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Leticia OLAVARRIA BERENGUER
leticiaolavarria@gmail.com

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leticiaolavarria@gmail.com

Summary

Race relations in Brazil are characterized by the coexistence of miscegenation (interracial social contact) and racial discrimination. This paper examines to what extent Brazilian race relations are expressed in the urban space, how they influence its physical configuration and the social processes that take place within it. In this sense, it states that as long as it is considered that space is subject to power relations it can be asserted that these dynamics are expressed in the configuration of Brazilian cities, particularly in Rio de Janeiro. Therefore, the urban structure of Rio reflects certain level of interracial sociability in terms of residence and the social hyper-inequalities of Brazilian society. In addition, the study of the favelas shows how social discourses about race and urban space are interconnected and reinforce racial discrimination.

Key words: Racial discrimination, segregation, favela, Afro-Brazilians, power relations, Rio de Janeiro.

Resumen

Las relaciones raciales en Brasil se caracterizan por la coexistencia de mestizaje (contacto social interracial) y la discriminación racial. En este trabajo se examina en qué medida las relaciones raciales en Brasil se expresan en el espacio urbano, cómo influyen en su configuración física y los procesos sociales que tienen lugar en su interior. En este sentido, se establece que en tanto se considera que el espacio está sujeto a las relaciones de poder, se puede afirmar que estas dinámicas se expresan en la configuración de las ciudades brasileñas, especialmente en Río de Janeiro. Por lo tanto, la estructura urbana de Río refleja cierto nivel de sociabilidad interracial en términos de residencia y las hiperdesigualdades sociales de la sociedad brasileña. Además, el estudio de las favelas muestra cómo los discursos sociales acerca de la raza y el espacio urbano están interconectados y refuerzan la discriminación racial.

Palabras clave: Discriminación racial, segregación, favela, afrobrasileños, relaciones de poder, Río de Janeiro.

1
Introduction

A history of spaces […] would be
at the same time a history of powers […].[1]

In the last decades Brazil has emerged as an economic and political powerhouse at regional and international level which performs an increasingly key role in international forums and institutions. Nevertheless, it is also in the forefront of the most unequal countries in the world. Despite whites and Afro-Brazilians[2] account for virtually the same proportion of the population (47.3 % and 50.7 % respectively), blacks are disproportionally represented in the poorest segments of society since they account for 70 % of the poorest 10 % (PNUD, 2005; IBGE, 2010). Moreover, according with PNUD (2005) 'the black Brazil' ranks 105th in the UN World Human Development Index whereas 'the white Brazil' ranks 44th. In the light of these data it is difficult to believe that until recently Brazil was portrayed as a racial paradise. The extension of race mixture was considered a flagship of cordial race relations, especially in comparison with other countries such as the U.S or South Africa. Likewise, the lack of segregationist laws was exalted as a proof of the absence of racism.

These phenomena are particularly evident in large Brazilian cities whose spatial configuration could be considered as a representation of the social hierarchy of Brazil. In the same space it is easy to distinguish two cities or one divided city. On the one hand, upper-middle class isolates itself in the so-called condominiums, that is, luxury enclaves full equipped with services and amenities, surrounded by high walls and safeguarded by high level security systems. On the other hand, the poor, especially Afro-Brazilians, inhabit the *favelas* (Brazilian shantytowns) which in spite of being very heterogeneous between them and within them, can be characterized by economic deprivation, low access to and quality of public services, high rates of informal work and alarming levels of violence.

This paper analyzes these dynamics in Rio de Janeiro which has been chosen as a case study because it is a very illustrative example of a divided city, with a great number of *favelas* and a relevant proportion of Afro-Brazilian population. There are 763 *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro that are inhabited by 1.4 million of people that accounted for 22 % of its total population (IBGE 2010). These figures place Rio de Janeiro as the leading city in the number of *favelas'* residents. Likewise, its unique spatial configuration, particularly the presence of *favelas* in the city center, makes it an interesting case for the study of residential segregation. Finally, Rio is on the spotlight because it will hold the most important sporting events in the coming years: the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. Indeed, the Olympics perform an increasing role as an agent of urban policy within a strategy of reshaping city's image.

Therefore, I examine to what extent Brazilian race relations are expressed in the urban space of Rio de Janeiro by relying on the theory

1 Foucault 2001: 190, cited in Eliécer 2010: 5.

2 Including pretos and pardos, that is, blacks and mulattoes.

of Foucault. The Foucault's theory of power under which all social relations are relations of power help us to understand the complex racial panorama of Brazil. Particularly, the lack of segregationist laws or explicit discriminatory policies and the persistent racial inequalities can be reconciled under the theory of Foucault since according to him power is not a property of the State but rather, it is exercised throughout the social body. Power is subtle and operates modestly but effectively at the micro level of social relations (Foucault 1979, Foucault 2002, Foucault 1992b, 1996a and 2003 cited in Fair 2010: 16). According to these statements, despite the lack of legal or official discrimination, the inequality experienced by Afro-Brazilians can be explained by the existence of racial discrimination which is subtly promoted by dominant classes that wield power. In addition, the Foucault's idea about the power and the space, according to which a specific space is attributed to an individual or social group in accordance with his/her or their qualities, characteristics and behavior in order to preserve the permanence and order in the functioning of the space, allow us to notice the logic behind the discursive and spatial configuration of *favelas*.

Furthermore, as long as it is considered that space is subject to power relations it can be asserted that the socio-spatial structure of Rio may correspond to the different strategies and mechanisms of control and discipline through which the power distributes and rules the space. Specifically, this article states that the conceptualization, configuration and evolution of Rio's favelas are consistent with the strategies of 'leprosy' and 'plague'. Likewise, I analyze how social discourses about race and urban space are interconnected and reinforce racial discrimination from the perspective of Goffman's stigmatization theory. In this regard, I show how the media coverage of the violence unleashed in the *favelas* because of the confrontations between the police and gangs broadcasts a denigrating message about the *favelas* and *favelados* that reinforces racial discrimination. Thus, Goffman's theory (2006) about how the society or some social group, which is able to impose its opinion, ascribes a negative quality, characteristic or behavior to an individual in such a manner that discredits and stigmatizes him/her is extrapolated to a social group *(favelados)* and particular space *(favelas).*

After summarizing the key components of Brazilian race relations through literature review, the text focuses on how they are extrapolated to the urban space of Rio de Janeiro. Firstly, I expose the theoretical framework of my work which is based on Foucault's theory of power. Secondly, the historical evolution of the city is described in order to draw parallels between the socio-spatial configuration of Rio, particularly that of the *favelas*, and the mechanisms of control and discipline formulated by Foucault. In addition, the social discourses related to increasing levels of crime and violence are highlighted in order to show how they contribute to the stigmatization of favelas and their residents and reinforce racial discrimination. Finally, I analyze the most recent initiative of Rio's security policy pointing out its most immediate effects and its likely long term consequences.

