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Articles

A CONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACH TO ILLOCUTION: THE CASE OF ORDERS[1]

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1. Introduction

Since Austin's (1962) and Searle's (1969, 1975) seminal work on speech acts, the study of illocution has had a central position in pragmatics. Two significant perspectives within the field have been provided by inferential accounts and functional grammar theories. In the early stages of the development of speech act theory, inferential approaches (Bach & Harnish 1979; Leech 1983; Sperber & Wilson 1995) were the leading voices of pragmatics. These studies argued that the production and interpretation of speech acts are, to a large extent, dependent on inferential processes. In general, the few attempts that were made to account for the conventional nature of illocutionary meaning were largely unconvincing (Searle 1975; Morgan 1978). In turn, some functionalist approaches (notably, Dik 1989, 1997; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004) have been concerned with the incorporation of illocutionary meaning into grammar. Halliday and Matthiessen, for example, classify speech act meaning (or speech functions, in their terminology) into four semantic categories: statements, commands, offers and questions, while Dik distinguishes four basic universal speech act types which are codified in the grammar of most languages. In spite of their many advantages, none of these approaches has provided an integrated account of illocutionary phenomena. Recent studies in Cognitive Linguistics have endowed the research

on illocution with crucial insights. Within this framework, illocution has been treated as a matter of inferential activity based on the activation of specific types of cognitive models called illocutionary scenarios (Panther & Thornburg 1998) or situational cognitive models (Ruiz de Mendoza 2005, 2007). Cognitivist studies have also provided a significant amount of evidence supporting the existence of conventional speech acts or, in more precise terms, illocutionary constructions, defined as form-meaning pairings where the form is associated with specific forms of illocutionary meaning (Pérez 2001; Pérez & Ruiz de Mendoza 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza & Baicchi 2007). Such insights have shown that there is a greater degree of conventionalization in illocutionary production and interpretation than has been recognized in the research on pragmatics.

These studies on the constructional nature of speech act meaning have paved the way for the incorporation of illocutionary phenomena into a principled model of meaning construction called the *Lexical Constructional Model* (Ruiz de Mendoza & Mairal 2008; Mairal & Ruiz de Mendoza 2009). The Lexical Constructional Model (LCM, henceforth), which has deep roots in Relevance Theory, Cognitive Linguistics and Construction Grammar, is concerned with the development of a comprehensive theory of meaning construction that accounts for all facets of the process. To that end, the model is structured into four descriptive levels, which deal with argument structure representations (level 1), implicated and explicated meaning captured by low-level situational models (level 2), implicated and explicated illocutionary meaning (level 3) and discourse structure and relations (level 4). Meaning derivation takes place at the four levels in the form of inference or conventionalized constructions. Lower levels of semantic structure can be incorporated into higher ones as regulated by a number of cognitive and pragmatic constraints. The LCM approach is based on two methodological assumptions. The first relates to the ubiquity of cognitive processes and the second has to do with the existence of a continuum between linguistic categories. These assumptions seek to endow the LCM with refined descriptive and explanatory adequacy.

In this context, the present contribution is a case study of the illocutionary category of ordering and consequently of level 3 constructions for this category within the LCM. The type of illocutionary constructions that will be analyzed consist of a specification of linguistic realizations and a number of semantic features structured in the form of situational cognitive models. The formal pole of the construction includes an array of linguistic devices such as sentence types, lexical items, grammatical properties and suprasegmental patterns. The semantic pole includes the knowledge of the meaning conditions taken by the characterization of an illocutionary type. This concept of illocutionary construction is required by the nature of the object of the study. Illocutionary constructions will be presented

as capturing the illocutionary meaning that arises from everyday interaction in the form of situational cognitive models. We will examine the conceptual grounding and realizations of constructions carrying order values and determine the relationship between their form and their meaning. Our contention is that the expression of orders is based upon linguistic mechanisms capable of activating relevant parts of the semantic base of ordering. After describing the meaning conditions that make up the situational cognitive model of ordering, we will explore the constructional realizations which activate those meaning conditions. The ordering value of these constructions will be determined by the assessment of each of the parameters of the situational cognitive model. We will further argue that the LCM provides an explanatorily adequate framework to understand the semantic and pragmatic behaviour of illocutionary meaning.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the main theoretical assumptions of the LCM. After an overview of the approach to illocution adopted by the LCM, section 3 puts forward a description of the situational cognitive model of the act of ordering that will be a guiding tool in our analysis. Section 4 concentrates on the study of constructions conveying ordering values. The aim of this section is to explore the degree of codification of constructional elements. Such study will make use of the analytical tools proposed by the LCM, thereby providing evidence of their explanatory power. Finally, section 5 summarizes the main conclusions of this research and outlines some future lines of research.

2. The lexical constructional model approach to illocution

In the LCM, traditional implicature and illocutionary meaning are treated as the result of affording metonymic access to situational cognitive models by activating one relevant part of them. Cognitive models of a situational kind involve the interaction between different entities within a certain time and place. The LCM distinguishes low and high-level situational cognitive models (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza 2007). The former are non generic models of representation created by making well-entrenched links between elements of our encyclopedic knowledge store. The latter involve generic models of representation created by deriving structure common to multiple low-level models. For example, begging for money outside a Church building is a low-level situational model. From many different instances of begging in a wide range of diverse contexts, we obtain generic structure common to all these situations, which make up the knowledge that we use to interpret each specific instance of begging. The common generic structure is a high-level situational model.

Metonymic operations on low-level situational cognitive models result in the derivation of implicatures. An example is the utterance *I waved down a taxi* (cf. Lakoff 1987: 87), which stands for a situation in which the speaker waves his hand to stop a taxi, gets into it and asks the driver to take him to the destination. The activation of one part of a low-level situational model gives access to the whole model. At the level of illocution, metonymy acts in much the same way with the difference that it does so on the basis of high-level situational cognitive models, which are more generic, as mentioned above. For example, an utterance like *I am thirsty* may stand as a request in the context of a request scenario based on the cultural convention whereby when people make it manifest that they are affected by a negative situation, other people are expected to provide them with help. This cultural convention is specified in the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model* (Ruiz de Mendoza & Baicchi 2007), which is a high-level cognitive model that stipulates that speakers are culturally bound to help other people if it is within their range of abilities. This is the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model* as formulated by Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007: 111–112):

(a) If it is manifest to A that a particular state of affairs is not beneficial to B, and if A has the capacity to change that state of affairs, then A should do so.
(b) If it is manifest to A that a potential state of affairs is not beneficial to B, then A is not expected to bring it about.
(c) If it is manifest to A that a potential state of affairs is beneficial to B, then A is expected to bring it about provided he has the capacity to do so.
(d) If it is manifest to A that it is not manifest to B that a potential state of affairs is (regarded as) beneficial for A, A is expected to make this manifest to B.
(e) If it is manifest to A that it is not manifest to B that a potential state of affairs is beneficial for B, A is expected to make this manifest to B.
(f) If it is manifest to A that a state of affairs is beneficial to B and B has brought it about, A should feel pleased about it and make this feeling manifest to B.
(g) If it is manifest to B that A has changed a state of affairs to B's benefit, B should feel grateful about A's action and make this feeling manifest to B.
(h) If it is manifest to A that A has not acted as directed by parts (a), (b), and (c) of the 'cost-benefit' model, A should feel regretful about this situation and make this feeling manifest to B.
(i) If it is manifest to B that A has not acted as directed by parts (a), (b), and (c) of the 'cost-benefit' model and A has made his regret manifest to B, B should feel forgiveness for A's inaction and make it manifest to A.
(j) If it is manifest to A and B that a particular state of affairs is not beneficial to B but A has no power to change it to B's benefit, A should still feel sympathy for B over the non-beneficial state of affairs and make this manifest to B.
(k) If it is manifest to A that A is responsible for a certain state of affairs to be to A's benefit, A may feel proud about this situation and make it manifest to B.

These cultural conventions are part of our high level knowledge about the world and because of this they are included in high-level models of interactional meaning. In effect, the stipulations of the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model* are regarded as underlying the semantic structure of high level situational cognitive models. Consider the utterance *I don't know what time it is*. For this utterance to be interpreted as a request, it must be clear from the context that the speaker wants to know the time. Contextual information thus contributes to the specialization of this expression, and allows us to derive the implicit request value by means of a metonymy on the basis of a condition-sequence reasoning schema of the following form: if the speaker does not know what time it is and he wants to find out, then he can ask the addressee to tell him. The condition part of the schema is supplied by the linguistic expression, but the consequence part has to be accessed metonymically. The inference is produced by affording metonymic access to the part of the high-level situational cognitive model (or generic structure) that is relevant for illocutionary interpretation. This part of the high level cognitive model of requesting is grounded in part (a) of the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model*, according to which people are expected to bring about any state of affairs that is beneficial to other people if they have the ability to do so. Following this schema, if it is manifest to us that someone else wants to know the time and we are able to give him this information, then we should do so. With frequent use, expressions originally involved in the selection of relevant points of access to a high-level situational cognitive model become conventionalized and give rise to fairly specified constructions. This is the case of the *Can You* X_{VP}*?* construction for the performance of requests. The request value of this sequence was initially inferred on the basis of the metonymy POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY (Panther & Thornburg 1999), whereby the expression of potentiality stands for the actuality of the future action. The frequent use of this sequence in appropriate contexts resulted in the conventionalization of the request meaning.

According to the LCM, the expression of illocution is often based on specific constructional patterns. Illocutionary constructions are considered linguistic mechanisms with fixed and modifiable elements capable of providing relevant points of access to high-level situational cognitive models. The nature of illocutionary constructions ranges from full codification to different degrees of conventionalization. Codified constructions activate all the essential features of an illocutionary category. For instance, explicit performative constructions are capable of activating the full high-level situational cognitive model of a speech act type by making explicit use of the performative verb. Non-conventional constructions are those which are not capable by themselves of instantiating the high-level model corresponding to an illocutionary category. In these cases, illocutionary interpretation relies on contextual information or shared background

knowledge. An example is the *Will You X_{VP}?* construction for the expression of requests. Through the activation of part (a) of the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model*, which constitutes the background for the high-level model of requesting, the speaker enquires about the addressee's willingness to help. The request value of the construction relies on the realization of the variable elements of the construction (i.e. the X_{VP} element is realized by a verb which denotes some kind of benefit to the addressee). In cases where the verb points to the addressee as the beneficiary of the action (cf. *Will you turn the music off?*), contextual information would make the interpretation of the construction as a request fairly straightforward. In contrast, if the verb does not involve any benefit to the addressee (cf. *Will you divorce your husband?*) the request value of the construction is automatically cancelled out. Thus, in the approach to illocution propounded by the LCM, conventionalization processes are compatible with inferential activity.

The present article takes sides with the notion of illocutionary constructions posited by the LCM and with the description of the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model*, both of which will serve as major theoretical elements of our analysis. The study of constructions in the next section will explore the theoretical implications of the account of illocution provided by the LCM on the basis of a wide range of instances of orders.

3. The semantic structure of orders

An order is an instruction given to people to make them act in the way other people want them to. The two conventions of the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model* that apply in the interpretation of orders read as follows (Ruiz de Mendoza & Baicchi 2007: 111):

> *If it is manifest to A that a particular state of affairs is not beneficial to B, and if A has the capacity to change that state of affairs, then A should do so.*
>
> *If it is manifest to A that a potential state of affairs is not beneficial to B, then A is not expected to bring it about.*

These two conventions also provide the background for the understanding of other directive acts such as requests. However, what is crucial about orders is the fact that the speaker has authority over the addressee. The speaker's power is linguistically realized through formal mechanisms like bare imperatives and falling intonation. The kind of authority the speaker is endowed with allows him to perform an order and reduces the addressee's options to refuse to act. The generic structure of orders generalizes over multiple everyday cases of social interaction where people attempt to get something done by other people. The following may be examples of low-level cognitive models for orders:

(1) A person has authority over someone else. The first person wants this other person to do something. Through an utterance, the first person makes this wish manifest to the other person. The other person, who is the addressee, acts as commanded.
(2) A person has authority over someone else. The first person wants this other person to do something. Through an utterance, the first person makes this other person aware of his obligation to act. The other person, who is the addressee, acts as commanded.
(3) A person in a position of authority knows that a course of action would be beneficial to someone else. This person appeals to the addressee's willingness to act. The addressee acts as commanded.
(4) A person in a position of authority over someone else wants this person to join him in a course of action that is beneficial for both. This other person, who is the addressee, acts as commanded.

These low-level models of ordering share common elements which make up their generic structure:

(5) A person has authority over someone else. The first person wants this other person to do something. Through an utterance, the first person makes this other person aware of his wish. The addressee is under the obligation to act as commanded. The addressee is expected to act as commanded.

This generic structure can be realized by means of specific constructions each of which, through contrast with others, acquires a given instantiation potential which is ultimately based on the way it exploits the generic structure. Some constructional realizations of the generic structure of orders are exemplified in the utterances below:

(6) I want you to leave me alone! (BNC)
(7) Shut up and sit down! (BNC)
(8) You are to hold this line (COCA 2008)
(9) You will finish this planet for us (COCA 2004)
(10) Jones, I order you to clean your boots (BNC)

All the above realizations, which instantiate relevant parts of the generic structure of orders, represent fairly explicit means for their expression. Utterance (6) spells out the part of the generic structure that relates to the speaker's wish to get an action carried out by the addressee. Utterance (7) instantiates the part of the generic structure in which the speaker gives an instruction for the performance of an action. The harsh use of a falling intonation in these two utterances underscores a further component of orders, which is the fact that the speaker has authority over the addressee. In turn, utterance (8) instantiates the part of the generic structure that presents the addressee as the agent of the action that is the object of the

speaker's wishes. The speaker's authority and the addressee's lack of optionality contribute to making the speaker's intended act of ordering explicit. The same meaning conditions are expressed in utterance (9). Finally, utterance (10), which displays the highest degree of codification for orders, manages to activate the full generic structure by making use of the performative verb. As will be made apparent in the next section, the use of these constructional realizations for ordering displays some peculiarities motivated by differences in the context of situation.

4. The realization of orders

The expression of orders has traditionally been associated with imperative sentences. Recent studies on the imperative sentence type, however, contradict such a belief (Stefanowistch & Gries 2003; Pérez & Ruiz de Mendoza 2010). Such studies give evidence that the imperative mood is prototypically used to direct attention with a low degree of imposition. These findings are in line with Pérez's (2001) research on illocution, which shows the imperative sentence type as largely unspecified and compatible with the performance of most directive speech acts. Thus, not only orders, but also all other directive speech acts can be performed by means of an imperative. Furthermore, orders can also be expressed through the use of declarative and interrogative sentences. In the next section, it is our objective to deal with the most common constructional realizations that activate the meaning conditions of the generic structure of ordering.

4.1. *Imperative order constructions*

The preference for the use of the imperative sentence type in the performance of orders is certainly not gratuitous. The imposing nature of imperative sentences makes them excellent foundations for the expression of orders. Imperative constructions are capable of conveying the imposition that is characteristic of orders:

(11) $X_{VP\text{-}IMP}$
Get me that iron quickly (BNC)

The use of an isolated imperative is capable in itself of producing explicit orders. The lack of overt mitigation enhances the degree of codification of the imperative as an order. The interpretation of an imperative is, however, dependent on contextual information to a large extent. Lower degrees of authority of the speaker over the addressee motivate an interpretation of a speech act which is closer to a request than to an order. In contrast, if the speaker has authority over the addressee, the interpretation of the imperative as an order is very straightforward. In utterance

(11) above, the speaker's authority is communicated by means of an expression of immediateness (i.e. *quickly*). The use of this type of expressions requires powerful speakers and is fairly specified for the realization of orders. As observed in the example, the combination of an imperative sentence and an expression of immediateness endow the order with a forceful meaning impact. Consider now example (12):

(12) *Please* $X_{VP\text{-}IMP}$
Please keep quiet (COCA 1998)

When used with the falling intonation that characterizes orders, *please* functions as a mitigator. The concept of mitigation has been traditionally associated with acts that involve optionality on the part of the speaker, like requests. In requests, mitigators are used to persuade the addressee into compliance by appealing to his willingness to help the speaker. In orders, mitigating devices may be seen as an irrelevant issue. The use of the adverb *please* in constructional realizations for ordering proves this intuition wrong. It is true that the lack of mitigation motivates more clear examples of ordering. However, highly codified orders may use some mitigating devices that may respond to a need to decrease the force of the act thus minimizing the cost that the specified action involves for the addressee. Examples (13) and (14) below illustrate this:

(13) Please take me straight back to London (BNC)
(14) When you are in your seats, *please* keep your belts fastened (COCA 1991)

The use of *please* reduces the imposition of the order in the two utterances. In utterance (13), the use of *please* offsets the urgency conveyed by the falling intonation and the inflexibility of the adverb. In (14), the adverb *please* reminds the addressees that they are compelled to obey regulations for their own safety. Both orders are uttered by powerful speakers. It may be the case that the power of the speaker is not enough to force the addressee into compliance. It may also be the case that the speaker does not want to make use of his power to achieve his goal. On these occasions, the mitigating effect of the construction has to do with the speaker's desire to reduce the force of the order. In other cases, the speaker may prefer to reinforce the imperative tone of the order by making explicit its illocutionary value. This is achieved through the use of an explicit performative construction:

(15) X_{VP} *It Is An Order*
Hurry up, Arthur! Go faster! It's an order! (COCA 2003)

The explicitation of the ordering value manages to instantiate the full generic structure of ordering. The meaning conveyed by the construction, however, changes depending on whether it is the speaker or a third party that issues the command.

In example (15), it is the speaker who gives the order and its communicative purpose is to get the addressee to carry out an action. In this scenario, it is evident that the speaker is in a position of authority over the addressee. This use of the construction, together with the falling intonation, conveys the implication that the speaker's decision is definite and gives the addressee little freedom to refuse. In contrast, when the construction is used in a context where the order comes from a third party and the speaker only reports on it, the meaning changes. Consider the example below:

(16) Your presence is required. This is not a request, Ross, it's an order (COCA 1994)

In the case of (16), the speaker is not giving the order, but simply pondering on the fact that orders have to be complied with. This use of the construction responds to the speaker's wish not to appear responsible for the obligation that is imposed over the addressee. Whoever the command comes from, nevertheless, the construction is uttered by speakers in a position of authority who believe the addressee is not willing to act as required. Higher degrees of willingness on the part of the addressee may motivate the use of more polite forms.

Another construction is exemplified in (17):

(17) *Let's* X_{VP}
Come on, guys. Let's clean up the mess (COCA 1994)

The plural imperative form *let's* is generally associated with acts of suggesting that involve both the speaker and the addressee. The "order" reading of this construction is largely dependent on contextual variables. In example (17), for instance, the speaker has enough power to impose on the addressee, but since the addressee is willing to carry out the action, the speaker does not need to perform a strict order and prefers a softer form. In these cases, this constructional form represents a much more appropriate means for the expression of the order.

4.2. Declarative order constructions

Declarative sentences are in principle compatible with the nature of orders since these involve the presentation of a future state of affairs. This property, however, is shared by the whole range of directive speech acts. As a result, the same factor that makes declarative sentences appropriate for the performance of orders makes them also suitable for expressing other directive categories. It becomes necessary to consider the relevance of other grammatical and lexical means which, used in conjunction with the declarative sentence type, result in a higher degree of codification of declaratives for the expression of orders. The constructions that we will examine below illustrate the way in which the use of different linguistic

mechanisms contributes to increasing the degree of specification of a declarative as an order. Consider (18):

(18) *You Have Got To* X_{VP}
Quiet, you've got to be quiet now, you've got to be quiet! (COCA 2010)

Highly codified orders can be produced by specifying declarative sentences by means of modality markers. Objective modality expresses the speaker's evaluation of the likelihood of occurrence of a state of affairs. Modality markers are capable of activating the parameter of the generic structure that points to the obligation that is imposed on the addressee. This type of obligation arises from the observance of the principles of interaction stipulated in the cultural conventions underlying the conceptual grounding of orders. Thus, through the activation of part (a) of the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model*, the addressee should bring about a state of affairs that is beneficial to the speaker provided that he has the ability to do so. Since the addressee has not brought about such a state of affairs, the speaker reminds him of his obligation to do so. Through a metonymic inferential schema, this construction gives easy access to the generic structure and has thus become highly conventionalized for the expression of orders. We have a similar situation in (19):

(19) *You Must* X_{VP}
You must write in a clear and lucid style (BNC)

The metonymic operation specified above is the same for this construction, with the difference that the use of the modal verb *must* makes the obligation imposed on the addressee more explicit. In the previous case, the modal verb implicated that the carrying out of the specified action should come as a personal decision made by the addressee. Self-imposed obligation acts, in this connection, as a source of authority. In the case of (19), the modal verb expresses an obligation imposed by a source that is external to the addressee, either the speaker or a third party. This type of obligation thus indicates higher degrees of imposition and is much more appropriate to express orders. Consider now:

(20) *You Are Going To* X_{VP}
You are going to play in the competition (BNC)

This construction expresses the same meaning of imposition as the previous ones. Again, through the application of part (a) of the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model*, the speaker reminds the addressee that he is under the obligation to bring about a certain state of affairs. The speaker then specifies the state of affairs that is expected to be brought about by the addressee. By expressing certainty about the carrying out of the action that is the object of the speaker's wishes, this realization presents the addressee as lacking optionality under the speaker's authority. Furthermore, the expression of certainty about the addressee's future course of action points to

the position of authority held by the speaker. The activation of these properties functions as a hint to interpret the construction as an order. Nevertheless, there is one parameter of the generic structure that is not overtly instantiated by this type of realization, namely, the speaker's interest in getting the action carried out. This parameter can be made explicit by means of using another declarative sentence expressing the speaker's wishes (cf. *You are going to play in the competition because I want you to*). This type of instances of the construction may display higher degrees of achievement as they activate a higher number of parameters of the generic structure of ordering. A slightly different situation is provided by (22):

(22) *You Are To* X_{VP}
You are not to call out. You are to raise your hand (COCA 2006)

The rationale behind this construction is the same as above but the modality marker used in this case places more emphasis on the addressee and his obligation to carry out the action expressed in the predication. This meaning implication manages to produce fairly codified instances of ordering.

Consider now:

(23) *I Order You To* X_{VP}
You people are trespassing. I order you off. Now (COCA 1990)

The explicitation of the order meaning of the construction can be made by using a performative verb.[2] The interpretation of performative constructions like the one exemplified above is to a large extent cued (i.e. linguistically guided) by the explicit use of the performative verb. The example in (23) succeeds in activating the full generic structure of the cognitive model in question thereby leading the addressee to the ordering value almost effortlessly. The high degrees of imposition conveyed by performative constructions of this kind makes them adequate in contexts in which the speaker wants to reinforce his authority over the addressee. As expected, the variable element of the construction must denote a speaker-controllable activity in order to inhibit an "order" reading. The constituent element can be interchanged with other verbs of command. See how the meaning implications of this realization do not change with the use of one or another verb:

(24) I command you to stay with me forever! (BNC)

(25) I instruct you to make a formal application (COCA 1990)

These realizations carry the same meaning entailments and because of this they may be regarded as mere constructional variants making use of different performative verbs. In any case, the use of a performative verb has the consequence of producing forceful orders.

Let us not consider (26):

(26) *I Want You To* X_{VP}
I want you to follow a woman (BNC)

This construction points to the parameter of the generic structure that presents the speaker as wanting the addressee to carry out an action. This is the motivating factor for orders, but its activation is not in itself capable of instantiating the complete generic structure. The "order" reading is thus dependent on contextual information pointing to the speaker as holding a position of authority over the addressee. In orders, such authority would be enough to bring about the compliance of the addressee and the order meaning of the construction would be simple to grasp. In contexts in which the relationship between participants is on equal terms, the use of the construction would count as an instance of a request.

4.3. Interrogative order constructions

Interrogative sentences are the least codified means for the performance of orders. This is due to the fact that the openness of the interrogative sentence type clashes with the imposition conveyed by orders. However, it is possible to reduce the characteristic openness of an interrogative sentence by means of certain linguistic mechanisms like expressions of immediateness and falling intonation, supported by gesturing. In so doing, the speaker will be able to activate the lack of optionality element that is typical of orders thus making the act more explicit. Let us concentrate on how these mechanisms are used to increase the degree of codification of interrogative constructions for the realization of orders:

(27) *Can you* X_{VP}*?*
Can you shut up for a minute? (COCA 2006)

This is fundamentally a request construction, but its request meaning can be overridden through pragmatic inference. The fact that the speaker questions the addressee about his capacity to carry out an action to satisfy the wishes of an authoritative speaker produces a collapse of logic that can only be re-established if the utterance is understood as an order. The interpretation of this realization as an order thus arises from the instantiation of part (a) of the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model*, which binds people to act to the benefit of others provided that they have the capacity to do so. Questioning someone over whom we have authority about his capacity to carry out an action to our benefit functions as a means of persuasion to obtain his compliance. Since the addressee should have acted as specified without being asked to do so, the use of this construction straightforwardly applies to cases in which the speaker wants to impose his authority to get the action carried out by the addressee.

It is precisely the speaker's latent authority that enables the "order" interpretation; otherwise the utterance would be understood as a request. Compare now:

(27) *Can You Please X_{VP}?*
Can you please stop interrupting? These are ridiculous objections. (COCA 1997)

This construction applies the same rationale as *Can You X_{VP}?*, with the difference that in this case the use of the adverb *please* urges the addressee to perform the action thus endowing the order with a more forceful meaning impact. The impositive use of the adverb derives from the fact that the addressee has not acted as expected by the speaker and therefore the speaker feels compelled to appeal to his willingness to do something which in principle should have been unnecessary.

A different interpretive path is taken by the following construction:

(29) *Why Don't You X_{VP}?*
Why don't you just be quiet for a while? (BNC)

Again this construction conventionally conveys a suggestion. This meaning can be nonetheless overridden through inference in a context in which the speaker is evidently irritated. In such a context, the speaker is not likely to be making a suggestion, so the addressee has to look for a different interpretation. The "order" interpretation of the construction thus presupposes that the addressee is behaving improperly and not acting as the speaker wants. This realization calls the addressee's attention to the ongoing state of affairs that affects the speaker and should be changed to his benefit, as stipulated in part (b) of the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model*. The activation of this generalization gives easy access to the part of the generic structure in which the addressee is required to act as the speaker wants, which gives rise to the order value of the construction. In utterance (29), the imposing falling intonation, together with the use of a time adverb contribute to making the act of ordering more explicit. The use of falling intonation decreases the openness of the interrogative sentence type and functions as a reminder of the speaker's authority. The time adverb *for a while* has the function of urging the addressee to act as required by the speaker. As should be expected, the use of these mechanisms increases the degree of codification of the resulting order.

