in her case —mere possibilities of improvement. (SS 57)

In "Signs and Symbols" living does have a meaning, that is, it is the veiled reference to something else. But its meaning is precisely the intolerable search for this meaning which always surrounds us and, paradoxically, is always deferred. The acceptance of the constant frustration of the meaning envisaged in mere possibilities of improvement joins Nabokov's thematization of the reading process. He assures that the novelist, like the chess player, poses "problems," and

> a great part of a problem's value is due to the number of tries — *delusive* or punning moves, *false* scents, specious lines of play, astutely and lovingly prepared to lead the would-be solver *astray*. (Nabokov 1960b: 290; my emphasis)

The accumulation of punning moves, false scents, specious lines of play, in other words, of interpretive clues (false or not), problematizes, twists, rugates, sublimates, and at once affirms the texture of classical modernist texts. In this tradition, whereby texts were conceived of as epistemological quests for truth, according to certain conventions, readers faced enormous difficulties in their attempt to understand those writings by determining their thematical and rhetorical modes. Those works —like much post-modern production— were (are) offered structurally (and institutionally) both as problems for interpretation and as epistemological speculations on the truth of human existence. The unveiling of meaning thus inscribes the possibility of the transcendence of solipsism.

However, the *story* of such an eager reading process is by no means simple. The complexity of modernist texts derives to a great extent from their exhausting intertextuality. They encapsulate echoes of and references to long series of texts which may belong to Western and even to Eastern tradition. In a sense, classical modernist texts postulate a very *learned* type of reader,

either a reader already familiar with the intricate textual inscriptions and evasions through integrative mythical patterns, through religious patterns and symbology, through the so-called experimental techniques feeding on the New Science and Bergsonian epistemology, through Freudian and Jungian psychoanalytical structures, or else a reader forced, by the above mentioned difficulty, to read and *learn* by heart the texts of Jessie Weston, Jung, Freud, or Bergson, and to constantly check out her or his knowledge of previous major texts from both Western and Eastern traditions, in order to discover truth-revealing verbal treasures within the texture of the work. T. S. Eliot's notes to *The Waste Land* ironically played on both types of reader.

Nabokov's fictions abound in imaginative games, patterns of suggestion, allusion, reflection and wordplay, which problematizes the very act of reading learned in a modernist context. His texts exploit the compulsive tendency we have as human beings to look at phenomena and try to discern meaningful patterns which seem to exist (according to the terms of his own formulation, since they can be "false" or "delusive"). The reader is inveigled into a difficult quest for gradually emerging patterns and interlocking clues. Nabokov designates the reader with the term "solver": he or she must not only solve verbal puzzles and pursue cryptogrammic paper chases, but also recognize parodies and unravel the complex existence of reality and fiction through a series of interpretive attempts, which are "metaphoric approximations of the shifting kaleidoscope" in Nabokov´s work (Clark 1986: 83).

Nabokov's "Signs and Symbols" presents itself ironically eager for analysis. Its very title overtly declares what this story is about. This narrative is not a devoted account of the illness of an artistically-gifted imaginative young boy and his parents, but a game of signs and symbols —or rather, signs *or* symbols[7]— which turns out to be the illness of any imaginative mind, including the reader's. "Signs and Symbols" is also a message scribbled in the dark by some transcendental law of signification, by a true meaning, by a *logos*. The assumption of the existence of a true meaning governs Nabokov's statements about the reading experience as a game of possibilities. If the reader is to discover that her or his assumption is just a "delusive" or "false" one leading her or him "astray," there must be a move or scent which is not delusive or false, a true meaning which permeates and gives sense to all the texture, which sustains and redirects the game of "moves" and of "tries" towards itself.

Thus the reader is inveigled into mimicking Nabokov's characters, isolated by their pattern-governed epistemological quest for true patterns, for a true meaning which always surrounds us and comes in through the cracks of our earthly door. One possible way of crossing the frontiers of solipsism is through death. The ironic distancing of the narrator's simple past tense powerfully inscribes the presence of death in Nabokov's short story: the open ending of the phone call which inevitably directs the reader's attention to the son's suicide, where this narrative unfolds backwards, is also the moment of the narrating act. The narrator uncannily speaks its existence beyond death (the simple past generates the irony of this privileged information from beyond). The presence of death is assured also in the disturbing presence of the zero: the girl's confusion is produced by the contingent typographical or material connection (though the number is given here its name "zero," playing again on the inevitability of figuration in fiction which depends on haphazard relational features of the signifier); this confusion also plays figurally on the son's tearing open a hole to escape from his isolation. Depending on the narrator's irony, the zero (nought, but also the origin of the endless series of numbers, the knot where both coordinate and ordinate axes intersect, the note —like the notes framing this paper— where the text acknowledges the presence of absence) is the possibility of communication —though at the same time the girl's dialling of the zero opens the ending and the possibility of suicide. The threat of the son's death permeates and tautens, so to speak, the pathetic texture of "Signs and Symbols":

> The last time their son had tried to take his life, his method had been, in the doctor's words, a masterpiece of inventiveness; he would have succeeded, had not an envious fellow patient thought he was learning to fly —and stopped him. What he really wanted to do was to tear a hole in his world and escape. (SS 54)

The metaphor of the hole engages Nabokov's autobiographical depiction of a moment of transcendental, almost mystical experience of a "vacuum into which rushes all I love." Both, death or suicide and combinational or pattern perceiving joy, are sustained by the above mentioned confidence in a founding *logos*.

IV

"Signs and Symbols" offers itself as a veiled reference for the learned reader engaged suspiciously in a quest for signs and symbols which refer to a hidden and true meaning. This short story abounds in what this would-be solver, me, is entitled to consider to be scents or clues —including the narrator's metaphors mentioned above—: punning names, such as Her-man Brink; the *mise en abyme* echoes of the three phone calls and the three sections of the narrative; the enigmatic figurative possibilities of such different elements as the birthday present consisting of a basket with ten different fruit jellies in ten different jars, the sequence of labels, the Underground train, the bus crammed with garrulous school children, the letter O, the zero; the open ended structure which redirects the whole narrative backwards, eager for a rereading that (de)signs a huge question mark, so to speak, which coincides with the upper edge of the text. The ending or lower edge of this narrative was already contained in the very title, in the upper edge. An open ending always sets itself up as a veiled reference to a meaning only attained after a rereading of the narrative; yet in "Signs and Symbols," this constant inquisitive rereading is the condition of any reading of the narrative —in fact, the condition of life. This vacuum-like title inveigles the reader into a constant searching for and checking of patterns, a constant attempt to decide whether they are *signs* or *symbols*.

The word *signs* is mentioned in the narrative:

> Clouds in the staring sky transmit to one another, by means of slow signs, incredibly detailed information regarding him. His inmost thoughts are discussed at nightfall, in manual alphabet, by darkly gesticulating trees. (SS 55)

These gestures or motions of the clouds are figurally read by the deranged boy as signs. Through a staring prosopopoeia, they are the veiled references to signs which in turn are veiled references to himself. Still, to mention the word "signs" is, so to speak, to unveil this hidden meaning, to read this message scribbled in the sky. In addition to this, the word "symbols" is not mentioned by the text (with the exception of the title which inveigles the reader into a quest for symbols) maybe —I seek support for my reading and thereby run the risk of becoming a referential maniac—, because they cannot be mentioned *as symbols,* they need to remain as *veiled, hidden, unmentioned* references to the meaning that governs the text, of the *logos* of which the old couple, the maniac son, the jars, the zero, the echoes *en abyme,* the ending, and therefore the whole narrative, are veiled references.

Nevertheless, the confidence in the existence of a founding meaning which tautens the figural texture of the story and validates true readings has no solid ontological grounds. This *logos* is nothing other than the product of figuration and combinational creation of meaning. The writing of the groundlessness of such a foundation is deployed by the ambiguity inherent in the "puzzling out" of the referential mania, squeezing into the figural system like weeds in a farm:

> Pebbles or stains or sun flecks represent in some awful way messages which he must intercept. Everything is a cipher and of everything he is the theme. Some of the spies are detached observers, such as glass surfaces and still pools; others, such as coats in store windows, are prejudiced witnesses, lynchers at heart; others again (running water, storms) are hysterical to the point of insanity, have a distorted opinion of him and grotesquely misinterpret his actions. . . . The very air he exhales is indexed and filed away. If the only interest he provokes were limited to his immediate surroundings —but alas, it is not! With distance the torrents of wild scandal increase in volume and volubility. The silhouettes of his blood corpuscles, magnified a million times, flit over vast plains; and still farther, great mountains of unbearable solidity and height sum up in terms of granite and groaning firs the ultimate truth of his being. (SS 55)

Everything in phenomenal nature, stains, pebbles, sun flecks, is a veiled reference or cipher of himself. However, this veiled reference reveals (rather reveils) that he is a cipher himself for phenomenal nature, that he is the veiled reference to a meaning which nature distortedly and grotesquely misinterprets. Clear surfaces such as still pools and glasses are detached observers: they do not misinterpret him because they offer a true and clear reflection of himself, a bidimensional figure in which he recognizes the ultimate truth of his being, which is always already a cipher. Problems begin for him when these surfaces offer a figure where he cannot recognize himself: the shadowing presence of coats behind and within his clear reflection in a store window, distorting it, is read as the menacing presence of lynchers; objects in which he cannot find an image in which he can recognize himself are hysterical to the point of insanity. Store windows are distorted images of himself, they are veiled references to himself; but this *himself*, the true undistorted one, is another image, the one reflected on a still pool, another cipher. Moreover, still pools, glasses, are already ciphers, for they are read *as* spies, observers, readers belonging to some staring conspiracy. Readers

become the reading of other readers who, in turn, are already some reader's reading. Everything is a cipher of something else: there are nothing but references and references to references, everywhere.

The weeds of referential mania invade any reading so that the inescapable moment of literality is postponed by granting this moment a figural essence. The narrator's puzzling out of the boy's referential mania, in what seems to be something of an elaborate paper in a scientific monthly, is also affected by the blight of these beautiful weeds. In this paragraph, the narrator completely marries the consciousness of the mother abolishing any ironic distance; it mimicks, word by word, it *is* word by word, the language of the mother: there is no use of the word "she" and the verbs are in the present tense (suspending the distance of the more frequent simple past tense). The abolition of the narrating irony presents the paragraph as the literal reading of the son's behaviour. However, this literality is illusory since we have no evidence of verbal activity in the son's conduct capable of explaining such a system of delusions. This paragraph is nothing but the figural reading of a wordless performance: the boy's movements, gestures, glances, phobias, are nothing but veiled references to this system of figural delusions.

In addition to this, the narrator never mentions the characters literally. The narrator does not use their proper names, but purely relational terms: "mother," "wife," "husband," "son"; even the pronouns "he" and "she" sanction the ironic distance and relation of narrator and characters. The narrator presents the figural extensions of such subjects, being itself a figural construct, a grammatical subject whose properties are transferred from contiguous predicates.

"Signs and Symbols" wonderfully inscribes by means of metonymy the vacuum of the deferring and differential essence of the referential mania:

> Bending with difficulty, she retrieved some playing cards and a photograph or two that had slipped from the couch to the floor: knave of hearts, nine of spades, ace of spades. Elsa and her bestial beau. (SS 57)

Cards are purely relational elements, whose meaning in the game depends solely on their relation to the rest of the pack. And it is here, among sheer relational elements, that the German maid they had had in Leipzig is given a literal name: Elsa.

Yet there is still another weed in "Signs and Symbols." My reading of this last quote as metonymy is the figural expression of my referential mania. It narrates my de Manian (or rather demonic) failure to read modernist reading conventions. Any attempt within my reading to generate meaningful patterns by random relational patterning of signifiers rather than by the constraints of meaning is forbidden by the constraint of my attempt. My essay narrates the impossibility of affirming the non-existence of a founding meaning without affirming the existence of the founding meaning of this affirmation. It also narrates the impossibility of my writing out the distinction between naming and reading, between perceiving and creating patterns, between Eliot's two learned readers, which is already inherent in the textual game of signs and symbols, and therefore of "Signs and Symbols."

My reading of the way we have meaning in "Signs and Symbols," that is, my reading of signs *or* symbols, also tells the short story of an impossible historical sequence: London, 1971; London, 1982; New Haven, 1979; Yale, 10 November 1977; Boston, 1948. My reading cannot avoid the compulsion of a reference to an unquestioned meaning that it denounces. I cannot do otherwise, which leaves me with something of a de Manian "suspended ignorance."[8]a

NOTES

1. This reference turns out to be highly suitable here, for Tanner's book was my first contact with Nabokov's fiction. I had not read anything either *by* or *on* Nabokov before my former *liaison* with Thomas S. Pynchon's work —particularly with *The Crying of Lot 49* and *V.*— *City of Words* being then an invaluable procurer. Hence it is that my reading of "Signs and Symbols" is essentially shaped by my biased knowledge of the postmodern condition, since the totality of the critical work devoted to Nabokov's long narratives and short stories considers "him" to be highly and decisively influential in the work of writers like Pynchon, Heller, Burroughs or Mailer. However, since this paper started as an attempt to read "Signs and Symbols" *à la* Yale School —no longer in Yale and never a school— for a post-graduate seminar in a Spanish university, I am not at all sure that terms like "postmodern" or "influence" prove to be "suitable here." Moreover, the very nature of the writings of Derrida, de Man, Miller or Hartman makes it impossible to write in a deconstructive way without betraying the deconstructive skeptic pull and thereby becoming impossibly deconstructive, therefore inscribing my attempt within a general economy —even in the institutional sense— that prevents its fulfilment, thus *making it* always impossible. Nevertheless, I would like to write in a *deconstructivistic fashion,* to try and write without and within some of the borders of the

postmodern shaping of my (mis)reading of "Signs and Symbols" that dramatize some of the oppositions governing deconstructive texts. Although the odds are against, it may "work."

2. Since I started from —and eventually reached— a state of complete ignorance in order to describe Nabokov's (non)concept of the relationships of consciousness, reality, and fiction, I must acknowledge the sources of my paper: Brian Boyd's *Vladimir Nabokov: Los años rusos* (1992); Laurie Clancy's *The Novels of Vladimir Nabokov* (1986); Beverly Lyon Clark's *Reflections on Fantasy* (1986); Peter L. Cooper's *Signs and Symptoms: Thomas Pynchon and the Contemporary World* (1983). Equally important to my reading are the texts produced by the *soi-disant* Yale School: Jacques Derrida's *Of Grammatology* (1977); Geoffrey H. Hartman's (ed.) *Deconstruction and Criticism* (1979) and *Lectura y creación* (1992); Paul de Man's *Blindness and Insight* (1983) and *Allegories of Reading* (1979); J. Hillis Miller's, *The Ethics of Reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot, Trollope, James and Benjamin* (1990). However, these misreadings are nothing but my precarious trying-to-find-and-simply-agreeing-to some of the notions and themes suggestively posited in, within and around Jonathan Culler's *On Deconstruction* (1983); Christopher Norris's *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice* (1982) and William Ray's *Literary Meaning: From Phenomenology to Deconstruction* (1984). In fact, these last three books cooperated with my assumptions about modernism and postmodernism and about Nabokov's fiction in my reading of "Signs and Symbols"; actually, these two "groups" of readings co-operated *on* me while I was reading. The textually oriented nature of both the postmodern condition and the hermeneutic philosophical readings of deconstruction urged me to look eagerly for passages which commented directly on symbolic relations, textual patterns and interpretive speculations, and passages whose discussion of the philosophical oppositions on which they depend have an indirect bearing on problems of figurality and reading. However, this reading was, and still at this moment is to be, rejected as biased: it is nothing other than a faithful response to Culler's demands for deconstructive criticism, and therefore a reading governed by a teleological aim or meaning, thus tutoring any uncanny deconstructive truce away. Therefore I wonder whether the more accurate reading *à la* Yale is to be produced here; by now it is clear that the most skeptically rigorous —if indeed there is some skepticism—, or al least sincere, statements written *on* this paper appear *here,* in the remark about the way my reading is but an echo of the cannibal dialogue maintained by the titles above mentioned. It is, it may be, as if the other *section* had something of a parergonal character, of a commentary, glose or illustration of this *section.* But *this* —you may argue, and not without justification— runs the risk of becoming a tempting signature.