2
Race relations in Brazil

We don't have a racial problem.
In Brazil, blacks know their place.[3]

The academic literature about Brazilian race relations can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, some scholars assert that there is little or no racial discrimination in Brazil and that the relation between people of different races is fluid. On the other hand, others state that racial discrimination is widespread. Following this scheme, key concepts for Brazilian racial ideologies, such as *mestiçagem* (miscegenation) and *branqueamento* (whitening), are analyzed.

From the 1930s onwards the first school of thought asserted that Brazil was a 'racial democracy' where there was little or no racial discrimination and race relations were characterized by *mestiçagem* (miscegenation). The most known defense of racial mixture was done by Gilberto Freyre in *Casa Grande e Senzala* (1933 cited in Cleary 1999: 9, Saldaña Pereira and Rambla 2007: 405) where he developed his particular view of slavery deprived of its hardest aspects. From his point of view race relations in Brazil were defined by harmonious cohabitation, affectionate intimacy and erotic attraction among masters and slaves which would lead to a more tolerant mixed society (Cleary 1999: 9, Saldaña Pereira and Rambla 2007: 405). Therefore, from this perspective the social disadvantages faced by black people were due to the recent past of slavery and thus, Brazilian social status was shaped by class rather than race (Harris 1952 cited in Wade 1997: 53-54). This view was shared by Pierson (1942: 337 cited in Wade 1997: 52) who predicted that racial inequality would disappear through `the fusing, biologically and culturally, of the African and the European into one race and one common culture'. This celebration of racial mixing should be contextualized in the early XX century, when Latin American intellectuals tried to confront the scientific racism and other racist theories that were very popular in Europe and North America proclaiming the uniqueness of the Latin American identities and cultures (Guimarães 1996: 44, Cleary 1999: 8, Muteba Rahier 2003: 42-43, Wade 2004: 358). Thus, Gilberto Freyre and his followers considered miscegenation not as a weakness but rather as the evidence of the successful adaptation to the tropics and thus, as the core of the Brazilian national identity (Cleary 1999: 10, Sheriff 2003: 89).

Moreover, it should be noted that the concept of *mestiçagem* in Latin America was built on racist ideologies. In this sense, the Brazilian racism of the XIX century adapted the European racist theories in such a manner that the degeneration deriving from racial mixture was redefined by the belief in the strength of whiteness that in case of racial mixing would cancel out the 'bad quality' of black blood. Consequently, the concept of miscegenation entailed the idea of whitening *(branqueamento)* (Hanchard 1994 cited in Wade 2004: 358, Guimarães 1996: 44, Clearly 1999: 6, Muteba Rahier 2003: 42-44, Sheriff 2003: 89-90). Although in the middle of the XX century (after the end of the Second World War) the premises of

3 Poular saying cited in Telles 2004: 139.

the scientific racism were discredited, Guimarães (1996: 45) claims that the ideology of *branqueamento* was translated to the sphere of social anthropology as the notion of upward mobility of mulatto. Pierson (1945 cited in Saldaña Pereira and Rambla 2007: 404-405) was the first scholar of this current of thought that pointed out the possible upward mobility of mulattoes within the social hierarchy. Indeed, the presence of *mestizos* (mixed people) in the elites of the country was the main argument raised to support the claim that there was not racial prejudice in Brazil.

Fernandes, who headed the next generation of scholars, challenged the ideology of racial democracy in the late 1950s. Fernandes (1964 cited in Da Silva 1998: 206) considered miscegenation as a mechanism of racial domination that by proclaiming an illusion of upward mobility legitimizes racial discrimination (Da Silva 1998: 206, Telles 2004, Saldaña Pereira and Rambla 2007: 406). In this sense, this new wave of thought showed through a series of studies commissioned by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) that racial inequalities were widespread and thus, racial democracy was a myth (Wade 1997: 53, Cleary 1999: 11-12). Nevertheless, in spite of denouncing that Brazil was far from being a racial paradise, these intellectuals maintained the thesis of the previous school that racial inequalities were due to class conflict. For instance, Fernandes in his monograph *A Integração do Negro na Sociedade de Classes* (1969 cited in Saldaña Pereira and Rambla 2007: 405, Wade 1997: 56, Telles 2004: 7) described Brazil immersed in a process of evolution from a traditional to a democratic capitalist society. Thus, he considered that the disadvantage of black people was due to slavery because their lack of education and skills did not enable them to be integrated in the newly industrialized labor market. Moreover, he believed that in the capitalist society racial identities would be overshadowed by class issues and, consequently, racism would disappear as long as capitalism develops.

The academic debate was interrupted by the coup of 1964 that brought the conservative right to power. The repression of the military government silenced the critical voices that denounced the prevalence of racial discrimination and inequality in the country and praised Freyre's idea of racial democracy because his description of the peaceful Brazilian history was very appropriate for that time of disunity and political instability (Cleary 1999: 14, Guimarães 2002: 319). It is precisely in this context when Degler reintroduced the debate about upward mobility of mulattoes in his book *Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (1971 cited in Sheriff 2003: 103, Wade 2004: 358) through a comparison of race relations in those countries. Without denying the existence of racial discrimination against blacks, Degler asserted that mulattoes in Brazil, unlike in the US, occupied a middle social category between blacks and whites that enabled them to avoid racial disadvantage and enjoy a preferential treatment. It is what he called 'mulatto escape hatch' (Sheriff 2003: 103, Wade 2004: 358).