5. Concluding remarks

The present contribution represents a first attempt to develop the illocutionary component in the LCM. This study makes use of an explanatorily adequate framework to understand the semantic and pragmatic behavior of illocutionary constructions that makes it possible to account for how illocution imposes different degrees of codification on its production and interpretation. The LCM adopts a

constructional account of non-pragmatic illocutionary phenomena capable of explaining the cognitive motivation and constraints of speech act meaning. In the LCM, illocutionary meaning is conveyed by means of conventionalized strings made up of parametrizable –and thus modifiable– and non-parametrizable or fixed elements. The LCM regards illocutionary constructions as the result of the interplay between cognitive construal operations and general principles of interaction formulated in the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model*. This model lies at the root of both conventional and non-conventional linguistic structures expressing all kinds of illocutionary meaning. Non-conventional expressions require inferential activity to produce illocutionary meaning, which is regulated through metonymic access to abstract cognitive models that are ultimately based on the generalizations of the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model*. Conventional expressions become entrenched as inferential shortcuts through frequent use. The approach adopted by the LCM thus considers both inference and codification. Our analysis has explored the theoretical implications of the LCM based on a wide range of instances of ordering drawn from electronic corpora. After defining the cognitive model underlying the speech act of ordering, we have described the illocutionary constructions that activate the parameters of the cognitive model. We have explored the way in which these constructions are used in the performance of orders depending on their degree of instantiation potential for each of the parameters that make up the cognitive model. Then we have shown that the nature of these constructions ranges from codification to different levels of conventionalization. Imperative constructions are the most explicit means of expressing orders. Declarative constructions only partially activate the cognitive model and their interpretation as orders is largely dependent on their use of specific linguistic mechanisms such as oblique modal verbs, expressions of immediateness or intonation patterns. At the end of the codification scale, interrogative constructions are the least specified means for the expression of orders due to their low instantiation potential. These facts evidence the need to account for illocution from a constructional perspective, although future research is needed to develop further the LCM's description of illocutionary constructions. The present study may thus add to the increasingly larger pool of proposals that lead in the direction of a cognitive account of illocutionary phenomena.

Notes

[1]. Center for Research in the Applications of Language (CRAL) (www.cilap.es). Financial support for this research has been provided by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation; grant number FFI2010-17610/FILO.

[2]. The notion of performative utterances is introduced by Austin (1962) to define those speech acts making explicit the act they are performing. The Functional Grammar (FG) account of illocution (Dik, 1989, 1997) is fully compatible with Austin's

description of explicit performatives. According to FG, the illocutionary meaning of explicit performative utterances is obtained derivationally where the starting point is the basic sentence type (e.g. the promise verb in *I promise I will buy you a car* transforms the statement into a promise). In contrast to FG account, the constructional perspective adopted by the LCM argues that certain explicit illocutionary values are not predictable from grammatical form and puts forward the idea that illocutionary meaning is obtained through the activation of high-level situational cognitive models, which are specifications of the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model.

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UNIFICATION OF THE SEMANTICS OF THE INFINITIVE IN ENGLISH[1]

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1. Introduction

More than twenty years ago, Wierzbicka (1988, 23) wrote, "clearly, the syntax of English complementation cannot be satisfactorily accounted for without semantics; unfortunately, with semantics, it cannot be satisfactorily accounted for either". It seems that the present situation has not changed much since with regard to the semantics of the infinitive in English as will be shown immediately.[2] It is generally agreed that the infinitive denotes some kind of future. This is illustrated in the following examples:

(1) Mary wants to be an actress (in future).
(2) I told Mary to be an actress.

When one says 'future', it means that the time of the event represented by the infinitive (henceforth, the time of the infinitive) is temporally located after the time of the event represented by the matrix predicate (henceforth, the time of the matrix predicate or verb). Therefore, in (1) the time of Mary's becoming an actress (if it really happens) is placed after now because the time of the matrix verb lies in the present. Similarly, in (2), the time of Mary's becoming an actress should follow that of the matrix verb, which is sometime in the past. Therefore, Mary may already be an actress now or this may have not happened yet. It is true that in most cases it is sufficient to interpret the infinitive as some kind of (relative) future.

However, it is easy to find examples which do not conform to this tendency. Examine the following sentences:

(3) Mary seems to be honest.
(4) George pretends to be honest.
(5) I consider Mary to be honest.

The examples above seem to show that the time of the infinitive overlaps with that of the matrix predicate. For example, (3) does not mean that Mary's being honest happens sometime in future. In fact, it expresses the present situation. What is worse, the infinitive seems to represent even past with regard to the matrix predicate as follows:

(6) It is nice to meet you.
(7) I am glad to meet you.
(8) I am surprised to see you.

The infinitive in (6), (7), and (8) seems to function as a reason for the state represented by the matrix predicates. Therefore, the content of the infinitive, chronologically speaking, should occur prior to the state denoted by the matrix predicates.

As is clear from the data above, the semantics of the infinitive in English seems to resist a single interpretation. As will be shown later, there is no proposal to explain all the diverse phenomena under a single interpretation. Therefore, Wierzbicka's words of more than twenty years ago still hold now. However, this paper aims to unify the semantics of the infinitive in English. This paper is organized as follows. First I will critically review Wierzbicka (1988), Duffley (2000, 2006) and Duffley (1992) to show that each account has a few problems. Then I will argue that the infinitive represents incorporation of a possible world by the 'real' world.

2. Three proposals: Wierzbicka (1988), Duffley (2000, 2006) and Duffley (1992)

Due to limited space, it is impossible to review all the papers on the infinitive in English. However, it is possible to divide most of them roughly into two categories. The proposals in the first category, where most classic ones belong, present a concrete definition of the infinitive with exceptions or a few variable definitions to cover all data. I believe that Jespersen (1940), Close (1962), Bolinger (1968), Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970), Stowell (1982), Dixon (1984), Quirk et al (1985), Wierzbicka (1988) and Duffley (1992) belong to this category.

The other category includes relatively recent proposals such as Dirven (1989), Verspoor (1999), Smith and Escobedo (2001), and Duffley (2000, 2006).

These proposals have been developed along with the advancement of cognitive linguistics. The proposals in this category assume that there is a single underlying representation for the same form, which is called a schema, and different interpretations may be added as the schema is applied to individual cases. In this way, it is possible to cover all seemingly conflicting data, though the schema tends to be too vague to be explanatory. In this section, I will review Wierzbicka (1988), Duffley (2000, 2006) and Duffley (1992).[3]

2.1. Wierzbicka (1988)

This is one of the most comprehensive works on English complementation. As far as the infinitive is concerned, Wierzbicka initially claims that its semantics includes the elements of 'I want' and some kind of futurity. This definition works well when one needs to explain the difference between the following:

(9) She was afraid to wake her mistress up. Wierzbicka (1988, 33)
(10) She was afraid of waking her mistress up. Wierzbicka (1988, 33)

(9) has an infinitive, so it implies that she wanted to wake her mistress up, but she was afraid to do so. On the other hand, in (10), there is no intention of her waking her mistress up: what she was doing might wake her mistress up, and this is what she was afraid of. In this way, the difference between the infinitive and the gerund is accounted for very nicely.

Nevertheless, as the data coverage expands, there are uses which seem to resist the interpretation of 'I want' and futurity. One such example is found when the matrix predicate denotes some kind of opinion. Examine the following sentence:

(11) I believe Mary to be dishonest. Wierzbicka (1988, 49)

As noted in the introduction, chronologically Mary's being dishonest, if any, does not follow the speaker's state of believing. Thus, strictly speaking, futurity does not hold here. Nonetheless, in this case, by employing Dixon's (1984) "yet unrealized activity", Wierzbicka continues to claim that the infinitive represents some kind of futurity. However, what is more problematic is that she continues to argue that the element of 'I want' is included in the example. According to the proposal, (11), for instance, implies that the speaker does not 'want' to say that people claim that Mary is dishonest, where 'I want' appears in negation. It may be presupposed that people, with the exception of the speaker, do not say that Mary is dishonest, but this presupposition need not be present. Moreover, if one applies 'I want' to (11) mechanically following the instance of (9) (where 'want' is applied directly to the infinitive), then he or she expects to learn that Mary 'wants' to be dishonest. Nevertheless, this interpretation is never found in (11).

More serious problems arise when one turns to the cases in which the matrix predicate denotes certain emotions. Consider the following example:

(12) I was surprised to hear that. Wierzbicka (1988, 105)

As noted above, the infinitive seems to function as a cause of the speaker's state of being surprised. In this case, Wierzbicka changes the definition of the infinitive and 'I want' is replaced with 'I think'. Thus, in the end she says, "It would appear that TO complements are generally characterized not only by a personal, first-person mode ('I want', 'I know', 'I think'), but also by a future component of some sort" (Wierzbicka 1988, 166). Therefore, no unified definition of the infinitive is available there.

The problem is not limited to the variability of the definition, however. To retain futurity, she claims that (12) implies that before the sentence was uttered, the speaker imagined the consequence of his or her hearing that, and thought that if this happened, he or she 'would' be surprised. However, it is hard to detect such a presupposition in the example. In fact, one may well be surprised if unexpected things happen.

To sum up, there are a few problems with Wierzbicka's (1988) proposal because it has failed to supply a unified interpretation of the infinitive and some hypothetical presuppositions have been posited.

2.2. Duffley (2000, 2006)

Duffley (2000, 2006), in contrast to Duffley (1992), which I will discuss in the next subsection, adopts the framework of cognitive linguistics. He claims that there is no single referential category to unify the semantics of the infinitive, as the following quotation makes clear:

> The fact that *to*'s meaning is so general that it can be applied to a variety of domains belies any attempt to reduce its meanings to a single referential category such as "future" (Duffley 2006, 27-28).

His main claim is that *to* in the infinitive is a preposition and, like other prepositions, it is polysemous. At the schematic level, the infinitive indicates "the very general notion of movement leading to a point" (2006, 26). Then this general notion is applied to various domains and specific meanings are attached to individual cases.

The starting point is the spatial interpretation of the preposition *to*. As in the example, *John went to the pool* (Duffley 2006, 25), *to* represents some spatial endpoint as a kind of Goal. If this general notion is metaphorically extended to a temporal domain, the infinitive is subsequent to the matrix predicate. Thus, the notion of futurity flows easily from such sequences as *Mary plans to visit her friend*.[4]

When the schematic notion is applied to other domains, the notion of sequence in time disappears. Consider the following example:

(13) The wall seems to be crooked. Duffley (2006, 27)

In this case, the domain is "logical rather than chronological". As a result, "appearances are represented as pointing/leading to the attribution of crookedness to the wall". Similarly, following Verspoor (1999), if the main predicate denotes some kind of opinion as in (14), the domain is "mental rather than temporal".

(14) I knew/believed him to be a liar. Duffley (2006, 27)

In this case, in the speaker's mind, 'him' is moving toward 'to be a liar'. More specifically, "knowledge and belief are represented as causing a mental connection of 'him' to 'be a liar' " (Duffley 2006, 27).

As discussed above, Duffley's (2000, 2006) analysis of the infinitive is that its general notion is movement leading to a point, but it is polysemous depending on the application domains. However, there are two potential problems. The first one is that the fact that the infinitive in English is actually polysemous may pose a problem for the language acquisition perspective. Thus, if there is a more concrete and unified interpretation of the infinitive, it is easier for children to acquire it. The other problem is that Duffley (2000, 2006) does not discuss the cases in which the matrix predicate represents certain emotions such as (12), (repeated below):

(12) I was surprised to hear that.

This kind of example is problematic for most accounts which assume futurity because the event of the infinitive seems to happen before the situation of the matrix predicate begins. This sentence seems to be problematic for Duffley (2000, 2006) as well, but this type of example is not discussed there.[5]

2.3. Duffley (1992)

This is another comprehensive work by the same author on the infinitive in English, particularly on the difference between the infinitive with *to* and the one without *to*. In contrast to Duffley (2000, 2006), the definition of the infinitive in Duffley (1992) is more concrete, as follows:

(15) the infinitive evokes an event, and *to*, the movement from an instant situated before this event up to the instant at which the event begins.
(Duffley 1992, 17)[6]

In other words, the infinitive describes the temporal transition from the state before the realization of the event of the infinitive (called 'before-position') to the moment when the realization of the event begins (called 'after-position'); this idea is similar to Hirtle (1975) in that the infinitive describes a situation before the

event of the infinitive is realized. This definition seems to work well not only for the examples such as (1) and (2) but also for examples such as (12). (1) and (2) are repeated below:

(1) Mary wants to be an actress (in future).
(2) I told Mary to be an actress.

In (1), there is a state of Mary's not being an actress and another state of Mary's being an actress, and the sentence means that Mary wants transition from the former state to the latter one. (2) is explained similarly. Duffley (1992) further argues that *to* requires the bare infinitive to be placed after something. Thus, in the case of examples such as (1) and (2), the infinitive content is placed after the matrix verbs, and hence, the notion of 'futurity' is derived in many cases.

Furthermore, the infinitive selected by emotion predicates such as (12) can be easily explained under Duffley (1992), which seems to be a problem for Duffley (2000, 2006) and others. Since *to* in the infinitive denotes a movement from the state when the infinitive is unrealized to the state when it begins to be realized, this movement may well be regarded as the cause of the emotion expressed by the main clause.

There is one problem with this proposal, however. As implied in Duffley (2000, 2006), if the movement represented by *to* in the infinitive is limited to a temporal transition, the infinitive must always be subsequent to 'something else'. Although this manner of positioning of the infinitive works well for examples such as (1) and (2), examples such as (13) and (14), which are repeated below, seem to be problematic:

(13) The wall seems to be crooked. Duffley (2006, 27)
(14) I knew/believed him to be a liar. Duffley (2006, 27)

Both in (13) and in (14), the time of the event denoted by the matrix predicate does not seem to be prior to the one of the situation represented by the infinitive.[7]

A more problematic example is the following:

(16) The village ceased to exist.

According to (15), *to* denotes the movement from the state before the event of the infinitive is realized to the moment when the same event begins to be realized. In other words, the infinitive itself means that the village, which did not exist before, appeared and existed somewhere. However, (16), on the whole, means such change of the state ceased. That is to say, the process of forming the village stopped in the middle, which implies that the village was never completed. Nevertheless, (16) does not have such a meaning. If the movement denoted by *to* is limited to temporal transition as in Duffley (1992), examples such as (16) cannot be easily resolved.

Despite this problem, Duffley's (1992) claim seems to be a better analysis than Duffley (2000, 2006) and other cognitive linguists' accounts in that it provides a more concrete definition of the infinitive. Below I will present a proposal which avoids the problems mentioned above.

3. The infinitive as incorporation of a possible world by the 'real' world

In this section I will claim that the infinitive in English builds possible worlds (cf. Lewis (1986) for possible worlds), in one of which the predicate of the infinitive holds, and *to* in the infinitive describes how the 'real' world in the mind of an individual moves towards, and hence assimilates the possible world among the many possible worlds. This section is organized as follows. First, I will present a brief notion of possible worlds. Then I will explain data which are sorted according to its temporal interpretations, and will show that the infinitive in all of the data receives the single but non-abstract interpretation.

3.1. Possible worlds

First compare the following sentences:

(17) The earth is flat.
(18) I wish the earth were flat.

Current science would regard (17) as false. However, people talk about counterfactuals all the time as in (18). This fact shows that we entertain situations other than the present situation, which are called possible worlds (cf. Lewis 1986). Thus, although (17) is false in the real world, one can truthfully say (18) because the semantic content of the embedded clause may hold in at least one possible world. If one makes use of this notion, unifying the semantics of the infinitive becomes very simple.[8]

3.2. *To* as 'future'[9]

Here I claim that the infinitive builds a possible world which is created by the predicate of the infinitive. I also assume that there is a type of possible world called the 'real' world, which the matrix subject or the speaker thinks reflects the reality.[10] The infinitive describes how the 'real' world enters, and hence, incorporates, the possible world represented by the predicate of the infinitive. In other words, what holds in the possible world comes to hold in the 'real' world too.

As an illustration, consider (19):

(19) Johni wants to PRO_i see a unicorn.

Following the tradition of generative grammar, I assume that the logical subject (or external argument) of the infinitive in (19) is denoted by "PRO", which refers to 'John.' The semantic representation is shown as below:

(20) John wants:



In (20), the undotted arrow indicates the path of the 'real' world while the dotted arrows describe paths which the 'real' world does not follow. Round spaces denote other possible worlds. The uppermost possible world in (20) represents a world where John can see a unicorn. I argue that the meaning of the infinitive is that the 'real' world enters and incorporates the possible world denoted by the predicate of the infinitive among many other possible worlds. Specifically, the content of the possible world is added to the 'real' world inside the rectangle, and this change is what John wants.

Above I have discussed a case in which the time of the infinitive is subsequent to that of the matrix predicate. There are many matrix predicates of this type in English: *want*, *expect*, *seek*, *attempt*, *plan*, and so on. One feature common to such predicates is that the movement process denoted by the infinitive is most naturally interpreted if the process happens at a later point than the time of the matrix predicates.[11] For example, in the case of *want*, when one wants something, one normally thinks of its realization as in the future, and one cannot want something that has already been realized. Similarly, in the case of *plan*, one does not plan events which have already passed. On the basis of the argument above, it is reasonable to assume that the time of the movement process denoted by the infinitive is determined by the semantics of the matrix predicate. Therefore, it is not always the case that the time of the infinitive follows that of a matrix predicate. Next we examine the cases in which the time of the infinitive overlaps with that of a matrix predicate.

3.3. *To* as 'present'

First, we discuss the following two examples:

(21) $John_i$ seems to t_i be sad.
(22) Mary considers $John_i$ to t_i be honest.

Both examples above have one feature in common: the time of the infinitive overlaps with that of the matrix predicate. However, there is one difference in terms of the possessor of the 'real' world. In the case of raising-to-subject predicates as in (21), the speaker of the sentence, not the subject (John), entertains his or her own 'real' world. This is because before the movement of John to the matrix subject, the matrix verb, *seem*, is a one-place predicate and selects the infinitive, and the implicit thinker of *seem* is the speaker of the sentence, not John.[12]

On the other hand, in the case of raising-to-object predicates as in (22), the matrix subject, Mary, possesses the 'real' world because the infinitive is selected by *consider* and the subject (or external argument) of *consider* is Mary. This difference apart, the two examples can be explained in a similar manner. They are represented as follows:

(23) (for (21))
It seems (or the speaker perceives):



(24) (for (22))
Mary considers:



In (23) the speaker's 'real' world chooses the world where John is sad, among many other choices. Hence, in the perception of the speaker, it seems that John's being sad is true. On the other hand, in (24), the matrix subject, Mary, considers the path of her 'real' world, which enters the world where John is honest. In other words, in Mary's thinking, John's being honest is true.

Before discussing the 'past' use of *to*, let me account for a problematic example for Duffley (1992) mentioned above. Consider (16) again:

(16) The village$_i$ ceased to t_i exist.[13]

The reason for its failure is that the transition from an unrealized to a realized event of the infinitive is temporal, i.e., occurs on the same time axis as in Duffley (1992). However, if that is the case, the sentence is expected to imply that there was a transition from a time when the village did not exist to a time when the village existed, which is not the intended meaning of (16). However, this kind of problem does not arise in the present account. (16) is represented as follows:

(25) What ceased is:



Similarly to *seem*, *cease* is a raising-to-subject and one-place predicate and selects the infinitive as its sole argument, so the possible worlds belong to the speaker in (25). The rectangle there represents the movement of the speaker's 'real' world into the world where the village existed. However, due to the matrix verb *cease*, the transition stopped, which implies that the world where the village existed was not part of his or her 'real' world. Hence, the speaker perceived that the village did not exist. Moreover, (the failure of) the transition happened in the mind of the speaker, not over time; hence, the interpretation is compatible with the presupposition that the village used to exist before, unlike Duffley's (1992) account.[14]

3.4. *To* as 'past'

The predicates which belong to this group denote some kind of emotion as discussed in Bolinger (1984), Wierzbicka (1988) and Duffley (1992) in detail. I examine the following example here:

(26) John$_i$ was surprised to PRO$_i$ see Mary.

In (26), the infinitive serves as the cause of John's surprise, so it is natural to think that the time of the infinitive precedes that of the matrix predicate. This fact has been a problem for all the proposals mentioned in this paper except Duffley (1992). However, it is easy to give a uniform account to examples such as (26) in the current proposal. (26) is represented as follows:

(27) John was surprised at:



(27) shows the movement process from John's 'real' world to the world where John sees Mary, which means that John thought he saw Mary. This movement was the direct cause of John's being surprised.[15] Therefore, the meaning of (32) is that John was surprised at the new realization brought about by the movement.[16]

To sum up so far, the infinitive represents the 'real' world's incorporation of a possible world denoted by the infinitive by entering it, and it does not have its independent tense in relation to the utterance time. In other words, the time of the infinitive is decided by the meaning and time of predicates which select the infinitive. Nonetheless, the past interpretation of the infinitive is quite restricted and mostly limited to emotion predicates. Most uses of the infinitive refer to present or future. This tendency owes much to the semantics of the infinitive, which describes movement between possible worlds. Thus, it is unsuitable to use the infinitive to represent past events using possible worlds because the content of the past is normally fixed in the 'real' world and incompatible with change (of possible worlds). In contrast, the infinitive can refer to future or present more easily because they are subject to change of states, events, and perception, and hence, creation of possible worlds.

4. Comparison between infinitive and gerund

In this section I would like to discuss how certain predicates select either an infinitive or a gerund or both, and if a predicate allows both of the forms, to show how the two forms can (or cannot) be differentiated in terms of interpretation. Before we proceed further, I would like to make one assumption. In the previous section, it has been shown that the infinitive creates possible worlds. I assume, in contrast, that the gerund itself does not produce a possible world apart from the 'real' world, which always exists in the mind of individuals.

As has been suggested by linguists such as Mair (2003), De Smet (2004), and Fanego (2004), semantics alone is not sufficient to explain why certain predicates select an infinitive or a gerund form. Nevertheless, it seems possible to provide a general tendency about the choice. For example, Rudanko (1989: 150) claims the following:

> infinitival […] constructions typically co-occur with verbs of positive volition while the *ing* pattern, lacking *to* and the historical associations of *to*, displays a tendency to favor verbs expressing negative volition.

Therefore, verbs of positive volition such as *want, hope, wish,* and *decide* take an infinitival form, whereas verbs of negative volition such as *avoid*, *cancel*, and *postpone* take a gerundive form. However, verbs such as *anticipate* and *intend* have positive volition, but they can select a gerundive form, whereas verbs such as *refuse* and *decline*, which seem to require negative volition, take an infinitival form. Furthermore, historically speaking, *avoid*, which now selects only a gerundive form, took an infinitival form earlier (cf. Fanego 1996a). Thus, I would like to modify it as follows:

(28) If the main predicate is nonimplicative and its complement denotes future, the complement tends to take an infinitival form. Otherwise, it takes a gerundive form.[17]

Since this is a tendency, there are still counter-examples as will be discussed below. However, the present proposal can account for the problem of why a tendency such as (28) exists. The reason is that since implicative verbs are verbs whose complements are supposed to happen (or not to happen) in reality, there is no need to posit other possible worlds apart from the 'real' world. For example, the verbal complement of *cannot help* is known to happen as illustrated by the following:

(29) a. Mary couldn't help laughing, so she laughed.
b. ?Mary couldn't help laughing, but she didn't laugh.

Thus, it is unnecessary to form possible worlds in the mind.

On the other hand, in the case of nonimplicative verbs such as *refuse*, its verbal complement may not happen as in the following:

(30) a. Mary refused to go out with John yesterday, so she didn't go out with him yesterday.
b. Mary refused to go out with John yesterday, but she changed her mind and went out with him yesterday.

Since *refuse* is nonimplicative, it is not known in advance whether its verbal complement really happens or not. Therefore, something that may or may not happen causes the speaker to create a possible world which the 'real' world may incorporate. Hence, the statement in (28) follows.

4.1. When the verbal complement refers to 'future'

Despite the argument above, it is impossible to predict the form of the verbal complement with semantics of the main predicate alone for several reasons. One is

that the meanings of infinitive and gerund could overlap under certain situations. In that case, history rather than semantics plays a more important role. Fanego (1996a) has shown that many uses of infinitives have been replaced by the gerund gradually over a long period. In this subsection, I would like to show how historical changes have affected the present choice of the infinitive and the gerund and to discuss two apparent (but not real) counterexamples.

The first big change in the use of the infinitive and the gerund was the following:

(31) If the complement of a main predicate denotes future and will definitely happen (or will not happen), the complement cannot take an infinitival form.

Because of this change, predicates such as *avoid, put off, postpone,* and *cancel* come to select a gerundive form because their complements are implicative and denote future. Consider the following example:

(32) John postponed writing a letter to Mary.

This sentence implies that although John's writing was postponed, it is assumed to happen, which I call future implicative. In contrast, predicates such as *want, hope, decide, promise, agree, plan* and many others take an infinitival form because their complements may or may not be realized, which I call future nonimplicative. Examine the following example:

(33) Mary has decided to go and see a movie.

(33) does not necessarily indicate that Mary will go and see a movie, i.e. Mary may change her mind and may not go to see a movie; we cannot be absolutely sure which course of action she will choose.

The difference between (32) and (33) is illustrated as follows, where *U* stands for the utterance time:

(34) John postponed writing a letter to Mary:



(35) Mary has decided:



In the case of a predicate whose complement is future implicative such as (34), since the content of the complement will surely take place, it is unnecessary to prepare a possible world other than the 'real' world, which is the horizontal arrow. In contrast, in the case of a predicate whose complement is future nonimplicative, the creation of a possible world is necessary, by which one can describe the possibility of something happening. Thus, the generalization in (31) is consistent with the present claim. However, I would like to discuss two types of verbs which seem not to conform to (31) below.

4.1.1. *Intend to vs. –ing*

The first case is *intend*. The complement of this verb can take either an infinitival or gerundive form without apparent semantic difference.[18] Strictly speaking, this fact is not a counterexample to (31) because the verb *intend* selects a future nonimplicative complement. That is, if one intends to go to work tomorrow, he may change his mind and may not go to work tomorrow. Nevertheless, the verb could choose a future implicative complement. Thus, if one intends going to work tomorrow and regards the action of going to work as one's plan, it is unnecessary to posit a possible world apart from the 'real' world. These two cases are illustrated as follows:

(36) He intends:



(37) He intends going to work tomorrow:



In the case of (36), 'his real' world enters, and hence, incorporates the possible world where 'he' works tomorrow, among other possible worlds, and this is what 'he' intends (to do). In other words, there are (infinitely) many choices, but 'he' chooses the path of 'his real' world entering the world where 'he' works tomorrow. On the other hand, in (37), the speaker's going to work is 'his' plan for tomorrow; in other words, 'he' knows that the plan will definitely happen. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to posit possible worlds and choose one. Both sentences describe the

same situation. Therefore, either usage is grammatical.[19] Verbs such as *anticipate, plan,* and *propose* belong here although *anticipate* takes a gerundive form mostly.