3. The term usually applied to this intertextual activity by many critics concerned with postmodern theory and literature is Hutcheon's *parody* (Hutcheon 1985). Nabokov's narratives have often been portrayed by critical papers —if we consciously permit our committment to seeking some pervasive unity of tone or theme in the whole work of an author, which is un-permissible— as essentially *parodic* —see Gass's remarks on Nabokov's parody of romance (Gass 1974: 139-142, 144-146), Clancy's statements on *Dar* as parody of Cherenyshevsky's *What is to be done?* (Clancy 1986: 15) or Tanner's commentaries on Nabokov's factual accu-mulation as a parodic device upon realism and naturalism (Tanner 1971: 37-38). However, I am not sure whether the word *parody* finds any appropriate place in a deconstructivistic reading, because the borders or limits of any text are much more problematic for me since I misread Culler's profitable *account* of the Derridadaic *Glas* (Culler 1983: 134-156) and Derrida's "Living On: Border Lines" (Hartman 1979: 75-176).

4. The basis of this affirmation rests on the effects of the sustaining figural implications of the metaphors of light and eyesight which permeate the texts of Western culture (Norris 1982: 81-83). Reading and visual perception are figurally related in my reading —as well as in "Signs and Symbols"— and underpin any (illusory) liability *exhibited* by this paper.

My intention in this re-mark is to sincerely acknowledge one of the tautening holes of my reading. However, to put all my argument under this note (or knot, and even nought), or under Tanner's quotes, or under this paraphrase of J. Hillis Miller, as if my contradictions were to be acknowledged and somehow exonerated here, is so far from innocent that it involves my argument and me at once in a dense tangle of assumptions and complicities, whether I want them or not, which will require an interminable disentangling.

5. Nabokov overtly exposed the recurrence of these themes in his brief introduction to the short story "Breaking the News" (Nabokov, 1975): "'Breaking the News' appeared under the title of "Opoveschenie" ("Notification") in an émigré periodical around 1935 and was included in my collection *Soglyadatay* (*Russika Zapiski*, Paris 1938)./ The milieu and the theme both correspond to those of 'Signs and Symbols', written ten years later in English (see *The New Yorker*, 15 May 1948, and *Nabokov's Dozen*, Doubleday 1958)."

6. This autobiography is shot through by similar passages reworking the dramatization of Nabokov's delight in and compulsion for observation; the paragraphs which recount his passionate activity as an entomologist (1960b: 123-139) are remarkable, particularly the ones *narrating* his fondness for the specificity and concrete detail of microscopic observation (1960b: 166-167).

7. *The Oxford English Dictionary* offers —among others— the following meanings of these two nouns:

Sign
1a .- A gesture or motion of the hand, head, etc. serving to convey an intimation or to communicate some idea.
1b .- A show or pretence *of* something.
1c .- A signal.
2.- A mark or device having some special meaning or import specially attached to it, or serving to distinguish the thing on which it is put.
2b .- A bookmark.
2c .- A conventional mark, device, or symbol, used technically (as in music, algebra, botany, etc.) in place of words or names written in ordinary letters.
3.- A mark of attestation (or ownership) written or stamped upon a document, seal, etc.
4 .- A figure or image; a statue or effigy; an imprint.
5a .- A device born on a banner, shield, etc.; a cognizance or badge.
5b.- Something displayed as an emblem token; *esp.* an ensign, banner, standard.
5c .- A pilgrim's token.
5d .- Insignia.
6.- A characteristic device attached to, or placed in front of, an inn or shop, as a means of distinguishing it from others or directing attention to it; in later use

commonly a board bearing a name or other inscriptions, with or without some ornament or picture.

7.- A token or indication (visible or otherwise) *of* some fact, quality, etc.

7d .- Trail or trace of wild animals, etc.

8 .- A trace or indication *of* something; a vestige (chiefly in negative phrases).

8b .- A mere resemblance *of* something.

9.- An indication of some coming event; *spec.* an omen or portent.

10a.- An act of a miraculous nature, serving to demonstrate the divine power or authority.

10b .- A marvel or wonder.

11a .- *Astr.* One or other of the twelve divisions of the zodiac.

11b .- A constellation.

Symbol

1.- A formal authoritative statement or summary of the Religious belief in the Christian Church, or of a particular church or sect; a creed or confession of faith, *spec.* the Apostles' creed.

1b.- A brief or sententious statement; a formula, a motto, a maxim; *occas.* a summary, synopsis.

2a.- Something that stands for, represents, or denotes something else (not by exact resemblance, but by vague suggestion, or by some accidental and conventional relation); *esp.* a material object representing or taken to represent something immaterial or abstract, as a being, ideal, quality or condition; a representation or typical figure, sign or token, *occas.* a type (of some quality).

2b.- An object representing something sacred, *spec.* (*absol.*) either of the elements in the Eucharist, as representing the body and blood of Christ. (EVELYN *Letter to Father Patrick* : The symbols become changed into the body and blood of Christ, after a sacramental, spiritual and real manner).

2c.- *Numism.* A small device in a coin, additional to and usually independent of the main device or type.

2d.- Symbols collectively; symbolism.

3.- A written character or mark used to represent something; a letter, figure or sign conventionally standing for some object, process, etc. *e.g.* the figures denoting the plants, signs of the Zodiac, etc., in Astronomy; the letters and other characters denoting elements, etc., in chemistry; quantities, operations, etc., in mathematics, the faces of crystal in crystallography.

These definitions unfold a complex span of criss-crossing references. Each one is contained within the other, which is to say that none contains the others. A sign is defined as symbol in 2c, and a symbol as sign in 3. These definitions run really close together, since they define signs and symbols as *conventional* (that is, whose use is agreed upon and common among a group, but which has no other basis for its existence but this agreement and communal character) *marks,* that is, writing, "scribbling." However there is some disparity within this apparent coincidence. On the one hand, a sign is used technically (as in music, algebra, botany, etc.) *in place of words and names written in ordinary letters*, in place of other conventional marks. A sign is a symbol used specifically (and conventionally) to replace other ordinary or average marks that belong to the whole community by means of conventional marks which are specific to a group, that is ordinary or average within this group. This (un)definition —which is nothing

other than the attempt to translate one word into a sequence formed of any terms other than it-self— unfolds itself through a series of repetitions brought about by the tyranny of the term *conventional* : any conventional mark is always already a conventional mark which replaces conventional marks. In addition to this, symbol is equated by SIGN 2c with mark and device (this last term, as I read it, contains the narrative of the use of the mark). On the other hand, symbol in 3 is a written character or letter used to *represent* something; *a letter, figure or sign conventionally standing for some object, process, etc*. The referential scope is strikingly (even transcendentally) different there; symbols are signs (no longer signs; signs forced to an es-trangement) or conventional marks standing for objects, processes, etc., and no longer in place of other ordinary conventional marks. The terms "represent" and "stand for" (*instead of* "used technically in place of") point to the basic disparate feature: symbols are, as it were, performers, delegates of some utterly different mode of existence —whereas signs were conventional replacements among equally conventional modes of existence. Signs were caught up in an endless process of self-reference, while symbols are veiled references to something other, something immaterial or abstract, as a being, idea, quality or condition. This sense is essential in all the meanings *The Oxford English Dictionary* offers for symbol: symbols usually refer re-ligious dogma, *truths*, they are reflections or expressions of the *logos* (*vgr.*, 1,1a, 2a); on one occasion (2b), these symbols are intimately connected with transcendence, becoming changed into the body and blood of Christ.

There remain also, as I conceive it, some other basic (seemingly) distinctive features. All the meanings offered for the word *sign* share the notion of a mark attached for technical uses, as a result of a deliberate act of stamping, printing or imprinting in order to distinguish the object or referent from the others, basically through the inscription of one's relation to this object. As for the word *symbol*, this relationship seems to be given (and not deliberately attached), dictated by some utterly different design, by the obedience to a founding *logos* which can only present itself through representation by symbols — which is definitely complicated by the fictional character pointed to by the sequences "formal authoritative statement or *summary*" and "a formula, a motto, a maxim; *occas.* a *summary*, a synopsis."

This divergence vanishes, or rather becomes unreadable, when we read in SIGN 9, 10a and 10b, that the intimacy with some transcendental otherness also inhabits the nooks and noughts (and notes) of the word "sign," or when we read in SIGN 11 how this conventional mark, when born on a banner or a flag also stands for something inmaterial or abstract, as a being, idea or quality, or else when we read in SYMBOL 3 that this conventional mark is also conventionally used among disciplines (including and included in SIGN 2c, 11a and 11b). The apparent disparity between these two terms appears to be groundless in "Signs and Symbols," though neither "Signs and Symbols" nor my reading can avoid its constant inscription. The words *sign* and *symbol* form (without forming) a dense tangle of allusions which is at once tangled and disen-tangled by their definitions in a dictionary, whose expression is, it may be, the odd relationship they maintain in the title "Signs and Symbols," where they are linked by "and," and at the same time separated by this "and" which abolishes any identity between the two.

8. Which, tempted by a "referential de Mania" for contingent riddling phonetic associa-tions and considering who this "me" is —a Spanish student writing his essay for an English graduate seminar— foreshadows a rather gloomy future for me. This somehow affirms in "Signs and Symbols" the (un)definition of life as the constant loss of mere possibilities of im-provement, or as J. Hillis Miller reads this: "To live is to read, or rather to commit again and again the failure which is the human lot" (1986: 67).

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MODALS
AND MODALITY
IN ENGLISH

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1. INTRODUCTION

Modality in English has traditionally been interpreted in terms of the use of modals, and although this is not the only resource available for the expression of this notion,[1] there is no doubt that it is the most important one. Still, modality as a whole is not a clear area of study, for several reasons, the most important being the fact that we can identify two different kinds of modality: "root" (deontic) modality (dealing with obligation, permission, ability, etc.) and epistemic modality (dealing with probability, possibility, certainty, etc.). This distinction has been studied in the past, and an interesting suggestion is that epistemic uses are dependent on, and derive from, deontic ones (cf. Sweetser 1982, 1990, who gives a unified treatment in terms of force dynamics and causality).[2] From a diachronic point of view, it is clear that epistemic modality derives from "root" modality, and we shall elaborate on this below. Diachrony can also be understood from a language learning perspective: children acquire the deontic senses of modal verbs earlier than the epistemic ones (as mentioned by Sweetser 1982: 485, who refers to Kuczaj and Daly 1979 and Shepherd 1981). Synchronically, "root" and epistemic modalities are related by means of a subsumption relation which will also be discussed here.

However, modality as a notion also needs to be examined in connection with tense and aspect. As will be shown, epistemic modality can be represented in a compact way together with tense in a graph which has time as one axis and possible worlds as the other. There is strong evidence that tense and modality are related: both are categories that are encoded in predications at the same level of depth, and both clearly interact with each other. This will also be looked into. If we consider tense, we shall also need to consider aspect, which deals with the internal configuration of time as it is expressed in verbs. The three categories tense, aspect, and modality are expressed mainly by auxiliaries; there is a great deal of crosslinguistic evidence that the three of them are closely interrelated (cf. Givón 1984: 269-318).

In order to analyse the way in which this interrelation takes place, we are going to use two axes: the diachronic one (relations through historical time) and the synchronic one (relations in the system at a given moment).

2. THE DIACHRONIC AXIS

2.1. Heine's account of the grammaticalization process of auxiliaries

Modals in English *(can, could, may, might, must, will, would, shall, should, ought* and *need)* are considered to be auxiliary verbs with a high degree of grammaticalization which is reflected in some morphosyntactic characteristics, such as the fact that they have no -*s* endings for the third person singular, and no infinitives, or past forms (except the forms *could* and *would* in some instances). In addition, many of them also have weak and contracted forms.

However simple their morphosyntactic functioning has become, a corresponding simplification and reduction of their meaning has not taken place. Let us take for instance the modal *can*. With this verb we can form sentences like the following:

[1] *If you want you can do it* (theoretical possibility)
[2] *Zaragoza can be very warm in Summer* (characteristic behaviour of reality)
[3] *You can leave the classroom now* (permission)
[4] *I can swim* (ability)
[5] *We can meet tomorrow* (suggestion)
[6] *Can I help you?* (offer)

[7] *Can you come here a minute, please?* (order)

We can see that there are many different possible senses for this verb ([5], [6], and [7] are pragmatically motivated, but [1], [2], [3] and [4] are clearly different meanings of the same modal). It could be argued that this is not a good example, since there are other modals which are more grammaticalized. Such is the case of *will* or *would*. But, still, we can distinguish different senses, as we can see in these examples for *will:*

[8] *It will rain tomorrow* (Prediction in the future)
[9] *There is somebody coming. That'll be Peter* (Prediction in the present: possibility)
[10] *He will keep forgetting everything* (habitual behaviour)
[11] *I won't open the door* (refusal; willingness not to do something)
[12] *You'll leave the classroom at six* (order)
[13] *Will you open the door, please?* (request; order)

This broad spectrum of possibilities for the different modals is a direct consequence of a historical process of grammaticalization with several stages. When the process stops at different points, different senses appear. Some of these senses are closer to the etymological origin (root modality), whereas others are nearer the pure epistemic modality scale in terms of possibility, probability or certainty.

Heine (1993) has put forward a very clear explanation for this phenomenon in cognitive terms. According to him, and drawing on extensive crosslinguistic data, there are several basic event schemas which underlie possible processes of grammaticalization for auxiliaries. They provide the basic concrete representations from which all known languages make the shift towards abstract concepts like tense, aspect, and modality distinctions. As basic event schemas he proposes the following:

a. Location (i.e. where one is)
b. Motion (where one moves to, from, through, etc.)
c. Activity (what one does)
d. Desire (what one wants)
e. Posture (the way one's body is situated)
f. Relation (what one is like, is associated with, or belongs to), or
g. Possession (what one owns)

(Heine 1993: 28)

All these event schemas have a very clearly identifiable conceptual form which helps us identify the constructions that use them:

Conceptual form		Proposed label
a.	"X is at Y"	Location
b.	"X moves to/from Y"	Motion
c.	"X does Y"	Action
d.	"X wants Y"	Volition
e.	"X becomes Y"	Change-of-state
f.	"X is (like) a Y"	Equation
g.	"X is with Y"	Accompaniment
h.	"X has Y"	Possession
i.	"X stays in a Y manner"	Manner

(Heine 1993: 31)

These basic schemas, together with a few derived ones *(serial, evaluative* and *purpose)*, can be the etymological source for auxiliaries marking tense, aspect or modality. This is shown in the following table:

Location	progressive, ingressive, continuous
Motion	ingressive, future, perfect, past
Action	progressive, continuous, ingressive, completive, perfect
Volition	ingressive, future
Change-of-state	ingressive, future
Equation	resultative, progressive, perfect, future
Accompaniment	progressive
Possession	resultative, perfect, future
Manner	progressive

(Heine 1993: 47)

The following are examples of how these schemas have evolved in different European languages:

[14] *I am **going to** play golf tomorrow* (motion schema > future) [English]
[15] *I **do** work very often with Mary* (action schema) [English]
[16] *You **will** go to the cinema* (volition schema > future) [English]
[17] ***Anda** diciendo por ahí que Juan es un incompetente* (manner schema > progressive) [Spanish]

[18] *Hij is een boek **aan het lezen*** (location schema > progressive) [Dutch; example from Heine 1993]

[19] *Bernd **wird** kommen* (change-of-state schema > future) [German]

[20] *Hoy **comeré** [comer-he] pronto*   (possession schema > future) [Spanish]

Now, if we look at the way in which these schemas have given rise to modals in English, it is interesting to note that verbs with full semantic content have become emptied of their semantic load. This phenomenon has also run parallel to a shift in grammatical category, word-class, morphosyntactic properties and even phonetic form. In a schematic way, we can say that modals have followed the shift from being in a structure [X-verb-complement] to a structure of the form [X-grammatical concept-main verb] (as postulated for all kinds of auxiliaries in Heine 1993: 47). Heine calls this shift the Verb-to-TAM[3] chain, in which several processes work at the same time: *Desemanticization, decategorialization, cliticization*, and (phonetical) *erosion* (Heine 1993: 54-58). This is well conceptualized by means of 'overlap' models, such as the following:

Overlap model of conceptual shift:

Stage:	I	II	III
Type of concept:	Source	Source Target	Target

Overlap model of morphosyntactic shift:

Stage:	I	II	III
Morphosyntax:	Verbal	Verbal Grammatical	Grammatical

Overlap model of erosion:

Stage:	I	II	III
Phonological			

form of			
expression:	Full	Full	Reduced
	Reduced		

(Heine 1993: 49-51)

Heine's account is extremely interesting as a model for the formation of current English modals. He gives even more details about the different stages in the four processes mentioned above, and specifies up to five steps in the process of decategorialization. Looking at the way in which these different steps take place together he postulates the existence of seven main stages in the Verb-to-TAM chain, which he denotes by the letters A to G:

Stages in the Verb-to-TAM chain:

Overall stage	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Desemanticization	I	II	III				
Decategorialization	I		II	III	IV	V	
Cliticization	I				II		III
Erosion	I				II		III

(Heine 1993: 58)

2.2. English modals and the grammaticalization process

If we try to fit the evolution of English modals into this general schema and look for the stages that correspond to some of them, we find that they are in stage E in most of their uses, which means that, according to the specifications provided by Heine (1993: 54-56) for every stage, they have the following properties:

Desemanticization: "The subject is no longer associated with willful/human referents, and the verb acquires a grammatical function" (III). This is clearly seen with *will*, the most desemanticized of the English modals. However, there are some instances of the use of this verb as a full semantic form in fossilized expressions such as "do as you will".