Nonetheless, after the hardest years of repression and when democracy was restored in 1984 Hanselbag and Silva questioned the 'mulatto escape hatch' theory. Their numerous studies based on census

data showed that the socio-economic differences between blacks and mulattoes (referred as *preto and pardo* respectively in census data) were insignificant or at least, that the situation of mulattoes was nearer to that of blacks than to whites' circumstances and thus, both groups suffered a similar level of discrimination (Silva 1985 cited in Hanchard 2003: 20, Silva and Hasenbalg 1992 cited in Hanchard 2003: 20, Silva and Hasenbalg 1999 cited in Wade 2004: 358). In addition, unlike the previous scholars mentioned, Hanselbag and Silva (1988 cited in Saldaña Pereira and Rambla 2007: 406) considered race as a factor in the reproduction of social inequalities. They stated that the socio-economic differences experienced by blacks and mulattoes cannot be attributed to slavery but rather to a specific racial discrimination process that produces an accumulation of disadvantages throughout their life cycle (Hasenbalg 1979, Hanselbag and Silva 1988 cited in Saldaña Pereira and Rambla 2007: 406-407).

Recently, Edward Telles (2004) has tried to reconcile the positions held by both lines of thought. He argues that previous scholars reached apparently contradictory conclusions because they have tended to focus on different dimensions of race relations. Thus, one school of thought has tended to focus on miscegenation (interracial sociability, social distance or what he calls horizontal relations) whereas the second generation of scholars has based their assertions on the level of racial inequality found in diverse socio-economic indicators (levels of social exclusion and marginalization, the so-called vertical relations). Telles states that the conclusions of both generations of scholars may be valid and consequently, both social inclusion (implicated in the concept of miscegenation) and social exclusion (derived from racial inequalities and discrimination) co-exist (Telles 2004: 107-214).

3
Socio-spatial segregation and racial discrimination in Rio de Janeiro

Many is the time I've felt less than a man
Unemployed, with my child going hungry
It's easy to criticize me
Society created me and now demands my death
Condemning me to die in prison
Transformed into television news.[4]

Once the particular features of Brazilian race relations have been examined, the text focuses on how they are reflected in the spatial dimension. In other words, how both interracial social contact *(mestiçagem)* and racial discrimination converge in the urban space of Rio. With this aim, I resort to analyze residential segregation based on race and class and some specific social dynamics that reinforce racial discrimination. Although the purpose of this paper is to study residential

4 MV Bill, Soldado do Morro, from the album. Tranficando Informaçao 1999, cited in Perlman 2005: 23.

segregation by race, it should be noticed as it was mentioned above that it is closely related to segregation by class.

Even though the literature about residential segregation by race in Brazilian cities is limited, it is possible to find relevant studies as those of Telles (1992, 1995, 2004) who challenges the assimilation theory based on US model arguing that the absence of extreme residential segregation does not result in lower levels of inequality and racial discrimination. Moreover, he argues that the residential exposure of middle-class whites to non-whites is limited and thus, interracial sociability has little effect on them. Therefore, racial ideologies persist embedded in social practices and reinforce racial inequality (Telles 2004: 194-238).

In addition, the work of Oliveira (1996, 1997, 2001) about the configuration of large cities as spatial representations of historical forms of racial exclusion is very illustrative. This argument is supported by Vargas (2006) who establishes a connection between race and urban space through his study about the media coverage of the installation of gates and cameras around Jacarezinho (a *favela* in Rio de Janeiro). He argues that the understanding of urban space is determined by race in those areas whose inhabitants are disproportionately blacks. Likewise, the notion of urban space influences the conceptualization of race since it is expected that different urban areas correspond with different racial groups. To put it another way, he states that *favelas* are vilified because they are inhabited mostly by blacks and similarly, black people are seen negatively by society because they account for the majority of *favela's* residents (Vargas 2006: 66-67).

Particularly, but in consistence with the studies mentioned above I analyze the socio-spatial segregation of Rio by relying on the theory of Foucault about power relations and space. From his view, all social relations are relations of power and thus, power is not a property of the State and its repressive apparatus but rather, it is exercised throughout the social body. In other words, power operates at the micro levels of social relations (Foucault 1979, Foucault 2002, Foucault 1992b, 1996a and 2003 cited in Fair 2010: 16). In addition, the power is legitimized by diverse scientific disciplines (knowledge) and their institutions whose objectivity enable it to present its discourses as the truth (Foucault 2002, Foucault 2003 cited in Fair 2010: 21). Furthermore, the space is not excluded from power relations but rather it is defined, characterized and distributed by the power. In this regard, Foucault refers to the notion of emplacement as the result of attributing a specific space to an individual or social group according to his/her or their qualities, characteristics and behaviors which have been previously established by the power through different strategies, techniques and mechanisms, that is, the so-called governmentality. Likewise, the specific space with its characteristics, limitations and conditions of use constitutes the individual or social group. Thus, the space works simultaneously as an element of inclusion and exclusion since it includes the individual or social group in a specific place but excludes them from others (Foucault 2001, cited in Eliécer 2010: 5, Foucault 2002).

The allocation of the individuals or social groups in a specific space is made through the application of a kind of mechanism that guarantees the homogenization among them. This mechanism is the normalization that ensures that all the individuals allocated in a specific space have the same characteristics, qualities, aptitudes…, etc. in order to maintain the permanence and order in the functioning of the space. This organization of the space and distribution of individuals and social groups is regulated by the discipline (Foucault 2002: 108-118). In this sense, Foucault studied how the discipline and its mechanisms organize the space through the strategies of 'leprosy' and 'plague'. The leprosy strategy prevents the lepers' access to the city keeping them away. By contrast, the plague strategy keeps the affected inhabitants in the city although they are subject of severe control measures in order to avoid the spread of the infection (Foucault 2002: 120-125).

It should be noticed that in order to analyze the socio-spatial segregation of Rio de Janeiro this paper pays special attention to the discursive and physical evolution of *favelas* as they constitute the main housing option for the poor and thus, for Afro-Brazilians. The first *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro arose in the late XIX century, especially after the abolition of slavery, when new freed slaves came to the city from the Northern and Northeastern areas of the country in search of work. They settled in the city center close to means of transport and the wealthy classes that offered prospects of employment in domestic service. During the first decades of the XX century these poor settlements were subject to government removal campaigns due to public health emergencies. This led the poor to the hills *(morros)* of the areas adjacent to the sea that had begun to be occupied by the upper middle class. Although these new settlements lacked basic infrastructure, they were located close to jobs and transport facilities (Oliveira 1996).