4.1.2. Verbs of imagination

Strictly speaking, verbs such as *consider, imagine, suggest, advise* and *risk* are not counterexamples to (31) because they are future nonimplicative. However, it is necessary to explain why an infinitival form is disallowed in such verbs. These verbs are exceptional in that they independently entertain possible worlds. Therefore, although they take a gerundive form, possible worlds are created too. Examine the following sentence and its semantic representation:

(38) He considers going to work tomorrow.

(39) He considers:



As assumed before, *consider* forms possible worlds without *to*. Thus, similarly to (36), there is a world where 'he' works tomorrow as well as other possible worlds. However, unlike (36), 'he' only considers a possibility of the 'real' world entering the world where 'he' works tomorrow: in other words, 'he' is not committed to any possible world there. Namely, 'he' is not strongly determined to make the possibility come true. Accordingly, the verbs of imagination cannot select an infinitive form if the 'real' world could turn into any of the possible worlds.

4.2. When a matrix predicate and its verbal complement overlap

The generalization of (31) is not applicable when the time of a main predicate and that of its complement overlap. Nevertheless, the following generalization holds:

(40) When a matrix predicate and its verbal complement overlap time-wise,

i) if the complement refers to some ongoing event, a gerundive form is appropriate, and

ii) if the matrix predicate stresses the transition from an unachieved state to its achieved state, an infinitive form is appropriate.

For example, verbs such as *enjoy, finish, stop, keep,* and *mind* take a complement which describes an ongoing event. Thus, they take a gerundive form:

(41) Mary enjoys singing very much.

(42) The kids didn't mind their parents smoking.

Since those verbs select verbal complements which hold in reality, there is no need to assume a possible world apart from the 'real' world. Hence, they take a gerundive form.

In contrast, verbs such as *manage, fail, seem,* and *pretend* describe the transition from an unachieved state to an achieved one, which is achieved by the 'real' world's entry into the possible world denoted by the infinitive.

Consider the following sentences:

(43) They managed to solve the problem.

(44) They failed to solve the problem.

(45) They pretended to be innocent.

Although *manage* and *fail* are implicative verbs, their meanings have to do with the successful or unsuccessful transition from the 'real' world into the possible world where they solve the problem. In the case of *pretend* as in (45), the movement of the 'real' world into the possible world which the infinitive describes is unsuccessful as with *fail*; however, it is intentional failure unlike *fail*. Since all of the verbs represent (successful or unsuccessful) transition between the 'real' and a possible world, they need an infinitive form as their verbal complements.

4.2.1. Aspectual verbs

There are many verbs which select both an infinitival and a gerundive form without apparent semantic difference. I will discuss a few cases in this and the next subsection.

Verbs such as *start, begin,* and *cease* allow both an infinitive and a gerund form as their complements without apparent semantic difference.[20] Compare the following pair:

(46) a. Mary started to dance.
b. Mary started dancing.

The meanings of these two examples are the following:

(47) Mary started:



(48) Mary started dancing:



(47) says that movement from Mary's 'real' world into the world where she dances started whereas the gerundive form in (48) expresses the beginning of Mary's dancing in the actual world. However, as far as the 'real' world is concerned, there is no semantic difference. Thus, both forms can convey the same meaning.[21]

4.2.2. *Like to vs. like –ing*

Kempson and Quirk (1971) claim that people show marked preference either to an infinitive or to an gerundive form under certain situations. Compare the following pair (1971: 552):

(49) a. I like to get up as soon as the alarm rings.
b. I like getting up when the weather is warm.

De Smet (2004) explains the contrast above by arguing that (49)*a* involves the subject's volition to get up whereas (49)*b* describes the subject's enjoyment of getting up.

The contrast can be easily explained under the present account too. In the case of (49)*a*, the infinitive expresses the movement of the speaker's 'real' world into the world where the speaker gets up, and what the speaker likes to do when the alarm rings is to get up among other possible choices (or actions). Thus, it explains De Smet's (2004) association of the infinitive with 'volition' very nicely. On the other hand, options of action are not taken into consideration in (49)*b*. It simply describes that what the speaker likes is getting up when the weather is warm. Thus, few people would employ the infinitive in (49)*b*.

However, De Smet also shows that both forms can show a habitual reading, in which case it is impossible to predict which form arises as a verbal complement of *like* as follows:

(50) a. He liked thinking of the past and the fun he'd had.
b. He liked to think of the past and the fun he'd had.
(Kempson and Quirk 1971: 552)

It is also possible to provide an account for this case. In the case of (50)*b*, what 'he' liked is to choose the action of thinking of the past among other choices in his spare time. In contrast, (50)*a* roughly means that 'he' thought of the past and the fun 'he' had as 'his' habit and 'he' enjoyed it, in which case the events of 'his'

thinking all appear on the time line of 'his real' world. Both of the meanings are possible to describe one's habit. Therefore, in the case of habitual readings, both options are available without much semantic difference. Hence, it is impossible to predict the form with the given information alone.

4.3. When the verbal complement refers to 'past'

If the time of a verbal complement is anterior to that of its main predicate, it mostly adopts a gerund form. Verbs such as *admit, regret,* and *deny* belong here. This situation is not unpredictable in the present account. Past events are what really happened (or did not happen), so it is unnecessary to create possible worlds and choose one of them using the infinitive. Thus, the gerund is normally favored when the content of the complement refers to an event or situation in the past.

However, as has been discussed in 0, emotion predicates such as *surprised* may select the infinitive, in which case the time of the infinitive is posterior to that of the main predicate. Accordingly, the gerund is not the only option when the complement refers to 'past'. Furthermore, according to Fanego (1996b), verbs such as *remember* used to allow *to have p.p.* as well as *–ing* until the mid of the 20th century. Besides, verbs such as *claim, hope* and *intend* can take *to have p.p.* This suggests that the infinitive can express 'past' content in two situations. One is when the change of state becomes the cause of an event described by the matrix predicate such as *surprised*, so there is overlap of time between the state and the event. The other type always needs the perfective *have*, which may suggest their complements overlap with their main predicates temporarily. Therefore, strictly speaking, the infinitives in both situations are not genuine cases of past.

5. Conclusion

I have shown above that the semantics of the infinitive can receive a uniform interpretation despite seemingly diverse uses. That is, the infinitive in English creates possible worlds, and the 'real' world enters, and hence, incorporates one of the possible worlds which is described by the predicate of the infinitive.

Moreover, deciding the time of the infinitive is dependent upon the semantics of the matrix predicate, due to which we typically have three uses of the infinitive in terms of its temporal interpretation: 'future', 'present', and 'past' to the time of the matrix predicate. As for the 'past' interpretation of the infinitive, its temporal positioning is very restricted and the 'real' world entry into the world denoted by the infinitive must serve as the direct cause of the emotional stated described by the matrix predicate (or perfective *have* is employed). Thus, the time of the

infinitive is not 'past' to that of the matrix predicate, but must be positioned at the beginning of the time of the matrix predicate. This argument, if correct, explains why predicates which require their objects to denote something in the past, such as *admit*, *regret*, and *remember* (when its object is a gerund), do not take the infinitive complement.[22]

As for the 'present' and 'future' interpretations, the former is often available with predicates of perception and realization because the movement of the 'real' world into the possible world denoted by the infinitive is directly perceived or realized; hence, their infinitives are naturally recognized as 'present'. Moreover, as with *manage, fail*, and *pretend*, when the success or failure of the movement is described, 'present' interpretations are derived with the infinitive. In contrast, in the case of 'future' interpretations, the matrix predicates semantically require their complements to happen in future. Thus, verbs such as *want, hope, aim* and *decide* select the infinitive.

The discussion, if correct, predicts that once infants learn the semantics of matrix predicates (as well as complements) properly, they can restrict the availability of the infinitive to a great extent. Since infants do not need to memorize different usages of the infinitive one by one, their acquisition of the English complementation system would be largely eased; this evidently needs to be tested systematically.

Notes

[1]. I would like to thank Teresa Fanego, Liang Chua Morita, and the two anonymous Miscelánea reviewers for important comments and stylistic suggestions.

[2]. When I say the infinitive, it means the one with *to,* not the bare form (without *to*) in this paper.

[3]. When one reviews literature, s/he should do so in a chronological order in the case of works of the same author. However, I will intentionally introduce Duffley (2002, 2006) before Duffley (1992) because I believe that the older (i.e. latter) work is superior.

[4]. Following Duffley (1992), Duffley (2000, 2006) assumes that matrix predicates which show temporal relationship with the infinitive are further divided into two groups. One, when used in the past tense, implies the completion of the infinitive (called "subsequent actualization" or "implicative") as in *John managed to solve the question.* On the other hand, the other group (called "subsequent potentiality" or "nonimplicative") does not have such implication. For example, *John wanted to be an artist* does not imply that John became an artist. I will discuss this distinction in section 4.

[5]. To be fair, Duffley's (2000) scope is limited to "(the) complement of transitive verbs in English", so the fact that examples such as (12) are not examined there is not a problem.

[6]. Duffley (2003), which is another work on the infinitive, applies the same view to the infinitive in the subject position.

[7]. In the case of examples such as (14), Duffley (1992) claims that there is a necessary before/after relationship between the event of the matrix clause and that of the infinitive. In comparison with the examples without *to,* it is clear that "*to* is used here to evoke an abstract before/after relation of condition to consequence" (Duffley 1992, 56). However, it seems more appropriate to say that the event of the matrix predicate includes the event of the infinitive in terms of time spans. Hence, the subsequent relationship between the matrix predicate and the infinitive seems unjustifiable.

[8]. It is possible to achieve the same effect with Fauconnier's (1994) mental spaces, which are adopted in Morita (2011).

[9]. When I say 'future' here, it means a time subsequent to the matrix predicate time. The same logic applies when I say 'past'. In the case of 'present', I assume that there is some overlap between the time of the infinitive and that of the matrix.

[10]. Here I depart from the standard assumption with regard to the use of the 'real' world in that the real world normally represents the world which truthfully reflects the current world whereas my use of the 'real' world can be subjective and be different from the real world. Thus, it is more correct to define the 'real' world as a set of worlds which are compatible with what the speaker or the matrix subject (which controls the infinitive) thinks is the case in the actual world.

[11]. Furthermore, such movement normally requires the "volition" of the subject. This is why linguists such as Wood (1956), Bladon (1968), Wierzbicka (1988), Rudanko (1989), and Smith & Escobedo (2001) have claimed that the meaning of the infinitive is claimed to be associated with "volition". However, the concept is derivative from the concept of the movement. Hence, there are cases when no "volition" is involved as is shown below.

[12]. Similarly, in the sentence, "It seems that John is sad", it is not John but the speaker who is thinking that John is sad, because the embedded clause is selected (and theta-marked) by *seem*. Of course, when a prepositional phrase appears as in *John seems to Thomas to be sad,* the possible worlds will belong to the person after the preposition, in this instance, Thomas.

[13]. The verb *cease* can be transitive, so there can be PRO_i instead of t_i in the example. However, since *the village* has no intention, it cannot control itself (unless it is used metaphorically). Hence, *cease* in the example must be intransitive, and hence, a raising-to-subject predicate. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting clarification here.

[14]. Actually, the representation of the infinitive is also compatible with the context in which the village never existed. However, it implies that no change ever occurred as to the village (i.e. the village never existed), and if so, it is pragmatically inappropriate to use the verb *cease* because it indicates change of state. This is the reason why it is presupposed in (16) that the village existed before.

[15]. This is why that use of the infinitive is limited to emotion predicates such as *sorry, pleased,* and *happy*. For example, in *John ran to hear the noise,* the infinitive cannot be the direct cause of John's running because its direct cause is not John's perception of the sound but his subsequent neural command from his brain to move his leg muscles. Thus, in the example, the infinitive is interpreted posterior to the main predicate.

[16]. The infinitive in the subject such as *To be there made us feel happy* (Duffley 2003: 344) belongs here too.

[17]. Rudanko (1988) is unsure about whether *refuse* and *decline* are implicative, so I regard them as nonimplicative. Furthermore, verbs such as *omit, deny, neglect, escape,* and *eschew* are implicative, but since their complements are not posterior to the main verbs, (28) does not apply to them.

[18]. Dirven (1989) argues that there is a difference between the interpretation of *intend to* and that of *intend –ing* in that the former, but not the latter, contains the intention and volition of the matrix subject. However, Fanego (2004), on the basis of several corpora, indicates that there is no such difference. In other words, even *intend –ing* shows the intention and volition of the subject.

[19]. According to Fanego (2004), they differ only in terms of formality. That is, *intend –ing* is more informal.

[20]. Verspoor (1996: 442-) claims that there is a semantic difference between the infinitive and the gerund and presents the following pair:

(i) He paused for a while and then began to speak again.

(ii) ??He paused for a while and then began speaking again.

However, I consulted a native speaker and he found no difference between (i) and (ii). That is, both are grammatical.

[21]. This is the conclusion Mair (2003) reaches. He compared the use of *start/begin to* and *–ing* among American and British speakers, and found that the use of the infinitive and the gerund greatly depends on nonsemantic factors such as regional differences and formality.

[22]. However, as Duffley (2006: 63) observes, in Shakespeare's writing, one can find examples of *remember* taking an infinitival complement, such as *Such groans of roaring wind and rain, I never remember to have heard.* Nonetheless, as discussed above, this is not a counterexample due to the presence of the perfective inside the infinitive.

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CLIL AND DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONAL COMPETENCE

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1. Introduction

1.1. CLIL and its added value

Content and Language Integrated Learning (CLIL) is a broad term that refers to the learning of content through a foreign language. As defined by Dalton-Puffer, Nikula & Smitt (2010:1): "Content and Language Integrated Learning (CLIL) can be described as an educational approach where subjects such as geography or biology are taught through the medium of a foreign language". According to Coyle, Hood & Marsh (2010:1) CLIL is not a new way of teaching languages or a new way of teaching content, but "an innovative fusion of both", "a dual-focused educational approach in which an additional language is used for the learning and teaching of both content and language".

Initially, there was fear that learning through an additional language would adversely affect the assimilation of the contents of different subjects, although, as stated in a Eurydice report of 2006 (2006:7), CLIL "seeks to develop proficiency in both the non-language subject and the language in which this is taught, attaching the same importance to each". For this reason, early research on this platform was directed to check not only the improvement in linguistic competence in the foreign language, but also to verify the success or otherwise of the learning process. In this sense, studies have been published, like Jabrun's, (cited by Coyle et al. 2010: 134)

showing that, after a year, immersion students outperformed their peers in math and obtained the same results in science. This has greatly dissipated the doubts about the proper training in the content, because it shows that students in bilingual programs become more efficient learners. In the words of Marsh (2002:173) "To learn a language and subject simultaneously, as found in forms of CLIL/EMILE, provides an extra means of educational delivery which offers a range of benefits relating to both learning of the language and also learning of the non-language subject matter". Furthermore, as Jabrun's study suggested, the benefits of CLIL do not only affect the acquisition of foreign language and content, but extend also to the cognitive aspect. For Coyle et al. (2010:10, 29) CLIL can "stimulate cognitive flexibility" and promotes "cognitive engagement", "high-order thinking" and increases capacity in problem solving. In this sense, Mehisto & Marsh (2011:30, 35), supported by the work of Kormi-Nuori at al. (2008) and Bialystok (2007), argue that bilingualism "improves cognitive functioning", "increases metalinguistic awareness and encourages the development of high-order problem solving" and in addition, a "bilingual mind has superior episodic and semantic memory".

Coyle et al. noted (2010:27) that, to understand the benefits of CLIL, we have to consider the concept of synergy "where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts" which explains the potential of this platform as a tool that promotes creativity and is linked to success at school (Baetens Beardmore 2008). CLIL promotes motivation (Coyle 2006), and encourages social inclusion, egalitarism, gender mainstreaming and school development (Marsh 2002).

Other authors point to the economic benefits of CLIL (Marsh, 2002; Mehisto & Marsh 2011), which take effect not only at an individual level (better opportunities to find a job), but also produce a "greater economic return on investment in language education" (Marsh 2002:11). Even health benefits derive from bilingualism since, according to studies cited by Mehisto Bialstok & Marsh in his article "Approaching the Economic, Cognitive and Health Benefits of Bilingualism: Fuel for CLIL", bilinguals are less likely to develop dementia.

In short, the synergy of CLIL methodology produces benefits that go beyond its initial intentions. In this article, we intend to explore more areas that may show the added value of CLIL. To do this, we will try to demonstrate how CLIL helps to develop emotional competence by means of a study conducted in Castilla La Mancha with secondary students.

1.2. CLIL in Castilla La Mancha

Before stating the characteristics of the implementation of CLIL in Castilla La Mancha, we will give a brief description about the expansion of CLIL in Europe and Spain, referring to the forces that work in progress and the variety of proposals developed under the umbrella of CLIL.

CLIL methodology draws on the experiences of immersion education and content-based instruction conducted in Canada and North America, which arrived in Europe in response to the need to educate multilingual citizens who live in a multilingual environment. This approach promotes communication, integration, sense of identity and cultural and professional exchanges in the EU.

The European Council recognizes the potential of CLIL as a tool for European integration in the context of linguistic diversity; since 1995 the council has supported its development through recommendations and concrete actions. 1995 is a key year because the Council Resolution of 31 March 1995 on improving and diversifying language, learning, and teaching within the education systems of the European Union, *referred, for the first time,* to the teaching of non-language subjects in a foreign language. The same year, the White Paper on education and training (Teaching and Learning - Towards the Learning Society) focused on the need for European citizens to become proficient in three languages and referred to the implementation of CLIL in Secondary Schools. In addition, the European Council provides financial support for mobility and training for CLIL teachers through the Socrates and Erasmus programs, support for the creation of the EuroCLIL network, and support for the European Label for innovation in language teaching and learning for CLIL projects, among other initiatives.

As demonstrated by the Eurydice report of 2006, at that time the platform had spread considerably across Europe. This was in part thanks to the boost received from the European institutions. In addition, as Coyle et al. (2010:8) noted, three important factors also contributed to the expansion of CLIL:

"This was due to four simultaneous major proactive forces: families wanting their children to have some competence in at least one foreign language; governments wanting to improve language education for socio-economic advantage; at the supranational level, The European Commission wanting to lay the foundation for greater inclusion and economic strength; and finally, at the educational level, language experts seeing the potential of further integrating languages education with that of other subjects."

Meanwhile, Marsh & Hartiala Maljier (2001:15), in *Profiling European CLIL Classrooms*, note the ability of CLIL to adopt different formulations and adapt to diverse contexts and objectives. They take into account five dimensions that serve for a reflection on the reasons for implementing CLIL and establish a taxonomy: "There are five dimensions based on issues relating to culture, environment, language, content and learning". These dimensions are affected by 3 factors: "age-range of learners, socio-linguistic environment and degree of exposure to CLIL". These variables give rise to a number of ways to understand and implement CLIL,

to the extent that there is no single model of CLIL and this feature is the one that best describes this platform. According to Dalton-Puffer et al. (2010:2): "what characterizes CLIL more than anything is the remarkable variety of practices that can be found under its umbrella".

In Spain the implementation of CLIL is also characterized by its variety, due to two elements of the Spanish situation. On the one hand, decentralization of powers in education produces a large heterogeneity in the interpretation and implementation of the program, as each Autonomous Community is responsible for creating its own independent model of application of CLIL. On the other hand, the existence of bilingual regions provides a previous experience in content-based instruction, given that an additional language (Catalan, Basque or Galician), was already being used for learning in some schools. This fact brings about a new challenge: the need to develop a multilingual model, since more than two languages are involved in the CLIL programs of these regions.

This is not the case in Castilla La Mancha, monolingual Autonomous Community located in central Spain. CLIL was implemented in Castilla La Mancha in 2005, with the creation of the European Sections, although there had been previous experience in the use of the integrated curriculum starting in 1995, thanks to the agreements between the British Council and the MEC. The *Orden* 07/02/2005 establishes the European Sections programme in public schools for infant, primary and secondary education, in which students learn the content of two or three subjects through a foreign language (English or French). After the amendment by the *Orden* of 23/04/2007, the European Sections are regulated definitely by the *Orden* 13/03/2008. Successive orders have expanded the number of State Schools with a European Section, reaching in 2011, (according to the Resolution 07/06/2011), 34 French European Sections and 178 English European Sections spread over 90 Primary Schools and 116 Secondary Schools.

The procedure for the inclusion of new educational centers in the program is regulated by the government through an official call for and selection of projects developed and presented by the schools' candidates. The outline of the bilingual programme that each center is committed to develop is established in the "Singular Commitment", a document drawn up by the school and signed by the school principal. The Singular Commitment lays down three guidelines: Firstly, a plan to ensure the participation of the whole school in the project (approval of the Teaching Staff and the School Council and inclusion in the regulatory documents –Education Project, General Programming, syllabus of the department of foreign language–). Secondly, steps describing the dissemination of the program (extracurricular and complementary activities). And thirdly, a description of organizational measures (schedules, subjects taught in foreign language, coordination between teachers

of content, foreign language and the language assistant). In short, this system guarantees that each center, while respecting the legality, can deploy a variety of CLIL proposals designed in every Singular Commitment.

On the other hand, the administration assumes responsibility for management, organization, resource and support measures necessary to develop the bilingual project, such as, for example, with the incorporation of Language Advisors and Foreign Language Assistants. In addition, the administration provides a training program for participating teachers (training courses, stays abroad, and exchange conferences for schools with European Sections).

Regarding access of students, the legislation does not permit any selection criteria based on their language skills or related to their academic performance, but general rules of admission procedure are to be respected (proximity of home to school, the existence of siblings enrolled, income, etc). However, to continue the program between primary and secondary education, students who have completed primary school in a bilingual program are guaranteed a place in a European Section of secondary education.

The bilingual program begins at an early age, i.e at three years old, in infant education. At this stage, and in the context of a globalized curriculum, 150 minutes a week in English Sections or 60 in French Sections are dedicated to the foreign language. In primary and secondary education, at least two non-language subjects are taught in the foreign language. The law neither requires nor forbids any subject to be taught in the foreign language and the schools are to select them depending on the availability of teachers who want and are qualified to teach their subject in English or French. However, according to the report emitted by the Office of Evaluation of the Regional Ministry of Education and Science in April 2010 about the European Sections in the Autonomous Community of Castilla La Mancha, the subjects taught in most European sections are science subjects (Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Geology), Social Sciences (Geography and History) and to a lesser extent technological and artistic disciplines.

As for the initial training of content teachers, there is no prerequisite of language proficiency (although it is necessary if teachers want to receive a monetary bonus). This aspect can be identified as an area for programme improvement. However, every year, the administration sends teachers with at least a B2 level of the CEFR (Common European Framework of Reference for Languages) to the European Sections which, for different reasons, need this additional support. For example, in the academic year 2012-2013, the administration has called for 218 teachers with at least a B2 qualification, which means nearly one teacher per European Section.

1.3. The awareness of the emotional component in learning: the presence of the emotional competence in the curriculum of Castilla La Mancha

Gardner's work (1983) about multiple intelligences and Goleman's book (1996) which addresses the issue of emotional intelligence, both highlight the importance of emotions in development, not only for social but also for intellectual development. These authors show that cognitive ability is not determined only by the intelligence quotient (IQ), but it is influenced by many stimuli and especially by emotions. As Denham (2006:85) points out "emotional competence also supports cognitive development", and emotions are connected to academic success: *"Emotional competence is crucial not only in its own right but for positive outcomes in both social and academic domains"*. These studies form the core of a growing interest in emotional competence and in the possibility of incorporating its acquisition in educational contexts.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning the implementation of SEL (Social and Emotional Learning) programs which provide explicit instruction for the socio-emotional development of students. Its effectiveness is noted by authors such as Zins et al. (2004:3) "SEL also has a critical role in improving children's academic performance and lifelong learning" and is corroborated by several studies, such as Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, Taylor & Shellinger's (2011). These authors conclude that students who receive high-quality instruction in social and emotional learning have better academic performance, improve attitudes and behaviour, and reduce emotional distress. Wharam (2009:13) insists on the need of learning emotional skills: "Emotional intelligence training is important because it works and can make a huge difference to stress and well-being", and Dueñas (2009: 93) underlines that being emotionally competent is essential for the human being, because "la competencia emocional influye en todos los ámbitos importantes de la vida". These benefits (academic, social and individual) corroborate the importance of emotional competence, which is considered one of the key competences that every citizen should reach. In fact, the authors of the DeSeCo project –whose aim was to define and select key competences for professional and economic development– took into account emotional intelligence. In this sense, Carblis (2008: 61) underlines "the central place of emotional intelligence competences within the DeSeCo approach to key competences" and states that "to develop these competences, people need high levels of emotional regulation (Carblis 2008:68). The DeSeCo project was the root of the recommendation of the European Parliament and the Council of 18 December 2006 on key competences for lifelong learning (Official Journal of the European Union L394). This rule defines key competences as "a combination of knowledge, skills and attitudes appropriate to the context. Key competences are

those which all individuals need for personal fulfilment and development, active citizenship, social inclusion and employment". The document mentions eight key competences: the sixth one is Social and Civic Competence. We can identify some characteristics of emotional competence in the legal description of this competence, such as the need for the students and future active citizens to achieve "personal and social well-being, which requires an understanding of how individuals can ensure optimum physical and mental health".

This recommendation is present in the Spanish Education Law, LOE (Act 2/2006 of 3 May). In article 6, paragraph 1, it defines curriculum as "the set of objectives, competencies, content, teaching methods and evaluation criteria". The Autonomous Community of Castilla La Mancha, in turn, in Decrees 68/2007 and 69/2007 of 29 May on the curriculum development of primary and secondary education, includes the key competences as a part of the curriculum. In this regard, it should be stressed that Castilla La Mancha is the only Spanish region that reflects the importance of emotions, feelings and desires as part of the learning process, adding a ninth competence to the list: emotional competence. Arreaza et al. (2011:74) describe emotional competence in their *Report on Assessment of key competences in Castilla La Mancha* as "the skills to understand and control the emotions and feelings, to read the moods and feelings of others, to establish positive relationships and to be a happy person who responds appropriately to the personal, social and academic requirements". The same document defines two main dimensions of this competence: firstly, self-awareness and self-regulation of emotions and secondly, social awareness and empathy in interpersonal relationships.

The inclusion of emotional competence in the curriculum of Castilla La Mancha means that its acquisition must be promoted by all subjects. Key competences are multifunctional and transversal, which implies that they are not exclusive to one subject, but all subjects must contribute to their development. In the study detailed below we will try to prove that emotional competence is more effectively acquired by CLIL students than by others.