Decategorialization: "The verb loses further verbal properties such as its ability to be negated separately and to occur in other positions of the clause, and the complement loses in nominal (and adverbial) properties, such as its nominalizing and/or adverbial morphology" (IV). All modals in English need to be attached to the main verb and have lost most of their verbal properties. This is a very characteristic feature of English modals, which all grammars identify as peculiar to them. Other languages retain verbal morphology for some of these auxiliaries (e.g. Spanish *poder* and French *pouvoir,* German *können* and Dutch *kunnen,* etc.)

Cliticization: "The verb loses its status as a separate word and develops into a clitic. The verb and its complement are now likely to form a *simple phrase,* which permits only one expression of tense, negation, passivization, etc." (II). The rule for negation in English clearly takes into account the relative position of the modal and the main verb, with only the form *not* inserted between them. Tense itself is marked by the modal. When this is not possible, the verb *have* is used (e.g. "he must be there now" vs. "he must have been there") adding perfectivity in the process.

Erosion: "The phonological substance of the verb tends to be eroded" (II). This is clear in written English with the modals *will* and *would*, where contractions like *'ll*, *'d*, are common. With other modals, unstressed forms are not uncommon. The tendency to fuse with *not* in negations also has a written manifestation: *can't, won't, shouldn't, wouldn't,* etc.

In general terms, English modals tend to be very homogeneous as far as their decategorialization and cliticization stages are concerned. But they are less so for desemanticization and erosion, which tend to go parallel. Some senses are closer to etymology, and they are expressed phonetically in a less eroded way. This means that they did not travel all the way to stage E of Heine's table without leaving some instances of less grammaticalized uses unharmed.

3. THE SYNCHRONIC AXIS

3.1. Introduction: The TAM system and layers in FG

In the preceding section, we have seen that there exists a clear, systematic account of how different senses of the same modals are etymologically related. However, their coexistence in a given moment is something that needs a synchronic formulation. Owing to the fact that modality is closely related with tense/aspect in most linguistic descriptions, it is fair to treat them here together, as constitutive parts of the so-called TAM (Time-Aspect-Modality) system. With this in mind we could start by referring to a grammatical model in which tense, aspect and modality have provided evidence for a complex, multilayered description of the clause: S. C. Dik's Functional Grammar (from now on, FG).

In FG, following suggestions by Hengeveld (1989), which were in turn based on the layered structure of the clause proposed in Foley and Van Valin's (1984) RRG,[4] utterances can be analysed in terms of a multilayered structure with this form:

LAYERS
Clause: $(E_1: [ILL (S) (A) (x_1: etc. (x_1))] (E_1))$
Proposition: $(x_1: [(e_1: etc. (e_1))] (x_1))$
Predication: $(e_1: [Pred_\beta (x_1)^n] (e_1))$
Term: $(x_1: Pred_N (x_1))$

(Dik and Hengeveld 1990: 3)

There are operators (p) for each of the four levels, so that the total representation would be something like

$(E_1: [\pi_4 ILL (S) (A) (\pi_3 x_1: (\pi_2 e_1: [\pi_1 Pred_\beta (x_1: pred_\beta (x_1)) ... (x_n)] (e_1)) (x_1))] (E_1))$

π_1: Predicate operators π_3: Proposition operators
π_2: Predication operators π_4: Illocution operators

(Dik and Hengeveld 1990: 2)

Van Valin's original proposal found justification for its tripartite division of clause structure in evidence from expressions for the TAM system. This is also the case with FG; we shall therefore look at how FG treats TAM

questions in its description, in order to see what can be used for an adequate treatment of modality interactions.

3.2. Tense and aspect

Tense and aspect are traditionally considered to deal with the expression of time. Tense concerns its "external" configuration, that is, the distribution of events along a temporal line, whereas aspect concerns its "internal" structure, that is, how time is organized inside a situation. Tense, according to Hengeveld (1989: 132), is represented by level-2 π_2 operators. This is so because it tends to be further away from the verb nucleus than aspect (level-1 and level-2 operators; see below). Aspect, however, is a more complicated matter. Aspectuality encompasses many distinctions that are categorized under different labels in different linguistic traditions. In Functional Grammar, according to Dik (1989: 186-187), who reserves the term "aspect" only for those aspectuality distinctions which are grammatically rather than lexically expressed, aspectuality covers the following sub-areas:

> (a) The type of SoA [State of Affairs] as designated by the predicate frame . . . also called *Aktionsart* (Mode of action). . . .
> (b) *Perfectivity/Imperfectivity*. . . .
> (c) *Phasal aspectuality* distinctions serve to describe what can be said at some reference point on the temporal dimension, in relation to the occurrence of some SoA. . . .
> (d) *Quantificational aspectualit*y distinctions express different forms of quantification over sets of occurrences of SoAs. . . .

(a) concerns aspectuality expressed lexically, which means that it is not to be treated as aspect in FG. As for (b), (c) and (d), they have operators at two different levels, because they function at different levels of the clause. This can be contrasted empirically in different languages.

The opposition perfectivity/imperfectivity and phasal aspect are treated as level-1 π_1 operators. Dik (1989) notes that there is very frequent interaction of these operators with a certain SoA. Conflicts between imperfectivity and telic SoAs, or between perfectivity and open-ended SoAs tend to resolve by assigning certain interpretations (conative, iterative or distributive for the former; ingressive or terminative for the latter). As for phasal aspect, it is expressed through different interpretations of the

perfective and imperfective (cf. Dik 1989: 187 ff.; Siewierska 1991: 118-120).

Quantificational aspect is treated as a level-2 π_2 operator for several reasons: it can quantify over any element of a core predication[5] and it can be specified independently of the other kinds of aspect (cf. Dik 1989: 204 ff.; Siewierska 1991: 121-122).

3.3. Modality

Modality receives a very complex treatment in Functional Grammar. Dik (1989: 205), following Hengeveld (1987, 1988), mentions the following sub-areas of modality:

Level 1: *Inherent modality*, which defines the relation between a participant and the realization of the SoA in which he is involved. It concerns ability or willingness, obligation, and permission.

Level 2: *Objective modality*, which expresses the speaker's evaluation of the likelihood of occurrence of the SoA. It can be divided into two sub-areas with a gradation of the degree of actuality involved. These are: *Epistemic objective modalities* (Certain-Probable-Possible-Improbable-Impossible) and *Deontic objective modalities* (Obligatory-Acceptable-Permissible-Unacceptable-Forbidden).

Level 3: *Epistemological modality*. Here we have modal distinctions signalling the speaker's personal commitment to the truth of the proposition. They are: *Subjective modality*, in which the speaker takes personal responsibility for the content of the proposition, and signals how certain he is about its truth; and *evidential modalities*, in which the speaker assesses the quality of the proposition according to how he has obtained it, be it through evidence, by personal experience, or by having heard it from someone else.

As far as English modals are concerned, only objective modality will be considered here. In fact, this is the proper type of notion that corresponds to modality, according to most authors. Inherent modality covers modal distinctions such as ability, willingness, obligation, permissibility, and volition. However, Siewierska remarks that

> these distinctions are realised lexically . . . , not grammatically. Hengeveld (1987: 11-12) suggests that there is also a semantic difference between inherent and objective modality in that by means of the former speakers merely present their knowledge of a given situation, while by means of the latter they offer an evaluation of the situation in terms of this knowledge. For many linguists, this difference excludes inherent modality from the proper domain of modality. (1991: 124)

As for subjective modalities, they are statements of opinion rather than fact, and Siewierska reminds us that, in English, "the modal auxiliaries are open to an objective and a subjective reading" (1991: 126). The distinction between "root" and epistemic modality (cf. Sweetser 1982), made on etymological grounds, corresponds broadly to the distinction between deontic and epistemic modalities. Root modality is closer to the etymological meaning, which has to do with evaluative judgement in many cases. Other authors also agree with this distinction, although they define modality in a way sometimes misleadingly similar to FG modality varieties for level 3 or 1. This is the case with Givón's (1993: 169) definition, in which, if we assume that modality has to do with the speaker's attitude towards a proposition, this attitude concerns two types of judgement:

(a) Epistemic judgements of truth, probability, certainty, belief or evidence.
(b) Evaluative judgements of desirability, preference, intent, ability, obligation or manipulation.

Of the utmost interest is the fact that, regardless of their concrete value as judgements, all these possible modalities can easily be explained in logical terms by means of a possible worlds approach.[6] Modality expressed logically in terms of possible worlds (certainty and probability) has been extended in order to interpret obligation/permission *(deontic logic)*, and knowledge/belief *(epistemic logic);* all these different logical models account for the opposition *realis/irrealis*, which Givón (1993: 172 and ff.) uses to denote a

characteristic feature of modality. The logical approach therefore provides us with an instrument which explains deontic modality as a special variety of epistemic modality, the subsumption of the former by the latter being plausible in the kind of explanatory schema suggested below. *Obligation* implies certainty and *permission* possibility; in a similar way, *knowledge* implies certainty and *belief* possibility.

3.4. Interactions

It has been mentioned in the previous sections that both FG objective modality and tense are considered to be in level 2 of the multilayered structure of the clause. We shall argue here that this is due to the fact that both tense and modality interact in a coordinated way, which in turn implies that a compact representation for both of them can be found. This representation can be made in a simple way by means of a two-axis schema in which the vertical axis represents time and the horizontal axis possible worlds or possible states of affairs (let us call it the *hypothesis/reality* axis).

For a start, it has been suggested that the following correlations between tense-aspect and epistemic modality show high predictability (Givón 1993: 171), which is a proof of interaction between the time axis and the hypothesis axis:

(a)	Past	===>	R-assertion (or presupposition)
(b)	Perfect	===>	R-assertion (or presupposition)
(c)	Present	===>	R-assertion
(d)	Future	===>	IRR-assertion
(e)	Habitual	===>	IRR-assertion

All this is congruent with a branching-path perspective at which we also arrive using a combination of temporal and possible-worlds logic (cf. van Benthem 1988: 32). The present is closed and comes from a single path of events that are already fixed in the past; but the future is open and there are parallel possible paths. Their number and "width," so to speak, is limited only by a certain perceived speed of change of things in reality. A good model for representing this would be a conceptual analog of Minkowski's light cones.

Minkowski's light-cones have been used as a convenient representation of what happens with the light travelling from distant objects in relativistic

physics. If we look at fig. 1, in which the horizontal axis represents distance and the vertical one time, and we imagine ourselves to be at the PRESENT point, the light that comes from objects inside the PAST cone can reach us at this point. The light of objects outside the cone will not reach us at this moment, but only later on in time, because the speed of light is fixed and there is too much distance for too little time. The same happens with our light, which will reach all objects inside the FUTURE cone but none outside it. We only have to substitute hypothetical distance for physical distance and perceived speed of changes in reality for speed of light, to use this representation for the tense-modality complex in natural language.[7] In this case, both PAST and FUTURE cones have limits that change according to the experienced speed of change in reality (we need to be careful about this convention: personal experience is highly subjective and it may be the case that speaker and hearer do not agree on it, which leads to not-completely-shared knowledge about possible paths of events).

Impossibility Low possibility High possibility FUTURE

Impossibility Possibility in the past Actuality PAST

PRESENT

Fig. 1

The dynamics of this representation is similar to that of Langacker's *dynamic evolutionary model* (1991: 277), an idealized cognitive model with three main components: (1) the *structured world model* (the world is structured in a certain way, which motivates the possibility of some situations and events, but the impossibility of others), (2) the *elaborated epistemic model*

(in which reality evolves in a certain way, but only a limited portion of reality is known to the conceptualizer), and (3) some force-dynamic concepts necessary to account for the evolution of events. However, the PAST and FUTURE cones we use here seem to us a more realistic diagrammatical representation of the tense-modality complex than Langacker's cylinders[8] (1991: 242, 244, 277). They clearly show the fact that, for a given point in time, the farther one goes into the past/future, the larger the number of possible alternative preceding/following situations one can find.

We can add to this representation a three-parameter general scheme similar to Reichenbach's three-parameter system for tense. In his analysis (Reichenbach 1947), verbal tenses can be classified according to the following temporal points: time of event (E), time of reference (R), and time of speech (S). If we follow an order relation (denoted by $<$; time overlap is denoted by $=$), we have the following combinations:

Present	$(R = E = S)$
Past	$(R = E) < S$
Future	$(R = S) < E$
Present Perfect	$E < (R = S)$
Past Perfect	$E < R < S$
Future Perfect	$S < E < R$

The three parameters can now be used not only as points in temporal space, but also as points in hypothetical space. Thus, the expression of hypothesis can be compactly explained together with time. If we look at fig. 1 again, we can see that in the PAST cone there is an actual path *(certainty)*, some other paths that could have been possible since they could have led to the PRESENT point *(possibility)*, and an area outside the cone in which no path could have led to that point *(impossibility)*. In the FUTURE cone the picture is pretty much the same, although, as we are now in the *irrealis* mode, there is no certainty path but only a highest possibility one. A convenient way of stating three parameters for modality would be to consider at least three degrees of "reality" (certainty, possibility, and impossibility or uncertainty). Again, we can set three parameters: *reality of event* (Er), *reality of reference* (Rr), and *reality of speech* (Sr). The *reality of event* stands for the degree of reality that the main event has; the *reality of reference* may be the certain condition or assumption that is used for assigning *realis* or *irrealis* status to the event; finally, the *reality of speech* has to do with the utterance itself.

Some examples of how this representation is to be applied are the following:

1. Certainty   (Unmarked schema: $[R_r = E_r = S_r]$)

*shall, shall not, will, will not, must, cannot, could not, would, would not*

Future + Certainty
(Highest possibility):

[21] *I shall see you tomorrow.*

Near future + Certainty
(Highest possibility)

[22] *I'll see you in a minute.*

Present + Certainty
(Highest possibility):

[23] *That can't be John - he's in Dublin.*

Past + Certainty:

[24] *I knew it couldn't be John.*

Future of the past + Certainty:
[25] *This child would one day rule all England.*

2. Probability (Unmarked schema: $[R_r = E_r < S_r]$)
should, should not, ought to, ought not to, may (not)

Proximal future + Probability (High possibility):
[26] He should be here soon.

3. Weak probability   (Unmarked schema: $[E_r < R_r < S_r]$)
might, might not, could

Future + Low probability:

[27] I might see you again next year - who knows.

4. Theoretical or habitual possibility
(Unmarked schema: $[R_r = E_r < S_r]$)

can

[28] *Zaragoza can be very warm in September.*

This possibility can be well understood in terms of a *structured world model* (Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger 1982; Langacker 1991: 264).[9]

5. Conditional certainty or possibility
(Unmarked schema: $[R_r < E_r = S_r]$; also $[R_r < (E_r < S_r)]$)

would, would not, could, could not, might, might not

[29] *If I were a rich man I would buy a yacht.*
[30] *If John came we could all go home.*

Conditionals, whether clearly marked by a suitable subordinator or not, involve shifting the deictic center (cf. Langacker 1991: 266-269). In the three-parameter schema proposed here the reality of reference has a higher degree of uncertainty. If this condition were to become true, E_r and S_r should also become true (in a basic conditional; if we use modals like "may," "might," "can," or "could," we change their degrees of reality somewhat).