During the industrialization of the city, which took place from about 1945 to the late 1970s, Rio de Janeiro experienced a remarkable economic growth and an expansion of the labor market. The increase of the salaried population allowed unprecedented social inclusion and mobility. In addition, the population of the city increased largely by the arrival of immigrants from within the state who moved from the countryside to the city attracted by better prospects for the future (Ribeiro and Telles 2000). Likewise, the number of *favelas* increased due to the lack of housing options. Furthermore, they spread to the Northern suburbs of the city, mainly to the areas of Ramos, Penha, Inhaúma, Meier, Irajá and Madureira where the manufacturing industry was located but also because the Dictatorship's removal Campaigns eliminated the *favelas* of the more valued residential areas (Oliveira 1996, 1997, 2001, Perlman 2005, Vargas 2006).

Nevertheless, these years of economic prosperity came to an end in the late 1970s with the new dictates of the global economy. The de-industrialization of key sectors such as shipbuilding and steel and the reorientation of the local economy towards modern tertiary sectors, such as finance, commerce and computers, led to an increase in the number of unemployed people and workers in the informal economy. Moreover,

the structural adjustment policies led to privatizations and reductions in the public sector size, social spending, subsidies, in short, to the disintegration of social welfare policies (Ribeiro et al. 1993, cited in Oliveira 2001, Oliveira 1996, Ribeiro and Telles 2000, Perlman 2005). As a result, inequality in income increased and poverty was intensified. Poverty was more spatially concentrated in the periphery where the poor population increased 81.4 % from 1980 to 1990 and accounted for 45.7 % of the total population in that area (Oliveira 1997: 12). Likewise, the intensification of poverty led to an increase in the number of *favelas*. Thus, 197 new *favelas* were formed in the city of Rio during the same period of time. Furthermore, there was an expansion and/or densification of those already established (Oliveira 2001: 7). In 1991 the number of residents in *favelas* within the municipality of Rio represented 17.3 % of its total population (IBGE 1991 cited in Oliveira 1997: 14). Nonetheless, the greatest growth in the number of *favelas* and amount of population took place in the metropolitan area of the city, mainly in the municipalities of Nueva Iguaçu, São João de Meriti and Nilópolis whose occupation was facilitated by a system of public transport that in spite of being inefficient, linked these areas with the city centre (Oliveira 1997, Oliveira 2002, cited in Vargas 2006: 65).

In parallel with this spatialization of poverty, there is a process of racialization of urban space in Rio since *favelas* are characterized by the presence of Afro-Brazilians (Perlman 1977, Zaluar 1985, 1994, Mendoça and Benjamin 1997, Sheriff 2001, Goldstein 2003, cited in Vargas 2006: 65). For instance, in 2010 *pretos and pardos* accounted for 66 % of the *favelas'* residents in Rio de Janeiro (IBGE 2010). Therefore, two phenomena occur simultaneously. On the one hand, the peripheralization of poverty, as the most remote regions from the city became inhabited by the poorest, least educated and mostly nonwhite population. On the other hand, the polarization of the city center and south zone which congregate the white upper middle class in the beach front communities of Copacabana, Ipanema and Leblon and the *favelas* that accounted for the presence of poor nonwhite population in the center (Ribeiro and Telles 2000). (See maps 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7).

More recently, the peripheralization of poverty has intensified due to the increasing value of land in the city center of Rio and the real estate companies' pressures that have transformed the South Zone into an exclusive and wealthy bastion (Oliveira 2001). In this sense, the *favelas* that are best located in the city are experiencing a gentrification process since they have become inhabited by lower-middle class displacing the poorest to the periphery (Oliveira 2001). In addition, the western metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, particularly the municipalities of Santa Cruz and Campo Grande, has experienced the greatest increase in the number of *favelas* and population chiefly due to the availability of land. This growth in the western metropolitan zone seems to correspond with the development of the municipality of Rio in that direction particularly, with the establishment of middle classes in the so-called condominiums throughout Barra de Tijuca that has been followed by a massive formation

of *favelas* in the contiguous area of Jacarepaguá (Oliveira 2001, IGBE 2011, cited in Cavallieri and Vial 2012).

Nonetheless, this general scheme of centralization of the wealthy white population in the center and South Zone of Rio and peripheralization of the majority non-white poor population should be completed in order to assess the real level of interracial sociability that takes place in the space of the city since we have seen that there are also poor non-white settlements in the city center (mainly *favelas*). Consequently, according to Telles (1992, 1995 and 2004) and Ribeiro (2000) the cross-racial social contact should be measured at neighborhood level. These authors relying on the results obtained by applying the dissimilarity, exposure and isolation indexes assert that racial residential segregation in Rio de Janeiro is moderate (see table 1).[5] However, they point out that segregation increases with higher income groups (see table 2). Thus, the minority non-white middle class is more segregated from middle class whites whereas poor whites are more likely to live close to the majority of poor nonwhite. According to these scholars, this may be explained by the restricted options of housing among the poor population of Rio rather than by a greater racial tolerance among this segment of the population. On balance, these data suggest that residential segregation in Rio de Janeiro cannot be explained only by social-economic status but also by self-segregation or/and racism.

5 The dissimilarity index measures *evenness* in the distribution of social groups across the census tracts of metropolitan areas, or the extent to which social groups are differentially distributed across neighborhoods in urban areas. It varies from 0, where groups A and B are evenly distributed throughout the urban area, to 100 where there is completed segregation. Exposure indexes measure the extent to which members of a certain social group are exposed to those of another group by virtue of living in the same neighborhood. Particularly, the index of white exposure to nonwhites measures the proportion of nonwhite neighbors residing in the census tract in which the average white person lives. It varies from 0, where the average white person has not black or brown neighbors, to 100, where all the neighbors of the average white person are nonwhite. Finally, the isolation index for nonwhites represents the extent to which the average nonwhite in an urban area has nonwhite neighbors (Telles 1992, 1995 and 2004).