2. Study

2.1. Objectives and Hypothesis

The objective of this study is to test whether the CLIL program positively influences the acquisition of emotional competence in secondary students in Castilla La Mancha. Bearing in mind that the acquisition of linguistic competences by CLIL students could be transferable to the emotional field, our hypotheses are that CLIL students compared to their counterparts:

—Are more likely to be aware of their emotions and feelings.
—Have more and better strategies to control their emotions and impulses.
—Are more skilful in their relationships with others and better able to manage coexistence problems.
—Develop their overall emotional competence more effectively.

2.2. Sample, Instruments and Procedure

This study is based on a diagnostic assessment conducted over the period 2010-2011 in Castilla La Mancha and established by Resolutions 16/02/2009 and 28/10/2010. The Spanish Law of Education 2/2006 of 3 May, art. 144 requires all Regional administrations to make a diagnostic assessment with a view to improving the quality, equity and inclusiveness of the education system, in short, with a view to having information about the basic competences.

Although it was not the aim of the educative administration to test the specific development of the different competences by students in the European Sections (i.e. CLIL students), the data obtained are likely to provide valuable information about it and particularly relevant to the comparison of the acquisition of emotional competence by CLIL and NON-CLIL students.

To test our hypothesis (CLIL students develop better emotional competence) we have got from the administration the diagnostic assessment data and we have processed these data dividing the students tested into two groups: CLIL students (who study in European Sections) and NON-CLIL students. The CLIL group is composed of 2,710 students, and NON-CLIL group of 17,969. All students were in 2nd ESO (Compulsory Secondary Education) and their average age was 14.

2.2.1. Instruments for data collection

The instrument used for data evaluation is a test developed by the Office of Evaluation of the JCCM (Regional Government of Castilla-La Mancha) entitled "Boredom." The index of validity and reliability of this test is high as proved by the "Alfa of Cronbach" and stated in the *Report of results. Diagnostic assessment of key competences* (2011:22)

In the assessment of key competences, the aim of the test is not to record students' knowledge, but to check if they are able to use skills, abilities and knowledge in a real situation. To do this, a realistic scenario is selected and a system of authentic tasks with real-world relevance is designed. The tasks integrate skills, knowledge and attitudes in a social context.

The scenario is an adaptation of a text from *El maltrato entre escolares. Técnicas de autoprotección y defensa emocional* by Matamala & Huerta and is followed by fourteen tasks. The scenario and task questionnaire are in Spanish (Annex 1).

The tasks are associated with a system of fourteen indicators connected with dimensions and subdimensions of emotional competence. The legal reference is Decree 69/2007 of 29 May establishing the curriculum of ESO (Secondary Education) and especially the General Objectives *d*. (strengthen affective skills and relationships with others, reject violence, resolve conflicts peacefully...) and *g*. (develop self-confidence, participation, critical thinking, make decisions, take responsibility...) and Annex I, which describes the contents of emotional competence.

There are two dimensions of emotional competence evaluated: "emotional self-awareness and self-regulation" and, "social awareness". The first dimension is divided into two sub-dimensions: "emotional awareness" and "emotion regulation", while the second dimension addresses the subdimension "personal relationships and problem solving."

There are three response formats: short answer, with a score of 2/1/0; longer answer, with a score of 3/2/1/0 and multiple choice, 1/0. In the evaluation test 8 questions are multiple choice, 5 are short answer questions and 1 is a longer answer question; the maximum score is 21 points.

The system of dimensions, subdimensions, indicators and scoring is detailed in the following table:

Dimensions	***Indicators***	***Score***
Self-awareness and self-regulation	**a. Emotional awareness**	
	Explicit self-assessment	1
	Interpret and express paralinguistic elements	2
	Anticipate emotional conflict	1
	Identify obstacles and interferences	3
	Be aware of mood	1
	Express feelings	2
	b. Emotion regulation	
	Self-regulate moods and reactions	1
	Use alternative thoughts	1
	Tolerate frustration and failure	1
	Act without inhibitions	1
Social awareness	**a. Personal relationships and problem solving**	
	Express anger without hurting others	2
	Respond to criticism	2
	Recognize the errors	2
	Express joy at the success of others	1

TABLE 1: Dimensions, subdimensions, indicators and scoring

2.2.2. Instruments of data analysis

Statistical analysis of data was conducted using the Statistical Package SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science). According to the "Cronbach Alpha" the reliability index is 0.712, which means it is high, since the reliability is considered acceptable if greater than 0.500.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (K-S test) run for normality testing showed the sample had a normal distribution, so we did a parametric test.Since the variable has only two categories CLIL / NON CLIL, we proceeded to compare means through the Independent Samples T Test.

2.3. Results and Discussion

We will present the results of the study in the order in which we considered the hypotheses described above. First, we will analyze the differences between CLIL and NON CLIL students in the indicators of the subdimensions of emotional awareness, emotion regulation and social awareness. Second, we will show total scores of the three subdimensions mentioned and finally, the overall results of comparing emotional competence scores of students who study within a CLIL programme and those not participating in this programme (NON CLIL).



FIGURE 1: Emotional awareness. Results for indicators.

CLIL students perform better on all indicators of the subdimension "Emotional awareness" and the differences are significant, as shown in Leven's test, since in all indicators p=0.000.

Although CLIL students score higher in all indicators, two of them, "explicit self-assessment" and "express feelings", could be connected with productive linguistic skills; one indicator,"be aware of mood", could be related to receptive skills, while one indicator "interpret and express paralinguistic elements" could be connected with both productive and receptive skills. This means that 4 out of 6 indicators are related to linguistic competence, which may explain the higher score of CLIL students, who have a greater mastery of communicative strategies. However, and proportionally to the score of each indicator, CLIL students have their best result in the indicator "anticipate emotional conflict", which is not connected with communication skills, and their worst one in "express feelings", which is related to linguistic competence.



FIGURE 2: Emotion regulation. Results for indicators

CLIL students outperform their counterparts in all indicators of the subdimension "emotion regulation" and the differences are significant, as shown in Leven's test, since p=0.000 in all indicators.

It is difficult to relate the indicators of this subdimension to communicative skills, so we could conclude that in fact there is no connection between the subdimension of "emotion regulation" and linguistic competence. However, CLIL students still score better in all indicators, especially in "use alternative thoughts" and "tolerate frustration and failure", in which they score more than 0.8 out of 1. In contrast, they have serious problems controlling their moods and reactions, as the score (0.37 out of 1) in indicator "self-regulate moods and reactions" show. NON CLIL students share the same strengths and weaknesses, but their results, as we have said are significantly lower in all cases.



FIGURE 3: Social awareness. Results for indicators

CLIL students score better in all indicators of the subdimension "social awareness" and the differences are significant, as shown in Leven's test, as p=0.000 for the indicators "express anger without hurting others", "respond to criticism" and "recognize the errors" and p=0.001 in "express joy at the success of others".

Almost all indicators of this subdimension can be connected in some way with expressive skills. Even the indicator "recognize the errors" could be related to specific abilities of bilingual students. In this sense, Baetens Beardmore (2008:7) notes that CLIL students "are more able to take into account situational factors and to react appropriately by correcting errors of sequencing and behaviour", a skill that can be useful for controlling emotions and for improving relationships with others.

CLIL students have their highest score in the dimension "express anger without hurting others" and their lowest in "express joy at the success of others", while NON CLIL students get their highest score in "recognize the errors" and their lowest one in "respond to criticism", although they score lower than their counterparts in all indicators.

Students enrolled in CLIL get significantly better results in all the subdimensions, showing that they are better able to understand and control their emotions and bear in mind the emotions of others.



FIGURE 4: Subdimensions of the emotional competence

Both groups (CLIL / NON CLIL) register their lowest performance in the subdimension "emotion regulation" and their highest results in the subdimension "social awareness". It seems that the difficulty of self-control among adolescents (the age of the students surveyed is between 13 and 15), is not directly related to the existence of bad relationships with their peers. In any case, it should be noted that students enrolled in CLIL particularly stand out for their social awareness, as their score is quite high; they scored almost 8 out of 10. In this regard we must remember that all indicators of the subdimension "social awareness" are related to a greater or lesser extent to linguistic competences.



FIGURE 5: Overall score of emotional competence

Having seen how CLIL students outperform NON CLIL students in the three sub-dimensions analyzed and that the differences are significant in all indicators evaluated, we drew the conclusion that CLIL students significantly outperform NON-CLIL students in overall emotional competence.

Thus, the results confirm our hypotheses and even exceed our expectations with regard to CLIL student performance, not only in foreign language acquisition, but in other areas of learning, such as emotional competence.

Conclusions

The results of this study confirm that CLIL students are significantly more emotionally competent than their peers. We can therefore say that there is a connection between CLIL and the development of emotional competence.

One hypothesis to explain this connection may be the fact that CLIL students have better communication skills and communication skills may help the development of certain strategies related to expression and comprehension that are necessary for emotional competence.

This hypothesis is based on the transferable and multifunctional nature of key competences, as they are applicable in many situations and contexts (transferability) and can be used to solve different kinds of problems and to accomplish different kinds of tasks (multifunctionality). This means that the CLIL students of our study could have applied their better developed strategies of expression and comprehension to contexts that were not purely linguistic. Thus, good expression skills could lead to strategies for expressing one's feelings or for mediating in case of conflict, so that linguistic competence can be used in situations which demand mastery in emotional competence. The same may be true of comprehension strategies given that they can promote the correct interpretation of paralinguistic elements and therefore the interpretation of different moods. In fact, receptive skills could foster emotional competences such as empathy. Empathy may be defined as the ability to understand and recognize other people's feelings.

However, while half of the indicators evaluated can connect with language skills, it is difficult to relate the other half with linguistic strategies.

"Social awareness" is the subdimension with most indicators (3 out of 4) connected with linguistic skills and is also the area where CLIL students best perform. The same can be said about "Emotional awareness", with 4 indicators out of 6 related to linguistic strategies. On the other hand, none of the indicators of subdimension "emotion regulation" is directly related to language, although CLIL students still

significantly outperform their non-CLIL peers. This means that our hypothesis about the transfer of skills, strategies and knowledge from linguistic to emotional competence is not able to explain such high results in all indicators and in all subdimensions of emotional competence.

Therefore, since the linguistic explanation is not sufficient to account for a significant difference in the acquisition of emotional competence between CLIL and NON CLIL students, new lines of research that attempt to explain this phenomenon remain open. Future studies might look for the factors behind this success and find out to what extent these factors contribute to the consolidation of emotional learning in CLIL students. New hypotheses should be studied to explain the better acquisition of emotional competence in CLIL classrooms and the impact of factors such as classroom climate, participation and collaboration. In this sense, we can argue that CLIL methodology places greater emphasis specifically on participation and collaboration. Escobar & Nussbaum (in Navés & Victori 2011:35) show that CLIL students "displayed a variety of complex collaborative strategies to adapt to particular communicative and learning needs". Thus, this emphasis on interaction, participation, and collaboration mayexplain why students enrolled in CLIL are more prepared to use communication skills to face the challenges of living together, and have developed more emotional strategies than their peers.

In this sense, factors such as classroom language could also be considered. CLIL teachers tend to be more aware of the mediating role of language. As Mercer (in Coyle (2011:52) says, they approach the "dialogic teaching", in which "the power of dialogue lies in classroom interaction and the quality of teacher-learner and learner-learner dialogue." Since the importance of dialogue is a typical feature of CLIL methodology and may play a capital role in the development of emotional strategies, it would be useful to evaluate it in future studies.

On the other hand, in order to understand the results of this inquiry, it would be helpful to study how the European Sections have integrated the contents of emotional competence in the curriculum. One of the characteristics of key competences is that they are interdisciplinary, which means that there is no correspondence between a competence and a subject, but each subject must contribute to the development of all key competencies and each competence will be achieved thanks to different subjects. While there are competences such as communication in the mother tongue, communication in foreign languages or mathematical competence whose contents are mainly related to one specific subject (language, foreign language, math), others, such as emotional competence, do not have a specific subject of reference, so the development of these competences depends exclusively on the presence of their contents in the syllabus of the

different subjects, in the programming of tutorial action and in complementary and extracurricular activities. For this reason, it would be interesting to test if there are important differences in the treatment of emotional competence in European Sections and other educative centres comparing their General Programming, which contains the syllabus of the subjects, extracurricular activities, tutorial action plan, etc. with ours.

In short, more research is needed, including new tests using different scenarios or indicators and addressed to students of different ages, for example, from primary education.

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Annex 1

ESCENARIO: **El aburrimiento**

Estamos en clase. Hoy hablamos de las emociones. ¿Has sentido alguna vez miedo, rabia, tristeza…? Seguro que alguna vez te has aburrido. Tres amigos hablan del aburrimiento.



– Yo creo que a los tres jinetes de la mala milk: el Miedo, la Rabia y la Tristeza hay que añadirle un cuarto: el Aburrimiento, que también puede ponernos agresivos –dijo Ricardo.

– Quieres decir que uno puede intentar salir del aburrimiento machacando al de al lado –añadió Rosi.

– Sí. Cuando me aburro me encuentro mal. Entonces me da rabia y envidia ver que otros se divierten o imaginarme que puedan estar pasándolo bien mientras yo estoy solo y aburrido.

– Tienes razón –dijo Eugenia-. Muchas de las llamadas que los chicos hacen a sus amigos son para preguntarles qué están haciendo. Son llamadas de comprobación, por si acaso se están perdiendo algún buen plan.

– Desde luego, a mí me fastidiaría que mis amigas se lo estuvieran pasando estupendamente y no me hubieran invitado. Si no me llaman, me están impidiendo que me lo pase bien y me dan ganas de hacerles a ellas lo mismo –dijo Rosi.

CUESTIONARIO DE TAREAS

Tarea 1. ¿Qué dice Ricardo de sí mismo?

A) Piensa que tiene miedo.

B) Se considera un envidioso.

C) Piensa que es una persona triste.

D) Se considera una persona feliz.

Tarea 2. Ricardo está aburrido, ¿qué gestos o movimientos representarían mejor su estado de ánimo? .....

.....

Tarea 3. ¿Qué situación "altera" a Rosi?

A) Que la inviten y se aburra.
B) Que la llamen por teléfono.
C) Que la inviten y lo pasen bien.
D) Que la consideren una persona triste.

Tarea 4. ¿Qué le impide a Ricardo disfrutar? .....

.....

Tarea 5. ¿Qué emociones vive Ricardo?

A) Rabia.
B) Alegría.
C) Miedo.
D) Tristeza.

Tarea 6. Imagina que formas parte del grupo. ¿Qué dirías? .....

.....

Tarea 7. ¿Cómo pueden Ricardo y Rosi superar su malestar?

A) Cambiando de amigos.
B) Pensando bien de los demás.
C) Machacando a los amigos.
D) Mandando mensajes para saber qué hacen.

Tarea 8. ¿Qué deben pensar para conseguirlo?

A) "No son mis amigos".
B) "Todos me tienen manía".
C) "Son mis amigos y están ocupados".
D) "A nadie le importa que me aburra".

Tarea 9. A veces, nosotros mismos creamos el problema. Eugenia habla de realizar llamadas de comprobación. Imagina que se retrasan en devolver la llamada ¿qué harías?

A) Adelantarme a llamar y "pedir cuentas".
B) Calmarme y esperar a que llamen.
C) No coger el teléfono cuando lo hagan.
D) Gritarles y ponerles a caldo cuando lo hagan.

Tarea 10. ¿Debe decir Ricardo lo que piensa a sus compañeras?

A) No, nadie debe saber lo que se piensa.
B) Sí, decir lo que se piensa ayuda.
C) Sí, pero únicamente cuando se piense en positivo.
D) No, porque se lo pueden contar a los demás.

Tarea 11. Las llamadas de comprobación, ¿son una manera adecuada de expresar el enfado? .....

.....

Tarea 12. Imagina que Rosi y Eugenia critican a Ricardo por su actitud, ¿cómo deben hacer su crítica? .....

.....

Tarea 13. ¿Cuál debe ser la respuesta de Ricardo? .....

.....

Tarea 14. ¿Qué sientes cuando los demás se divierten y tú no?

A) Rechazo: "¡me caen mal!".
B) Agresividad: "¡los odio!".
C) Indiferencia: "¡me da lo mismo!".
D) Alegría: "¡me gusta que sean felices!".

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SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC RULES IN OLD ENGLISH ADJECTIVE FORMATION[1]

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1. Introduction

As some authors, such as Kastovsky (1992) and Lass (1994) have argued, the lexicon of Old English has two main defining properties. Firstly, the lexical stock is homogenously Germanic and, secondly, word-formation is considerably transparent both in terms of form and meaning, in such a way that the whole lexicon is permeated by the word-formation families that result from generalized derivational processes of zero derivation, affixation and compounding.

Previous work in the area of Old English word-formation has paid special attention to the evolution from variable base morphology to invariable base morphology (Kastovsky 1986, 1989, 1990, 2006) and the major processes and patterns of lexical creation (Kastovsky 1992). More recently, the Old English lexicon has been searched for the exponents of semantic universals (Martín Arista and Martín de la Rosa 2006; de la Cruz Cabanillas 2007; Guarddon Anelo 2009a, 2009b) while more theoretical questions have been discussed from the point of view of Old English, including grammaticalization (Cortés Rodríguez and Martín Arista fc.), lexical layers (Martín Arista 2011b, 2011c, fc.-a, fc.-b), morphological recursivity (Martín Arista 2010a, 2010b; Torre Alonso 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, fc.), the morphological structure of complex words (Martín Arista 2011a, 2011c, fc.-c, fc.-d) and morphological productivity (MaízVillalta 2011; Mateo Mendaza fc.-a, fc.-b). That is, the emphasis has been put on the units, categories and processes of

Old English word-formation, but little has been done in the area of meaning, with the exception of work on semantic universals, and no advance has been made in the field of the lexical relations attributable to word-formation processes. For this reason, this piece of research focuses on the formation of Old English adjectives from the point of view of the change of meaning produced by the processes of word-formation that turn out affixal adjectives. The aim is twofold. Firstly, it is necessary to come up with an exhaustive description of the units, categories and processes that turn out affixal derived adjectives in Old English. Secondly, this research aims at offering a systematic description of adjective formation that is based on up-to-date linguistic theory. In this respect, I have looked for a complete framework that is compatible with the foundations of a structural-functional theory of morphology as set out by Martín Arista (2008, 2009) and adequate for the processing of the linguistic data of Old English. I have opted for Pounder's (2000) paradigmatic model of word-formation, which is, in turn, based on Mel'čuk's (1996, 2006) Meaning-Text Theory.

This brief review of the relevant literature and the foundations of the researchserves as an introduction. The remainder of this work is organized in the following way. Section 2 centres upon morphological processes and the basis of the Process and Paradigm Model. Section 3 provides a description of the different derivational functions that take part in the formation of Old English adjectives. Section 4 concentrates on the data and the sources of the research. Sections 5 and 6 include the analysis carried out in terms of syntactic and semantic rules. Section 7 comments on an issue that has arisen in the course of the research and draws the conclusions. Finally, the appendix lists all the adjectives analysed in this work, along with their translation into Present-day English.

2. Functions and rules in Process and Paradigm Morphology

The goal of the Meaning-Text Theory (Mel'čuck 1996, 2006) is to explain the correspondence between language meaning and language form (text, or sound). It represents natural languages by means of stratificational models comprised of the following levels: Semantic Representation (SemR), Deep-Syntactic Representation (DSyntR), Surface-Syntactic Representation (SSyntR), Deep-Morphologic Representation (DMorphR), Surface-Morphologic Representation (SMorphR), Deep-Phonetic Representation (DPhonR) and Surface-Phonetic Representation (SPhonR). In the works just cited Mel'čuk (1996, 2006) is concerned mainly with Semantic Representation, Deep-Syntactic Representation and Surface-Syntactic Representation. Semantic Representation specifies the common meaning of a set of synonymous utterances, with respect to which two types of semantic units are distinguished: *functors,* on the one hand, which include predicates, quantifiers

and logical connectives and which can take arguments or *semantic actants;* and *semantic objects*, on the other. The second stratum, Deep-Syntactic Representation, specifies the syntactic structure of one particular sentence. In tree representation, which accounts, among other things, for dependency, the relations held between the lexemes can be of four different types: *actantial,* which connects lexemes with their actants; *attributive,* which connects nodes with their attributes, modifiers, and circumstantials; *coordinative,* which connects cojoined lexemes; and *appendency,* which connects nodes with lexemes denoting an interjection, a direct address, a parenthetical, etc. Surface-Syntactic Representation also uses a dependency tree for representing the syntactic structure of a sentence, the difference with Deep-Syntactic representation being that the nodes of SSynt-trees are actual lexemes of the language and the nodes of DSynt-trees are generalized lexemes. In order to transform one DSyntR into another equivalent one the use of *paraphrasing rules* is necessary, which become of special relevance for lexical choice and text organization.

Pounder (2000) bases her paradigmatic model of word-formation on the distinction between the lexical and morphological units that partake in word-formation. Among lexical units, we find the word-form, which represents a minimal utterance between pauses, being an actually occurring, concrete and countable item. The lexicon does not include any direct representation of the word-form. The second lexical unit is the lexeme. It is the fundamental unit of the lexicon, although it exists at an abstract level, thus it is not directly accessible. A lexeme can be morphologically complex. The meaning of a lexeme tends to be more general than that of word-forms, and it has lexico-syntactic properties, such as class and gender. The word-form requires a lexeme to exist, otherwise a word-form would not be possible. It is the lexeme that is formed, but not the word-form. The lexemic meaning is created on the basis of the original lexeme, whereas the word is assigned syntactic properties. Word-formation does not consist of the creation of a set, but of an abstract item. The lexicon, unlike word-forms, is an open, potentially infinite list which can always be enlarged. Potential lexemes exist in an abstract but real sense, although they do not exist in the lexicon.

Turning to morphological units, the morph is the most concrete of the morphological units. The morpheme is the abstract elementary morphological sign. The morpheme may be lexical or non-lexical; lexical morphemes have symbolic or referential content, whereas non-lexical morphemes have symbolic or referential content. Both the morph and the morpheme are notions mainly concerned with form. These units are not important in themselves; we will make greater use of functional labels such as *stem* (or base), *root*, and *affix*.

Pounder applies the framework of lexical functions to the analysis of 16th century German adjectives, draws a basic distinction betweenword-formation meaning and the lexical meanings of word-formations. A word-formation paradigm is *a set of paradigmatic relations between word-formations sharing a lexemic root* (Pounder

2000:82).The morphological word-formation paradigm contains word-formation meanings (functions) as defined in the Meaning-Text Theory. Whereas the paradigm as a morphological structure comprises a set of paths between a base and the operations that turn out its derivatives, the lexical paradigm involves a structured pattern of instructions for operations on stems. The morphological paradigm is valid for a whole lexical class, such as the class of adjectives, or a subclass such as deadjectival verbs. The lexical paradigm is the individual paradigm of the member of a lexical class, such as, for instance, the paradigm of a certain verb. In other words, the morphological paradigm defines a set of possible operations that can be instantiated by the lexical paradigm. This means that the morphological paradigm, consisting of a set of operations, represents the dynamic side of word-formation, whereas the lexical paradigm, as a product, constitutes the static side of word-formation.

In Process and Paradigm Morphology, operations and rules account for all relevant aspects of derivational morphology. The word-formation morphological operation has the following form:

$$< X \rightarrow Y \text{ ; 'FR' ; } \Sigma > \text{ ; 'WFO}_X\text{'; } \Sigma >$$
$$< f \text{ ('X') ; 'SR}_X\text{' ; } \Sigma >$$
$$< \Sigma_X \rightarrow \Sigma_Y \text{ ; '}\Sigma R_X\text{' ; } \Sigma >$$

FIGURE 1: The word-formation morphological operation

As presented in figure 1, lexemes are signs of the form <X ; 'X' ; Σ>, where the *signifiant* is a set of lexical morphs (of morph complexes). The word-formation morphological operation specifies the base and the affix (X→Y), the derivational function (*f* ('X')) and the category change ($\Sigma_X \rightarrow \Sigma_Y$), along with the relevant restrictions. In the morphological rule, four kinds of *signifiants* can be found: (i) *signifiants* of the general form: X Å y (derivation), where y is an affix; (ii)*signifiants* of the general form: X → X (conversion);(iii)*signifiants* of the general form: a → b (modificatory processes), where a and b are phonological units in X and Y respectively and are defined in Σ; and(iv)*signifiants* of the general form: X Å Y (compounding), where X and Y are bothstems.The semantic rule is a sign of the form <*f* ('X')' ; 'SR$_X$' ; Σ>, where the *signifiant* is a function, of which there is a finite set in a given language.Thesyntactic rule is a sign of the form <$\Sigma_X \rightarrow \Sigma_Y$; 'ΣR$_X$' ; Σ>where the *signifiant* is a relation between the syntactics of two lexical items.

Before defining the semantic and syntactic rules that determine the formation of Old English adjectives, section 3 offers an inventory of the lexical functions necessary for the derivation of this lexical category.

3. Derivational functions in Old English adjective formation

In the Process and Paradigm Model, as well as in the Meaning-Text Theory, a lexical function is a binary correlation between two sets that gives rise to an (infinite) series of ordered pairs (x, y), in which the conceptual (logical) motivation is visible (Pounder 2000:108). Consider, as an illustration, the derivational function EX('X'). Given the general form *f* (x) = y and a function such as EX('X') = y ('out of') it is possible to get a correlation between the set of substance designations, as in EX(WOOD) = WOODEN.

The list of word-formation functions provided by Pounder (2000) is based on the lexical functions of the Meaning-Text Theory. This set is expandable and draws a basic distinction between primary and secondary word-formation functions. The latter are *applicable to some or all lexico-syntactic categories, and modify word-formation meanings rather than constituting word-formation meaning on their own* (Pounder 2000:109). Secondary functions are often used in combination with the primary functions. An example of secondary function is the pejorative function, which belongs to the sphere of evaluative morphology.

Primary functions
REL('X'): 'with respect to X'
EX('X'): 'X' is the origin
OF('X'): 'X' is the possessor
FOR('X'): 'X' is a goal or purpose
LIKE('X'): 'X' is a characteristic of 'X'
WITH('X'): 'X' is a possessed object or property or is in some sense present
POSS('X'): 'X' is in some way possible, potential
DIST('X'): 'X' stands in a distributive relation to something
PL('X'): 'X' is pluralized
SING('X'): 'X' is singularized
DIM('X'): 'X' is made smaller, diminished
NEG('X'): 'X' is negated
I('X'): 'X' and y are identical

Secondary word-formation functions
POS('X'): 'X' is evaluated positively
PEJ('X'): 'X' is evaluated negatively
INTENS('X'): 'X' is associated with high degree of expressive-emotional intensity
AUGM('X'): 'X' is increased

FIGURE 2: Primary and secondary word-formation functions (based on Pounder 2000)

Apart from this classification, the second degree functions have to do with figurative senses, that is, a meaning with the additional element 'as if'. These functions are represented as follows: 'WITH' = LIKE(WITH('X')), as in HONEYED (*honeyed words*); 'EX' = LIKE(EX('X)), as in FLAXEN (*flaxen hair*); and 'OF' = LIKE(OF('X)), as in PIGTAIL. As regards the relation between inflectional and derivational meaning, Pounder (2000) proposes the function PL('X'), which introduces the plural number by inflectional of derivational means.

