John Dewey: warranted assertibility as synecdoche

Abstract

Dewey problematically introduces the notions of truth and knowledge into the general argument of his Logic. He maintains that the purpose of research is to produce statements that have warranted assertibility and equates, by definition, knowledge and truth with this type of statements. This strategy has to deal with problems stemming from two different fronts. The first one has to do with the line of continuity that Dewey establishes between animal behaviour, behaviour in everyday life, and scientific behaviour. If the notion of truth is not necessary to describe animal behaviour, neither will it be necessary to describe scientific research. The second one comes from the epistemological consequences that Dewey draws from the change in our scientific theories and their warranted assertions. I explore the role that error and repetition have in this area and argue that Dewey's position, while not false, constitutes a case of metonymy, i.e. of taking a part for the whole.