Metropolitan area	Dissimilarity	White exposure to nonwhites	Nonwhite isolation	Percent nonwhite
Rio de Janeiro	37	32	50	40

Source: 1980 Census of Brazil cited in Telles 2004: 203.

Table 1

Segregation indexes and racial composition of Metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, 1980 (page 14).

	Dissimilarity between:	
Metropolitan area and income group in Brazilian reais	White vs black	White vs brown
Rio de Janeiro		
75-149	42	38
150-224	46	39
225-374	45	39
375-749	54	42
750-1499	-	55

Source: 1980 Census of Brazil cited in Telles 2004: 209.

Table 2

Indexes of dissimilarity among whites, browns and blacks by family income group, 1980 (page 15).

Self-segregation of nonwhites may have diverse explanations such as the will to avoid a potentially racist contact from whites, the impossibility of accessing other options of housing, kinship or friendship bonds and the desire of proximity to particular institutions. In this sense, Rolnick (1989 cited in Telles 2004: 207) points out that Afro-Brazilians in Rio de Janeiro are prone to concentrate in poor neighborhoods close to other co-ethnics and institutions like samba schools and terreiros de candomble (Telles 2004: 207). In addition, it is well known the tendency to self-segregation of upper and middle classes in luxury condominiums promoted by a desire of prestige, social status, contact with «equals» and security (Caldeira 2000, Perlman 2005, Ribeiro 2007, Wacquant 2008). Nevertheless, racism should be also contemplated as a cause of racial residential segregation in the light of Telles's study. Telles (2004: 210-211) found that in all income levels, white-black segregation is greater than white-brown segregation (see table 2). Furthermore, the degree of segregation from the middle-class (predominantly white) for poor non-whites is greater than that from middle class for poor whites (see table 3). This is consistent with the study of Oliveira (2002 cited in Vargas 2006: 64) that shows the disadvantages experienced by poor blacks vis-à-vis poor whites of the same marginalized community. In addition, it also shows that the average years of residence in the favelas is greater for blacks and thus, it can be deduced that they enjoy less opportunities of social mobility.

Dollars	Whites	Browns	Blacks
0-74	83	91	99
75-149	67	72	88
150-224	50	53	62
225-374	40	43	51
375-749	36	39	48
750-1499	34	36	(46)

Source: 1980 Census of Brazil cited in Telles 2004: 211.

Table 3
Residential dissimilarity of income groups by race from populations earning over $ 1500 per month; Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area, 1980 (page 15).

In addition, the confluence of a set of social dynamics, that is, socio-economic deprivation, crime, police abuse and stigmatization of *favelas* and their inhabitants may indicate that they have been subject to a process of ghettoization rather than correspond to a formation of enclaves (Chanddha and Wilson 2008). Although *favelas* in Rio are really heterogeneous between them and within them, in general terms the *favelas'* level of access to and quality of urban infrastructure and public services is lower compared to other urban areas (Perlman 2005, Vargas 2006). For instance, in 2008 the access to garbage collection in the

favelas was 67.41 % whereas in other areas was 92.17 % (FGV 2010). At this stage, it is possible to draw parallels between Foucault's theory and previously described situation of *favelas*. The conceptualization of the *favelas* responds to the leprosy strategy by which, according to Foucault, the power organizes the space confining a homogenous segment of population («lepers») to an isolated place from the rest of the city. This isolation can be witnessed in the poor and deficient infrastructure, equipment and public services but also in the limited access to schools, health care, job opportunities and job networks that tend to be located in or close to middle-class neighborhoods. For example, in 2008 the average years of schooling was 6.4 in the *favelas* whereas in the wealthier neighborhoods it was 9.9 years (FGV 2010). What is more, for the same year the frequency of higher education was 2.6 % in the *favelas* and 24.1 % in the «city» (FGV 2010). Consequently, the unemployment rate and the proportion of people that work in the informal market are higher whereas the incomes are lower. Specifically, the income average of *favelas'* residents was less than the half of that of other urban sectors (R$350 and R$1046 respectively) (FGV 2010). The remaining social dynamics that converge in the *favelas*, that is, crime, police abuse and stigmatization warrant closer attention in the following section of the paper.

3.1. The stigmatization of *favelas* and its inhabitants

The concept of stigma used in this paper relies on the ideas of Goffman (2006) who states that society create different social categories and establish the attributes felt to be natural and ordinary for members of each category. These attributes established by society form the virtual social identity of the individual which can be different of his/her actual social identity that is formed by his/her real attributes. In this context, the stigma is produced when the society or some social group that is able to impose its opinion, ascribes a negative quality, characteristic or behavior to an individual in such a manner that discredits him/her. Goffman distinguishes three types of stigmas: those perceived as physical handicaps, those associated with individual's character and finally, those related with race, religion or nationality. Consequently, the stigmatized individual that does not have the attributes considered as natural or ordinary is seen as abnormal and thus, he/she is dehumanized and discriminated.

In this regard, the current conceptualization of *favelas'* inhabitants is grounded on the symbolic references that have historically structured the social relations in Brazil (De Souza e Silva 2010). Therefore, it can be witnessed that residents of *favelas* suffer from an accumulation of stigmas. Apart from those stigmas that they can have because of being black or poor (lazy, immoral..., etc.), they added that of living in a *favela* (violent, rowdy, dishonest..., etc.) (Adorno 1995: 6, cited in Wacquant 2008: 61, Marquez 2005: 7). Indeed, the study of Perlman (2005: 12)

shows that living in a *favela* is perceived as the most powerful stigma among the poor of Rio. In this sense, the stigmatization process of *favelas* and their people has intensified firmly during the last two decades associated with the arrival of drug trafficking (Ribeiro 2007: 108). The drug commerce disembarked in the *favelas* in 1980 where criminal gangs consolidated their points of sale because of the advantages that their hilly topography and nonlinear streets provide in confrontations with other rival bands and the police. Soon thereafter, the fights between gangs and with the police for the control of the territory increased sharply the level of violence and insecurity and led to an atmosphere of fear that reached the whole city. This situation became even worse when some retired police and firemen started to form paramilitary groups (known as militias) and also because of the implication of corrupt policemen in criminal activities (Vargas 2006, Koonings and Veenstra 2007, Leite 2008).