4. CONCLUSION

To conclude, we can say that epistemic modality in terms of a certain-proba-ble-possible-impossible-uncertain scale can conveniently be considered to be the most basic kind of modality which subsumes others, and this is clearly seen from both a diachronic and a synchronic perspective. If we analyse modal auxiliaries as a characteristic word class for the expression of modality in English, it is clear that from a diachronic point of view there has been a process of grammaticalization in which their semantics has evolved from the concrete to the abstract. Heine's account (1993) is a good model which shows how constructions for the expression of concrete event schemas have gradu-ally been desemanticized and eroded to end up as expressions for TAM no-tions in English, as well as in many other languages. From a synchronic point of view, epistemic modality is the basic reference kind of modality: it interacts directly with tense and can therefore be combined as complementary notions in any expression using modal auxiliaries. The schema proposed as a descriptive representation has a very strong resemblance to Minkowski's time-space cones used in relativistic physics and it is a simple and clear model which allows for more detailed analysis using lineal algebra methods. These methods could perhaps help in the future to compute relationships be-tween tense and modality. We all know that language analysis is not as straightforward and direct as we would like it to be, but there is no doubt that this kind of study could reveal interesting potential phenomena for further study.a

NOTES

1. Dirven points out that "there is a long tradition in the descriptive grammar writing of English which concentrates solely or predominantly on the modal auxiliaries, excluding the other expressions of modality" (1989: 60). We acknowledge the fact that this is true; moreover, there are even expressions in which modals themselves use adverbials to grade their meaning. Consider, for instance, the following sequence of expressions for epistemic modality:

will certainly + V	100%
will almost certainly + V	
will probably + V	
may well + V	
may/will possibly + V	
might + V	
probably will not + V	
certainly will not + V	0%

Our consideration of only modal auxiliaries here does not imply that there are not other resources for the expression of modality.

2. It is customary in research on modals and modality to refer to the work carried out by authors like Palmer (1979, 1986), Twaddell (1963), and others. The interested reader may go to these sources for more information. Basically, Sweetser (1990) and Heine (1993) give a very up-to-date (although less extense) account of this topic, enriched with a more cognitively-oriented perspective.

3. TAM is a widely accepted acronym for "Time-Aspect-Modality."

4. Foley and Van Valin propose three levels: the *nucleus* (predicate and predicate operators - aspectual inflections and adverbials), the *core* (nucleus and verbal arguments, as well as some modal operators), and the *periphery* (adjuncts, tense, subjective markers, evidential modalities, and indicators of illocutionary force).

5. A core predication has the form $[[\pi_1 \text{pred} (\text{arg})^n] (\sigma_1)^n]$ in FG, corresponding to a level-1 structure.

6. Basically, in a possible worlds semantics we have a model M=<W, R, V> in which W stands for a set of "possible worlds," R for a relation of "accessibility," and V for a valuation. It is not my intention to explain this kind of semantics in more detail, since it is a very well-known area in logical linguistics. For references, vid. Van Benthem (1988: 15).

7. Van Benthem (1988: 36) makes a connection with tense logic systems and also refers to a partial tense logic system developed by Goldblatt (1980), but the use of these cones for the study of modality in natural languages is unknown to me.

8. Langacker's representation is a tridimensional one. We follow a similar criterion: the horizontal dimension has a central point of maximal probability, and the values decrease the farther we move from this central point on two dimensions (this makes a total of three with the vertical axis). As is clear in the figure, the result is two cones.This representation is the same as the original by Minkowski for relativistic physics.

9. A structured world model assumes that the world is structured in a certain way and that some events are incidental whereas others are regular and predictable. When it is the case that we are referring to manifestations of the normal course of events, then we may do so by using strong probability or habituality.

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DESPLAZAMIENTOS

LÉXICO-SEMÁNTICOS
Y EFECTOS MACROESTRUCTURALES
EN LA TRADUCCIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE
THE ALEXANDRIA QUARTET:
TOPOLOGÍA CONCEPTUAL

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0. INTRODUCCIÓN

Dentro de la Traductología Descriptiva, rama de la Traductología no aplicada (prescriptiva) ni teórica (cfr. Holmes 1988), hemos desarrollado en otros artículos (véanse nuestras referencias de la bibliografía para una comprensión de las cuestiones relacionadas) una metodología integradora y funcional fundamentada en la teoría léxico-semántica y textual de forma multidimensional (atendiendo a los distintos aspectos de ambas) y destinada a la descripción traductológica temática de textos narrativos, que hemos aplicado a las relaciones traductivas léxico-semánticas micro y macroestructurales entre *The Alexandria Quartet* de Lawrence Durrell y su traducción al español (a partir de ahora simplemente *El Cuarteto* para las dos versiones) con referencia al tema del amor, estudio que funciona en nuestra investigación global como verdadera piedra de toque y motor impulsor de la metodología.

El objetivo de este artículo es explorar el papel que desempeña la especi-

ficación del dominio léxico-conceptual al que pertenecen las unidades léxicas que intervienen en los desplazamientos léxico-semánticos, objetos del estudio, por una parte, en la interpretación de las relaciones traductivas obtenidas mediante un programa de recuperación textual y observadas en un corpus acotado que llamamos *transémico* (cfr. Sánchez 1995c), y, por otra, en la (re)construcción por el analista/traductólogo de una estructura conceptual para todo el texto. Asimismo analizamos algunos resultados concretos, proporcionados por el procedimiento que exponemos, sobre la *macroestructura transémica* del amor en *El Cuarteto*.

En el primer análisis del corpus transémico (*análisis* transémico) para cada porción textual (es decir, no en la *discusión* de dicho corpus; cfr. Sánchez 1995f) hemos presentado la información de los desplazamientos en formato de definición tal y como se estableció en Sánchez (1995b). Esto tiene sentido si tenemos en cuenta que la representación léxica de los marcos cognitivos en los textos viene condicionada (ya que no determinada) por la composición de rasgos léxicos, que actúa así como mecanismo mental de filtro (Andor 1985). Los rasgos se pueden apreciar fácilmente y remiten a un lexema superior o rasgo básico, de acuerdo con el método de la descomposición gradual para las representaciones léxicas propuesto en el modelo lexemático-funcional de aplicación lexicográfica de Martín Mingorance (p.e. 1984 y 1990), sobre el que basamos la obtención de nuestros *corpus léxico* y transémico, y el primer análisis de éste.

Dado que nuestro objetivo, en el análisis transémico, es descubrir los diferentes grados de prominencia temática que se ponen de manifiesto en cada transema y que establecen estrategias textuales mediante cadenas a lo largo de todo el discurso transémico, se han remitido sistemáticamente los ATR (architransemas) y las definiciones de los AD (aspectos de disyunción) de Leuven (1989-90), modelo traductológico comparativo y descriptivo que mo-dificamos y ampliamos para nuestra metodología, a la macroestructura léxica —partiendo de los rasgos— tal y como se describiría en un diccionario onomasiológico de las características del presentado en Sánchez (1995a y 1995b). A diferencia de van Leuven, hemos preferido hacer del análisis transémico un análisis de campos en parte para intentar extraer de él una *topología architransémica* textual-conceptual para el TO (texto origen) y el TM (texto meta). La expresión léxica del ATR debe tomarse conceptualmente, al menos en un plano teórico, y como interpretación intersubjetiva de rasgos comunes con carácter relacional, como en las definiciones lexicográficas.

Idealmente sería interesante presentar las dimensiones de los campos pertinentes a los desplazamientos completamente estructuradas, con todos sus lexemas miembros definidos y demás detalles, para ver qué lugar ocupan los lexemas responsables de dichos desplazamientos en la arquitectura léxica global. Sin embargo, esto equivaldría a hacer casi un minidiccionario onomasiológico-contrastivo completo para cada desplazamiento y es imposible en la descripción traductológica de un texto como una novela completa donde, además, el aspecto lexicológico, aun siendo la base de partida, está posteriormente subordinado en el análisis del corpus al estudio macrotextual. Mediante el modelo indicado queda justificado el recurso a la descripción lexicológica del lexicón como base de la discusión transémica poético-textual para aplicar eficazmente la macroestructura léxica a la comparación transémica.

Este método en la presentación de los campos de los componentes de los desplazamientos nos permite estudiar ahora los cambios conceptuales que se producen de un campo a otro en los desplazamientos de los AD (modulaciones, modificaciones y mutaciones) como base interpretativa complementaria del estudio específico de los desplazamientos que se puede añadir al estudio de la incidencia en la macroestructura y de la norma traductiva. Por otra parte, hemos comprobado que bastantes lexemas que intervienen en los desplazamientos pertenecen a dos o más campos, de manera que en la definición (siempre en términos de un lexema superior), describimos la focalización del campo que tiene lugar en el texto (cfr. Sánchez 1995f), y se puede ver cómo en ocasiones el architransema no se extrae de los sentidos básicos sino de la especificación residual, produciéndose desplazamientos limítrofes entre modificaciones y mutaciones, otra posibilidad no contemplada en el método de van Leuven.

En el análisis transémico pensamos que es suficiente especificar los hiperónimos explicantes de los lexemas definidos sólo en los AD_{STT} (aspectos de disyunción —o diferencia— en textema del TO) y en los AD_{TTT} (aspectos de disyunción en textema del TM), no empleándose este sistema en la especificación de los architransemas aunque el AD_{STT} o el AD_{TTT} sea igual a cero, esto es, aunque coincida con el architransema (cfr. Sánchez 1995c). El hiperónimo que se emplea en las definiciones de los AD no es necesariamente el archilexema del campo, aunque éste aparece con frecuencia. Los campos los indicamos en el architransema sólo si en los dos AD se repiten. Los títulos de los campos deben entenderse flexiblemente, es decir, cada título responde

al campo correspondiente al sentido que se interpreta como normalmente
focalizado en el caso de lexemas que podría considerarse pertenecen a varios
campos (la mayoría del léxico abstracto), constituyéndose así un claro
ejemplo de perspectivización. Por último, cada definición lo es de un
predicado semántico, es decir, en caso de lexemas polisémicos, se recoge la
acepción correspondiente al sentido en cuestión que, en nuestra
interpretación, se focaliza en el texto.

Ya tratamos la coherencia que el intérprete textual (re)construye cogniti-
vamente por medio de las continuidades textuales (cfr. Sánchez 1995e) y gra-
cias a su entorno cognitivo o conjunto de hechos o presuposiciones mani-
fiestos en forma de marco para él (cfr. Sperber y Wilson 1986). Un marco es
un complejo de objetos y acontecimientos o estados y puede considerarse
como una matriz de representaciones cognitivas de situaciones, estados de
cosas y episodios. En la discusión del corpus analizado transémicamente dis-
tinguimos entre marcos evocados por las regularidades textuales y marcos in-
vocados por el intérprete correspondientes a los elementos de significado de
cualquier nivel textual "which make sense for him because their textuality
makes them accessible" (Neubert 1985: 139) en función de la señal textual
que lo hace posible. Puesto que las configuraciones transémicas del corpus
(cfr. Sánchez 1995f) son secuencias proposicionales cognitivamente identifi-
cadas como pertinentes en la comprensión del discurso textual, puede consi-
derarse que son funcionalmente coherentes (que tienen coherencia local desde
el punto de vista de todo el texto) si las proposiciones respectivas tienen una
función semántica definida (por ejemplo de condición o consecuencia) en tér-
minos de la relación con proposiciones anteriores. Como el enfoque asume el
modelo de activación extendida (*spread activation*) de marcos (cfr. Sánchez
1995d), lo anterior quiere decir que se activan marcos que presentan
relaciones (de condición, consecuencia, etc.) con los marcos directamente
asociados al tópico del amor. Este tipo de relaciones, objeto de la discusión
transémica, vinculan los marcos activados a categorías narrativas como los
acontecimientos (cfr. Sánchez 1995f), en los cuales se pueden producir
desplazamientos semánticos, por lo que resulta importante averiguar qué
estructuras conceptuales se ven afectadas y qué architransemas implicados en
dichos desplazamientos.

Determinadas marcas léxicas expresan el concepto o conceptos
macroestructurales para los pasajes; estos conceptos contienen, mediante es-
tructuras relacionales como las mencionadas, otros conceptos que se encuen-
tran también lexicalizados en el pasaje (y recogidos en los análisis transémi-

cos). Esta es la forma más evidente de expresión de la macroestructura del pasaje (Dijk 1977a: 58, 63-66) y justifica que estudiemos los títulos de campo de los ATR y AD, pues en la discusión transémica se ponen éstos en relación con los conceptos macroestructurales, lexicalizados en los pasajes, que figuran en la estructura conceptual general que intentamos extraer. De hecho, en la discusión, tras el establecimiento del acontecimiento macro-proposicional de la secuencia (cfr. Sánchez 1995f), se debe mostrar, tanto para el TO como para el TM, la forma en que la coherencia profunda entre los actos predicativos de los acontecimientos macroproposicionales de todos los pasajes se corresponde con una estructura conceptual general que sería la responsable de la coherencia discursiva y referencial, es decir, de la coherencia del mundo narrativo de la novela. Por consiguiente, como panorama general de la parte de la investigación que hemos denominado dicusión transémica, somos partidarios de que en ella se centre sistemáticamente la investigación sobre los siguientes apartados:

(1) desplazamientos y efectos macroestructurales: analizamos los datos aportados por el corpus, examinando primero la cantidad y los tipos de des-plazamientos (junto con su categoría y naturaleza) que acontecen en las rela-ciones transémicas; los macroefectos potenciales que se pueden prever, según van Leuven, a partir de este inventario de desplazamientos; las conclusiones generales que se pueden sacar a la luz de los ATR y AD analizados sobre las dimensiones conceptuales activadas; y las implicaciones potenciales que se desprenden de las anteriores conclusiones en términos temático-narrativos, es decir, para el tema del amor en el original inglés y su versión en español.

(2) interpretación transémica: análisis pasaje a pasaje de (a) su estructura presuposicional explicación de la coherencia secuencial interpretada inferen-cialmente y (b) establecimiento de su macroproposición y obtención del he-cho macroestructural por el que representamos la macroproposición a partir de la serie de hechos correspondientes a toda la configuración del pasaje. A partir de la macroproposición y de un correlato contextual que a veces es preciso incluir para cada pasaje se deben sacar consecuencias y expresar implicaciones contextuales para el episodio narrativo descrito en el que se inserta la secuencia —si es que no coincide de hecho con ella— gracias al vínculo que establecen entre ambos parámetros macroreglas como eliminación, abducción y generalización (cfr. Dijk 1977). Posteriormente se establece la estructura conceptual general entre macroproposiciones, desde el punto de vista transémico, es decir, obtenemos la estructura conceptual general para todo el corpus y finalmente, teniendo ésta en cuenta, a partir de,

por un lado, la estructura conceptual local de los microdesplazamientos del pasaje (expresada en los ATR y AD), y a partir de los macrodesplazamientos, por otro, intentamos expresar las posibles implicaciones generales para la estructura temática del amor en *El Cuarteto* y su desplazamiento cognitivo en la traducción, es decir, para la macroestructura temática transémica.

En lo que sigue tocaremos el apartado (1) y determinadas cuestiones de la última etapa de (2) que tienen que ver con (1), es decir, con la estructura conceptual.

1. DESPLAZAMIENTOS Y EFECTOS MACROESTRUCTURALES

En nuestra investigación los datos que obtenemos del análisis transémico de los desplazamientos arrojan los siguientes resultados:

El número total de transemas analizados, si entendemos por transemas los pasajes textémicos en relación traductiva con sus homólogos en el otro idioma, es de 97. Esta cifra se traduce en 357, si preferimos utilizar el término *transema* para la relación traductiva de dos textemas. Puesto que sólo se contabilizan y analizan textemas donde se presentan desplazamientos, podemos decir que hemos analizado 357 desplazamientos transémicos diferentes, distribuidos en los 97 pasajes, o ejemplos con transemas obtenidos desde un nodo nuclear que expresa el tema del amor. Estas cifras se desglosan por tipos, categorías y naturaleza de los desplazamientos como sigue:

00. Modulación Semántica (especif.)	**35**
01-f/c/m (forma, clase o modo)	14
02-elemento aspectual	19
05-elemento de intensidad	2
00. Modulación Semántica (generaliz.)	**24**
01-f/c/m	.15
02-elemento aspectual	5
04-elemento concreto	1
05-elemento de intensidad	3
10. Modulación estilística	**8**
14-elemento específico del texto	3
15-elemento cultural	1
17-elemento paradigmático	4
20. Modificación Semántica	**65**
21-f/c/m	43

22-elemento aspectual..	17
23-el. subjetivo...	1
25-el. de intensidad..	4
40. Modificación sintáctico-semántica......................	**47**
41-tiempo verbal...	7
42-persona verbal...	3
44-clase o función sintáctica..	17
45-palabra estructural (funcional).....................................	20
50. Modificación sint.-estilística...............................	**2**
51-explicitación...	1
52-implicitación...	1
60. Modificación sint.-pragmática............................	**10**
61-acto de habla..	3
62-deixis/anáfora...	5
63-significado temático..	2
70. Mutación...	**167**
71-omisión...	42
72-adición..	20
73-cambio radical de significado......................................	105

Tabla 1. Datos de los desplazamientos, según categorías de Leuven (1989-90).