The inventory of derivational functions proposed by Pounder (2000) has been adapted to the study of the formation of Old English suffixed adjectives. The following primary functions have been taken directly from Pounder. An illustration of each is given in (1):

(1) REL('SWÆP'): *swǣpig* 'fraudulent'
EX('ELETRĒOW'): *eletrēowen*'of olive-trees'
LIKE('WUDU'): *wudiht* 'thick (with trees), garden-like'
DIM('(GE)BÆRNAN'): *sāmbærned*'half-burned'
I('NYTT 2'): *unnyt 1* 'useless'

In (2) the secondary word-formation functions are listed that have been used without modification with respect to Pounder´s proposal. As in (1), an illustrative example of Old English suffixal adjectives is provided:

(2) PEJ('(GE)SCRENCAN'): *misscrence* 'distorted'
INTENS('SNOTOR'): *foresnotor* 'very wise'
DIST('HWĒOL'): *twihwēole* 'two-wheeled'

In turn, no affixal adjective has been found in the*Nerthus*database that displays the following derivational functionsfound in Pounder's (2000) inventory:

(3) OF('X):
FOR('X'):
WITH('X'):
POSS('X'):
PL('X'):
SING('X'):
NEG('X'):
POS('X'):
AUGM('X'):

On the other hand, several functions that have not been proposed by Pounder have been used. To begin with, the function NEG('X') has been broken down into three functions of a more specific nature: PRIV('X'), OPP('X') and COUNTFACT('X'). The typology of lexical negation is based on Martín Arista (2010b) and relies basically on lexical category: privation requires a nominal base, counterfactuality

a verbal base and opposition an adjectival base. The function WITH('X') has been subdivided into WITHENT(ity)('X') and WITHPROP(erty)('X'). For this distinction I have derived my inspiration from the typology of entities adopted by Functional Grammar (Dik 1997a, 1997b) and Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008), in which properties belong to the zero-order and entities to the first-order of the typology of entities. My function STA(ive) draws on the fundamental distinction made by Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997; Van Valin 2005) between stative and non-stative predications, the adjectives I have analysed belonging to the former type. The functions LOC(ative) and TEMP(oral) have been taken from Mel'čuk (1996), although Beard and Volpe (2005) make a similar proposal. Finally, the figurative function LIKE(LOC('X') is based on the authors just mentioned but follows the methodology devised by Pounder (2000) for the definition of non-literal word-formation functions. In this respect, Brinton and ClossTraugott (2005) have underlined the role played by locative prepositions and adverbs in the development of telic particles throughout a process of grammaticalization of a figurative use. To close this section, the functions not included by Pounder (2000) but used in this research include:

(4) PRIV('WĪTE): *wītelēas* 'without punishment or fine'
OPP('SCYLDIG'): *unscyldig* 'guiltless'
COUNTFACT('DREFAN'): *undrēfed*'untroubled'
WITHENT('HLÆDER'): *hlædrede* 'having steps'
WITHPROP('WYNN'): *wunsum* 'winsome'
STA('HOSPAN'): *hospul*'despised'
TEMP('(GE)WRĪTAN'): æfterwriten'written afterwards'
LOC('INNE 2'): *inneweard 1* 'internal'
LIKE(LOC('MĒDAN')): *inmēde*'close to one's heart'

4. Data of analysis and methodology

The data of analysis have been retrieved from the lexical database of Old English *Nerthus* (www.nerthusproject.com), which is based mainly on Clark Hall´s (1996) *A Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionaryand Supplement*. Other sources of *Nerthus* include *An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary and Supplement* (Bosworth and Toller 1973), Sweet´s (1976) *The Student´s Dictionary of Anglo-Saxon* and *The Dictionary of Old English* (Healey 2003). The etymological part draws on Holthausen´s (1963) *AltenglischesetymologyschesWörterbuch*, Ettmüller´s (1968) *Lexicon Anglosaxonicum* and Orel´s (2003) *A Handbook of Germanic Etymology*.

In its present state, *Nerthus* contains 29,987 predicate headwords (type), including 16,690 nouns, 5,785 adjectives, 5,618 verbs, 1,654 adverbs and members of other grammatical categories. This research focuses on the 5,785 adjectives, 3,356 of which have been derived by affixation.

I have followed the conventions adopted by the *Nerthus* lexical database as regards the use of numbered predicates to indicate morphologically relevant differences. As Torre Alonso *et al*. (2008) and Martín Arista (2010c, 2011c,) explain, numbered entries have been defined on the grounds of different category, different morphological class or different variants for predicates formally equal in order to stress morphological contrasts. For instance, *ābūtan* 1 'on, about, around'belongs to the lexical class of the adposition and *ābūtan* 2 'about, nearly', to the adverb. Similarly, *andfenge* 1 'acceptable, agreeable'qualifies as an adjective, whereas *andfenge* 2 'undertaker, helper'is ascribed to the category noun. As for the difference in morphological class, *besēon* 1 'to see, look', for example, is a Class V strong verb, whereas *besēon* 2 'to suffuse'is a Class I strong verb. Similarly, *byrðre* 1 'bearer'is a masculine noun whereas *byrðre* 2 'child-bearer'is feminine. With respect to variants, two or more predicates receive a different number depending on the existence of different spelling variants, as is the case with *fōdder* 1 'food'with variants *fōddor* 1, *fōddur* 1, *fōter*, and *fōdor*; *fōdder* 2 'cover'with variants *fōddor* 2 and *fōddur* 2; and *fōdder* 3 'hatchet', with variants *fōddor* 3 and *fōddur* 3. A total of 148 numbered adjectives have been used in the analysis.

Two word-formation processes play a role in the formation of adjectives in Old English, both of an affixal nature: prefixation and suffixation. 1,264 prefixal adjectives and 2,092 suffixal ones, which together make 3,356 affixal adjectives are analysed in this piece of research.

The prefixes attached to derived adjectives are *ā-, ǣ-, ǣg-, æf-, æfter-, æl-, æle-, æt-, al-, am-, an-, and-, be-, bī-, eal-, eall-, ed-, el-, ell-, for-, forð-, fore-, fram-, frēa-, ful-, full-, (ge)-, ge-, gēan-, geond-, healf-, in-, med-, mis-, ō-, of-, ofer-, on-, or-, or-, sam-, sin-, sine-, tō-, twi-, þri-, þurh-, þry-, ūð-, ūp-, ūt-, un-, under-, wan-, wiðer- and ymb-*.

The suffixes attached to derived adjectives include *-ða, -ad, -ade, -bǣre, -cund, -e, -ed, -ede, -eg, -eht, -ehte, -el, -en, -end, -ende, -er, -ern, -erne, -es, -et(t), -fæst, -feald, -ful, -ga, -ic, -iende, -ig, -ige, -iht, -ihte, -ing, -isc, -lēas, -lic, -n, -od, -ode, -ol, -or, -sc, -sum, -ta, -te, -u, -ud, -ul, -um, -weard, -welle, -wendeand -wīs*.

Regarding the methodology of research, this work draws on the structural-functional theory of morphology put forward by Martín Arista (2008, 2009, 2011a) in two important respects. Firstly, the defining properties of derivational morphology are recategorization and recursivity. Secondly, word-formation

meanings are accounted for by functional relations. On the latter question, I have opted for the derivational functions proposed by Pounder (2000), who has put forward a complete model of Process and Paradigm morphology which can be traced back to Mel'čuk's (1996, 2006) structural theory of morphology. These general principles are implemented by means of the following methodological steps. In the first place, I formulate the form rules that stipulate the affix, base and lexical categories found in the derivation, as in (5):

(5) FR_1<x Å ad; 'FR_1'; s.c.: N> *geillerocad* from ILLERACU 'surfeit'

The next step is the formulation of semantic rules, which account for the word-formation meaning in terms of a derivational function, as in (11):

(6) SR_{10}<OPP('X'); 'SR_{10}'; s.c.: Adj/Adv/N/V>*unmærlic* from MÆRLIC 'great'

The next methodological step requires a definition of the syntactic rules that are responsible for lexical category and meaning changes without change of form, as in (7):

(7) $\Sigma R_1 < \Sigma_N \rightarrow S_{ADJ}$; 'ΣR_1' ; s.c.: N>*æcen* 2 'oaken' from ÆCEN 1 'wood of oaks'

Before concentrating on the analysis itself, it is necessary to mention the question of morphological relatedness. While most adjectives have been assigned to a base of derivation, thus acknowledging their morphological inheritance, this is not always the case. For a total of 69 predicates no base of affixation has been found, probably as a result of the scarcity and fragmented character of the linguistic dataavailable. The predicates in question are *æltæwe, ætbrēdendlic, ahwlic, Arabisc, Arrianisc, bebbisc, bodigendlic, Bulgarisc, cicropisc, Cillinesc, clæclēas, clincig, dalisc, (ge)drȳme, duniendlic, (ge)dwæs 1, ēawisclic, Eficisc, ēowigendlic, eretic, farendlic, Fariseisc, Frencisc, geærwe, geanul, gecneord, geēane, gefæd 1, gefrēdra, gegēorendlic, gehwæde, gelǣr, geneorð, gerēðre, geresp, gerislic, getricce, getwis, grammatic, grandorlēas, hrurul, Libanisc, (ge)lōme 1, Lundonisc, lytig, Mailrosisc, mealmeht, mechanisc, Memfitisc, Nazarenisc, Nicēnisc, nihstig, pierisc, Pirenisc, (ge) risne 1, ryplen 1, selden, sēoslig, singal, Spēonisc, Steornede, (ge)tæse 1, Tirisc, towlic, twiblēoh, þrisnæcce, uncamprōf,* and*dundergendlic*. It is necessary, therefore, to provide the derivation base so as to ascertain whether we are dealing with defective derivations requiring the insertion of a hypothetical (reconstructed) predicate that preserves the graduality of derivation or with basic lexical items.

With these theoretical and methodological premises, an analysis of the syntactic and semantic rules involved in the formation of Old English adjectives follows in sections 5 and 6.

5. Syntactic rules

The syntactic rule is the third element of the *signifiant* of the operation (apart from the form and semantic rules). The syntactic rule may be considered a sign consisting of *signifiant, signifié,* and syntactics, the latter referringto the formal properties of signs and symbols. The *signifiant* of the syntactic rule in word-formation expresses a modification of the syntactic properties of a lexeme in producing a new lexeme. The rule has this general representation: $\Sigma R_x = <\Sigma_x \rightarrow \Sigma_Y$; '$\Sigma R_x$' ; $\Sigma>$. The syntactic rule often involves a grammatical category such as a lexico-syntactic class as in $<\Sigma_N \rightarrow \Sigma_V>$, where N stands for Noun and V for verb. Other examples are the changes of transitivity or the changes of gender. Two syntactic rules are found in the formation of Old English adjectives, as exemplified in (8) and (9). Both assign adjectival combinatorial properties to the base, thus cancelling the properties of other lexical categories. The derivatives follow the rule.

The syntactic rule in (8) changes the category of the derivation base from noun into adjective, as in *ǣcen* 2 'oaken':

(8) $\Sigma R_1 <\Sigma_N \rightarrow S_{ADJ}$; 'ΣR_1' ; s.c.: N> (66 predicates)
ǣcen 2 'oaken' from ÆCEN 1 'wood of oaks'

ǣlǣte 2 'desert place', *ǣlenge 1* 'lengthy', *ǣtern 2* 'poisonous', *ælmihtig 1* 'almighty', *æscen 2* 'ashen', *crīsten 1* 'Christian', *dīegol 1* 'hidden', *dysig 1* 'ignorant', *þēodisc 2* 'gentile', *eallwealda 1* 'all-ruling', *forðweard 1* 'inclined forwards', *fyrlen 1* 'distant', *(ge)dwǣs 1* 'stupid', *(ge)risne 1* 'suitable', *(ge)tæse 1* 'pleasant', *geðafa 2* 'agreeing', *gefæd 1* 'orderly', *gemēde 2* 'agreeable', *gerād 2* 'conditioned', *getæl 2* 'ready', *getīeme 1* 'suitable', *hālig 1* 'holy', *hæðen 1* 'heathen', *heolstor 2* 'dark', *lǣwede 1* 'lay', *lygen 2* 'lying', *lyswen 1* 'full of matter', *mēdren 1* 'maternal', *medmicel 1* 'small', *mennisc 1* 'human', *midfeorh 2* 'middle-aged', *midlen 2* 'midmost', *oferhygdig 2* 'proud', *ofermēde 2* 'proud', *ofermōd 2* 'proud', *oferprūt 1* 'over-proud', *Scyttisc 1* 'Scottish', *singrēne 2* 'evergreen', *slidor 1* 'slippery', *stāniht 1* 'stony', *twihynde 1* 'having *wergild* of 200 shillings', *ūtlendisc 1* 'stranger', *ufeweard 1* 'upper', *ungeðwǣre 1* 'discordant', *ungefōg1* 'immense', *ungerād 1* 'ignorant', *ungerīm 2* 'countless', *ungerȳde 1* 'rough', *ungetæse 2* 'inconvenient', *ungewiss 2* 'unwise', *ungōd 1* 'bad', *unmiht 2* 'impossible', *unnyt 1* 'useless', *unriht 2* 'wrong', *unsæd 2* 'unsaid', *unsōð 1* 'false', *untȳdre 1* 'firm', *wāðol 2* 'wandering', *wǣpned 1* 'male', *wēsten 2* 'desolate', *welig 1* 'wealthy', *werod 2* 'sweet', *westweard 2* 'west', *wiðerhȳdig 1* 'refractory', *wiðerhycgende 1* 'refractory', *wylfen 1* 'wolfish'

In the syntactic rule represented in (9), there is a change of category from adposition, adverb and pronoun into adjective, as in *andlang* 2 'along', *allefne*2 'universally' and *ǣnig 2* 'any, any one':

(9) $\Sigma R_2 <\Sigma_X \rightarrow \Sigma_{ADJ}$; 'ΣR_2' ; s.c.: Adp, Adv, Pron> (33 predicates)

*andlang*2 'along' from ANDLANG 1 'entire, continuous'

tōweard 1'approaching', *ufanweard 1*'highest'

allefne 2 'universally' from ALLEFNE 1 'quite equal'

ætrihte 1'right at', *allefne 1*'quite equal', *frēolslic 1*'free', *Fresisc 1*'Frisian', *fulnēah 1*'very near', *gehende 1*'near', *hiderweard 1*'hitherward', *inweard 1*'internal', *(ge) lōme 1*'frequent', *lustbære 1*'pleasant', *lȳtel 1*'a little', *middeweard 2*'middle', *nēadwīs 1*'necessary', *nihterne 1*'nightly', *norðweard 1*'north', *onriht 1*'right', *ormæte 1*'immense', *sūðerne 1*'southern', *twigilde 1*'paying double', *(ge)tynge 1*'fluent', *þrigylde 1*'to be paid three fold', *undēore 1*'cheap', *undierne 1*'open', *unēaðe 1*'not easy', *ungefēre 1*'inaccesible', *ungemæte 1*'immeasurable', *unhīere 1*'horrible', *unnēah 1*'not near', *unsȳfre 1*'unclean', *unweorð 1*'unworthy'

ænig 2 'any, anyone' from ÆNIG 1 'any, anyone'

ænig 2'any, anyone'

6. Semantic rules

The semantic rule is the second element of the *signifiant*. Semantic word-formation rules cover only a part of the semantics relevant to word-formation: they are restricted to a finite list of relations that are familiar to speakers and that are independent of lexical items. The simplest semantic rule is the identity rule; this means that the operation contains only a full formal rule and/or a syntactic rule. Regarding the semantic side, the function of the lexical meaning of the stem concerned is an identity function that does not modify this meaning. The semantic rule can be considered a sign consisting of *signifiant, signifié*, and syntactics. The semantic rule is a description of the semantic modification and the accompanying conditions. The representation of the semantic rule has the following general form:SR_x = <*f*('X'); 'SR_x' ; Σ>. In the semantic rule the meaning of the complex item is described as a function *f* of the meaning of the basic item *X*. The syntactics of the semantic rule is structured according to the same general principles as other signs. It includes information as to what semantic lexical classes the rule applies to, and also to what lexico-syntactic classses the rule applies. A comparison relation, for example, can be represented as SR_x = <LIKE('X') ; 'SR_x' ; 'SR_x' ; s.c.: N,V…>.

By way of illustration, these follow some of the semantic rules applicable to Old English adjective formation. The semantic rule in (10) inserts the DIM(X) lexical function, so that a derived adjective such as *medwīs*'dull', *twisliht*'forked' and *sāmstorfen*'half-dead' are produced:

(10) SR_2<DIM(X); 'SR_2'; s.c.: Adj/N/V> (41 predicates)

medwīs from WĪS 1 'wise'

healfclypigende'semi-vowel', *healfcwic*'half-dead', *healfdēad*'half-dead', *healffrēo*'half-free', *healfhār*'half-hoary', *healfhrūh*'half-rough', *healfhwīt*'half-white', *healfrēad*'reddish', *healfscyldig*'half-guilty', *healfsinewealt*'half-round', *medrīce*'of little power', *medspēdig*'unprosperous', *medstrang*'of moderate means', *medtrum*'weak', *medwīs*'not wise', *sāmcwic*'half-dead', *sāmgrēne*'half-green', *sāmlǣred*'imperfectly taught', *twiwyrdig*'ambiguous'

twisliht from SLIEHT 'stroke'

*healffēðe*half-lame, *healfhundisc*'semi-canine', *healfnacod*'half-naked', *twigǣrede*'cloven', *twisliht*'forked'

sāmstorfen from STEORFAN 'to die'

healfbrocen'half-broken', *healfclǣmed*'half-plastered', *healfclungen*'half-congealed', *healfeald*'half-grown', *healfgewriten*'half-written', *healfslǣpende*'half-asleep', *healfsoden*'half cooked', *sāmbærned*'half-burned', *sāmboren*'born out of due time', *sāmlocen*'half-closed', *sāmmelt*'half-digested', *sāmsoden*'half-cooked', *sāmstorfen*'half-dead', *sāmswǣled*'half-burned', *sāmweaxen*'half-grown up', *sāmwīs*'stupid', *twirǣde*'uncertain'

The lexical function DIST(X) partakes in the semantic rule that appears in example (11), thus giving rise to a total of 79 derived adjectives:

(11) SR_3<DIST(X); 'SR_3'; s.c.: Adj/N/Num/V> (78 predicates)

twifēre from FĒRE 'able to go'

felafeald'manifold', *manigfeald*'various', *nēahfeald*'intimate', *twidæglic*'lasting two days', *twifēre*'having two ways', *twiscyldig*'liable to a double penalty', *twiseht*'disunited', *þridæglic*'lasting three days', *þrigǣrede*'cloven into three parts'

þrifēte from FŌT 'foot'

hundfeald'hundredfold', *hundwelle*'hundredfold', *twibēte*'subject to double compensation', *twiecge*'two-edged', *twifēte*'two-footed', *twifeðerede*'double-winged', *twifingre*'two fingers thick', *twihǣmed*'one who marries twice', *twihēafdede*'double-headed', *twihīwe*'of two colours', *twihlidede*'double-lidded', *twihwēole*'double-lidded', *twilafte*'two-edged', *twinebbe*'having two faces', *twinihte*'two days old', *twisestre*'containing two sesters', *twistrenge*'two-stringed', *twitælged*'double-dyed', *twiwintre*'two years old', *þribeddod*'having three beds', *þrifēte*'having three feet', *þrifingre*'three fingers broad', *þriflēre*'having three floors', *þrifōtede*'three-footed', *þrigēare*'three years old', *þrihēafdede*'three-headed', *þrihīwede*'having three forms', *þrihlidede*'three-lidded', *þrihyrne*'three-cornered', *þrilēfe*'three-leaved', *þrirēðre*'having three rows of oars', *þriscȳte*'triangular',

þrislite'three-pointed', *þristrenge*'three-stringed', *þriwintre*'of three years', *þrysumer*'three years old'

fīffeald from FĪF 'five'

ān*feald*'single', *eahtafeald*'eightfold', *endlyfenfeald*'elevenfold', *fēowerfeald*'fourfold', *fēowertigfeald*'fortyfold', *fīffeald*'fivefold', *fīftigfeald*'fiftyfold', *fiðerfeald*'fourfold', *hundseofontigfeald*'seventyfold', *hundseofontigseofonfeald*'seventy-sevenfold', *hundtēontigfeald*'hundredfold', *nigonfeald*'ninefold', *seofonfeald*'sevenfold', *siexfeald*'sixfold', *sixtigfeald*'sixtyfold', *tīenfeald*'tenfold', *twēntigfeald*'twentyfold', *twelffeald*'twelvefold', *þrifeald*'threefold', *þrītigfeald*'thirtyfold', *þūsendfeald*'thousandfold'

twifȳrede from (GE)FŪRIAN 'to furrow'

twibrowen'twice-brewed', *twidēagod*'double-dyed', *twifȳrede*'two-furrowed', *twimylte*'twice melted', *twisnæcce*'double-pointed', *twisnēse*'double-pointed', *twispunnen*'twice-spun', *twiðrāwen*'twice thrown', *ðridǣled*'divided into three parts', *þrifeðor*'triangular', *þrifȳrede*'triangular', *þrihǣmed*'one who marries thrice'

Example (12) shows the lexical function LIKE(X) and the derivatives that can be attributed to the insertion of this lexical function.

(9) SR_8<LIKE(X); 'SR_8'; s.c.: N> (15 predicates)

wyrtig from WYRT 'herb'

æppled'shaped like an apple', *āncorlic*'anchoretic', *ātorlic*'poison-like', *buclic*'like a goat', *flǣscen*'of flesh', *hellfenlic*'like a fen of hell', *hundlic*'of or like dogs', *hunigtēaren*'sweet as honey', *hunigtēarlic*'nectar-like', *hwælen*'like a whale', *lārēowlic*'like a teacher', *wilddēoren*'fierce', *wīnlic*'vinous', *wudiht*'forest-like', *wyrtig*'full of herbs'

7. Conclusions

In the light of the results, the conclusion can be drawn that a one-to-one correspondence between derivational functions and affixes in the formation of adjectives in Old English is the exception rather than the rule.In quantitative terms, the number of predicates included in the first group, namely those whose functions are realized by one affix reaches 394; the rest of the predicates belong in the second group, which make a total of 2,971.

Thus, the findings of this research are relevant to two different areas: (i) in the first case, each affix is analysed in terms of the derivational functions that are assigned to them, whereas in (ii) each derivational function is analysed in terms of the affixes that perform each function.

Regarding the combination of affixes and derivational functions originated from the analysis, figures 3 and 4 provide an abridged account of this relationship along with an example of each:

Prefix	Functions performed	Example
ā-	I('X')	*ālǣte 2* from (GE)LǼTAN 'to allow to remain'
	PRIV('X')	*ācnōsle* from CNŌSL 'kin'
æfter-	TEMP('X')	*æfterboren* from (GE)BERAN 'to bear, carry'
æl-	I('X')	*ælmihtig 1* from MIHTIG 'mighty'
	INTENS('X')	*ælceald* from CEALD 1 'cold'
æle-	INTENS('X')	*ælegrādig* from GRǼDIG 'greedy'
æt-	I('X')	*ætrihte 1* from (GE)RIHT 2 'straight'
	INTENS('X')	*ætealdod* from EALD 'old'
	PRIV('X')	*æthȳd* from HȲD 1 'hide, skin'

FIGURE 3: Relationship between prefixes and functions

Suffix	Functions performed	Example
–ad	WITHPROP('X')	*geillerocad*from ILLERACU 'surfeit'
–ade	WITHENT('X')	*hēlade* from HĒLA 'heel'
-bāre	I('X')	*lustbāre 1* from LUST 1 'desire'
	WITHENT('X')	*hunigbāre* from HUNIG 'honey'
	WITHPROP('X')	*lofbāre* from LOF 'praise'
-cund	REL('X')	*sāwolcund* from SĀWOL 'soul, life'
–e	I('X')	*gehende 1* from HAND 1 'hand'
	REL('X')	*unsǣle* from UNSǼL 'unhappiness'
-ed	I('X')	*wǣpned 1* from WǼPEN 'weapon'
	LIKE('X')	*ǣppled* from ǼPPEL 'fruit in general'
	WITHENT('X')	*gewīred* from WĪR 'wire'
	WITHPROP('X')	*āblered* from BLERE 'bald'

FIGURE 4: Relationship between suffixes and functions

The whole analysis demonstrates that the prefixes that perform a single derivational function include *æfter-* (TEMP('X')), *æle-* (INTENS('X')), *al-* (I('X')), *am-* (OPP('X'), *eal-* (INTENS('X')), *for-* (INTENS('X')), *frēa-* (INTENS('X')), *full-* (INTENS('X')), *gēan-* (INTENS('X')), *healf-* (DIM('X')), *mid-* (I('X')), *ō-* (PRIV('X')), *sām-*

(DIM('X')), *sine-* INTENS('X'), *þurh*-INTENS('X'), *ūp-* LOC('X'), *ūð-* (INTENS('X')), *wan-* (PRIV('X')), *wiðer-* (LIKE(LOC('X')). As for suffixes, the ones that realize a derivational function only are *–ad* (WITHPROP('X')), *–ade* (WITHENT('X')), *-cund* (REL('X')), *–eg* (REL('X')), *–ehte* (WITHENT('X')), *–end* (STA('X')), *-er* (INTENS('X')), *–ern* (EX('X')), *–feald* (DIST('X')), *–ic* (EX('X')), *–iende* (STA('X')), *-ige* (REL('X')), *–igend* (STA('X')), *–ihte* (WITHENT('X')), *–ing* STA('X'), *-lēas* (PRIV('X')), *-ode* (WITHENT('X')), *–sum* (WITHPROP('X')), *–te* (REL('X')), *–ud* (WITHENT('X')), *–ul*STA('X'). All in all, 19 prefixes out of 56 perform a single derivational function, as opposed to 21 suffixes out of a total of 51, which means that the degree of polysemy displayed by prefixes is slightly higher than polysemy in suffixes.