The portrayal of this social crisis in the media has increased even more the social distance between residents of *favelas* and upper and middle classes, dividing the city between the civilized world or *asfalto* (literally asphalt) and the urban jungle or *morro* (hill). In fact, the criminalization of *favelas* and their residents has been a constant in the media which have disseminated more or less explicitly associations of *favelas'* inhabitants with criminal organizations and as such they have been considered as criminals or accomplices (Vargas 2006, Leite 2008, Nogueira, Martinuzzi, Machado da Silveira and Padilha 2012). In this regard, the recent study of Nogueira, Martinuzzi, Machado da Silveira and Padilha (2012) about the «frames», that is, the hierarchical process by which the media choose or highlight particular aspects of the reality and avoid or underestimate others, is very illustrative. By analyzing the news of *favelas* published in three leading Brazilian magazines (Época, Istoé and Veja) during the period from 2006 to 2008, they observed that the discourses of the media could be classified in four categories «violence and drug trafficking», «shortage and lack», «social scourge» and «paradise and diversity» and concluded that among them the most repeated was by far the first one. Likewise, Vargas (2006) in his study about the media coverage of the installation of gates and cameras around Jacarezinho (a Rio's *favela*) in 2001 and the public debate that followed the event, shows that such discourses, although often tacitly, linked Afro-Brazilians to crime and corruption. Therefore, having assumed that there are no media free of ideology and thus, that every information responds to particular political, economic and social interests, it can be argued according with Foucault (2002) that the media perform an important role as disciplinary institutions and mechanisms of surveillance and control. In this sense, the media, as collaborators of the power, have contributed through the mechanism of normalization to the «homogeneization» of the *favelados* attributing to them the status of criminals o accomplices of criminal gangs.

As a result of this media coverage, the security policy of direct confrontation was reinforced and was largely supported by the upper and middle classes of Rio who feared that the «chaos» of the *favelas* spread over the city (Da Souza e Silva 2010). Thus, the repressive strategies utilized by the police and the army became seen as unavoidable and materialized in devastating incursions (known as *blitz*) over the *favelas* taking the lives of innocent people (Cano 1997, 2003, cited in Leite 2008: 218, Koonings and Veenstra 2007). In this respect, Afro-descendants are the most affected (Human Rights Watch/Americas 1997 and Amar 2003, cited in Vargas 2006, PNUD 2005). For instance, from 1993 to 1996 the lethality index was 4.6 for whites, 9.0 for browns and 8.2 for blacks (Cano 2002 cited in Telles 2004: 167).[6] Nonetheless, the stigmatization of *favelas'* residents tarnishes the legitimacy of their denunciations as well as their collective actions since their collective organizations, mainly neighbors associations, are also suspect of collaborating with criminal gangs (Leite 2003, cited in Leite 2008: 221, Fridman et al. 2005, cited in Leite 2008: 221, Silva et al. 2005, cited in Leite 2008: 221, Vargas 2006). To sum up, *favelas'* residents suffer from the denial of their right to life, to justice and of association, apart from their limited social rights due to their participation in the informal labor market. Thus, although the principle of equality is embodied in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 it is evident that in practice the *favelados* do not enjoy the same rights that other segments of society. All the disadvantages experienced by the inhabitants of *favelas,* that is, limited access to or low quality of public services such as schooling and health care, restricted access to jobs and thus, to income or social protection schemes, violence and coercion exerted by drug gangs, police brutality and social stigmatization have a devastating effect on their structure of opportunities and rights and consequently on their development (Sen 2000).

3.2. The destigmatization of *favelas* but what about their residents?

In recent years there has been a change in the public security policy of Rio de Janeiro that has relevant consequences for *favelas'* population. In 2008 the Secretary of Public Security of Rio de Janeiro announced the creation of *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (UPP) (Pacification Police Unit) whose first unit was installed in the *favela* of Santa Marta in December of the same year. This new strategy comprises two axes of action. Firstly, the permanent establishment of community policing bases in the *favelas* with the aim of reconnecting its residents with the security forces of the state. Secondly, the introduction of social programs oriented to promote the development of these areas (De Souza e Silva 2010, UPP Social 2012, Vieira da Cunha 2012). During 2009, the UPP spread quickly throughout the south of the city (Babylon Chapéu Mangueira, Pavao-Pavãozinho and Cantagalo) and also in two enclaves in the west (Batam and Cidade de Deus). In 2010 the *favelas* of Andarí, Borel, Formiga,

6 The lethality index is the ratio of killed to wounded civilians (Telles 2004: 167).

Macacos, Salgueira, Trabajaras/Cabritos and Turano, all of them located in Tijuca area and the South of Rio, joined the strategy, as well as the Morro de Providência which is set in the central zone. In the following year, the expansion of the UPP continued mainly within the central zone of the city (Escondidinho / Prazeres; Fallet / Fogueteiro / Coroa; Mangueira and São Carlos) although a *favela* from the North (São João) was also included in the programme. The pattern of 2012 was characterized by the incorporation of northern areas such as, Complexo da Penha, Complexo do Alemão and Barreira do Vasco and Tuiuti but also two important favelas of the South, Rocinha and Vidigal. Finally, Complexo de Cajú, also in the North, was integrated in 2013 (UPP Social 2012, UPP 2013). The social axe of the new strategy was not implemented until 2011 and involves diverse sectors: town planning and infrastructure, which account for the larger number of programmes and *favelas* addressed; productive inclusion and poverty reduction; culture and sports and education and health care (UPP Social 2012; Vieira da Cunha 2012).

The UPP project has been well received by both society's dominant groups (media, business associations and upper and middle classes) and *favelas'* residents. According to the opinion poll conducted by Rio Como Vamos (2011: 69), 65 % of the population thinks that UPP has brought security to the city.[7] In addition, 37 % of people that live in neighborhoods where UPP units have been settled perceive streets more peaceful although, this perception is more intense in the south zone of the city (Rio Como Vamos 2011: 71). This can be due to the massive presence of UPP in that area and also because it is where the UPP is more consolidated. The media also have praised the UPP and have emphasized the increasing security and peace in the city by displaying statistics about the decline in crime rates (Vieira da Cunha, 2012). In fact, it seems that the media coverage of the UPP, which has reached international levels, has attracted many tourists to the *favelas* which have become part of the official tourist route of the city (Veja 2010, Vieira da Cunha 2012). Besides this triumph, the media has also highlighted the social and economic successes of UPP's implementation in the pacified zones. For instance, the improvement in school's performance, the revitalisation of local commerce and the regulation of small informal-sector enterprises (O Globo 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, Polvo de Rio 2012, Vieira da Cunha 2012). Furthermore, the media has underlined the investment in infrastructure and public services that has been done in these areas and the benefits that it will bring for residents (O Globo 2011c, 2012b).