La primera impresión que se puede obtener de la tabla es que el desplazamiento más abundante con diferencia es la mutación (especialmente el cambio radical de significado), que supone casi la mitad del total. Si admitimos que por su frecuencia proporcional este dato refleja una tendencia, ésta es ostensiblemente contraria en nuestro estudio particular a lo que apunta van Leuven sobre la frecuencia mayor de la modulación semántica especificativa y de la modificación sintáctico-semántica por palabra funcional (explicación), así como Levy y van den Broeck (cfr. Leuven 1990), quienes piensan que la tendencia es la generalización. La enorme cantidad de un desplazamiento tan radical como la mutación hace suponer que se producen efectos determinantes para la traducción, y viene a contradecir la tendencia, apuntada en Sánchez (1995c) de que suele haber muchos microdesplazamientos con ligeras desviaciones o pocos desplazamientos con un macroefecto considerable. A la mutación le sigue en orden descendente la modificación semántica (sobre todo la de f/c/m), la modificación sintáctico-semántica (palabra funcional), la modulación semántica-especificación, la

modulación semántica-generalización, la modificación sintáctico-pragmática, la modulación estilística y, por último, la modificación sintáctico-estilística. Es interesante notar que, en principio, hay un gran número de desplazamientos "importantes", desde el punto de vista de la distancia transémica, y se dan menos desplazamientos de importancia "menor" (los tres últimos tipos).

Recordemos los efectos probables sobre los distintos niveles de la fábula (sólo incluimos los correspondientes a la tabla 1):

MICRODESPLAZAMIENTOS	MACRODESPLAZAMIENTOS EN EL NIVEL DEL DISCURSO			EN EL NIVEL DE LA FABULA		
	ID	T	IN	ID	T	IN
00(modi se; todos)	x		x	x		x
14.2("espec.al texto[1])		x	x			x
15(" exot/natu)	x		x	x		x
17(" paradig.)	x		x	x		x
20(modi sem; todos)	x		x	x		x
41(modi si-se; tiempo)		x	x		x	x
42(" persona)	x		x	x		x
44("clase o func si)		x	x			x
45("pal. funcional)		x	x			x
50(modi si-est; todos)		x	x			x
60(modi sint prag; todos)		x	x			x
70(mutac.:todos)	x	x		x		x

Tabla 2. Efectos probables de los desplazamientos (Leuven 1989-90); NB: ID: Ideacional; si: sintáctico; T: Textual; mutac: mutación; In: Interpersonal; exot: exotización; se: semántico; natu: naturalización; est: estilístico.

Según este inventario de desplazamientos, y siguiendo el método descriptivo de van Leuven, se pueden prever una serie de efectos macroestructurales potenciales que examinamos a continuación.

Básicamente, las modulaciones y modificaciones (más éstas que aquéllas) efectúan un cambio directo en las elecciones semánticas, y por ello en el estilo cognitivo que canaliza en el discurso la imagen ideacional del amor en la fábula. Esto, además ocurre con mucha frecuencia, según los

datos. Los cambios se producen a través de la alteración que también se da en la focalización de los acontecimientos, de la que es responsable la función interpersonal en el nivel de la fábula, la cual a su vez es resultado de la distancia e identificación entre el narrador y lo narrado en el discurso. Siguiendo el razonamiento de van Leuven, el mayor grado de especificación de la traducción española de *El Cuarteto*, aunque en parte compensado por sus movimientos generalizadores, debería contribuir a un cierto realce dinámico del poder evocativo de acontecimientos que presenta el original inglés y a una mayor emotividad o subjetividad en la narración y evaluación de dichos acontecimientos. La caracterización de personajes (en este caso también la del amor como actante fundamental de la novela), se vería inevitablemente afectada. Habría que intentar concretar en este sentido la dirección que puede tomar dicha tendencia a la emotividad o a la subjetividad —a la abstracción o a la tangibilidad— en la imagen que se da ideacionalmente del mundo narrativo en el que el amor cobra especial importancia, y de qué manera se reducen las múltiples interpretaciones que podrían surgir en el original como resultado de isotopías disyuntivas en el discurso (Eco 1987), dando origen a una visión más "cerrada" que en la versión inglesa. Esta podría ser una de las causas de la *verflachung* (Snell-Hornby, 1988), que como en otros tantos *translatorische Stile*, o estilos traductivos, se observa a primera vista en la traducción de *El Cuarteto*.

Los aspectos del estilo cognitivo que surgen, según van Leuven, dependiendo de la naturaleza del desplazamiento, y que son especialmente responsables de la caracterización de las emociones y acciones, son: dinamismo (en caso de elementos semánticos aspectuales), emotividad o subjetividad (en elementos subjetivos), pintoresquismo y capacidad de sugerencia (en elementos de concreción), y exageración, agresividad (en elementos de intensidad). Los desplazamientos que expresan generalizaciones deben producir una cierta vaguedad en el estilo cognitivo del discurso, y habría que ver cómo compensan o cómo se contrastan con las especificaciones.

Aunque nuestro interés radica sobre todo en los aspectos puramente semánticos, por mantener una relación más directa con el nivel ideacional del discurso, y por ello con la representación de la entidad *amor* en la fábula, es interesante observar algunas modulaciones no estrictamente semánticas que también producen cambios en la función ideacional de la fábula, como las específicas al texto, que afectan a la ordenación sintáctica de la función textual y a la presentación de los conceptos y acontecimientos. Las modulaciones de

elementos paradigmáticos suponen cambios en las representaciones metafóricas y demás tropos, y por tanto en la focalización e interpretación del mundo de ficción. Las modificaciones sintáctico-semánticas que afectan al tiempo verbal cambian la relación del acontecimiento proposicional y el tiempo del enunciado, con lo que la secuencia de acontecimientos presentada en virtud de la función interpersonal también puede trastocarse. Si el accidente verbal trastocado es la persona, hay un cambio ideacional, ya que se afecta la función de agente y por tanto la responsabilidad de la acción; también puede afectar al tono o distancia interpersonal utilizada.

Los dos tipos de modificación sintáctico-semántica más utilizados en la traducción que nos ocupa afectan a la clase o función sintáctica y al tipo de palabra funcional. En el segundo caso, que es el más numeroso en esta categoría, la forma de producirse la cohesión —elemento tan importante para nosotros— es distinta; ello repercute, en nuestra opinión, en un cambio de patrón cohesivo para el léxico no funcional. Las adiciones u omisiones de palabras funcionales cambian el carácter explícito de la cohesión, con lo que la coherencia no se verá igualmente sustentada y habrá que recurrir a la producción de implicaturas y al empleo de inferencias para crear las conexiones, que ya no son tan claras. Esta última dimensión está relacionada con la explicitación o implicitación de la categoría sintáctico-estilística que alude al grado de interpretación que el narrador hace accesible. Por su parte, la modificación sintáctico-pragmática puede condicionar la imagen de los personajes y la distancia del narrador. Los cambios deícticos afectan lo explícito de la cohesión, y deben comentarse en conjunto con los que ya hemos dicho que también la trastornan. El cambio de significado temático cambia la importancia que se concede a los diversos elementos por lo que el orden textual de la presentación de los desplazamientos puede cambiar también.

En cuanto a la mutación, los rasgos semánticos de los elementos léxicos tienen mucho que decir sobre su inmediata facultad dislocadora del sentido ya que se afecta aquí a las elecciones semánticas del discurso y por tanto a la imagen de los elementos focalizados en la fábula. Por añadidura, en la interpretación transémica prestamos mucha atención a las mutaciones que afectan de lleno a los nodos nucleares del amor, ya que esto afecta claramente la cohesión nodular de la novela sobre la que se asienta nuestra representación cognitiva de su mundo textual. En vista de cómo unos simples datos numéricos llaman la atención sobre los procesos traductivos en juego, se puede advertir que en la traducción de *El Cuarteto* el desplazamiento de dicha estructura medular se da con mucha frecuencia, con lo que la base

textual disponible para las inferencias del lector español crea de entrada una ruta cohesiva muy distinta de forma que es difícil activar pertinencias y coherencias semejantes.

   Examinaremos ahora los dominios conceptuales a los que atañen los desplazamientos, tal y como se nos revela en la estructura noológica de los ATR y de los AD en los transemas más importantes para nosotros, esto es, los que contienen modulaciones y modificaciones semánticas, y mutaciones,[2] es decir, indagaremos en lo que podemos denominar la *topología conceptual* de las relaciones transémicas en la traducción de *El Cuarteto*.

(1) <u>MODULACIONES ESPECIFICATIVAS</u> :

- ATR: SENTIMIENTO (10 referencias), PERCEPCIÓN MENTAL (9), COGNICIÓN (4), CONDUCTA (3).

    [f/c/m: PERCEPCION MENTAL (3), COGNICIÓN (2) y CONDUCTA (2);
    en el. aspectual: SENTIMIENTO (8), PERCEPCIÓN MENTAL
                    (6) y COGNICIÓN (2);
    en el. de intensidad: SENTIMIENTO (2).**]**

- AD. especificados[3]:

ATR	AD$_{TTT}$	
[C:COGN.**]**	**[**C:LENGUAJE**]**	
[C:COND.**]**	**[**C:PERC.M.**]**	
[C:MEDIDA**]**	**[**C:BIOL.**]**	
[C:SENS.**]**	**[**C:SENT.**]**	en f/c/m

==

[C:ACCIÓN**]**	**[**C:COND.**]**	
[C:PERC.M.**]**	**[**C:COGN.**]**	en el. aspectual

(2) <u>MODULACIONES GENERALIZADORAS</u> :

- ATR: SENTIMIENTO (7), CONDUCTA (7).

    [f/c/m: CONDUCTA (4), SENTIMIENTO (3), COGNICIÓN   (2), ACCIÓN (2);

el. aspectual: SENTIMIENTO (3), COGNICIÓN (3), POSESIÓN

                                (2).**]**

- AD. generalizados:

AD$_{STT}$ AD$_{TTT}$
[C:SENT.**]**   **[**C:BIOL.**]**   el. de intensidad

(3) MODIFICACIONES SEMÁNTICAS

- ATR: PERCEPCIÓN MENTAL (19), SENTIMIENTO (15), CONDUCTA (7),
      COGNICIÓN (5),

   [f/c/m: PERCEPCIÓN MENTAL (15), SENTIMIENTO (9),   CONDUCTA (6), COGNICIÓN (5),
   el. aspectual: PERCEPCIÓN MENTAL (3), SENSACIÓN (2),
                       POSICIÓN   (2);
   el. de intensidad: SENTIMIENTO (2). **]**

- AD.:   ATR   AD$_{STT}$ AD$_{TTT}$
              [C:COGN.]   [C:COGN.]   [C:COND.]
              [C:COGN.]   [C:COGN.]   [C:PERC.M.]
              [C:COND.]   [C:PERC.M.]   [C:COND.]
              [C:COND.]   [C:SENT.]
              [C:MEDIDA]   [C:CAMBIO]   [C:EXIST.]
              [C:PERCEP.]   [C:PERCEP.]   [C:SENSAC.]
              [C:SENT.]   [C:LENG.]   [C:PERCEP.]   f/c/m
          ===
              [C:COND.]   [C:COND.]   [C:PERC.M.]
              [C:EXIST.]   [C:COND.]   [C:TIEMPO]
              [C:MOV.]   [C:ACCIÓN]   [C:ACCIÓN]
              [C:PERC.M.]   [C:CAMBIO]   [C:MEDIDA]
              [C:PERC.M.]   [C:BIOL.]
              [C:SENT.]   [C:SENS.]   [C:SENT.]
              [C:SENS.]   [C:PERC.M.]   [C:SENS.]   el. aspectual

(4) MUTACIONES:

- **TOTALES:**   CONDUCTA (74), PERCEPCIÓN MENTAL (65),
  (DOMINIOS)   SENTIMIENTO (41), COGNICIÓN (16),

- **AD. omitidos:**   CONDUCTA (10), PERCEPCIÓN MENTAL (9),
                      SENTIMIENTO (7), TIEMPO (4).

- **AD. añadidos:**   CONDUCTA (7), PERCEPCIÓN MENTAL (2),
                      MEDIDA (2).

- **AD. en cambio radical[4]:**
Totales: CONDUCTA (59), PERCEPCIÓN MENTAL (53),
                     SENTIMIENTO (32), COGNICION (15),

<u>AD (inglés):</u>   CONDUCTA (15:6-perc.ment.), PERCEPCIÓN
                     MENTAL(15:6-cond.), SENTIMIENTO (8-3-
                     sensac.), COGNICIÓN (6:3-cond.).
<u>AD (español):</u>   CONDUCTA (16:6-perc.ment.), PERCEPCIÓN
                     MENTAL (12:5-cond.), SENTIMIENTO (8:4-
                     sensac.), BIOL (6:3-cond.)

Lo primero que se puede destacar es el predominio casi absoluto de cuatro títulos de campo en las cuatro categorías expuestas: CONDUCTA, PERCEPCIÓN MENTAL, SENTIMIENTO Y COGNICIÓN. Esto indica que la inmensa mayoría de los desplazamientos de estas categorías afectan a términos de estos dominios léxico-conceptuales, estando aquéllos en cierta relación textual con lexemas del campo del amor, es decir, con SENT. En realidad esta circunstancia sería un interesante punto de partida para la investigación posterior en cuanto a la red semántico-conceptual global, ya que es muy reveladora de las estrechas relaciones entre estos campos, que vendrían a confirmar la formación de constelaciones en la arquitectura léxico-conceptual de la lengua. Resulta muy significativo que los desplazamientos afecten a lexemas de este dominio, que es el que estudiamos como productor del tema. También es digno de mención el lugar destacado que ocupa SENT. en relación a modulaciones de elementos de intensidad y aspectuales, con los efectos po-tenciales que ya hemos descrito. Debemos estar atentos a los

efectos mate-riales que interpretemos en los pasajes para dilucidar cómo se ve afectada esta dimensión tan estrechamente ligada al tema que nos ocupa.

En las modulaciones y modificaciones, los cuatro dominios (sobre todo PERCEPCIÓN MENTAL Y SENTIMIENTO) forman la estructura común de los desplazamientos según indican los datos para los ATR. En cuanto a la estructura dispar formada por los dominios presentes en los aspectos de disyunción, los desplazamientos que afectan al dominio conceptual del léxico sobre el que actúan no son muchos si se comparan con los desplazamientos totales para las categorías. En la traducción, por tanto, parece haberse retenido el campo la mayoría de las veces que ha habido un desplazamiento, y sólo en los casos señalados ha habido cambios en el dominio. Entre estos se pueden notar asociaciones o relaciones homológicas[5] entre los cuatro dominios.

En cuanto a las frecuentes mutaciones, las cifras presentadas para todos los dominios que intervienen, independientemente de si se trata del TO o del TM, reflejan la gran cantidad de desplazamientos que afectan a estos cuatro dominios que, en el caso de las mutaciones, representan su estructura dispar, ya que no hay ATR para esta categoría. Es interesante también observar que CONDUCTA es el que más referencias presenta en los diferentes tipos de mutaciones y que, en el caso de las mutaciones por cambio radical de significado que traen consigo un cambio de dominio conceptual, este título es el que más aparece tanto en el primero como en el segundo lugar de las ecuaciones para el texto inglés y para el español, seguido de cerca por PERC. MENT. Esto quiere decir que muy frecuentemente un término de CONDUCTA o de PERC. MENT. se traduce con desplazamientos que entrañan cambio de dominio, y que éste es el dominio más utilizado para sustituir a otros dominios en los pasajes analizados del texto español. Destaca también que los dominios más descompensados en la relación entre omisiones y adiciones son PERC. MENT. y SENT. con lo que deducimos que hay notablemente más términos de estos campos que en español están ausentes de las estructuras predicativas del amor y que han sufrido cambios radicales en los pasajes del corpus; (sobre el efecto que podrían tener estas mutaciones en la cohesión nodular, véase más arriba).

Los datos presentados incluyen el dominio de SENT. entre los más afectados, confirmando nuestra intuición inicial de que en la traducción de *El Cuarteto* se produce un gran efecto sobre la macroestructura del amor.

De toda esta exposición se puede pensar que nuestra representación cognitiva de las estructuras predicativas de los nodos del amor experimenta desplazamientos más o menos considerables en la lectura de las dos versiones

(bien a través de la presentación de acontecimientos y personajes, bien mediante descripciones directas de los aspectos del amor presentados en la novela) y que las parcelas conceptuales de nuestra representación que se ven más afectadas vienen expresadas por los cuatro títulos mencionados. Podemos esperar, entonces, que en la interpretación de cada ejemplo transémico, nos encontremos con numerosos elementos léxicos (más o menos centrales en la información que se presenta sobre la función del amor en el transcurso de los acontecimientos y en la descripción de personajes) que por su semántica arrojen marcos cognitivos diferentes en la lectura de uno y otro texto por lo que hace a la focalización de estas cuatro dimensiones de la fábula; hecho que nuestra investigación confirma. En otras palabras, en la interpretación transémica (que no podemos incluir aquí) debemos preguntarnos en qué medida y de qué manera se correlacionan el mundo mental, sentimental y conductual de personajes y acciones que afectan a la configuración del tema del amor en el TO y en el TM.