Concerning the relationship between derivational functions and affixes, figure 5 includes a selection of functions and the corresponding affix or affixes:

Function	*Affix*	*Example*
PEJ('X')	*mis-*	*misboren*from (GE)BERAN 'to bear, carry'
PRIV('X')	*ǣ-*	*ǣfelle* from FELL 'skin, hide'
	æt-	*æthȳd* from HȲD 1 'hide, skin'
	and-	*andfeax* from FEAX 'hair'
	-lēas	*mǣðlēas*from MÆÐ *1 'measure'*
	ō-	*ōmihte*from MAGAN 'to be able'
	or-	*orfeorme* from (GE)FEORMIAN 'to entertain'
	wan-	*wanes:oc*from SĒOC 'sick'
OPP('X')	*am-*	*ambyre*from (GE)BYRE 'time, occurrence'
	an-	*anspilde*from SPILD 'destruction'
	in-	*incūð*from (GE)CUNNAN 'to be or become acquainted with'
	on-	*onspornend*from (GE)SPURNAN 'to strike against'
	un-	*unwæterig*from WÆTERIG 'watery'
COUNTFACT('X')	*un-*	*ungeðinged* from UNGEÐINGAN 'unexpected'

FIGURE 5: Relationship between functions and affixes

Overall, only two functions are realized by one affix: PEJ('X') and COUNTFACT('X'), whereas the functions that are realized by more than one affix include PRIV('X'), OPP('X'), DIST('X'), DIM('X'), INTENS('X'), WITHENT('X'), WITHPROP('X'), EX('X'), STA('X'), TEMP('X'), LOC('X'), LIKE(LOC('X')), LIKE('X'), REL('X'), and I('X').

Notes

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LA DETECCIÓN Y TRADUCCIÓN DE METÁFORAS COMO HERRAMIENTA DIDÁCTICA EN EL APRENDIZAJE DE UNA L2 PARA ALUMNOS DE BACHILLERATO: DESCRIPCIÓN FRENTE A PRESCRIPCIÓN

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1. Introducción

En las últimas décadas han predominado los enfoques comunicativos frente a otras perspectivas didácticas en la enseñanza de una L2. De acuerdo con el Marco Común Europeo de Referencia para la enseñanza y el aprendizaje de lenguas (MCER), (2002), los principios metodológicos aplicados en la enseñanza de una L2, en el caso del presente estudio la lengua inglesa, deben promover un aprendizaje autónomo, adecuado a las características del alumnado. Para ello deben tenerse en cuenta las necesidades e intereses de los estudiantes, proponiendo tareas y actividades que permitan una interacción comunicativa e incidan en el desarrollo de las destrezas oral, escrita, auditiva y lectora. Con el fin de ampliar el abanico de estrategias que pueden incidir en la capacidad de analizar textos escritos en una L2, así como en la comprensión lectora de los estudiantes de bachillerato, presentaremos una aplicación práctica para la identificación y la traducción de metáforas en textos periodísticos en el aula de una L2.

En este trabajo de investigación nos planteamos dos objetivos fundamentales, cuya posible consecución consideramos que puede incidir en la enseñanza de una L2 para alumnos de bachillerato: por una parte, analizaremos las metáforas identificadas por dos grupos de informantes en textos periodísticos, con el fin de evaluar si la aplicación de una aproximación descriptiva realizada por un

grupo o una aproximación prescriptiva elaborada por el otro pueden incidir en mayor o menor grado, respectivamente, en la capacidad de los informantes de identificar metáforas. Por otra parte, tras recopilar las traducciones que los dos grupos de informantes elaboraron de las metáforas que habían detectado, desde un enfoque descriptivo uno y prescriptivo el otro, efectuaremos una valoración de la muestra recogida, teniendo en cuenta el enfoque respectivo aplicado. Respecto a la distribución de las cuestiones relativas al marco teórico de nuestro estudio, trataremos ciertas aproximaciones descriptivas y prescriptivas sobre la detección de metáforas en el apartado 2, y sobre su traducción en el apartado 3. En el apartado 4 veremos algunos aspectos didácticos de una L2 relacionados con las perspectivas descriptiva y prescriptiva que los informantes han seguido en su trabajo práctico para detectar y traducir metáforas. A continuación, el apartado 5 contiene una sección que trata las diferentes variables aplicadas para analizar los resultados obtenidos, y dichos resultados distribuidos en las cuatro secciones siguientes. Por último, el apartado 6 está dedicado a las conclusiones.

2. La detección de metáforas: la retórica tradicional frente a la aproximación cognitiva

Desde un enfoque tradicional, la metáfora era considerada únicamente como un fenómeno lingüístico (Mortara, 1991). Sin embargo, desde hace algunas décadas, mediante la aplicación a su significación de los principios de la lingüística cognitiva, la metáfora se trata como un tipo de estructura de pensamiento, extensivo a distintos contextos de nuestra vida cotidiana (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Ortony 1993; Croft & Cruse 2004; Barcelona Sánchez 2000; Ruíz de Mendoza 2005; Eubanks 2011).

Según Glucksberg (2001: 8), ambos enfoques pueden coexistir. A través de su aproximación semántico-pragmática a la concepción de la metáfora, hace distintas reflexiones en comparación con la consideración de la metáfora como un fenómeno cognitivo, llegando a algunas conclusiones tras analizar los tres principios que consideran la metáfora desde un enfoque semántico-pragmático:

1. Literal meaning is basic and has unconditional priority.
2. Figurative meaning is derived from the literal and can be discovered by discovering the nature of the substitution of the metaphorical for the literal.
3. […] metaphor understanding is more complex and requires more cognitive work than literal understanding. Metaphor understanding also requires the use of contextual information, which literal understanding, by definition, does not.

A partir de los principios enunciados, afirma que la interpretación del texto puede realizarse gracias a la información que aportada el contexto se produce tras la

descodificación, pues la primera –la interpretación– comporta mayor dificultad que la segunda –la descodificación–. Glucksberg analiza el concepto de metáfora y el proceso de su comprensión, enunciando dos características fundamentales de su representación que se daban por supuestas:

- Una referencia dual (una literal y otra apartada de aquella).
- Los diferentes papeles que pueden desempeñar los "temas" ("topics") y los "vehículos" ("vehicles"), utilizados de forma interactiva en el proceso de comprensión de la metáfora.

Desde la perspectiva tradicional, la metáfora se considera como una figura retórica que consiste en la desviación del sentido literal de la palabra, motivada por la transferencia de su significado hacia otra expresión con la que es posible identificar un cierto parecido, es decir: "la sustitución de una palabra por otra cuyo sentido literal posee cierta semejanza con el sentido literal de la palabra sustituida" (Lapesa 1985; Mortara 1991). Dicha definición, que atañe solo al aspecto lingüístico, es la que se toma como referencia para detectar las metáforas desde un punto de vista prescriptivo. La diferencia entre la metáfora y otras figuras retóricas, como la metonimia y la sinécdoque, puede resultar difícil de establecer (Vázquez Ayora 1977:314), por lo que hemos optado por aportar la definición del manual de Lapesa (1985:119), que define la metonimia como una figura retórica que:

> "consiste en designar una cosa con el nombre de otra, que está con ella en estas relaciones: causa a efecto, continente a contenido, lugar de procedencia a cosa que de allí procede, materia a objeto, signo a cosa, significado abstracto a concreto y significado genérico a específico".

La distinción entre la metáfora y la metonimia ha sido señalada con el fin de caracterizar, de la forma más clara posible, las metáforas desde ambas perspectivas: el enfoque tradicional, que las considera un recurso literario y está basado en los principios teóricos de la retórica tradicional (Le Guern 1976; Lausberg 1966; Mortara 1991) y el cognitivo, desde el punto de vista de la lingüística cognitiva, fundamentada en la comparación de una expresión textual que hace referencia a hechos de la vida cotidiana, permitiéndonos así crear una estructura en nuestro pensamiento para establecer y comprender dicha comparación (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Ortony 1993; Barcelona Sánchez 2000; Glucksberg 2001; Kövecses 2002). De esta manera, quizá sea posible identificar de un modo más apropiado la metáfora, aunque a menudo puede resultar difícil de discernir, ya que, mientras que la relación establecida entre los dos conceptos implicados en una metáfora se realiza en base a su similitud, las dos entidades de una metonimia aparecen relacionadas a través de su contigüidad (Kövecses 2002).

En todo estudio sobre la detección de metáforas, consideramos que los informantes deben conocer el significado de la palabra en cuestión, así como el de

la palabra sustituida, ya que de este modo puede resultar posible identificar las dos características de la metáfora mencionadas, a las que hace referencia Glucksberg (2001), interpretando la referencia dual de la palabra y relacionándola con posibles "temas" y "vehículos" que impliquen diferentes significados. Kövecses (2002:68) aporta, además, desde un punto de vista tradicional a través de un ejemplo ("The roses on her cheeks") algunas características básicas que no se consideran desde una perspectiva cognitiva:

1. Metaphor is decorative or fancy speech. […]
2. Metaphor is a linguistic, and not a conceptual, phenomenon. […]
3. The basis for using the Word "roses" to talk about somebody's cheeks is the similarity between the color of some roses (pink or red) and that of the color of a person's cheeks (also pink or some light red).[…]
4. It is this preexisting kind of similarity between two things that constrains the possible metaphors speakers can employ for skins of some color.

Sin embargo, el mismo autor apunta que tales características no pueden aplicarse en todos los casos, ya que algunas expresiones metafóricas no manifiestan referencias a una realidad preexistente. Con esta afirmación parece aludir a las metáforas novedosas, cuya significación depende de su contexto, en contraste con las metáforas lexicalizadas, también denominadas estándar (Newmark 1988:108). Las metáforas lexicalizadas son las pertenecientes al sistema lingüístico del hablante y aparecen casi todas en los diccionarios bilingües; son "aquellas que el hablante ha dejado de percibir como tales y que han pasado a formar parte del sistema lingüístico y cultural y que, por tanto, se utilizan dentro de los límites de "normalidad" que imponen las reglas del polisistema" (Rabadán Álvarez 1991:142). Por otra parte, las metáforas novedosas son aquellas creadas por el autor del texto en la Lengua Origen (Newmark 1988). Como define Rabadán (1991:136), "son aquellas que presentan el grado máximo de violación de las reglas lingüísticas y literarias del polisistema sincrónico" y, por tanto, su aspecto temporal resulta "esencial en su caracterización, pues lo que hoy se considera novedoso […] puede llegar a fosilizarse en una metáfora lexicalizada". Estas metáforas solo pueden comprenderse mediante una interpretación realizada en el contexto en el que se producen, teniendo en cuenta los elementos que contribuyen a su significación desde un punto de vista pragmático (Goatly 1997:34).

En contraste con la interpretación tradicional, la metáfora está considerada, desde un punto de vista cognitivo, como una estructura conceptual. La estimamos como una posible elección sobre la que conceptualizamos una relación entre una experiencia y el conocimiento previo. Dicha relación es la que se establece entre un dominio fuente, en el que reside el significado literal de la metáfora, y un dominio diana que se refiere al hecho descrito en la realidad (Lakoff & Johnson 1980;

Barcelona Sánchez 2000; Samaniego 2000; Croft & Cruse 2004; Ruíz de Mendoza 2005). Desde la perspectiva de la lingüística cognitiva, la metáfora se define como "understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain" (Kövecses 2002:4), es decir, se diferencia de una expresión lingüística ya que, a través de ella, podemos concebir una estructura conceptual, que puede manifestarse mediante distintas palabras o expresiones referidas a la misma metáfora, entendida como una estructura de pensamiento (Barcelona Sánchez 2000; Samaniego Fernández 2002). La perspectiva cognitiva de la metáfora puede proporcionar a los estudiantes la oportunidad de reflexionar sobre el uso de la L2, tomando conciencia de la relación establecida entre las expresiones lingüísticas y los hechos a los que hacen referencia. No obstante, creemos que ambas aproximaciones a la identificación de metáforas, tanto la tradicional como la explicada desde el punto de vista de la lingüística cognitiva, pueden resultar de utilidad en la clase de una L2, ya que para realizar la detección de las metáforas los estudiantes deben ser capaces de identificarlas (Heywood et al. 2002; Pragglejaz Group 2007), a través de la lectura comprensiva y el análisis del texto, para posteriormente proceder a su traducción.

3. Distintos enfoques de la traducción de metáforas: una aproximación didáctica de la descripción frente a la prescripción

Los métodos de enseñanza de una L2 puestos en práctica desde los años ochenta, que siguen los principios metodológicos acordes con los enfoques comunicativos, intentan fomentar el desarrollo de la competencia comunicativa en los alumnos, basándose en el uso inmediato de la L2. De este modo, procuran evitar el uso de la L1 en el desarrollo de las clases, con el fin de que los alumnos formulen todos los procesos necesarios para su aprendizaje en la propia L2. Sin embargo, la utilización de la traducción como estrategia de enseñanza parece posible y adecuada en algunos casos, dependiendo del contexto, el nivel de competencia de los alumnos en la L2 y los objetivos propuestos dentro de la programación, especialmente con referencia a la competencia escrita (Duff 1989; Harmer 1998; Malmkjaer 1998).

La traducción ha mantenido una relación directa con la didáctica de una L2 a través del tiempo y ha constituido una herramienta fundamental en su estudio, especialmente mediante el método de la "Gramática-traducción". Sin embargo, a partir del final del siglo XIX y de forma más categórica tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, se produce un rechazo generalizado hacia dicho método, que pretende excluir el uso de la L1 en el proceso de aprendizaje de una L2, llegando hasta la década de los años setenta, en el siglo XX. A partir de este momento, en el que surgen los Estudios de Traducción como una disciplina independiente de la lingüística

(Holmes 1972), aparecen diferentes corrientes en la traducción (Munday 2008); algunos teóricos consideran la tipología textual y las características del texto como factores determinantes en su traducción (M. Snell-Hornby 1988; A. Neubert & G.M. Shreve 1992). Snell-Hornby (1988) diseña un enfoque "integrado" para la traducción, en el que considera que las normas son aplicables no solo al idioma sino a todos los niveles de la vida social, variando de una comunidad a otra; otros teóricos son partidarios de realizar un modelo de estudio del texto más pormenorizado y continúan en los años noventa siguiendo los principios de la corriente funcionalista, como C. Nord (1991), cuyo modelo de traducción es aplicable a todo tipo de textos y situaciones. Dicho modelo está basado en tres nociones fundamentales que se refieren a la jerarquía funcional de los problemas de traducción, el papel del análisis del Texto Origen y la importancia de aspectos relacionados con el texto, como sus funciones, el emisor y el receptor, el medio, la motivación y el tiempo y el lugar de la recepción del texto.

Posteriormente surge la teoría del Polisistema (Even-Zohar 1979; Toury 1995). Even-Zohar (1979), siguiendo las ideas de los formalistas rusos de la década de los años veinte y criticando el enfoque de la estética tradicional respecto a los géneros literarios. El Polisistema es concebido como un conjunto heterogéneo y jerarquizado de sistemas, que interactúan procurando un proceso dinámico de evolución, adecuado para cada clase de obra literaria traducida. Este conjunto de sistemas también tiene en cuenta las posibles diferencias existentes en las condiciones socioculturales, que pueden determinar la traducción de las obras literarias (Munday 2008). Años más tarde, Toury (1995:55), que trabaja en colaboración con Even-Zohar, desarrolla una teoría, creando una estructura detallada de los Estudios Descriptivos de Traducción, que resulta fundamental a raíz de su definición del concepto de normas, relacionadas con el comportamiento social del individuo, ya que considera la traducción como un hecho influenciado por distintos factores socio-culturales. Toury clasifica dichas normas con respecto a la traducción, en iniciales, preliminares y operacionales. Las normas iniciales se refieren a la elección que el traductor hace al adoptar una perspectiva centrada en el TO ("adecuación" o traducción literal) o en el Texto Meta ("aceptabilidad" o traducción libre). Las normas preliminares tratan la transferencia del texto, teniendo en cuenta la documentación que el traductor debe realizar sobre el texto, o la posible política de traducción relativa a una lengua o un tipo textual concreto. Por último, las normas operacionales describen la presentación y las características lingüísticas y estilísticas del texto, en relación con el propio proceso activo de traducción.

Desde una perspectiva prescriptiva, la traducción se centra en el contenido del TO, procurando transmitirlo de forma literal. Según García Yebra (2004: 312) el proceso de la traducción abarca dos fases: la comprensión y la expresión. Él

mismo resume el procedimiento: "Decir *todo y solo* lo que dice el original, y decirlo *lo mejor posible*". También Newmark (1988:69) se manifiesta como defensor de la traducción literal, "literal translation is correct and must not be avoided, if it secures referential and pragmatic equivalence to the original", y la describe a través de su procedimiento: "Literal translation ranges from one word to one word, […], through group to group, […], collocation to collocation, […], clause to clause, […], to sentence to sentence".

En cuanto a la traducción realizada utilizando una perspectiva descriptiva, nos centramos en el contenido del TM. Se propone la traducción como un proceso que culmina en un producto, en cuya realización debemos considerar ciertas premisas, teniendo presente el sistema sociocultural al que está dirigido. Aunque existen distintas teorías, que hemos citado respecto a la traducción descriptiva, nos hemos acogido a las normas propuestas por Toury (1995), con las que pretende establecer una clasificación de los distintos tipos de estrategias de traducción llevadas a cabo, dentro de un contexto determinado, en el que considera de vital importancia un proceso dinámico de evolución, respecto a los propios sistemas que la integran. Toury propone una metodología de la traducción distribuida en tres fases:

1. Localizar el texto dentro del sistema de la cultura meta observando su significado o aceptabilidad.
2. Comparar los cambios en el TO y el TM, identificando relaciones entre pares de binomios textuales de segmentos del TO y el TM.
3. Intentar generalizaciones, reconstruyendo el proceso de traducción para cada binomio del TO y TM.

Por último, respecto a la solución acerca de la dificultad que supone la traducción de la metáfora en particular, Toury (1995) propone distintas posibilidades que el traductor puede escoger dependiendo de cada caso:

— Metáfora por la misma metáfora.
— Metáfora por una metáfora diferente.
— Metáfora por no-metáfora.
— Metáfora por Ø.
— No-metáfora por metáfora.
— Ø por metáfora.

Pese a que los Estudios de Traducción constituyen actualmente una disciplina independiente, algunos teóricos han relacionado la traducción con la enseñanza de una L2, postulando su utilización como una estrategia práctica en dicha enseñanza (Duff 1989; Zaro 1999; Deller & Rinvolucri 2002; González Davies 2004), como también hemos pretendido a través del presente estudio.

A continuación veremos ciertos aspectos didácticos de una L2, relacionados con nuestro trabajo de investigación y analizaremos los resultados obtenidos, aportando ciertas conclusiones.

4. Diseño de un estudio para la utilización de textos periodísticos en el aula de L2 en Bachillerato

De acuerdo con la legislación vigente en los países de la Unión Europea, en la Ley Orgánica de Educación del 3 Mayo de 2006, en todo el territorio español, y en el Decreto 67/2008 del 19 de Junio, en la Comunidad de Madrid, se enuncian las medidas legislativas que han de aplicarse en la enseñanza de lenguas en bachillerato. La programación diseñada para estos alumnos debe incluir textos extraídos de distintos medios de comunicación, de lenguaje cotidiano y real, para su estudio y aprendizaje, con cuyo uso en el aula se pretenden distintos objetivos (BOCM 27/6/2008, p. 39-42):

- Leer de forma autónoma textos narrativos, procedentes de un medio de comunicación, sobre temas relacionados con los intereses académicos, personales y profesionales de los alumnos.
- Identificar los elementos textuales y el propósito comunicativo en textos periodísticos actuales que emplean un lenguaje real y de uso cotidiano, introduciendo aspectos culturales de interés.
- Analizar el lenguaje empleado en los textos periodísticos, centrando la atención sobre las expresiones que reflejan un sentido implícito y facilitando su comprensión.

Creemos que dichos objetivos, recogidos en el marco legal, son fundamentales para los programas de enseñanza de una L2 y deben considerarse en su diseño. Teniendo presentes tales objetivos, pretendemos que, a través de la identificación y la traducción de las metáforas halladas en textos periodísticos, los alumnos analicen el vocabulario y las construcciones sintácticas de estos textos, en los que se emplea un lenguaje real. Estas actividades pueden permitir a los alumnos de bachillerato establecer una relación entre los nuevos contenidos de la L2 y sus conocimientos previos, adaptándolos al nivel de competencia requerido (Widdowson 2003; Hinkel 2006; Lightbown & Spada 2006; Ellis 2005). No obstante, el nivel de dificultad en la comprensión de los artículos periodísticos seleccionados para nuestra investigación puede resultar, a priori, algo elevado para algunos alumnos y necesitarán la colaboración del profesor en su análisis, completando la realización de su trabajo fuera del aula.

Para comparar el impacto de los dos tipos de enfoque, descriptivo y prescriptivo, sobre el aprendizaje de la L2 en los alumnos, tanto en la detección de metáforas en los artículos periodísticos como en su traducción, se ha necesitado la colaboración de dos grupos de informantes (14 alumnos en cada uno), integrantes de una misma clase, que son estudiantes de la modalidad de bachillerato de humanidades y ciencias sociales, del mismo nivel, el primer curso, de edades comprendidas entre los 16 y los 18 años, en el instituto Gómez-Moreno, ubicado en el distrito de Ciudad Lineal de Madrid. Los grupos han sido designados de forma aleatoria, sin

considerar el nivel de conocimientos en la L2 ni otro factor distintivo, ya que en la clase hay 28 alumnos y se han distribuido en dos grupos de igual número, siguiendo el orden alfabético del listado. En el programa de L2 para el primer curso de bachillerato, en nuestro caso la lengua inglesa, esta se imparte durante tres períodos semanales de 55 minutos de duración, a lo largo del curso académico, lo que ha supuesto un total de 112 períodos lectivos en este curso. Se ha podido desdoblar el grupo de 28 alumnos durante un período lectivo semanal, lo que ha permitido dedicar, aproximadamente, un tercio de las clases del curso al análisis de los textos periodísticos con cada uno de los grupos de 14 alumnos, de manera alternativa. Respecto a los datos examinados en este artículo, se han recopilado después del transcurso de tres clases, impartidas en tres semanas consecutivas, respectivamente, durante el mes de enero de 2009. En cuanto al nivel de competencia en la L2 de los estudiantes, puede ubicarse entre el A2 y el nivel de Umbral o "Threshold", B1, establecidos por el MCER, ya que los objetivos alcanzados por los estudiantes tras cursar el bachillerato coinciden con algunos de los definidos en dichos niveles.

A ambos grupos de alumnos se les han explicado ciertas nociones fundamentales, de carácter teórico, relativas a conceptos tratados en los dos apartados anteriores, dedicados a la detección y traducción de metáforas, respectivamente, a lo largo de seis sesiones (tres relacionadas con la detección de metáforas y otras tres, con los distintos enfoques de la traducción, en cada grupo), impartidas durante las seis primeras semanas del curso, ya que los textos analizados en esta investigación forman parte de una muestra textual, tratada a lo largo del curso académico 2009-2010, que está siendo examinada para una tesis doctoral. En el primer grupo, en el que se ha efectuado un enfoque tradicional de la metáfora, se la ha considerado como un recurso literario, que sirve para enriquecer la expresión lingüística del texto exclusivamente, sin hacer ninguna referencia a aspectos cognitivos relacionados con estructuras de pensamiento. Para la puesta en práctica de este trabajo, hemos definido algunas pautas que los informantes han seguido para realizar la detección de las metáforas desde una perspectiva prescriptiva o literalista:

- Lectura comprensiva del texto, con la ayuda de un diccionario bilingüe y las notas descritas acerca del vocabulario recogido en cada artículo periodístico.
- Identificación de las palabras que manifiestan una posible desviación en su significado literal, con la intención de establecer una comparación con otras expresiones lingüísticas que no están reflejadas en el texto, a las que este hace alusión y con las que comparten algún rasgo común.
- Detección y recopilación escrita de las metáforas existentes en los textos, a partir de la definición dada de metáfora, entendida como figura literaria: "la sustitución de una palabra por otra cuyo sentido literal posee cierta semejanza con el sentido literal de la palabra sustituida", teniendo en cuenta la diferencia expresa con la metonimia y otras figuras literarias.

A continuación, solo al mismo grupo, que ha tratado la detección de metáforas desde una perspectiva tradicional, se le han explicado ciertas pautas básicas basadas en principios teóricos aplicables dentro de un enfoque prescriptivo de la traducción. Desde esta aproximación, la atención debe centrarse en el texto escrito en la LO, en este caso, en lengua inglesa, de una forma tradicional o literal, atendiendo a la caracterización apuntada por algunos autores relevantes, mencionados anteriormente. Considerando el TO como punto de partida, hemos tomado las recomendaciones descritas por Newmark (1988), como referencia para la traducción de la metáfora y le hemos dado determinadas indicaciones al grupo que utiliza la aproximación prescriptiva:

- Lectura comprensiva del TO. (En este caso nos referimos a las metáforas que ya han sido detectadas como figuras retóricas y recopiladas previamente).
- Traducción literal, con ayuda de un diccionario, del TO, procurando conseguir el mayor grado de equivalencia formal posible (Vázquez Ayora 1977) en la Lengua Meta, (o la mayor "adecuación" posible), fundamentalmente respecto a las unidades léxicas, y considerando las características de los artículos periodísticos.
- Lectura comprensiva del TM. Revisión del TM: comprobación de la corrección en su sintaxis, morfología y signos de puntuación.

Mientras tanto, en el segundo grupo de informantes se ha explicado un enfoque cognitivo de la metáfora, contemplándola como una estructura de pensamiento que nos permite comprender una situación o un hecho contextualizado al compararlo con un evento real o cotidiano. A este grupo le hemos indicado las siguientes pautas de detección de las metáforas, desde una perspectiva cognitiva:

- Lectura comprensiva del texto, con la ayuda del diccionario bilingüe y las notas descritas acerca del vocabulario recogido en cada artículo periodístico.
- Identificación de las expresiones que manifiestan una posible desviación en su significado literal y establecen una comparación que, al mismo tiempo, puede relacionarse con una metáfora conceptual, representativa de la metáfora lingüística señalada en el texto.
- Detección y recopilación escrita de las metáforas existentes en los textos a partir de la definición dada, "la comprensión de un dominio conceptual en términos de otro dominio conceptual" (Traducción propia).

El mismo grupo, que ha detectado las metáforas desde el punto de vista de la lingüística cognitiva, ha aplicado ciertas normas descriptivas de traducción, definidas por Toury (1995) en base a la teoría del Polisistema, reflejadas anteriormente:

- Lectura comprensiva del TO. (En nuestro caso se trata de las metáforas detectadas y recopiladas desde el punto de vista de la lingüística cognitiva).
- Traducción descriptiva, con ayuda del diccionario, del TO en la LM, procurando aplicar la noción de "aceptabilidad" en el TM –según las normas iniciales explicadas (Toury, 1995)–, y teniendo en cuenta las características del texto periodístico.

- Lectura comprensiva del TM. Revisión del TM: comprobación de la corrección en su sintaxis, morfología y signos de puntuación.