Nevertheless, Amnesty International reports (2011, 2012, 2013) point out that the investment in social services for communities living in poverty was still scarce. In addition, residents have been subject to intimidation, forced evictions and relocations to the outskirts of the city due to infrastructure works without receiving any economic compensation. Likewise, although this organization recognizes that UPP have achieved

7 *Rio Como vamos* is an initiative that monitors the municipal management of Rio de Janeiro through diverse indicators of health, education, public security, transport, housing, environment and labor with the aim of identifying possible inequalities and reorientate the implementation of public policies. See: http://www.riocomovamos.org.br/portal>.

reductions in the level of violence, it highlights the excessive use of force and corruption in some of its units. Finally, these reports state that militias dominate many parts of the city extorting protection money from residents, illegally providing services and threatening those who opposed them. In this sense, outside the pacified zones criminal gangs continued with their activities. They have moved from the *favelas* located in the south of the city to those in north and the periphery that are not covered by UPP plan (De Souza e Silva 2010, Vieira da Cunha 2012).

Consequently, the level of security achieved in the *favelas* of the southern and central zones and Jacarepaguá areas as well as the recent provision of infrastructure and public services, has skyrocketed the price of the *favelas* in the housing market by 400 % (O Globo 2010, cited in Vieira da Cunha 2012: 151). In this regard, it can be considered that the mentioned processes as well as the regularization of the *favelas* (in terms of taxes, economic activities and supply contract) pose challenges for the future of the original inhabitants since there will be an increase in the cost of life that the residents will not be able to face (Oliveira 2001, De Souza e Silva 2010). Therefore, unless some measures are adopted to support communities in this process of formalization and integration into the city, the most likely trend is that the poorest residents will have to migrate to the periphery of the city and their homes will be occupied by more affluent segments of society. Thus, the implementation of the UPP would contribute to the gentrification of the *favelas* that are best located in the city and would intensify the peripheralization of the poor which eventually would increase the residential segregation in Rio de Janeiro.

All the social problems that arise or may arise from the implementation of the UPP lead to the question of which are the purposes of this new strategy apart from those mentioned by official sources. It is evident that until this moment the implementation of UPP has mainly focused on the zones where the international sporting events will take place in the coming years, which are also the most valued by the housing market, investors and speculators and high society of Rio de Janeiro. Therefore, it can be considered that the implementation of the UPP is consistent with a strategy of urban regeneration for staging the mega events of the coming years. Indeed, the Olympics are performing an increasing role as an agent of urban policy within a global city promotion strategy oriented to «recontextualize» the city in the collective imagination and connect it to global flows of capital, people and ideas (Andranovich et al. 2001, Short 2004: 99-100). Regarding the transformation of the urban space, the Olympics provide a clear timeline to initiate redevelopment plans, accelerate pre-existing plans or even legitimize those that had been stalled as a result of previous conflicts. In this sense, the positive impacts of the Games are the revitalization of derelict sites (particularly in the inner city), the creation of attractive public spaces, athletic facilities and public transport infrastructure. However, these benefits are unequally distributed among the city's inhabitants. One of the most common

effects of these programs is the escalation of real estate prices, which makes housing unaffordable for many low income residents and leads to the gentrification of those areas. Furthermore, the organization and implementation of such events are frequently characterized by forced evictions; criminalization of homelessness and other negative impacts on marginalized communities' housing rights (Essex and Chalkley 1998, Chalkley and Essex 1999, Short 2004, COHRE 2007, Smith 2008). There are several examples of this phenomenon but Atlanta 1996 Olympic Games is the most controversial. It is estimated that 30,000 people were affected by displacement due to Olympics-related gentrification and the associated escalation in housing costs and that 19 out of every 20 displaced people were African-American (COHRE 2007: 197, Smith 2008: 65).

Nonetheless, the undertone of the political, economic and social decisions that has promoted UPP deserves closer examination. The ideas of Foucault (2002) about social relations as power relations and how the power uses diverse strategies and mechanisms of discipline in order to achieve its aims seem very useful in this context. In this sense, the violent police actions carried out in the favelas during the last decades correspond to the extreme mechanism of power in the disciplinary society. After the failure of this policy, it was necessary to find another mechanism of discipline: the plague strategy. It can be considered that this change is embodied in the UPP initiative in which the use of force is more limited but that involves a stronger and permanent control factor. Likewise, according with Foucault's ideas about the relation between power and space, the transformation occurred in the features of the space of *favelas* will change the type of inhabitants that correspond with them and thus, the standards applied to them.

In addition, this change in the security policy can be also analyzed from the stigmatization theory of Goffman (2006) since this new strategy intends to remove the stigma attached to *favelas* providing them with high levels of security, infrastructure, a favorable economic atmosphere…, etc. This modification in the symbolic concept of *favelas* is made by who hold the power and establish social patterns of stigma. Nevertheless, this strategy may remove the stigma of the *favelas'* space but it is likely that it will not reach their inhabitants, neither at individual nor collective level, since their stigmas also derived from their race and level of income, and the symbolic consideration of society about them has not changed.

4
Conclusions

During a long span of time Brazil was exalted as a racial paradise where race relations were characterized by cordiality and kindness. The extension of miscegenation and the lack of segregationist laws were

considered as proofs of the absence of racism. However, several studies about the topic achieved to show that the notion of racial democracy was a fallacy and thus, social integration and mobility of Afro-Brazilians was not so widespread. Even though it was considered that the inequalities experienced by Afro-Brazilians were just due to class issues, the accumulation of disadvantages that keep them on the lower strata of society cannot be explained only by economic reasons. By contrast, it can be stated that class inequalities reinforce race inequalities. Therefore, although racial mixture is a fact that cannot be denied (about 82 million of people classified themselves as *pardo*), it has not been translated into social integration (IBGE 2010). Furthermore, as long as interracial social contact *(mestiçagem)* takes place only among the poor, the racist discourses and practices remain present in the social body. Indeed, it has been showed that ideologies of racial mixture may imply an ideology of whitening.