2.   ESTRUCTURA   CONCEPTUAL   Y   MACROESTRUCTURA TRANSÉMICA PARA EL TEMA DEL AMOR

Tras la interpretación transémica, el siguiente paso en el estudio de la traducción de *El Cuarteto* es concretar la cadena de hechos macroestructurales (cfr. Sánchez 1995f) que interpretamos en la descripción transémica para, a partir de aquélla, intentar obtener la estructura conceptual general. Ello facilita observar posteriormente la forma en que los desplazamientos traductivos afectan a esta macroestructura global para formar la macroestructura transémica de *El Cuarteto* para el tema del amor.

Las cadenas de estados, procesos y acciones, en las que intervienen directamente de un modo u otro, o ancilarmente, referencias léxico-conceptuales coherentes relativas al tema del amor, forman en realidad una estructura temática progresiva en el mundo textual que ideacionalmente se puede relacionar con el mundo extenso-conceptual (no extenso propiamente dicho, pues se trata de una entidad abstracta) y con la función ideacional del texto en dicho mundo, que es seleccionar el amor macroestructuralmente como tema narrativo. Nos ocupamos, pues, como dijimos al principio, de estudiar las relaciones entre las predicaciones de los diversos macrohechos estudiados, es decir, su coherencia predicativa, cuya representación cognitiva global sería un marco general o macroestructura conceptual para toda la cadena coherente que contendría nodos fijos y, más abajo en la estructura,

variables relacionadas con cada uno de estos nodos.

Esta etapa supone presentar los hechos macroestructurales de todos los transemas comentados agrupados en estados, procesos y acciones, con especificación del focalizador correspondiente, las modalidades observadas que acompañan a la macroproposición y las funciones semánticas de los argumentos, junto con un resumen de los efectos producidos por los desplazamientos y los cambios que afectan de una forma u otra a los cuatro dominios ya expuestos, es decir, SENT., COND., PERC.M. Y COGN. Los macrohechos se presentan en orden: estados, procesos y acciones. Éstos a su vez presentan el si-guiente orden interno: 1: elemento de SENT. en función Cero (estados), Exp. (procesos), o Ag/Fo (acciones); 2: en función Ref. (estados), Fo (procesos) o Go/Fo (acciones); 3: otros (ningún elemento de SENT. presente, sintagma verbal, Ref. —en procesos—, Instr.).

Estos son los criterios para los niveles distinguidos en la estructura conceptual general, que se puede presentar por motivos prácticos mediante la clasificación decimal (con expresión de niveles y nodos) en vez de en diagrama arbóreo (véase ejemplo de Estados-tipo 1 en el apéndice):

I.   Estado, proceso o acción del hecho macroestructural del pasaje.
II. Centralidad de la posición del Argumento (1º, 2º o 3º) en que aparece un elemento de SENT. en la estructura jerárquica del marco predicativo (Dik 1989:101).[6]
III. Los personajes asociados a la emoción amorosa expresada. Se eligen como nodos con prioridad sobre otros que aparezcan en la proposición si: (a) ocupan argumentos más centrales siguiendo la escala 1º-2º-3º; (b) si son sujetos de la emoción amorosa antes que objetos de la misma; (c) si se focalizan más centralmente que los demás en el acto predicativo.
IV. Los personajes relacionados indirectamente con la emoción o aquellos a los que ésta se dirige (incluyendo al propio personaje que está asociado directamente con la emoción[7]), y las proposiciones generales. En estas últimas incluimos también las proposiciones generales sobre el amor o sobre cuestiones que no incluyan las emociones amorosas directamente.
V.   Las variables predicativas correspondientes a los nodos fijos anteriores.

Especial atención dedicamos al tipo de función semántica que desempeña

el referente principal de la emoción amorosa en los distintos macrohechos (por ejemplo, mayoritariamente la función Cero (0), es decir ocupando un primer argumento de un estado: cfr. Dik 1989).

La estructura conceptual, organizada jerárquicamente, indica los estados de cosas de la fábula representados macroestructuralmente en los pasajes del mundo textual de la novela que obtuvimos como corpus. Dado que se trata de macrohechos, es decir de representaciones cognitivas de los estados de cosas macroestructurales de cada pasaje textémico, algunas veces no aparece un elemento de SENT. (correspondiente en el texto a un referente central del tema del amor en la fábula). Esto es debido a que en ocasiones los elementos de nuestro dominio conceptual forman parte sólo periféricamente del hecho macroestructural, es decir, aparecerían en nodos inferiores de la representación cognitiva completa de cada pasaje. Observamos, sin embargo, que la inmensa mayoría de macrohechos contienen un elemento relacionado con lo que hemos denominado, en sentido lato, el campo del amor de la novela (cfr. Sánchez 1995a), es decir, contienen un elemento perteneciente a SENT. central o periféricamente.

El amor, junto con sus conceptos relacionados, aparece en *El Cuarteto,* según la interpretación transémica de su lexicalizacion textual, sobre todo en representaciones de tres estados de cosas en los que intervienen los personajes de la historia o en los que se focalizan de forma general rasgos peculiares del amor: estados-tipo 1 (referente de la emoción amorosa en función cero (0)), procesos-tipo 2 (en función fuerza (Fo)) y acciones-tipo 3 (ocupando un tercer argumento, es decir en posición periférica a la estructura jerárquica del marco predicativo; cfr. Dik (1989)), sobre todo en los dos primeros (entre los dos casi el doble que acciones); por tanto, la conceptualización del amor se estructura en marcos no dinámicos, es decir, donde no se dan agente o fuerzas controladoras de acciones.

En los estados aparece en la mayoría de los casos dentro de estados-tipo 1 (20 de 29), esto es, se da con más frecuencia dentro de argumentos cuya función semántica es (0) por lo que se conceptualiza como entidad primordial del estado en cuestión, es decir, entidad de la que se predica un estado con referencia a otros elementos, más que entidad con referencia a la cual se predica un estado de otra entidad (8 casos) o entidad cuya función es locativa con relación a la predicación general (1 caso).

En los procesos se conceptualiza mucho más como entidad que funciona como fuerza instigadora de un proceso (17 de 32) que como la que sufre el

proceso (5) o la entidad en relación a la cual se da el proceso (9).

En las acciones aparece más como agente de la acción o como fuerza agentiva que produce la acción (13 de 34) pero también como la entidad afectada de alguna forma o producida por la entidad controladora de la acción (9) y como referencia, pero sobre todo instrumento, en virtud de los cuales se da una acción entre los personajes (7). El hecho de que el amor figure como entidad controladora de la acción aun siendo una fuerza y que no hayamos incluido estos casos como procesos, se debe a que el amor, a pesar de ser una entidad abstracta, se conceptualiza como si fuera una entidad concreta capaz de control animado de las acciones. Esto viene a confirmar las teorías experiencialistas (p.e. Lakoff y Johnson 1980, Koevecses 1986) de que el amor se comprende ante todo como entidad metafórica, es decir, remite numerosas veces a factores concretos de nuestra experiencia. En efecto, debemos concluir que en la conceptualización del amor en los actos predicativos de nuestro texto se comporta en algunas ocasiones como si de tales factores concretos se tratara, respon-diendo a la metáfora general: "el amor es una fuerza" o "el amor es un agente que desencadena una acción".

Es de destacar también que en una mayoría clara de los casos (más del 70%), se da un cambio de dominio en las relaciones transémicas de cada pasaje, por las que obtenemos una macroestructura ligera o netamente diferente en el TM. Esta formaría parte de lo que hemos llamado macroestructura transémica, es decir las relaciones transémicas (relaciones traductivas basadas en unidades teóricas llamadas transemas) en el nivel de la macroestructura global del TO y del TM. En Sánchez (1994) se ofrece una descripción detallada (a partir de las variaciones en los hechos macroestructurales y por tanto en la estructura conceptual general) de en qué consiste esta macroestructura transémica, qué variaciones presupone y por tanto qué implicaciones finales podemos extraer para el tema del amor en *El Cuarteto* y su retextualización al español.

A partir de dicho comentario detallado sobre los dos polos de la macroestructura transémica obtenida, el polo origen y el polo meta (que no podemos dar aquí por motivos de espacio; véanse nuestras referencias al final), deducimos, y resumimos a continuación, el modo en que los desplazamientos de los cuatro dominios más importantes afectan a la configuración del tema del amor en los dos textos.

Como es lógico, la actuación del proceso traductivo sobre estos dominios aparece supeditada a los cambios particulares y generales en la caracterización de personajes y en la presentación de acontecimientos, de forma que mediante una constitución ligeramente diferente de los ámbitos

mental, sentimental y conductual en la microestructura de ambos textos se obtienen macroestructuras de los pasajes apreciablemente distintas y a la postre macroestructuras globales para los dos textos radicalmente divergentes, hipótesis sobre la que descansa toda la investigación y que los resultados obtenidos confirman.

Algunas consecuencias generales que hemos podido obtener para la macroestructura del amor con la sola consideración de estos cambios conceptuales en el TM y a la luz de la estructura conceptual referida son:

En el TM, a diferencia del TO, no se especifica la relación fundamental que se da en toda la novela entre la experiencia sexual y el conocimiento. La sexualidad no se presenta tampoco como vía para la realización personal o vital, mientras que en el TO, si no se progresa en el conocimiento afectivo y sexual, sobrevienen situaciones condenadas al fracaso de un personaje o una pareja, expresado en múltiples formas. El TM no presenta la incapacidad amorosa (impotencia, apatía, exceso de atención prestada a las sensaciones antes o después de la relación amorosa, autoengaño sobre la respuesta del objeto amoroso) como estadio necesario, aunque doloroso, dentro del desarrollo afectivo iniciático, que es la vía hacia el mundo de la imaginación (que también es erótica), hacia una nueva vida vivida deliberadamente.

Tampoco se establece la conexión entre otras emociones, como la ternura, y la nueva comprensión del amor que adquieren los personajes principales, casi exclusivamente Darley y Clea; esta nueva conciencia de un nuevo significado para la vida afectiva, que por fin se quiere vivir plenamente, es en parte el tema mismo de *El Cuarteto*, y, en relación con ella, el TM no presenta la identificación de la liberación sexual con la artística, por lo que es mucho más difícil en el TM establecer conexiones con la presentación de la nueva realidad "heráldica" o simbólica a la que Darley y Clea aspiran en *Clea*. En el TO esta liberación simboliza la culminación, y al mismo tiempo el comienzo, de la búsqueda transpersonal propuesta a lo largo de la novela y especialmente en las últimas páginas; esta búsqueda debe partir de lo más físico, es decir, de la realidad sexual antes de poder asumir el acceso a una nueva realidad simbólica y creadora; sin embargo, el TM afecta a la representación que podemos hacernos en el TO de la liberación que se propone para romper con las fuerzas morales represoras de lo sexual.

Las dimensiones emotiva y erótica se confunden en el TM, no se separan nítidamente como en el TO. La relación entre elementos de estas dimensiones sufre constante variación. La dimensión erótica se focaliza negativamente, de manera que se estigmatizan sus elementos erótico-sexuales en lugar de otros

distintos, que pertenecen a dominios conceptuales diferentes. Se cambia el signo de la dimensión senso-erótica y se omiten aspectos importantes de sus elementos. Se omiten las alusiones sexuales, por lo que se reduce la intensidad de la presentación de momentos clave en la relación entre dos personajes. También ocurre que se suele concebir una relación más importante (de amor) que la simple aventura de exploración entre dos personajes, al contrario que en el TO, en donde se favorece, en consecuencia, un mayor contraste entre el mundo sexual presentado, producto del *it* alejandrino, y la dimensión de desarrollo hacia lo heráldico transcendente. Relacionado con esto último, se focaliza más en el TM el aspecto espiritual del amor, más que el mental o psicológico del TO.

No se presentan como ficciones ni la personalidad ni el amor, que en el TO sí se conceptualizan como meros productos de los engaños de la mente, en el estadio de sensación que representa *Justine* dentro del esquema tetralógico en la escala hacia lo heráldico. El amor no tiene en el TM una naturaleza paradójica. El TM no hace referencia a la disolución del ego que trae consigo el amor, por lo que se afecta directamente a toda la fuerza motriz de la "investigación del amor moderno", objetivo explícito del autor, en un mundo posfreudiano en el que se ha quebrado el concepto de persona; de hecho, especifica la identificación de realización con autoconocimiento, mediante lo que se insiste en la presentación de un ego no fragmentado, cognoscible, mientras que en el TO el autoconocimiento sólo es una primera etapa (*Justine*) que se revisará (*Balthazar*) y se transcenderá (*Clea*) tras la consideración de la posibilidad de ofrecer realidades objetivas (*Mountolive*). Tampoco presenta la posibilidad de encontrar coherencia y unificación de la fragmentación mental y personal considerando el amor como forma especial de la atención, como hace el TO. El TM introduce en su lugar la intervención, el control sexual, la censura, que no entronca con la ecuación amor=atención, la cual representa una de las etapas fundamentales del despertar de la conciencia en la ascensión a lo heráldico.

Se modifican importantes aspectos de la caracterización de un personaje, como ocurre con Justine: no se recoge la naturaleza mental (la voluntad) de su deseo, fuente de sus propios sinsabores y derrotas (sobre todo la caída final de su pedestal de diosa, donde la había colocado Darley en *Justine*), y por tanto ésta aparece como sujeto de la emoción erótica, en vez de apresada en su propia reflexión mental, en su propio ego malsano. El carácter mental del deseo es fundamental en el TO para entender la trampa aniquiladora del deseo que no se pone al servicio de algo más, de un nuevo amor basado más en la ternura, un "loving-kindness".

Se refuerza la posición masculina en la visión de la relación hombre-mujer, en numerosas ocasiones.

Los desplazamientos en la macroestructura son tanto aspectuales como centrales a los acontecimientos, los cuales suelen sufrir un aplanamiento (la *verflachung* de Snell-Hornby 1988), atenuándose la intensidad y determinadas características que inferimos para un personaje en un momento dado. En los desplazamientos más importantes se cambia la estructura predicativa.

Considerando que el TO es bastante explícito en cuanto a los temas centrales, el TM es a veces menos explícito en la presentación del acontecimiento y presenta acontecimientos contrarios, además de variar de diferentes formas los contrastes establecidos en el TO entre los diferentes elementos de los acontecimientos. En el caso de acciones se da el caso de que se ve reducido el alcance o ámbito de una entidad que participa en una acción de forma crucial para la visión del amor que se nos hace representar en la lectura de la novela.

3. CONCLUSIÓN

Este tipo de resultados sobre el efecto de los cambios de dominio se pueden ampliar y detallar, naturalmente, partiendo de la interpretación transémica y de las macroestructuras de los pasajes a que da lugar *sin consideración especial de los cambios de dominio*, pero ello formaría parte de otra publicación. De momento creemos que se ha de destacar lo siguiente: tan sólo la consideración de las divergencias en términos de los dominios léxico-conceptuales a los que pertenecen los elementos léxicos, sobre los cuales se observa algún desplazamiento léxico-semántico con cambio de dominio aparejado, arroja de por sí resultados que si bien no son definitivos o exhaustivos, sí son ineludibles y tremendamente importantes para comprender el tipo de macroefecto producido por los desplazamientos léxico-semánticos. El hecho de que, dentro de un enfoque plural (por integrador) y funcional, se hayan obtenido resultados de tanta significación para la macroestructura temática mediante un estudio en profundidad de comparativamente escasos pero representativos fenómenos microestructurales, nos da a entender que efectivamente este tipo de investigación y metodología es necesario y que, como pensábamos en los inicios de la nuestra, se puede afirmar que en traducción cualquier decisión, por pequeña que parezca, se inserta en una

serie de relaciones textuales por las que produce unos efectos a veces insospechados pero ciertamente trascendentales para el mundo de ficción que de forma intersubjetiva (esto es, sin considerar la variación individual pero como base para la misma) se percibe cognitivamente en la recepción textual de una novela en un idioma y polisistema literario-cultural diferentes.a

NOTAS

1. Que no sean calcos, categoría que van Leuven especifica aparte.

2. Sólo incluimos, a modo de ilustración, los datos de los dominios más frecuentes, teniendo en cuenta sólo valores por encima del 2, para el ATR, y del 1 para los AD (por eso, por ejemplo, no incluimos CONDUCTA en el. aspectual, donde sólo se da un caso) pero presentando sólo los cuatro dominios con más referencias, independientemente de que haya algún otro que obtenga más valores que 2 (ATR) o 1 (AD).