En nuestra investigación, los segmentos son las metáforas que los informantes han detectado en los textos periodísticos y han traducido posteriormente. La traducción que ellos han realizado constituye la muestra del TM sobre la que han reflexionado, identificando las relaciones existentes entre sí y buscando la opción más correcta, ajustada al TM, que es transmitida a la audiencia.

Con referencia a la elección de los textos periodísticos, hemos considerado que pueden aportarnos un tipo de lenguaje característico, en el que podemos distinguir diferentes recursos literarios, entre los que destacan las metáforas con una gran profusión (Bell 1991; Fowler 1991; Van Dijk 1988). Se han seleccionado artículos pertenecientes al periódico *The Times*, dentro de la sección de opinión, como "news articles", cuyo lenguaje es un ejemplo de lengua estándar de prestigio reconocido a nivel nacional e internacional. *The Times* se considera un periódico perteneciente al grupo de los "up-market", es decir, por su formato con hojas de gran tamaño se engloba entre los "broadsheet" y los temas que trata y el contenido de sus artículos se califican de "cultos" frente a los "tabloids", de menor tamaño y contenido más popular, en algunos casos incluso sensacionalista, como el diario *The Sun* (Henry, 1986). Dentro de la tipología textual a la que pertenecen estos artículos, seleccionamos sus rasgos más relevantes poniendo de manifiesto, en primer lugar, su contenido temático, que contempla distintos aspectos culturales de actualidad. Se trata de textos narrativos cuya coherencia textual está marcada por la expresión de un objetivo determinado, un aspecto temporal durante el que se desarrollan los hechos, su ubicación, los agentes implicados, los propios objetos u hechos y las relaciones establecidas entre ellos. Los hechos son descritos de forma breve, a través de la visión subjetiva del autor de cada artículo, secuenciados temporalmente y en una estructura que presenta una idea general seguida de otras particulares (Werlich 1983; Van Dijk 1988; Bell 1991).

Los artículos escogidos han sido recopilados de manera electrónica, teniendo en cuenta su extensión (no más de 300 palabras, ya que si no, no podrían tratarse por completo durante una clase), el tema tratado y la posibilidad de ser analizados durante un período lectivo, considerando el grado de dificultad que entraña la comprensión de su contenido. Para contribuir a la comprensión del vocabulario y las posibles expresiones idiomáticas que pueden obstaculizar el trabajo propuesto a los alumnos, se ha elaborado una selección de palabras y expresiones con algunos sinónimos, al pie de cada artículo, basándonos en el *Oxford English Dictionary* (2003), el *Collins Spanish-English English-Spanish Dictionary* (1992) y un diccionario de sinónimos, *Thesaurus* (1985). Dicha selección se ha llevado a cabo teniendo en cuenta el nivel de dificultad del vocabulario de los textos periodísticos y los conocimientos requeridos a los alumnos que cursan el bachillerato. Además

ha sido necesario el uso del diccionario bilingüe por parte de los alumnos y la colaboración activa del profesor, durante los períodos dedicados a esta tarea. También ha sido preciso que los informantes dedicaran cierto tiempo al estudio de los textos fuera del aula para que el trabajo pudiera completarse debidamente.

Dentro de los textos de la muestra, utilizados en nuestra investigación, hemos seleccionado, de manera aleatoria, tres artículos de opinión, pertenecientes al periódico *The Times,* publicados los días 8, 10 y 12 de Marzo de 2009, respectivamente, disponibles a través de la página de internet del periódico *The Times* (citados entre nuestras fuentes primarias), sobre los que aportaremos los datos recogidos, relativos a la detección y traducción de metáforas que los informantes han llevado a cabo desde los dos enfoques mencionados.

5. Criterios de análisis de los resultados y presentación de los datos obtenidos

Al comparar los resultados que cada uno de los dos grupos ha obtenido al elaborar sus respectivos trabajos hemos aplicado ciertas variables para su análisis, indicadas a continuación. Dichas variables han tenido en cuenta características intratextuales que consideramos inherentes al propio texto, así como otras de tipo extratextual, que pueden incidir de forma significativa sobre la interpretación de la muestra de metáforas identificadas y traducidas que se ha recopilado (Nord 1991; Hatim & Mason 1995).

En primer lugar, hemos realizado una estimación de las metáforas detectadas por cada uno de los grupos de informantes, señalando aquellas que coinciden en la muestra recogida por los dos grupos de alumnos. A continuación hemos considerado ciertos factores extratextuales para su análisis, (en relación con el texto de las metáforas detectadas y no con su traducción), con el objetivo de comprobar si han incidido en la identificación que los alumnos han hecho de las metáforas en los textos: el registro, la función y el propósito de dichas metáforas. Hemos tratado la función y el propósito de manera conjunta, ya que se producen de forma correlativa en los textos recopilados, tomando como referencia para su clasificación la propuesta de ciertos teóricos (Werlich 1976; Nord 1991; Hatim & Mason 1995).

En cuanto al registro, hemos tomado como referencia el término de "variación lingüística" (Hatim & Mason 1995: 39). Sobre este factor influyen distintas características contextuales (geográficas, sociales, temporales, etc.) propias del emisor del mensaje, además de otros tres aspectos fundamentales, referentes al uso lingüístico: el modo, el campo y el tenor. El modo hace referencia al medio en el que se desarrolla el acto comunicativo. Por otra parte, el campo refleja la función social del texto. No obstante, en nuestra investigación no hemos analizado estos

dos factores –el modo y el campo–, ya que consideramos que podrían ser objeto de estudio de un trabajo de investigación más amplio y detallado. En cuanto al tenor, pueden distinguirse dos tipos: personal y funcional. El tenor personal es la categoría del discurso que refleja el tipo de relación existente entre el emisor y el receptor del mensaje (Hatim & Mason 1995:50), mientras que el tenor funcional indica la categoría que describe la finalidad con la que se utiliza el lenguaje en una determinada situación. En lo tocante al tenor personal de las metáforas detectadas en este estudio hay que tener en cuenta la amplia escala de categorías graduales (íntima, coloquial, formal, oficial, etc.), que podemos encontrar entre una relación formal y una informal en la que participan el emisor y el receptor del mensaje.

Como hemos visto, existen distintos condicionantes que inciden sobre el registro, complicando su clasificación. En este trabajo hemos considerado tres tipos diferentes de registro: formal, neutro e informal, entre los que hemos distribuido las metáforas detectadas por los informantes. El tipo de registro neutro no aparece marcado por ninguna elección lingüística del emisor del mensaje, es decir, no presenta rasgos típicos de un registro formal, ni tampoco muestra características morfológicas, semánticas o sintácticas del discurso informal. El registro formal se caracteriza por un conjunto de opciones lingüísticas que expresan un respeto marcado entre un emisor y un receptor desconocidos entre sí. Por último, el registro informal se caracteriza por una relación social dada entre un emisor y un receptor que se conocen, manifestada a través de expresiones coloquiales, formas abreviadas, etc. (Werlich 1976; Hatim & Mason 1995).

Por otra parte, hemos aplicado a los resultados obtenidos las variables intratextuales que consideramos de mayor relevancia: el tipo de metáforas clasificadas por su forma, y también por su uso, y el tipo de traducción realizada según su aceptabilidad (más libre y enfocada hacia la LM) o adecuación (enfocada hacia la LO). En relación con el enfoque en la traducción, hemos considerado en el polo de adecuación las traducciones elaboradas "palabra por palabra" que presentan una correspondencia en el número de unidades léxicas traducidas con el TM, obteniendo una traducción literal de las metáforas (Vázquez Ayora 1977; Newmark 1988; Samaniego Fernández 2007). La aceptabilidad se manifiesta en las traducciones que no presentan una equivalencia formal entre el TO y el TM, descartando el concepto de "fidelidad"; el grado de neutralidad está marcado por una diferencia formal relativa, marcada en ciertas unidades léxicas entre el TO y el TM. Así mismo, también hemos contrastado el número de versiones elaboradas por cada uno de los dos grupos de alumnos de las traducciones de las metáforas identificadas y el número de palabras traducidas, así como su porcentaje respecto a las de los textos analizados.

En las cuatro secciones siguientes presentaremos los resultados obtenidos relativos a las variables aplicadas, en las cuatro secciones siguientes. La clasificación de

las metáforas, respecto a los factores extratextuales mencionados, y la distinción entre las metáforas atendiendo a su uso y a su forma no las han realizado los informantes, puesto que su tarea se ha limitado a la identificación y a la traducción de las metáforas de los textos periodísticos.

5.1. Resultados obtenidos en el número de metáforas detectadas

El grupo que ha aplicado el enfoque descriptivo (en lo sucesivo, grupo 1) ha detectado un 29,17% más de metáforas que el grupo que ha utilizado el enfoque prescriptivo (en lo sucesivo, grupo 2). Con respecto a estos datos, que pueden deducirse de los reflejados en la Tabla 1, podemos afirmar que el grupo 1 ha demostrado un mayor grado de capacidad para identificar los distintos tipos de expresiones metafóricas halladas en los textos que el grupo 2.

	GRUPO 1 (enfoque descriptivo)				GRUPO 2 (enfoque prescriptivo)			
	Texto 1	Texto 2	Texto 3	Total	Texto 1	Texto 2	Texto 3	Total
N.º de metáforas	8	8	8	24	8	3	6	17

TABLA 1: Número de metáforas detectadas por los informantes

Creemos que el enfoque prescriptivo ha ejercido cierta influencia restrictiva en los informantes, limitando su capacidad para identificar expresiones metafóricas a través de normas de la retórica tradicional. No obstante, ambos grupos coinciden en la detección de cierto número de metáforas, como se puede observar en la figura 1: hay un 54,16% de coincidencia en las metáforas detectadas en el grupo 1, frente al 82,35% de las coincidentes, entre las detectadas por el grupo 2.



FIGURA 1: Coincidencia en las metáforas detectadas

El porcentaje señalado en la coincidencia de las metáforas por el grupo 2, en referencia al grupo 1, consideramos que se debe en parte, al hecho de que el grupo 2 ha identificado un menor número de metáforas, lo que posibilita dicha coincidencia en el número de ejemplos detectados, respecto a la totalidad de la muestra. También es posible que el nivel similar de competencia lingüística de los informantes haya limitado su atención en ciertos casos, lo que les ha llevado a omitir otros posibles ejemplos que había en los textos; a este factor habría que añadir además el efecto restrictivo que comporta el enfoque prescriptivo, tal como se menciona arriba. Por otra parte, no hemos considerado la totalidad de los ejemplos existentes en los textos, ya que nuestro objetivo era valorar el contraste entre ambas perspectivas, descriptiva y prescriptiva, a la hora de que los estudiantes detecten metáforas, en particular, y aprendan una L2, en general.

5.2. Resultados de la aplicación de variables extratextuales

5.2.1. Función y propósito

Entre los resultados obtenidos en la muestra, referidos exclusivamente a la comparación de las metáforas recopiladas por los informantes con respecto a la totalidad de las metáforas detectadas en los textos periodísticos, por los dos grupos de informantes, se manifiesta un predominio de la función expositiva, así como del propósito informativo. El grupo 1 ha detectado, entre las metáforas que ha encontrado, un 45,83% de aquellas cuya función es expositiva y tienen un propósito informativo, mientras que el grupo 2 ha detectado un 41,17%, sin aportar ninguna diferencia significativa al respecto. Creemos que esta función predomina en los casos analizados debido al tipo de discurso de los textos periodísticos tratados (Werlich, 1976; Nord, 1991; Hatim & Mason 1995), pero no parece reseñable en cuanto a la detección de las metáforas que presentan estas características, por parte de ningún grupo de informantes en particular. No obstante, veamos en el cuadro 2 una misma metáfora detectada por ambos grupos, en la que hemos valorado ciertos contrastes debidos al texto identificado que forma parte de ella en cada caso, respecto a su función y su propósito:

He bears the image, from bearing and clothing, of wealth and contentment as a successful man of the theatre and a landowner might evince.	He bears the image, from bearing and clothing.

TABLA 2: Ejemplo de una metáfora detectada coincidente en el grupo 1 (enfoque descriptivo), a la izquierda; el grupo 2 (enfoque prescriptivo), a la derecha

En el texto aportado por el grupo 1 apreciamos una función expresiva a través del símil "of wealth and contentment as a successful man of the theatre and a landowner…", que ha sido identificado como una metáfora, desde la perspectiva

descriptiva, cuyo propósito parece ser el de deleitar; sin embargo, el texto del grupo 2 puede interpretarse como una metáfora lexicalizada, centrada en la expresión "bears the image…", cuya función consideramos expositiva, ya que se limita a transmitir una descripción, y cuyo único propósito es el de informar sobre dichos datos. Consideramos que el grupo 1 manifiesta a través de este ejemplo una mayor atención hacia el texto, fundamentada en el mayor porcentaje de palabras traducidas. Creemos que con ello el grupo 1 demuestra un mayor grado de comprensión del texto, comparado con el grupo 2, cuya aplicación de las normas prescriptivas parece haber restringido la detección de su ejemplo.

Sin embargo, en el Texto 1 analizado por los informantes, posiblemente debido a que se trata de un discurso de contenido político, la función argumentativa es la que hemos identificado en mayor frecuencia, así como el propósito de persuadir a la audiencia, a través de las metáforas detectadas por ambos grupos, como apreciamos en los ejemplos del cuadro 3, de una metáfora novedosa y otra lexicalizada:

"We are game-changing players in the United Nations, the EU, Nato, the World Trade Organisation and the G8"	"It is precisely because we love Scotland so much that we do not want to see it weakened by leaving the UK"

TABLA 3: Ejemplo de metáfora novedosa Ejemplo de metáfora lexicalizada

5.2.2. Registro

Los resultados demuestran una preponderancia del tipo de registro neutro en ambos grupos: un 62,5% en el grupo 1 y un 64,69% en el grupo 2, que no aportan contrastes significativos entre los datos de las metáforas detectadas. Por ello, podemos afirmar que, respecto a los factores extratextuales analizados, no parece que estos hayan tenido ningún efecto restrictivo, desde ninguno de los enfoques aplicados en nuestra investigación.

5.3. Resultados de la aplicación de variables intratextuales

5.3.1. Clasificación de las metáforas detectadas atendiendo a su forma

Respecto a esta clasificación, se registra un mayor número de metáforas puras en el grupo 1, con un 83,33% frente a un 41,21% en el grupo 2, teniendo en cuenta que, desde el punto de vista cognitivo, solo se han distinguido la metáfora y la metonimia, como ya hemos mencionado. No obstante, destaca el matiz de diferencia entre ambas aproximaciones y podemos afirmar que el grupo 1 demuestra una mayor capacidad para detectar las distintas manifestaciones metafóricas de acuerdo con la clasificación establecida.

Como observaremos en el siguiente ejemplo del cuadro 4, ambos grupos han detectado la misma metáfora lexicalizada que, atendiendo a la clasificación según su

forma puede considerarse bien una personificación desde la perspectiva prescriptiva "will kill electric cars"; bien una metáfora desde la descriptiva:

This is the conversation that will kill electric cars as a truly mass-market carbon-reduction tool.	This is the conversation that will kill electric cars.

TABLA 4: Ejemplo de una metáfora lexicalizada, detectada por el grupo 1 (enfoque descriptivo), a la izquierda; el grupo 2 (enfoque prescriptivo), a la derecha

El siguiente tipo de metáfora detectado con más frecuencia en nuestra clasificación es la personificación, con un 17,64%, registrada únicamente en el grupo 2. El resto de las metáforas detectadas, en el mismo grupo, pertenece a distintas clases representadas por los tropos que, en cierta medida, están basados en la expresión de una comparación, cuya clasificación hemos aplicado mediante las definiciones que aparecen en los manuales que hemos utilizado (Lausberg 1966; Lapesa, 1985; Mortara 1991), –metonimia, sinécdoque, antonomasia, litote, énfasis, hipérbole, juego de palabras, símil, personificación, alegoría y sinestesia–.

5.3.2. Clasificación de las metáforas detectadas atendiendo a su uso

Con relación a este aspecto, partiendo de la definición aportada por algunos de los teóricos citados anteriormente (Newmark 1988; Rabadán Álvarez 1991), el grupo 1 ha detectado un 25% de metáforas novedosas en su muestra y un 75% de metáforas lexicalizadas; en el grupo 2, un 17,64% son metáforas novedosas frente al 82,36% de metáforas lexicalizadas. Dichos porcentajes se desprenden, como podemos observar, de los datos aportados mediante la clasificación que hemos realizado, expresados en la figura 2.



FIGURA 2: Tipo de metáforas según su uso

El porcentaje superior de metáforas novedosas identificadas por el grupo 1 (teniendo en cuenta los datos recopilados, las características de los informantes, el tipo de textos y los demás factores que pueden haber influido en los resultados obtenidos en esta investigación) parece demostrar una mayor capacidad de dicho grupo para reconocer esta clase de metáforas, ya que para su detección, es necesaria la comprensión de elementos contextuales y de aspectos temporales del texto (Rabadán Álvarez 1991; Goatly 1997), que no aparecen recogidos en los diccionarios. Por ello, la perspectiva de la lingüística cognitiva parece haber resultado de mayor efectividad frente a la perspectiva de la retórica tradicional, aportando estrategias cognitivas para la detección de metáforas que pueden incidir en el desarrollo de la comprensión lectora.

5.4. Resultados de las traducciones recopiladas de las metáforas detectadas

Veamos, a continuación, las distintas versiones de la traducción de las metáforas detectadas en los ejemplos del cuadro 3, realizadas por cada grupo:

"Estamos para cambiar el juego político de las Naciones Unidas / Nosotros somos sustitutos en la política / somos moneda de cambio / somos un cambio radical en la política de las Naciones Unidas / somos jugadores en la política / Somos jugadores en el juego en la política en las Naciones Unidas".	"Somos jugadores suplentes en un juego político / somos la moneda de cambio de un juego cambiante / Somos unos jugadores en un cambiante juego de las Naciones Unidas, de la UE, de la OTAN, de la OMC y del G8."
"Es precisamente porque amamos tanto a Escocia que no queremos verla debilitada por abandonar el Reino Unido / Debido a que la tenemos mucho aprecio a Escocia, no queremos verla abandonada, pobre, por separarse del Reino Unido."	"Es precisamente que amamos tanto a Escocia que no queremos verla debilitada por abandonar el Reino Unido / Es precisamente por lo que amamos Escocia, tanto que no queremos verla debilitada por abandonar el Reino Unido".

TABLA 5: Traducciones descriptivas del grupo 1 Traducciones prescriptivas del grupo 2

Las versiones de la traducción de la metáfora novedosa del grupo 1 recogidas en el cuadro 5, "estamos para cambiar el juego político" y "somos un cambio radical", parecen transmitir el sentido del TO y presentan un alto grado de aceptabilidad como TM. Sin embargo, las versiones del mismo grupo "somos jugadores en la política" y "somos jugadores en el juego en la política" se aproximan a la adecuación del TO, omitiendo el sentido de la expresión "game-changing", que ha sido traducido de una forma más libre en las otras versiones del mismo grupo. Por otra parte, consideramos que la primera versión de la metáfora lexicalizada del mismo grupo tiende a la adecuación del TO, al igual que en las aportadas por

el grupo 2, en las que puede apreciarse una correspondencia entre los elementos léxicos, referidos a la metáfora lexicalizada, con los elementos que forman parte de su traducción. Creemos que hay una redundancia en la versión "somos jugadores en el juego", debido a la falta de destreza y de conocimientos sobre el proceso de traducción de los informantes que la han elaborado.

Las traducciones realizadas por los dos grupos de informantes de las metáforas detectadas presentan un predominio en la tendencia hacia la adecuación de los textos, como podemos apreciar en la figura 3. Es decir, que las traducciones elaboradas por ambos grupos están enfocadas hacia el TO en una proporción mayor, siendo el 45,85% de las versiones traducidas por el grupo 1 y el 52,77% en el grupo 2, las que presentan esta característica. Creemos que dicha tendencia se debe al nivel de competencia lingüística de los informantes y al hecho de que la traducción que han realizado no es profesional, ya que carecen de la formación y de la experiencia necesarias.



FIGURA 3: Tipo de traducción de las metáforas según el enfoque

En cuanto al número de versiones recopiladas de las traducciones de las metáforas identificadas de la muestra (expresadas en la tabla 6), el grupo 1 registra un 32,08% más de versiones que el grupo 2. Este hecho confirma las afirmaciones anteriores respecto a la perspectiva descriptiva, que fomenta la atención de los informantes hacia el texto, permitiendo el reconocimiento de distintas opciones posibles a la hora de traducir las metáforas, mediante la expresión de diferentes versiones dentro de una tendencia hacia la aceptabilidad en el TM. En esta investigación, la traducción de metáforas realizada desde una perspectiva descriptiva les ha aportado a los alumnos una concepción más flexible del propio proceso de la traducción, consiguiendo que les presten una mayor atención al texto y a su comprensión y relacionando las metáforas detectadas en los textos con los "dominios diana" o conceptos a los que aluden.

	GRUPO 1 (enfoque descriptivo)				GRUPO 2 (enfoque prescriptivo)			
	Texto 1	Texto 2	Texto 3	Total	Texto 1	Texto 2	Texto 3	Total
N.º de metáforas	8	8	8	24	8	3	6	17
N.º de versiones de su traducción	5/2/6/1/2 5/2/1(24)	1/1/2/2/1/3/ 1/2(13)	1/3/2/1/3/ 1/1/4(16)	53	4/2/1/1/3/ 5 1/1 (18)	3/2/3 (8)	1/3/3/1/1/ 1 (10)	36
Porcentaje de palabras traducidas	48,5%	42,37%	36,99%	43,05%	40,12%	11,86%	34,14%	28,58%

TABLA 6: Número de metáforas detectadas, versiones de sus traducciones y porcentaje de palabras traducidas parcial y total de los textos periodísticos

Por último, el porcentaje de las palabras traducidas por el grupo 1 respecto al total de las de los textos de muestra (43,05%) es muy superior al del grupo 2 (28,58%), como se aprecia en la Tabla 6.

Consideramos fundamental tener presente la percepción de la realidad que sugiere la metáfora (Hatim & Mason, 1995:14), procurando dotar del mayor grado de aceptabilidad posible al texto resultante de la traducción. Los informantes, que han aplicado el enfoque descriptivo a la traducción, adaptándose a la aproximación cognitiva de la metáfora (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), han procurado crear un texto dotado de corrección y ubicado en la cultura de la LM, en nuestro caso el español, que presente un grado de equivalencia aceptable. No obstante, debemos tener en cuenta que los informantes son dos grupos de estudiantes de bachillerato que, aunque han aplicado las nociones relacionadas con ambos enfoques de detección y traducción de metáforas respectivamente, no son traductores expertos.

6. Conclusiones

Con respecto a los objetivos propuestos en este trabajo de investigación, los resultados obtenidos demuestran que los informantes del grupo 1 tienen una mayor capacidad para identificar metáforas, tanto lexicalizadas como novedosas, ya que han detectado en los artículos seleccionados un 29,17% más de metáforas que los del grupo 2. Entre los ejemplos detectados únicamente por el grupo 1, que ha realizado una aproximación descriptiva, figuran algunas metáforas lexicalizadas, como "The so-called Flower portrait, is clearly copied from Droeshout rather than from life" (Texto 2) o "Professor Stanley Wells, a leading Shakespearean scholar" (Texto 2) y otras novedosas, como por ejemplo, "chargetastic" (Texto 3). Respecto a dicha distinción, puede resultar de interés que el porcentaje de metáforas novedosas detectadas (grupo 1, 25%; grupo 2, 17,64%), es mucho menor al de las lexicalizadas (grupo 1, 75%; grupo 2, 82,36%) en los dos grupos.

En la muestra de metáforas detectadas hay algunos ejemplos coincidentes de metáforas lexicalizadas, que han sido identificados por ambos grupos como queda reflejado, por ejemplo, en "this is the conversation that will kill electric cars" (Texto 3), o "It is precisely because we love Scotland so much that we do not want to see it weakened by leaving the UK" (Texto 1). Consideramos que la superioridad en el número de metáforas lexicalizadas detectadas por los dos grupos, en contraste con las novedosas, se debe quizás al nivel de competencia lingüística de los informantes, y a su adecuación a las pautas indicadas para llevar a cabo el proceso de detección. Ambos factores parecen haber ejercido una influencia restrictiva, especialmente respecto al Texto 1, en el que estimamos que existen más ejemplos de metáforas novedosas que podían haber sido detectados. No obstante, a la vista de los resultados obtenidos, creemos que la identificación de metáforas ha resultado una estrategia práctica, que ha estimulado la capacidad de comprensión lectora de los informantes, especialmente desde la perspectiva de la lingüística cognitiva. Asimismo, pensamos que la distinción entre las metáforas novedosas y las lexicalizadas podría ser objeto de futuras investigaciones, puesto que ambos grupos han identificado metáforas pertenecientes a las dos clases mencionadas.

Con respecto al enfoque realizado en la traducción que cada uno de los grupos ha aplicado, observamos que ambos tienden a utilizar la adecuación como técnica de traducción, aunque el porcentaje de traducciones recogidas que muestran estas características es superior en el grupo 2, cuyo enfoque era el prescriptivo. Dicha tendencia, marcada en ambos grupos, puede estar motivada por el nivel cultural y de competencia lingüística y traductora de los informantes que, como estudiantes de bachillerato, aún deben desarrollar. Resulta interesante observar la correspondencia entre las unidades léxicas, que caracteriza a las traducciones que manifiestan una tendencia a la adecuación del TO, en las siguientes versiones de las traducciones de metáforas lexicalizadas, detectadas por el grupo 1: "es precisamente porque amamos tanto a Escocia que no queremos verla debilitada por abandonar el Reino Unido", o, "ésta es la conversación que terminará con los coches eléctricos". Sin embargo, los resultados obtenidos demuestran, parcialmente, que la aplicación de ambas aproximaciones ha sido realizada poniendo en práctica las pautas indicadas de manera coherente: en el grupo 1, cuyo enfoque era el descriptivo, las versiones de traducciones orientadas hacia la aceptabilidad (33,96%) superan a las recopiladas por el grupo 2 (19,44%), cuyo enfoque era el prescriptivo. No obstante, consideramos que sería necesario un mayor nivel en la competencia lingüística de los informantes, que posibilitara la realización de traducciones con un mayor grado de aceptabilidad en el TM.

Creemos que tanto la detección de metáforas como su traducción han resultado estrategias útiles, que han estimulado la atención de los informantes y su capacidad

de análisis léxico de los textos seleccionados. No obstante, sería necesario realizar con la colaboración de otros grupos de informantes nuevas investigaciones que pudieran determinar mediante criterios objetivos, a través de datos empíricos, el grado de mejora en las destrezas de la comprensión lectora y de la traducción. Consideramos que no se deben extrapolar los resultados obtenidos en el presente trabajo sin un estudio más amplio. Por ello, a través de futuras investigaciones, pretendemos obtener resultados que aporten más datos e información más detallada al respecto.