This paper examines how these dynamics that characterized Brazilian race relations work in the urban space, particularly in Rio de Janeiro. In this regard, Rio is characterized by a model of center-periphery but also by the polarization of the city center in terms of income and race. In other words, the poor (mostly nonwhite) reside in the outskirts of the city whereas white upper-middle classes and poor nonwhite *favelados* coexist in the city center. Therefore, the correlation of class and race social hierarchies is also evident in the urban space. In this sense, the studies of Telles (1992, 1995, 2004) about residential segregation in Rio de Janeiro show that it is moderate although it increases with income. Thus, there is interracial sociability but only among the poor, that is, poor whites and blacks coexist in the *favelas* but they are segregated from the white upper-middle class which means that although interracial sociability exists, it is conditional on class. Regarding the consequences of residential segregation from the middle class, it can be said that favelas' residents apart from the disadvantages that they suffer from being poor and/or black (lower life expectancy, lower levels of income, schooling, higher unemployment rates…, etc.) they have to face those imposed by living in a favela, that is, lack of access to and low quality of public services and infrastructure, limited job opportunities and networks, high levels of violence, police abuse..., etc. Therefore, although favelas are spaces of interracial social contact, as long as there is residential segregation by class, it does not translate into social integration. As a result, racial residential segregation is reinforced by class residential segregation. This accumulation of disadvantages can also be applied to the identity sphere. Thus, inhabitants of favelas apart from the stigmas that society has imposed on them because of being black and/or poor, that is, being lazy, dishonest, immoral, rowdy…, etc., they suffer from those imposed because of living in a favela, that is, being criminal, violent, drug addict…, etc.

In addition, a closer examination of the social processes that involve the favelas and its residents lead to the conclusion that there are also social dynamics that particularly reproduce racist stereotypes and reinforce racial discrimination. In this sense, the arrival of drug commerce to the *favelas* and the subsequent confrontations between drug gangs and the police have intensified the stigmatization of their occupants particularly, of those of African origin. The portrayal of *favelas* and, particularly the spiral of violence unleashed there, in the media has contributed to increase the social distance between their residents and upper-middle classes. In fact, the criminalization of *favelas* and their residents has been a constant in the media which have disseminated associations of *favelas'* inhabitants, particularly of those with any African origin, with crime organizations. As a result, the security policy of direct confrontation has been socially reinforced and has materialized in police's lethal incursions over the *favelas.* In this respect, Afro-descendants seem to be the most affected too. However, their stigmatization tarnishes the legitimacy of their denunciations. On balance, it could be asserted that the discrimination suffered by Afro-descendants because of being black, poor and living in a favela constraints their structure of opportunities and rights and thus, their development.

The theory of Foucault (2001 cited in Eliécer 2010: 5; 2002) about the power relations and the space is very illustrative to analyze the social dynamics that converge in the urban space of Rio. Particularly, how the power distributes the space and attributes it to an individual or social group according to their characteristics, qualities…, etc., with the aim of ensuring the homogeneity among the occupants of a specific space, in such a manner that the inhabitants become to be constituted by the characteristics, qualities and conditions of the space. As it has been showed trough this paper this process corresponds to the situation of the *favelas* and its residents. In addition, the configuration of the *favelas* can be considered as a strategy of space's organization and thus, of power relations. In this sense, the development of *favelas* may respond to the strategy of 'leprosy' since the poor (whites and those with any African origin) have been relegated to the space that correspond with their attributes, partially segregated from the rest of the city and excluded from society. Nonetheless, the arrival of drug commerce to the favelas altered the organization of the space and thus, the power relations structure because the increasing level of violence and crime affected the sense of security of the upper-middle classes. In a first stage this deviation of system was tried to be addressed by the most extreme mechanism of power in the disciplinary society, in this case by the most repressive security policy. Nevertheless, after the failure of this mechanism it was necessary to find another mechanism of discipline. In this regard, it can be considered that this change is embodied in the UPP initiative in which the use of force is more limited but involves a stronger and permanent

control factor. Thus, it can be stated that the strategy of 'leprosy' has been substituted by that of 'plague'.

Moreover, given the fact that the implementation of UPP has mainly focused on the zones where the international sporting events will take place in the coming years, which are also the most valued by the housing market, investors, speculators and high society of Rio de Janeiro, it can be asserted that it may respond to the will of those actors of modifying city's image before holding these sporting events. Furthermore, the immediate effects of this initiative, that is, increasing security levels, provision of infrastructures, increasing value in the housing market as well as the costs attached to their formalization and integration in the city, pose challenges for the future of *favelas'* residents. The most likely trend is that they will have to move to the periphery and *favelas* will experience a process of gentrification. Consequently, the peripheralization of the poor and nonwhites will be increased and the residential segregation in Rio de Janeiro will intensify. Finally, according with Goffman's theory (2006) this new strategy may remove the stigma attached to *favelas* through providing them with the attributes that are valued by society but it is likely that it does not affect their occupants since their stigmas derive from being black and poor whose negative symbolic consideration within Brazilian society has not changed.

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

Map 1

Average monthly income in minimum salaries of head of household by neighbourhood-2000 (IPP Rio, 2000a).



MMap 2

Proportion of literate people aged 15 or more by neighborhood-2000 (IPP Rio, 2000b).

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

vvMap 3
Human development index/general by administrative region-2000 (IPP Rio, 2000c).



Map 4
Proportion of whites in relation to the total population by administrative Region-2000 (IPP Rio, 2000d).

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

Map 5
Proportion of blacks in relation to the total population by administrative Region-2000 (IPP Rio, 2000e)..



Map 6
Proportion of pardos (browns) in relation to the total population by administrative Region-2000 (IPP Rio, 2000f).

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

Map 7
Proportion of favelas's residents in relation with the total population by administrative region-2000 (IPP Rio, 2000g).