3. Aquí, como en los siguientes AD., nos interesan los cambios de dominio que hayan podido tener lugar, y no recogemos las especificaciones, generalizaciones, etc. que se dan dentro del mismo dominio.

4. Las primera cifra entre paréntesis a la izquierda de : corresponde al título en mayúsculas de antes del paréntesis y la segunda, después de : indica el número de referencias del título que sigue a la cifra para el texto del otro idioma.

5. Es decir, entre los dos textos considerados independientemente de la dirección de uno a otro.

6. Al primer argumento se le asigna la función (Ag) o (Fo) en acciones, (Proc) en procesos y (0) en estados. Al segundo (Go) en acciones, (Fo) en procesos y (Ref) en estados. Al tercero hemos asignado (Rec), (Ref), (Loc), (Dir), (So). Dentro de este tercer grupo incluimos también, para mayor operatividad, los casos en los que no aparezca en el macrohecho un elemento de SENT. independientemente de la asignación de funciones.

7. Por ejemplo, podemos encontrar un caso en que J. aparezca como elemento asociado al amor no en general sino al suyo propio, a su forma particular de vivir la emoción en el mundo de ficción.

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APÉNDICE

ESTRUCTURA CONCEPTUAL GENERAL

I. ESTADOS

I.1.1.   Arnauti y Justine
<15> Los celos de A. hacia el violador de J. (0) son ridículos (Ref.)

Macroefectos relacionados en el pasaje del TM:

[Él en vez de ella retrocede ante el reproche que le hace A. producto de sus celos —> más pasividad masculina**]**

I.1.2.
I.1.2.1. Clea
<44> El amor sin pasión (0) es poco importante (Ref) para una persona noble e inocente como C. (Ref)

Poco original en vez de poco importante.

I.1.2.2. Clea (Gen.)
1. <85> El amor sexual (0) es una forma torpe pero importante de conocimiento (Ref).

Omisión de torpe. Se elimina la relación de subordinación.
DOMINIOS: COND. —> 0

2. <86> La ternura (0) es fundamental (Ref) para la actitud vital y redentora o artística (Ref).

No ternura sino amor. El arte aporta amor no ternura en el proceso de realización.

I.1.2.3. Clea y Justine
1. <43> El amor entre C. y J. (0) se anticipa como estéril y absorbente (Ref).

Lleno de deseo cálido en vez de absorbente **[**el deseo, en vez del egoísmo, lo marchita**]**
DOMINIOS: PERC.M. —> SENT.

2. <46> Una experiencia amorosa, como la de C. con J., (0) supone engaños de uno mismo (Ref).

Decepciones (falta de cumplimiento de expectativas) en vez de autoengaños.

I.1.3.1. Darley (Gen.)
<79> El rostro amado y la personalidad humana (0) son ficticios para D. (Ref).

En el rostro amado se focaliza el crecimiento celular del momento presente y continuo. No la personalidad, sino la existencia, es ficticia.
DOMINIOS: PERC.M. —> BIOL.

I.1.3.2. Darley y Justine
<28> La paradoja del amor entre D. y J. (0) consiste en distanciar los egos en la cercanía (Ref).

Amor no paradójico. La cercanía atrae, no distancia.

I.1.3.3. Darley y Justine
<37> Las emociones de D y J (0) son de índole sexual (Ref) para el taxista.

[Menos intensidad en los resultados de este carácter sexual—>resalta la confusión entre lo emotivo y lo erótico; aspecto menos negativo en el taxista]
DOMINIOS: PERC.M. —> SENT

I.1.4.1. Justine y Darley
<25> La relación sin amor con D. (0) es para J. positiva (Ref.)

Negativa (no satisfactoria de sus promesas) en vez de positiva. [la moral no da respuesta a su examen de la relación con D.]
DOMINIOS: COGN. —> COND.

I.1.4.2. Justine y Darley
<29> El amor de J. (0) no es total (Ref)

Amor de D. en lugar de amor de J.

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REVIEWS

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RESEÑAS

Nancy R. Comley and Robert Scholes,
Hemingway's Genders:
Rereading the Hemingway Text.
New Haven: Yale UP, 1994. 153 p.

In the *TLS* September 1, 1995 issue, David Van Lear reviews *Hemingway's Genders* in what I consider a remarkable piece of misunderstanding of Comley and Scholes' book. Comley and Scholes are neither apologizing for "Hemingway's resentment of feminist discourse" nor writing his eulogy nor trying to relocate Hemingway's genders within a well-lighted place. They are not making a statement in support of a recuperation of Hemingway either. Rather, they are offering a holistic reading of Hemingway's texts. Theirs is a reading based on the assumption that these texts contribute to the formation of a higher textual unit in which the issue of gender becomes a prominent feature.

As I see it, this one and only text resulting from Comley and Scholes' critical reading is intertextual in nature. If something is to be criticised, surely it is not the intertextual quality of their reading, which I believe to be an asset. I object, rather, to their not acknowledging the fact. Comley and Scholes' lack of acknowledgement of the critical concept of intertextuality affects their method of analysis negatively because it leaves part of their methodology unspecified. Scholes, a respected critic, is considered to be a semiotician as well as a structuralist. His structural bend is a bit overbearing,

especially as it results in the abundant, if not abusive, use of the idea of code within *Hemingway's Genders*.

The outcome of a semiostructural as well as intertextual reading of Hemingway's works is bound to be abstract. At least, Comley and Scholes' reading of Hemingway's stories as different encodings of one and the same matrix implies that the text is readable on two different levels. The underlying, abstract code is produced by a deep reading and realised under different guises or a discreet number of textual variants at surface level. In such a structural reading mothers, nurses, bitches, girls and lesbian devils are comparable and reducible to a single pattern or matrix integrating all their features. So it happens with fathers, doctors, boys, "maricones," bullfighters, soldiers and boxers. The parallel roles assigned to the male and female characters seems to render these roles comparable. Now, how do Comley and Scholes read the differences versus the similarities found between males and females? The authors' explanation does not account for the different weight the voices of women and men bear within the text. Hemingway's texts dramatize the conflict between the sexes by means of a highly stylized and complex use of language on the part of the characters and narrator. The analytical method used by the authors is not flexible enough to tackle this pragmatic issue; since it leaves out contextual and ideological factors which could contribute to a sounder understanding of why and what for did Hemingway design his characters the way he did. They admit,

> Our critical method is directed not at the aesthetic dimension of Hemingway's work- neither his prose style nor the shape of his stories, admirable though these are - but at the ethical dimension. That is, we are concerned with the representation of human character in Hemingway's writing, especially with how characters are constructed along lines of gender and sexual behaviour. (Comley and Scholes 1994: xi)

There is a certain amount of self-contradiction behind this statement. How can Comley and Scholes be concerned with the representation of human character in writing and with how characters are constructed if they disregard the architecture, or discursive texture, of Hemingway's prose? Can the ethical and aesthetical dimensions of a literary text be treated in isolation? These are theoretical questions about the nature of the literary text. Depending on what answer we give them we will be more or less satisfied with the result of

Comley and Scholes' work. Personally I have read it with some interest which I know derives mainly from the fact that I admire Hemingway's literature.

It is a conceited misunderstanding that makes Van Lear affirm that "While Hemingway is interested in gender, he is not interesting on gender." An unbiassed revision of Hemingway's stories, for instance, will render Van Lear's presumption groundless. It is probably his reading that "only underscores the work's faith in white male entitlement." As a woman I read "Hills like White Elephants," "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber," "The Snows of Kilimanjaro," "Cat in the Rain," or "Up in Michigan," among others, and I can hear the silenced women who need not be empowered by their or anyone else's discourse, women whose mere presence suffices. Their truth is heard, indirectly spoken but radically affirmed by Hemingway's text if not by Hemingway, himself or his narrators. Whose voice should we privilege when we read Hemingway's novels and short stories? Wouldn't it be better to acknowledge all, and welcome the polyphony of voices within which the reader's voice is inscribed?

Van Lear says Hemingway is not interesting on gender but writers are interesting if they succeed at involving their readers in the possible worlds they model textually. Does it make sense to ask of interesting writers to be interesting on something? Their texts are rich enough, readers provide their own feminist or masculinist interpretations of Hemingway's texts according to their interests and ideological horizon. Comley and Scholes insist that Hemingway's men exhibit to a greater or lesser extent characteristics which in our western culture used to be considered feminine and viceversa, some of his women exhibit characteristics traditionally viewed as masculine. In Hemingway's texts these fictional men and women form a continuum rather than a bipolarity. How do Comley and Scholes interpret this fact? They just do not interpret it, but leave this task to others —which leaves us wondering where is the ethical dimension of their reading.

In spite of all its weaknesses, *Hemingway's Genders* succeeds in "making it difficult to think of Hemingway as a writer with too much machismo for his own good" (Comley and Scholes, 1994: 146) and this is positive because it helps Hemingway's readers to get rid of stereotypes that burden the image of the writer and his texts; an image that takes time to erase once it has been formed because it lingers entrenched, as in Van Lear's apparently innocuous review, where it would be less expected.a

BEATRIZ PENAS IBÁÑEZ

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Susana Onega, ed.,
Telling Histories:
Narrativizing History, Historicizing Literature.
Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1995. 202 p.

The paradoxical, quasi-oxymoronic nature of the title of this book, *Telling Histories,* added to the chiasmic pattern of its subtitle, *Narrativizing History, Historicizing Literature,* splendidly brings to the fore the no less contradictory character of the relationship between history and the literary phenomenon. This relationship is interestingly discussed and widely explored in the papers that compose this volume, which has been edited by Susana Onega and recently published by Rodopi.

Searching for the phrase that would best define the most outstanding features of a current fictional trend, Linda Hutcheon proposed the term "historiographic metafiction" in her book *A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction,* published in 1988. The term was initially meant to refer to a large body of well-known novels which combined the kind of intense self-reflexivity which is characteristic of metafiction, and had been inherited from modernism, with historical events, characters and settings depicted in accordance with the most traditional techniques of classic realism. Hutcheon further contended that historiographic metafiction shared with postmodernism two of its most salient features: its overtly contradictory nature and its apparent rejection of any form of totalization. In line with her reasoning, Hutcheon affirmed historiographic metafiction to be the most characteristic mode of postmodernism in literature. This assertion seems corroborated by the considerable amount of novels with overt metafictional traits and a historical background which proliferated in Britain in the late 1970s and especially in the decade of the 1980s, as well as by the increasing critical attention paid to historiographic metafiction as an outstanding literary mode.

On the other hand, it should be noticed that in the late 1970s and 1980s both historians and philosophers of history were paradoxically challenging

the legitimacy of history as a supposedly scientific source of knowledge. The apparent contradiction generated from the fact that historical novels were proliferating in Britain at a time when the validity of history as a science was being challenged from within justified the celebration of the symposium on the relationship between literature and history which was held in March 1993 at the University of Zaragoza, and accounts for the readiness with which scholars from Spain and other European countries responded to this call. The fruitful outcome of the intellectual debate generated at the symposium appears now as a volume, *Telling Histories,* which collects some of the papers presented at the symposium. The criterion for the selection of the papers is accurately exposed in the foreword to the book and rests on the conviction that a complete comprehension of historiographic metafiction as a postmodernist literary phenomenon inevitably requires the exploration of the origins of historical fiction as well as the study of the relationships between the development of this literary mode and the concept of history itself.

This is the purpose behind the introductory chapter of the book, by Susana Onega. In the first few pages of the book, Onega manages to trace the roots of historiographic metafiction by going as far back as Renaissance literature in search of the origins of the unstable relationship between literature and history, a relationship which not only lies at the core of postmodernist fiction itself but is also problematized in the critical analysis of the works proposed by the contributors to this volume. The development of modern historiography from the Enlightenment to Hegel's dialectical description of "world history" is shown to have been simultaneous with the evolution of realistic fiction and the historical novel. Later on in the chapter, Onega establishes a new parallelism between the development of historiographic metafiction and the appearance of the New Historicism as the contemporary philosophy of history. With the New Historicism, the attempt at separating literature from history which had begun in the Renaissance comes full circle, since, as Susana Onega clearly states, contemporary philosophers of history and/or historians like Jacques Ermarth, Adam V. Veeser, Paul Veyne or Hayden White, among others, emphasize the linguistic nature of both history and literature and therefore expose the inability of history to express absolute truths. Having been reduced to the category of a human construct, History, the discourse of the powerful mainstream of culture, loses its status of "grand narrative" and "monolithic truth," and in so doing it leaves ground for the emergence of equally valid, and/or equally constructed, discourses of the marginalized Other. Believing in the ability of literature to reveal those truths which cannot be grasped from traditional history, contemporary writers of

fiction experience a certain impulse, even a compulsion, to write historiographic metafictional works. The discovery that fiction can be more truth-revealing than history allows for the positive flavour in Onega's final words, since such a discovery permits contemporary writers of historiographic metafiction to strive for self-identity against the oppressive background of history and to try and fight against the anxiety of difference that had suffocated their predecessors.

Coherent with its general aim, the volume presents a first part composed of four preliminary articles which are understood as the necessary point of departure for the discussion of postmodernist literature that frames the second part of the volume. These first four preliminary articles introduce the reader, first, to the appropriation of history by literature since the appearance of Walter Scott's historical romances and, secondly, to the characteristic mechanisms at work in postmodernist texts —creation, imitation, and parody— by resorting to nineteenth-century historical fiction. The first two articles focus on three Victorian authors and their works, whereas the last two articles are dedicated to less orthodox chapters related to the nineteenth-century: the ballad history of Ireland, on the one hand, and Indian historical fiction, on the other. Andrew Sanders's contribution is an overview of the work of Victorian writers who explored the implications of Sir Walter Scott's innovatory fiction. Historical fiction in Victorian Britain was "a reflection of ideas of dialectical advance," Sanders contends. In his article, special attention is paid to George Eliot and her novel *Romola,* as a representative of Macaulay's conception of history and to Charles Dickens and his *A Tale of Two Cities,* as exemplifying Carlyle's historical ideas. Sanders interestingly explores the full implications of these two historical approaches in the final message conveyed by each of the two novels. In the second article, Dolores Herrero brilliantly analyses the often neglected fiction of the late Victorian writer, Mary A. Ward, in the light of Hegelian "world history." Her thorough analysis leads to the conclusion that Ward's fiction proves more interesting as a sociological and/or religious document of the period that for its actual literary value. The ballad history of Ireland and its patriotic significance centres the discussion in María Pilar Pulido's article, the third in this first part of the volume. Finally, Felicity Hand exposes the clearly biased representation of a historical moment, the 1857 Indian Mutiny, in two imperialist novels, Henry Kingsley's *Stretton* and Edward Money's *The Wife and Ward of a Life's Error.* Hand criticises the devastating effects that such manipulating literature had on later Anglo-Indian historical fiction.

The second part of this volume is dedicated to the "postmodernist era." The eight articles selected indisputably contribute to provide an overall vision of the workings of contemporary historical metafiction in Britain, as the ensuing quick revision intends to suggest. Luisa Juárez presents a close analysis of Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* as a novel which explores the frontiers between history and fiction. The concept of history is problematized in the novel through the foregrounding of all those fictional elements characteristic of historiography. In so doing, *Midnight's Children* challenges institutionalized versions of history and proposes the creation of a national conscience through the writing of fiction. Marita Nadal explores the postmodernist combination of history, parody and reflexivity in William Golding's *Rites of Passage* which, as the title of the novel suggests, serves the author to expose a world in transition poised between Neoclassicism and Romanticism. Nadal concludes that Golding's novel is an ironic inversion of conventional sea novels.