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Notes

THE ANCESTRY OF JOHN DOE: A SQUIB

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Work preparatory to redrafting the *Oxford English Dictionary*'s entry for the name *John* has turned up three hitherto unpublished references to *John Doe*.[1] The earliest of these dates from 1599, 170 years before Blackstone's celebrated comment on this legal fiction, long viewed as the first written attestation. It then seems opportune to explore the possible origins of the name from the fresh vantage point of the late sixteenth century.

In his *Commentaries on the Laws of England* dealing with 'Private Wrongs' the celebrated eighteenth-century legal historian William Blackstone discusses writs which 'are either optional or peremptory; or, in the language of our law, a *praecipe*, or a *si te fecerit securum*.' The second is used when nothing other than simple satisfaction is demanded via a court judgment. Blackstone illustrates with 'writs of trespass ... wherein no debt or other specific thing is sued for in certain, but only damages to be assessed by a jury.' The defendant is called to appear in court, provided the plaintiff has given security (here persons supportive of both the plaintiff and his cause) that he fully intends to prosecute his claim. But of such security Blackstone writes:

> The whole of it is at present become a mere matter of form; and John Doe and Richard Roe are always returned as the standing pledges for this purpose. The ancient use of them was to answer for the plaintiff; who in case he brought an action without cause, or failed in the prosecution of it when brought, was liable to an amercement from the crown for raising a false accusation; and so the form of the judgment still is.[2]

Later historians have identified *John Doe* as the name given to the fictitious lessee of the plaintiff in the now obsolete mixed action of ejectment, while *Richard Roe* was the fictitious defendant.[3] Here, in a procedure and with names that were mere matters of form by the mid-eighteenth century, the Roman legal practice of naming fictional persons is seen in what would appear a thoroughly English guise. But is it English?

When a third name was called for, the convention was to use *Peter Poe*. This both rhymes with the two foregoing names and replicates the alliterative pattern of the second. This assonance is less fully realized in the first name, *John Doe*, giving it the appearance of a slightly less arbitrary origin than the two following, and perhaps of some original discrete status. *Doe* has never been a common English surname.[4] *Roe*, on the other hand, is a fairly frequent name in the English-speaking world. Its origins, however, are not exclusively English but also Irish, in which context the name derives from the adjective *ruadh* 'red, red-headed', used as epithet and sobriquet. The third surname, *Poe*, clearly an expedient and with a more tenuous connection to *Doe* and *Roe*, is traced to Old Norse *pá* 'peacock' and is among a number of European names with the meaning of 'showiness' and 'vanity'. Although never common, it is attested in both England and Ireland.[5]

Like *Roe* and *Poe*, *Doe* has an Irish parallel, if not antecedent, but it is not drawn from the everyday register where *ruadh* or Hiberno-Norse 'peacocks' are at home. *Doe* (vars. *doé, dae*) is found in Middle Irish as an infrequent term from the elevated register of poetry and law, and is a synonym for 'human being, person'. In the lexical compilation now called *Cormac's Glossary* and ascribed to the late ninth-century bishop-king of Cashel, Cormac mac Cuilennáin, we find *doe .i. duine* '*doe*, i.e., person'.[6] In other texts dealing with law, *doé* is listed among the twenty-six *togarmand miadslechta* or 'rank sections of dignity'.[7] Evidence is too slim to determine whether it represents a given socio-economic rank, for which early Irish offers a rich terminology, but it does occur in the list just after the lowest of the extensive noble ranks and before the farming classes.[8]

The chief objection to entertaining the loan of *doe* 'person' or a variant from the Irish to the English legal tradition is phonological. The Irish word contained a diphthong, by the Middle Irish period, already moving toward resolution as a pure vowel [i]. The English spelling *Doe*, on the other hand, probably represents a long, equally pure [o] sound in Middle and early Modern English. Yet, if *doe* were so little a part of everyday speech that it required a gloss, and is otherwise found only in legalistic texts, it may never have had much in the way of an oral life. It then appears justified to hypothesize a text-to-text transfer of the term, resulting in a simple replication of orthography, without a phonic echo as interference. This does, however, add one more area of speculation to this inquiry.

The discovery of *doe* in the early Irish legal vocabulary invites closer scrutiny of the surname *Roe* and a questioning of its simple derivation from *ruadh* in the present legal context. *Roe* is found as a legal term for 'duel, single combat, field of combat', which accords well enough with the notions of plaintiff and defendant, but seems unlikely to have supplied the name of just one side of the dispute, and the defendant's at that. More intriguing is early Irish *roach*, which referred to the witness to a contract.[9] Thus one could see in the pair *Doe* and *Roe* a principal and a witness.

Early Irish legal tradition also offers precedents for, or at least procedures comparable to, English law in the areas of illegal and legal occupation of land. Although it was an offence to squat on another's land, right of ownership could be established if such presence went uncontested for a stipulated period of time, called *rudrad*. Such usucaption could be opposed by ejecting cattle, tearing down fences, and by verbal complaints before witnesses (Kelly 1988: 109). Legal entry, *tellach*, was effected in the presence of witnesses and with the backing of sureties. A first such action might be followed by a withdrawal and the submission of the dispute to arbitration. This process could be reiterated with escalating symbolic acts of taking possession; legal ownership might follow successful arbitration or the failure of the defendant to submit to arbitration (Kelly 1988: 186f.). Irish law offers much evidence for sureties or guaranties which had a human identity, and which might roughly be compared to present-day character witnesses, with the same lack of evidentiary weight.

To return to John Doe, we have no evidence for fictitious persons in the early Irish legal tradition, from whom *John Doe* and *Richard Roe* might be thought to descend. Given that *John Doe* and *Richard Roe* now appear to have been in regular use in England from about 1600 onwards and had become commonplace by Blackstone's time in writs concerning trespass and ejectment, it would be easy enough, in the light of the history of English land tenure in Ireland, to improvise a larger fiction and see John Doe as the tenant of an English landholder in Ireland, at pains to prosecute his claim against a rival, whether an unnamed Englishman with a tenant or lessee of his own, Richard Roe, or a native Irish defendant so named. But this is more speculative than based on hard evidence.

If we were to pursue the link between Old Irish *doe* and Blackstone's *John Doe* as tantamount to 'just anybody', which is admittedly a slight over-reading of the evidence, we should need to establish how the praxis of Irish courts under British rule, in particular as they dealt with titles to land, could possibly have influenced English common law even in such an insubstantial matter as fictitious guarantors. Irish law students, albeit largely from Old English backgrounds, studied in England in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and Irish lawyers pleaded cases there,

providing additional opportunities for the transfer of legal concepts.[10] According to Richard Stanihurst, Irish law was being used in Ireland in many areas along with English common law as late as the third quarter of the sixteenth century, and the latter did not predominate until the following century.[11] The new evidence now in the hands of the editors of the *OED*, however welcome, still leaves a tantalizing temporal gap between the introduction, from whatever source, of *John Doe* into English legal procedure, and these first attestations.

The later history of the name *John Doe* is yet another story. Blackstone's remark appears to have continued to be well-known into the nineteenth century, as when Charles Dickens writes of the prenaturally aged law clerk Smallweed in *Bleak House*:

> In short, in his bringing up, he had been so nursed by Law and Equity that he has become a kind of fossil Imp, to account for whose terrestrial existence it is reported at the public offices that his father was John Doe, and his mother the only female member of the Roe family.[12]

The name *John Doe* crossed the Atlantic to America in the legal context, maintaining its use as a dummy name in legal scenarios but also becoming a proxy for the name to be filled in on a form and, in police jargon, the provisional name for an unidentified corpse. Apart from the latter extension, *John Doe* seems never to have been at home in British or American slang.[13] Police use of the name may well mean that John Doe's days are numbered.[14]

Notes

[1]. The *OED* slips offer the following three summaries: 1599 J. Adames *Order of Keeping Court Leete* sig. D1, "After the Stile of the Court entered, you shall cause the Bayliffe to crie once Oyes, and then call the Jurors. *Examp.* John Doe, Richard Roe, John Den, Richard Fen, [etc.]"; 1648 R. Robins *Whip for Marshalls Court* sig. D1^{v}, "Their writts run to Arrest John Doe, and Richard Roe in an action of Trespas"; 1671 F. Philipps *Regale Necessarium* 159 Returning upon the Writ the feigned names of *John Doe* and *Richard Roe* for the Sureties put in by the Complainants to make good their Complaints or Actions. I am grateful to John Simpson, Chief Editor of the *OED*, and to his staff for this information, in advance of its appearaance in the New Edition. Later examples of *John Doe* in *Oxford English Dictionary,* 2nd ed., Oxford, 1989, online version December, 2011.

[2]. Blackstone (1979: 275).

[3]. *OED* (1989), s.v. *John* 4.

[4]. The rare English name *Doe* reflects the French (Anglo-Norman) name *D'Eu*, based on the toponym from the department of Seine-Inférieure; see Reaney (1967:73 and 1997:137).

[5]. Discussion in Hanks and Hodges (1988), s.n. *Peacock*. Here, *Doe* has an entry comparable with that in Reaney (1967) but the Irish antecedents of *Roe* are not mentioned

and a simple equivalence with English *Ray* is listed, traced to the Old English term for the female roe deer.

[6]. Cormac mac Cuilennáin (1912), entry Y494. See, now, the *Early Irish Glossaries Database*, http://www.asnc.cam.ac.uk/irishglossaries, *s.v. doe (*Y494).

[7]. O'Donovan et al. (1865-1901: IV, 344f.), Binchy (1978: II, 582, l. 33); additional examples in Quin et al. (1912-76), s.v. 2 *doé*.

[8]. On Irish social nomenclature, see Kelly (1988).

[9]. Kelly (1988: 320), s.v., with refs.

[10]. Brand (2000). For two case studies of Irish and English law interacting, see Hand (1967).

[11]. Stanihurst (1584: 33-38), cited in Sharpe (1986: 188f.). On the early phase of this long transitional period, see Brand (1981).

[12]. Dickens (1983: ch. 20).

[13]. See, for example, Partridge (1984).

[14]. The argument presented here is speculative, hence the cautionary note sounded in its title, "A Squib". It is entirely possible that the resemblance of *John Doe* and early Irish *doe* 'person' is merely an entertaining coincidence. I am grateful to the editors of *Miscelánea* for their generous provision of space for what may be a less than fully convincing scholarly exercise.

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Reviews

ANALYSING GENRE: THE COLONY TEXT OF UNESCO RESOLUTIONS

Olga Dontcheva-Navratilova
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The book *Analysing Genre: The Colony Text of UNESCO Resolutions* brings to the fore the diplomatic discourse of UNESCO resolutions, a still unexploited field of research in communication and discourse studies. Diplomatic communication is said to be "the site of an intricate multi-cultural institutional dialogue that opens a path towards the solving of international conflicts and the reaching of agreement in international affairs" (Dontcheva 2009: 1). As a highly-specialized professional genre, UNESCO resolutions stem from a complex process of encoding and decoding context-dependent communicative purposes and strategy-oriented meanings, in which text-production is the outcome of careful negotiation between the members of a collective authorship. The discourse of the UNESCO reflects such specialized professional practices in that discourse is characterized by internal organization, conventionalization and stability of form.

Conceived as a piece of genre-based research, *Analysing Genre: The Colony Text of UNESCO Resolutions* explores the set of linguistic features which are typically associated with UNESCO resolutions, such as text organization, lexicogrammatical and semantic choices, information processing and cohesive relations. Its primary aim is to study text typology and stylistic variation with the objective of examining the impact of situational context on generic structure, a goal which is successfully met by combining the theoretical support of sociolinguistics, stylistics and pragmatics. The research undertakes the ambitious task of studying the effect of

situational context on generic structure from both the synchronic and diachronic view point in an attempt to observe any visible signs of the development of this genre over the last sixty years. In this spirit, the book is primarily concerned with the analysis of two major themes. On the one hand, the research addresses the socio-cultural context of UNESCO as an international governmental organization and how this particular professional setting may play a role in the way the institution shapes discourse structure and preconditions generic variation. On the other, the study is interested in examining the colony text-type on discourse organization in connection with diachronic variations. This approach proves to be relevant as it gives an indication of the historical development of the genre and its dynamism.

Chapter 1 opens with a broad-brush preface in which Dontcheva-Navratilova anticipates a number of the fundamental principles on which the research draws. Chapter 2 discusses some of the key concepts and methodological issues that have concerned genre studies over the last thirty years. In her examination of genre, style markers of genres and colony texts, the author clarifies the functional perspective that shapes the analysis. Language is, thus, perceived as a system of meaning potential (Halliday 1979) where meaning is negotiated and recreated by the interactants (Mey 1991). The research conceptualizes genre as meaning carrier, that is, as a set of discursive choices which consistently correlate with particular communicative circumstances in a field (Fowler 1986). Genre's prototypicallity allows readers to decode particular sets of linguistic choices enabling a specific set of communicative intentions. The author also reviews existing literature on legal, political and diplomatic language. Informative as these sections are, one may nevertheless be inclined to think that the research should have included important references such as Maley (1994, 2000), Tiersma (1999, 2002) and Bhatia (2004, 2008), and that it could have benefited from examining of the discursive elements of strategy (Vaara et al. 2004; Pälli et. al. 2009) to explain the alignment of contemporary institutions such as UNESCO with *strategic* social welfare. This framework could have provided a fine-grained contextualization of the communicative purposes of the UNESCO discursive community, or as Geertz (2007) puts it, a thick description of the context in which a text is produced. The contextualization of UNESCO resolutions is included in Chapter 3, which establishes four functional criteria (i.e. situational parameters, discourse participants, communicative purposes and communicative conventions) to identify the value of the situational variables responsible for the rhetorical structure and the set of linguistic options in the process of text production. Within this interpretative framework and drawing on concepts such as context of situation, communicative events, politeness, cohesion and coherence, clause relations and intertextuality, the author undertakes the analysis of the genre of UNESCO resolutions. Chapter 4 shows from a diachronic and synchronic viewpoint that UNESCO discourse has gradually codified its

communicative practices and discourse processing procedures. In the first section of this chapter, Dontcheva-Navratilova draws on diachronic studies to discuss the inclination of UNESCO discourse towards formal codification and professional accommodation. Her approach reveals that this type of intergovernmental institutional communication is characterized by particularly recurrent lexical phrases and syntactic structures which may be said to be prototypical of the legal discourse (i.e. functional structure and organization of discourse, unambiguity and all-inclusiveness), but interestingly enough, it is precisely the conventionalized reliance on these elements that establishes a gradual delimitation of the genre of resolutions as distinct from the legal register. In the second section of the chapter, Dontcheva-Navratilova proves that UNESCO discourse is a highly structured and codified genre and focuses on three major aspects of genre-based analysis: generic structure potential, structure of rhetorical moves and intrageneric variation. In an attempt to provide a holistic and comprehensive analysis of the discourse of UNESCO Resolutions, this section also considers stylistic aspects of formal written institution discourse, recurrent syntactic patterns in adverbial structures, clause patterns and verb complementation, cohesion and coherence. Chapter 5 ends this genre-based analysis by presenting some concluding remarks concerning the theoretical framework, the results of the practical study. It also suggests some directions for further research, including the application of this functional framework to diplomatic communication, the refinement of methodology and the analysis of different aspects of intercultural communication such as cross-cultural pragmatic strategies, coherence and dispute resolution strategies.

The research presented in the book is not only the result of the author's long-term involvement in the study of the genre under scrutiny, as the author suggests, but the result of significant research, thorough enquiry and, above all, strong commitment and dedication. This is why experienced and novel linguists may find it useful. Experienced researchers will encounter compelling arguments for the discussion of UNESCO diplomatic discourse, particularly in regard to its textualization and its generic variation. Furthermore, a study of these characteristics may assist young researchers in recognizing unexploited scholar sites of engagement, set out the guidelines for further linguistic analysis and inculcate those operationalized professional requirements necessary to interpret discourse and foster critical, and reflective scientific thinking. Of special relevance for them may be the clarifying glossary of terms included in the book. Dontcheva-Navratilova presents an inclusive, comprehensive examination of the textualization of UNESCO resolutions with sufficient evidence of the appropriateness of genre-based studies in diplomatic discourse. A minor drawback could be that the research's emphasis on the textualization of discourse often overshadows the equally relevant contribution of contextual elements partly responsible for UNESCO discursive

choices. This relative lack of attention paid to the contextualization of discourse is a shortcoming which could be rectified, for example, by placing greater emphasis on the discussion of the closed-set parameters included in the model for contextual analysis of genre (Chapter 2) or by discussing the significance of relevant aspects such as intertextuality, interdiscursivity and hybridization in the text-production process.

To conclude, this research offers us a valuable, well-founded and innovative analysis whose main strength underlines the need to advance in the study of the situational context on generic structure of UNESCO intergovernmental diplomatic discourse.

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Abstracts

A CONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACH TO ILLOCUTION: THE CASE OF ORDERS

Nuria del Campo Martínez
Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza

The present contribution studies the semantic base of orders at level 3 of the *Lexical Constructional Model* (Ruiz de Mendoza & Mairal 2008; Mairal & Ruiz de Mendoza 2009). The pragmatic structure of level 3 illocutionary constructions arises from the interplay between construal operations and general social conventions captured by the *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model* (Ruiz de Mendoza & Baicchi 2007; Baicchi & Ruiz de Mendoza 2010). We examine the rationales for a number of conventionalized formulas carrying order values and explore their realizational potential. We argue that the realization of orders is based upon grammatical mechanisms that exhibit instantiation potential for relevant parts of the semantic base of ordering.

Key words: illocutionary meaning, illocutionary constructions, *Lexical-Constructional Model*, ordering, conventionalization, *Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model*.

Esta contribución estudia la base semántica de las órdenes en el nivel tres del *Modelo Léxico Construccional* (Ruiz de Mendoza & Mairal 2008; Mairal & Ruiz de Mendoza 2009). La estructura pragmática de las construcciones ilocutivas de nivel tres surgen de la interacción entre operaciones de perspectivización y las convenciones sociales estipuladas en el *Modelo Cognitivo de Coste-Beneficio* (Ruiz de Mendoza & Baicchi 2007). Asimismo, examinaremos las bases cognitivas de un amplio número de fórmulas convencionales para la expresión de órdenes y exploraremos la capacidad realizativa de dichas fórmulas respecto a las referidas

bases. Defenderemos que la realización lingüística de las órdenes se basa en mecanismos gramaticales que poseen diferente potencial de instanciación de las partes pertinentes de la base semántica de ordenar.

Palabras clave: ilocución, construcciones ilocutivas, *Modelo Léxico Construccional*, órdenes, convencionalización, *Modelo Cognitivo de Coste-Beneficio*.

UNIFICATION OF THE SEMANTICS OF THE INFINITIVE IN ENGLISH

Hisashi Morita

This paper has two aims. The first aim is to unify the diverse interpretations of the *to*-infinitive in English. By adopting Lewis's (1986) concept of possible worlds, I will claim that the infinitive represents incorporation of a possible world by the 'real' world. The second aim is to explain how certain predicates have come to select the infinitive or the gerund or both. I will argue that historic changes along with the semantic restraint of the infinitive can account for the current state of complementation.

Key words: infinitive, gerund, possible worlds

El presente artículo tiene un doble propósito. El primero es unificar las diversas interpretaciones del infinitivo *to-* en inglés. Desde el concepto de Lewis (1986) de los mundos posibles, nuestra postura mantiene que el infinitivo representa la incorporación de un mundo posible a través del mundo "real". El segundo objetivo es explicar cómo algunos predicados han seleccionado el infinitivo, el gerundio o ambos. Los cambios históricos junto con las restricciones semánticas del infinitivo pueden explicar el estado actual de la complementación.

Palabras clave: infinitivo, gerundio, mundos posibles

CLIL AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONAL COMPETENCE

Esther Nieto Moreno de Diezmas

The broad spread of CLIL (Content and Language Integrated Learning) bilingual programs is being accompanied by a parallel development of research on the benefits of this platform. Initially, the research interest lay in the study of foreign language acquisition and the acquisition of content of non-language subjects taught in a foreign language. However, in recent times, new areas of the CLIL program's potential are being discovered. A wide range of studies prove that CLIL implies new benefits: cognitive, social, economic, etc. The goal of this article is to demonstrate that CLIL programs contribute to the development of emotional competence by means of a study conducted with secondary school

students of secondary education enrolled in a CLIL program in the Autonomous Community of Castilla La Mancha.

Key words: bilingual, CLIL, learning, emotional competence

La amplia difusión de los programas de enseñanza bilingüe AICLE (aprendizaje integrado de contenidos y lenguas extranjeras) está siendo acompañada por un desarrollo paralelo de la investigación sobre los beneficios de esta plataforma. Inicialmente, el interés de la investigación se centró en el estudio de la adquisición de lenguas extranjeras y la adquisición de contenidos de materias no lingüísticas impartidas en una lengua extranjera. Sin embargo, en los últimos tiempos, nuevas áreas de potencial del programa CLIL están siendo descubiertas. Una amplia gama de estudios demuestran que AICLE implica nuevos beneficios: cognitivos, sociales, económicos, etc. El objetivo de este artículo es demostrar que AICLE contribuye también al desarrollo de la competencia emocional, como prueba este estudio realizado con estudiantes de Educación Secundaria inscritos en el programa AICLE en la Comunidad Autónoma de Castilla La Mancha.

Palabras clave: Bilingüismo, AICLE, aprendizaje, competencia emocional.

SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC RULES IN OLD ENGLISH ADJECTIVE FORMATION

Raquel Vea Escarza

The aim of this journal article is to offer a paradigmatic analysis of the formation of adjectives by means of affixation in Old English.More specifically, the focus is on the change of meaning attributable to the processes of word-formation that turn out affixal adjectives. In a paradigmatic model, the formal modification of stems maps onto semantic and/or syntactic modifications, which are couched in terms of semantic and syntactic rules. After an analysis of the semantic and syntactic rules that apply in the formation of 3,365 derived adjectives, two conclusions are reached. In the first place, 19 prefixes out of 56 perform one derivational function, as opposed to 21 suffixes out of a total of 51, which means that the degree of polysemy displayed by prefixes is slightly higher than that of suffixes. Secondly, only two derivational functions are realized by one affix, which also shows that a one-to-one correspondence between affixes and derivational functions is the exception rather than the rule.

Key words: morphological operation, Process and Paradigm Model, Syntactic rules, Semantic rules, Old English

El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer un análisis paradigmático de la formación de adjetivos por medio de la afijación en inglés antiguo. Más concretamente, el objeto de estudio es el cambio de significado atribuible a los procesos de formación

de palabras que originan adjetivos afijados. En un modelo paradigmático, la modificación formal de los *stems* corresponde a modificaciones semánticas y/o sintácticas, formuladas a base de reglas semánticas y sintácticas. Después de analizar las reglas semánticas y sintácticas que de aplican en la formación de 3.365 adjetivos derivados, se obtienen dos conclusiones. En primer lugar, 19 prefijos a partir de 56 realizan una función derivativa, a diferencia de los 21 sufijos de un total de 51, lo que significa que el grado de polisemia que muestran los prefijos es ligeramente superior al de los sufijos. En segundo lugar, sólo dos funciones derivativas son llevadas a cabo por un afijo, lo que indica que una correspondencia de uno a uno entre afijos y funciones derivativas es la excepción más que la norma.

Palabras clave: operación morfológica, Process and Paradigm Model, reglas sintácticas, reglas semánticas, inglés antiguo

LA DETECCIÓN Y TRADUCCIÓN DE LAS METÁFORAS COMO HERRAMIENTA DIDÁCTICA EN EL APRENDIZAJE DE UNA L2 PARA ALUMNOS DE BACHILLERATO: DESCRIPCIÓN FRENTE A PRESCRIPCIÓN

Raúl Victoria Sánchez

In this article we will try to offer a perspective on the possible impact of the identification and translation of metaphors, found in newspaper articles written in English, on the L2 learning process of two groups of informants. These informants belong to two different groups of high school students, who are members of the same class, in the last two years of a secondary education School in Madrid (I.E.S. Gómez-Moreno), before the entry to University. They have identified and translated metaphors from two different perspectives: one group of informants, from a descriptive approach and another group from a prescriptive one. In our research we pursue two fundamental objectives: firstly, the estimation of the informants' work from two different approaches about the identification of metaphors in newspaper articles, and secondly the assessment of the translations performed of the identified metaphors by each group of informants, from the approaches mentioned. The students' work on the news articles published by *The Times* online and the collecting of data were carried out during an academic year (2009-2010), with both groups of informants. The news articles come from the opinion section of the newspaper and were collected between the 1st of January and the 30th of April in 2009.

Key words: translation, translation teaching, metaphor, L2 teaching, cognitive linguistics.

En el presente artículo se pretende ofrecer una perspectiva sobre el posible impacto de la detección y la traducción de metáforas, halladas en textos periodísticos escritos

en lengua inglesa, en el aprendizaje de una L2 con dos grupos de informantes. Estos informantes pertenecen a una misma clase del primer curso de bachillerato de un instituto de enseñanza secundaria de Madrid (I.E.S. Gómez-Moreno), que han detectado y traducido dichas metáforas desde dos enfoques diferentes: uno descriptivo y el otro, prescriptivo. Con esta investigación, se persiguen dos objetivos fundamentales: en primer lugar, la valoración, desde dos enfoques distintos, del trabajo de los informantes sobre la detección de metáforas en textos periodísticos y, en segundo lugar, la evaluación de las traducciones de las metáforas identificadas por cada grupo de informantes, desde los dos enfoques mencionados. El trabajo de los informantes sobre los artículos publicados en el periódico *The Times* online y la recopilación de los datos se han llevado a cabo durante un curso académico (2009-2010). Los artículos pertenecen a la sección de opinión y se recopilaron entre el 1 de Enero y el 30 de Abril del 2009.

Palabras clave: traducción, enseñanza de la traducción, metáfora, didáctica de una L2, lingüística cognitiva.

Notes for contributors

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

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…following Blakemore (1987: 35),…

…perform a distinctive function in discourse (Blakemore 1987).

…this issue has received a lot of attention by relevance theorists (Blakemore 1987, 1992; Wilson and Sperber 1993).

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NEALE, Steve. 1992. "The Big Romance or Something Wild? Romantic Comedy Today". *Screen* 33 (3): 284-299.

SAFRAN, Steve. 2007. "E&P: VT paper should be considered for Pulitzer". <http://www.lostremote.com/index.php?tag=virginia-tech>. Accessed July 25, 2008.

"Stars Slate Bush at Relief Event". 2005. BBC News. (September 19). <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4260182.stm>. Accessed February 21, 2010.

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