A play is under scrutiny in the third chapter of the second part of this volume. Leaving aside what would have been a more traditional but much less illuminating study of the position assigned to woman as the other of man, Chantal Cornut-Gentille demonstrates clearly and effectively how *Top Girls* dramatizes all the important feminist issues which are embodied in the oft-quoted sentence "the personal is the political." María Lozano's article is a very clever contrastive study of two quasi-simultaneous novels by two acclaimed authors, Julian Barnes and Jeanette Winterson. Lozano's gifted analysis of the novels *A History of the World in 10 1/2 Chapters* and *Sexing the Cherry* concentrates on the discourse of love each of the two novels discloses. Susana Onega's next article is also centred on a novel by Jeanette Winterson, *Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit.* Onega presents this novel as a somewhat idiosyncratic *Bildungsroman* in which the author redefines the concepts of history and story-telling, on the one hand, and refunctionalizes fantasy not as the source of mere escapism but as an alternative space in which lesbian subjectivity can be asserted, on the other. Ángeles de la Concha examines Margaret Drabble's extensive literary production which, as de la Concha signals, has a clear penchant for history as its common denominator. In her interesting article, de la Concha exposes the parallel development of Drabble's conception of the meaning of the historical element that pervades her works and of the evolution in the narrative form of her novels. Celestino Deleyto concentrates on Angela Carter's *Wise Children* as a novel which explores the search for origins through the exploration of sexual relationships. In so doing, the novel does away with history and patriarchy

and proposes in their place the female body and female sexuality as a space in which to locate female identity. Finally, Jesús Benito selects an Afro-American novel, *The Chaneysville Incident,* to explore how historiographic metafiction can outwin history in the forging of one's own past and in regaining one's cultural heritage especially when searching for one of the cultures which has been marginalized and systematically silenced by mainstream history.

In spite of the variety of styles and authors included in this book, or maybe because of them, *Telling Histories* is definitely a highly recommend-able work. The combination of theoretical issues with the analysis of specific works from varied perspectives and angles makes the book an illuminating overview of both the origins and development of historiographic metafiction. It also offers crucial insights into the meaning and purpose of recent histori-ographic metafiction in Britain.a

MARÍA DEL MAR ASENSIO ARÓSTEGUI

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Salman Rushdie,
The Moor's Last Sigh.
Londres: Jonathan Cape, 1995. 437 p.
El último suspiro del Moro.
Traducción de Miguel Sáenz. Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 1995. 493 p.

La aparición de una novela en las circunstancias que rodean a la publicación de *The Moor's Last Sigh* supone un acontecimiento literario internacional, y un éxito asegurado. La publicación casi simultánea de la traducción española de Plaza y Janés ha de explicarse como parte de un lanzamiento editorial orquestado a nivel mundial. Algo quizá necesario, por otra parte, para ofrecer a los francotiradores integristas un blanco múltiple y móvil, como ya se hizo al publicar *The Satanic Verses* un consorcio de editores.

Rushdie se ha convertido en un símbolo, y ésa no es una posición có-moda para un escritor. Su posición hace que se espere de él un alegato, un mensaje que sólo pueda enviar quien está "encumbrado" en una posición ex-

cepcional. Como diría Sartre, no puede elegir su tema, porque le viene dado: vive atrapado en su tema. Y así no es extraño que encontremos en esta novela de manera prominente los motivos de la huida, la prisión, el fanatismo, el odio ancestral, el fundamentalismo que falsea la historia y distorsiona la tradición. El problema planteado al autor aquí es quizá el de conseguir universalizar su situación, no escribir un mero alegato, sino llegar a escribir además la novela que quizá hubiera escrito de ser otra su situación. Y así vemos a Rushdie volver en cierto modo a la manera de *Midnight's Children:* las sagas familiares a lo Macondo, el fresco sobreabundante de personajes e historias que se ramifican por todas las capas de la sociedad de Bombay a lo largo de varias décadas. Incluso hay una conexión entre ambas novelas a través de la aparición de Aadam Sinai convertido en *yuppie* e impostor. El material novelado es una sucesión de traiciones, intrigas, escándalos y crímenes en un ambiente de *jet-set,* alta finanza y mafia barriobajera. El padre del Moro, Abraham Zogoiby, es un reconocido magnate y *capo* en la sombra del crimen organizado; su madre, Aurora Zogoiby, antes da Gama, es una pintora célebre, artista nacional volcada en su arte. Este arte es una versión pictórica del realismo mágico, y es ocasión para diversas relaciones *en abyme*. La manera historiográfico/metaficcional de Rushdie se encuentra aquí en plena forma. El realismo mágico se revitaliza precisamente al ser reabsorbido por la realidad. El libro produce la impresión del realismo mágico clásico, pero Rushdie ha conseguido que ello brote espontáneamente de la complejidad postmodernista que describe. Surge la fantasía de la superposición de realidades a través de la historia, la ficción y el abigarramiento multicultural de una ciudad moderna y tercermundista; surge también de la flexibilidad de la narración del Moro y su capacidad para absorber múltiples voces y perspectivas de otros personajes, de la calle, la publicidad, la cultura de masas y tradicional. También todo tipo de clásicos: en la primera sección (una página), asoman entre otros la historia de la reconquista de Granada, Vasco de Gama, Cervantes, Lutero, *The Tempest, Othello,* los Evangelios, *Treasure Island,* Nabokov, *Edipo Rey,* Virgilio, la *Divina Comedia,* John Barth y Henry Miller, por no mencionar la novela por entregas del "Asunto Rushdie", una de las claves permanentes del libro. La abundancia intertextual del libro es uno de sus mayores logros, en particular porque los lazos intertextuales son establecidos de manera vital y dinámica por el narrador conforme analiza las líneas de fuerza que le constituyen como sujeto o los mitos y discursos que se utilizan a su alrededor para conformar versiones de la realidad.

El narrador mismo recuerda mucho al Saleem de *Midnight's Children,* incluso en su proceso de decadencia física acelerada (asociado también de modo reflexivo al progreso del libro hacia el final de la lectura). El envejecimiento prematuro del narrador, primero un niño con cuerpo de joven y luego un joven con cuerpo de anciano, se justifica vagamente como una enfermedad mal conocida, pero incluso este elemento semifantástico tiene el efecto de presentar al protagonista como un *everyman*—la vida vista desde la madurez es irritantemente y anómalamente breve para todos. Saleem Sinai era una encarnación crítica y problemática de la India múltiple. El Moro también remite su linaje a diversas razas y orígenes: indio, español, portugués, judío, moro. Esta vez Rushdie superpone lo excepcional y minoritario con lo tipificador: nos contará, dice, una historia india porque todos sus personajes son indios, y hasta aparecen elefantes, señala —sólo que el elefante, que pisa al daliniano Vasco Miranda mientras intenta pintarlo desde abajo, está alquilado a un circo en Granada. Parte de la justificación de esta estrategia está en la lucha contra el estereotipo a que se ve abocado Rushdie; parte en un énfasis aún mayor en la multiplicidad étnica y cultural, en el barroquismo irreducible de la realidad histórica. Rusdhie escribe así su alegato contra los maximalismos xenófobos, la limpieza étnica y la intolerancia religiosa. En una maniobra un tanto ambigua, el papel del Ayatollah lo desempeña aquí Mainduck, un líder extremista hindú que azuza a sus seguidores contra musulmanes, judíos y cristianos. El Moro se arrepiente de asesinar a este individuo en un raro gesto de compasión, también equívoco en un personaje que después de todo ha estado trabajando para Mainduck como matón a sueldo.

Rushdie, quizá por temor a predicar, parece haberse impuesto la norma de no presentar un modelo ético aceptable en su novela. Produce así resultados confusos y un libro muy amargo a pesar de su vitalidad estilística. Los personajes son en última instancia ajenos y fríos. El autor insiste en reivindicar como humana —no demonicemos— la crueldad, la corrupción más degradante y el egoísmo llevado hasta la demencia. *Insaan,* "humano", nos dice el narrador, y el lector lee "insane." La familia Zogoiby aplica el lema de que sólo la corrupción les salvará del fanatismo— y la novela no ofrece realmente ninguna otra salida. El arte de Aurora, imagen especular de la escritura de Rushdie, responde sólo a parte de la experiencia real que lo hace posible, y su valor moral es limitado, subjetivo, porque no entra en diálogo auténtico con la dinámica social (o personal) de la que surge. Tal vez aquí haya otra reflexión *en abyme* sobre la problemática de esta novela. El

mundo aparece en ella como un gran caos donde el amor, la decencia y la belleza son sólo un ideal malogrado por el que el Moro suspira a lo Boabdil, en una escenificación bastante buscada. Los personajes son demasiado excepcionales, y la armazón que intenta contener toda la olla podrida es demasiado deliberada. El narrador es consciente de todo ello, y su adopta una distancia irónica hacia el material.

Resulta de todos estos elementos una peculiar desconexión entre el yo narrador y el yo personaje, o más generalmente entre la calidad verbal del libro y la historia narrada— nos resulta difícil imaginarnos al Moro a la vez como autor de las palabras que leemos y de las acciones relatadas. Hay, de modo general, una falta de principio de orden en la novela, y quizá sea ese el mensaje que Rushdie nos manda desde su pedestal con señales bastante equívocas: el libro no ha podido ser mejor, nos dice, *"Here I stand. Couldn't've done it differently."* El narrador muere resignado esperando días mejores, pero nada en la novela nos da pie a suponer que vayan a venir.

Nos queda el arte verbal de Rushdie: el placer del uso inesperado que cada voz hace del lenguaje ajeno, el malabarismo con alusiones y percepciones sacadas de ese gran cajón de/sastre que son los recuerdos familiares y la historia personal. El traductor español hace lo posible por seguir las acrobacias verbales del original, y transmite un porcentaje muy apreciable de la novela, aunque con frecuencia se ve obligado a simplificar o a conformarse, como es de rigor, con una dicción bastante menos aerodinámica que la del original.a

JOSÉ ANGEL GARCÍA LANDA

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ABSTRACTS

THAT-CLAUSES IN NP

Juan Carlos Acuña Fariña

The aim of this paper is to discuss aspects of the grammar of the (non-relative) *that*-clauses which follow head nouns. Specifically, two aspects will be discussed here. The first has to do with the different types of expansions of head nouns wich can appear under the form of (non-relative) *that*- clauses. The second concerns the nature of the evidence for positing distinct types of *that*-clauses in NP structure. In essence, this paper focuses on the complement/modifier divide, as this applies to *that*-clauses in NP. Central to this discussion will be our attempt to sustain the thesis that *that*-clause complements to nouns do not exist.

IRONY AND THE OTHER OFF RECORD STRATEGIES WITHIN POLITENESS THEORY

Laura Alba Juez

The present paper is part of a more complete study of the phenomenon of *verbal irony* within the framework of Politeness theory as presented by Brown and Levinson in their book *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Use* (1987, first published 1978). The possibility of combining an off record strategy such as irony with on record strategies has already been considered (Alba Juez, 1994a). In the present paper some examples are presented which illustrate the combination of verbal irony with the other off record strategies set out in the theory by Brown and Levinson. It is taken for granted that the

reader is familiar with Politeness Theory, and hence many concepts are not explained or defined herein.

REVISING SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES IN THE NOVELS OF NADINE GORDIMER

Rosalía Baena Molina

Narrative perspective is a particularly relevant prism through which the relations between literature and history can be viewed. Nadine Gordimer's novels have often been analyzed as historical artifacts that give insight on South African historical situations, and the players in the drama. This paper suggests that a narratological study of point of view and the examination of diverse perspectives in the different novels sheds light on an understanding of the conflicts enacted in her fiction. The flexibility in her manipulation of point of view is observed in particular in four novels: *A Guest of Honour* (1971), *The Conservationist* (1974), *Burger's Daughter* (1979), and *My Son's Story* (1991). Her novels thus pose in acute form the question of whose story will be told and who will tell it. The multiplicity of voices and the corresponding shifts in focalization evident in her novels provide ways to explore the nature of both the creative act and the connection between the personal and the political.

REFLEXIVE NARRATIVE IN *LOLITA,* BY VLADIMIR NABOKOV

Asunción Barreras Gómez

What Nabokov's narrators produce is not a faithful record of the past but an imaginative invention, mediated by their point of view, their metafictional consciousness and their active manipulation of the story. There is, then, a difficulty in portraying reality, because any point of view on reality is a subjective one, in which memory and imagination are mixed. Nabokov recognizes that he cannot show reality in a simple form. An analysis of the narration in *Lolita* shows a more problematic relationship between fiction and reality than the one realist fiction allows the reader to acknowledge.

THE POETRY OF JUDITH WRIGHT:
INVENTING AUSTRALIA, INVENTING THE SELF.

Nela Bureu

The poetry of Judith Arundel Wright, a contemporary Australian artist born in Armidale, New South Wales in 1915, offers us an interesting poetic reading of Australia's past and a deep meditation on the meaning and value of life.

IDENTIDAD Y DIFERENCIA EN
THE CLONING OF JOANNA MAY, DE FAY WELDON

Silvia Caporale Bizzini

The aim of this paper is to carry out a reading of Fay Weldon's novel *The Cloning of Joanna May*. This work is the ironic answer Weldon gives to a culture that uses the negation of difference as a means to contain the feminine subject within the limits of the normative identity that the Cartesian ontology has assigned to women. In *The Cloning of Joanna May,* the discourse on gender is closely related to the discourse on the construction of identity. Weldon not only proposes a revision of the histories of women that belong to different social classes and educational backgrounds: she relates these histories to issues that explore the relation which exists between the feminine identity and social structures.

THE TEACHING OF GRAMMAR

María Rosario Cuesta Cuesta

The purpose of this paper is to examine a number of theoretical principles concerning the teaching of English grammar in EFL contexts. Section One

begins with an examination of the strengths and drawbacks of product and process approaches, arguing that there is no single right methodology for the teaching of grammar and advocating a variable balance between product and process perspectives. Section Two gives recognition to the role of individual differences in learning style. Section Three focuses on the relationship between instruction and second language learning, suggesting that learners require formal instruction and informal exposure and that the two together work better than either on its own. Finally, Section Four considers the role of consciousness-raising in the acquisition of grammatical structure. It examines the question of whether second language learning is conscious or unconscious. While the relevance of unconscious processes should not be ignored, a serious reassessment of the notion of consciousness and its role in language learning is necessary.

THE LICENSING OF PARASITIC GAPS

María del Pilar García Mayo

One of the syntactic characteristics attributed to parasitic gaps in the literature is that they require the presence of an S-S variable. This licensing variable must not c-command the parasitic gap. In this paper I argue that an operator/variable pair is not the only essential environment allowing the licensing of parasitic gaps in Spanish at S-S contrary to what happens in English where only variables license these constructions. This paper adopts the theoretical assumptions of Government and Binding theory.

THE REFERENTIAL MANIA OF "SIGNS AND SYMBOLS": READING NABOKOV'S SHORT STORY

Álvaro Garrido Moreno

Nabokov's parody has been most influential to many postmodern writers of fiction. The criticism of his work as well as his own autobiographical elucidations show an intimate dependence on a modernist assumption that there is a transcendental founding meaning in literature and existence which should be suggested by the creator and unveiled by the reader. This is apparently the impression that tautens his beautiful tale "Signs and Symbols." Nevertheless, a close reading —playing with some devices borrowed from deconstructive criticism— will emphasize the existence of intimate contradictions in the writing of that assumption. This paper also tries to illustate the exciting effects of deconstructive devices as well as my inability to accomplish such a reading.

MODALS AND MODALITY IN ENGLISH

Carlos Inchaurralde Besga

Modality as a linguistic notion has a clear expression in English through the use of different modal verbs. In this respect, we can approach this fact from both a diachronic and a synchronic perspective. In the development of modals in time, it is interesting to consider Bernd Heine's account, for whom modals' development should be considered within a process of grammaticalization and desemantization of full verbs, fully explainable in cognitive terms. From a synchronic point of view, modality as is expressed by English modals should be viewed in connection with tense and aspect. A convenient way of visualizing the interplay that takes place is the use of Minkowsky's space-time cones, which are presented here with examples illustrating the usefulness of this model for the description of these grammatical notions in an integrated manner.

DESPLAZAMIENTOS LÉXICO-SEMÁNTICOS Y EFECTOS MACROESTRUCTURALES EN LA TRADUCCIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE *THE ALEXANDRIA QUARTET:* TOPOLOGÍA CONCEPTUAL

Jesús M. Sánchez García

The article is part of a research effort which develops a combined functional lexically-oriented methodology within Descriptive Translation Studies designed to examine lexico-semantic and macrostructural, i.e. thematic, shifts in translated narrative texts such as the Spanish translation of Lawrence Durrell's *The Alexandria Quartet* to which the methodology has been applied with reference to the theme of love. It explores the role that specifying the lexico-conceptual domains of the units in lexico-semantic shifts play in interpreting transemes (textual units in a translational relation) as well as in obtaining a general conceptual structure for the text analysed which may ultimately lead to a statement on the transemic macrostructure for a given topic. Besides, it provides some specific results as to the love-related transemic macrostructure for *The Quartet* and its Spanish translation, which we have been able to derive by applying our methodology.

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Notes for Contributors

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ÍNDICE

238